

East Mediterranean Chronicles

A Decade of Change 2009-2019

Volume 1 2009-2010

Editors:

Chr. G. Pelaghias

Marta Murzanska

George Chr. Pelaghias



ERPIC

European Rim Policy and Investment Council

East Mediterranean Chronicles

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ERPIC
European Rim Policy and Investment Council
Larnaca
2020

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In memory of
S. R. Schwenninger
1951 - 2020

In memory of
R. P. Collins
1949 - 2017

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACC	Area Control Center
ADL	Anti-Defamation League
AGP	Arab Gas Pipeline
AKEL	Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού (<i>Greek</i>) - Progressive Party of Working People
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (<i>Turkish</i>) - Justice and Development Party
ATC	Air Traffic Control
BCM	Billion Cubic Meters
BTC	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline
BTE	Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Pipeline
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CPC	Caspian Pipeline Consortium
ECJ	European Court of Justice
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
ENI	Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (<i>Italian</i>) – National Hydrocarbons Authority
EOKA	Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών (<i>Greek</i>) - National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
FIR	Flight Information Region

FRONTEX	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IHH	İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri İnsani Yardım Vakfı (<i>Turkish</i>) – The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief
IMF	International Monetary Found
ITGI	Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
LOC	Lines of Communication
NAT	North Atlantic Track
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NOBLE	Noble Energy, Inc.
OCA	Oceanic Control Area
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (<i>Kurdish</i>) – Kurdistan Worker’s Party
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
POW	Prisoners of War
RAF	Royal Air Force
RoC	Republic of Cyprus
SBA	Sovereign Base Area
SHELL	Royal Dutch Shell
TCF	Trillion Cubic Feet
TCP/TCGP	Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline
TPAO	Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (<i>Turkish</i>) – Turkish Petroleum Corporation
‘TRNC’	‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’

TRT	Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu (<i>Turkish</i>) - Turkish Radio and Television Corporation
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNIFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

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PREFACE

The Eastern Mediterranean region, often referred to as the 'Levant', occupies a unique place in the world. Geographically, it is situated at the crossroads of three continents: Asia, Africa and Europe. It is the cradle of several ancient civilizations: Egyptian, Babylonian, Assyrian, Phoenician, Greek and Roman, as well as the root of European and Western cultures. It is the birthplace of three of the world's great religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. At present, the Eastern Mediterranean forms a part of the wider Arab and predominantly Sunni Muslim world. But due to its rich heritage and history spanning over millennia the region is very diverse, consisting of a colorful mosaic of cultures, ethnicities, religions and sects. A place of strategic importance, it has a long history of civilizational clashes, imperial conquests and inter-state conflicts. It is, without doubt, one of the most volatile and conflict-prone regions in the world. Nevertheless, the peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean have over centuries developed a distinct and recognizable culture.

For most of the Common Era, the Eastern Mediterranean formed a part of the Roman and Byzantine Empires and several Islamic caliphates. The abolition of the last caliphate in 1924 following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was a watershed moment in the modern history of the Eastern Mediterranean and the wider Middle East. The French and the British divided the Ottoman regions into their spheres of influence. The artificial borders of new protectorates were drawn arbitrarily with little regard to demographic realities. Modern nation-states of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan born out of those arrangements have to this day not managed to fully develop a sense of national identity able to bridge ethnic, tribal and sectarian loyalties. This unresolved identity crisis when pitted against a drive for state nationalism has been one of the main causes of the repeating cycles of conflict over the last century.

One of the most important issues in the attempt to fashion a new regional order has been the role of religion in the political sphere. Disillusionment and frustration equated Western secularism with injustice and oppression. The emergence of a potent movement of Islamic revival was driven by the nostalgia for Islam's past glory and a contempt for Western values. The Iranian revolution of 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic has been one of the most important examples of such 'Islamic awakening'. After consolidating power internally, Iran's religious establishment found fertile ground for the export of Shia Islamism in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

In the Sunni Muslim context, the 'Islamic awakening' was best advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood whose influence and presence spread throughout the region and far beyond. The

Brotherhood came to power by a popular vote in the Gaza Strip in 2006 and briefly in Egypt on the initial wave of the Arab Spring. In Syria, although brutally suppressed in the early 1980s by Hafez al-Assad following a rebellion against the Baathist regime, the Brotherhood played a key role in the 2011 uprising against Hafez's son Bashar. The subsequent Syrian civil war forged close ties with Turkish Islamists and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) whose ideology has been greatly influenced by the Muslim Brothers. The Brotherhood's ideologues, in particular Sayyed Qutb – 'the architect of worldwide jihad'* - inspired a variety of Islamist currents, including al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). In Turkey, the rise to power of the AKP under the leadership of Erdogan led to Ottoman nostalgia and legitimized the ideology of political Islam. The new regime began challenging Turkey's secular and pro-Western orientation. This change of direction has been manifested in irredentist, expansionist and pan-Islamic tendencies often described as 'neo-Ottomanist'. But, despite its Islamist character, the ruling party has not rejected nationalism but rather emphasized the religious component of Turkish national identity, leading to a blend of nationalism and Islamism.

The struggle for the hearts and minds of the Middle East has been complicated by Western involvement. The United States in particular has a long history of prioritizing economic and strategic interests over democratic and liberal values. The West's apparent failure therefore to practice what it preaches has reinforced the sense of disillusionment with Western values, adding to the appeal of religious fundamentalism. The murderous Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88 was followed two years later by a massive US-led Western intervention against Iraq's genocidal treatment of its Kurdish populations and its invasion of Kuwait. Just over a decade later, the US and its allies invaded Iraq a second time to dispose of the Hussein regime. The subsequent occupation of Iraq led to a long and bloody insurgency with a staggering human death toll. It created a favorable environment for sectarianism, radicalization and the emergence of an al-Qaeda branch in Iraq - a precursor of IS. Similarly the nearly nine-year-long Syrian civil war has brought a death-toll of around half a million and a humanitarian crisis on a scale unseen since World War II. The influx of Syrian refugees put an enormous economic and social burden on neighboring countries of Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. The conflict triggered the migration crisis in Europe which undermined Schengen, bitterly polarized Europeans and many believe contributed to Brexit. The chaos caused by the war enabled ISIS to wreak havoc in lands that fell under its control. IS-organized or inspired terrorist attacks swept across Europe and the West, undermining a sense of security, deepening the rift between indigenous and Muslim populations and leading to erosion of civil liberties.

Over the next few years, the Syrian civil war became a regional quagmire. In 2015, Russia launched a military intervention in Syria to aid Bashar al-Assad's regime. The intervention turned the tables of the war to the regime's favor. It enabled Russia to secure its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean marking its resurgence in the Middle East, thereby challenging the US

* Jonathan Raban, 'My Holy War,' The New Yorker, 4 February 2002, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/02/04/my-holy-war>

regional supremacy. Following the withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq and capitalizing on the rise of the IS, Iran through several Shia militias including Hezbollah established a strong political and military presence in Iraq. Therefore, it has moved closer to completing the so-called 'Shia crescent' – the sphere of Iranian influence stretching from the Persian Gulf through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. This 'axis of resistance', as Iran calls it, seeks to challenge the West's and Israel's presence in the region.

The decades-long Arab-Israeli conflict continued to have grave regional and global repercussions. At the outset, it led to the flight of Palestinians and Jews from Palestine and many Arab countries. Palestinian refugees triggered internal strife in Jordan and Lebanon. The fifteen year-long Lebanese civil war led to the Iranian Hezbollah permanently establishing itself in the country leading to continuing terrorism and intermittent conflict on the Lebanese-Israeli border. The outbreak of the Arab Spring was initially interpreted as a long overdue wave of democratization. Except for Tunisia, however, the results of the uprisings fell below expectations. When President Mubarak stepped down after thirty years in power, Egyptians were full of hope for a better future. However, after a brief experience with the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood in power, Egypt returned to traditional politics. Following the NATO-supported ousting of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya descended into civil war which allowed al-Qaeda, IS and other jihadi groups to establish strategic footholds. As in Syria, the involvement of external actors complicated the situation even further. Similarly, since the AKP came to power, Turkey saw a gradual unraveling of democratic norms and institutions. Crackdowns on freedom of expression, purges and mass arrests of military and state employees and constitutional changes concentrating power in Erdogan hands, all testify to Turkey's slide to autocracy. Secularism – the country's official policy since the time of Atatürk – has also come under attack in the foreign policy sphere. As a result, Turkey has been drifting away from the West. Its relationship with Israel has become strained, while ties with Russia were strengthened. Its neo-Ottomanism found expression in the Aegean, the Eastern Mediterranean, Iraq, Syria and Libya.

The last decade also saw promising hydrocarbons discoveries in the Levantine Basin that could potentially remold the region economically. At the same time, due to the region's complicated political and strategic environments, such discoveries could turn into flashpoints for new conflicts. Without question the modern history of the Eastern Mediterranean has been turbulent. The region has suffered from interstate wars, civil strifes and unresolved conflicts. Sectarianism, radicalization and religious extremism have bred intolerance and widespread persecution of religious minorities. Ancient communities living in the Levant for centuries have been systematically wiped out. At the same time, rampant corruption and limited political accountability have led to widespread unemployment, poverty and growing sense of injustice.

* * *

The last decade bore witness to several important events that have and will continue to affect the historical development of the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East. These volumes are a record of such events as they took place. Adopting a three-pronged approach, we

tracked evolving security challenges, the rising promise of the region's energy potential, and grassroots bid for political reform. The changing security landscape, the new hydrocarbon discoveries, the so-called "Arab Spring" and its aftermath have given birth to new dynamics and challenged the validity of old paradigms. The complexity of such developments was compounded by the ebb and flow of superpower involvement. The return of Russia, the softly treading but growing Chinese presence and an uncertain US response risked a new round of superpower competition in the region. Fallout from the Second Gulf War and the frustrating process of Iraqi regime-change added to the effects of Syrian destabilization and fanned the flames of political Islam and the dream of a new caliphate. International and regional efforts to confront the Islamic State triggered dynamics that promised to further change the face of the region. The specter of the creation of a Kurdish corridor along the southern Turkish border, as well as the prospect of an Iranian arc from Tehran to the Mediterranean fanned the flames of long-standing disputes, such as the Turkish-Syrian territorial feud, the Israel-Iran confrontation, and the ageless Israeli-Palestinian struggle.

To this volatile mix one must add the challenges to Western hegemony. During the last decade, the East Mediterranean has witnessed a growing disillusionment with Westernism, liberalism and Western-style democracy as the basis for good governance, economic prosperity and social and political stability. The last decade has also revealed the political impact of demography when combined with the latest products of the electronic age. Populations of key states in the region have not only increased, but so has the ratio of young to old. Moreover, these larger, younger populations are now interconnected and their voices amplified by electronic social media. Social and political mobilization has found new tools used with considerable effect in Egypt and elsewhere in the region. This new interconnectivity, however, has not worked in favor of Western political and social concepts. On the contrary, disillusionment with Westernism by ever larger and younger populations of the region has made it easier for both regional and global actors of non-Western powers to challenge American regional hegemony. Targeting liberalism as the driving concept behind globalism, Russian, Chinese and Turkish Eurasianists seek to legitimize illiberalism and even authoritarianism as a better organizing principle for states seeking political reform and economic prosperity. Eurasianism has been offered as the foundation of a revised concept of communalism, representing the sacred link between 'peoples' and their homelands, the link that gives rise to national and cultural characteristics to be savored and protected against the leveling effects of Western globalism. Rejection of the West has given new impetus to competing paradigms, paving the way to hegemony and dominance by powerful regional actors. In this context, new concepts of autocratic democracy resonate among advocates of political Islam, both Shia and Sunni. A Russian-Turkish-Iranian coalition has held up surprisingly well over their common Syrian undertaking despite some developing rifts, especially between Russia and Turkey over Ukraine and the Libyan internecine conflict. Turkish neo-Ottomanism based upon and fueled by intense nationalism and Islamism is another point of concern. Without doubt, efforts to re-legitimize the idea of empire, if allowed to bear fruit, will have a profound effect on the future of the region and beyond.

When seen from the perspective, the need to deal with the consequences of the region's energy potential takes on a new element of urgency. Energy discoveries in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) have triggered a confrontation between the ROC on one hand, and the Republic of Turkey and its internationally unrecognized proxy, the "Turkish Republic of North Cyprus". Turkish claims against Greek maritime and insular territories, as well as involvement in other low and high intensity conflicts, including Syria and Libya, further threaten the stability of the region. On the other hand, the regional character of the nascent energy industry has contributed to a new East Mediterranean dynamic for regional co-operation. Israel, Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus, with the apparent approval of the United States, slowly moved multilateral institutional cooperation that could help develop and ultimately defend the energy resources of the Eastern Mediterranean. Such cooperation, although explicitly non-exclusive of Turkey, aims nevertheless to avoid regional dominance by any single power.

* * *

Volumes 1 through 4 of the East Mediterranean Chronicles contain the product of ERPIC's activities over the last ten years. During this period, the Council organized and hosted international conferences, roundtable presentations and discussions, formal interviews, as well as online interviews and presentations. These volumes contain timelines and transcripts of such conferences, discussions and interviews, as well as reports and analyses by people that bore witness to the underlying events. The timelines mentioned, although not exhaustive, are meant to mark the significant events of the period being covered. All material originally recorded in electronic form have been transcribed, translated and edited where necessary by the Council's permanent staff. Such editing, however, especially of material transcribed verbatim, has sought to ensure continuity and clarity while preserving the stylistic, grammatical and syntactical characteristics of the original material. We are deeply grateful to all who have so kindly, graciously and diligently contributed their valuable time to complete these volumes and compile the materials they contain. The Editors wish to thank all the literary contributors whose names appear in the List of Contributors at the end of each volume. In particular, the Editors wish to thank Andrew Lambert, Andrestinos N. Papadopoulos, Klearchos A. Kyriakides, Gary Lakes, Fanoulla Argyrou, Habib C. Malik and Marios L. Evriviades for their contributions, as well as Jacqueline Booth for her organizing skills. Our thanks are due to Ephraim Sneh, David Ben-Bashat, Eran Lerman, Yair Hirschfeld, David Altman, Baruch Spiegel and Elie Friedman, for their invaluable help.

The Editors
December 2020

Introduction to Volume 1

The material contained in Volume 1 represents ERPIC's work-product for the years 2009 – 2010. It addresses several important themes that will be seen to recur over the next decade. One such theme is the vulnerability of the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) in the face of an escalating Turkish regional challenge. The complicated Turkish-Cyprus relationship will affect the development of the East Mediterranean energy industry, as well as the broader power and security equations in the region. Ambassador Andreas Jacovides (see Contents, Contributions: Item 2) analyses the most significant issues of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and their relevance to Cyprus. During an ERPIC conference in September 2009, Klearchos Kyriakides (Item 4), Philip Towle (Item 5), Robert Holland (Item 6), Andrew Lambert (Item 7), and Nicholas Grief (Item 11) addressed not only Cyprus's vulnerability in a historical context, but also its strategic significance in relation to Western security in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The rise of a regional Turkish challenge was identified in this early material by former Cyprus Foreign Minister Erato Kozakou-Marcoulis (Item 3), Ambassador Andrestinos Papadopoulos (Item 30), Christos Iacovou (Item 13), and Ambassador Demetrios Theophylactou (Item 35), who discuss the historical and political foundation of the new Turkish geopolitical paradigm put forth by Ahmed Davutoglu. The latter's influence upon the thinking of Turkey's new strongman, Recep Erdogan, proved catalytic both for Cyprus and the region.

Andrew Lambert's presentations (Items 19, 20 and 32) on the psychology of warfare, coercion and a new paradigm of warfare, anticipate many aspects of conflict in the region over the next several years. Lars Wedin (Item 16), Maria Stromvik (Item 15) and former Cyprus Defence Minister Phivos Klokkaris (Item 17) comment on Cyprus's role as defence producer and defence consumer in the context of Western security in the region.

Sherle Schwenninger (Item 27) and Herbert Reginbogin (Item 34) touch upon the dissonance between the US and the EU, especially over Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern security. This issue is further highlighted by Ambassador Guy Sevrin (Item 31) in his overview of EU concerns during the Belgium EU Presidency, and Ali Biniaz's (Item 18) presentation on EU-Iranian relations. Gary Lakes' presentation (Item 8) focuses upon various aspects of the oil and gas industry, and its importance in shaping the geopolitics of the region.

Lastly, a group of presentations, including those by Costas Frangeskides (Item 22) and Klearchos Kyriakides (Item 21 and 1) focus on the concept of the rule of law and its importance for

democracy and representative governance, and anticipate the socio-political conflicts that would engulf the region some short years later. Not least in this context is the presentation by Avishai Ehrlich (Item 29) on the politicization of humanitarian aid which ultimately became the trigger for the geostrategic transformation of the region marked by the Turkish-Israeli fall-out.

East Mediterranean Chronicles

Timeline 2009 - 2010

2009

1. *17 January 2009* – Noble Energy announced a significant gas discovery at the Tamar well in Israel's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). It was the largest gas discovery in Israel to date.¹ Other operators of the concession included Isramco Negev 2, Delek Drilling, Avner Oil Exploration and Dor Gas Exploration.²
2. *6 April 2009* – During his first visit to Turkey, the newly inaugurated US President Barak Obama said that predominantly Christian US, and predominantly Muslim Turkey could build a 'model partnership'.³
3. *27 April 2009* – Turkey and Syria conducted the first ever joint military exercises, causing concern in Israel over their close military relations.⁴
4. *18 January 2009* – A three-week Israeli Operation Cast Lead ended in the Gaza Strip. The conflict resulted in 1,400 Palestinian and 13 Israeli deaths. Israel's stated goal of the operation was to stop Palestinian rocket fire and weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip.⁵
5. *29 January 2009* – Israel's President Shimon Perez and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had an argument at the World Economic Forum over Israel's actions in Gaza. The event revealed the deterioration of relations between the two countries.
6. *31 March 2009* – Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister of Israel.

¹¹ Avi Bar-Eli, Lior Zeno, Yaron Cohen Zemah, 'Largest Natural Gas Reserve Discovered in Israel Worth Approximately \$95 Billion, 29 December 2010, <https://www.haaretz.com/largest-natural-gas-reserve-discovered-in-israel-worth-approximately-1.5100884>.

² 'Noble Energy Announces Significant Natural Gas Discovery at Tamar Well Offshore Israel,' Noble Energy, 17 January 2009, <https://cutt.ly/aggEHbe>.

³ 'Obama Says U.S., Turkey Can Be Model for World,' CNN, 6 April 2009, <https://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/06/obama.turkey/index.html>.

⁴ 'Turkish, Syrian Armies Begin Drills on Rescue, Search Operations,' Kuwait News Agency, 5 October 2009, <https://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/06/obama.turkey/index.html>.

⁵ 'Israel/Gaza. Operation 'Cast Lead': 22 Days of Death and Destruction,' Amnesty International, 2009, <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/48000/mde150152009en.pdf>.

7. 1 May 2009 – Ahmet Davutoglu became the foreign minister of Turkey. Davutoğlu is regarded as an architect of the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) Turkish pan-Islamist neo-Ottoman foreign policy, as laid out in his book 'Strategic Depth'.⁶
8. 4 June 2009 – President Obama delivered his famous Cairo speech meant to mark a new chapter in the US's relations with the Muslim world.⁷
9. 12 June 2009 – Mass protests against the presidential election results erupted in Iran following claims of fraud. The protests lasted several months and were violently suppressed, with several dozen casualties and thousands imprisoned.⁸
10. 13 July – 20 August 2009 – Turkish research vessel *Koca Piri Reis* conducts research activities off the west coast of Cyprus, in the area overlapping with the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) EEZ and continental shelf (see Plate 1).⁹
11. 20 July 2009 – The trial of 56 suspects under the second indictment of the so-called Ergenekon trials began. It was part of an ongoing series of trials that started in 2008 after targeting senior military figures, police officers, opposition members, intellectuals, academics and journalists. The defendants were accused of belonging to a diverse network of individuals linked to the Turkish 'deep state' and plotting to overthrow the AKP government.¹⁰
12. 5 October 2009 – Turkey and Syria conducted joint search and rescue exercises.¹¹
13. 12 October 2009 – Turkey cancelled a joint NATO military exercise with Israel over the latter's offensive in the Gaza Strip.¹² Shortly after, it was announced that Turkey would hold a second military exercise with Syria, an indication of developing military ties between the two countries.¹³

⁶ Guldener Sonumut, 'Neo-Ottoman Minister,' Politico, 8 July 2009, <https://www.politico.eu/article/neo-ottoman-minister/>; Behlul Ozkan, 'Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism,' *Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 56, Issue 4, 23 July 2014,

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2014.941570?needAccess=true&journalCode=tsur20>.

⁷ 'The President's Speech in Cairo: A New Beginning,' The White House, 4 June 2009,

<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/presidents-speech-cairo-a-new-beginning>.

⁸ Ian Black and Saeed Kamali Dehghan, 'Riots Erupt in Tehran over 'Stolen' Election,' The Guardian, 13 June 2009, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/13/iran-mahmoud-ahmadinejad-riots-tehran-election>.

⁹ Konstantinos Stylianou, *Hellenic Response to Turkish Aggressive Energy Claims in the East Mediterranean*, European Rim Policy and Investment Council, 2014, p.81.

¹⁰ Nicholas Birch, 'Turkey's Trial of Century,' Prospect Magazine, 14 August 2009, <https://cutt.ly/tggE22p>.

¹¹ 'Turkish, Syrian Armies Begin Drills on Rescue, Search Operations,' Kuwait News Agency, 5 October 2009, <https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2029778&language=en>.

¹² Julian Borger, 'Turkey Confirms It Barred Israel from Military Exercise Because of Gaza War,' The Guardian, 12 October 2009, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/12/turkey-israel-military-gaza>.

¹³ 'Syria to Hold Exercises with Turkey,' Al Jazeera, 16 October 2009, <https://cutt.ly/XggRyuh>.




Plate 1: Turkish hydrocarbon exploration off the west coast of Cyprus, 13 July – 20 August 2009




Plate 2: Turkish second licensing chart for the year 2011

14. 20 October 2009 - The Greek government admitted that the budget deficit of 12.5% was twice as big as it previously stated. The figure was later revised to 15.6%, over five times the EU limit.¹⁴
15. 25 November 2009 – Under pressure from the Obama administration, Israel imposed a 10-month construction freeze on all of its settlements in the West Bank and called for the resumption the peace talks. The Palestinians rejected the call.¹⁵
16. By December 2009, Turkey proceeded with a fifth licensing chart for the year 2011 (see *Plate 2*).¹⁶
17. 2009 – The Republic of Cyprus prepared the first Master Plan for the construction of the Vasilikos Energy Center. The plan included the building of an onshore liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminal next to the Vasilikos power station.¹⁷

2010

1. 20 January 2010 – The newspaper *Taraf* published leaked documents detailing the so-called Sledgehammer plot, an alleged military coup plan against the Turkish government. According to the documents, the plan included bombing of two mosques in Istanbul and accusing Greece of downing a Turkish aircraft over the Aegean in order to destabilize the country and justify the military takeover.
2. February 2010 – United Nations agencies reported that between 1.3 million Syrians are affected, and 800,000 were severely affected by a three-year drought in north-eastern Syria. The drought deprived rural population in the affected areas of almost all sources of livelihood. The effects of the drought were exacerbated by the impact of high food and fuel prices, and the global financial crisis.¹⁸
3. 22 February 2010 – 49 active and retired military officers, including 4 serving admirals and 17 retired generals, were arrested as a part of the Sledgehammer probe. Further arrests followed in April, May and June.
4. 23 April 2010 – Greek Prime Minister Papandreou asked for a rescue package from the Eurozone and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).¹⁹

¹⁴ Tony Barber, 'Greece Vows Action to Cut Budget Deficit,' *Financial Times*, 20 October 2009, <https://www.ft.com/content/3e7e0e46-bd47-11de-9f6a-00144feab49a>.

¹⁵ Barak Ravid and Agencies, 'Netayhau Declares 10-month Settlement Freeze 'To Restart Peace Talks,' *Haaretz*, 25 November 2009, <https://www.haaretz.com/1.5122924>.

¹⁶ Konstantinos Stylianou, *Hellenic Response...*, p. 82.

¹⁷ 'Master Plan of the Vasilikos Area (Update). Vol. 1,' Republic of Cyprus, Prepared for Noble Energy International on behalf of the Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism, 31 October 2013, p. 1.

¹⁸ 'Syria Drought Response Plan 2009-2010: Mid-Term Review,' United Nations, February 2010, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20E00ADAF9F3C153852576D20068E86B-Full_Report.pdf.

¹⁹ Mark Hallam, 'Greece Activates the EU-IMF Financial Rescue Package,' *Deutsche Welle*, 23 April 2010,

5. 2 May 2010 – Eurozone countries agreed on the so-called First Economic Adjustment Programme, a 110-billion euros rescue package for Greece in loans spread over three years.²⁰
6. 8 May 2010 – Syria said it was ready to reopen peace talks with Israel, with Turkey serving as a mediator.²¹
7. 16 May 2010 – Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was announced leader of Islamic State in Iraq, previously known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq.²²
8. 31 May 2010 – Gaza flotilla raid – also known as the Mavi Marmara incident – a military operation by Israel took place against six civilian ships of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla. Nine Turkish pro-Palestinian activists were killed by the Israeli commandos. Turkey recalled its ambassador in Israel, followed by the break down in Israeli-Turkish relations.²³
9. 2 September 2010 – The US-brokered negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority began in Washington. Israel offered to renew the freeze on the West Bank settlements in exchange for the Palestinian Authority's recognition of Israel. Palestinians rejected the offer.²⁴
10. 12 September 2010 – Turkey held a constitutional referendum. The most important provisions overhauled Turkey's Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (HSYK), giving the prime minister and the parliament more control over the appointment of their members. Presented as a requirement to bring Turkey's constitution in line with the EU democratic standards, the reforms were criticized by the opposition, claiming they had brought the judiciary under the AKP's control.²⁵
11. 15 September – 15 November 2010 – Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) conducted research activities off the west and north-west coast of Cyprus, in the area overlapping with the RoC's EEZ and continental shelf. The survey was carried out by the Norwegian research vessel *Bergen Surveyor* (see Plate 3).²⁶

<https://www.dw.com/en/greece-activates-the-eu-imf-financial-rescue-package/a-5498676>.

²⁰ Ian Traynor, 'EU Debt Crisis: Greece Granted €110 bn Aid to Avert Meltdown', *The Guardian*, 2 May 2010, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/02/eu-debt-crisis-greece-aid-meltdown>.

²¹ Ayla Jean Yackley, 'Syria Ready to Resume Peace Talks with Israel – Turkey,' *Reuters*, 8 May 2010, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-syria-israel-idUSTRE6471Q720100508>.

²² Anthony Shadid, 'Iraqi Insurgent Group Names New Leaders,' *The New York Times*, 16 May 2010, https://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/iraqi-insurgent-group-names-new-leaders/?_php=true&_type=blogs&mtref=en.wikipedia.org&gwh=DB1F9A0DD3C13E1889690FE46AA840A8&gwt=pay&assetType=REGIWALL.

²³ Robert Booth, 'Israel Attack on Gaza Flotilla Sparks International Outrage,' *The Guardian*, 31 May 2010, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/31/israeli-attacks-gaza-flotilla-activists>.

²⁴ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'The Resumption of Direct Talks Between Israel and the Palestinians, 15 September 2010, https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/History/Pages/Special_update_Resumption_talks_Israel_Palestinians_2-Sep-2010.aspx.

²⁵ 'Erdogan Pulls It Off,' *The Economist*, 13 September 2010, <https://www.economist.com/newsbook/2010/09/13/erdogan-pulls-it-off>.

²⁶ Konstantinos Stylianou, *Hellenic Response*..., p. 82.




Plate 3 - Turkish hydrocarbon exploration off the west and north-west coast of Cyprus, 15 September – 15 November 2010

12. 16 December 2010 - The trial of 196 military officers suspected in the Sledgehammer probe began.²⁷
13. 17 December 2010 - In Tunisia, a fruit-vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself aflame after police apprehended him for failing to have a license to sell his goods. The incident highlighted long-simmering frustrations over injustice, poverty, police brutality, and corruption of the political elite. It triggered protests dubbed the 'Jasmine Revolution' to end the Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's rule. The event marked the beginning of what was later termed the 'Arab Spring'.²⁸
14. 17 December 2010 - Cyprus and Israel signed an agreement for the delimitation of their respective EEZs.²⁹
15. 29 December 2010 - Noble Energy announced the discovery of the Leviathan gas field in Israel's EEZ. According to early estimates, the field held over 16 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of

²⁷ Jonathan Head, 'Turkey Tries Army Officers over Sledgehammer 'Plot'', BBC, 16 December 2010, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12006352>.

²⁸ Rania Abouzeid, 'Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on Fire,' Time, 21 January 2011, <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html>.

²⁹ 'Agreement Between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone, Signed in Nicosia on 17 December 2010,' United Nations, <https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/ISR.htm>.

gas and it was worth \$95 billion.³⁰ It was the largest gas discovery in Israel to date, and the largest one for Noble Energy in its history.³¹

³⁰ 'Noble Energy Announces Significant Discovery at Leviathan Offshore Israel,' Offshore Energy, 29 December 2010, <https://www.offshore-energy.biz/noble-energy-announces-significant-discovery-at-leviathan-offshore-israel/>; Avi Bar-Eli, Lior Zeno, Yaron Cohen Zemah, 'Largest Natural Gas Reserve Discovered in Israel Worth Approximately \$95 Billion, 29 December 2010, <https://www.haaretz.com/largest-natural-gas-reserve-discovered-in-israel-worth-approximately-1.5100884>.

³¹ Amiram Barkat, 'Noble CEO: Leviathan Is Largest Gas Find in Our History,' Jerusalem Post, 29 December 2010, <https://www.jpost.com/national-news/noble-ceo-leviathan-is-largest-gas-find-in-our-history>.

CONTRIBUTIONS

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Klearchos A. Kyriakides**
13 May 2009

The Lessons of Lancaster House Fifty Years On: The Importance and Contemporary Relevance of the Lancaster House Conference and Zurich-London Agreements of February 1959

I'm going to split my talk into four parts. First of all, I'm going to very briefly outline the history of the British connection with Cyprus from 1878 until 1959. Secondly, I'm going to skate over what happened exactly fifty years ago in February 1959 which gave rise to the Zurich-London agreements. I'm thirdly going to skip over the principal provisions of the Zurich-London agreements. But what I want to do in my final part of my talk, which will be the main part of the talk, is to draw the lessons from the Lancaster House and Zurich procedures and apply those lessons to what is going on here in Cyprus today. So my focus really is on the lessons of Lancaster House rather than on Lancaster House itself.

Let me just lay my cards on the table straight away. The other day I was listening to a wonderful Greek song, and according to the lyrics of the Greek song, “Έλληνας είμαι και μη με κρίνεις με τους κανόνες της λογικής”. My argument is that the Zurich-London process was fundamentally illogical. By the same token the Annan Plan process was fundamentally illogical. And by the same token the current peace process is illogical. That's my overarching argument.

My second overarching argument is the Zurich-London process, the Annan Plan process and the current process involve what's called top-down diplomacy, top-down negotiations, negotiations conducted in a closed room, in secret between people who have decided upon themselves to embark upon the process with the citizens shut out.

So those are my... And let me just go one step further. My third overarching argument is that the top down process needs to be replaced by a bottom-up process involving the citizen, and not just a change of a procedure but a change of substance. Because the substance of the Cyprus question in my view is fundamentally defective. I speak as somebody who was born in England. My parents

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

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are of Greek Cypriot origin. I have the privilege to have an excellent education in England, my whole mindset has been framed by my English education. So I speak from that standpoint. And it's because I was the beneficiary of an English education and an English legal education, that's why I'm saying that the process is illogical and substance is illogical.

Let me just skate over the history. In a few sentences, the United Kingdom - as you all know - acquired Cyprus under the Convention of Berlin in 1878. They effectively leased the island from the Ottoman Empire. They then annexed the island in 1914, the island became a British colony from that day to become a Crown colony - ceremonial title - in 1925. In the 50s the British came under colossal pressure from the Egyptians to move out of Egypt. They eventually decided to move out of Egypt in 1954, even though the departure wasn't confirmed till 1956. The British therefore relocated their forces here on the island of Cyprus in the mid-1950s. The same time the British were developing a nuclear deterrent. Cyprus and the infrastructure they were developing on Cyprus was pivotal to the construction and the development of the British nuclear deterrent. Side by side of those developments the role of Turkey in British foreign policy thinking was expanding, partly as a result of the Cold War, partly for other reasons. Against this strategic political backdrop, as we all know, the Greek Cypriot political leadership under Archbishop Makarios and Colonel Grivas embarked upon the anti-colonial campaign. Now, we're all familiar with the history, so I'm going to race forward.

The thrust of what I'm going to say is that for various reasons the Greek Cypriot political leadership effectively lost control of the process, especially after the archbishop was exiled to the Seychelles. The British brought Turkey and Greece into the picture, and the Americans were to some extent influencing things behind the scenes. And in 1956-57 the British came up with the idea of partitioning the island. This was put into the public domain in December 1956 by the foreign secretary. The British envisaged the partition of the island as a settlement to the Cyprus question. In 1957 the Americans took issue with the idea of partition. The British Chiefs of Staff took issue with the idea of the partition, and the Colonial Governor (*inaudible*) objected to the idea of partition. So the idea of partition was kicked into touch by virtue of an unholy alliance between the Chiefs of Staff in London, the Colonial Governor here in Cyprus and the American administration in Washington. This is all laid out in the study of Robert Holland, it's been laid up in my PhD thesis, it's laid out in the National Archives in Washington and in the UK.

The point I'm coming to is that partition was a non-runner by 1958. And the British who was still a colonial power had to come up with a new arrangement to settle the Cyprus question. They originally had in mind the idea of tri-dominium under the McMillan Plan which the Greek government resisted and the Turks didn't much like. And eventually by the end of 1958, by which time there was bloodshed here on the island between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and others, there was a possible war between Greece and Turkey. By late 1958 the idea emerged that the Cyprus question should be settled by means of what became known as guaranteed independence.

Archbishop Makarios gradually came around to this idea as well, and in Paris in December 1958 Greek and Turkish governments essentially agreed between themselves that the future of the British colony would be resolved by means of this concept of guaranteed independence. So in Zurich, in the first few days of February 1959 the Greek and Turkish governments convened and they came up with this notion: there will be a Republic of Cyprus which would be nominally independent, it would be subdivided into two parts with a Greek Cypriot political leadership and Turkish Cypriot political leadership, it would be unitary officially, but in substance it would be subject to what the Turks referred to as "intellectual partition". So there would have been a

unitary state subject to intellectual partition. The phrase of course didn't prop up in the documents that were placed in the public domain back then. And as we all know, this arrangement was going to be underpinned by Treaty of Alliance giving Greece and Turkey the right to station forces on the island, and the Treaty of Guarantee.

That agreement was concluded in Zurich on the 11th of February between the Greek and Turkish governments. They all jumped on a plane through to London. They met with the British foreign secretary on the evening of the 11th of February 1959. The British foreign secretary gave his blessing, subject to UK requirement to be met which over the next two or three days were indeed met.

Now, the conference needed to be convened. Notice the use of the word 'conference'. It wasn't really a conference. It wasn't designed to be a conference on which matters were going to be negotiated. This was a piece of political theater. It was designed to create the impression that negotiations were going to be conducted, an agreement was going to be put together. But the agreement was already put together in secret talks between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The purpose of the conference was to convey a semblance of Cypriot participation into the process. So the conference was convened - and I'm glad to see that the photograph of the conference has been placed on your desks - the conference was convened on the 17th of February 1959. Archbishop Makarios was presented with the Zurich-London Agreements, otherwise known as the Lancaster House Agreement, a copy of which I presented to you. This document, or a variation of this document was presented to Archbishop Makarios and to Dr. Kucuk, the Turkish Cypriot leader, and they were told 'take it or leave it'. There was no opportunity for a single word to be amended. The conference stretched from 17th to the 18th of February, and all sorts of alleged threats were forced on the archbishop's shoulders. He went to bed on the evening of the 18th of February, he prayed, he woke up the following morning and left his signature. And the London Agreement was born, and that London Agreement gave rise to the 1960 Constitution, the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Establishment.

Now, the point I'm coming to is this. And it's a point that was made in antiquity by none other than Aristotle. And I'm going to read you what Aristotle said in antiquity in his great book 'Politics': "The task confronting all those who wish to set up a constitution within a democracy is not only, or even mainly to establish the constitution, but rather to ensure that it is preserved intact." Aristotle adds: "Any constitution could be made to last for a day or two. It follows," Aristotle declares, "that a constitution (*inaudible*) possible to command the support of all citizens." The key phrase that I take from that analysis of Aristotle is that any constitution can be made to last for a day or two. The primary purpose - as I see it - the primary purpose of the trilateral approach taken by the Greek, Turkish and UK governments in February 1959 was to strike a deal, to cut a deal, to reach a fix which (*inaudible*) the name of the politicians to go back to their electorate and parliaments and proclaim success.

The downside of this process is that there was no thought given to the long-term future of the very people who would have to live with the consequences of what was agreed. That's the second document that's been given to you is. A cartoon from The Daily Express which is taken from the 12th February 1959 and that cartoon I think says it perfectly: the Greek, Turkish and British governments were primarily interested in just fixing this deal and then walking away, not in the case of Turkey or the UK. That was their primary (*inaudible*), just cut this deal and close the Cyprus question, which was bedeviling them for so many years. They failed to hit the basic principle of Aristotle: "look to the future".

We just leap forward a bit - isn't this what was happening with the Annan Plan? Focus, as I see it, was to cut a deal and don't worry too much about the consequences, we'll muddle through the consequences. And I fear that what's going on today is rather similar. The overwhelming objective of Mr. Downer at the UN, the overwhelming objective possibly with parties (*inaudible*) - I'm not privy to what they're doing. But to me as an outsider it seems that all they seem to be focused on is reaching a deal rather than looking at what's going to happen on a day or two later. And that's my fear. It's all too easy to cut a deal, pick up the Nobel Peace Prize and then see the things disintegrating within a few months or years. And that's really the first major lesson to be drawn from the Lancaster House process. If you are involved in a negotiation and if you're involved in the process designed to set in the Cyprus question, look to the days, weeks and months beyond the conclusion of the implementation of the settlement.

Now, the 1959 Constitution is also very important for another reason. As we all know, as we should know, the 1959 London Agreement enshrined foreign interference in this island, and it prevented the executive government from wielding any effective political power by means of this arrangement whereby there was a Greek Cypriot president and Turkish Cypriot vice-president, a Turkish Cypriot veto and weighted powers in favor of the Turks. This is - as we've discussed before - this was really a product of its era. Let's just take each in turn.

What was the Annan Plan - and I lay my cards on the table here because I campaigned against the Annan Plan from its first incarnation, I didn't wait till the very last moment unlike some. The fundamental premise of the Annan Plan is to enshrine and indeed extend external interference. The Annan Plan, as we know, would have enabled the United Kingdom to maintain its military presence here on the island, in different form, but it would have been essentially preserved under the Annan Plan. The Treaty of Alliance would have remained in place subject to variations. This would have enabled Turkey, who would be the prime beneficiary of it, to maintain a firm military foothold on the island. And I flew over, by the way, I've come over from England; it took ten minutes to fly from Turkey to the island of Cyprus. So they would have been the prime beneficiaries of the Treaty of Alliance.

The Treaty of Guarantee would have remained in place under the Annan Plan in a different form. So what am I saying? I'm saying that the 1959 Zurich-London Agreements are of contemporary relevance today. I would like to see at least the Treaty of Alliance and Treaty of Guarantee swept away. And I would hope that the negotiations which are taking place at present would be based on the premise on the premise that they would be swept away. I don't see that happening because Turkey doesn't want the Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Alliance to be swept away. But that's the relevance of Zurich-London. Whenever I watch RIK - I watch RIK when I'm in England - I very rarely see the politicians, the talking heads on television, go back to this document or its later 1960 version and talk about this being swept aside. They talk about Turkish troops being swept aside. This is what they should be talking about, the legal basis upon which certain Turkish troops are permitted to station in the island. So the second lesson to be drawn from Lancaster House is that the Lancaster House (*inaudible*) should - in my view - be eradicated as part of any new settlement. It should not form the foundation of any settlement. And this is where I see great difficulty between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. And I don't like those phrases for reason we can discuss later. I don't like the premise of the current negotiations which are predicated on the Turkish Cypriot premise that these agreements will remain in place. So that's the second lesson to be drawn that has to do with the external powers.

The third lesson to be drawn is from that phrase I used earlier: 'intellectual partition'. According to the Turkish government, the Zurich Agreement which became the London Agreement was predicated on the basis that the Republic of Cyprus would be subject to intellectual partition - not geographical partition, but the intellectual partition. Hence, the detailed provisions in the constitution. Similar provisions are found in the Annan Plan which gives even greater powers to the Turkish Cypriot side. And who knows? They were discussing this in secret.

The current negotiations are proceeding on a similar basis. I think that's fundamentally wrong. Interestingly enough, I had a look the other day at the Radcliffe Plan - the lovely thing about being an academic, we have the time to go back and read old documents. The Radcliffe Plan was quickly dismissed upon its publication because the British government or British colonial secretary decided on the day of its publication to envisage partition as a possible solution of Cyprus question. So this document, the Radcliffe Plan was kicked into touch in December 1956. It was overlooked and forgotten. There's a marvelous little paragraph here in the plan. Lord Radcliffe was a lawyer, one of the most eminent lawyers in the United Kingdom. And he was asked to provide for a constitutional framework whereby the governor would remain in place and power would be diffused down into the two communities. But he says this, and I don't think anything has changed: "I have given my best consideration to the claim put before me on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community. They should be accorded the political representation equal to that of the Greek Cypriot community." Back in '56 the Turks were pushing this idea of having equal representation under the constitution that Radcliffe was going to put together.

"If I do not accept it,"

the 50-50 idea,

"I do not think that it is out of any lack of respect for the misgivings that lie behind it. But this is a claim by 20% of the population to share political power equally with 80%, and, if it is to be given effect to, I think it must be made good on one of two possible grounds. Either it is consistent with the principles of a constitution based on liberal and democratic conceptions of political power which should be balanced in this way, or no other means in the creation of such political equilibrium will be effective to protect the essential interests of the community from oppression by the weight of the majority."

Radcliffe concludes:

"I do not feel that I can stand firmly on either of these propositions. The first embodies the idea of federation rather than a unitary state. It would be natural enough to accord to members of a federation equality of representation in the federal body, regardless of the numerical proportions of the populations in the territories they represent. But can Cyprus be organized as a federation in this way? I do not think so."

He's speaking in 1956.

"There is no pattern of territorial separation between the two communities (...)."

There is now de facto territorial separation, but as we know from our European human rights law and now European Court of Justice Law, there is no legal territorial separation. There is a de facto separation. But he says:

“There is no pattern of territorial separation (...) and, apart from other objections, federation of communities which does not involve also federation of territories seems to be a very difficult constitutional form.”

And then we come to the crucial point. I've already spoken about the external interference. Now I'm going to (*inaudible*) subdivision of power. And this is what Lord Radcliff says: “I find myself baffled in the attempt to visualize how an effective executive government for Cyprus is to be thrown up by a system in which political power is to remain permanently divided in equal shares between two opposed communities.” And I ask you, and perhaps you can help me. I'm an outsider looking in and I find myself baffled. How is it possible to have effective executive government when you have a 50-50 split in the executive? The Annan Plan tried to resolve this conundrum by giving the deciding vote to the foreign judge sitting on the Supreme Court. Now, quite apart from the lawyers here who could understand this point, perhaps, quite apart from the separation of powers objections to that, is the function of the judiciary to settle political squabbles in the executive? Leading that to one side, is it right that the majority of the population should be subject to an effective veto in the hand of a minority with the balance of power wielded by a foreigner? That was the premise upon which disputes would be resolved under the Annan Plan. It was the grounds upon which disputes would have been resolved in (*inaudible*) and it was the premise upon which the whole system of the Annan Plan was predicated on. Lord Radcliffe, who is far more eminent lawyer than I am, was baffled by the suggestion, and I was baffled as he was. And I don't think anything has changed since he uttered those remarks in 1956. So that's another lesson to be drawn from Lancaster House.

Let's look at some of the others. And I really want to finish within the next ten minutes and have a discussion. Let me skate over this. Number one: a political leader needs to have a sound grasp of history and the principles of public international law, political science and related disciplines. Archbishop Makarios was a priest. He was surrounded by advisers who were well-meaning, but in my view without the benefit of hindsight, I must stress, in carrying the gravitas or the intellectual weight that was perhaps needed. Now, I wasn't privy to the Annan Plan process and I'm not privy to what's going on now. The question I pose is: does the current political leadership here in the Republic of Cyprus have the requisite intellectual weight and do they have the requisite intellectual advisers? Perhaps we can discuss that later.

Second lesson: a political leader must promote the national interest after defining what he means by the national interest. So what is the national interest of the proposed Federal Republic of Cyprus? Is there agreement to go back to Aristotle? Is there agreement between the two sides as to what is the common national interest? Unless there is agreement as to what is the common national interests, then how can you go ahead and construct the constitutional apparatus? Because that constitutional apparatus needs to promote the national interest.

Third lesson: the political leader must identify an achievable strategic objective and then pursue that objective by means of a coherent plan of action. An appropriate strategy should be backed up by appropriate tactics. But what is the strategic objective of President Christofias and Mr. Talat? And what strategy are they jointly devising in order to achieve that strategic objective? In my view as an outsider looking in, they don't have that common strategic objective now when they're negotiating. Are they going to have it, to quote Aristotle, towards two or three days after the constitution comes into force? So what is the strategic objective that they are seeking to pursue? What is the role that Cyprus is going to perform in international community? That needs to be articulated and agreed.

Fourth fundamental lesson, and let's go back to procedure. What happens in advance of the conference or behind the scenes once the conference has begun is much more important than what goes on during the proceedings of the conference. Now, I've been reading JK Galbraith here, and I would urge you to read JK Galbraith analysis of the 1929 Wall Street crash, in which he analyzes the concept of meetings. Have they agreed heads of terms? You're closer to this than I am. Have the two sides agreed heads of terms before plunging into the negotiations? That's what we do as lawyers normally. When I act for one client and Christodoulos acts for another client, we don't embark upon detailed negotiations over the terms of the transaction before our respective clients have agreed the principal heads of terms. Have they agreed the principal heads of terms? I know they're talking about this concept of bi-zonal bi-communal federation. But is the Republic of Cyprus going to be killed off and replaced by a new state? Is the new state of affairs going to be a metamorphosis of the Republic of Cyprus? What is going to be the relationship with NATO, for example? What's going to be the makeup of the Constitutional Court? The Supreme Court? What are going to be the powers of the constituent states? These are fundamental things in my view which ought to be agreed before you plunge into negotiations.

The reason JK Galbraith is so magnificent, among other things, is that he talks about the "no-business business meetings". Back in 1929 the president, when the banks were crashing, when Wall Street was crashing, he would strut around Washington, he would go to business meetings and he would stand outside buildings and make ground statements to the press. And according to Galbraith most of these meetings were no-business business meetings. And he says that:

"This is the type of the meeting which is called not to do business, but to do no-business. The meeting is called not because there is business to be done, but because it is necessary to create the impression that business is being done. Such meetings are regarded more as a substitute for action. Indeed, they are widely regarded as action."

So the purpose of the meeting is to have the meeting. And he goes on:

"The no-business meetings of the great business executives,"

now he's talking about 1929,

"depend for their illusion of importance on something quite different. Not the exchange of ideas or the spiritual rewards of comradeship, but the solemn sense of assemblage which power gives to the assemblage. Even though nothing of importance is said or done, men of importance cannot meet without the occasion seeming important. Even the commonplace observation of the head of a large corporation is still a statement of the head of a large corporation. What it lacks in content it gains in power from the assets behind it."

As I see it as an outsider, if you engage in detailed negotiation before you've agreed the principal heads of terms, you're engaging in a no-business business meeting. And again, I'm not privy to what's going on, but as an outsider looking in, that's the conclusion that I draw. In my view what they should do is agree the principal heads of terms before plunging into the detail, before setting up committees and subcommittees and working parties and working groups.

A lesson of Lancaster House is a procedural one. Do what you have to do behind closed doors if you have to do it behind closed doors, but make sure that it results in action. Lancaster House resulted in action. It was the wrong action in my point of view, but it actually produced

something. So the lesson is: there's a difference between a business meeting which produces something and a no-business meeting which produces nothing.

The next lesson: a political leader should not rush into making decisions or signing any document with far-reaching irreversible consequences unless they have absolutely no alternative. Archbishop Makarios was told: if you don't sign, the island will be partitioned - the gist of the alleged threats that were foisted on him. We know from the archival materials behind the scenes, it wasn't in Western interests back then to partition Cyprus. Eisenhower - to be fair to President Eisenhower of the Americans - did not like the idea of partition. The British Chiefs of Staff or (*inaudible*) go around people's homes and ordering people out of their homes in order to produce a 1922-style exchange of population. They were not prepared to do it. So for those reasons, in my view, partitioning idea was off the table. Archbishop Makarios didn't know that. But because he succumbed to the pressure, he fell into the trap that was put before him. And so the lessons of that is: don't cave in to pressure.

Back in 2004, I remember when I was giving a few lectures criticizing the Annan Plan, there were certain people who quite understandably were supporting the Annan Plan because they feared the consequences of voting 'no'. And one of the arguments that was (*inaudible*) was that the so-called 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' ('TRNC') - the Turkish-occupied north - would receive international recognition. That was one of the arguments battling about at the time of the Annan Plan. I remember saying back in 2003 and early 2004, it's not in the Western interest to provide a de jure recognition to the Turkish-occupied north. If there's a de jure recognition and there's de jure partition, it means the Treaty of Establishment will be unraveled. The UK will not have the right to overfly the occupied north. The UK will not have the right to use the port of Famagusta. The UK will not have the right to use facilities in the Turkish-occupied north, should they wish to do so under the Treaty of Establishment. And it is not in British interests for that to happen, it's not in the American interest for that to happen. The strategic calculations to one side, public international law cannot allow a precedent whereby separate sovereign state is carved out of the existing unitary state by means of the use of force. And I think my argument runs true.

And so the lesson for the future is: if we ever come to a new Annan Plan scenario and threats are bandied about, learn the lesson of Lancaster House, and learn the lesson of 2004, and don't cave in to pressures. And that argument is even more important now when the Republic of Cyprus is a member of the European Union. And I'm struck, of course, by what Sophocles said in antiquity: "Quick decisions are unsafe decisions."

Two or three more conclusions, and then I'll wrap up and have a discussion. Legal advice. It is absolutely imperative that a political leader who goes into a conference hall or goes into a set of negotiations with appropriate legal advice. Archbishop Makarios had Zenon Rossides, a fabled diplomat, skilful lawyer. The question, I'll put it in the form of question: did he have the requisite legal skills experience and knowledge to grapple with the huge legal questions raised by the Lancaster House agreement? Did Glafkos Clerides, did Spyros Kyprianou, did the other lawyers who formed part of the circle around Makarios, did they have the requisite skills? This document raises complicated questions of constitutional law and public international law, to name but two.

Today in 2009 the Cyprus question raises issues of public international law to do with state sovereignty, for example, and armed forces. It raises questions of maritime law, raises questions of international human rights law, raises questions of European Union law, constitutional law - I

can go on, and on and on ad nauseam. Question: does President Christofias have the requisite team of lawyers, both here on the island and perhaps overseas, to tender the requisite legal advice in order to navigate way through the choppy legal waters? Law was complicated back then in 1959, today it seems even more complicated. It is absolutely vital that you have appropriate legal advice.

I'm just going to give you a little observation by one of our great judges in England Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. This is what he said in a case called Royal Bank of Scotland and Etridge. What do we mean by independent legal advice? This is what President Christofias needs, I hope he has this. But I'm just going to give this to you. This is, by the way, what Tony Blair allegedly didn't have in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq. "All that is necessary is that some independent person free from any taint of the relationship or the consideration of interest which would affect the act should put clearly before the person what are the nature and the consequences of the act." This is a domestic context but I think it's of broad importance. It simply means that the advice shall be removed entirely from the suspected atmosphere and that from the clear language of an independent mind they should know precisely what they are doing. I don't think in hindsight Zenon Rossides was sufficiently removed from the suspected atmosphere. In the same, I don't think that Lord Goldsmith was removed entirely from the suspected atmosphere back in 2003 in relation to Iraq. The best form of legal advice is legal advice from an in-house government legal team, the attorney general, government legal advisors, side by side with external advisors. The Turkish Cypriots interestingly enough back in the 50s had professor Jennings from Cambridge as an external advisor. Professor of constitutional law. They had their in-house advice but they had at least one external advisor to give this independent legal advice. "Furthermore, a political leadership not normally allow this decision making to be shaped by theological or religious considerations." I think Archbishop Makarios was fairly clearly allowed some theological and religious considerations to enter his mind. I'll just quote you the Chief Rabbi of the United Kingdom Dr. Jonathan Sacks who I very much enjoy listening to, very lucid and articulate and intelligent gentleman. But according to the chief rabbi: "I can't imagine anything worse than ruled by religious leaders and I would have nothing to do with."

Let's just wrap up. The rule of law should prevail - this is my concluding thought. The rule of law should and must prevail. And what do we mean by the rule of law? It means that everybody involved in the process must comply with the law, everybody involved in the process is subject to the law, and nobody in the process is above the law. I began by quoting Aristotle, I'll end by quoting Aristotle: "The rule of the law is preferable to that of any individual." And if there is to be a settlement to the Cyprus question, it requires the rule of law to prevail. But what it also entails, as I've hopefully explained over the last forty minutes or so, is a correct procedure, and the correct procedure which results in an appropriate substance. I've written two articles recently, one of which I've circulated around the room, which supports this idea of a settlement from the bottom up. Settlement in which the citizens are in the driving seat, not the politicians up in the clouds and behind closed doors operating in secret. The citizens are in the driving seat. The citizens should have an opportunity to have an input into the process, the citizens should have an opportunity to scrutinize the documentation as it evolves. This is a democracy. If it's a democracy, then normal democratic principles should prevail. We should be seeing that the legislation that is being drafted goes through as in England: the first reading, second reading and so on, we should see the documentation as it evolves. We should have sight of the minutes of the meetings. Perhaps like in Northern Ireland where they have a mixture of secret meetings and open meetings. But the current process as I see is procedurally defective. And Lancaster House

suggests that if you get the procedure wrong, you'll end up with defective substance as well.
I rest my case.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Andreas Jacovides**
23 June 2009

Current Issues of the Law of the Sea and Their Relevance to Cyprus

Let me start by saying that I am very pleased to be speaking to a knowledgeable and concerned audience on a topic with which I have been dealing, in different capacities, for some four decades and which is currently of considerable significance in its many facets.

Time does not allow to go into the historical development of the rules of the Law of the Sea, going back to Hugo Grotius and his *De Mare Liberum* (1648), or, earlier still, the Rhodian Code of the 3rd century B.C. Nor is it possible to deal with the earlier attempts at codification by the United Nations, which were superseded by the much more ambitious undertaking of the Third United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea (1973-1982). The resulting Convention, this veritable Constitution of the Oceans consisting of 320 Articles and nine Annexes, was signed in Montego Bay, Jamaica on 10 December 1982 and regulated a multitude of issues. Having been ratified by some 160 states (including the EU), its provisions are considered to have become part of customary international law.

These included old traditional concepts, such as the territorial sea and freedom of navigation and new concepts, such as the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the regime of the deep seabed and archipelagic waters. Small delegations (such as ours) while not totally neglecting issues marginal to the country's interest, such as environmental protection and scientific research (indeed, I had to pay some attention to these as Vice Chairman of the Third Committee and member of the General Committee), archipelagic waters, passage through straits, etc., they of necessity had to concentrate on the issues which were of direct significance to them.

In the case of Cyprus, in addition to strongly supporting the adoption of a 12 mile territorial sea (Art. 3 of the Convention - Cyprus had already in 1964 proclaimed a 12 mile territorial sea zone) and that enclosed and semi enclosed seas, such as the Mediterranean, are regulated by the same basic rules as those applicable to open seas and oceans (e.g. the Pacific or the Atlantic) subject to the acceptable anodyne duty to cooperate with the riparian states (Articles 122 and 123) and for the protection of archaeological objects found in the seabed (Articles 149 and 303), we

* Text as submitted by the speaker.

** Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus (a.h.)

concentrated on certain key issues of primary importance to Cyprus.

These were, firstly, the regime of islands and their undiminished entitlement to the zones of maritime jurisdiction, i.e. territorial sea, EEZ, continental shelf and contiguous zone (Art. 121); secondly, the question of the delimitation of these zones of maritime jurisdiction between states, the coasts of which are opposite or adjacent to each other (Articles 15, 74, 83); and, thirdly, the question of settlement of disputes (Part XV, Articles 279-299 and Annexes VI, VII, VIII).

I do not think I need to elaborate on why these issues are of primary concern to Cyprus. All you need to do is to have a look at a map of the Eastern Mediterranean to realize why. Cyprus is of course, an island state as, for instance, is Malta in the Mediterranean and Jamaica in the Caribbean (both are allocated in semi-enclosed seas).

Despite efforts made by some states (notably Turkey) in the Preparatory Committee (1970-73) and in the early stages of the Conference, to differentiate between island states or other islands, this effort faced coordinated opposition and did not succeed. Consequently, all islands (including the Greek islands in the Aegean), other than uninhabited rocks, are governed by the same basic rule, as was our objective. Cyprus is an island surrounded in three directions (north, east, south) by continental states and, to the west, by the Greek islands of Crete, Rhodes and Carpathos (and indeed, Castelorizo), in no direction reaching 400 miles (200 from each side). Therefore, it is self-evident that the application of the median or equidistant line as the basic rule for delimitation is of primary importance, especially when it comes to the EEZ (and indeed, to the continental shelf, which are co-extensive in the ordinary situations).

Additionally, to establish that an island has no less entitlement to the zones of maritime jurisdiction than continental territories, and also that the median line is the starting point and basic rule for delimitation, it is essential, especially for small and militarily weak states such as Cyprus, that there be in place an effective system of compulsory settlement of disputes ensuring that the rights of all states are equally protected. Our position on this point was spelled out in a statement we made in the Plenary of the Conference in 1976, and was motivated both by reason of our attachment to the general principle of equal justice under the law and by national self-interest as a small and military weak state, which needs the protection of the law, impartially and effectively administered, in order to safeguard its legitimate interests under the Convention. In other words, we were firmly for the rule of law and against the law of the jungle - a point to which I shall revert in light of the current situation regarding the EEZ.

Evidently, time does not allow to develop the arguments used and get into tactics and alliances utilized, or to describe in any detail as to how these basic positions fared in the course of the Conference – the Cyprus delegation was, at different stages, the champion and spokesman of the ‘islands’ and ‘median line’ groups. The UN publications on the ‘legislative history’ of the regime of islands, delimitation and dispute settlement provide ample material to anyone wishing to pursue it. May I also refer you to a 28 page lecture I gave at the Rhodes Academy for Maritime Law and Policy in July 2004 (and its published version in the 2006 Oslo University publication for Professor Carl August Fleischer) for additional material.

For the purposes of today’s presentation, suffice it to say that as far as the status of islands is concerned, our position is fully safeguarded through Art. 121, subject to the qualified exception of rocks; as far as the median line is concerned, it continues to be the general rule as far as the territorial sea and the contiguous zone are concerned, but less clear as far as the EEZ and the

continental shelf are concerned under Articles 74 and 83. However, in subsequent years, the situation was clarified in the right direction through judicial interpretation in such cases before the International Court of Justice and arbitral tribunals as Libya/Malta, Norway/Denmark (the *van Mayen* case); Qatar/Bahrain; Cameroon/Nigeria (the Bankassi peninsula case); Yemen/Eritrea; Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana/Suriname and, most recently, Romania/Ukraine. As far as compulsory third party settlement is concerned the relevant part, XV, of the Convention, represents a significant advance from previous UN codification conferences, but the disputes relating to sea boundary delimitations were made subject to an optional exception as an unavoidable concession to political realities. In subsequent years, many states have by agreement referred their delimitation disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or to Annex VII arbitral tribunals by mutual consent (some such cases I have already cited). Realistically speaking, because of Turkey's unwillingness to accept third party settlement, it is unlikely that the situation being faced by Cyprus with Turkey in the EEZ will be submitted to such a settlement (and, of course, Turkey is a non-party to the 1982 Convention). I shall revert to this later.

Since the topic of today refers to 'current issues' of the Law of the Sea, it may be of interest to you if I cite two or three issues which currently receive much attention. One such 'hot' issue (if you excuse the pun!) is the Arctic, which is thawing as a result of global warming, and the extension of the continental shelf by the riparian states which are the Russian Federation, Canada, Norway, United States through Alaska and Denmark through Greenland. This is a matter where big stakes are involved since it is estimated that 20-25% of the world resources of oil and gas are situated on the Arctic seabed, and may be exploitable in the near future. The allocation of claims to the continental shelf beyond national jurisdiction (up to 350 miles) is the responsibility of one of the main bodies established by the UNCLOS III, the Committee on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf, and this applies globally, not just in the Arctic. For this, and the related issue of the revival of interest for commercially exploitable minerals in the deep seabed, much is currently written. Some of you may have seen, for instance, the 16th May 2009 issue of "The Economist" for interesting facts, maps and figures on these current issues.

Another such issue which is currently receiving much attention is that of piracy at sea, especially off the coast of Somalia. Many nations, including those of the EU, deployed warships in the area under enabling Security Council resolutions, and in cooperation with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), in order to combat this phenomenon. While pirates can be prosecuted under the long existing principle that pirates are *hostes humani generis* (enemies of the human race), the subject is not free of legal complications.

Returning now closer to home after this brief diversion, let me tell you that in my 2004 Rhodes lecture (to which I referred earlier), there was a postscript of four pages (pp.25-28) focusing on some developments relative to Cyprus. Those were grouped under four headings:

- The Cyprus-Egypt EEZ delimitation agreement, signed in February 2003, and ratified in March 2004. To this should be added the subsequent Cyprus-Lebanon EEZ delimitation agreement of 2007, in the same terms based on the median line and including a paragraph on the provision of arbitration regarding any disputes arising from it. I understand that a supplementary agreement was reached recently (2009) with Egypt for joint exploitation of resources which may be found straddling the line of delimitation.
- Recent Cyprus legislation proclaiming EEZ and Contiguous Zone (April 2004).

- The position regarding the Sovereign British Areas (SBA), as related to the law of the sea.
- Relevant provisions in the 2004 UN plan (Annan V) on a Cyprus settlement.

Since we have some way to go this afternoon, I will not tire you by going into these headings, but will be glad to make this material available, and perhaps some of you, more knowledgeable than I am on recent and current developments, can supplement it.

Let me now turn to the current issue of oil/natural gas exploitation by the Republic of Cyprus in its EEZ and Turkey's behavior in this regard.

For the past few years, periodically reports appear in the Cyprus press, sometimes under sensational headlines, accompanied by maps and pictures of oil platforms, on the oil and natural gas wealth of the region. It is said that the Eastern Mediterranean basin contains some 400 billion dollars' worth of oil and natural gas that much of it lies in the areas south of Cyprus (between Cyprus and Egypt or Cyprus and Israel, Gaza and Lebanon) within the Cyprus EEZ. Some such press reports have mentioned that Cyprus will become the new Eldorado, that we shall assume the status of sheiks and emirs with more money than we would know what to do with, and anticipate that Cyprus will join OPEC! No doubt, such talk is exaggerated. There are indeed indications that some oil deposits, and most probably considerable quantities of natural gas, do lie in the seabed in areas to the south, east and west of Cyprus. Foreign companies, including Noble Energy and Shell, have discovered substantial natural gas deposits off the coast of Egypt and off Israel/Gaza, and chances are that there are deposits in the adjacent Cyprus EEZ, as preliminary research has confirmed. But whether these deposits are in such a quantity and quality as to be commercially exploitable, and whether the depth at which they are found makes exploitation too difficult and expensive, remains to be seen. I say this in order to put the matter in perspective, but I do not claim any scientific expertise on such matters. In fact, this is one of the reasons I suggested that an expert, such as Mr. Solon Kassinis, might be willing to be here and enlighten us.

My own impression is that the Cyprus Government (particularly successive Ministers of Commerce, beginning with Mr. Nicos Rolandis with the valuable help of the Head of the Ministry's Energy section) have taken appropriate steps through the conclusion of delimitation agreements, notably with Egypt and Lebanon so far, and through dividing the EEZ area over which Cyprus has jurisdiction and sovereign rights, into blocks for allocation to oil exploration companies under appropriate procedures, for us to have cautiously optimistic expectations. Legally, but at present theoretically, the Republic of Cyprus has sovereign rights over the whole of Cyprus' EEZ but, under present circumstances where Turkey occupies 37% of the land and considerably more of the coasts of the island, it is prudent not to push this point, at least for now.

These prospects, however, are threatened by the fact that Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriots, are raising political and legal obstacles, which in turn may discourage major oil companies from undertaking commitments in areas the legal status of which is disputed. The Turkish Cypriot argument that "the Greek Cypriots are not to proceed on their own and the Turkish Cypriots are co-owners and they have to participate in the prospective profits", legally speaking, has no leg to stand on. The ownership of such deposits as may be found in the Republic's EEZ is of the Republic of Cyprus, which has a Government recognized by all States in the world as such, except for Turkey (under the Ankara Protocol, Turkey has a conventional obligation to recognize the Republic of Cyprus, and to open its ports, airports and air space to it, an obligation

which Turkey has so far failed to meet). So, it is not a matter of a national group within Cyprus (be it the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, or indeed, the Armenians, the Maronites and the Latins), but the state of Cyprus and its internationally recognized Government, which is entitled to the living and non-living resources of the Cyprus EEZ (incidentally, under the Treaty of Establishment of 1960, Appendix O (3)(10), it was specified that should minerals be found in the soil of the SBA's, the benefit should accrue to the Republic of Cyprus). If and when, hopefully when, there is a solution to the Cyprus problem, the people of the reunited Cyprus will, through such governmental structure as will have been agreed upon, own such wealth of the Cyprus EEZ. I am aware that there has been a suggestion that a portion of the oil/gas wealth to be found (if it is found, and if it is commercially exploitable) be deposited in an account to the benefit of the Turkish Cypriots upon a political solution being achieved. However, this - if it is practicable - would be a political pragmatic accommodation, not a legal obligation, and here we are discussing the legal position.

A more substantial obstacle lies in Turkey's claim to a segment of the EEZ under the Cyprus/Egypt Delimitation Agreement, west of 32,16,18 parallel (if I understand it correctly). Turkey also claims not to recognize the Cyprus/Egypt Agreement.

Apparently, this claim is based on the theory, put forward by Turkey during the Law of the Sea Conference, originally to the continental shelf and EEZ of the Aegean purporting to divide it between the continental shores of Greece and of Turkey. This novel, unfounded and arbitrary theory, based on the false assumption that islands have no continental shelf, received no support. Since the Conference, as we have already seen, by adopting Article 121 asserted that all islands in the Aegean have their own continental shelf, no more was made of it. Turkey's subsequent attempt to argue that, in enclosed and semi enclosed seas, special rules should apply other than those already adopted (including Article 121) was also rejected after considerable argument and the result was Articles 122, 123 on enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, which were not satisfactory to Turkey.

As a result of losing on these, and other issues (such as the prohibition of reservations to particular Articles, as Turkey wanted), Turkey did not sign or ratify the Law of the Sea Convention. To this day Turkey is the only country in the world to vote against the annual Law of the Sea resolution in the UN General Assembly. Turkey did so, most recently, in December 2008 as it did in all previous years, a matter which, in my opinion, should have been appropriately raised and highlighted by Cyprus in the General Assembly, the more so since Turkey had proceeded with threats against Cyprus authorized vessels in the Cyprus EEZ two weeks earlier (13 November 2008), a fact which was duly protested to the Security Council, (the same Security Council to which Turkey had just been elected as a non-permanent member by 151 votes without Cyprus or Greece lifting a finger to avert such election of a habitual violator of Security Council resolutions on Cyprus since 1974 – but this is another subject).

So Turkey, a non-party to the 1982 Convention, asserts that its EEZ extends half way between the south coast of Anatolia to Egypt's coast in the Mediterranean, encroaching on Cyprus's EEZ, as agreed with Egypt in a valid agreement on the basis of the 1982 Convention to which Cyprus and Egypt are state parties. Turkey has notified its position to the UN Secretariat (which, as is the practice, simply noted it). Cyprus protested repeatedly to the Security Council, as well as to the UN Secretariat, and to the EU. The EU recently included a reference in its report on Turkey's Association Agreement that Turkey should respect the sovereign rights of the EU member states. The UN Security Council (of which, ironically, Turkey is this month's President!) took no action.

Turkey continues to harass and threaten Cyprus authorized vessels in the EEZ and Cyprus reiterates its intention to continue exercising its sovereign rights within its EEZ.

Under these circumstances, what are the appropriate steps to be taken by the Republic of Cyprus to safeguard its legitimate sovereign rights? One option would be to meet force with force but Cyprus is one hundred times smaller than Turkey, and has no effective way of meeting the Turkish naval threat, and no realistic prospect that anyone else will do it for her. Not Greece, which has its own situation vis-a-vis Turkey; not the United Kingdom which has shown the value of its 'guarantee' in 1974; not the EU towards one of its members, although she sent warships off Somalia against the pirates; not the US and its Sixth fleet, unless perhaps an American vessel was involved.

Another option would be for Cyprus to play more decisively and effectively its cards in the EU on Turkey's accession process (in this respect the case of Slovenia and Croatia is instructive).

The third option is provided by the indisputable fact that Cyprus has international law on its side. Islands have the same entitlement to the EEZ as continental territories, under the 1982 Convention and customary international law. Cyprus has a valid agreement with Egypt dividing the EEZ between the two countries on the basis of the median line. Cyprus has taken a firm position in the Law of the Sea Conference, and elsewhere, in favor of international disputes being solved peacefully, on the basis of the applicable international law rules through compulsory third party dispute settlement.

Taking all this into account, why not proceed to declare that, while it has no doubt as to its legal rights in the EEZ, Cyprus is willing to test this before the International Court of Justice (as happened in so many recent cases of the ICJ deciding delimitation disputes e.g. Qatar/Bahrain, Norway/Denmark, Cameroon/Nigeria, Romania/Ukraine)? It is of interest to recall that very recently, a senior EU official, Michael Leigh, raised the possibility of third party settlement if the parties are unable to solve the issue by other means.

If we had resorted to the ICJ for an Advisory Opinion on the alleged and unfounded right of forcible intervention by Turkey under the Treaty of Guarantee in March 1964, as suggested by U Thant (see relevant references on this point in the books by Mr. Clerides and Mr. Soulioti) our legal position would have been incomparably stronger on this point. If we had not resorted to the European Court of Human Rights, we would not have had the significant decision of *Loizidou v. Turkey*. If we had not resorted to the US Federal Court in Indianapolis, in 1988, we would not have had the Kanakaria mosaics back in Nicosia, to mention a few examples where resort to justice has proven most valuable to the Cyprus cause, the Orams case being the most recent one.

A few days ago, a Cyprus newspaper quoted a "Cypriot diplomatic source" that to go to third party settlement would mean that we would cede away our legal rights. It must have been a misquotation since to go to court to assert your rights is the proper way to safeguard your rights, not to cede them. This is how the rule of law works in the national as well as the international level.

The difficulty with what I just urged is that Turkey would not accept the jurisdiction. But, if we took this initiative, we would at least have the significant advantage of being perceived as relying on international law to assert our strong legitimate rights, and this in itself would be a major gain. If the case were to be adjudicated by an international tribunal, there can be little doubt

that the result would be favorable, on the basis of the existing conventional and customary international law.

It is sometimes said that the Cyprus problem is a political one and will not be solved through resort to courts. I do not disagree. The Cyprus problem, if it is to be solved, will be solved politically. But it will strengthen our position enormously, as well as the viability of such agreement, if the political solution was based solidly on the relevant international law rules, and not be incompatible with such rules. Small states have to rely on the rule of law, and this should be obvious even to those who are not knowledgeable on international law

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis**
28 July 2009

Ahmet Davutoğlu: A New Era in Turkey's Foreign Policy? A Perspective from Cyprus

When Chris Pelagias asked me a month ago to choose a subject for presentation at the next roundtable of ERPIC, I immediately responded that I would like to speak on Ahmet Davutoglu foreign policy approach and agenda, as it emerges from his theory of “strategic depth” and from the policies pursued by the Justice and Development Party since it came to power nearly seven years ago. This is because in recent months I have been studying more thoroughly Turkey's foreign policy and especially the main theorist and architect of Turkey's evolving foreign priorities, Ahmet Davutoğlu, the current foreign minister of Turkey. It has always been my firm conviction that studying your adversary's policies and objectives, a country may be in a better position to analyze and evaluate all the dimensions of its strengths and weaknesses as well as any possible prospects for future transformation of their relations. Studying Turkey has always been fascinating, especially studying Turkey's foreign policy and diplomacy which I consider the most successful asset of this complex and multi-dimensional country.

Before we examine Ahmet Davutoğlu and his theory of “strategic depth”, I think it would be important to briefly go through Turkey's foreign policy before the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party, in order to appreciate the significant impact of the changes affected.

Before doing so and in order to fully comprehend the impact of Turkey's geographical position in its international relations I will cite one example given by William Hale, the former head of the Political and International Studies department at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, in his book “Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000”,

“Turkey is the only state, apart from Russia, with territory in both Europe and Asia, and is affected by and affects international politics in both south-eastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean, in Transcaucasia and the southern regions of the former Soviet Union and in the northern part of the Middle East. Historically, Turkey's most strategically significant asset has been its control of the straits of Dardanelles and Bosphorus, on which Russia had depended for direct maritime access to the Mediterranean

* Text as submitted by the speaker.

** Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus

and the only route through which Britain, France and later the United States could challenge Russia in the Black Sea. The fact that Turkey's geographical position is one in which the interests of several great powers intersect has also given its foreign policy makers a degree of flexibility not open to states which are likely to be dominated by a single great power (the case of Mexico and the United States being an obvious example)."

As Davutoğlu elaborates in his article "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007" published in "Insight Turkey" in January 2008, during the Cold War Turkey was considered as a frontier country. As part of the Western Block, Turkey was a means of control in the south among the Western powers extending to the East and at the edge of the West. Turkey belonged institutionally to the West and was considered the most important country in NATO. For over 60 years Turkey had prioritized its relationship with the West as manifested by its membership in almost every Western multilateral organization and during the entire Cold War period by its role as a barrier and deterrent of Soviet Union influence and perceived threat. Both Turkey and Greece were linked with Western Europe under the Truman Doctrine, with the United States having committed itself to protecting them. All weapons and military equipment required by Turkey to play its barrier role were supplied by the United States even before the country formally joined NATO in 1952.

In addition, under the Marshall Plan Turkey was given economic assistance, along with other European countries, within the broader framework of rebuilding Europe after the WWII and creating a stronger foundation for the countries of Western Europe and repelling communism. Turkey's participation in the Korean War further consolidated her friendship with the West and especially with the U.S.

According to Davutoğlu, Turkey was a country of priorities in its foreign policy orientation during the Cold War era. Foreign policy makers at the time followed a certain hierarchy of priorities which were static in nature. Becoming NATO's southern bulwark against the Soviet Union and defending the so-called free world from communism remained the highest priority for Turkey's foreign policy throughout the Cold War, while other regional issues, especially those in the Middle East, were not among Turkey's priorities, to the point that Turkey's approach towards the Middle East was described by a number of analysts as one of "benign neglect". This approach was inherent in the Kemalist ideology and in particular in the conservative secularist approach followed by Turkish governments, especially after the WWII that prioritized relations with the West and Western policies and interests, to the detriment of Turkey's relations with its Middle East Arab and Muslim neighbors. This policy was more manifested during the 1950s and 1960s when Turkey became the first Muslim state to recognize Israel, voted in favor of France during the Algerian war of independence, allowed US marines to use İncirlik during the Lebanese crisis in 1958 and kept a diplomatic distance from most of the Arab states. This monolithic Western-oriented policy started changing in the late 1960's with Turkey siding with Egypt during the Six-Day War in 1967, becoming a full member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 1976 and opening a PLO office in Ankara in 1979. Turkish rapprochement with the Middle East continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s, but it was centered primarily in economic and trade relations, while its relations with Syria continued to deteriorate, especially after Damascus provided safe haven and political support to Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader, Abdullah Ocalan.

In this respect we have to highlight the continuous involvement of the Turkish military throughout the period in Turkish politics as a guardian of the Kemalist regime. We should also

recall that in 1960, in 1971 and in 1980 the military intervened assuming power either to suppress Kurdish nationalism or leftist so-called threats, thus striking a heavy blow to the democratization process in Turkey that started in 1950.

After the end of the Cold War, Turkey remained preoccupied with the Kurdish question, while President Ozal's full political and economic support during the First Gulf War behind the US military campaign served as a catalyst for Turkey's rapprochement and reengagement with the Middle East. Nevertheless, Ankara's signing of a military cooperation treaty with Israel in 1996, as a reaction to Arab and European criticism of its policies towards the Kurds, tended to isolate Turkey from a number of Arab countries. In the meantime, the Kurdish question continued to dominate the Turkish domestic and foreign policy agenda throughout the 1990's, especially after the death of President Ozal who had a broader perspective of Turkey's relations with the Middle East, as well as a vision of how to deal with the Kurdish issue. The remaining period of the 1990s which was characterized by many analysts as the lost decade, found Turkey submerged in internal issues with the Islamic threat now being added to Kurdish separatism in dominating the domestic agenda. The military played an active role in effectively subduing all Islamist political tendencies with the so-called "soft coup" of 1997 succeeding in forcing the coalition government of Islamist Prime Minister Erbakan of the Welfare Party to resign.

Let us now examine the new trends in Turkey's foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government which, despite its Islamist roots, succeeded in wearing a conservative democratic uniform and winning in the 2002 general elections in a landslide. This is the time when Ahmet Davutoğlu, then Professor of International Relations at Marmara and Beykent Universities, had published his book *Strategic Depth* by which he effectively influenced Turkey's foreign policy. In 2003 Professor Davutoğlu was granted the title of ambassador and was appointed chief adviser of Prime Minister Erdogan on foreign policy. Since then he has been known as the AK Party's foreign policy intellectual architect and by some as the Kissinger of Turkey's diplomacy, because of the pro-active and multi-faceted foreign policy he has devised and has been implemented since the AK Party came to power.

Ahmet Davutoğlu was appointed Turkey's foreign minister on May 2nd, 2009. He was born in the conservative Turkish city of Konya in 1959, graduated from the German International School and holds a PhD in Political Science and International Relations from Bosphorus University. According to some analysts, it is because of his stellar credentials as a devout Muslim and an influential international relations scholar that both Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul from an early time noticed him and fully exploited his talents.

The main thesis of Davutoğlu theory, as he described it in his book "Strategic Depth" and in several speeches and articles, is that a nation's value in world politics is predicated on its geostrategic location and historic depth. Based on this theory, Turkey is uniquely endowed both because of its location in geopolitical areas of influence, particularly its control of the Bosphorus, and its historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Davutoğlu emphasizes Turkey's connections to the Balkans, the Middle East and even Central Asia and argues that Turkey is the natural heir to the Ottoman Empire that once unified the Muslim world and therefore has the potential to become a Muslim regional power. During a handover ceremony at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Davutoğlu wasted no time to assert his strategic vision. Turkey, he said, is going to pursue the forward looking and robust policies in its strategic neighborhood, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans. "It has to take the role of an order-instituting country in all these regions", he said and he invoked the idea of Turkey's historic responsibility vis-à-vis the

countries and the peoples that used to be incorporated in the Ottoman Empire. “Beyond representing the 70 million people of Turkey,” Davutoğlu said, “We have a historic debt to those lands where there are Turks or which were related to our land in the past. We have to repay this debt in the best way.”

For this approach Davutoğlu has been criticized for a neo-Ottoman policy which he has tried to refute in many of his articles and speeches, stressing that the aim was to reintegrate the country into its surrounding region, while at the same time maintaining Turkey’s long-standing Atlanticist and European tilt. “If you have more influence in your own hinterland, you will be a more meaningful contributor to the EU and to NATO”, Davutoğlu told Jonathan Marcus, a BBC correspondent in an interview last September. In a very interesting article entitled “Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism”, the author Omer Taspinar concludes that

“In short, there are clear differences between Kemalism and neo-Ottomanism in three main aspects of strategic culture. Where neo-Ottomanism favors an ambitious regional policy in the Middle East and beyond, Kemalism opts for modesty and caution. Where one favors multiculturalism and a more moderate version of secularism, the other prefers strict measures against headscarves and Kurdish ethnic identity. Where one is increasingly resentful of the EU and the United States, the other is trying to pursue EU membership and good relation with Washington.”

According to Davutoğlu, Turkey’s geography gives her a specific central status which differs from other central countries like Germany, Russia or Iran. Turkey holds an optimal place because it is both an Asian and a European country and is also close to Africa through the Eastern Mediterranean. In terms of history, culture and its area of influence, according to Davutoğlu, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea country. Thus, according to the “strategic depth” perspective foreign policy is perceived no longer as a series of bilateral relations or foreign policy moves, but as a series of mutually reinforcing and interlocking processes. In this respect he argues that in order to formulate a long lasting strategic perspective, one needs to take into account “historical depth” which provides a sound assessment of the links between the past, present and future, as well as a “geographical depth” penetrating into the intricate dynamics of the relations between domestic, regional and global factors. He further argues that the geo-economic factors that contribute to the strategic depth of a country could only be genuinely interpreted at the intersection of these historical and geographical paradigms. Making an analogy of a bow and an arrow, Davutoğlu argues that the further Turkey strains its bow in Asia, the more distant and precise would its arrow extend into Europe. Hence, he argues, “If Turkey does not have a solid stance in Asia, it would have very limited chances in the EU.”

As a central country, Davutoğlu further explains, Turkey needs to go beyond a parochial approach to national security and to become a security and stability provider for its neighboring regions. Consequently, Turkey’s active engagement from Central Asia to Africa, from the OIC to the EU, from its membership to the UN Security Council to its involvement as a key player in the Middle East and as an energy corridor from the Caucasus, Central Asia, Iran and Iraq to Europe. Thus, while maintaining its traditional Western, NATO and EU orientation, Turkey also has a strong Eurasian and Middle East component. The premise of this argument is that Turkey should not be dependent upon any one actor like the West, but should actively seek ways to balance its relationship and alliances so that it can maintain optimal independence and leverage

on the global and regional stage. As Ahmet Davutoğlu outlines in his article published in *Insight Turkey*, Turkey's new foreign policy is based on the following five principles:

- The first principle is that there should be a balance between security and democracy in a country in order to be able to establish an area of influence in its environment.
- The second principle is a “zero problem policy towards Turkey's neighbors.” Davutoglu sights as examples of this principle Turkey's relations with Syria and Georgia as well as its relations with Iran, Iraq and Bulgaria. Nevertheless, as he himself admitted in a speech at the Henry Jackson Society in June 2008, with the exception of Cyprus and Armenia, Turkey has excellent relations with all its neighbors. He further added that in the history of the Turkish Republic the first time a Syrian President came to Turkey was in 2004. The first time a Russian President came to Turkey in an official capacity was in 2005. Also, for the first time a Saudi King, an Iraqi President and a Greek Prime Minister visited Turkey.
- The third principle is the development of relations with the neighboring regions and beyond. As a result, Turkey became active in the Balkans, in the Middle East, in the Caucasus and in Central Asia.
- The fourth principle is adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy whereby Turkey's relations with other global actors aim to be complementary, not in competition.
- The fifth principle is a proactive foreign policy supported by rhythmic diplomacy which is manifested in the many initiatives promoted and the international meetings and organizations Turkey has hosted in the last seven years, including the Alliance of Civilizations, co-initiated by the Turkish and Spanish Prime Ministers, as well as the hosting of the NATO and the OIC summits. Following a successful campaign in Africa in 2005, Turkey became an observer in the African Union. Turkey also facilitated or hosted a number of meetings on the issue of the nuclear program of Iran on the issue of Afghanistan, on the Palestinian issue etc. Through this intense diplomatic activity, Turkey succeeded after 48 years to be elected, by 151 votes out of 192, to one of the non-permanent seats of the UN Security Council. This was the result of a forceful diplomatic campaign that extended to Africa (in 2005), to Latin America (in 2006), the Arab countries and Asia seeking to establish political and trade links and to provide development assistance to a number of countries. According to Davutoğlu, this rhythmic diplomacy has allowed Turkey to intervene consistently in global issues using international platforms, which signifies a transformation for Turkey from a central country to a global power. Davutoğlu admits that this is the result not only of state policy but also the business community, the civil society, the academic community, think tanks and other actors, which he considers essential for promoting an effective foreign policy.

In order to realize his foreign policy vision, Davutoğlu has put forward a number of mechanisms which he analyzed in various articles, speeches and interviews, both prior as well as after he was appointed foreign minister:

- The first mechanism is an integrated foreign policy approach. This, as we have seen earlier, is a departure from Turkey's prioritization of foreign policy objectives during the Cold War. Today, Turkey does not turn its back to any areas or problems, as it did in the past. Its policy is flexible enough to respond appropriately to changes.

- The second is an all-inclusive, equidistance policy aiming at including all related actors, forming a broad coalition to solve problems and develop initiatives.
- The third is presence on the ground, in particular during times of crisis. As Davutoğlu points out, Turkey needs to be on the ground whether in the EU, the Middle East or the Caucasus, as exemplified during the Russia-Georgia and the Gaza crises. Nevertheless, Davutoğlu adds, Turkey is no longer a country which only reacts to crises, but notices the crises before their emergence and intervenes effectively and gives shape to the order of its surrounding regions.

Having outlined the main thrust of Ahmet Davutoğlu's foreign policy vision as it has unfolded during the last seven years, let us now see a few examples of these initiatives as well as the new style employed by Turkey.

As pointed out by Igor Torbakov and Hanna Ojanen of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Turkey's growing strategic interest in and involvement with the troubled region of the Middle East is viewed by Turkish policymakers as being within the sphere of Turkey's geopolitical responsibility as well as a region that currently poses the greatest number of threats to the country's security. The Iraq policy is one example. The Turkish government was against the US War against Iraq and its relations with the United States became very strained in 2003. In the end, following intensive bargaining Turkey secured \$US 16 billion in grants and loans along with an agreement that 20,000 Turkish troops could enter northern Iraq to protect Turkish interests there. According to state department senior officials at the time, Turkey also secured that all her vital concerns would be incorporated in the final version of the Annan Plan, following arbitration by the UN Secretary General. Despite the deal, the Turkish Parliament voted against allowing the US to open a northern front to invade Iraq from Turkish territory. Instead, both before and after the War, Turkey organized a number of meetings of the extended neighboring countries of Iraq with the participation of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Kuwait, intended to pave the way for Iraq to be considered not only an American issue but an international one, being dealt with within the framework of the UN. Moreover, Turkey's involvement was another way of further establishing its position in the Middle East as a facilitator and an important actor in the region, as well as safeguarding the unity of Iraq and averting its disintegration and fragmentation. Turkey's efforts to integrate the Sunni community in Iraq into the system are prevalent, while at the same time it maintains contacts and dialogue with all other groups within Iraq, even with the Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq. Yet the primary concern of Turkey over Iraq remains Kirkuk and how it will safeguard its perceived vital interests in Northern Iraq. As Davutoğlu himself admitted in a Council on Foreign Relations speech, "Kirkuk is important because it is a multi-ethnic state and also Kirkuk is the oil-rich city. So everybody wants to get Kirkuk."

Following the elections in the United States, Turkey became increasingly concerned over the US President's intentions for an early and full US withdrawal from Iraq, fearing a full scale civil war and an eventual break up which will have detrimental effects to Turkey's vital interests in the region.

Davutoğlu's articulation of Turkey's Middle East policy is based on the following principles:

- Regional security for all, no one or the other side;

- Dialogue as the means of solving the region's problem, highlighting Turkey's role as mediator and communication channel;
- Economic interdependence;
- Cultural coexistence and plurality.

Davutoğlu is widely considered the architect of dialogue with all the political actors in the Middle East, including the most controversial ones like Hamas leader Khaled al-Mashal. He has been also instrumental in Turkey's mediation between Syria and Israel. As Asil Aydintasbas wrote in the Forbes Magazine issue of last February,

“Under the AK Party Turkey has been delving into areas that its traditional westward-looking foreign policy considered off-limits, acting as a powerbroker in far off disputes from Afghanistan to Palestine and Iran. In doing so, it certainly has become more enmeshed in the Muslim world, sometimes even positioning itself as the spokesman for the Islamic world, as reflected by Erdogan's outburst in Davos against Peres, or Turkey's reluctance to accept Danish Prime Minister Anders Rasmussen as the head of NATO, due to his stance during the Danish cartoon crisis.”

It should be also mentioned that Ankara in its intensely promoted relations with Moscow, tries to avoid taking sides in any “Russia versus the West” problems. During the Russia-Georgia crisis of last year, Prime Minister Erdogan pointed out the importance of relations with Russia in the following way:

“America is our ally and the Russian Federation is an important neighbor. Russia is our number one trade partner. We are obtaining two thirds of our energy from Russia. We act in accordance to our national interests. We cannot ignore Russia.”

To contain any crises in the region, Turkey suggested last year a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform to configure a dialogue between the three Caucasus states, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey. No results have yet been produced from this initiative, primarily because of the issue of Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan's agitation against any potential rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia and/or Russia.

As a last example we should mention Turkey's successful initiatives to create an energy hub in Turkey. According to Davutoğlu, “Thanks to the geographical position Turkey enjoys, part of its national strategy involves facilitating the transit of energy across its territory.” It is, therefore, natural to remain preoccupied as to how to ensure that its role as an energy transit country will not be jeopardized by instability and conflict in the region. A web of pipelines already crosses Turkey, carrying hydrocarbons along east-west and north-south energy corridors. Among the most significant is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which connects the Caspian and the Mediterranean through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. One million barrels of Caspian crude is pumped each day through the \$4 billion pipeline. Another important pipeline is the Turkey-Greece Interconnector which has the capacity to transport 11.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz field. An extension planned to link the line to Italy is expected to be operational by 2012. Other pipelines already pumping or in the works in Turkey include the Blue Stream pipeline, which connects mainland Russia with mainland Turkey and will eventually deliver 16 billion cubic meters of gas annually once operating in full capacity, the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline - a proposed bypass to the heavily traveled Bosphorus shipping lane, this 350 mile long

line would transport oil from the Kashagan oil field in Kazakhstan's portion of the Caspian Sea - and finally the recently signed major project, the Nabucco pipeline. This multinational pipeline, projected to open in 2015 would transport gas mainly from Azerbaijan with future contributions from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and other sources, to Central Europe through the Turkish gas hub of Erzerum. The main objective behind this last project is to diversify supply to EU countries, while bypassing Russian territory. Turkey in the meantime, is keeping its options open. Bulent Aliriza, Turkey project director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies says posturing by Moscow has pushed Ankara to balance its cooperation with the West while expanding cooperation with Russia and Iran.

As we have said earlier, this new neo-Ottoman, pro-active foreign policy of the AK Party government and its architect Ahmet Davutoğlu has received a lot of criticism both from within Turkey, but also from outside circles. One veteran Turkish diplomat described him as "having the capacity to fill old wine in new bottles," because according to him there is little new in Turkish foreign policy; it is merely being repackaged. Ankara in his view has been unable to match the "pro-active" foreign policy with practical achievements. This is because of Turkey's quasi-state nature, i.e. not functioning like a state- as long as real democracy does not fully function within all the institutions in the country. As another critic, retired ambassador and columnist Temel Iskit put it, "It is hard to say that this visibility has increased Turkey's effectiveness. For example, Turkey could not reap any harvest from its role as a facilitator in the Middle East. The Palestinian issue remains in stalemate and Turkey was not given any credit for the Israel-Hamas ceasefire." In another article entitled "Vision or Illusion? Ahmet Davutoğlu's State of Harmony in Regional Relations", the authors Kaya and Karaveli conclude with the following observation which I quote:

"The pull of economy and of ideology – of Arab capital and of political Islam – is inevitably making Turkey more Muslim Middle Eastern in its foreign policy outlook. Yet, the assumption that guides this foreign policy reorientation, personified by Ahmet Davutoğlu, suffers from important weaknesses. The expectation that Turkey, empowered by its 'strategic depth', is destined to move to the center of international politics has already been revealed as highly unrealistic. The effort to search for dialogue and understanding in a region beset by power rivalries, and not least by pathological suspicions of the intentions of the 'other', is laudable in itself. Yet the tendency to postulate a state of harmony, of the possibility of having 'zero problems' with all neighbors, reflects a wishful thinking that is sure to be tested severely by regional realities."

Now, from a Cyprus perspective one thing remains obvious. On the one hand Turkey has increased its visibility and political weight internationally. Its recent election to the UN Security Council, its inclusion in the G20 and the Obama administration's full support behind Turkey's new pivotal role are indicative of this strengthened position in the region and beyond. On the other hand, however, nothing seems to have changed in Turkey's stand towards Cyprus, Greece, Armenia and the Kurdish issue, because these issues continue to remain under the firm grip of the Turkish military, being considered as the most important national issues that cannot move away from the jurisdiction of the army. Hence, the Turkish air force's continuing provocations in the Aegean, continuing threats regarding Cyprus's legitimate oil and gas exploration plans, Ankara's recent decision to authorize its oil corporation, the Turkish Petroleum Corporation to explore for oil in the Eastern Mediterranean, off the coast of Cyprus, as well as its continuous violations of Cyprus' airspace are all indicative of this unchanged Turkish policy vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus.

Regarding the Cyprus question itself, it would be rather difficult in such a short period of time to analyze the policy of the Erdogan government and point to any possible changes with previous administrations. One fact remains unchanged. The Turkish military, which continues to occupy Cyprus Republic territory, continues to have the first and final say on development on the island and its prospects for a solution. The previously mentioned observation of the veteran Turkish diplomat regarding Davutoğlu, that he has the capability to fill old wine in new bottles, is absolutely fitting in the case of Turkey's Cyprus policy. Nothing in fact has changed regarding the Turkish positions on the Cyprus issue. To the opposite, I see further deterioration. When Mr. Davutoğlu and the other Turkish officials do not even mention the word federation, let alone bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, as the basis for a Cyprus settlement and instead stress bi-zonality, new partnership based on political equality of two founding states and effective Turkish guarantees, this is nothing else but the old Turkish recipe of partition and separation based on ethnic and religious criteria. On the 17th of July this year, the Turkish foreign minister contradicted even more his theories of "strategic depth" and "zero conflict with neighbors" when, characterizing the ongoing negotiations in Cyprus as the last chance, he launched an indirect threat to the effect that either the Cyprus problem will be resolved by the end of the year, or Turkey will be forced to think about alternatives. The continuing non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus - a member of the EU that Turkey wants to join - by the Turkish government and its refusal to implement the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement as far as Cyprus is concerned, by continuing to restrict Cyprus flag and Cyprus-related vessels from entering Turkish ports and Cyprus registered airlines from using Turkish airports and air traffic corridors, constitutes also a sharp contradiction of the theory and philosophy behind Ahmet Davutoğlu's "strategic depth". It is also a clear indication that the Turkish army is the one that dictates the Turkish Republic's Cyprus policy.

Above all, if Turkey wants to be considered a reliable power in the region and beyond, it has to be consistent. Whatever policies it promotes in Iraq, must equally be promoted elsewhere, where Turkey has perceived interests. When Ahmet Davutoğlu rightly speaks against the idea of ethno-sectarian conflict in the Middle East and strongly holds that "Historically, none of the Middle Eastern cities have been composed of a homogeneous ethnic and sectarian fabric. In order to establish order in the Middle East it is essential to maintain this composition in one way or another," he cannot condone and perpetuate policies of ethnic separation in Cyprus. When he strongly argues about the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iraq and Georgia he cannot condone and perpetuate the military occupation of Cyprus Republic territory, which is part of the territory of the EU.

Turkey's accession process for membership in the European Union provides the right avenue to achieve the necessary transformations in Turkey's international and domestic conduct as far as respect for international law and human rights are concerned. The EU is very clear on the criteria and on Turkey's obligations. Turkey cannot be treated in a different way from other candidates on the grounds that it now wants to portray itself as a global power. Big or small nations must equally go through the same transformations in order to have a chance to be admitted to the EU. No exceptions, no blank checks are permitted and no threats can change the rules.

Cyprus has always been supportive of Turkey's accession to the European Union. It views this prospect as a Win-Win situation for all parties concerned. No one would stand to lose from such membership. Of course, Turkey would stand to benefit first and foremost, by being able to consolidate democracy and to curb the Kemalist influence and role of the Turkish military in

Turkish politics. Cyprus would also benefit by having as a neighbor a fully European country that abides by international law and human rights. Also Greece, the European Union, regional peace and prosperity would also stand to benefit from such transformation and membership Turkey. Nevertheless, Turkey's EU accession process is an issue that has created, over the last couple of years, heated discussions in Europe, with positions voiced against Turkish membership on demographic, geographic, political and cultural grounds. This is not the place to discuss in depth these arguments and the difficulties surrounding Turkey's membership prospects. What remains important is for Turkey to continue with the necessary reforms that have been stalled for the past two years and proceed without delay to implement its commitments towards the EU. This would definitely give a sure boost to the process. Otherwise, it will continue to face many insurmountable obstacles.

I do not profess to be an expert on Turkey's foreign policy. I do hope, however, that I have given the right incentives through this presentation that could spark a dialogue around this table. Definitely, through such dialogue we could become wiser at the end of the day on this and other related issues.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION*

Klearchos A. Kyriakides**
11 September 2009

The Crescent of Crisis, the Kaleidoscope of Conflict and the Strategic Role of Cyprus

I'm particularly pleased to see so many old friends and colleagues in the audience before me. I always think it's important for an event such as this to have a sense of history. It's impossible to understand the present day unless we go back and examine how history has unfolded.

Exactly seventy years ago, the Second World War was beginning to take shape. Indeed, exactly seventy years ago today, on the 11th of September 1939 Time magazine marked the outbreak of the Second World War with a series of interesting reports. One of these included an evocative assessment of the implications of the Second World War for the Mediterranean, which Time magazine referred to as “the great tideless, embattled sea of antiquity”. And according to Time, the Mediterranean was a decisive theater of war. But it was also a maze of variables which was crisscrossed with conflicting currents. Focusing on the east of the Mediterranean Time magazine added that “the currents in the east were marked by the rush of opposing interests and they were threatened by netted variables, each as dangerous, each as explosive as a floating mind.” And it's tempting seventy years later to say that nothing in substance has changed. That description of the Mediterranean, the east of the Mediterranean is as valid today as it was back then.

It's also rather sobering to recall that during the Second World War up to six hundred Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Armenians, Maronites and Latins were killed in action, including two hundreds also missing presumed dead. As the Allies prepare to commemorate the 70th anniversaries of the great battles of the Second World War, let us hope that the contribution of those servicemen will be properly acknowledged.

More to the point so far as this conference is concerned, the Cypriot contributions to allied forces highlights a fundamental point: when the chips are down and when Western values are at risk, Western interests are best served if the island of Cyprus is united not just politically, but in the willingness of its citizens to cooperate with the West in defense of those values.

The West is a loose association, a loose grouping of states which have shared values. European

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

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Union is a representative, I submit, of the West. The European Union, according to its treaty, is founded on liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law - principles which are common to the EU member states including the Republic of Cyprus. And I've always emphasized to my students: we in this hall and in the UK are beneficiaries of one of the most cherished of human rights, the qualified right to freedom of expression within the law. All of us today will be exercising that fundamental human right. Ray has asked me to be provocative. I shall be provocative, and I shall be provocative in a way that I think reflects that cherished right to freedom of expression. And I shall be provocative without fear of being arrested by the authorities, without fear of being thrown into jail by the courts, and without fear of being ostracized by society. That's because the Republic of Cyprus today, at least in the government-controlled areas, has been transformed into a Western liberal democracy which espouses and protects fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. And I'm reminding here of the great observation of Adlai Stevenson, the American politician who unsuccessfully ran for the presidency. According to Adlai Stevenson, a free society is one where it is safe to be unpopular. By the end of my forty five minutes or so contribution I may be unpopular in some parts of this room. But I'm going to exercise my human right to freedom of expression in that regard.

My objective this morning, ladies and gentlemen, is threefold. The details are set out in the draft paper that you have in front of you. My three objectives are: Firstly, to look at the history of the Republic of Cyprus and highlight the degree to which it has been transformed from a republic that was in the non-aligned movement, and not really considered part of Europe, let alone the West, into a unique pillar of the West and Western values. It's not yet a perfect pillar, but it's very much I would submit a pillar of the West. My second objective is to draw attention to this so-called "crescent of crisis" and the "kaleidoscope of conflict", two phrases which entered the lexicon of international relations, and consider what sort of role Cyprus already performed, and what role it may perform in the future. And in the third and final part of my talk I'm going to grapple with the elephant in the room, the Cyprus question, and submit to you that the present negotiations are inappropriate, to say the least.

Let's begin therefore with the transition of the Republic of Cyprus from a non-aligned state into a unique pillar of the West. I thought it was appropriate to begin with a bit of literature, from Lawrence Durrell. In "Bitter Lemons", the magnificent book he wrote, recalling his experiences on the island, he describes his journey in 1953 from Venice to Cyprus. And he remarks in a wonderful passage, when he arrived in Cyprus, "It was time to say good-bye to Europe." That was the attitude of the 1950s. Cyprus wasn't really part of Europe. It was close to Europe, but it wasn't really part of Europe. And I'm afraid the colonial period very much contributed to that perception. Hence, as we all know, the failure in the post-war period to apply democratic principles properly to this island. That of course gave rise to the troubles of the 50s. And the settlement of 1959-60 which allowed three NATO allies to maintain control of this island, but at the same time it established a Republic of Cyprus that was not put into the NATO alliance. That's quite important for my thesis. It's important for my thesis, because back in 1959 Greek and Turkish governments considered seriously and, indeed, they agreed in principle, that the Republic of Cyprus should join NATO alliance. For various reasons the idea was kicked into dungeon, and the Republic was established in 1960 as a state, outside the framework of NATO. And in 1961 the first president of the Republic Archbishop Makarios applied to the Non-Aligned Movement, and became a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. And this - I'm not going to go into any details here - this created the perception, or rather underlined the perception in certain circles in Washington in particular, that the Republic of Cyprus was not part of the West. If you

look at the declassified papers of the United States administration from the period, you can encounter this wonderful poem written by Samuel E. Belk, who was in the Eisenhower administration. This is what he said in December 1959, in a poem: "Cyprus line in the sea, Could your future lumia be? Divided and torn from East to West. What a mess!" It's easy to speak with hindsight, but in hindsight, was it the best decision for the Republic to join the non-aligned movement and cavort with characters such as Castro, Nasser, Sukarno and Tito? I know, here the consensus in the 60s and 70s was that was a good idea, but in hindsight, if you understand the realpolitik of the period, and if you understand American thinking, perhaps that wasn't a wise idea.

The point is that the Non-Aligned Movement, to all intents and purposes, was a Third World alliance which cut little teeth in the international environment. There was no equivalent in the Non-Aligned Movement of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. There's no self-defense mechanism. So, when crisis erupts, the Non-Aligned Movement is incapable of springing to your defense.

And we all know what happened in the immediate post-1960 period. Internal tensions erupted in the 60s, and those internal tensions gave rise to military intervention from Turkey, initially in 1964 and then with the fully fledged invasion in 1974. I'm not going to go into the details. The point is that the invasion and partition of the Republic in 1974 was partly a consequence, partly a consequence of the isolated fragile status of the Republic of Cyprus within the international system. It was isolated, caught between the East and the West with friends in the non-aligned movement, who had no power and no ability to spring to the Republic's defense.

What are the lessons, therefore, from that pre-1974 period? There are various ones and I'm going to just single out. The first one is that the government and citizens of the Republic of Cyprus really have to treat the world as it is rather than as they would wish it to be. Secondly, they need to fully appreciate the geopolitical framework of which their homeland forms part. Thirdly, they need to take appropriate decisions to protect their interests, and they must never be too insular. To quote what we said earlier: you need to look over the horizon and not just look at what goes on within the parameters of this island. But perhaps most significantly of all, the government and citizens of the Republic, in my view, need to understand that for any ship of state, if I can use a navy analogy, for any ship of state to pass through the dangerous waters of international relations, it needs shrewd captaincy together with the united disciplined crew, which is on the lookout for rocks which are visible, as well as icebergs which are not. And given the presence of so many risks it's sometimes safer for a small ship to form part of the formidable powerful flotilla, rather than try and make its own way on its own.

So, in 1974 the Republic found itself shipwrecked, isolated, with very few friends around the world, a Republic that had been torn in two, its northern areas occupied militarily, its populations demographically split and pretty much in a very bad place.

So that was the position in '74. Now, let's just move forward since 1974 and see what's happened. In that post-1974 period the Republic, by hook or by crook, has managed to progress from being a de facto partitioned shipwrecked state into a modern liberal democracy with a flawed, but nonetheless functioning democratic political system and membership of the European Union. This is a profound importance to the West and to this Republic, and I don't think it's been fully realized in either the West or the Republic that this transition has happened. And I don't think the implications in this place, in particular, have been fully grasped. The Republic of Cyprus is

now part of the West. I live in England, I watch RIK - the Cyprus broadcasting service and its political programs - and I often hear politicians talking about the West as if it's some organizational body over there. The Republic is part of the West and it's something that people here need to grasp. Western values are essentially Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean values. Many of those concepts that I referred to earlier, democracy and the rule of law, have their philosophical origins in ancient Athens. These are not alien concepts, these are not alien values. These are values that are inextricably part of the culture and the framework, and I would add the mindset of the people in this part of the world. So that is of fundamental importance and needs to be grasped.

By the same token I would add that in the West we don't often regard the Republic of Cyprus as part of the West. Often, when you read international relations' articles, there's a sort of sentence mentioned in which Cyprus is mentioned in the context of the Cyprus question, or as an offshoot of Turkey, or as part of the Middle East - maybe part of the Middle East, as I would put it, an island off the Middle East. But it's also been inextricably part of the West. And there needs, therefore, be a mindset change of gear, I would submit, both in the West and in that part of the West that is known as the Republic of Cyprus.

Now, let's just go back to the history. In that post-74 period, the Republic of Cyprus had a choice as it were. It could - have the circumstances being different - have chosen the path of, say, the Palestinians after the 1948, or 1967 or indeed 1973 Middle Eastern wars. The Republic could have embarked upon a military campaign, either on an official basis, or using paramilitary forces. It could have engaged in a hijacking of aircraft and all those other dreadful things that we saw in the 70s and 80s in a different context. The Republic and its citizens chosen not to go down that path. Arguably, they didn't have a choice of doing it, but the fact is I don't even think it came to anyone's mind to pursue that approach. They chose the path of cooperation with the West, even though they had been let down badly by the British in particular, and by the Americans. So they chose the path of cooperation with the West, they chose to shun confrontation, and they chose to shun any form of violence, with a view to securing political objectives.

At the last, as far as I can see, the last episode of that sort of violence here in Cyprus occurred with the assassination of the US ambassador in August 1974. But that was at the height of the troubles. Since then violence has not form part of the agenda of the Republic or its citizens.

Now, this path of cooperation has got - as far as I can see, as an outsider looking in with a limited access to official documents and other materials - as far as I can see, this path of cooperation is operating on two levels. On the softer level there are things such as educational links between the Republic and the West. As a lawyer I'm obliged to say this, that the legal links between the Republic and the UK are profound. According to the Cyprus Bar Association, as many as 64% of registered lawyers in the Republic studied law or qualified as lawyers in England, before coming back to the Republic to practice law. And that speaks volumes for the quality of legal education in the UK. But it also says something about the common law legacy of colonialism, and it also says something about the underlying - how can I put this - love/hate relationship between the Republic and its citizens and the United Kingdom. So that, on one level, there are cultural, educational, trade and other links, that have been built up between the Republic and the UK. But on another level there has been this path of cooperation, as I put it, that has also affected the military sphere, which is something I've written about extensively in different contexts.

But in that post-1974 period, the Republic remained a non-aligned member, remained non-aligned, but at the same time it offered its territory to Western military forces at certain times. A good example occurred in the post-74 period of the U-2s. The Republic of Cyprus did not object to the continuing presence of American U-2 aircraft at Akrotiri. In 1982, when the Lebanon crisis erupted – or one of the many Lebanon crises erupted - the Republic put its territory at the disposal of the US Marines and other US forces. Larnaca Airport was used, Limassol port was used as well as the SBAs. They could have said to the Americans, no, sorry, in view of what you did in '74 we're not going to cooperate. But they chose to cooperate. They made a decision back then under President Kyprianou to cooperate and the Lebanon operation was facilitated by the use of both, the Republic and the SBAs.

With regard to the SBAs, the Republic - for as far as I can tell - has maintained a policy of cooperation with the SBAs. They may not have been in that post-74 enthusiastic about the continued British presence, but they haven't put, as far as I can see, any major obstacles on the part of the British, and they try to cooperate so far as possible with them. So that policy of cooperation with the West in that period in the '70s and '80s is quite profound.

But the turning point, ladies and gentlemen, the turning point I would submit just looking at the post-74 history, perhaps came in 1990. In 1990, just as the Berlin Wall... The dust was beginning to settle and as the Cold War was beginning to end, two events happened of profound significance to the orientation of the Republic of Cyprus from the non-aligned movement to the West.

In 1990 the Republic of Cyprus in July of that year submitted its formal application to join the European Economic Community, as the EU was then known. July 1990 was the application made to the EEC. That was a bold and ultimately successful move which signaled that the Republic was heading in a westerly direction. They didn't make any applications in NATO, but they made an application to the European Union. And given the history of the European Union and its symbolic status as a pillar of the West that was of profound significance, which ultimately bore fruit 14 years later.

The other thing that happened in 1990 was in August - and I was here when it happened having a summer holiday - the Iraqis invaded and occupied Kuwait. And the British particularly used their Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) to go in support of the Kuwaitis - initially the Americans called it a Desert Shield and then Desert Storm. The Republic could have kicked up a fuss as they did in 1973 when the Americans used, or tried to use but were prevented by Heath, tried to use the SBAs in support of Israel. The Republic of Cyprus did not kick up a fuss. So the British were able to send in hundreds of aircraft into Akrotiri and send their forces to and from the Gulf without any obstacles put in their path by the Republic. Now, that may be in part because the operation in the Gulf had UN support. But nonetheless, it was a reflection of how the Republic was moving away from this sort of non-aligned mindset that had colored its policies in the 60s and 70s. So in my view 1990s were quite critical.

Three years later we had the publication in Foreign Affairs of that historic article by Samuel P. Huntington "The Clash of Civilizations". Now, Huntington I don't think spent much time thinking about Cyprus or writing about it, although Cyprus crop up in both his article and his subsequent book on this subject. Now, that should remind ourselves what Huntington said back in 1993. He argued that as the Cold War was ending,

“World politics is entering a new phase. (...) The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. (...) The central axis in world politics in the future is likely to be, (...), the conflict between ‘the West and the Rest’ and the responses of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values.”

And Huntington proceeded to identify several major civilizations including the Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic Orthodox, Latin American and - as he put it - possibly African.

Now, where did the Republic of Cyprus fall in this categorization articulated by Huntington back in 1993? Was it an integral part of the Western civilization? Was it an integral part of the Slavic Orthodox civilization? Was it part of the Islamic civilization? Or was it one of the so-called ‘torn countries’, a phrase that Huntington used in that article? Now, Huntington reached the view back in 1993 that the Republic of Cyprus, or Cyprus as he put it, was part of the Slavic Orthodox civilization. Looking back on the history I would probably argue that was an inappropriate (*inaudible*) on Huntington's terms, if we are to accept Huntington's terms. It's more accurate to say that in the 1990s the Republic of Cyprus was still a torn country: it had a foot in more than one civilizational camp. It was a torn country in the sense that it was also historically a part of the Ottoman Empire, and thus the Renaissance and many of the other developments of Western Europe had bypassed it. I hope you can see where I'm getting at here. This was the mindset of the 1990s, as the Balkans were set ablaze. But the point is, Huntington reflected I think American thinking at the time: the Republic was not part of the West. It was part of the Islamic Orthodox block, or at best a torn country.

Things, ladies and gentlemen I would suggest you, have changed since 1993. And what's changed in particular since 1993 is the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union. The Republic now, I would argue, in Huntington's terms - if one accepts Huntington's terms - is indeed part of the Western civilization. It is a modern liberal democracy, has by and large a free market economy, it espouses and cherishes Western values, and it is to all intents and purposes a part of the West, as I defined it earlier. It still has some of the trappings of the torn country syndrome, and it still has the trappings of what Huntington describes as the ‘kin country’ syndrome. Do you watch Eurovision song contest and the voting patterns at the end of the Eurovision song contest? That's nothing I watch, the songs are generally dreadful. But the Republic of Cyprus always grants twelve points to Greece, however good or bad the song is. And it also often gives high marks to Armenia or other Orthodox countries. And that's a reflection of this sort of “kin country” syndrome.

The serious point though is that in substance the Republic has become part of the West, that's my argument, subject to these lingering attachments to Orthodoxy, and, at least in the occupied areas, to Islam.

Now, let's move on a bit, and I'm conscious at the time, and let's look at the period since 2001 onwards and try and bring this story up to date. Well, what's happened since 2001 is that the Republic of Cyprus without much fanfare, without actually making a fuss about it, without even trying to - as far as I can see - gain too many political or financial rewards has essentially put its territory at the disposal of Western, and primarily US and UK military forces, in connection with Iraq and Afghanistan. That is of fundamental importance and yet I don't think too many people in this Republic have gained any political or financial dividend from it.

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001 - which of course occurred exactly eight years ago today - more than 2,700 people were killed in devastating circumstances. And before the dust had come to settle at the three crash sites, the attention turned to Afghanistan, the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. That quite clear, not just from the media reports, but from the diaries of, for example, Alastair Campbell who was the Prime Minister's press spokesman in the UK at the time. Alastair Campbell's diaries revealed that Tony Blair spent the previous summer reading the Quran - I think that's quite interesting (*inaudible*). But the point is that the - as we all know - the neo-cons in America seized their moment. And those who accepted the Huntington thesis had a (*inaudible*) day. They saw this as the apotheosis of the Huntington vision. I was struck by an article in The Jerusalem Post on the 24th of September, it seemed to encapsulate this train of thought. This is what an opinion piece said in the Jerusalem Post on the 24th of September 2001:

"It's beginning to sink in that what happened on September 11th was not a single terrorist attack on a single country, but the Pearl Harbor of Islamism in its war against the West. In 1941 the Americans were surprised by the Japanese attack. At least they knew what and where Japan was. In retrospect, the great defeated '-isms' of the last century, Nazism and communism, were well understood. Now, we are groping for an understanding of the new '-ism' that has declared war on us."

Now, the neocons seized their moment, America went into Afghanistan - still is today - and went into Iraq. The point is - and it was little reported at the time - Republic of Cyprus opened its airspace and territory to the United States. And from what little information we have in the public domain it's pretty clear that this was not a total ingestion. The Americans seized the opportunity to make use of the airspace and territory of the Republic of Cyprus. And indeed, in 2002 I understand that the US and the Republic signed a mutual legal assistance treaty in relation to the legal and commercial aspects of the so-called "Global War on Terror". But also there was an agreement made in connection, a separate agreement made in connection with cooperative efforts in response to terrorism, humanitarian assistance, US Navy ports visits, US aircraft landings and other agreed activities. In other words, the Republic of Cyprus in 2001 and 2002 effectively opened its territory to US military forces. And that's a profound development, if you think about the non-aligned history of the Republic.

As a consequence of that we now know the American forces used the Republic and the SBAs of course, the British used the Republic and the SBAs of course, and the invasion of Iraq took place. This isn't the place to go into the pros and cons of the invasion of Iraq. For what it's worth, I was on that demonstration in London in February 2003 demonstrating against the forthcoming - or I could see (*inaudible*) all those others. We were ignored. That's another story. The point is the Republic of Cyprus was there for the West to use and the West in the form of the US and the UK used the Republic.

What did the Republic gain in return? You're in a better position to know than I. Did it gain any financial assistance? I don't know. (*Voice from the audience*) *The Annan Plan!* They were given the Annan Plan! (*Laughing*). And I cannot understand the mindset in both Washington and London. Here you are, you have a territory that is at your disposal - the Republic of Cyprus - you have next door Turkey that has said 'no' to you. Remember, in 2003 Turkey said 'no'. On Huntington's terms, Turkey may have said 'no' because of the so-called 'kin country' syndrome with regard to Iraq, partly - if you accept Huntington's thesis - because Turkey is heading in Islamist direction. Whatever the reason, Turkey said 'no'. The Republic of Cyprus said 'yes'. And you would think the Republic would have gained some political dividend - they didn't. They were

presented with this document that was a travesty. It was procedurally defective and it was substantively disastrous as well. And I written about this in a different context.

In fact, my argument here - a very important point I'm going to make - my argument here... And I'll just show you a couple of maps because there's the dodgy dossier from 2002 which alleged that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction which were capable of reaching British bases in Cyprus and Israel and elsewhere. The point is, the point that I'm making to you here is that the Annan plan was not in Western interest. This was a counter-Western document. It was promoted, as we know, by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair. I don't know whether they read the Annan Plan, whether they just read what was given to them by their officials. But the point is that the Annan Plan was not in Western interest.

And I'm going to just draw your attention to one provision of the Annan Plan which doesn't really attract much attention. And it's the provision to do with international military operations. Under the Annan Plan we would have had a Greek Cypriot constituent state and the Turkish Cypriot constituent state operating under the umbrella of a very weak federal government. It beggars belief that under the plan the Republic of Cyprus or the UCR - the United Cyprus Republic - would not have been permitted to put its territory at the disposal of international military operations without the support of not just the United Cyprus Republic, but other parties: the Greek Cypriot constituent state, the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, Greece and Turkey. Now, I'm not the world's leading expert on military strategy but I'm aware of what Sun Tzu said: "Speed is the essence of war." If speed is the essence of war, is it invested interest for the consent of five entities to be obtained before you're able to pass through the airspace of the Republic or make the use of ports, or territory, or air bases? I can't understand the mindset of President Bush and Tony Blair back in 2004, why they agreed to this. The British, of course, have a Treaty of Establishment to fall back on the SBAs. But President Bush didn't have that luxury. And in the event of the Annan Plan going through, the United States would have been left in the position whereby they would have required the consent of Turkey, Greece and these two constituent states to make use of the Republic of Cyprus, and if one of them said 'no', the Americans couldn't use the Republic, and they would be dependent on the British and the SBAs, should they need the SBAs. And as we know from 1973, the British are not guaranteed to always say 'yes' to the Americans. And as we've discovered over the Libya and Lockerbie case over the last few weeks, the British can sometimes upset the Americans in extraordinary circumstances. My point is the Annan Plan was counter-Western. It was a counter-Western document. And beside that narrow strategic point, it would have transformed the Republic of Cyprus into an apartheid, racially flavored and racially divided so-called federal republic.

So that brings me to the second part of my talk, which is a "crescent of crisis" and the "kaleidoscope of conflict". Let's look at the future therefore. What is it that the Republic can do to assist the West in this broader region? Chris Pelagias has already drawn attention to the article in Time magazine which in caps first of all drew attention to this phrase: "the crescent of crisis". It's been subsequently reported and used in this book that was written by three authors. Two of them have been serving in the Obama administration. So it's a phrase I think we need to treat seriously and regard with some degree of respect and care. The Republic is, as we can see, situated - I would put it this way - off of the Middle East, it's not really a part of the Middle East. It's now of course part of the European Union. But it's beautifully positioned in one sense in order to enable Western forces militarily to gain access to that region, of course, it's dependent, as far as naval forces are concerned, on the Suez Canal, and as far as air forces, it's dependent on air

space clearance from other states in the region. But geographically it's in a beautifully positioned location.

But leaving aside the hard military aspects of this. Cyprus is also beautifully positioned in another sense. It's culturally close to this region, the people of this island understand the mindset of the people in the so-called 'crescent of crisis', there are existing trade links, there are new educational links with the various universities here. The Republic is in a beautiful location to assist the West in dealing with this region on not just the military level, but perhaps more importantly on the soft political and cultural level too.

Let me just wrap up for the next five minutes or so by just throwing your attention to the 2006... Sorry. Let me just refer to the "kaleidoscope of conflict". This is a phrase that was coined by General Dannatt who has recently retired as the Chief of the General Staff of the UK. He was a politically astute general who was not afraid to speak his mind and upset New Labour politicians. But he offered a number of thoughtful ideas as regards the future of Western military and political strategy around the world. And according to general Dannatt, the West faces two major trends. The first major trend is the threat of al-Qaeda-fueled Islamist extremism. That's the first trend as part of this "kaleidoscope of conflict" that he refers to. We have a major threat and it perhaps can be confronted partly with military power, but perhaps more importantly with non-military soft power as well.

And the second trend that he refers to focuses on the so-called 'information campaign': the way in which the world's problems are going to be addressed requires good use of information. I presume what he means is intelligence gathering in one sense, but also communications, broadcasting, education, the promotion of values in another sense as well. (*inaudible*) the Republic of Cyprus is beautifully positioned in regard to assisting the West as regards both trends. Let's look at the military aspect from one point of view. We had the Lebanon crisis in July 2006. The Republic hosted – I forget the figures, is it 15,000? – American fugitives from Lebanon. Several thousand Brits were evacuated here. The French used the island. The Australians used the island. They used Turkey as well to some extent. But the main thrust of the operations was here. So Cyprus is perfectly positioned to assist in humanitarian military operations in that sense. But in another sense, BBC has these transmitters still I think in Zygi. Cyprus is valuable in terms of broadcasting, it's valuable in terms of Education, and perhaps more can be done in that regard.

Let me now come to my third and final part of my talk. I've tried over the last forty minutes or so to explain to you, firstly, how the Republic of Cyprus has progressed from being a pillar of the non-aligned movement into a unique member of the Euro-Atlantic alliance and of the West. It hasn't joined NATO alliance or indeed Partnership for Peace, and as far as I'm aware it hasn't even made any applications to join. But what it has done, it has joined the European Union, it's cozied up to the Americans and it's trying to maintain its friendship with the United Kingdom and other Western players. So there's quite a profound transformation.

Today we find ourselves confronting this - as our national security strategist in the UK has put it - threat of Islamist extremism and terrorism, and we have other problems as well with WMD and threats of more traditional nature. In fact, this week before I left England, the newspapers reported this ghastly crown court case which involved the conviction of three UK-born gentlemen of Pakistani origin who were involved in plotting to blow up - I don't have to say that allegedly anymore because they were convicted - they were convicted of plotting to blow up seven or more airliners flying from the UK over to the United States. It was referred to by The Times's

“An airline plot to rival 9/11.” And The Independent referred to it as “Potentially Britain's 9/11.” But this threat of Islamist extremism it's not something that... I was a bit skeptical when I started reading about this. But now we're seeing the court cases and the convictions and the evidence that's presented to court. We're beginning to see that this is a genuine and real threat. And it is a threat the West should treat seriously and it should act accordingly. The Republic is perfectly positioned to enable the West, if it needs to engage in military operations, to engage in those military operations in areas - and it looks as if this plot had a Pakistani element - in areas to the east where these threats emerge.

The problem is that the two leaders here on the island, they are engaged in a so-called peace process which is going to - if it succeeds - result in the establishment of a bi-zonal bi-communal federation consisting of the two political communities. It's going to turn this Republic into a basket case which the West will not be able to use properly. Furthermore, as I see there is a risk of Islamist extremism entrenching itself in the occupied areas of the north. I've read over the summer that - I may be wrong, and perhaps a Turkish Cypriot here can correct me if I am wrong - but I read that compulsory Quran classes are being introduced in the schools in the occupied areas. That's partly the product of the influence of the so-called secular Turkey. I also read this week that a cleric in the occupied areas has called for the old part of Nicosia to be transformed into an Islamic canton, where Sharia law prevails. Are we thinking about these things carefully? Does the bi-communal settlement really going to enable the Republic to remain a Western entity? Or is it going to fulfill Huntington's thesis and see a Christian-dominated south and a Muslim-dominated north? Do we really want to have racially and religiously defined zones - a phrase relevant to Germany and the postwar period - do we really want to have racially and religiously defined zones in the Republic of Cyprus as the future unfolds? Do we really want Turkey, which is itself militarily progressing in a neo-Ottoman direction and perhaps politically progressing in an Islamist direction, do we want Turkey to maintain a permanent military presence in the Republic of Cyprus, or in whatever entity it turns into in the future? Do we want to have that provision that we had back in 2004 with the Annan Plan whereby Turkey has a veto over how the territory of this place is used? I've put these points in the form of questions so we can maybe discuss them afterwards. But I would argue that the interests of the West are not served by any Annan Plan settlement. And I would go one step further and say the whole concept of bi-zonality and bi-communality is alien to the West, it's contrary to the Western interest, it undermines Western values and it ought to be consigned to the dustbin of history, together with partition and enosis.

If the Republic is to serve the West, and play a role in the West, and to help construct bridges into the 'crescent of crisis', in my view it needs to be a democratic, unitary, united Republic which is stripped of these 1960 arrangements.

Which brings me finally to the British. The British have tried to go about things in Cyprus in a rather different way. Whereas Turkey, for example, has used brute force to acquire territory, the British are engaged in this wonderful practice that William Mallinson first used: “elginism”. It's a practice which I refer to in my paper. It's rather like the practice of acquiring the Elgin Marbles or the Parthenon Marbles, which are in the British Museum. This is my definition of “elginism”: “It may be described as a peculiarly British process of securing a *prima facie* a legal title over property or territory but in circumstances which raise awkward questions, if not also the possibility of a legal challenge to the provenance of the title.” So the British have this wonderful presence here on the island through the Sovereign Base Areas and the Treaty of Establishment

which I would argue is “elginistic” in its characterization. But perhaps the Republic ought to think seriously about how to deal with the British presence in the future. perhaps it should be restructured under a new treaty with different arrangements, bilateral rather than quadrilateral, and British bases are folded into the new security apparatus which protects the interests of the people here more than the interests, or as much as the interests, if not more, than the interests of the outsiders. And much more broadly the Republic ought to consider what it is doing in the global security architecture. Should it further engage with the West? Should it apply to the security structures which now exist? Is it going to fulfill its destiny in the Western direction by joining any of those organizations? And I would argue these questions ought to be resolved now, before there's any settlement, not after the settlement has been reached. Because if a settlement is reached and you have disagreements on something as fundamental as this, you can have deadlock. And nothing is going to happen and the system and the state will (*inaudible*).

I think my time is up ladies and gentlemen. But I hope I fulfilled the mission that was given to me by Ray and I have been provocative. And I noticed I hadn't been arrested yet which suggests that this place is still a liberal democracy.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION*

Philip Towle**

11 September 2009

British Strategy and Cyprus: Past and Present

Introduction

Ever since 1878, when Britain took control of Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire, British politicians and commentators have looked for ways in which the island might be employed to influence events in the Balkans and Middle East, first as a naval and military base, and later as an air base, a broadcasting station and an Intelligence gathering post. How far any of these ambitions could be realized depended crucially on whether decision makers understood political developments in the region but secondly on whether British agents in the area could put their decisions into effect.

Analyses of great power intervention in the Third World are divided between those who believe that policies are primarily decided on Machiavellian grounds of ruthless interest and those who believe that a mixture of interest, good intentions and incompetence generally lies at the root of policy. This essay falls firmly into the latter group; it suggests that British policies towards the region have failed when their Intelligence has been poor and politicians have misunderstood the tide of events and thus their ability to influence them.¹

Historical background

Britain took over Cyprus because of the grand strategic changes which were happening in the Balkans, Turkey and Egypt and which shaped the politics of what our conveners here today call that “troublesome region that stretches from the Balkans into Central Asia, the Near East and North Africa”. The first change was that the peoples of the Balkans were becoming politically aware and determined to expel their Ottoman rulers, a process which had popular support in Europe partly because the Balkan peoples were seen as representatives of Christianity and partly because of the methods the Turks used to repress them.² Yet their unrest increased fears amongst Conservative British politicians of Russian expansion into that region and into Turkey proper

* *Text as submitted by the speaker.*

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¹ Mohammed Ayoob, Editor, *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World*, Croom Helm, London, 1980.

² ‘Central Europe Cannot Shut Its Eyes,’ *The Times*, 3 September 1877.

because many erroneously believed that Turkey itself was in terminal decline. At the same time, the French construction of the Suez Canal in 1869 had focused attention on Ottoman possessions in the Middle East as never before. Although they knew that the canal would vastly improve communications and trade with India and elsewhere in Asia, the British had opposed its development because they knew that it would increase suspicions between Britain and France, and enhance their competition over Egypt.

The British statesmen who attended the Congress of Berlin in June and July 1878, Salisbury and Disraeli, attempted to find a comprehensive solution to these problems. The outcome was lauded at the time as a great British achievement and both statesmen have high reputations for their policies. The conference accepted that Turkey could no longer control any part of Europe but the British tried to prevent Russia dominating the successor states. At the same time they guaranteed Turkey in Asia and backed that assurance by attempting to establish a base in Cyprus from which they thought they could send forces to Turkey's assistance. They also imagined that they could push their fleet through the Dardanelles to protect Constantinople should Russia attack.³

And yet, the much-vaunted British achievement proved both in the short and medium term equally problematic. Cypriot geography made it unsuitable for the naval base they sought; in the 1880s it seemed a fever-ridden, poverty-stricken island of which little could be hoped and which the Gladstone government soon considered abandoning. We also now know that Russian policy was far less coherent than the British often believed; there was no coordinated, long-term plan for expansion, just a series of ad hoc moves impelled by ambitious pro-consuls in Central Asia and by popular Russian support for the aspirations of the Serbs and other Balkan Slavs.⁴

Within three years of the British intervention in Cyprus, Gladstone's anti-imperialist government had initiated the British domination of Egypt and the Suez Canal which lasted until 1956 and which greatly diminished any strategic importance of Cyprus over the next decades. More ironically, Turkey was to show 37 years after the Congress of Berlin that it was not only not in a state of collapse but that it could defeat the British who had so condescendingly agreed to protect it against Russia. In the meantime, Russia had now become one of Britain's two most important allies in a desperate struggle for survival.

In sum, British policy in 1878 was based on poor Intelligence of conditions in Cyprus, of the resilience of Turkey, of Britain's ability to come to Turkey's support, of the intentions of the Russian government and of the Russians' capacity to dominate the Balkans. Subsequent British policies in the Middle East often had the reverse effect to those intended. To take two of the most egregious examples; the ambiguous commitment in the Balfour Declaration to establish a Jewish 'homeland' in Palestine enabled both Zionists and Palestinians to claim that the British had broken their word. From 1922 onwards, British politicians made frequent efforts to demonstrate what a 'homeland' did not mean but they were never able to show exactly what it did mean.⁵ The Declaration has left a running sore which continues to destabilize the region, while British efforts to regain control of the Suez Canal in 1956 led to their humiliation and exposed their economic

³ Dwight E. Lee, *Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention of 1878*, Harvard University Press, London, 1934, chapter three; A. J. P. Taylor and A. P. Thornton in F.H. Hinsley, *The New Cambridge Modern History XI: Material Progress and Worldwide problems*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, pp. 548, 553, 573, 575.

⁴ Dietrich Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy 1860-1914*, Berg, Lemington Spa, pp. 77- 85.

⁵ See *Palestine: Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government*, Official Communique No 2/39, paragraphs 4 to 7.

weakness. The leaders of the states, which they were supposed to be protecting in the Baghdad Pact, actually felt sorry for their 'protector' although they also wished to dissociate themselves from a country which could attack an Arab state in conjunction with the Israelis.⁶ In the first case, the British wholly misunderstood the relationship between Jews and Arabs, in the second they underestimated the strength of Egyptian nationalism and Washington's hostility to any policy which smacked of colonialism.⁷

There were successes for British policies in the Middle East, but these were often achieved, despite the inadequacies of government policies, by British officials and military officers who had expertise on Arab politics. Immediately after the First World War Britain took over more territory in the area than it could manage in the face of Arab resistance. It was left to officials like Percy Sykes, Arnold Wilson and John Glubb to find some way of administering and policing Iraq at a price Britain could afford.⁸ Similarly, it was the British armed forces which had to fight to maintain control of Iraq when it broke into rebellion in 1919 and to maintain some degree of peace between Jews and Arabs in the newly acquired Palestinian mandate. Again, it was the armed forces which had to regain the Suez Canal in 1956 and to control the Basra area of Iraq after the Anglo-American invasion in 2003.

Changes in the balance of power between great and small states

The process of universal political involvement, which destabilized the Balkans in the 1870s, has now encompassed the whole region on which we are focusing today. Whenever such politicization takes place *before* stable, constitutional structures and civic institutions have been developed, the process is profoundly unsettling and usually violent. The Balkans are still unstable almost a century and a half after the Berlin Congress, providing the world with a new term for an old pattern of behavior in 'ethnic cleansing' in the 1990s.⁹ Such violence is particularly intense when the country involved is divided by culture and religion.¹⁰ It also increases in direct proportion to the degree to which the historic religions are prescriptive and autocratic. It is through religion that the process of politicization begins and if a particular religion teaches people to use their own powers of reasoning and intuition, rather than to rely on authority, then modernization is much smoother.

If political involvement has made the region unstable, it has also completely changed the military balance between great and small powers. When Britain took over Cyprus in 1878 there was no serious opposition either from Turkey or the people living on the island.¹¹ And the British remained on the island even when they found it of no immediate strategic use. They kept it because it was not costly to garrison and because Queen Victoria and others believed that giving

⁶ Mohamed Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez through Egyptian Eyes*, Arbor House, New York, 1987, p. 221.

⁷ See Anthony Eden, *Full Circle*, Cassell, London, 1960, book 3, chapter one; Keith Kyle, *Suez*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1992; Selwyn Lloyd, *Suez 1956: A Personal Account*, Jonathan Cape, 1978, chapter 14.

⁸ Arnold Wilson, *Mesopotamia 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties*, Oxford University Press, London, 1931, p. 273; Philip Graves, *The Life of Sir Percy Cox*, Hutchinson, London, undated; John Glubb, *Arabian adventures: Ten Years of Joyful Service*, Cassell, London, 1978. Some paid for official mistakes with their lives - see Zetton Buchanan, *In the Hands of the Arabs*, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1921.

⁹ For the way in which this process had long affected the region see Milovan Djilas, *Land Without Justice*, Methuen, London, 1958.

¹⁰ See, for example, Lt Colonel R. S. Stafford, *The Tragedy of the Assyrians*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1935.

¹¹ Not that Britain could impose its culture on Cyprus, see Mary Koutselini-Ioannidou, 'Curriculum as a Political text: the Case of Cyprus (1935-1990)', *History of Education*, Vol. 26, pp. 395-407.

it up might involve some loss of prestige. Ironically, it began to become useful to the British in the 1950s, because of the development of airpower and the weakening of their position in the Middle East, just when the rise of EOKA made their position untenable. In the event they had to concede the independence of the island, something they had declared impossible at the start of EOKA's campaign. The balance has swung yet further in favor of guerrilla movements in recent years, beginning in Sri Lanka, with the appearance of suicide bombers.

And suicidal attacks are not the only new factor. 9/11 should have woken the Western world to a change almost as great as politicization itself. Guerrillas will now take the battle to their enemies' homeland. EOKA did not generally carry out attacks on Britain itself, nor did the Vietcong attack the United States. There were, of course, exceptions, Udham Singh hunted down Sir Michael O'Dwyer and killed him on 13 March 1940, two decades after O'Dwyer had been Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab during the Amritsar massacre.¹² But that was unusual. In the future, politicization, cheap travel and the spread of minority ethnic groups in the West, will ensure that similar assassinations and terrorist attacks will be much more frequent. The consequences are already apparent, Britain, for example, has doubled the size of its Intelligence community over recent years. Everywhere border surveillance and airport security has been strengthened. This means that less money is available to spend on the traditional armed forces and that, despite George W. Bush's proclamation of a 'war on terror' and British determination to carry the war to the terrorists, the European security establishments are moving from the attack to the defence.¹³

The growth of Islamist movements

However radical they were, the governments, which came to power in the Middle East after the end of colonialism, shared many Western political ideals, notably to raise standards of living. In most cases they failed because there was too much government interference and centralization; while Europe was recovering from the Second World War and East Asia was astonishing the world by its industrialization, the only great increases in prosperity in the Middle East were a consequence of oil exports from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Iran, although there was subsidiary development due to European tourism on the Mediterranean coast. In 1982 the Algerian economy grew by 2.5 percent, the Iraqi economy declined by 5 percent, the Kuwaiti by 7.5 percent, the Libyan by two percent and the Lebanese by 2.5 percent.¹⁴ There were dramatic changes year by year but by 2007 the Algerian GDP per head was only \$3944, the Egyptian \$1656, the Iranian \$3969, the Iraqi \$2265, the Jordanian \$2606 and the Lebanese \$5737. In some of the oil rich states the situation was very different with Kuwaitis having a GDP per head of \$45,328, the Qataris \$78,127 and the Saudis \$13661.¹⁵ But there was a widespread feeling that development had failed. India has responded to a similar discovery in the 1990s by opening its markets, freeing its industry from government control and achieving economic growth of about 7% a year. Not so the Middle East where frustration and national humiliation have turned into displaced aggression against the West.

When different societies and states are brought into contact, one usually becomes dominant and tries to persuade the others to assimilate its culture. Alternatively, the dominant culture can try

¹² Alfred Draper, *Echoes of War: The Amritsar Massacre and the Twilight of the Raj*, Buchan and Enright, London, 1985.

¹³ For the British response see *The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter*, Cm 5566 Vol. 1, Ministry of Defence, London, 2002.

¹⁴ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1983-1984*, London, 1983, pp. 50-65.

¹⁵ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2009*, Routledge, London, 2009, chapter five.

to maintain its position by perpetuating its separation and the weaker culture may collude in this process to protect itself through isolation, although it will try to overcome its weakness in other ways.¹⁶ In the 1950s and 1960s it seemed that the countries bordering the southern and eastern Mediterranean were assimilating European *political and economic* culture, and could live with the effects of tourism. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the growth of Islamist movements elsewhere have thrown this assumption into question. Anti-Western propagandists now come in many forms; many claim that the West has tried not just to introduce democracy and capitalism but to destroy all Islamic culture and religion by assimilating these into Western patterns and trying to impose the 18th Century Enlightenment on the Islamic world. Thus the Egyptian Professor Zaynab Abd Al-Aziz told Saudi television in May 2005 that the Second Vatican Council in 1965 had set out to Christianize the world. This plan had been backed by the United States' government which staged the 9/11 attacks in order to launch a 'crusade' against the Muslim world beginning with Iraq. Nor is this an isolated view; the former Syrian Information Minister, Dr. Mahdi Dakhallallah and others have accepted this conspiracy theory about 9/11.¹⁷ Whether or not they agreed about the genesis of 9/11 others deplored its effects; 30 heads of Pakistani madrassas and prominent Islamic scholars put out a statement in January 2008 claiming that after 9/11:

Efforts were launched with full preparedness to take the nation on an irreligious path in the name of 'moderation' and 'progressive' thinking. Changes were made in the curricula of the educational system, to make them look good to foreigners instead of [making them appropriate for] our national interests. Completely unjustified amendments were made in hudood law [regarding women] in the name of women's rights- [amendments] which were not only unrelated to women's rights but also included further injustices against them. And the government, instead of resolving these problems, remained busy promoting dancing, the Basan [kite festival], [and women's participation in] marathons.¹⁸

Thus, al Qaeda has been successful in encouraging Muslim resentment against the West. Its attacks have been designed to prove that the West was much more vulnerable than it had seemed in the past. Osama bin Laden's former bodyguard, Nasser Ahmad Nasser Al-Bahri explained that al Qaeda attacked the US destroyer Cole in Yemen because it wanted:

To damage the USA's reputation in the naval arena, to raise the morale of the Muslims and to prove to the Islamic nation that its sons are capable of striking the nation's enemies wherever they may be, by sea, by air and by land.¹⁹

The Egyptian MP, Hamadein Sabahi told Egyptian television in July 2005, 'any weapon that kills an American is good. Any gun aiming at the Marines is good. Any slaughtering of an American in Iraq is good'.²⁰

Muslim liberals have resisted Islamist claims, dismissed conspiracy theories about 9/11 and

¹⁶ George M. Frederickson, 'Models of American Ethnic Relations: A Historical Perspective,' in Deborah Prentice and Dale Miller (Editors), *Cultural Divides: Understanding and Overcoming Group Conflict*, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1999, chapter two. As far as colonialism was concerned see Richard Faber, *The Vision and the Need: Late Victorian Imperialist Aims*, Faber and Faber, London, 1966, chapter one.

¹⁷ Special Dispatch-Egypt/Saudi Arabia, 10 June 2005, Middle East Media Research Institute; Special Dispatch-Syria-US and the Middle East, 11 September 2007, Middle East Media Research Institute.

¹⁸ Urdu-Pashtu Media Project, 19 February 2008, Middle East Media Research Institute.

¹⁹ Special Dispatch N. 766-Jihad and Terrorism, 19 August 2004, Middle East Media Research Institute.

²⁰ Special Dispatch-Egypt/Jihad and Terrorism, 27 July 2004, Middle East Media Research Institute.

praised the tolerance shown by European societies towards Muslim immigrants. Dr Ahmad Abu Matar, a Palestinian living in Norway pointed out that even the extremist Islamic Liberation Party was able to operate from London and to call for the spread of Islam to the rest of the world and the need for the Queen of England to convert. Such tolerance continued even though Muslim clerics encouraged the assassination of the Dutch cinema director Van Gogh and other terrorist incidents.²¹ Similarly, Abd Al-Mun'im Sa'id, the Director of the Centre for Political and Strategic Studies of the Al-Ahram publishing house criticised the persecution of minorities in the Arab world and the intolerance and despotism found in most of the region. The Islamic countries are thus pulled between those who support the development of some features of secular political and social behaviour, and those who attack democracy, favouring rather the adoption of Sharia law and other strictures of traditional Muslim society. The schism has been likened to the emergence of Protestantism and the struggles of the Reformation in Europe.

Western involvement in the Middle East

Writing in 1932 the distinguished British strategist, J.F.C.Fuller commented:

The materialistic conception of fighting force must undergo a drastic change if force is to maintain internal tranquillity and frustrate external pressure. It is not physical force itself which is wrong, but physical force applied to conditions which it cannot rectify... Physical force is but one of several means of protecting national existence, or if needs be, of carrying the national will over the frontiers of hostile peoples.²²

In the 1930s, when Fuller was writing, it was only too clear that winning the battle of ideas was as important as winning on the battlefield. The Allies were victorious in 1918 but they lost the battle to convince the German people that the post-war settlement was reasonable, not least because influential writers led by John Maynard Keynes had denounced the settlement, accusing the US, British, French and Italian leaders of 'empty and arid intrigue' and of failing to understand the magnitude of the issues before them. Despite initial criticism of Keynes' book, which *The Times* described as the 'cry of an academic mind, accustomed to deal with the abstractions of that largely metaphysical enterprise known as "political economy"', other writers began to follow his lead. Eventually his views, however destructive they were because of the filippic they gave to German revisionism, became the conventional wisdom as they fulfilled some deep psychological need for self-criticism amongst the educated elite in Britain and the United States.²³ The failure to win this battle and the onset of the great depression meant that the German democrats lost the political struggle with the National Socialists. The consequence was another disastrous World War leading to millions of deaths and the devastation of Europe, the Middle East and China.

Today the West has to understand the battle of ideas in the Islamic world and how, if at all, it can assist those who sympathize with its political and economic beliefs. If the conservatives were to win, the Islamic world would stay economically inert and politically unstable. Emigrants would continue to flood into Europe amongst whom a minority would use violence to try and impose

²¹ Special Dispatch-Reform Project, 10 June 2005, Middle East Media Research Institute.

²² J. F. C.Fuller, *The Dragon's Teeth: A Study of War and Peace*, Constable, London, 1932, p. 197.

²³ John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, New York, 1920, pp. 6,7; 'A Candid Critic of the Peace,' *The Times*, 5 January 1920; Harold Nicholson, *Peacemaking 1919*, Constable, London, 1933. More balanced works were often ignored, see for example, E.J. Dillon, *The Peace Conference*, Hutchinson, London, 1919, and Paul Mantoux, *The Carthaginian Peace or the Economic Consequences of Mr Keynes*, Oxford University Press, London, 1946.

Islamist views. Since this is the primary issue, military intervention by the United States and Britain in Iraq in March 2003 was an egregious mistake because it deposed the secular ruler of Iraq, Saddam Hussein and thus strengthened his rivals, the more deeply religious governments in neighboring countries. After 9/11 the Western powers ignored their own precepts and laws, and exposed themselves to the charge of hypocrisy; they claimed to believe in democracy yet refused to accept the election of Hamas in Palestine; they denounced torture in the Third World, yet used it in Guantanamo and sent prisoners to be tortured elsewhere.

Their policy towards the Middle East exposed not only the weakness of Western Intelligence but the profound amateurishness of the policy making mechanism. The decision to attack Iraq was taken by a handful of people with no deep experience of the Middle East, no clear understanding of the nature of the Iraqi government and of the absurdity of their claim that Saddam Hussein had helped the Islamists of al-Qaeda organize 9/11. Connections between al-Qaeda and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, one of the Kurdish guerrilla groups fighting against Baghdad, were distorted by leading members of the administration and particularly the Vice-President Cheney to suggest a link between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein -equivalent to suggesting a link between the British and Libyan governments in the 1980s because the Libyans were in touch with the IRA.²⁴ There was a curious parallel between 1956 and 2003; in the first case Anthony Eden's mendacious denials of coordination between the French, British and Israelis were followed by the disastrous Anglo-French attack on Egypt, notionally to protect the Suez Canal during a war between Israel and Egypt. It took decades for Britain's reputation to recover.

The incompetence of the Bush administration and the Blair government landed the armed forces in a second war (after Afghanistan) of a type for which they were particularly ill-suited. In a conventional war the United States is more powerful than all the other countries in the world, it needs to do everything possible to avoid embroiling itself in campaigns which play to its weakness rather than its strength. The possibility that an insurgency might break out against invaders should have been clear to anyone who had studied Iraqi history. Precisely such a rebellion had occurred when British took over the country under a League of Nations mandate after the First World War and that insurrection was to be replicated in the resistance to the United States after 2003.²⁵

The strength of that rebellion encouraged America's enemies and discouraged its allies. As Hamas leader Khaled Mash'al argued in February 2006:

We say to the West, which does not act reasonably, and does not learn its lessons. By Allah, you will be defeated. You will be defeated in Palestine, and your defeat there has already begun. (...) America will be defeated in Iraq, wherever the [Islamic] nation is targeted, its enemies will be defeated, Allah willing. (...) Tomorrow our nation will sit on the throne of the world. This is not a figment of the imagination, but a fact. (...) The Arabs have said: we don't want [conventional] wars, thank you very much. Leave the war to the peoples. Today the Israeli weapons are of no use against the peoples. We have imposed a new equation in

²⁴ See, for example, Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, Pocket Books/Simon Schuster, London, 2004, p. 141; 'Bush Claim on Saddam, al-Qaeda Link Debunked,' *The Hindu*, Madras, 10 September 2006.

²⁵ Arnold Wilson, *Mesopotamia 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties*, Oxford University Press, London, 1931; Zeton Buchanan, *In The Hands of the Arabs*, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1921.

the war. In this equation, our tools are stronger. That is why we will defeat them, Allah willing.²⁶

Public reaction

The impact of the US attack on Iraq on public opinion around the world was revealed by the Pew polls in June 2003. The pollsters asked people to rank 'world figures' in terms of their confidence in their tendency to do the right thing; bin Laden came first in Palestine, third in Indonesia and second in Jordan, Pakistan and Morocco. 93% of Moroccans, 91% of Jordanians, 82% of Turks and Indonesians and 74% of Pakistanis expressed disappointment that Iraqi resistance against the United States had not been more effective. Even amongst US allies, 58% of South Koreans, 30% of French and 29% of Kuwaitis also expressed disappointment. For the West, the only encouraging aspect of the polls was that large majorities in many Muslim countries continued to believe in democracy, 83% in Kuwait, 75% in Lebanon and 63% in Jordan. Ominously it was in Turkey, which has had a quasi-democratic system for many years, that the highest proportion, 37%, said democracy was a Western system unsuitable for the Muslim world.²⁷ Similarly, in 2007 81% of Turks said they disliked US ideas about democracy and 83% disliked American ways of doing business.²⁸ This popular antagonism towards democracy in such a society shows how profound the gap remains between certain Western and Muslim ideals and political behavior. Many years ago, the Indian writer Nirad Chaudhuri pointed out how much deeper and more personal the clash was between the West on one side and the Hindu and Muslim worlds on the other than what he called the 'cold-blooded' Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West.²⁹ More recently, as argued above, India has moved closer to the West, while elements in the Muslim world have moved in the opposite direction. Roger Scruton has shown how this is partly the result of the fundamental contradiction between a society which tries to solve political problems by discussion and agreement on one side and a society which relies on interpretation of a sacred text.³⁰

The closest parallel to the Islamist reaction against the West is Japanese policy in the 1930s. In that case also Japan had emulated the West after its opening in the 19th Century, absorbing Western technology, copying the German army and the British navy and modelling its constitution on the German Reich. At the same time its educational system stressed the importance of nationalism and loyalty to the Emperor, while Shintoism became the dominant religion.³¹ By the late 1920s the young nationalists who had come through this system were disappointed with the way in which the West had responded and with what they regarded as the appeasement of Western governments by their own leaders. They tore apart the embryonic democratic system by assassinating Japanese statesmen, undermined the League of Nations by invading Manchuria and showed their rejection of international law by killing or enslaving Asians who stood in their way or allied prisoners who fell into their hands. The kamikaze pilot at the

²⁶ Special Dispatch-Palestinian Authority/Jihad and Terrorism, 7 February 2006, Middle East Media Research Institute.

²⁷ Pew Research Centre, 'Views of a Changing World 2003: War with Iraq Further Divides Global Politics,' <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=185>.

²⁸ Pew Research Centre, 'Global Unease with Major World Powers,' 27 June 2007, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256>.

²⁹ Nirad C. Chaudhuri, 'My Views of the Real East-West Conflict,' *Encounter*, September-October 1985.

³⁰ Roger Scruton, *The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat*, Continuum, London, 2002.

³¹ Walter A. Skya, *Japan's Holy War: The Ideology of Radical Shintō Ultrnationalism*, Duke University Press, Durham, 2009.

end of the war was a precursor of the suicide bomber. In the Japanese case the Western powers had failed to study the Japanese educational system and so they did not understand what was happening. Similarly, it was only recently that they began to appreciate the effect the Saudi-funded madrassas were having across the Islamic world.

The election of President Obama has greatly improved the image of the United States in most countries; 90 percent of Kenyans and 79% of Nigerians now express a favorable view. But such sympathy is still much less obvious in parts of the Islamic world with only 27% of Egyptians, 25% of Jordanians, 16% of Pakistanis and 14% of Turks expressing favorable views. Now that the focus has turned to Afghanistan with the reduction in the US presence in Iraq, the same split between the Muslim and non-Muslim world is still evident. Only 19% of Egyptians, 15% of Turks, 12% of Jordanians and 4% of Pakistanis support the US presence in that country.³²

The Role of Cyprus and the ferment in the Muslim world

The utility of British bases in Cyprus will largely depend upon the quality of the policy for which they are employed. As General Fuller pointed out in the quotation above, it is not that military force is never useful but that it has to be employed only when appropriate. Al Qaeda and other Islamists argue that every Western use of military force in the Muslim world is an attack on the Muslim nation, in other words that the US should not have used force to free Kuwait from Iraq in 1991. Nor do they give the West any credit for its support for Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo; on the contrary they blame it for not helping them soon enough. But these are not necessarily majority views in the Islamic world. The Islamists' objective is to blacken the West in every way and to block its ability to use its conventional forces to beneficial effect.

Different cultures interact economically, politically and ideologically. Friction is inevitable when the Western ideology and the Islamic world come into contact. The magazine of the Global Islamic Front Sada Al-Jihad attacked the "filthiness of the souls" of Western peoples in July 2009, blamed democracy for the World Wars and described it as "a great tribulation and a huge catastrophe" because "Islam and democracy are absolutely incompatible".³³ Given the difficulty of bridging such differences by negotiation, it is all the more important to try to encourage rapprochement on economic and political issues. Though terrorists are rarely poor and frequently come from the richest and best-educated sectors, many of the current problems in the Islamic world are economic. The West can encourage stability in the region by assisting broad economic development, which means providing technical aid and market access. Only if the Islamic world is generally integrated into the global economy and not just through oil exports can some of the resentment building up in Arab cities be reduced. Politically the greatest advance would be a reduction in Israeli-Palestinian hostility, which would undo some of the damage done by the Balfour Declaration and its implementation. But any compromise would involve concessions which some on either side would reject altogether and all would find very hard to stomach.

Everything that has been written above suggests that the Western leaders have sometimes been extremely poor at assessing the situation in the Muslim world and responding appropriately. They have embarrassed and humiliated themselves over Suez in 1956 and Iraq in 2003, they have

³² Pew Research Centre, 'Chart of Opinion of the United States in 2009,' <http://pewglobal.org/database>.

³³ 'Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor,' 8 July 2009, Middle East Media Research Institute. See also Nirupama Subramanian, 'Extremism's New Face', *The Hindu*, 15 April 2007, and 'Karzai Backs Down Over "Abhorrent" Marital Rape Law,' *The Times*, 28 April 2009.

left problems in Palestine which have, for decades, defeated all attempts at a solution, and they have abandoned those like the Iraqi Assyrians whom they professed to be helping.³⁴ What is needed is for Western governments to listen much more carefully to experts on the Middle East and to those living in countries like Cyprus which are located in the region. This means following a much more cautious policy than has been the case in the recent past; the distinguished 19th-century political analyst, Walter Bagehot summarized the views of those who advocate such a diffident style of foreign policy:

We wish that foreign nations should, as far as may be, solve their own problems; we wish them to gain all the good they can by their own exertions, and to remove all the evil. But we do not wish to take part in their struggles. We fear that we might mistake as to what was best; we fear that in so shifting a scene we might find, years hence, when the truth is known, that we had in fact done exactly the reverse of what was meant, and had really injured what we meant to aid. We fear that, amid the confusion, our good might turn to evil, and that our help might be a calamity and not a blessing.³⁵

³⁴ R.S. Stafford, *The Tragedy of the Assyrians*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1935.

³⁵ Walter Bagehot, *Biographical Studies*, Longmans Green, London, 1895, p. 377.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Robert Holand**

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The British, the Mediterranean and the Anglo-Cypriot Relationship: What Went Wrong and Can it Be Put Right?

“For Great Britain,” the distinguished diplomatic historian E.H. Carr said in a lecture during 1937 ‘the Mediterranean problem is, in its final analysis, a problem of the way in, the way through, and the way out. If you consider the steps by which Great Britain became a Mediterranean power, you will find that her policy has always been dominated by this question of entrances and exits.’¹ Carr was writing in the after-blast of the crisis over Abyssinia, in its strategic aspect essentially a Mediterranean crisis. If you read the history of most Mediterranean countries during the 1930s, Abyssinia crops up prominently. Books on Cyprus largely ignore it. The introspectiveness of Cypriot affairs – both of the Cypriots themselves, and the British in Cyprus – is a theme I will come back to.

The ambivalence of Cyprus in British strategic assessments from 1878 onwards lies in the fact that Cyprus is not, in any very precise sense, on the way in, through or out of anywhere in the Mediterranean. It is not an *opening* such as Gibraltar, the Straits of Constantinople, Alexandria/Suez, or indeed Alexandretta, nor does it have the centrally commanding position of Malta. “Cyprus I should not propose to consider,” a senior Admiralty planner sniffily remarked in 1898 when considering where the British Mediterranean Fleet should be based at the outbreak of any war, “as it has no harbors and no strategic value.”² Such dismissiveness on the part of British military planners could be endlessly quoted.

The problem here is that strategic value is such a nebulous concept. It is what anybody wants to make of it at a particular time, and under specific and often wildly changing circumstances.

** Text as submitted by the speaker.*

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¹ E.H. Carr, ‘Great Britain as a Mediterranean Power,’ Cust Foundation Lecture, University College, Nottingham, 1937, p. 1.

² ‘Strategic Position of the Mediterranean Fleet in Time of War,’ 5 April 1898, ADM 121/75, National Archives of the United Kingdom.

Gibraltar offers a classic instance. Its military significance has entered all kind of lexicons, including the musical. Mozart wrote an Ode to its defenders during the great siege by Spain in the 1780s, and “safe as the Rock of Gibraltar” has a place in English usage – Ella Fitzgerald used it in a soulful lyric in the 1940s (probably because it had been General Eisenhower’s first headquarters as American and Allied Commander in Europe). Yet there is a considerable body of literature from the late eighteenth century stressing Gibraltar’s military and naval *defects*, from its lack of water and vulnerability to disease, to the fact that from the moment really big guns were invented – the Armstrongs, Krupps and Creusots of the 1870s – Spain could have made the Rock untenable for the British at any time *if she dared to do so*, which until Franco in the 1950s and 1960s she never did.³ When a distinguished soldier was appointed Governor of Gibraltar in 1938 he remarked after his briefings in Whitehall that the place was “...only a garage. I dread to think what the Gibraltarians would say if they knew.”⁴ Many a Governor of Cyprus must have dreaded what Cypriots would think had Whitehall’s assessments of its value been published in the Government Gazette in Nicosia. In short, hard and fast, blanket statements of strategic ‘truths’, complete with large-scale colored maps, often turn out to be complete bunkum.

Why then *did* the British keep Cyprus between 1878 and 1960? Why did they not throw it up after occupying Alexandria in 1882 on the grounds that Disraeli had been sold a pup by the Sultan, and then palmed it off onto the British electorate? The Cypriot mountains provided a convenient sanatorium for recovering personnel. Still more useful were the Cypriot mules used in successive campaigns thereafter in Egypt, Greece (Salonica, etc.) and Palestine.⁵ This may sound like taking coals to Newcastle – after all, Egypt had a few mules of its own – but without the great mule farms around Famagusta the advance of Allenby’s army on Jerusalem in 1917 might have been delayed. Mules were indispensable in the logistics of unmotorized fighting. ‘No mules, no maneuver’ one Allied general remarked at Monte Cassino during the Italian campaign in 1944⁶, when thousands of lorries and tanks were snarled up in coastal traffic jams.

Beyond such prosaic matters as commercially-available livestock, however, the basic British motivation in possessing Cyprus was to stop other people having it and to be able to develop the island at some future point should it ever seem beneficial. There were two junctures at which Cyprus seemed to be on the verge of big things for the British – in 1937 and then in 1953/4 – in both cases not so much on its merits, as because of political uncertainties in Egypt – but, then, in the sphere of strategy, everything is purely relative and incidental. Both occasions, however, especially 1937, passed by all too quickly. Whether Cypriots *wanted* to be developed by British money, great dockyards and all, as the Maltese had been, is another matter. Henry Frendo says that the Cypriot press in the 1930s reflected a resentment at being left out of such a bonanza, though in saying so perhaps he is reflecting a specifically Maltese discourse.⁷ I will come back to Malta frequently in this paper. Here my point is that pure hypotheticals and negatives about the future do not make a brilliant basis for any relationship. In discussing ‘what went wrong?’ in

³ Lawrence Pratt, *East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain’s Mediterranean Crisis, 1936-39*, Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 41.

⁴ Roderick Macleod (Ed.), *The Ironside Diaries 1937-9*, Constable, 1962, p. 17.

⁵ For some early aspects of these uses see Maria Panayiotou, ‘The Strategic Origins of Cyprus and its role during the Arab Revolt and the resulting Egyptian campaign, 1876-1882,’ M. Phil Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2006.

⁶ Douglas Porch, *Hitler’s Mediterranean Gamble: The North African Campaign in World War II*, Orion Pub Co, 2004, p. 443.

⁷ Henry Frendo, ‘Britain’s European Mediterranean: Language, Religion and Politics in Lord Strickland’s Malta, 1927-1930,’ *History of European Ideas*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1995, p. 48.

Anglo-Cypriot terms this air of being in a vacuum, an absence of clear direction or real purpose, was very important.

The purpose of my presentation – already implied – is to offer an inevitably eclectic pan-Mediterranean perspective. This emerges from the book I am currently writing on the British in the Mediterranean since 1800 – that is, since the seizure of Malta in 1800, since if there is a single compelling image of British power and survival in the Mediterranean it was the British Fleet in Valletta's Grand Harbour. The fascination is to see how different places – including Cyprus – fit into a broad scheme. If there has been one basic question relating to the British in the Mediterranean context it was surely this: were they staying, or were they going? Were they just sojourners – or “merely visitors, like the Americans or the Danes” as the historian and *The Times*' eminent naval correspondent, W.L. Clowes, put it in the 1890s⁸ – or were they rather in some sense *inhabitants* themselves? Did local populations need to reckon on them as a permanent fact or ‘player’ in the region, or ultimately would they pack up and disappear? This theme of *packing up* we come back to, but virtually all of Britain's Mediterranean relationships were tied up with such imponderables, including the Cypriots.

As part of this background, a *Financial Times* columnist – thwarted in a wish this summer to book a journey from Palma to Nice and then on to Beirut – wrote a piece on the disjointed character of Mediterranean travel.⁹ Such an observation is hardly original, but the very longevity of the trait is suggestive. Elizabeth Monroe in her classic 1937 book, *The Mediterranean in Politics*, says how she wanted to travel from Algeria to Egypt taking in Tunisia, and recalls how the local travel agent simply looked at her in amazement.¹⁰ No such ticket could possibly be booked in his office.

This is an anecdotal way of commenting on the un-integrated character of the Mediterranean as a region. Fernand Braudel was careful to write of the Mediterranean *World* precisely because it lacked the coherence of a *region*. A Maltese historian, Dominic Fenech, comments how most countries in the Mediterranean define their interests and involvements in ways that are ‘tangential to, or lead away from the Mediterranean, rather than across it’. He concludes that:

“(...) the regionality of the Mediterranean is recognized more by external actors with alleged ‘vital interests’ than by the indigenous states. In itself this follows directly from the last (nineteenth) century when Mediterranean regionality was largely brought about by the British- Russian-French contest for hegemony.”¹¹

In passing – because it is relevant to this conference's theme – one might say that the same process has operated in regard to the so-called ‘Middle East’ from the early twentieth century, and especially since *circa* 1945. As an entity, the ‘Middle East’ is even more of an artificial confection than the Mediterranean, a terminology of choice to make some apparent sense out of post-Ottoman confusion. It is the product of Western – and latterly overwhelmingly Anglo-American and American – strategic imagination, or rather pure invention. As a category, it cannot survive the decline of Western power east of Cyprus likely to occur over the next twenty years. It may well be that an older nomenclature – such as “Near East” or “Levant” – might come back into

⁸ Arthur J. Marder, *British Naval Policy, 1880-1905. The Anatomy of British Seapower*, Frank Cass, 1941, p. 211.

⁹ Tyler Brul , ‘My Summertime Flight of Fancy,’ *Financial Times*, 20 June 2009.

¹⁰ Elizabeth Monroe, *The Mediterranean in Politics*, Oxford University Press, 1938, p. 161.

¹¹ Dominic Fenech, ‘Mediterranean Regionality’ in Victor Mallia-Milanes (Ed.), *Malta: a Case-Study in International Cross-Currents*, Malta University Publications, 1991, pp. 267-277.

vogue, though they too carry outdated cultural baggage.

Against the background of the fragile regionality of the Mediterranean during an earlier period, insofar as there was a classic Mediterranean institution, *the British Mediterranean Fleet was it*. Nothing else made the region into some kind of operational whole. Admittedly, French shipping out of Marseilles and the Austria-Lloyd line out of Trieste made their contributions, but these were commercial rather than political and strategic. When Kings and Sultans fled, 'trouble-makers' were exiled, or fleeing refugees taken to safety, it was usually in Her Majesty's warships (though some refugees, including Greek-speaking ones, were occasionally left to other devices). The British Fleet to a significant degree created Mediterranean states by acts and omissions. It breathed life into Greece by smashing the Turks at Navarino, as we all know, and, less well known, significantly helped to create Italy by allowing Garibaldi to get to Sicily and then Naples, much to Napoleon III's irritation. The fact, therefore, that the British Mediterranean Fleet had only a subsidiary and erratic relationship with Cyprus means that the island after 1878 remained essentially peripheral, embedded in the exclusive Hellenism of the majority population. There was no counterpart of the linguistic battle between Englishness and *Italianità* in Maltese society, itself a reflection of an expanding cultural marketplace in that island.

If only because of state origins, the power and strength of British maritime supremacy became axiomatic in Greek and Italian political discourse over a long period; it provided Venizelos with the excuse he needed to sideline Greek-Cypriot *enosists* in 1919, and again in 1931 after the brief spurt of disorder in the island. Seemingly on the ropes in June 1940, British supremacy at sea was reasserted in September 1943 when the Italian Prime Minister signed the surrender on board a British warship before entering Malta's Grand Harbour. On that seminal Mediterranean occasion, Admiral Cunningham boosted Greek pride by making sure that one of the Royal Hellenic Navy's warships took its place in the receiving line. Yet already by circa 1950 the days of Britain dominating Mediterranean waters had passed, the baton taken up by the American Sixth Fleet –though the latter could never play the regional and political role of its British predecessor.

But if strategic concepts are often nebulous and fleeting in meaning, so are related assertions of *supremacy, mastery, strength* and so on. What to some appeared the immutability of British power at sea frequently seemed to the British themselves as highly vulnerable. In 1796 the British had abandoned the Mediterranean completely, and although Nelson fought his way back in, the spectre of *abandonment* never really went away. There were sustained periods when an *anti-Mediterranean* sentiment took a firm grip in military planning circles in Whitehall, as in the 1890s, the years immediately prior to 1914 and after 1935; whilst it was with some difficulty that Churchill fended off his military chiefs who wanted to clear out completely again in mid-1940. In these crises Mediterranean commitments were widely seen as a *millstone*, a liability, quite beyond the British capacity to shoulder, and which should be sheared off until such time as victory was secured in other directions.

The British in the Mediterranean, then, were not really the 'masters' that others often took them to be. To what degree, if at all, one might ask, were Cypriots of an earlier generation *aware* of these imponderables? It is sometimes contended that Cypriots before the Second World War had little cognition of the complexity and flux of international-cum-regional affairs, apart, that is, from the fate of Greece itself. Yet it does seem surprising that it should be so. After all, people's futures depended hugely on external events. Let us take the 1930s, when the British were busy deciding which bits of the Mediterranean might be more dispensable than others. The Maltese kept a close watch on the movements of the British Mediterranean Fleet, not only because many

livelihoods depended on it, but increasingly because their very security hung in the balance. One Israeli historian notes how Palestinian Zionists deeply interested themselves in British strategic thinking.¹² The Egyptians did a complete somersault from wanting British soldiers *out* to screeching that there were far too few of them – “troops and more troops” a senior Egyptian figure demanded of the British Ambassador in Cairo in 1938.¹³ These people knew that predators were on the prowl, and that however much one might wish to cut loose from the British in the longer term, meanwhile they were “a hope, a strength and a very present help in trouble.”¹⁴

Nowhere in the Mediterranean was judged more dispensable by London than Cyprus. The Royal Navy had no intention whatsoever of going anywhere near it *in force* after 1938, if only because Italian airfields in the Dodecanese were too close, and it was left to a small garrison incapable of guarding anything seriously, ready to be picked up by whatever enemy could be bothered to make the effort. As it turned out, after June 1940 Hitler encouraged Mussolini to take Cyprus, and sometimes Mussolini encouraged Hitler to do so¹⁵, on a kind of “After you, Caesar” basis, but neither did. By then nobody in Cyprus could be unaware of the risks – after all, Nicosia was bombed, though on a scale that to the Maltese would have been considered inconsequential. Yet Cypriot historiography takes little account of this persisting insecurity and fragility, and the limits that they set. Does this represent actual historical consciousness amongst most Cypriots at the time, or simply a gap in latter-day scholarship in recreating their world? It might be speculated that one reason why enosis remained so long purely *aspirational* was because educated, sophisticated contemporaries needed no reminding that in the real world any change in the status of Cyprus was likely to mean being passed from one overlord to another, rather than entering some Hellenic apotheosis. As John Darwin has recently emphasized in his widely-read *After Tamerlane: A Global History of Empire*, in the Eurasian world, including its Mediterranean borderlands, empires are the norm, not the exception, in history.

As already implied, comparisons between Malta and Cyprus are particularly telling, if only because they highlight the contrasting milieus of the central and eastern Mediterranean. Of course it is true that there was an *Anglo* element in Maltese life inconceivable in Cyprus. The British commanding presence in Malta went back longer in time (to 1800), and was deeper in nature, above all because of Admiralty docks. The Maltese Prime Minister – the island did have a Prime Minister – at the end of the 1920s was an English nobleman. But there were always plenty of tensions between British authority and civilian Maltese. The Cypriots had their constitution suspended once, in 1931; but the Maltese had their own suspended on multiple occasions (another way of saying that they kept getting it back and losing it again). But after June 1940, and devastatingly after January 1941, the British *and* the Maltese in Malta were bombed and near-starved together. There were more high explosives dropped on Malta than on London or Coventry at the height of their blitzes. This was a bonding experience for all concerned, symbolized by the award of the George Cross by King George VI. It did not mean that the Maltese loved the British or indeed vice versa. It did mean that the British admired the Maltese for their grit and determination under extreme duress, and the Maltese – as a recent evocation of the siege years reiterates – almost universally retained a ‘soft spot’ for the British despite their many

¹² Michael Cohen, ‘British Strategy and the Palestine Question, 1936-9,’ *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 7, Nr. 3, 1972, p. 170.

¹³ Trefor Evans (ed.), *The Killearn Diaries, 1934-1946*, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1972, p. 109.

¹⁴ Monroe, *op.cit.*, p. 22.

¹⁵ Porch, *op.cit.* p. 616.

defects.¹⁶ Here is the psychological background, for example, to the proposal in the 1950s that Malta should actually become part of the United Kingdom – albeit a suggestion which those acquainted with the history of the Cyprus Tribute will not be surprised to hear was promptly shot down by the British Treasury. Still, the legacy remains. In Valletta one can take an evening meal in the Prince of Wales' Band Club, and have a beer afterwards in the Anglo-Maltese Union, both wholly Maltese institutions.

The point is that there can be no real parallel with Cyprus and the Anglo-Cypriot relationship between 1939 and 1945. In that case there was no mental and emotional convergence under acute external pressure of the Maltese type, whereby the very life of the island seemed to hinge on Spitfires and the heroism of convoys. For this anybody in Cyprus could be thoroughly relieved. The island fortunately fell between the cracks, as it were, of the Second World War, as it had of the First. It did not get fought over, and villages razed, as in Crete, where combined Anglo-Cretan resistance also left residues not wholly unlike the Anglo-Maltese. This is not to discount the wartime services of Greek-Cypriots at many levels, including Cypriot volunteers who got stranded alongside Palestinian Jewish counterparts waiting for the Royal Navy on the beaches of Kalamata in the dismal Greek spring of 1941, or those who served in the Cyprus Regiment. But in essence – as a book on wartime Cyprus soon to be published by Anastasia Yiangou shows – the missing of minds between the British and the Cypriots was partially checked after 1939, but was not reversed.¹⁷ After 1945 things could pick up where they had left off, only *more* intensively, because the war had triangulated a new phase of struggle between Left, Right and the British following the emergence of AKEL. This triangular contest was taken a stage further during the Constitutional Convention of 1947-8, presided over by Sir Edward Jackson, another British official whose career, like that of Sir Harry Luke, combined both Maltese and Cypriot experience at crucial periods (Jackson was Lieutenant-Governor of Malta in the war, before becoming Chief Justice of Cyprus in 1943).

One thing that went wrong in the Anglo-Cypriot relationship with severe consequences concerned relations between colonial administration and the Church. Again, Cyprus and Malta provide instructive counter-points, and although this is tangential to our main geo-political themes, the aspect is worth briefly dwelling on. Maltese Roman Catholicism was just as protective of its own rights and status as Cypriot Orthodoxy. It is scarcely credible that a Cypriot Archbishop could be Scottish-born, as was Caruana, Bishop of Malta for much of the first half of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, if you had asked officials in the Mediterranean Department of the Colonial Office *circa* 1938 which Church they worried about most, the Maltese or the Cypriot, they would probably have said the Maltese. But when it came to the crunch colonial officialdom and Catholic clergy in Malta knew that their interests hung together. Maltese Bishops and ordinary clergy were indispensable during the wartime emergency; in Cyprus, by contrast, the Church adopted a more enigmatic stance. After 1945 the secular (that is, British) and religious authorities in Malta were united in a *shared* suspicion of the Left; in Cyprus, in pitting themselves against the island's own Left, the Right and the Church *also* went on an offensive against the British. It is only by comparing the dynamics of different situations that the scale of the risks duly run can be fully appreciated.

The running of high risks and associated miscalculations was something of a phenomenon in the

¹⁶ Lawrence Mizzi, *The People's War. Malta, 1940-43*, Progress Press Co. Ltd., 2007.

¹⁷ Anastasia Yiangou, *Cyprus and the Second World War: The Reinvention of Politics, 1939-35*, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2010.

post-war world, and especially of the early 1950s. That world was changing so fast and so fundamentally that it seemed great opportunities were there to be grasped. This was particularly so in the case of those who saw the much-harassed British as their opponents, from, say, Nasser and Neguib in Egypt, to Mosadeqq in Iran. But there were at least two imponderable in such risk-taking: first, that if in earlier decades the British might be weaker than they appeared, in the 1950s they might be stronger than surface indications at first suggested; secondly, the consequences of trying to exploit their vulnerability might be booby-trapped with unanticipated effects.

Here the Mediterranean parallel with Cyprus coming to mind is not Malta, but Gibraltar. Cyprus and Gibraltar certainly had one thing in common; there was a genuine irredentist impulse drawn to a near-by Motherland (very near-by in the case of Gibraltar – Spain was a short stroll from Government House). Malta, by contrast, was never really *terra irredenta* – you could count the Maltese who wanted to become part of Italy *politically* almost on the fingers of two hands. Not since the 1780s had any Spanish government tried to activate its claim to Gibraltar. There was far more interest in acquiring bits of Morocco with British help, than in regaining the Rock and inviting British retribution. After 1954 Franco began to reverse this policy, eventually culminating in the border closure – a new ‘siege’ – in 1969. The result, however, was that the Gibraltarians simply gave up their residual Spanishness – most, after all, were first and foremost Spanish-speakers – and became fervently ‘British’; indeed, more British than the British wanted them to be.¹⁸ This remains the case today – indeed, yesterday, September 10, was National Day in Gibraltar, and Main Street there was awash with Union Jacks and Gibraltar flags. From 1704 to circa 1954 Gibraltar and its Spanish hinterland existed in symbiosis and Gibraltar *was* Spanish to a significant degree, so that Spanish-medium newspapers outsold *The Gibraltar Chronicle*. Franco’s actions changed this irreversibly for the worse *from the Spanish point of view*, so that today *The Gibraltar Chronicle* – the oldest English newspaper in the world – has no Spanish competitor.

The echo of Cypriot events in this are probably not hard to detect. The architects of EOKA’s campaign after 1952/3, like Franco at more or less the same moment, thought that the critical moment for their irredentist ambition was approaching. If Franco just had to gradually pressurize the frontier, all that ‘real’ (not just *aspirational*) protagonists of Enosis had to do in Cyprus was make a bit of ‘noise’ in the form of blowing up radio stations and, if that did not work, the odd police station. So the thing unfolded. Had the British been the main obstacle, Cyprus would have ended up in Greece, just as Gibraltar would almost certainly have ended up in Spain. However, this was not the case, and EOKA’s actions helped to mobilize a hitherto wavering Turkish-Cypriot consciousness, just as Franco gave birth to a real Gibraltarian identity. This is not to say that anybody was stupid, and as such to be reviled for the errors and consequences of their ways. It is merely to see that the world of the 1950s was full of pitfalls and traps that we can see easily enough looking back, but which contemporaries were apt to blunder into regardless.

The British, of course, made their own errors and misjudgments, and for much the same reasons – the confusions and flux of the times. Again, in the context of this conference, the difficulties of properly assessing post-1945 geo-strategic circumstances as through a glass darkly should be underlined. As Dominic Fenech notes, the defeat of Germany by 1944-45 at first seemed to restate the conditions of an essentially nineteenth-century Anglo-Russian cross-Mediterranean contest,

¹⁸ For an excellent summary see Martin Blinkhorn, ‘A Question of Identity: How the People of Gibraltar Became Gibraltarians,’ in David Killingray and David Taylor, *The United Kingdom Overseas Territories*, OSPA Research Project/Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London 2005.

with the French in a supplementary role conditions which included a patronage of Greece, a British guarantee of Turkey and international oversight of the Straits.¹⁹ Had such familiar outlines taken shape, then with Alexandria, Haifa and other possibilities falling by the wayside Cyprus might at last have become central to a revamped British Mediterranean commitment, and for entirely *non-NATO* reasons. There were large hints of this in the establishment of British Land Force Headquarters in Cyprus after 1953. But already a very different regional order was gestating, in which previous Mediterranean rivalries were overtaken and reformulated in the age of superpowers. Part of the tragic element in Cypriot events of the 1950s, and their legacy, including their impact on Anglo-Cypriot relations, was the bankruptcy and hollowness of the strategic argumentation attached to it in British planning, both diplomatic and strategic.

A shifting variable here was the premium attached respectively to Greece and Turkey in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This relativity mattered a good deal in Cypriot affairs, the decision by Cypriot supporters of Enosis to launch a militant campaign, after all, hinged on maximizing Greece's leverage over Britain, and largely ignoring any potential counter-leverage by Turkey. One can see how such an assumption emerged. True, the British had given a qualified guarantee to Greece in the spring of 1939 only as a necessary supplement to giving one to Turkey. The British at that point had no intention whatsoever of fighting in Greece as they had after 1916. But in the event, they did after Greece's 'Oxi' to Mussolini overlapped so powerfully with the aftermath of Britain's own spirit of the Blitz during 1940.²⁰ By contrast, Turkey was very much in the wartime dog-house for its refusal to join the Allied side until very late in the day, and then for wholly self-protective reasons.

Furthermore, in the immediate post-war period Greece in Western perspective seemed considerably more deserving than Turkey, and also more urgently in need of 'saving', being duly accorded pride of place in the formation of the Truman Doctrine. Meanwhile Turkey had to work its passage back into favor, deeply anxious about the apparent Russian determination to secure their historic, essentially Tsarist, goal of preponderance at the Straits. No wonder the Turks played the tame pet when the Dodecanese were given to the Greeks in 1947/8. By extension, Turkey seemed wholly unengaged as to the future of Cyprus. Ankara had bigger things to worry about. As Evanthis Hatzivassilou has shown, Greece's entry into NATO during 1952 provided the cast iron guarantee it had always wanted, especially with regard to its crucial northern border.²¹ Against this background, viewed from Athens or Nicosia, the old Venizelist principle that Greece could not afford to lift a finger over Cyprus easily appeared outdated and dispensable.

But in fact the international-cum-regional hierarchy in Greco-Turkish terms, so far as Western proclivities went, was reverting to pre-war norms after 1950/1. There were several reasons. Egypt was slipping from the British grip, and urgent means were required to keep Syria and Iraq on-side. The Turks offered to do the job.²² The Americans wanted Turkey in NATO to use their army in Korea. The reality was that, in the same vein as Britain's panicky Balkan diplomacy in 1939, Washington opened the NATO door to Greece in 1952 only because it was part of the logic of

¹⁹ Dominic Fenech, *The Mediterranean Region during the Cold War and After* in John Hattendorf (Ed.), *Naval Policy and Strategy in the Mediterranean. Past, Present and Future*, Taylor & Francis, 2000, p. 223.

²⁰ Robert Holland, 'Patterns of Anglo-Hellenism: a 'Colonial' Connection?' in Robert Holland and Sarah Stockwell (Eds.), *Ambiguities of Empire*, Taylor and Francis, London, 2009, p. 77.

²¹ Evanthis Hatzivassilou, *Greece and the Cold War. Frontline State, 1952-1967*, Routledge, 2006, pp. 24-36.

²² Mustafa Bilgin, *Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era*, I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd., 2008.

securing Turkey. Otherwise it would have remained shut. The British were reluctant about the whole exercise, but had to swallow the pill. After 1954/5 Western security frameworks in the 'Middle East' – the Northern Tier, the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and all that were really dressed-up versions of Turkish defense schemes they had been pressing on London and Washington for some years.²³ In short, the push by radical supporters of Cypriot Enosis, based on reaping the rewards of Greece's enlarged freedom of diplomatic maneuver, expressed not least in the United Nations, was riddled with extreme uncertainty. Recent history appeared to make the risks worth taking. Unfortunately, in making geo-political choices, as in buying shares, recent history is usually the worst possible guide to go by.

The essence of this presentation has been to suggest that looking at Cypriot circumstances in broader settings can help to expand our understanding. One barrier here is that, precisely because of the disjointedness inherent in Mediterranean regionality, attempts at comparisons between societies and polities are rare, and when made can grate on people. I recall attending a conference in Heraklion and making a contribution attempting to link enosis struggles in Crete and Cyprus. A formidable Cretan lady got up when I had finished and proceeded to give me a good going-over. She saw no reason why on earth Cretans should have to put up with being compared to those Cypriots, and least of all by an Englishman. One had to sympathize. But tracing parallels and analogies across the narrow, elongated but ever-fascinating stretch of water known as the Mediterranean remains full of intriguing possibilities, even if at the end of the day its western, central and eastern portions do belong to very different worlds.

Finally, my agenda was meant to include, regarding Anglo-Cypriot relations, 'how can it be put right?' Certainly that relationship was badly deformed by the process of decolonization in ways that it has not been the purpose of this paper to go over yet again. One anecdote helps to convey the psychological legacy on the Greek-Cypriot side. In the 1950s and 1960s, when it came to arranging Independence Day ceremonies, the British supplied a *chef de protocol* whose speciality was setting up such happy occasions. His services were usually accepted. The Greek-Cypriots in the immediate lead-up to August 16, 1960 would have nothing to do with him.²⁴ Still, some degree of alienation in Mediterranean 'ends of empire' were in fact the norm rather than otherwise. The most mutually bitter in the British 'realm' was in Egypt. If the profound sourness in Anglo-Cypriot terms was political and diplomatic, in Malta it was social and economic, precisely because of the degree of material dependence involved. Indeed, no post-colonial Cypriot leader has been so specifically anti-British as the ex-Rhodes Scholar, Dom Mintoff, in Malta (though maybe Papadopoulos runs him close). Even the Anglo-Gibraltarian connection emits keen tensions, the British feeling that the Gibraltarians care little about damaging the United Kingdom's relations with Spain as an important EU partner, and the Gibraltarians that the British Foreign Office would leave them at Spanish mercy if ever given half a chance. Both suspicions have some justification. What would be best for Anglo-Cypriot relations today is what would be best for all these other complex interactions: transparency, trust, clarity, consistency and recognition of mutual interest. If those who govern us, however, were habitually impregnated with all these priorities and qualities, human history would not be the conflict-strewn phenomenon it is.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ See David Cannadine, 'Independence Day Ceremonials in Historical Perspective,' in Robert Holland, Susan Williams and Terry Barringer (Eds.), *The Iconography of Independence: 'Freedoms at Midnight'*, Routledge, 2009.

CONERENCE PRESENTATION*

Andrew Lambert**
11 September 2009

The Eastern Mediterranean and the Projection of Power

Introduction

Though now much forgotten, the Mediterranean has been a cauldron of air power experimentation, notching up a number of “firsts” in air warfare. It was the location for the first strategic bombing campaign (Capronis in 1915 v Austria). It provided the site where air power’s domination of ground forces was demonstrated for the first time (Wadi el Fara). It was the place where, again for the first time, and under wartime conditions, a battle fleet was destroyed from the air (Taranto). And it was the place where an entire country was saved from almost certain destruction, by the rapid resupply of war materiel by air (Yom Kippur)¹.

The good weather in the region has been an important factor in air power’s successes, helping air power to demonstrate its ability to yield both tactical and strategic results. Not only at Wadi el Fara, but during the North African Campaign in 1942/3, and at the Mitla Pass (1967), air power achieved psychological and physical effects that were truly decisive.

This paper, considering the history and importance of air power in the Eastern Mediterranean, will concentrate largely on Britain and the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) operations in the region. This is not to minimise such events as the ’67 Arab Israeli War where air power destroyed the Egyptian Air Force on the first day, the Yom Kippur War mentioned above, or even the effectiveness of Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and NORTHERN WATCH, both mounted from Turkey, but simply to focus attention on Cyprus and its role in the Eastern Mediterranean. Even this gives the author a broad canvas to show how much the RAF has been intimately involved in the region; for example, the author’s own squadron was involved in offensive operations in Southern Italy, at Lecce in 1943, and again, exactly 50 years later when he was the Squadron Commander, based at Gioia del Colle, for operations over Bosnia! And even now Akrotiri provides a base for air combat training and for resupply to the Middle East.

** Text as submitted by the speaker.*

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¹ In this, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, although only 26% of US aid was sent by air, none of the 74% sent by sea arrived before the fighting stopped. And without that flow of more than 27,000 tons of tanks artillery and ammunition, not to mention the 56 ready-to-fight combat aircraft, Israel could well have succumbed.

Relevance of Air Power

Since 1991 the surgical accuracy of modern air weapons has become so impressive that its fact is recognized by all who might challenge the West's superiority². This effect has imposed 2 changes on the way in which nations (and sub-state actors) now regulate their affairs:

- For the West's competitors, wars of high technology are no longer seen as lucrative, as they will lose and lose quickly - even if, like Saddam Hussein, they have spent a fortune on the way. Competitors who wish to challenge the West are forced, therefore, to find their own asymmetric methods. Principal amongst these is the use of civilians, either as human shields (such as in built-up areas), or as targets directly, as we now see in terrorist activities almost daily.
- If high-technology (peer-group) confrontations are likely to occur less often, then other roles of air power become more salient, in particular reconnaissance, humanitarian relief and direct support for the army in the field. In this latter category, just as in Iraq in the inter-war period and in Afghanistan today, air power now substitutes for a shortage of soldiers on the ground.

Eastern Mediterranean

The Eastern Mediterranean and its proximate land mass has been a cross-road for mass migrations for centuries. Since the arrival of the Sea Peoples in the 13th Century BC the Eastern Mediterranean has been the location for almost perpetual inter-ethnic strife and now, with this strife being exacerbated by inter-faith conflict, it is difficult to envisage a harmonious future for the region.

Conscious that whatever may be written could be taken as another example of imperial nostalgia, and a continuing desire to control world events, it is nevertheless important to see British interests in the region in context. Although the Barbary pirates gave Britain an early rationale for a presence in the Mediterranean, it was the growing power of France that brought Great Britain into the region.

British in the Eastern Mediterranean

Certainly, by the time of Bonaparte, British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean were manifested in a desire to prevent Napoleon from establishing French control. It was thought the French might attack the Ottoman Empire either in Egypt or even by direct assault on Constantinople itself, and Nelson was ordered to contain the French Fleet and, if possible, to destroy it. Maintaining a blockade off Toulon, on 20th May 1798 Nelson's fleet was caught in a storm, and whilst the British were undertaking repairs off Sardinia, Bonaparte departed Toulon unobserved. Not sure of his intended destination, Nelson sailed post-haste to Naples in the hope of gaining intelligence from the British ambassador, Sir William Hamilton. The indications were that Bonaparte was in Malta so Nelson sailed there without delay. Arriving off Malta on 22nd June, Nelson was informed that Napoleon had just left towards the East. Turning towards Egypt, the fleet noticed sails to the east north-east, but Nelson assumed them to be stragglers and accelerated south-eastwards. Arriving off Alexandria one day before Napoleon, Nelson assumed

² But this asymmetry will only prevail for as long as the West (and the USA in particular) maintains its investment and continues to sustain a large margin of military superiority.

he had mistaken Napoleon's destination and began immediately to sail for Constantinople. After searching for some while, just off Cape Matapan, he was told that the Turkish governor had been informed of the French invasion of Egypt. Again Nelson set sail for Alexandria. Making fast progress in a favourable wind, early in the afternoon of 1st August he was off the city.

In the subsequent battle at Aboukir Bay, Britain lost 218 killed and 677 wounded. France lost 5000 and her entire fleet. Napoleon and his army were stranded. Britain was the Master of Mediterranean, a mastery she never entirely lost. And Nelson, wounded in the battle, returned to Naples to the arms of Emma.

Contemporaneously with Aboukir Bay, the British East India Company had, since the Battle of Plassey in 1756, progressively been creating the foundations of a commercial empire on the Indian sub-continent. As this empire grew so too did the need to preserve the lines of communication (LOC) both around the Cape of Good Hope, and also by land and sea, across the Eastern Mediterranean.

Suez and Oil

During the 18/19th century, "the Sick Man of Europe", the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, was unwittingly creating a strategic vacuum into which expansionist Russia, from Catherine the Great³ onwards, attempted to develop. Russian areas of interest were both in the Eastern Mediterranean, and south-eastwards towards British India, where according to the phrase of the day, Russian soldiers would "wash their boots in warm water". The opening of the Suez Canal in November 1869, coupled with a progressive, yet accelerating demand for oil, set the strategic priorities for Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean: first was the need to secure the LOCs to the Empire, and 2nd to guarantee British access to the oil fields of the Middle East.

Oil was discovered in Baku in 1846, in Iran in 1908, in Iraq in 1927, in Saudi Arabia in 1932 and Kuwait in 1956. Many of the new oil discoveries occurred in areas either owned by Britain, or within the British mandated territories in the Middle East. By 1919, Britain controlled 50 percent of the world's proven oil reserves.

Flight – early military use

By 1900 Britannia certainly ruled the waves, with a large fleet and suitable bases right across the Mediterranean, but the first powered flight in 1903 was inevitably going to upset the comfortable status quo and change the future pattern of warfare. Though static airships had previously been successfully employed (*inter alia*) for spotting and reconnaissance at the Battle of Fleurus⁴,

³ The naval Battle of Chesme took place on 5-7 July 1770 near and in Çeşme (Chesme) Bay, in the area between Asia Minor and the island of Chios, the site of a number of past naval battles between Turkey and Venice. It was a precursor to the later Greek War of Independence (1821-29), and the first of a number of disastrous fleet battles for Turkey against Russia.

⁴ During the French Revolution one of the first acts of the Committee of Public Safety was to appoint an advisory commission that recommended using observation balloons to help France's armies. In the Battle of Fleurus (June 26, 1794) French forces under Jourdan defeated a large Austrian army under Saxe-Cobourg in one of the most decisive battles of the period. French use of the reconnaissance balloon *l'Entreprenant* marked the first military use of an aircraft and it is acknowledged by both sides that the balloon had a decisive influence on the outcome of the battle.

during the Siege of Paris⁵ in 1870, throughout the Boer War⁶, and had even been used by Napoleon⁷, it was the advent of powered aircraft, of machines that could propel themselves wherever they wished over the battlefield, that would prove decisive; with the Italians being the first to employ powered aircraft in war.

On 29 September 1911 Italy declared war on the Ottoman Empire and after preliminary naval bombardments, with fire being directed from static balloons, Italian naval forces occupied Tobruk (4 October) and Tripoli (5 October). On October 23, 1911, an Italian pilot flew over Turkish lines on a reconnaissance mission, and on November 1, the first ever aerial bomb was dropped when Lieutenant Giulio Gavotti threw four small grenades out of his plane to terrorize Turkish troops below.

The first military use of an aircraft had occurred just 8 years after the first powered flight. Thereafter, the Italians used aircraft successfully for

- Reconnaissance
- Artillery Spotting
- Transport of supplies & personnel
- Bombing enemy troops, supplies and facilities

With victory won, Colonel Douhet was tasked with writing a report on the campaign. His imagination had been caught in 1905 by the first Italian dirigible and in 1908 by Italy's first powered aircraft. In 1910 he had written "the skies are about to become a battlefield as important as the land or sea". By 1914 Douhet had become an air power zealot; branded a "radical", his ideas so enraged his superiors that he was exiled to the infantry. This did not stop him writing in December 1914 that "to gain command of the air is to be able to attack with impunity any part of the enemy's body". For this he wanted 500 bombers, and he suggested dropping 100 tons of high explosive per day on Constantinople to coerce the Porte into opening the Dardanelles to Allied shipping.

World War I

The outbreak of WWI found the British in control of Egypt, and an airbase was hastily constructed at Ismailia. On 27 November 1914 a Maurice Farman biplane conducted the first aerial reconnaissance of the Suez Zone against an expected Ottoman attack through Palestine.

⁵ Air medical transport is thought to have first occurred in 1870 during the Siege of Paris when 160 wounded French soldiers were transported by hot-air balloon to France. Balloon mail was also used to overcome the communications blockade, with a rate of 20 cents per letter. Letters were photographically reduced by René Dagron to save weight. A total of 66 balloon flights were made, including one that accidentally set a world distance record by ending up in Norway.

⁶ Observation balloons were used by the British during the war to observe the movements of Boer troops in the difficult, rugged South African terrain. They were much feared by the Boers who were otherwise very difficult to detect.

⁷ Coutelle persuaded Napoleon to allow the Aéroliers to accompany the troops to Egypt in 1797. However, the skills of the Aéroliers were not efficiently used, and at the Battle of Aboukir in 1798, the British destroyed the equipment. Upon returning to France in 1799, Napoleon disbanded the Aéroliers and the balloon school. With that, the dream of a French airborne invasion of Great Britain died, and the use of balloons by the French military was suspended for 40 years.

By mid January 1915 a mixed force of Maurice Farman's and seaplanes had been deployed to Egypt, formed No 30 Sqn, and were used in the defeat of the Turkish advance later that year.

By 1917 the decision was taken to evict the Turks from Palestine and Allenby's offensive began on 27 October that year. By 11 December 17 Allenby had taken Jerusalem after hard fighting. Faced by 3 Turkish armies, VIII, VII and IV, Allenby attacked in September 1918. And if the effectiveness of air power in Europe had been impressive, now it was to demonstrate a new potency.

Air power initially targeted telephone exchanges, and successfully cut communication links between all Turkish HQ – so much so that IV Army, east of the Jordan, was blissfully unaware of the start of the assault – and remained in camp. The other two armies now bore the brunt of the attack:

VIII Army

Rapid British cavalry and armoured vehicles outflanked VIII's positions and by noon VIII Army began a strategic retreat east down Wadi Zeimer. Fighters and bombers pounced on them; the size of the force retreating between Et Tire and Tul Keram was estimated at approximately 6000 troops and 500 vehicles. The greatest slaughter, however, took place between Tul Keram and Anebta, where the Bristol Fighters, DH9s, and SE5s bombed and strafed the retreating columns, trapped in a defile created by the small Wadi Zeimer. The German commander General Liman von Sanders subsequently wrote:

"The low-flying British bombing formations, relieved every half-hour, littered the road with dead troops, horses, and shattered vehicles. Officers repeatedly attempted to rally the troops, but in vain as they were concerned only with their own safety."

VII Army

On the next day VIII Army retreated northwards to El Affule, whilst VII Army moved towards Wadi el Fara, to move eastwards to the Jordan, presumably to link up with IV Army. Both VII and VIII were heavily attacked by aircraft, engendering panic amongst the troops and stampedes amongst the vast number of horse-drawn transport. By the end of the day VIII had lost all semblance of order and was in mass flight, with many looking for an opportunity to find safety in surrender.

Wadi el Fara

On the 3rd day, 21 September, early morning recce revealed VII still strung out along the old Roman road north then east through Wadi el Fara. At least 800 horse-drawn vehicles, troops in marching order and MT was streaming eastwards to Jordan. All day long air raids were maintained along this winding road. No. 1 Squadron made six heavy raids during the day, dropped three tons of bombs, and fired nearly 24,000 machine-gun rounds into the struggling parties. Other squadrons attacked this same road with another three tons of bombs and 20,000 machine-gun rounds. Earlier the Turks, bolstered by German troops had fought well and had put up stiff resistance. The panic and the slaughter beggared all description. Now, their resolve gave out and they ran. TE Lawrence wrote:

"It was the RAF which converted the retreat into a rout, which had abolished their telephone and telegraph connections, had blocked their lorry columns and scattered their infantry units."

By 25 September Amman had been taken, and Damascus then fell on 30 September. This one attack, occurring in a theatre far away from the main scene of battle, may seem isolated and unique, but it reflects a growing fear of the potency of the aircraft that had already proved its efficacy over the fields of France, where the term “strafen” (to punish) became associated with an aircraft machine gun attack, where the Zeppelin had caused an outcry amongst the civilian populations of London, and where the strategic bombers of the (Allied) Independent Force were building up for a sustained attack on German cities in 1919 using what we would now call Weapons of Mass Destruction, namely a combination of HE and gas. Air power had indeed changed the face of warfare.

Inter-war years

The end of WWI left the UK with vast mandated areas in the Middle East, particularly in Transjordan and Mesopotamia. Because of a shortage of trained soldiers, in 1921 the RAF was given the imperial policing role in Mesopotamia and base construction across the region began. Apart from those constructed in Iraq, Palestine and Egypt, new permanent air bases were to be constructed on Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus:

- The idea of an airfield in Gibraltar dates back to the 1920s when the then Governor of Gibraltar and his counterpart in Algeciras formulated a plan to construct a landing strip. The plan, however, was rejected by both the Spanish and British governments. Permission was, however, granted to operate an air passenger service from Gibraltar to Tangier in 1931. The service operated from the racecourse, but was terminated after only three months due to maintenance difficulties. The first two RAF camps were constructed in Gibraltar at the beginning of the Second World War, the first was North Front Camp which was on the racecourse; the second was New Camp which was built on reclaimed land next to Montague Bastion.
- On Malta, Hal Far was built soon after WWI as a shore base for aircraft with the British Mediterranean Fleet. In the run-up to war Luqa, Ta Kali (Ta'Qali) and other small airstrips were first built by the RAF during 1940 and extensively expanded in the next three years.
- In Cyprus RAF Nicosia was constructed in the 1930s. Principally a military establishment at first, it was, in the event, little used being remote from the scene of major operations.

World War II

In 1939, with WWII now imminent, Middle East Command comprised some 300 ac, including 14 Bomber Sqns and 5 Fighter Sqns equipped with Gloster Gladiators. To cover an area of 4 ½ million sq miles against Mussolini's 1200 ac seemed an impossible task, to say the least.

Gibraltar

Gibraltar served a vital role controlling virtually all naval and air traffic into and out of the Mediterranean Sea from the west and was the first link in the chain that led from the Straits, to the island fortress of Malta, and ultimately to Egypt and the Suez Canal. In late 1939 construction of a solid-surface runway began on Gibraltar, and on 9 September 1939 No. 200 Squadron RAF was ordered to Gibraltar. As a reprisal for the attack on the French fleet at Mers el Kebir, Gibraltar came under aerial bombardment from Vichy French aircraft and was also subsequently attacked by Italian aircraft based on Sardinia.

Given its strategic importance, Germany made detailed plans to capture Gibraltar, primarily by air assault. The plan, codenamed 'Felix', was devised at the highest level of command and was signed by Adolf Hitler. It involved prompt entry through Spain (with or without permission) coupled with attacks driving the British out of the Western Mediterranean. With Gibraltar taken, the Strait would be effectively closed to the Allies, forcing all Mediterranean-bound Allied shipping to steam all the way around Africa. German planners were confident an assault in January 1941 would yield victory. However, Franco's consent was not forthcoming and the operation was postponed, modified, and ultimately abandoned⁸.

Malta

Malta was strategically important because it hosted several airfields and was the only British harbour between Gibraltar and Alexandria. Malta was also essential for offensive operations against Axis supply convoys destined for North Africa. Invasion had been considered by the Germans, but in the end Crete was favoured. Instead a bombing campaign was mounted to neutralise Malta. The first attack came from Italy on 11 June 1940, and the arrival of the Luftwaffe in Sicily in 1941 intensified the campaign.

- During 1941 and 1942, more than 3,000 raids occurred. The towns surrounding the industrial areas around the harbours took a fearful pounding, and much of the population was evacuated. This was area bombing on a gigantic scale. Malta could not be allowed to fall.
- In the first six months of 1942, there was only one 24-hour period without air raids. The inhabitants were forced to lead a subterranean existence which caused severe health problems and eventually led to a typhoid epidemic. Casualties were high: 1,493 civilians died and 3,674 were wounded. Children suffered greatly.

The island was defended by fighter squadrons and resupplied at considerable cost. Indeed some historians have questioned whether Malta was used to support the 8th Army, or the 8th Army to support Malta! By the early summer of 1942, the island was cut off and suffering from severe shortages. Then the Germans made a strategic mistake: lulled into an early sense of victory, aircraft were diverted to fight on the Eastern Front, enabling 61 British Spitfires to be got through to Malta. Raids decreased and defences improved, but it wasn't until the arrival in August of a convoy from Alexandria that food was brought to the near-starving civilian population. By the following summer the siege was lifted as the Axis powers faced defeat in North Africa. However, the air siege of Malta was a "close run" thing. Had German pressure been maintained or even intensified, Malta may well have ceased to operate or even function at all – with perhaps decisive results for the North African campaign.

Taranto

The naval Battle of Taranto took place on the night of 11th November 1940. Waves of Swordfish attacked the Italian fleet as it lay at anchor in the harbour. During the attacks the battleship

⁸ Perhaps the Germans missed a strategic opportunity, as in July 1942 Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed Allied Commander-in-Chief for Operation TORCH, the Combined invasion of Western North Africa. Gibraltar was a key component in this operation but, with Gibraltar in German hands, TORCH would have been almost impossible.

Littorio was hit by three torpedoes, while the battleships Conte di Cavour and Caio Duilio each received one, and bombs damaged a cruiser in the inner harbour. The Italian battleship fleet lost half its strength in one night.

Moreover, the RN decisively defeated the Italian fleet a few months later in the Battle of Cape Matapan (March 1941). Fairey Albacore torpedo bombers from HMS Formidable attacked the battleship Vittorio Veneto. Lieutenant-Commander Dalyell-Stead flew his Albacore to 1,000 yds from Vittorio Veneto, hitting it at the outer port propeller and causing 4,000 tons of water to be taken on. A third strike, by six Albacores and two Swordfish was made between 19:36 and 19:50. A torpedo crippled the cruiser Pola, forcing her to stop. Closing the distance, the Allies detected the Italians on radar shortly after 22:00, and were able to close without detection, the Italians having no radar. The battleships Barham, Valiant and Warspite were able to close to 3,500 yds, unnoticed by the Italian ships. After just three minutes of firing two Italian heavy cruisers, Fiume and Zara, had been destroyed and 2 Italian destroyers (Vittorio Alfieri and Giosu  Carducci) were sunk. Another two destroyers, Gioberti and Oriani, managed to escape, the former with heavy damage.

The effect of British carrier-launched aircraft on the Italian warships foreshadowed the end of the "big gun" battleship, as the attacks on the Prince of Wales and Repulse off Malaya in 1942, the destruction of the Bismarck and the surprise attack at Pearl Harbour were all to bear witness.

North Africa

On land, air power was also to demonstrate its potency. By February '41, the Italian thrust into Egypt had been defeated and British troops were re-deployed into Greece. Almost simultaneously Rommel was ordered to take command of the Afrika Korps in Tripoli. His initial attacks met with some success. Meanwhile, in April '41 Germany invaded Greece. Falling back, the Allied forces retrenched on Crete - which was considered at the time to be the strategic "Key to the Eastern Mediterranean". A seaborne invasion was confidently predicted by the Allies, despite the presence of a sizeable RN fleet off the coast. After a number of "Blue on Blue" losses, by the 18th May there were only 5 fighters left on Crete, 2 Hurricanes and 2 Gladiators on Heraklion, and 1 Hurricane at Maleme. In view of the sea assault, the decision was taken to withdraw them, and they flew back to Egypt just before the invasion started, one that came from the air, not from the sea! On the second day of the German air assault Maleme airfield fell; troops were rapidly deployed to theatre, and within a further 8 days the whole island was in German hands.

With Rommel's new thrust to the east across North Africa in 1942, the RAF under Air Marshal Coningham found itself squeezed into an ever smaller number of bases in Egypt and Palestine. But this concentration had advantages in terms of logistics, cooperation and commonality of tactics. After the second Battle of Alamein, the RAF moved forward with surprising speed to leap-frog into air bases across North Africa, and then into Tunisia. The theatre was nicknamed the "Battle of the Airfields" because the strength of each army was directly related to its air force's access to airfields. The Air power of an advancing army diminished as it had to use unprepared airfields with long lines of communication while that of a retreating army increased as it fell back into prepared sites, complete with stockpiles. And when the winter rains arrived, the most forward armies lost much of their air support, as unprepared airfields became mud pits.

For the Allies there had been many air successes. Perhaps the first was the value of air superiority. With air superiority, everything became possible; without it all operations – ground as well as air

– became “paralysed”. The measure of success can be judged by the fact that in just one week, for example, the RAF flew 10,000 sorties, whilst the Axis managed just 3,000. Second was the re-rolling of fighters into the ground-attack role. When the need to attack tanks from the air was identified, it was clear that bombers would be too inaccurate so fighters were employed against them. A cannon was needed to penetrate the armour and the 40mm “S” gun was chosen with special AP ammunition. Two underwing cannons were fitted to the Hawker Hurricane fighters of 6 Squadron⁹, and the standard attack manoeuvre was to dive on the target from 5000 ft, which allowed the aircraft to get up to its maximum speed in the dive. The pilot would fire off 303 rounds from his machine gun until they hit the target, then would fire a pair of 40mm rounds. The process of firing and re-aiming could be done two or three times on each pass, giving a good pilot perhaps 2-3 hits on his target.

These aircraft served in North Africa from mid-1942 where they achieved considerable success; claims included 144 tanks hit, of which 47 were destroyed, plus nearly 200 other vehicles. During and following El Alamein six squadrons of Hurricanes claimed to have destroyed 39 tanks, 212 lorries and armoured troop-carriers, 26 bowlers, 42 guns, 200 various other vehicles and four small fuel and ammunition dumps. However, they didn’t have it all their own way as they suffered heavy losses, from ground fire and they also lacked effectiveness against the heavily armoured Tiger tank.

Nevertheless, the combined effect of carpet bombing and strafing had its effect. As Rommel recorded in the Afrika Korps Diary:

“Officers and men were badly shaken and their fighting capacity considerably reduced by the enforced dispersal, lack of sleep and the strain of waiting for the bomb.”

Indeed, he went on to say:

“(…) anyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an enemy in complete control of the air fights like a savage against modern European troops, under the same handicap, and with the same chance of success.”

Paradoxically and somewhat bizarrely, ground forces on both sides believed that the other side’s air power was dominant. Even in the late stages of the campaign Allied soldiers complained of the devastating effects of the Luftwaffe, and this was at a time when the RAF had clear air superiority. This sober thought demonstrates well that the demoralising effect of being attacked is far greater than the positive psychological effect of seeing one’s own air power in action.

With the Operation TORCH landings in French North Africa, an ever-increasing force of fighters, fighter-bombers and bombers was now concentrated against the stores and supply dumps of the enemy, his shipping in the Mediterranean, his airfields and his retreating armies. Supply had, in fact, proved to be the crux of the desert battle. Rommel’s Afrika Korps was halted as much by a lack of fuel as by direct enemy action.

In the final battles in Tunisia, the Allied air forces destroyed the last attempt by the Germans to reinforce their ground forces by air from Sicily and, in turn, prevented the evacuation of those forces. In 3 weeks in April 1943, 432 enemy transport aircraft were destroyed for the loss of 35 fighters. By the end of the war the RAF had deployed further forward into Italy, with bases in

⁹ Forever afterwards known as the “Can Openers” for their success against armoured vehicles.

Sardinia (Elmas), in Sicily and at several locations up and down the Italian mainland.

Post-War

At the war's end, the RAF had a string of bases right across the Med, some well-found, others little more than a field. Through this area ran the vital Middle East oil pipelines and, of course, to the east the Suez Canal. Britain was still the mandate holder in Palestine, had permanent bases in Egypt and colonial responsibilities for Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus. Government aspirations at the time were to put the clock back to 1938, as if nothing had changed. But in its wake, WWII left the Eastern Mediterranean in a state of "chaos, bitterness and confusion."

The Soviet Union had territorial and patronage ambitions in the whole area. And this stance, coupled with the US' policy of anti-colonialism, progressively destabilised the area, encouraging extreme nationalist groupings as a counter to the ambitious communist cells in each of the occupied countries. British Forces in Greece which had trained and equipped the Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF) were ordered out by the end of 1946, and at the Italian Government's insistence RAF Forces in Italy were withdrawn in toto by the end of 1947.

In the wake of the Holocaust, some 1½ million European Jews wanted to move to Palestine; the Egyptians seemed determined to evict Britain at the earliest opportunity so they could overrun Sudan, and British Forces in the whole area demanded immediate repatriation, in places even going on strike to ram their point home! As soon as victory over Japan had been won, British Forces were drawn down at a rate that now looks foolhardy, creating a power vacuum. In just 4 months, in the autumn of '45, force levels were halved, creating a climate of indifference, and a real military vacuum that was sure to be filled.

Despite British Forces' best attempts to stop them, Jewish refugees poured into Palestine, and the hostility created precipitated Britain's abrogation of the mandate, and her precipitate flight from Palestine in June '48. Ironically, this then drew the RAF forces in Egypt into a bizarre form of combat when Egyptian Spitfires attacked Israeli Spitfires, watched by British Spitfires! In the battles that followed the RAF seemed to be the enemy of both! At various times it seemed as if first the Israelis, then the Egyptians would attack the Canal bases. Then, on 16 October 51, Egypt abrogated the Defence Treaty; all Egyptian labour withdrew and riots occurred around the beleaguered British bases. In July 1952 the Colonels' Revolt deposed King Farouk and in April 1954 Nasser became PM, determined to "liquidate the British occupation". Negotiations followed and the British agreed to withdraw in toto within 20 months, but with the agreed option of returning if either Turkey or Iraq were attacked by the USSR. In April 1956, the last British Forces left Egypt.

CENTO and the Eastern Mediterranean

As events in Hungary would soon demonstrate, the USSR was an increasing threat in the region, and a Soviet thrust through the Caucasus was feared (obviously then not much changes here - cf 2008!). On 12 January 1955 the Turko-Iraqi Pact was signed, expanded on 4 April to include Britain as the nuclear guarantor, drawing in Iran and Pakistan as well into what became known first as the Baghdad Pact, and then as CENTO. Although the US was not a full member it contributed and supported the Pact. Modelled after the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), CENTO committed the nations to mutual cooperation and protection, as well as non-intervention in each other's affairs. Its goal was to contain the Soviet Union by having a line of strong states along the USSR's south-western frontier. Bearing in mind the sizeable armies already in Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, Britain's principal contribution would be from the air, particularly a nuclear capability.

Clearly, the withdrawal from Egypt would have to create an enormous build-up of forces in Cyprus, and RAF Nicosia would be inadequate. So in 1955, the decision was taken to build a new airbase, to full NATO standards, on the peninsula at Akrotiri. Completed on 1 January 1956, it became the centre for RAF operations, allowing Nicosia to evolve first into a transport base, and then into the Civilian International Airport. Sadly, space does not permit the description of the events of Operation MUSKETEER - the militarily successful, but diplomatically flawed, repossession of the Suez Canal Zone. But if it did anything, MUSKETEER underscored the importance of Cyprus and Malta as forward bases in the region. With the completion of Akrotiri, four new Canberra Sqns in the nuclear Strike role, together with PR support deployed in 1957, with a full nuclear capability being available from December 1961. In due course the TSR-2 was to have replaced the Canberra.

In the 50+ years since Suez, even this posture moved on. On July 14, 1958, the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in a military coup and the king assassinated. The new government, led by General Qasim, withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, opened diplomatic relations with Soviet Union and adopted a non-aligned stance; Iraq quit the organization shortly thereafter. The organization dropped the now obsolete "Baghdad Pact" title in favour of CENTO.

In Libya, the RAF had occupied 3 permanent Italian AF bases, at Castel Benito near Tripoli, Benina, near Benghazi and El Adem 20 miles South of Tobruk. The first Yugoslav Sqn formed at Benina in 1945, before moving home to Yugoslavia. All of these bases were used as staging posts to repatriate troops from India, and El Adem was even used by BOAC in the post-war period. The treaty with Libya prevented the bases from being used for MUSKETEER, but very soon the bases became hosts for weapons training. Sadly, in 1964 economic pressures forced the RAF to reduce its presence in Libya to just El Adem, and with defence review following defence review even El Adem was now in decline. However, on 1 September '69 a military coup ousted King Idris and the new regime, led by Col Gaddafi, insisted on RAF withdrawal. This was accomplished by 31 March '70.

Cyprus became independent in August 1960, but Britain retained two Sovereign Base Areas at Dhekelia and on the south coast at Episkopi/Akrotiri. As part of the 1966 defence review it was decided to replace the Canberras with two Sqns of Vulcans, and in January '69 all 4 Canberra Sqns were withdrawn. By 1970 Akrotiri was one of the largest and most important bases in the RAF. However, in 1974 Turkey invaded Cyprus and with a foreign army only some 50 miles away, the decision was taken to withdraw the nuclear weapons and the Vulcans.

Meanwhile, CENTO itself was in difficulties. Pakistan had asked for military support against India in 1965 and again in 1971, but this had been denied. The alliance finally collapsed when the Shah's departure prompted the withdrawal of Iran in 1979, shortly followed by Pakistan and Turkey, leaving the UK as the only member.

In 1964 Malta became independent and a 10-year agreement on mutual defence, together with development aid of £50m, gave the British rights to use the bases. Canberra PR aircraft were moved in from Cyprus and 203 Sqn equipped with Shackleton ASW ac were deployed from Ballykelly in Northern Ireland, the Shackletons being replaced by Nimrods in 1971. Sadly, the 1967 defence review reduced the forces on Malta and the then Prime Minister of Malta began a process of renegotiating an increase in development aid to offset the loss of revenue from the drawdown. Amid bitter wrangling, the aid was increased and the offer of base facilities extended to 1979, but on 31 March '79 all RAF flying ceased in Malta, and the facilities became increasingly used by

Libya.

Current Operations

So, with that chapter closed and the RAF's presence much reduced did this mean the end of air power operations in the region? Clearly not, and let's just remind ourselves of some of the operations involving air power that took place in the region since WWII:

Year(s)	Conflict	Involving Cyprus?
1946	Greek Civil War	√
1948	Berlin Blockade	
	Arab-Israeli War	√
1950	(World Population now 2.3 Bn)	
1956	Suez – Op MUSKETEER	√
	Soviet invasion of Hungary	√
1967	6-day Arab- Israeli War	√
1968	Czechoslovakia Invaded	
1973	Yom Kippur Arab-Israeli War	√
1974	Turkish invasion of Cyprus	√
1975	Civil War Lebanon – Syria invaded	√
1980-88	Iran-Iraq War	
1982	Israel invades Lebanon - US in Beirut	√
1986	Op EL DORADO CANYON – air attack on Libya	
1991	1 st Gulf War (Op DESERT STORM)	√
1991-1996	Operation PROVIDE COMFORT – defense of Kurds	√
1993-99	Bosnia, and then Kosovo	
1996-2003	Establishment of Iraqi Northern No-Fly Zone (Op NORTHERN WATCH)	√
1994-99	Chechnya Campaigns	
1999	(World Population now 6 Bn)	
2003	Iraq War (Op OIF)	√
2003	Darfur Conflict in Sudan	

2008	Russo-Georgian Conflict	√
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Of course, there have been many other conflicts elsewhere in the world, ranging from full-scale military engagements such as Korea and Vietnam to more minor events such as the Falklands Conflict or Sierra Leone. However, perhaps unsurprisingly, a large majority of operations have taken place within the area bounded by the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. At briefings given at İncirlik AB in 1999 the then US commander (BG Dave Deptula) calculated that 75% of all post-WWII conflicts had taken place within unrefuelled F-15E range of İncirlik Air Base - which is just 50nm from Cyprus.

What this table, and the thoughts of the USAF commander, highlight so well is both the likelihood of conflict in this region, and air power's ability to intervene. Unlike in WWII where Cyprus was largely peripheral to the main areas of conflict, now it seems more like a strategic aircraft carrier situated deep in potentially hostile waters. Surrounded to the north, east and south by areas of instability, its position is truly strategically significant. Indeed, as the table shows, Cyprus and the forces on it have been involved to a greater or lesser extent in at least 14/21 conflicts that have taken place in this region since WW II.

Limitations

However, even given Cyprus' unique geo-strategic position, there are considerable limitations for its full utility as an effective military base and a contributor to world peace. The first of these stems from its physical location *vis-à-vis* neighbouring countries whose attitude to British national, Allied or NATO operations ranges from the often hostile (Syria) to the ambivalent (Israel) to the cooperative (Egypt). Given the location of Cyprus, the type and extent of air operations from the island are thus determined by the cooperation of the ring of nations that almost surround the island to the east. This means that operations from Cyprus are very much on a case by case basis. Some nations may tolerate over flight for a particular mission while others bar the way. A nation may also accept certain types of operations, but not others.

Electronically, of course, it is far more difficult for a non-cooperative neighbouring nation to prevent forces from utilising the electromagnetic spectrum for long range sensors. Given the range of these devices and the passive nature of many sensors, Cyprus provides a useful platform from which to receive information from many parts of the world where there is instability and military or terrorist operations of interest.

While the Sovereign Base Areas are British national territory, HM Government normally takes account of Cypriot sensitivities when operating forces from its bases. For historical reasons, Cyprus is not a member of NATO while both Turkey and Greece are. It is a member of the EU, while Turkey is not. This institutional maze places limitations on the use of the Republic of Cyprus by NATO and even EU forces, compelling operations to be on a bilateral or multi-lateral basis out with the various treaties. As Katsikides and Charalambides have noted:

"The new political scene does not only affect Poland. It also affects Cyprus, which walks alone within the EU as it belongs neither to NATO nor to PfP (Partnership for Peace in Europe). (...) Therefore, Cyprus cannot adequately participate in such a defensive deepening between NATO and ESDP, as it was decided by the European Council on December 12, 2008. (...). Consequently, Cyprus' remoteness from NATO and PfP turns the

Republic away from and shrinks its active participation within the defensive institutions of the EU. Thus, the question, not only for Cyprus but also for other EU member-states and the EU as such, is whether a policy can be shaped and conducted in the context of national and common interests or on the basis of a dogmatic position derived from a gone era.”¹⁰

Regional risks

So will Cyprus, particularly the SBAs, continue to be of vital strategic importance? Clearly, much depends on the view of the strategic drivers for the rest of this century. Forecasting the future is, of course, highly fraught, and many erudite organisations are paid millions to assess and predict the future. Sadly, they almost always get it wrong. So much so that none of the military operations that the UK has been involved in since WWII were predicted, or budgeted for. All have been resourced from standing forces allocated to other tasks. Indeed, it is almost a truism that wars are rarely predicted; and perhaps the reason is simple. Conflicts that are analysed and predicted are normally addressed and negated before they flare up, either by deterrence or diplomacy. So the only wars left are those that have not been thought about or prevented. These then that remain are entirely unpredicted, uncatered for and virtually always causing surprise. So, expecting the unexpected requires nations to be prepared – having the infrastructure and weapons in being ready for any eventuality.

International Relations.

That said, there are, nevertheless, some strategic pointers that might offer a clue as to the general nature and causes of war. First is the institutional problem. Historians tell us that one of the causes of the First World War was the system of secret bilateral interlocking treaties that existed in 1914, and that if just one of these treaties were invoked then it would in turn, just like a modern computer programme, activate another and another with the result that the whole continent would inevitably be drawn into war.

In more modern times it is salutary to think of how close to war the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact came on occasions. How just one event such as the Cuba Missile Crisis, Davuto or the Gary Powers U-2 incident brought the world to the brink of destruction. Now, of course, the bipolar stability of the Iron Curtain has been replaced by multipolarity with several new regional powers, often sadly, supported by the threat of nuclear weapons. And many of these new nuclear states are in range of the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel, India and Pakistan are already acknowledged nuclear powers, with Iran and possibly even Syria attempting to procure or produce such weapons.

Moreover, many of the nations in the region are also highly underdeveloped, with burgeoning populations and declining economies. This creates deep-rooted envy manifested paradoxically in both a desire to destroy the West, whilst at the same time a popular desire to migrate to enjoy all the West has to offer. Such actors often encourage religious fanaticism, becoming the patrons of terrorism, a coercive *modus operandi* they can employ through acolytes or third parties with virtual impunity. Whereas, the solid Iron Curtain of the Cold War kept its peoples in, the new version is more a weedy Green Hedge, running the length of the Maghreb, through which a new

¹⁰ Savvas Katsikides and Yiannos Charalambides, ‘NATO, Cyprus & ESDP,’ 19 March 2009.

form of mass migration" threatens Europe.

Population

The second and arguably the most influential strategic driver is that of population growth itself. As Dr. Edward Lutwak has pointed out, if a population suddenly increases in size, and the growth cannot be supported from local resources then this imbalance will always self-correct, by famine, plague, migration or war. As he has noted, sudden population growths are often succeeded 20 years later by bloody wars.

World population has been increasing logarithmically since 1900 and, despite the carnage of World War I, the mass flu epidemic that followed it or the slaughter of World War II, nothing has reduced its explosive climb, prompting pundits to suggest (incorrectly) that there are more people alive now – than have ever lived. In 1998 the UN population growth graph¹² showed that virtually all the growth would take place in less developed countries, many of whom, of course border the Eastern Mediterranean to the east or south. Growth would, however, plateau from 2050 onwards when it was assumed that population would peak at about 11 Bn.

World population has already passed 6.8 billion, with much of the population growth occurring in Middle-Eastern countries, where GDP growth is often less than population growth and the people will, as a result, become poorer. Many territories in the region are recognised as failed states, lack effective government (e.g. Pakistan) or live on charity (e.g. Gaza). The UN currently predicts that the world population will rise to about 10Bn where it will level off and plateau at no more than 11Bn. Now, in the latest population assessment the UN has elaborated the plateau effect rather more, showing that it depends entirely on fertility predictions amongst the peoples of the less developed countries. On the one hand, if fertility rates continue along similar lines to those now, then world population will continue to increase at a more or less constant rate, reaching 11 Bn by 2050 and then doubling every 40 to 50 years. Conversely, if fertility can be reduced, then the gradient starts to level off by 2050.

Optimists point out that much depends on education for women, who are then persuaded to use contraception to control their fertility, whilst others point out that this is difficult to achieve. The Catholic Church is opposed to contraception; many Black Africans regard contraception as medical imperialism; and Muslim countries encourage polygamy and large families. According to Chatham House¹³:

“A revolution in agriculture will be needed to meet a projected 50 per cent increase in demand for food by 2030.(...) What we're seeing now is just the start of a multi-decade challenge: feeding a global population set to approach ten billion by 2050, in the face of climate change, tighter energy supply, and growing competition for land and water resources.”

Resources

Water

Since humans consume resources, it is worth considering where those resources are under the

¹¹ Perhaps the Sea Peoples in reverse!

¹² UN World Population Prospects, 1998.

¹³ Alex Evans, 'Rising Food Prices: Drivers and Implications for Development,' Chatham House, 20 April 2008.

most stress. First is water. Somewhat perversely, the highest population growth rates seem to occur in areas where water is in the shortest supply. With water in the region at a premium, with flow rates down the Nile already reduced, with competition for the Jordan River and with instability around the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the situation is likely to lead to competition, if not conflict. Some literature has identified a new form of power broker, the so called “hydro hegemons”, states who because of their superior position control the flow of water into neighbouring countries, such countries are Turkey, Israel and Kazakhstan to name but a few.

Oil

Finally, of course, one cannot ignore the oil situation. Despite there being a temporary glut – largely because of the world recession – this will not last. As population increases, as many nations become richer, so the demand is certain to increase. At maximum rates of production, and with the most stringent economy measures, all the current estimates point to a worsening supply gap from 2015 with price being the only limit on demand, and figures of perhaps \$200 or maybe even \$400 per barrel being quoted. Effective alternatives still seem a long way off, and even at the most optimistic rate of introduction are unlikely to offset the growing demand. Oil will thus progressively become unaffordable for many, and probably subject increasingly to the vagaries of political corruption. Shortages will thus become of increasing concern, leading to stronger and stronger competition. And Cyprus, of course, is right on the edge of the oil area, and when the Ceyhan oil pipeline comes on full stream, it will sit astride one of the principal global oil routes.

It is clear, therefore, that the competition for ever declining resources is likely to increase, leading almost inevitably to conflict somewhere in the area. This conflict is likely to be localised, at least initially, and confined to those areas where population growth yields a surplus population that cannot adequately be provided for.¹⁴ No doubt, as well, any conflict would also be exacerbated by religious tension.

Though it is always difficult to predict conflict accurately, a guide to the future can be found from studying those areas where tension is already high, where conflict is already taking place, or where the risk factors are particularly high.¹⁵

Role of Cyprus

As this map makes clear, the island of Cyprus is almost at the centre of a vortex of instability. It is thus supremely well situated for supporting operations both in the Middle East and south, into Africa. Located as it is at the normal maximum range for most air transport assets operating from the UK¹⁶, Cyprus provides an invaluable stepping stone for onward flight to theatres as far away as India or Africa¹⁷. For humanitarian relief, civilian evacuation from warzones or for support of an army in the field Cyprus is ideally located. Although few attack or Recce missions would be flown directly from Cyprus, operations into Palestine, the Sinai, or with air to air refuelling, much further, to Iran/Afghanistan or beyond are entirely possible. As an air platform, as an unsinkable

¹⁴ In the Gaza strip, for example, a population of 80,000 in 1948 has risen to 1.45m and could easily reach 4m, all these confined to an area very similar in size to the “pan-handle” of Cyprus.

¹⁵ See Annex: Current high-risk areas.

¹⁶ E.g. C-130 or A-400M.

¹⁷ Despite the increasing use of C-17s or chartered long-range transports, it would be costly to use such aircraft alone to support a full campaign, and the existing fleet would still be employed for all but the most time-critical items.

aircraft carrier, Cyprus' potential is clear. But at present this potential is only realised by Britain and, to a lesser extent, the USA.

Given its strategic location, Cyprus cannot, however, remain on the side-lines, hoping that war will pass it by as it did in WWII, hoping to remain immune to all the conflicts that potentially surround it. A unilateral, pacifist or non-aligned stance is hardly appropriate given her links with Greece, Turkey, Britain and the EU. Indeed any attempt by Cyprus to withdraw from regional conflagration could actually precipitate the very situation she might fear most – invasion or exploitation by a hostile power with few scruples – perhaps a re-run of 1570! Far better, therefore, for Cyprus to grasp the initiative, recognise her geo-strategic potential, and take the lead in securing her future as a vital contributor amongst the Western nations.

Annex: Current high-risk areas:




Plate 4: Current high-risk areas

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION*

Gary Lakes**
23 October 2009

Oil, Gas and Energy Security

Introduction

Energy security is an issue of global concern, one that has gained prominence over time in step with the rise in global energy demand. Where will our future energy supplies come from? How much will they cost? Who will be delivering those supplies? How will they be delivered? These are some of the questions that governments and private companies have long asked themselves, but which are being asked today with a greater sense of urgency.

Once again, by the sheer chance of its geographical location, Cyprus finds itself in the middle. It is surrounded here in the eastern Mediterranean by the Middle East, North Africa and the Caspian Sea regions – all of which are major crude oil and natural gas producing areas and all of which figure prominently and strategically within the context of energy security.

Turkey and Cyprus

The eastern Mediterranean countries are actively engaged in the exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources to various degrees. The most successful have been Libya and Egypt. Syria produces crude oil and gas, much of which is used domestically. Some seismic data has been acquired in Lebanon's and Syria's offshore waters. Israel produces small amounts of hydrocarbons and has recently announced two offshore gas discoveries very near to Cyprus's offshore zone, where so far only seismic surveys have been conducted. The discoveries in Israel are encouraging when one considers that seismic surveys conducted in Cyprus's own waters indicate promising prospects for exploration, although they are located in very deep water.

Turkey, while it has very limited hydrocarbon resources of its own, has begun to play a major role as the bridge between these energy-producing regions and Europe – the main market on this side of the globe. Indeed the Turkish foreign minister stated recently that Turkey sees itself as a bridge connecting Middle Eastern gas producers with Europe.

Turkey is itself a growing energy consumer. It required 690,000 b/d and used 36 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas in 2008, according to the latest BP Statistical Review.¹ Not only is Turkey willing to act as a bridge between eastern energy producers and western energy consumers, it is also keen to secure eastern energy supplies for its own use. It imports natural gas from Iran, crude oil from Iraq, and recently signed an agreement with Qatar, which has massive natural gas reserves, to study the possibility of constructing a gas pipeline that would carry Qatari gas to Turkey via Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria.² Furthermore, late last year, Turkey signed an agreement with Iran regarding participating in the South Pars project, which would eventually lead to Turkish companies developing gas fields in southern Iran and shipping that gas by pipeline to Turkey.³

Turkey is well aware of its importance to both consumer and producer nations and it is looking to employ its geo-strategic location as a means of enhancing its role as an energy entrepoin in the years to come. In the meantime, Turkey is keen to explore its own territory in search of oil or gas reserves and has recently announced an investment program worth hundreds of millions of dollars for its offshore Black Sea region.

Turkey has over the last two years launched exploration and development programs in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey claims a large amount of the Eastern Mediterranean including a section that encroaches on Cyprus's EEZ. It also lays claim to offshore areas that Greece considers its own. Turkey's navy has in the past interfered with the offshore hydrocarbon research being carried out in the Cyprus EEZ. How Turkey's claims to part of that zone could complicate Cyprus's plans to exploit whatever oil and gas resources might exist within the Cyprus EEZ remains to be seen. But that might become apparent during the course of the next year after the launch of the second Cyprus offshore bidding round.⁴

Egypt has a developed oil and gas industry. While its crude oil production has declined in recent years, Egypt is seen as having a strong potential for future gas production. It will be necessary for Egypt to use much of its gas reserves to meet its own growing domestic need for energy, but it also intends to produce enough gas to expand its LNG industry and to boost the volume of natural gas that it ships through the Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP) to the Levant so that it can eventually ship gas to Turkey and Europe.

Energy demand is growing in Egypt where in 2008; the country consumed 693,000 b/d of crude oil along with 40 bcm of natural gas, according to the BP statistics.⁵ Numerous foreign companies are involved in developing Egypt's oil and gas reserves, and indeed, some of Egypt's most promising reserves are located offshore in the eastern Mediterranean and near the Cyprus EEZ.

Logistics

While the term energy security may suggest a scarcity of oil and gas – the primary generators of energy in this stage of human civilization – at this time hydrocarbon scarcity is not really a problem. There are areas and fields where hydrocarbon reserves are beginning to decline, and major discoveries are becoming rare, but the time when the world might begin to see a period of

¹ BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009, <http://www.bp.com/>

² Middle East Economic Survey, 12 October 2009, <http://www.meeq.com/>

³ * Text as submitted by the speaker.

⁴ **Journalist; Director, Energy Program, ERPIC

‘peak oil’ is thought to be 10 to 20 years away. Exploration companies have to drill deeper and deeper into the Earth and recently there have been several huge discoveries – such as the one made by BP in the Gulf of Mexico and those made by Petrobras offshore Brazil. Several years ago, BP reported a gas discovery at a depth of some 7,000 meters in Azerbaijan’s sector of the Caspian Sea with ‘significant potential’.¹ Drilling to such depths is carried out at considerable costs.

Discovering and developing hydrocarbon resources have always been a challenge, but a considerable part of energy security is concerned with the safe and steady shipment of oil and gas to areas where demand is greatest. For now and for the most part, energy exploration, development, export and import are carried out smoothly in the southeastern corner of the Mediterranean.

The transport of crude oil by tanker to or from Eastern Mediterranean countries is a routine matter of business. Both Egypt and Libya export crude, Egypt exports liquefied natural gas (LNG) by tanker and vessels carrying crude, petrochemicals and LNG sail through the Suez Canal between eastern and western producers and consumers. Israel, Lebanon and Cyprus import fuel for their domestic needs. Syria exports some crude oil.²

As if the straightforward business of buying and selling isn’t complicated enough, there must, of course, be politics. The politics of the energy industry are very complex and convoluted. Producers must develop their resources and sell, consumers have no choice but to buy, politicians want to wrest whatever advantage they can from the arrangements. As strategic commodities, controlling access to and the movement of oil and gas is a serious undertaking.

The Caspian situation

There are five Caspian Sea littoral states, Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the legal status of the Caspian Sea was thrown into question and it remains unresolved. In order to proceed with developing their respective area of the Caspian offshore, Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have signed bilateral agreements dividing the seabed.³ Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are currently engaged in discussions on the demarcation of their respective territories, but Iran is insisting that Caspian Sea reserves be developed jointly, and barring that it wants the sea divided into five equal sectors in which it would receive 20%.⁴ This compares with the roughly 13% of the sea that was considered its territory during the Soviet era.

The area that Iran claims in the Caspian juts into the southern part of the sea into areas that Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan claim as their own. Iran is somewhat adamant about its position, in 2001 when BP was conducting a seismic survey in the Alov, Arag and Sharg Block in southern Caspian waters; Iran sent a warship and aircraft to chase the two seismic vessels involved in the work away.⁵ Tehran stated that the survey was being carried out in Iranian waters. BP and Azerbaijan have not returned to the area since. While the five littoral states meet periodically to discuss the status of the sea, they are not expected to reach an agreement anytime soon. Control over the huge oil and gas reserves and how those reserves will be moved to world markets is a key

¹ Middle East Economic Survey, 19 November 2007, <http://www.mees.com/>.

² Middle East Economic Survey, 3 August 2009, <http://www.mees.com/>.

³ Middle East Economic Survey, 6 April 1998, 13 July 1998, 10 December 2001, <http://www.mees.com/>.

⁴ Middle East Economic Survey, 27 August 2007, <http://www.mees.com/>.

⁵ Middle East Economic Survey, 30 July 12001, <http://www.mees.com/>.

issue.

Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are keen to exploit their huge reserves, and while Russia and Iran already have huge reserves of their own within their countries, they are keen to maintain a degree of political influence over the strategic resources in the Caspian.

Coming to a final agreement on respective territories in the Caspian would enable Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in particular to pursue export routes across the Caspian Sea through the construction of underwater pipelines. Complicating this is the fact that Iran and Russia have expressed their opposition to such pipelines on several occasions.¹

Proven crude oil reserves among the three Caspian Sea states of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are estimated at around 50 billion barrels.² Proven natural gas reserves are estimated at 11 trillion cubic meters.³ These are considered conservative estimates, especially with regard to gas reserves. Turkmenistan, alone, claims to have in excess of 24 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves.⁴

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, international oil companies (IOCs) moved quickly to establish themselves in a part of the world that had been a remote part of the Soviet domain. Virtually all of the developments of the oil and gas resources in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan since 1991 have been the result of investments made by consortia of Western oil companies.

Caspian crude exports

There currently exist a number of pipelines designed to transport crude oil produced in the Caspian region to foreign markets. Russia holds something of a monopoly on natural gas transport out of Central Asia, but there are several more independent pipeline projects designed to carry both crude and gas in the works. How these projects progress will have much to say about the future of European energy security.

To export the crude oil and gas from the Caspian region, old Soviet-era pipelines were refurbished and new ones were built. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which stretches 1,760 kilometers from the Caspian Sea to the eastern Mediterranean, was a major (and controversial) undertaking. The BTC came into operation in June 2006. It is now seen as a vital piece of Caspian energy infrastructure as it is the primary export route for Azerbaijani crude and the terminal has already loaded millions of tons of oil. During the last year it also began to carry some Kazakh crude.

While BP was in the early stages of revamping and developing Azerbaijan's offshore Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) oilfields, it refurbished the old Soviet-era pipeline running between Baku and the Georgian Black Sea port of Supsa. This pipeline was used before the BTC came into operation. It has a capacity to transport 145,000 b/d.⁵ The Soviet-era Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline was also used during the pre-BTC days. Its capacity is around 100,000 b/d⁶ and Azerbaijan still exports small volumes of oil through it. For crude transport through the Caucasus, Azerbaijan,

¹ Middle East Economic Survey, 5 October 2009, <http://www.mees.com/>.

² BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009, <http://www.bp.com/>.

³ BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009, <http://www.bp.com/>.

⁴ Middle East Economic Survey, 22 September 2008, <http://www.mees.com/>.

⁵ Middle East Economic Survey, 18 August 2008, <http://www.mees.com/>.

⁶ Middle East Economic Survey, 16 February 2004, <http://www.mees.com/>.

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan also use railway lines to carry crude by rail tanker to Black Sea ports, particularly Batumi and Kulevi. They are owned respectively by Kazakhstan's state-owned KazMunaiGaz and Azerbaijan's state oil company Socar.

BP is the leading Western company operating in Azerbaijan; it also heads the consortium that is developing Azerbaijan's offshore Shah Deniz gas field. During the course of bringing that field on-stream, another BP-led company built the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) which runs parallel to the BTC crude pipeline to Turkey, and this gas feeds into the Turkish gas distribution system at Erzurum.

The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) was formed for the purpose of building a 1,580 kilometer pipeline to carry crude oil produced at Kazakhstan's onshore Tengiz oilfield – which is operated by a consortium led by the US oil company Chevron – across western Kazakhstan and southern Russia to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. After years of delay caused by differences between Russia, which is the largest shareholder in the CPC, and its Western partners, plans are now being drawn up to double the capacity of the pipeline, which came into operation in 2001, to 1.32mn b/d by the middle of the next decade.¹ That is essentially where Caspian crude oil and gas transport is at this time. Several of the pipeline projects that are proposed are designed to be built upon this existing infrastructure.

Crude oil from Iraq is also exported through Turkey's Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.² This crude arrives at Ceyhan through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, which was built in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war. Also, there has been talk in recent years that Iraq might rebuild the pipeline that runs to Syria's Mediterranean port of Tartous, but that project is likely to be years away.

Caspian and Middle East gas exports

Regarding the transport of natural gas through pipelines in the region, there is the South Caucasus Pipeline, which was mentioned earlier. It now has the capacity to transport 8 bcm/y of Shah Deniz Gas. Azerbaijani gas is delivered through this pipeline to Georgia and Turkey. There exists also the Interconnector-Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) pipeline, which is – and will be – essentially a linking of domestic grids that will transport gas from east to west. Some new pipeline has been constructed between Turkey and Greece, and new pipe will be laid across northern Greece and the Adriatic Sea. There is the Blue Stream gas pipeline, built by Russia's Gazprom and Italy's ENI earlier this decade. It runs across the Black Sea from southern Russia to Samsun, Turkey, and then links into the Turkish domestic grid. It has a capacity to carry 16 bcm/y, but has yet to reach that volume. Turkey imports most of its natural gas from Russia, but most of it comes overland through Bulgaria. In the Levant, there is the Arab Gas Pipeline, which was also mentioned earlier. It begins in Egypt and crosses the Gulf of Aqaba to Jordan and runs north into Syria. The AGP will also supply Egyptian gas to Lebanon through Syria. There are plans, and work may have already started to extend the pipeline into Turkey, where it will join the Turkish domestic network. From there the Egyptian's hope to feed their gas into the proposed Nabucco gas pipeline, which will begin in central Turkey.³

These are the main working oil and gas pipelines in the region, complementing this is a list of proposed projects that may or may not be constructed. But one thing is clear and that is that

¹ Middle East Economic Survey, 22/29 December 2008, <http://www.mees.com/>.

² Middle East Economic Survey, 17 March 2008, <http://www.mees.com/>.

³ Middle East Economic Survey, 17 March 2008, <http://www.mees.com/>.

Turkey figures prominently in this part of the world as a conveyor of oil and gas supplies from producer countries to consumers.

Bypassing the Bosphorus

There are a number of proposals for the construction of crude oil pipelines that would bypass Turkey's Bosphorus and Dardanelle Straits. Again, there is a lot of politics involved in this and it remains to be seen just which of these proposals will eventually be the one to win out.

The Turkish waterways see several million barrels of crude oil and products sail out of the Black Sea and past Istanbul every day. The Turks are quite concerned about the volume of tanker traffic and have taken steps to regulate the flow of tankers through the waterways. There are at least five proposed pipeline routes designed to move crude oil out of the Black Sea to world markets: the AMBO pipeline across the Balkans; the Burgas–Alexandroupolis pipeline through Bulgaria and Greece; the Pan European Oil Pipeline across southwestern Europe between Constanza, Romania, and Trieste, Italy; the Odessa-Brody-Plock pipeline, through Ukraine and Poland; and the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline through eastern Turkey. Only the Odessa-Brody section of the Odessa-Brody-Plock pipeline exists and most of the other projects have been on the drawing board for years. Ukraine finished construction of the Odessa-Brody section of their pipeline in 2001, but they could find no one – particularly the Azerbaijanis and the Kazakhs – to ship crude through it. In 2004 they were forced to reverse the flow of the pipeline to allow Russian crude to flow through it to the Black Sea for export. Only recently have the Ukrainians taken measures to change the Odessa-Brody pipeline back to its original flow direction as it finally prepares to accept some shipments of Azeri crude. The Bosphorus bypass pipelines are essentially waiting for crude oil supplies to materialize. Only the presence of crude oil will warrant the construction of these new pipelines – as the example of Odessa-Brody shows.

Right now there are two of these proposed projects that stand a possible chance of being built. One is the Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline (BAPLine), in which Russia's Transneft holds 51% and Bulgaria and Greece split the remaining share; the other is the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline, also known as the Trans Anatolian Pipeline.¹ Russia is keen to have the BAPLine available to transport the increased volume of crude oil that will be transported through the CPC once that pipeline is expanded. For its part, Turkey would like to see CPC shipments transferred to its proposed Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline, along with the crude exported from the terminals in Georgia.

Rotterdam on the Med

Turkey has stated on numerous occasions that it would like to see Ceyhan, in the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean become a 'Rotterdam on the Med', meaning that Turkey would like to transform what is now a small crude oil loading terminal into a regional energy entrepot. Should the Samsun-Ceyhan crude pipeline be built and operate at full capacity, the amount of crude arriving at Ceyhan – added to that from the Caspian and Iraq – could amount to more than 3mn b/d. The Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline is to have a capacity of 1.5mn b/d of crude.² The BTC, which already has a 1mn b/d capacity, is likely to see throughput increase to as much as 1.6mn b/d in the years ahead as shipments of Kazakh crude through the BTC increases and

¹ Middle East Economic Survey, 17 March 2008, <http://www.mees.com/>.

² Ercan Ersoy, 'Shell Soon to Join Samsun-Ceyhan Pipeline: Sources,' *Reuters*, 26 May 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-Oil/idUSL2643390220080526>.

shipments of Iraqi crude, through the northern pipeline from Kirkuk, are likely to increase to more than 1mn b/d as Iraq slowly gets its hydrocarbon industry back on its feet.

At one point Turkey was considering licenses for at least four refineries at Ceyhan. It has also been suggested that petrochemical plants could be built there and that natural gas could be routed there by pipeline for the production of LNG. If Turkey should succeed in realizing all these things, there could indeed come the day when Ceyhan would be recognized as a major oil trading center.

Regional challenges

The Middle East is usually in an uproar, so bombings or fighting that may disrupt shipments of Iraqi crude don't lead to alarm. The political fracas with Iran over its nuclear research program did impact prices during the first six months of 2008, when oil prices were on their way to reaching \$147/B in July of last year. But the crude oil market is now oversupplied and the continuing dispute between Iran and the UN over its nuclear program makes little impact on the oil market. That could of course change, depending on the current round of talks between the P5 + 1 and Iran.

The war in Afghanistan and increasing violence in Pakistan is naturally cause for concern, but as long as these conflicts remain localized there is not much worry about them impacting energy production and distribution.

If there is to be an examination of possible crises in this region, then the focus at this time must include the movement of hydrocarbons from the Caspian Sea and Russia to Europe. The war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 was a wakeup call to Europe, as was the gas price dispute between Russia and Ukraine last January, when Moscow left a huge chunk of Europe to freeze while it argued with the Ukrainian leadership over its gas bill.

That dispute and a less consequential disagreement between Russia and Ukraine the year before erased from Europe's collective mind the thought that Russia was a reliable energy supplier. Why Russia felt it necessary to go to such lengths over its gas supply issue with Ukraine has left most of us guessing. But in a way it is lucky for Europe that that dispute came to a head when it did, because it forced Europe to pull its head out of the cloud that it sometimes prefers to exist in.

The same goes for the war between Russia and Georgia. In August 2008 a dispute arose between Georgia and Russia that resulted in Russian troops invading Georgia and occupying parts of it for several days. During the war, crude oil and gas shipments through Georgia were stopped. That means shipments of oil and gas through the BTC and Baku-Supsa crude oil pipelines, and natural gas shipments through the SCP pipeline were halted.¹ Crude shipments by rail were halted. The key export routes for Caspian oil and gas were severed. Shipments were not resumed for a number of days until after the war ended and the Russian forces withdrew.

The war is explained as being about the rights of South Ossetia, but it clearly demonstrated that Russia can easily bring shipments of Caspian oil and gas to an abrupt halt if it so chooses. Apart from making it clear that Moscow is not pleased with Georgia's political realignment with the West, Moscow also made it clear to the West that shipping crude oil and gas through a volatile state like Georgia can be a risky business.

¹ Middle East Economic Survey, 18 August 2009, 25 August 2009, 1 September 2009, <http://www.mees.com/>.

The Russian gas monopoly Gazprom supplies Europe with roughly 40% of its supplies. Russia appears keen to maintain that market share and expand it if possible. Gazprom has signed deals and acquired assets in Algeria and Libya, from where Europe will be receiving large volumes of gas in the future. It is seeking assets in Nigeria and the proposed Trans Sahara gas pipeline project, which, if it is ever built, will deliver more natural gas to Europe via Algeria.

Nabucco and Russian resurgence

The Ukraine price dispute demonstrated to Europe just how vulnerable the EU is to Moscow's temperament and it reinforced the fact that Europe needs to diversify its gas supplies. Thus the Ukraine dispute and the Russia-Georgia war put new European emphasis on the proposed Nabucco Gas Pipeline project, plus other gas supply projects in North Africa and West Africa.

Earlier this decade, a number of Eastern European countries got together and proposed the construction of a natural gas pipeline that would carry gas from the Caspian region to Europe through Turkey.¹ The idea was to provide gas to Europe that would not come from Russia. By the year 2000, Europeans had become concerned over their growing dependence upon Russian gas. As it turned out, the events of 2008 and January 2009 drove this point home.

In 2002, when the Nabucco project was first conceived, European gas companies thought that it would be prudent to diversify their supplies by tapping into those huge Caspian reserves, and so the Nabucco Gas Pipeline consortium was formed in 2004 by Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.

Imagine the reaction in Moscow. First the BTC crude oil pipeline through the Caucasus and then a gas pipeline, both of which are designed for the purpose of transporting hydrocarbons from the Caspian region – a region once controlled by the Soviet Union – without having to cross Russian territory.

Moscow had voiced its opposition to the BTC when it was first proposed in the late 1990s but at the time there was little that Russia could do. It was politically weak. Over the last several years, as the price of crude oil has increased, Russia has been able to reassert itself. The collapse of crude oil prices a year ago dealt a serious blow to the Russian economy, but it has recaptured some of its political influence in the world.

Yet like the BTC, the idea that a gas pipeline designed with the intent of sending Caspian gas to Europe for the express purpose of reducing Europe's dependence on Russian gas does not sit well in Moscow.

The Nabucco Gas Pipeline project proposes to transport 31 bcm/y of gas through a 3,300 km pipeline from a gathering point west of Ankara to the Baumgarten gas hub in Austria.² From the start, the partners had their eye on gas from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Middle Eastern suppliers. It was initially thought that the pipeline could become operational by 2009. Its current construction cost is estimated at around \$8 billion.³ It is now expected to come into operation by 2014.

¹ See <http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/>.

² Ibid.

³ Middle East Economic Survey, 20 July 2009, <http://www.mees.com/>.

But Nabucco has not been able to secure gas supplies and hence its delay. Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz gas field is currently producing around 7 bcm/y and peak production for Stage 1 development will be under 9 bcm/y. Current productions are going to Georgia, Turkey and a small amount to Greece.¹ Stage 2 productions are expected to come on-stream in 2014 and output will increase to 16 bcm/y.² Azerbaijan has stated recently that it is willing to ship gas to Europe through Nabucco once it is built. That will give Nabucco about a quarter of its capacity.

Earlier this year two Nabucco partners, Austria's OMV, which leads the consortium, and Hungary's MOL, purchased a 20% share of Pearl Petroleum, a joint venture between Sharjah-based Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum which is developing the Khor Mor and Chemchemal gas fields in Iraqi Kurdistan. Gas shipments from northern Iraq are to be piped into Turkey, where they will find their way to Nabucco.

Earlier this month, Reinhard Mitschek, Managing Director of the Nabucco Gas Pipeline project, said first gas is expected to flow through the pipeline in 2014 and that the first shipments are likely to be of Iraqi origin. "We believe that we will start up in 2014 and that the gas will be ready from Iraq. During 2015, 2016, we should have a further 8 billion cubic meters from Azerbaijan," Mitschek said.³

Apart from finding sources of supply, another delay involved differences within the consortium. The Nabucco members had difficulty negotiating gas allocations and prices with Turkey. As mentioned, Turkey aspires to be a regional energy hub, but it has no energy resources of its own. What Turkey wanted was to keep 15% of the gas transiting Nabucco for its own use at a preferential price. The other Nabucco partners, who now include RWE of Germany, would not agree to that. Turkey intended to store that gas or resell it to third parties. Azerbaijan, for its part, was not keen to discount its gas price in favor of Turkey.

Turkey has since been persuaded to adjust its position and in July an intergovernmental agreement was signed by the five countries through which the pipeline will pass. More negotiations among the partners lay ahead, however.

During the gathering for the intergovernmental agreement in Istanbul, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki stated that Iraq would be willing to supply Nabucco with 15 bcm/y of gas. Maliki did not explain from where the gas would originate, but it has been mentioned that gas produced at Iraq's Akkaz gas field could be exported to Syria where it would be exported to Turkey through the AGP. Plans for this scenario have yet to take shape.⁴

If it were not for international sanctions against Iran, that country, which possesses the second largest gas reserves in the world, would be a very likely supplier of gas for Nabucco. Turkey already receives gas from Iran by pipeline, and while Iran is not now able to supply the volume of gas that Nabucco would be interested in receiving, the potential exists. But as long as Iran retains its current political stance and sanctions remain in place, there is little chance that it will be supplying gas to Nabucco.

As far as Nabucco is concerned, the prize is Turkmenistan. Gas reserves in that country are

¹ Middle East Economic Survey, 26 November 2007, <http://www.mees.com/>.

² Middle East Economic Survey, 12 October 2009, <http://www.mees.com/>.

³ Middle East Economic Survey, 12 October 2009, <http://www.mees.com/>.

⁴ Middle East Economic Survey, 25 May 2009, 20 July 2009, <http://www.mees.com/>.

unknown. President Gurbanguli Berdymukhamedov, who has been in power only since February 2007, occasionally hints at the size of Turkmenistan's gas reserves – suggesting 24 trillion cubic meters – and makes statements about how his country supports multiple export routes, although he had yet to say yes to Nabucco.

Turkmenistan has a lot of gas that has yet to be developed. But regarding exports to the West it has two major problems – it is in dispute with Azerbaijan about where the offshore boundary in Caspian Sea should be (oil and gas fields are at stake in this) and the other problem is how to get around Russia.

A key detail in all this is the fact that if Turkmen gas were to be exported to Europe without crossing Russian or Iranian territory it would be necessary to build a Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP). As noted earlier, both Russia and Iran are opposed to cross-Caspian pipelines, and they are particularly opposed to them primarily for this reason. They do not want to do Europe any favors.

Russia has an agreement to buy at least 80 bcm/y of Turkmenistan's gas output as of 2010.¹ This gas would undoubtedly be routed to Europe. For Moscow, a Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline would be like a leak in the Central Asian gas balloon.

A Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline was nearly built in 2000 by Shell and GE of the US, but that plan fell through when the late President Niyazov demanded that a large amount of the financing for the project be paid up front.

Technologically it would not be difficult to build a Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline. It would link up with the SCP in Azerbaijan, and Turkmen gas would be on its way to Europe.

The Europeans and Russians are not the only parties interested in Turkmen gas. Later this year or early next, a 40 bcm/y capacity pipeline is scheduled to begin operation that will carry Turkmen gas across Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China.² Turkmen shipments will eventually reach 30 bcm/y and Kazakhstan is expected to export around 10 bcm/y of its own gas to China through that system.³

Nord Stream and South Stream

Russia dismisses the Nabucco project as unrealistic. There is no gas to supply it, it says. But as events with Ukraine have shown, Russia, too, has its own problems. Not only Ukraine, but Belarus has also proved to be problematic. In order to get around these difficulties and continue supplying Europe, Russia has proposed two bypass pipelines of its own.

Nord Stream is designed to carry 55 bcm/y to Germany by means of an underwater pipeline through the Baltic Sea.⁴ By traveling down the Baltic, the gas in the pipeline bypasses not only Belarus but also the former Soviet Baltic states which are now members of the EU and Poland, also an EU member and a former member of the Warsaw Pact. These eastern members of the EU have criticized this, and it is important to point out that if the EU had a common energy policy,

¹ Middle East Economic Survey, 3 December 2007, <http://www.mees.com/>.

² Middle East Economic Survey, 7 April 2008, <http://www.mees.com/>.

³ Middle East Economic Survey, 7 April 2008, <http://www.mees.com/>.

⁴ Middle East Economic Survey, 14 September 2009, <http://www.mees.com/>.

Nord Stream might not be on the table.

Nord Stream is estimated to cost €5.5 billion and come into operation in 2011. Later phases of the project will increase the project's cost.¹

Russia's other proposed pipeline, South Stream, is considered to be a rival to Nabucco, although the EU and Russia, for the sake of protocol, do not admit that South Stream is competing with Nabucco for the Central European market and if projections for European gas demand is correct, both gas pipelines will be required to meet those demands anyway. But for now, the two projects are racing against time against one another.

Vladimir Putin, while still president of Russia, announced the plan to build South Stream in 2007 during a gathering of Black Sea states. With South Stream, Russia will be able to bypass Ukraine and Turkey, rather than expand Blue Stream as was previously proposed.

South Stream, currently estimated to cost around €20 billion, calls for the construction of a 900 kilometer gas pipeline across the Black Sea.² The pipeline would reach depths of more than 2,000 meters (about three times deeper than a Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline). Russia said recently that it would transport more than 60 bcm/y through the pipeline.³ Italy's Eni, which partnered with Gazprom to build the Blue Stream to Turkey, would again join Gazprom in this project.

South Stream would make landfall in Bulgaria from where it would take northern and southern directions. The northern route would cross Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and Austria and also terminate in northern Italy. The southern route would cross Bulgaria, Greece and enter southern Italy.

There is no doubt that Russia has the gas reserves to supply these pipelines, but they would have to be developed and this would require considerable investment. It is more economical for Russia and more politically satisfying for Russia to draw upon Turkmenistan's gas reserves and those in other Central Asia and Caspian countries. Gazprom has already approached Azerbaijan with an offer to purchase all of its Shah Deniz gas output that is not under contract. Azerbaijan has since agreed to sell Gazprom 500 million cubic meters/year of Shah Deniz gas beginning 2010.⁴ But this is seen as more of a political concession than a deal that Azerbaijan genuinely wants to pursue.

Kazakhstan

In recent days it has been announced by Kazakhstan that it intends to proceed with the Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System (KCTS)/Trans-Caspian Project. The purpose of this project will be to export crude oil produced at Kazakhstan's giant offshore Kashagan oilfield in the northern Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, and from there to Ceyhan.

Initially the project calls for tankers to ferry the crude across the sea from Kuryk to a terminal in Azerbaijan from where it will be fed into the BTC. Ultimately this project calls for the

¹ Middle East Economic Survey, 14 September 2009, <http://www.mees.com/>.

² Middle East Economic Survey, 10 August 2009, <http://www.mees.com/>.

³ See <http://south-stream.info/?L=1>.

⁴ Energy Intelligence, Nefte Compass, 15 October 2009, http://www.energyintel.com/publicationhomepage.asp?publication_id=3.

construction of an underwater pipeline to transport as much as 1.2mn b/d of crude across the Caspian.¹

Kazakhstan has also repeatedly expressed its support for multiple export routes, but the existence of the CPC begs the question as to why not expand the CPC pipeline further and ship Kashagan crude through it.

One possible answer is that the Central Asian oil and gas producers have decided that they would rather not rely on Russia. Moscow blocked the expansion of the CPC for years over issues like taxes, loans and management, to the point that Tengizchevroil (TCO), the operator of the Tengiz oilfield, had to resort to shipping crude by rail car as it had during the pre-CPC days. Rather than put too much faith in the future of the CPC, TCO will also participate in the KCTS/Trans-Caspian project.²

Remaining questions

The momentum for hydrocarbon production is rolling in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. The question is how long will those countries wait to have a settlement over the legal status of the Caspian Sea before they go ahead with building under water pipelines? Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have a bilateral treaty demarcating their sea beds. What happens if they proceed with the construction of a crude oil pipeline without Russia's or Iran's permission? What happens if Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan reach an agreement on their offshore borders and agree to construct a gas pipeline? How will Iran respond? Would it send warships and airplanes again? How would the governments of the Western companies involved respond? How would the EU and U.S. respond if there is more trouble in Georgia and the Russian military invades that country again? What if there is a pro-Moscow coup in Tbilisi and the new government nationalizes the pipelines running through its territory? What if it sells those pipelines to Transneft and Gazprom?

Momentum is also gathering in the southeastern Mediterranean. The big gas discoveries offshore Israel and Cyprus's upcoming second offshore bidding round have injected new interest in the region for the international oil companies. But what if Turkish warships continue to harass survey vessels in the Cyprus EEZ? What if a US company like Noble Energy decides to drill in Cypriot waters? Will it be able to go about its business?

The situation that exists within the energy sector of the Greater Eastern Mediterranean region is complicated enough to invite any number of misunderstandings or even incidents. Crises erupt only when things are brought to an abrupt halt and the threat of violence or a return to violence looms. The question surrounding all of this is whether countries new to the energy industry will be allowed to develop their energy resources independently and export their production freely, or whether they will have to continually face a situation where a stronger neighbor is forcing reluctant decisions upon them.

¹ Platts, 5 October 2009, 8 October 2009, <http://www.platts.com/>.

² Platts, 5 October 2009, <http://www.platts.com/>.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION*

Solon Kassinis**
23 October 2009

Energy Security and the Geopolitics of Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean

Throughout this discussion I will begin by analyzing some facts about what is happening in our region, and will go on to the suggestions which I have, as I believe that these could be used as a catalyst for solving various political instabilities in our region.

My main presentation will begin with an analysis of some facts and figures regarding the EU energy sector, because my suggestion is to do with the energy security of the European Union. I will discuss Europe's dependency on energy supplies, and what is happening, especially with the dependency of Europe on Russia. I will then finish with my suggestions in view of the prosperity that I believe does exist throughout the region, the establishment of the south/north energy corridor and pipeline which could be assisting not only the whole of the region, but Turkey would also be a beneficiary when they are in Europe.

I would like to say a few words regarding the off-shore hydrocarbon activities and, of course, to indicate that in our region it is unexplored, and the impact that South/East Mediterranean may have on the EU energy supply.

Now, coming to some figures, it can be seen that when looking at the inland energy consumption, and primary production of fuels, the figures I have are up until the year 2007. When looking at the consumption by type of fuel, it shows how they modify from coal towards natural gas nowadays, so the dependence on natural gas has subsequently increased. It is also necessary to observe that 80% of all the energy consumed is provided by oil, natural gas and coal, whereas in 1990, hard coal and lignite accounted for nearly half of all the primary energy produced.

Looking at the share of primary production in the gross inland consumption, crude oil, natural gas and hard coal exhibit a significantly decreasing share of primary production, and many major fossil fuel resource sites within the EU are also in decline. Due to the increase in consumption and the decrease in primary production there has been increasing dependence on fossil fuel imports. The energy dependency figures demonstrate that the EU imports approximately 55% of its energy needs; however, this figure is expected to rise to 70% by the year 2030.

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

** *Energy Service, Ministry of Commerce of the Republic of Cyprus*

The geographical origin of imports differs by type of fuel. Russia is a significant source of imports for natural gas, coal and oil, whereas the Middle East, North Africa and Norway are significant suppliers of oil. North Africa and Norway are also major suppliers of natural gas, and Australia, Colombia and South Africa provide most of our hard coal resources.

In summary, the EU relies mostly on energy imports from Russia, the Middle East, North Africa and Norway. It is, however, concerned about the long-term availability of these supplies. An issue which is presented by this reliance is the fact that some of these regions suffer from political instability, and risks of terrorism and their energy resources may be used as a political weapon. Instead they should use their energy resources as a catalyst to solve political problems.

We have witnessed the Ukrainian crisis of January 2006, March 2008 and January 2009, where there have been threats that the access to oil supplies may be cut. There have, therefore, been clear warnings to the EU of energy resource threats. Europe is very vulnerable to oil shock prices that may be created by the main energy suppliers. That is why they have to seek alternatives.

The main energy policy of Europe is the sustainability, competitiveness and, most importantly, the security of supply. It is clear that the EU is dependent on Russia, and they are subsequently very concerned. We have approximately 50% of Europe's energy supplies imported, and the main supplier in Russia is Gazprom. They have lots of new policies that they want to put to their users because they want to be the single producer, and the single supplier. Russia is the EU's most important trading partner as they are currently the world's largest producer of hydrocarbons. Several of the EU states are entirely dependent on Russia for their gas supplies.

So it is increasingly essential to see what they do, and their policies regarding Europe. What I am suggesting is that there could be an alternative utilization, the supplies from the Mediterranean Sea, and I am sure that it is very prosperous regarding hydrocarbons. I have been saying this for some years now.

We know that there are various projects in the pipeline. We also know that there are a lot of political inferences not to materialize these projects. An example of this is the Nabucco project.¹

As there are potential threats to Europe's supply of energy it is necessary to explore ways to diversify its sources. The South-East Mediterranean region presents the most obvious candidate to serve as a new and relatively untapped source of natural gas and oil for Europe. This potential supply would be complementary to Caspian resources, thereby enhancing energy security for Europe and contributing to energy independence from Russia.

We are aware of other pipelines throughout Turkey, Greece and Italy, and the South, but they are not considering that the Mediterranean Sea is also an alternative. I am sure that what they discover here, the Egyptians, the Israelis, and possibly tomorrow the Cypriots and Lebanese, they could make a pipeline and join all these forces through either Nabucco or another existing pipeline through Turkey, and then Turkey would also benefit.

From Nabucco, Turkey is already going to get about \$530 million per year as rent as well as, (without taxation) 20% off the price of gas, so they clearly have many benefits.

So all these issues, I believe, could be utilized by the politicians, and I believe this could be used

¹ Initiated by Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH.

as a catalyst for the dissolution of these political problems, and would be beneficial.

We already have the Arab Gas Pipeline, which has been in operation since 2003. There is also the infrastructure of liquefied natural gas (LNG), especially in Egypt. The Iraq-Israeli oil pipeline is already under construction, and is going to be in operation. So what happens now is that the Palestinians make three wells there with British Gas, and all three are successful, they were discovered 3-4 years ago. Recently - although I will expand on this later - the Israelis discovered a very big structure in the region.

The Egyptians have already made 146 wells in the Mediterranean Sea. There are 81% of gas reserves in the Mediterranean Sea. However, in the Nile there are only 2%. So it is true that we are talking about a virgin area, the Mediterranean Sea, and there are many prospects in the region. We did a big survey, and found that there are some very serious companies now interested. Moving on to another area, we have a discovery in the South East Mediterranean, and I had a meeting where I was with the CEO of Noble who made the discovery. They initially thought they would find 2.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf), and they showed me in their strong room that they are indicating an estimated 8 tcf. This is the second biggest discovery of last year. By 2012, they believe that they will have gas from their own reserves, and are using a very fast track to utilize the gas they have.

Cyprus itself is now making efforts of discovery, and we are hoping to move to a second bidding round next year. It is the third biggest island in the Mediterranean Sea, and provides a crossroad for many big international energy routes. It is a strategic hub for business activities in the region, and provides a bridge between Europe and the Middle East. Cyprus has already signed the relevant legislation and agreements: with the Arab Republic of Egypt ratifying the law in 2003 for the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the Framework Agreement concerning the development of cross-median line Hydrocarbon resources, and the Confidentiality Agreement in 2006.

Cyprus also signed an agreement with the Republic of Lebanon for the delimitation of the EEZ in 2007, and even with Israel we are trying our best, and we do believe that it is going to benefit both countries for this agreement to materialize. Of course, with Syria, their minister visited us, and we do believe that we can collaborate and finalize this agreement.

Various legislative regulations have come in based on the European Union's relevant Directive 94/22/EC¹, and they must be in harmony with this. We have very transparent and very open procedures of how we evaluate the bidders depending on their work activity, their reputation, their previous experience, and especially their financial capability, but above all is the share of the benefits of the exploration, which is based on production share in contract. Cyprus is giving to all other states zero taxation so they have to include everything in their share, so we give them this very stable business environment so they know this country. Another new idea that I suggested which has also been adopted is that the share is not stable, but it is modified according to international prices at the time so there would be different tiers associated with the taxation prices.

The various licenses are exploitation licenses like those that have already been given to the American company, and are very much dependent on the Development Production Plan and the

¹ Outlines conditions for granting and using authorizations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons – 30 May 2004.

Environmental Impact Assessment study, and of course, as I said the main evaluation criteria are the technical and financial abilities of the applicant, and the ways in which the activities are carried out. These are alongside the offered financial considerations, and the efficiency and responsibility with the previous license. Finally, national security and public interest will also be taken into account.

Some of the surveys that have been carried out, utilizing some of the more recent and developed technologies have provided more clarity. We are the first country in the world to use this technology for a very big survey. We have hydrocarbon prospecting licenses which are granted for up to 1 year. We have indicated to BP and to Shell to use Cyprus as a supplier. When looking at the geological structures it can be determined that there must be hydrocarbon potentials. This is identified by geological surveys, but no drilling.

There are also hydrocarbon exploration licenses which have some technical requirements regarding how long we are giving them the license. They have to show that they are doing activities within the first 3 years, otherwise we might not extend this license. We can give two extensions to each one, but if they do not do anything we may not renew. On each renewal at least 25% of the initial licensed area is relinquished. In case of a discovery the licensee has the right to be granted an exploitation license for that discovery.

Hydrocarbon exploitation licenses can be granted for an initial period of up to 25 years, and can be renewed once for up to 10 years. During decommissioning, some production facilities (e.g. pipelines) may remain in place and can create an “artificial reef effect” which is considered to be a beneficial impact.

The offshore seismic survey is the first survey that we carried out in 2006. During this time we had about six lots of 770km of 2-D seismic survey. We have interpreted this information to create a data log entitled “New Exploration Opportunities Offshore Cyprus: A Geological Interpretation Based on a New Regional 2D Seismic Survey” which was prepared by Beicip-Franlab. These are in four volumes, include 179 figures and 37 maps. They must be purchased by companies interested in participating in the 1st Licensing Round Offshore Cyprus. We have already sold them to 14 companies, so there has been a lot of interest.

We have found that when looking at images of anticline structures with flat spots that on comparison with those of Shell in the NEMED block that we have very similar structures.

When looking at the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) study, Cyprus is the second country after England to carry out this study in the North Sea in order to identify, describe and evaluate the likely significant effects on the environment of implementing hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation activities. Applicants for licenses are bound to follow, and comply with the results and recommendations of the SEA.

In 2007 another offshore seismic survey was carried out, but in 3D over 659km². It identified several hydrocarbon indicators such as flat spots, bright spots and amplitude anomalies. It also gave a better understanding of intra-Messinian and pre-Messinian structures.

By the end of this month we will have a new interpretation report entitled “New Exploration Opportunities Offshore Cyprus: Exploration Plays and Leads” prepared by Beicip-Franlab. We believe that in the second bidding round we will have a lot of data.

Noble's spokesman said on 23 January 2009 that the discovery of gas at Tamar has implications for gas potential off Cyprus where the US player has been awarded operation ship of Block 12. The spokesman is reported to have said, "We believe the play concept extends into Cypriot waters."

The EU is worried about its dependency on Russian energy supplies, and is looking for alternative sources. It has been found that the South-East Mediterranean region can make a substantial contribution to Europe's energy security. The South-Eastern Mediterranean supplier is complimentary to Caspian resources, thereby enhancing the security of supply to Europe and contributing to energy independence from Russia.

In addition to ensuring security for the EU, the South Mediterranean energy cooperation will radically contribute to the development of the region, and to increase the geopolitical stability. The south-north energy corridor could turn the East Mediterranean region into an area of sustainable and balanced economic development based on comprehensive cooperation and solidarity. It will also strengthen cooperation, and create the appropriate framework conditions for prosperity, dialogue, stability and peace. The new developments will enhance the regional political stability, economic development and reduce poverty and social divisions.

Finally, it can also improve bi-lateral relationships, developing synergies, and enhance the continuous regional cooperation (e.g. Israel-Palestine, Cyprus-Turkey).

That is how I see it and I believe that we will live to see this materialize. In addition, I believe that energy could be used not only as a tool for fighting wars, but also something that can help towards stability.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION*

Avishai Ehrlich**

23 October 2009

Is Israeli-Palestinian-Arab Conflict Intractable?

In addressing the above issue, I shall start by referring to a quote from George Mitchell who recently said, “I believe there's no such thing as a conflict that can't be ended. They're created and sustained by human beings. They can be ended by human beings. No matter how ancient the conflict, no matter how hateful, no matter how hurtful, peace can prevail.”¹

He may be right in principle, but as John Maynard Keynes said, “In the long run, we're all dead,” and he said that in a very similar set of circumstances. Mitchell is right in principle as no situation is forever, but it does not follow that peace can be gotten at any time.

Existing impediments to peace may befall any specific peace initiative. The right conditions must be created for efforts to be successful, and if these conditions are not right, then simply having a strong will is not enough.

In order to embark on this question of intractability, my feelings and my analysis are that I find it hard to believe that there is going to be a breakthrough in the Israeli-Arab conflict soon. Having said that, I am more than willing to eat my hat if it should happen!

It is important to recognize the difference between the world that President Bush inherited in 1990, and the world as it is today. At that time, it seemed to be the beginning of what was called “The American Century”.

I do not think that there would be many who would predict the American century in 2010, and this illustrates just how fast things can change. President Obama finds himself in a very odd situation, as he is currently in the middle of an economic crisis, and outstretched in never ending wars; a position that was determined by the Bush administration. What we are facing now are limitations, and this is applicable even to American power.

When I come to characterize the Israeli-Palestinian-Arab conflict, especially if you bear in mind the Cyprus conflict, it has three special characteristics which admittedly do feature to a much

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

** *Professor of Sociology, University of Tel Aviv*

¹ Mitchell Report - April 2002.

lesser degree in the latter conflict.

The first one is the permanent violence of the conflict. There are hardly any other major conflicts that I can think of that have had so many violent eruptions over such a long time. These violent eruptions on a large scale do not sum up the daily violence that occurs and subsequently becomes part of the new routine in that part of the world. So there are these highly intensive violent conflicts happening in a very volatile and central area to the economy, and the security of the world. Due to the location, these actions become more acute than if they were taking place elsewhere.

The second of these characteristics which is different is the dimension of holiness which is added to the conflicts. What I mean by this is that, as there is a strong symbolism attached to the Holy Land for three major world religions, its relevance far exceeds its locus and it is, therefore, a constant focus of world attention.

I may have given this example before, but an Israeli poet Yehuda Amichai wrote in one of his pieces that Jerusalem is a place where everyone remembers that he's forgotten something, but does not remember what it is.¹ Jerusalem is, therefore, a very mythical place, and far exceeds any type of materialism. It is because of this religious aspect that the conflict is made even more difficult to resolve.

The third aspect that is unique to this conflict is that it has many actors, and arguably too many actors. As the proverb goes, "too many cooks spoil the broth", and here there are too many actors with their fingers in the proverbial soup. This means that although very few of them, if any, can resolve the conflict, it does not take very much for others to spoil the efforts to reach a resolution.

There are a number of reasons here why I believe there are too many actors involved in the conflict. In almost every conflict, you will find that those involved directly will seek alliances. Most commonly, at least in the context of the bi-polar world, the main actors will align themselves with a super power. In this instance the super powers contest the conflict, and it becomes subsumed within the bi-polar world, and its structure, and between the bigger structures which used to be called the cold war.

These alliances mean that the superpowers become involved by proxy, by a transfer of finances, by a transfer of arms, and by the way in which they intercede on behalf of one or other of the sides in various international institutions or organizations such as the UN.

This is one level of seeking alliance, but there is another aspect to it. This is that both Israeli nationalism, which is also known as Zionism, and the Palestinian national movements are pan-movements. Zionism is not the idea of securing independence to people who sit in a circle territory. It is the idea of moving people who were minorities in different places, and concentrating them in one place where they are a majority. In that respect, it differs from other nationalisms, because most other nationalisms, even if they have populations outside the state, they would like the territories to be adjacent or annexed to it. So this represents a different meaning of the word "pan-".

The use of the word "pan-" can also refer to a nationalism which claims to represent all Jews, wherever they are. It is enshrined in some basic laws of becoming a citizen such as the law of

¹ Yeshuda Amichai, *Me-ahorei Kol Zeh Mistater Osher Gadol* (Abramson's translation), 1974, p. 139.

return which was enacted in 1950. This legislation gives automatic citizenship to any Jew coming to Israel. In return, Zionism claims to represent all Jews, and since after the Second World War its main opponents have been within Judaism, and orthodoxy, and the Jewish socialist movement. It does gain the affinity of the majority of Jews as well, and it organizes Jews for the interest of the Israeli state.

It has chapters, youth movements, concessions and lobbies which work to mobilize and support the Jewish community. The Jewish lobby is not only made up of Jews in the US. It is a conglomeration of many different groups, some which are Christian, some fundamentalist Christians, who for various reasons try to articulate American policies in the direction of the support of Israel.

There is another level of support for Israel, and this exhibited itself mainly in 1947. It brought about the creation of the state of Israel and was in the aftermath of the Holocaust. If one looks at the vote in November of 1947 which partitioned Palestine in the General Assembly, there was a very interesting division. All the Arab and Muslim countries voted against the partition, and all the countries where there was a Christian majority voted for, including communist countries. Gromyko, who was then the representative of the USSR, spoke very eloquently about the suffering of the Jews.

I highlight the Holocaust at this stage because it has subsequently become an issue between Iran and Israel. My personal view is, however, that although the Holocaust did occur, the Palestinians were not responsible for the Holocaust. If it was not for the Holocaust, however, then the partition may not have happened as many of the Jews emigrated from Israel between Hitler's rise to power and 1939, which more than doubled the number of Jews in Palestine over 6 years. This created a critical mass for the building of the state.

So this kind of solidarity is something that Israel relies on, uses and wants, and evidence of this can be seen very clearly within the EU, as there is no common EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

I will give an example using the vote that happened in October based on Goldstone report, where countries such as Slovakia, Hungary and Italy voted against accepting the report, and some EU countries abstained altogether. Britain and France were not present at this vote, so this shows how the EU responds with regard to a common policy.

The Palestinians also have a pan-movement. The Palestinians, like the Jews, have become a diaspora-nation, and they live not just inside Israel or in areas occupied by Israel, but they live in several Arab states, and in Jordan they are the majority. They live outside of the Arab states, and in that respect they also try to mobilize support from the surrounding states.

They are, therefore, relying on two movements. The pan-Arab movement was a secular movement that defined anyone who spoke Arabic as Arab regardless of their religion. It saw all Arabs as belonging to one big nationalist movement, and hoped that there would be one incorporated Arab state. These were the ideals of Nasserism and Ba'athism, in Syria, Iraq and so on.

There were many clashes within Ba'athism, even between Iraqi and Syrian Ba'athists, but one thing they had in common was that they were all united on the issue of Palestine, so this solidarity formed the cornerstone of the fundamental axiom for the pan-Arab movement. In this respect,

Palestinians could rely on support from the Arab states.

Despite the apparent solidarity, there was also a negative effect to be garnered from this movement as although there was a feeling that all the Arabs were one family, this contained different ideologies, and different Arab states fought internal Arab competition. This presented struggles even within the Palestinian movement. Each fraction set up its different organizations, and each one supported, financed and trained their organizations which helped to create this plethora of chaotic and un-united forms of leadership. This has deteriorated further in the last few years into a schism between Hamas and Fatah, but it has been like this for some time. Reflecting upon this it can be seen that sometimes it is better to have one state rather than having many states in your family.

The third circle which the Palestinians tried to capitalize, and this goes back to the 1920s, was the pan-Islamic circle which was much larger than the pan-Arab circle. The golden dome in the Al-Aqsa mosque was mainly financed by donations from Muslims in India. In the United Nations there are now 57 Muslim states, and this means that almost automatically the Palestinians can rely on at least 57, plus other states, for suggestions to criticize or denounce Israel. This manifests itself as a distortion of world democracy. These movements have, therefore, led to Israel's attitude towards the UN, and their belief that it is of no use to them.

So it can be seen that both movements have created circles of support around Palestine which are much bigger than they are. It creates so many conflicting interests, and so many interventions that it is very difficult to see how all of these can be synchronized towards an agreement. Of course, this was not possible during the bi-polar structure of the world until 1989. Indeed in the Armistice in 1949 and the Rhodes Agreements after the first Israeli-Arab war, there were many meetings and attempts, but very few results actually arising from the negotiations towards achieving peace.

If I now proceed to concentrate on the world as it emerged after 1990, I would say that short of one peace agreement, which was achieved in 1979 between Israel and Egypt, and was the result of Egypt shifting sides from the Eastern block to the Western block, there were hardly any serious negotiations between Israelis and Arabs during the period of the Cold War. So most of what has happened, has happened within the last 19 years.

One important thing to note is that during 1948-67, the Palestinians as an autonomous actor almost did not exist. It was a potential resolution that did not end up with a partition once state was created, and another state was partially swallowed up and conquered by three different other states, those being Israel, Jordan and Egypt. It is only after 1967 that Israel controls all of what used to be mandatory Palestine. Hence, the argument between the Israelis and the others over whether it is occupied or not and where is it occupied from.

This had a meaning though, which I will now illustrate. The first point which made it possible for Israel to talk to the Palestinians was the demand that the Palestinians renounced their occupation of Israel and renounced terrorism.

Arafat pushed Iran until in 1988, when in Stockholm he made, after several corrections, a statement saying that he recognized Israel. One of the first things that happened immediately afterwards was that Jordan announced that it was renouncing all claims on the West Bank bit. Suddenly Jordan said that it had no claims on the west bit, but that is after 1950 when Jordan had annexed the west bit. The space is, therefore, suddenly vacant and belongs to nobody.

As a result of this action the Palestinians issued the Declaration of Independence in order to immediately seize this vacuum that had been created, not that the state was a state at the time as it was occupied by Israel as it was before, but as a result it did not have anything to do with Israel. This declaration, however, created a claim over the territory, and it also made, since the re-declaration of Israel, a leadership partner with whom Israel, and the world, could give a legitimate status to and negotiate with.

Since this time we have had several major rounds of negotiations, and the world seized upon the situation after 1990, and the Madrid conference was convened in 1991. This was the first time that the Israelis and the Palestinians sat together, and Russia also participated. In 1993 the Oslo negotiations started, but they ended in the disaster in 2000 of Camp David. The last rounds after Camp David were in Taba, where both sides moved further towards what they wanted, but then the Second Intifada broke out, and there were subsequently a lot of suicide bombers.

In 2003, there was another attempt by the quartet comprised of Russia, the UN, the EU and the US, who promoted the road map for peace. This still stands on what was accomplished. This demonstrates that there have not only been negotiations, but there have been lots of negotiations. Due to the thousands of hours that have already been spent in negotiations, it now means that there is nothing that has not been thought of that can suddenly appear. The parameters have been made quite clear in relation to what conditions each side expects in order for there to be any sort of solution.

The idea of a two-state solution is first of all implied in the petition, and then it is stated again in resolutions 242 and 338, 1967. One is made to wonder whether it is really possible to have two states, and now there are some people who have considered having a bi-national state as the state solution. I mention these things not because they are realistic, but because also in Cyprus there is the conflict between the two states.

The very simple reason for why it is not realistic is because for a two state solution there needs to be an agreement between the two states. Personally, as I belong to such extremist left wing groups, I support in principle the one state solution, however, I do not believe, like Mitchell, that it can be reached before I am dead. So I would be willing to compromise with the two instead in the hope that if after about 30 years, if the people have not killed each other, then they would be able to talk about the one state solution. We are still witnessing daily killings, so this must stop before we can even attempt reconciliation.

The elements of any two state solutions are, first of all, borders and disagreements, which are to do with the fact that the UN partition was supposed to be a 55% and 45% split between the Arabs and the Jews, with more going to the Jews, even though they were only one third of the population, because the refugees from Europe were supposed to come in shortly afterwards. The war did not end with that kind of situation, but the Israelis captured 79%, so what we refer to as the West Bank in Gaza today is 21% of what used to be British land. Now, the Israelis are negotiating about this, but the Palestinians claim to have already made the biggest sacrifice. This is not particularly because they are kind hearted, but due to the situation after 1948, so no-one could tell what result would come of it. Time has played a very big role in this process, and after two or three generations have passed it becomes very difficult to distinguish between who is native, and who is not. So the territory and the borders are one major thing.

Since 1967, Israel started deliberate state activity settling Jews in the newly occupied territory, and that is the main hurdle that we encounter now. What was more or less agreed in Tama is that the territory of the two states should roughly be the borders that were in place before the 1967 war, and that if any corrections should need to be made, then land should be exchanged on more or less a one-to-one basis.

The second aspect is in relation to independence and its meaning. Lately Netanyahu said at last for the first time that a ruling party could say that they accept the Palestinian state, but that it is demilitarized and other conditions. Previously things have been said about not having military alliances with others, and Israeli control over the air space and so on. All of these things may have their justification in the interests of security. Indeed, that was always Israel's position, and it came out for the first time during the negotiations with Egypt, because Egypt always saw itself as a patron of the Palestinians. During the negotiations, even during Begin's time, he was willing to grant autonomy, but not state. Basically, what Netanyahu says now is not very different to what Begin said.

The third, but partially combined element is security. In security, the Israelis understand first and foremost that there must be a cessation of hostile activities. Israel is extremely sensitive to this because irregulars or non-competence have always been a major problem in Israel, not when there have been major conflict relations, but on a daily basis. This situation where there is a lack of security, porous borders and daily incursions and retaliations by Israelis, has been a major part of the Israeli mentality and their lifestyle.

So for Israeli security it means a cessation of all the conflicts that are occurring on a low intensity level. Palestinians, of course, demand the same thing about the Israeli army, and what the Arab countries call state terrorism. I would say that the results are irregular in Israel, although not to the same extent, but there are armed groups who take the law into their own hands and provoke, kill and so on. The continuation of this situation, therefore, is a hazard for the state losing in monopoly on the means of coercion.

Security for the Palestinians means also a very important thing, which is the stopping the Israeli settlement. They perceive that land will be taken, and once this has happened they will never get it back. The Palestinians, therefore, make an equation between stopping the right to resist by way of arms and the stopping of settlements.

In Israel, stopping settlements is a very difficult issue for any government, but perhaps even more so for a government of the left because it is subject to more attacks by the right, and it can lose its majority if it prevents settlements. A government of the right, however, cannot lose its majority if the people from its own camp attack it because they will not break down the government to give it to the left. Security means that there is now, especially after 2000, the removal of all of the barriers, road blocks and terminals within the West Bank, and so on. It also means removal of the siege on Gaza. All of these things are equal to having security for the Palestinians.

Another important aspect concerns Jerusalem, and there are two aspects to be discussed here. It was previously a divided city until 1967, but then the Israelis annexed it and started building all around it, and have extended the territory of Jerusalem so that the Jerusalem of today is many times bigger than it was in 1967. Jerusalem now includes a large part of the West Bank, so if you extend the municipal borders of Jerusalem, and understand the idea that it must not be returned,

then it means that there is less and less possibility of there being negotiations about borders. Both sides claim that Jerusalem is their capital.

This is not an insurmountable situation. In the last negotiations it was agreed that Jerusalem would be divided, and after Camp David in Tabá improved versions were accepted. The government did not have the majority, and so there is a question as to whether a government that does not have a majority has the power to make binding decisions. So we must look at the territory of Jerusalem, but also at the heart of that territory is, of course, what we call the Holy Land. There is also Temple Mount. The whole of the old city with all of its holy places is just one square kilometer. During the partition decision by the UN in 1948 a solution was found. It was found that Jerusalem should be united, and should be under the supervision of the UN.

There have been various attempts to resolve the question of the holy places, however, an idea that I like very much is that the sovereignty of these places should be left to God.

Another thing that the Palestinians cannot accept is resolution 191, which provides that refugees have a right to return to Israel if they are willing to live in peace. However, the Israelis stick to resolution 181, which is the provision of Palestine.

At this point I will say a few words about the problem of the refugees. From the Palestinian point of view, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is not just an organization of people living in the West Bank area. It regards itself, very much like the Zionist organization, as the representative of all the Palestinians regardless of where they are. Jordan is the only state which gave citizenship to the Palestinians. All of the Arab states, in order to leave the question burning, and in order to make sure that they can represent the Palestinians, they refuse citizenship. One of my friends from Lebanon who participated in the conference last year said that everyone loves Palestine, but they hate the Palestinians. The PLO, which aims to represent all of the Palestinians, finds it extremely difficult to abandon part of its constituency by saying that they resolve the problem of the West Bank. Therefore, the Palestinians find it extremely difficult to leave the question of refugees out of any agreements. We are now talking about roughly 3.5-4million people. To return these people would be that Israel would not have the same character as a Jewish majority anymore and, therefore, it is a non-starter for the Israelis.

So it is known now by all sides that, if there is going to be a resolution, then this problem will have to be solved by settling these people elsewhere.

I have now outlined the main issues that must be resolved, and accordingly any feasible solution will have to deal with these.

In the meanwhile, we have had many changes which have been very important. In 2005, there was an actual Israeli decision to evacuate Gaza. From the Israeli point of view this evacuation should have been sufficient, and they did not understand what more was required of them as missiles were still being directed at the Israelis.

From the Palestinian point of view, even though the Israelis have left, they have taken the parameter of Gaza and sealed it off, besieged it and basically nothing can go in or out unless it is over the border with Egypt where there are now apparently more than 1,500 tunnels. They break in through these tunnels to obtain fuel, animals, missiles, and anything else that they need.

In 2006, President Bush was exerting pressure on us to democratize. There were, therefore,

elections by the Palestinian Authority which was founded as a result of the Oslo Agreement. There was also a split between Hamas and Fatah, which deteriorated into a very horrific civil war. What you see here is not just two groups within the Palestinian movement, but in the appearance of Hamas you can see the influences of different movements within the Islamic border. Hamas is an offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood which is the main opposition in Egypt. Hamas now gains a lot of support from Hezbollah and from Syria, so it has a plethora of connections. Because of the siege, and because they have never accepted Israel's right to exist, Hamas goes back on the Stockholm Agreement of 1988 as they believe that they gained no benefit from it, so why should they renounce their agreement. So now within the Palestinian movement there are two groups with different policies operating. One tries to make amends with the US and the EU in order to reach a possible agreement and the other sticks to the old politics of only using force.

I believe that ultimately - and many academics would agree with me - the arms struggle has caused the Palestinians more harm than good because through the use of arm struggle they created a justification for Israel to use its much superior power and inflict upon them much heavier losses. In the cycle of blood and retaliation it becomes so that everyone forgets who fired the first shot.

In December 2008, there was an operation called "Molten Lead", which the Israelis claim was the right to self-defense because for years there was a barrage of missiles and psychological warfare from the Palestinians. So then, when the Israelis could not stop it they went in. I am very critical of what Israel did next, and I do not believe that they were justified. The way they used power came from a very simple way of thinking.

The high capital warfare that we have today is that in order to save lives, your side has to be able to shoot from afar. The technologies, however, are not that accurate and subsequently there is a lot of collateral damage meaning that many ordinary citizens are killed. This is true not just about Israel, but it also applies to what the US did in Afghanistan and Iraq. War has become asymmetric as most of the wars nowadays are not between two armies, but now you usually have an army against what we call non-combatants.

As we know from revolutionary warfare and guerrilla warfare, the guerrilla should be like a fish in water. No longer are battles conducted face to face in uniform, but they are carried out under the cover of camouflage, and one of the best forms of camouflage is where you cannot tell who is military and who is civilian. Hamas used civilian places to hide or to hide their arms. The Israelis adopted an approach where they would not risk soldiers, but instead when they approached a house they would fire missiles, and when they can detect no movement they would proceed to investigate. However, they would sometimes find that children had been killed.

This is what also happens in Iraq and Afghanistan all the time, so there is an impossible situation which the world will have to address.

In order to round up, I would just like to say a few words about the above situation, and also about President Obama. The Gaza conflicts were continuing right up to the day that Obama was inaugurated. However the day that he was inaugurated it stopped. We have seen that Obama has made a difference to the US, both with the economy and with the unilateralism of the US, and so perhaps, the Israelis could copy the unilateral system from the US, and do on a regional level what the US has done throughout the world. Suddenly we can see that the world is changing because Obama, maybe by inclination - and I really do believe that he has a different

predisposition than President Bush - or whether it is because of the restriction on the power of the US, it has taken a different turn.

In relation to the conflicts, what we have seen is that he does not believe in resolving the problem by tackling it directly. He shows a capability of understanding the much wider implications of who aides and abets, and in turn considers all of the surrounding issues.

The second thing is that he cannot continue with unilateralism and he is moving into multilateralism, and that is one of the reasons why he got the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009, because he has already achieved a lot.

The third point is that he is taking a much more indirect approach. In the Israeli-Arab conflict, one of the things that Obama is trying to do is understand that in order to resolve the Israeli Arab conflict he has to resolve a lot of other conflicts that stand in the way. For example with Iran, he has to get the support of Russia to have a resolution of functions in the Security Council. This cannot be achieved if he puts strong radars on the borders of Russia. He understands this, and won't put these things in place. He also sees the advantages of negotiating in order to make things happen. Through coming to an agreement with Russia, suddenly the possibility arises of more trade negotiations.

This approach is as applicable with the Israeli-Arab conflict as with regard to many of the problems I have highlighted. The solution does not just lie with the Palestinians, but many other Arab countries are also involved. If there are problems with the supply of arms to extremist groups such as Hamas, then you have to try and resolve it at the source.

So negotiating with Iran is not just a question of enriching. It also concerns resolving Iran's attitude towards its place in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is part of the solution in order to sort out the troubles with Gaza, and it demands a lot of investment, and the resolution of the Arab conflict, not just the Palestinian conflict.

So there are now much wider discussions between all of the states involved in order to resolve the conflicts gradually, piece by piece. I would just like to finish by saying that I have great hopes for the action that Obama is taking. His plans are admirable, but they are very complex and very difficult to synchronize. Whether he will be able to bring all of the pieces of the puzzle together before he is out of time is questionable. I just hope that the next election will not happen before that. That is the problem that I can envisage, but if he does succeed then what he will bring about is not just peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, but a much wider solution to all the problems in the Middle East. It does, however, depend on some many other variables in relation to the length of negotiations and his time in office.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION*

Nicholas Grief**
23 October 2009

The Legal Principles Governing the Control of National Airspace and Flight Information Regions and Their Application to the Eastern Mediterranean

Introduction

It is a fundamental and universally recognised principle of international law that “every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory”.¹ As Shawcross & Beaumont state, “the concept of sovereignty is the key stone upon which virtually all air law is built, since any flight in international aviation requires the prior consent of the State overflown, which is generally granted by treaty.”² The territory of a State consists of “the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty... of such State.”³

The corollary of this principle, the international status of the airspace above the high seas, is equally well established. The airspace of the high seas, like the subjacent waters, is not subject to the territorial sovereignty of any state.⁴ The airspace of the high seas is the airspace above “all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in

* *Text as provided by the speaker.*

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¹ Art 1, Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation 1944. The Convention has 190 parties, including Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the UK. Art 1 was intended to be, and is, declaratory of customary international law. The upper limit of airspace is not yet defined. Various theories and proposals have been put forward, including the lowest altitude at which a satellite can remain in orbit (c 56 miles / 90 kms). In 1983 the USSR proposed 110 kms. The issue is still under discussion in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. In practice, however, the highest altitude at which aircraft can fly is well below the lowest possible perigee of a satellite in orbit, so the lack of vertical delimitation has not posed problems.

² J. D. McClean, et al, *Shawcross & Beaumont: Air Law* (4th revised edition), LexisNexis Subscriptions, 2005, pp. 1-26.

³ Art 2 of the Chicago Convention; Art 3 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 provides for a maximum territorial sea breadth of 12 miles.

⁴ Art 89 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provides: ‘No State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.’

the internal waters of a state.”¹ Since the high seas are open to all states, the legal regime is characterized by the principle of freedom. One element of the freedom of the high seas is the freedom of overflight.² The freedom of overflight is not absolute, however. It must be “exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.”³

The airspace of the high seas being an international space, aircraft flying there are generally subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their state of registry. This corresponds to the legal status of ships on the high seas; where the rule of exclusive flag state jurisdiction applies⁴ save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties (e.g. hot pursuit).⁵ Like warships on the high seas, military aircraft in the airspace of the high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any state other than their state of registry.⁶

Since the legal status of airspace reflects that of the subjacent land or waters, the issues of delimitation and legal regime are inextricably linked. Territorial disputes between states can endanger civil aviation, as illustrated by the long-standing Aegean Sea airspace dispute. Turkey insists that Greek airspace extends only 10 km (6 miles) offshore, whereas Greece claims that it extends 16 km (10 miles). In May 2006, Greek and Turkish F-16 fighters collided at about 27,000 feet over the southern Aegean Sea, some 21 miles southeast of the island of Karpathos. Greece said that its planes had intercepted Turkish aircraft in Greek airspace, whereas Turkey claimed that the Greek planes had interfered with Turkish maneuvers in international airspace. A Greek pilot was killed. An Olympic Airways pilot was quoted as saying: “We obey the rules of the sky, but the fighter pilots do not.” And a Greek air investigator observed: “There is very limited space over the Aegean Sea and its air corridors are very crowded. It is only a matter of time before a warplane crashes into a commercial plane.”⁷

The regulation of flight over the high seas

The airspace in respect of which a State is responsible under the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) for operational control is called a Flight Information Region (FIR). The term ‘FIR’ is defined in Annex 2 to the Chicago Convention as: “An airspace of defined dimensions within which flight information service and alerting services are provided.”

For a landlocked country, the FIR consists only of the country’s sovereign (territorial) airspace. The FIR of a large state may be divided up into a number of regional FIRs. For a coastal state, the FIR consists of the airspace above its land and sea territory plus any international airspace in

¹ Ibid., Art 86. The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) can extend up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. Within the EEZ, the coastal State has sovereign rights for the purpose or exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources of the superjacent waters, seabed and subsoil. All States enjoy the freedom of overflight in the EEZ.

² Ibid., Art 87(1)(b). In Art 2(4) of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958 it was called ‘the freedom of aviation’.

³ Ibid., Art 87(2).

⁴ Ibid., Art 92(1).

⁵ Ibid., Art 111.

⁶ Ibid., Art 95.

⁷ ‘Air Duel Risk to Aegean Tourists,’ BBC News, 24 May 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5011646.stm>.

respect of which ICAO has assigned responsibility to that state. For example, the UK FIRs / UIRs¹ (London / Scottish) consist of the airspace above UK land and sea territory plus the international airspace assigned to the UK by ICAO.² The UK FIRs / UIRs borders the Stavanger, Amsterdam, Paris, Brest, Shannon FIRs and the Shanwick and Reykjavik Oceanic Control Areas (OCAs).

The North Atlantic Track (NAT) Region comprises seven FIRs / UIRs / OCAs including Reykjavik and Shanwick (based at Prestwick in Scotland but using radio facilities near Shannon in Ireland). Together, they operate an upper airspace track structure and provide an air traffic separation and information service for all aircraft crossing the North Atlantic. Flights above the eastern half of the North Atlantic, up to longitude 30° W, are controlled by Shanwick. West of that boundary they are controlled by Gander and New York. The Organized Track System consists of several approximately parallel tracks from points off the west coasts of the UK and Ireland to points on the Canadian coasts, with a similar number of tracks designated for eastbound traffic. The tracks are selected by computer, the main consideration being the weather. They also take account of preferred routes, danger areas and military airspace reservations.

Although the freedom of aviation applies over the high seas, it is not absolute. Freedom must be regulated in the interests of all who are entitled to enjoy it. In this regard, Article 12 of the Chicago Convention reflects the special legal regime of the airspace over the high seas. It requires each contracting State to ensure that all aircraft bearing its nationality mark, wherever they may be, comply with the rules of the air there in force (i.e. the rules of the air applicable to the particular airspace). Since the regulation of flight over the high seas is a matter of international competence, Article 12 provides that “[o]ver the high seas, the rules in force shall be those established under this Convention.” Thus, compliance with ICAO’s rules of the air is mandatory in the airspace of the high seas. Those rules are found mainly in Annex 2 to the Chicago Convention. They include the rule that a flight plan must be submitted to the appropriate ATS unit³ prior to operating any flight across international borders (i.e. FIR borders). As the Convention applies only to civil aircraft and is not applicable to State aircraft, including “aircraft used in military services,”⁴ however, the rules of the air established under it apply only to civil aircraft. Nevertheless, the parties to the Convention have undertaken, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.⁵ In practice, most states ensure that their military aircraft comply with the rules of the air but, as discussed below, there have been many instances of non-compliance in the Nicosia FIR.

Airspace sovereignty and air traffic control producers in the Nicosia FIR

The geographical location of Cyprus gives it a vital strategic position and makes it an important business and tourist destination for people all over the world. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Nicosia FIR is one of the busiest in the region. Inherited from British administration, it consists of the airspace over the land and sea territory of the Republic of Cyprus plus the international airspace over the Eastern Mediterranean in respect of which ICAO has assigned responsibility to

¹ ‘UIR’ means Upper (Flight) Information Region, at Flight Level 250 and above (i.e. 25,000 feet indicated on an altimeter set to 1013.2 mbs).

² See Eurocontrol chart ‘FIR / UIR in the Lower Airspace’ (Source: National AIPs, Effective: 12 March 2009).

³ I.e. the appropriate ATC unit.

⁴ Art 3(a) and (b) of the Chicago Convention.

⁵ Ibid., Art 3(d).

Cyprus.¹

According to Article 1 of the Treaty of Establishment, the Republic of Cyprus comprises the Island of Cyprus, together with the islands lying off its coast, with the exception of the two Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) of Akrotiri and Dhekelia.² The Cyprus Act confirms that the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus as an independent country does not affect UK sovereignty or jurisdiction over those areas.³ Under Appendix O to the Treaty of Establishment, Cypriots (and others resident in the Republic) have the freedom of navigation and fishing in the territorial waters of the SBAs, but the freedom of aviation in the superjacent airspace is not mentioned.⁴ Since the SBAs are within the Nicosia FIR, there would appear to be areas of UK airspace within the Nicosia FIR. If so, this situation would seem to be similar to that of the Channel Islands (which are not Overseas Territories but Crown Dependencies under the sovereignty of the British Crown) being situated within the Brest FIR, one of France's regional FIRs.⁵

In *R (Kibris Türk Hava Yollari CTA Holidays) v Secretary of State for Transport*,⁶ however, concerning permits to fly between the UK and northern Cyprus, Mr Justice Wynn Williams observed that the Republic of Cyprus 'has exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above the whole of the island of Cyprus and territorial waters adjacent thereto'.⁷ Although his Lordship had earlier noted that by virtue of s 2 of the Cyprus Act the Republic of Cyprus is declared to comprise the entirety of the island of Cyprus with the exception of the two Sovereign Base Areas,⁸ his statement about the Republic's airspace sovereignty was not similarly qualified. Nevertheless, he correctly rejected the claimants' submission that the term 'sovereignty' in Art 1 of the Chicago Convention presupposes the exercise of effective control over the area in question.⁹ In rejecting their application for judicial review of the Secretary of State's refusal to vary an existing operating permit¹⁰ and to issue a permit to operate specified charter flights, the judge held that granting

¹ For the FIR boundaries, see ICAO Enroute Chart ENR 6.1, 'Nicosia FIR – ATS and RNAV Routes', edition 01, Date of Issue 23/10/2008. See also the Eurocontrol chart, above, note 13. Nicosia International Airport has not operated since 1974 as it is within the UN Buffer Zone.

² Treaty No 5476, Nicosia, 16 August 1960, [http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/F207EF6146AA7AFEC22571BF0038DDC6/\\$file/Treaty%20of%20Establishment.pdf](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/F207EF6146AA7AFEC22571BF0038DDC6/$file/Treaty%20of%20Establishment.pdf).

³ S 2(1)(a) of the Cyprus Act 1960.

⁴ Appendix O, Art 3(1).

⁵ On 1 March 2002, the Republic of Cyprus took over from the SBAs the responsibility of providing Search and Rescue (SAR) Services for aeronautical and maritime accidents in the international area under its jurisdiction, which is identical to the Nicosia FIR. The UK had provided SAR Services in the Nicosia FIR since 1960, under Annex B, Part V, Section 9 of the 1960 Treaty of Establishment which provides: 'In so far as the services established for their own use make this possible, the United Kingdom authorities shall make available search and rescue facilities for all civil aircraft within the flight information region administered from Nicosia.' The UK continues to meet its treaty commitment by making military helicopters available to assist as required in SAR operations in the Nicosia FIR. See Hansard, HL, 27 March 2002: Col WA55.

⁶ [2009] EWHC 1918 (Admin). The Republic of Cyprus intervened in the proceedings as an Interested Party.

⁷ Para 43.

⁸ Para 12.

⁹ Paras 40-41. In Case C-420/07 *Apostolides v Orams* (28 April 2009), the European Court of Justice similarly found that the Republic of Cyprus continues to have sovereignty over the northern part of the island despite not exercising effective control there.

¹⁰ The existing permit allowed the first claimant, a Turkish airline, to operate scheduled passenger services on routes 'Points in the Republic of Turkey – Intermediate Points – Points in the United Kingdom – Points beyond' but prohibited the picking up of passengers at intermediate points (e.g. Ercan) or in the UK for setting down at intermediate points. The variation, if granted, would have allowed the airline to 'to take on board and discharge

the permits sought would have violated the UK Government's legal duty not to recognise the 'TRNC' and would have placed the UK in breach of its obligations under the Chicago Convention.¹

ICAO's en route chart for the Nicosia FIR, showing airways, control zones, reporting points and navigation aids,² warns that '[t]he entire airspace over the territory of the Republic including its territorial waters' is a prohibited area and that '[o]verflying aircraft are restricted within the established airways and, as instructed by Air Traffic Control, within the Control Zones.'³ Given that this prohibition/restriction applies only to the Republic's territorial airspace and not to the international airspace within the Nicosia FIR, it is consistent with Article 9 of the Chicago Convention as long as certain other conditions are fulfilled. Article 9(a) provides:

"Each contracting State may, for reasons of military necessity or public safety, restrict or prohibit uniformly the aircraft of other States from flying over certain areas of its territory, provided that no distinction in this respect is made between the aircraft of the State whose territory is involved, engaged in international scheduled airline services, and the aircraft of the other contracting States likewise engaged. Such prohibited areas shall be of reasonable extent and location so as not to interfere unnecessarily with air navigation. Descriptions of such prohibited areas in the territory of a contracting State, as well as any subsequent alterations therein, shall be communicated as soon as possible to the other contracting States and to the International Civil Aviation Organisation."

Similarly, under Article 9(b) of the Convention each contracting State reserves the right,

"in exceptional circumstances or during a period of emergency, or in the interest of public safety, and with immediate effect, temporarily to restrict or prohibit flying over the whole or part of its territory, on condition that such restriction or prohibition shall be applicable without distinction of nationality to aircraft of all other States."⁴

Article 9(c) provides that each contracting state, under such regulations as it may prescribe, may require any aircraft entering the areas contemplated in subparagraphs (a) or (b) to land as soon as practicable at a designated airport within its territory.⁵

passengers, baggage and cargo at a point or points in the United Kingdom carried or to be carried on services from the United Kingdom to northern Cyprus and vice versa'.

¹ Paras 90-91. The court held that the UK would have been in breach of its obligation to respect and uphold the rights conferred upon Cyprus by Arts 5, 6, 10 and 68 of the Convention.

² See note 17.

³ See also AIP Cyprus, ENR 5.1-1, 23 Oct 08, Department of Civil Aviation, ENR 5: 'Navigation Warnings', ENR 5.1: 'Prohibited, Restricted and Danger Areas'. This indicates that the prohibition / restriction applies 'H24' and without upper limit.

⁴ Cf Section 7(2) of Annex B to the Treaty of Establishment, which provides: 'Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 4 of this Section, in the interests of the security of air navigation, the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus shall take steps to limit or prohibit aircraft, other than United Kingdom military aircraft, from flying in the airspaces and during the periods specified from time to time by the United Kingdom authorities over such parts of the training areas, ranges, range areas and localities used in accordance with this Part of this Annex as are within the territory of the Republic. This prohibition shall extend to – (a)...(b)...(c)...(d)...' See further note 42 below.

⁵ See further AIP Cyprus, ENR 1.12-1, 25 Jul 07, Department of Civil Aviation, ENR 1.12: 'Interception of Civil Aircraft'. This sets out the procedures and visual signals applicable over the land territory and territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus in the event of interception of an aircraft. Under Art 3 *bis* (a) of the Chicago Convention, the contracting States recognise that every State must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft

According to ICAO, the authority for Air Traffic Control (ATC) within the Nicosia FIR rests solely with Nicosia Area Control Centre (ACC). ATC instructions must only be accepted from Nicosia ACC,¹ which is also the sole authority for the allocation of SSR codes.² Nicosia ACC is thus responsible for the provision of Air Traffic Services for all flights within the Nicosia FIR, whether to or from Larnaca / Paphos airports or overflying Cyprus. A network of airways links the adjacent FIRs / UIRs (Athens, Cairo, Tel-Aviv, Beirut, Damascus and Ankara).

A contributor to an aviation blog has highlighted the importance of good coordination between adjacent ACCs and the problems associated with the lack of direct contact between Ankara ACC and Nicosia ACC:

“Air Traffic Control relies heavily on coordination between adjacent ACCs. For example, when an aircraft flies from Athens to Cyprus the Greek controller will call his colleague at Nicosia ACC and give him details of the flight, such as the level at which the aircraft flies and the time it estimates to reach Cyprus. This information will enable the Cypriot controller to plan ahead as to what to instruct the pilot of the aircraft in order to reach its destination safely and quickly. As a result of the Turkish invasion of 1974 this communication has been lost between Turkey and Cyprus. The effect of this is that aircraft can enter the Cyprus FIR at its northern boundaries with Turkey, without allowing the Cypriot controller the time to decide how to handle the aircraft. In order to minimize the problem, the Cyprus Civil Aviation Authority has issued instructions to aircraft operators so that when an aircraft is flying over Turkey on a route that will bring it over Cyprus then the pilot must call Nicosia ACC 10 minutes prior to entering Cyprus FIR, giving details of its flight (level, route etc.) The entry points to the FIR that are affected by this situation are TOMBI and VESAR.

Ankara ACC, in its effort to change the status quo, instructs aircraft on a southbound course towards Cyprus, on passing points well before the Ankara FIR boundary, to contact Ercan Control, an ATC unit in the occupied part of the island which is not recognized by ICAO. ICAO only recognizes the legal government of Cyprus and has issued instructions to aircraft operators to obey only Nicosia ACC when in the Cyprus FIR.”³

The accuracy of that blog entry is confirmed by the following Briefing Bulletin concerning IATA Communications / Control Procedures in the Nicosia FIR/UIR:⁴

- General

Authority for Air Traffic Control within Nicosia FIR/UIR rests solely with Nicosia ACC....

in flight and that, in the case of interception, the lives of persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered.

¹ The boundary between Ankara and Nicosia FIRs / UIRs, as described in ICAO Doc 7754, runs from N3605 E03000 to N3558 E03230 to N3555 E03333 to N3555 to E03540.

² ‘SSR’ means Secondary Surveillance Radar. An SSR Transponder on board an aircraft identifies that aircraft on ATC radar screens by responding to signals transmitted from a ground station.

³ The Professional Pilots Rumour Network (PPRuNe), <http://www.pprune.org/archive/index.php/t-285080.html>, 26 July 2007. The entry appears to have been made by someone from the Cyprus ATC association.

⁴ Jeppesen Briefing Bulletin, 12 Mar 99, attached to IFALPA Safety Bulletin, 2 August 2006, <http://www.ifalpa.org/downloads/Level1/Safety%20Bulletins/2006/07SAB07-Ankara%20and%20Nicosia%20FIR%20procedures.pdf>. Emphasis in the original. ‘IATA’ is the International Air Transport Association.

ATC instructions must **ONLY** be accepted from Nicosia ACC, including allocation of SSR codes.

Most of the northern part of Nicosia FIR/UIR, inclusive of a wide area of the high seas, has been identified by Ercan Control, a station based in northern Cyprus, falling under the Turkish Cypriot administration, as a zone under its control. The authority of Ercan Control over this zone for air traffic Control purposes is **NOT** recognized by ICAO.

Contrary to ICAO requirements, no contact is effected between Ankara and Nicosia ACCs. Nicosia ACC requires that aircraft approaching Nicosia FIR/UIR from Ankara FIR make pre-entry contact **at least 10 minutes before the FIR boundary**. It is essential that crews comply with this requirement: **only then will Nicosia ACC be in a position to assume control and provide appropriate traffic separation**.

- Southbound Procedures

While in Ankara FIR comply with control instructions issued by Ankara ACC (either directly or by relay through any other station designated by Ankara, e.g. **Ercan Control**. (...)) up to point VESAR (...) or point TOMBI (...).

Establish contact with Nicosia ACC **at least 10 minutes before FIR BDY**. Once contact established and flight details including Flight Level (FL) information passed, **avoid making requests to Ankara ACC for FL changes for the rest of the flight through Ankara FIR**, unless climbing from or descending to aerodromes in the immediate vicinity of the FIR boundary. If for any reason it becomes absolutely necessary to make such level changes after the initial contact with Nicosia while still in Ankara FIR, it is important for safety reasons that Nicosia ACC be advised at once of the change.

At VESAR or TOMBI, flights will come under the sole control of Nicosia, change automatically to Nicosia ACC. Although no formal transfer of control procedures is effected between Ankara and Nicosia ACCs and no changeover instructions are issued on crossing the FIR boundary, flights should thereafter **ONLY** accept control instructions issued by Nicosia ACC until handover to the next ATC unit or FIR / UIR. Any invitation to change to another station (e.g. Ercan Control) should be politely acknowledged but disregarded. In case of insistence a check should be made with Nicosia ACC.

Similarly, due to the lack of contact between the two ACCs, when northbound in the Nicosia FIR, flight information must be provided to Ankara ACC at least 10 minutes before crossing the Nicosia / Ankara FIR boundary. IATA procedures emphasize that Nicosia ACC's control authority remains absolute up to the point of entry into Ankara FIR, however.

In August 2006, against the background of the conflict in Lebanon, combined with the expectation of an increase in air traffic in the region as humanitarian and relief flights increased, ICAO reminded operators of the procedures to be followed in the Nicosia and Ankara FIRs. It reminded them "as a matter of urgency" to strictly adhere to the specific procedural requirements at the interface between the two FIRs (especially the '10 minutes' requirement) and, to ease the handling of traffic and coordination procedures, requested all transit traffic through Nicosia FIR (and not operating to or from airports in the area) "to avoid changing Flight Level to the

maximum extent possible.”¹

In terms of eastbound traffic, the blog contributor reports that Ercan Control’s attitude sometimes causes problems:

“For example, although Ercan has no direct communication with neighbouring airports such as Beirut and Damascus, it often issues descent clearances to aircraft proceeding to those destinations. Obviously Cypriot controllers must work extra hard to ensure that safety is not impaired at the area of FIR transition and so far we have managed to carry out this task admirably well.”²

In November 2006, ICAO’s European Air Navigation Planning Group “agreed that the communication difficulties and confusing coordination experienced by flights operating in the northern part of the Nicosia FIR should be included in the list of deficiencies in the European Region.” An Appendix to the Report described the problem in the following way:

“Long lasting issue. Any envisaged solution requires the intervention of the two involved States in order to find suitable solution.”³

Aerial incidents in the Nicosia FIR

Although ICAO’s rules of the air do not apply to military aircraft, in practice most states ensure that their military aircraft comply with them in the airspace over the high seas. Indeed, Art 3(d) of the Chicago Convention provides:

“The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.”

That obligation is reflected in Section 4(2) of Part II of Annex B to the Treaty of Establishment, which provides:

“The United Kingdom authorities shall have the right for United Kingdom military aircraft to fly in the airspace over the territory of the Republic of Cyprus without restriction other than to have due regard for the safety of other aircraft and the safety of life and property in the Republic of Cyprus.”⁴

On 27 February 2003, a few weeks before the start of military action against Iraq, the US Embassy in Nicosia issued a release concerning US military aircraft flights in Nicosia FIR:

“The United States Embassy notes that all US military flights operating in international

¹ <http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/fod200612.pdf>.

² See note 34.

³ ICAO, Doc EANPG/48 – Report of the Forty-Eighth Meeting of the European Air Navigation Planning Group, Paris, 28-30 November 2006, Para 6.2 and Appendix O. The Appendix states ‘Priority for action A’ and ‘Date of Completion ASAP’.

⁴ Annex B, Part IV, Section 1 states that in addition to the other rights conferred by the Treaty of Establishment, and, in particular, the right of overflight under Section 4(2) of Part II, the UK authorities shall have the right from time to time to engage in training within the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and the airspace over it. The areas to be used, the periods during which training shall take place, and other special arrangements in connection with training are set out in the following Sections of Part IV of the Annex.

airspace within Nicosia Flight Information Region follow or exceed all applicable international procedures to ensure that air safety in the region is maintained. The United States government is committed to ensuring US military flights in international air space near Cyprus operate with due regard for the safety of civilian aircraft in the area.”¹

The relevant international procedures are not always followed, however. The Government of Cyprus has frequently drawn the UN Secretary-General’s attention to violations of the Nicosia FIR by Turkish military aircraft. For example, a letter dated 25 June 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations stated:²

“Moreover, it should also be mentioned that on 13 October 2005, two F-16 and two RF-4 Turkish military aircraft flying in a single formation violated three times international air traffic regulations, and once the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus. Initially they entered the flight information region (FIR) of Nicosia from an easterly direction (FIR of Ankara) without prior notice, and then flew perimetrically along the south coast of Cyprus at a distance of 17 nautical miles; the distance was reduced to 10 nautical miles over the Akrotiri area. The four aircrafts violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, flying over the occupied area of Karpasia before exiting towards the FIR of Ankara. It is also noted that while in the south-east part of the FIR of Nicosia the formation entered an activated dangerous zone (LCD3) where five British aircraft were involved in a military exercise.

Furthermore, on 14 October 2014, two F-16 and four RF-4 Turkish military aircraft, flying in a single formation, twice violated international air traffic regulations and twice the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus. Initially they entered the FIR of Nicosia from the FIR of Ankara without prior notice and then overflew perimetrically along the south coast of Cyprus at a distance of 14 nautical miles and at 10 nautical miles while approaching the Akrotiri area. The formation violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus flying near the Akrotiri area and over the occupied area of Karpasia before existing towards the FIR of Ankara.

In both of these incidents, the Turkish military aircrafts did not make contact with the Nicosia flight control nor did they submit flight plans to the competent authorities or request the appropriate clearance permission, this posing a serious threat to civil aviation in the area.”

By way of contrast, in May 2000 Israel apologized to Cyprus for repeated violations of the Nicosia FIR by its military aircraft. The Government of Cyprus had complained that on over 100 occasions Israeli military aircraft had entered the Nicosia FIR without first submitting flight plans to the local aviation authorities. It was reported that the Israeli ambassador had conveyed the apologies of the Israeli air force for the problem caused.

Unauthorized entry into a state’s territorial airspace (i.e. the airspace over which the state enjoys

¹ <http://nicosia.usembassy.gov/uspolicy/pr-fir.htm>.

² Embassy of Cyprus in Sweden: http://www.cypemb.se/dbase/cypemb/archive_378.asp. For the details of other protests, see the following UN documents: A/55/527-S/2000/1041, 27 October 2000; A/55/776-S/2001/119, 8 February 2001; A/55/990-S/2001/599, 18 June 2001; A/56/785-S/2002/100, 22 January 2002; A/56/925-S/2002/441, 18 April 2002; and UN General Assembly, Fifty-Seventh Session, Agenda Item 31 of the Preliminary List, 3 July 2003.

complete and exclusive sovereignty) by the military aircraft of another state violates Article 3(c) of the Chicago Convention, which provides that “[n]o state aircraft of a contracting state shall fly over the territory of another state or land thereon without authorisation by special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the terms thereof.” In certain circumstances it could also violate Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

Conclusion

As the aerial incidents and the various communications/control issues referred to above demonstrate, most of the problems experienced in the Nicosia FIR cannot be separated from the wider and deep-rooted geo-political issues. In the interests of the safety of civil aviation in the region, and of international peace and security, it is to be hoped that a lasting solution may be found to those underlying issues. More particularly, there would seem to be at least three main challenges with regard to national airspace and FIRs in the Eastern Mediterranean. First, the risk that civil aircraft may be hijacked and/or transformed into guided missiles as on 11 September 2001. Secondly, the risk of civil aircraft being brought down like Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie or Iran Air flight 655 over the Strait of Hormuz.¹ And thirdly, it is conceivable that the Eastern Mediterranean may have a part to play in the ballistic missile defense calculations of the US, the UK and other states.²

¹ Both incidents occurred in 1988. The Iranian airliner had been flying from Iran to Dubai when it was shot down by a US warship. An ICAO report was highly critical of the USA. In particular, there had been no coordination between US warships in the Gulf and local ATC units. See *Destruction of Iran Air Airbus A300 in the vicinity of Qeshm Island, Republic of Iran on 3 July 1988*, Report of ICAO Fact-Finding Investigation, 28 ILM (1989), p 843.

² See e.g. Hansard, HL, 28 February 2007: Cols 1598-9.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION*

Alon Liel**

23 October 2009

Turkish-Israeli Relations and the Syrian Track

Introduction

Throughout this presentation the subject of the Turkish-Israeli relations will form my main focus. However, I shall also seek to draw wider conclusions from this basis.

In order to put this issue into context, it is necessary to begin with a short introduction based on the first 55 years of relations between Israel and Turkey, before proceeding to discuss one specific area of time.

Developments 1949 -2002

In order to understand the importance of this relationship, it is crucial to note that Turkey is the only Muslim country which has had diplomatic relations with Israel since it was founded. These relations were created at the beginning of 1949, and have been maintained ever since, so this truly is a unique relationship. Subsequent to this we have had more Muslim countries that have created diplomatic relations with Israel such as Egypt and Jordan, and in the past with Iran. Turkey, however, is the only country that has upheld this link continuously throughout the years.

Despite this continuity, it has been a turbulent relationship, mostly due to regional events rather than any bilateral events. Initially, for roughly the first 6 years of relations, from 1949-55, there existed a harmonious partnership, and the two countries cooperated in every possible sense, even with regard to the military.

During these early stages Israel was just emerging from the War of Independence, but during the years 1952-53 there were already units of the Israeli army marching in military parades in Istanbul, and Israeli Navy boats were going to Turkey for exercises.

This convergence between the two countries presented a tremendous surprise to Israel. However, the affable relations did not continue for very long. In 1955 the Baghdad Pact came about, and a different regime came into force in Iraq. This created new pressures for the Turkish government, and subsequently the Prime Minister Menderes called for a halt in associations. As

* Text as provided by author

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a result of this, the Israelis had very little contact with Turkey for almost three years, despite the Israeli flag remaining in Ankara.

In August 1958, Iraq changed once again to become very anti-western, and so Menderes came back to Israel. There was a meeting between Ben-Gurion and Menderes where the two countries agreed on an alliance. This provided that Iran and Ethiopia should also be included by way of a periphery alliance. From this point until the end of 1963, the relationship was very good, although it was carried out in secret. It was very different from the relationship that existed in the early 50s.

The relationship changed yet again due to regional events in 1964. The dispute between Cyprus and Turkey was surfacing, which meant that Turkey had to focus on its international affairs, and it subsequently became increasingly difficult for Israel to maintain reasonable relations with them.

During 1964-67, Israel tried very hard to upgrade the relations to an embassy level, but the Turkish politicians and diplomats were too involved in the international issues surrounding the Cyprus problem, and upgrading their relationship with Israel would have created greater problems with the third world countries.

In 1967, there was the Six-Day War where Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, Golan Heights and East Jerusalem. This event created a major crisis in relations between Israel and Turkey. Shortly after the war, however, Turkey participated, for the first time, in the first meeting of the Islamic conference in 1969.

From 1967-73, the relations were cooler, but in 1973, at the beginning of the energy crisis, the situation began to deteriorate even further. Turkey was in desperate need of oil, especially from 1977 onwards, and was dependent on supplies from Muslim countries, particularly Iran, Iraq and Libya. It started to owe large amounts of money, as it would often obtain the oil by credit agreements, and as a result, they accumulated billions of dollars of debt.

During 1977-80, relations between Israel and Turkey became very dry until 1980, when the biggest crisis in Israeli history occurred. Israel began to apply its laws to East Jerusalem, something that Turkey strongly disapproved of, and pressures were subsequently placed on Ankara to break the diplomatic link.

Although the link was not entirely broken, the relations were downgraded to the position of second secretary, and the Israeli chargé was removed.

In February 1981, the Turks insisted that we send the second secretary to Ankara rather than the Ambassador. I was the second secretary at this time, and it was at this point that the dramatic change became very apparent. I was sitting in Ankara, holding the flag and I could not do anything. I could not see anyone, and I had no visitors from Israel, for three years, and no Israeli officials visited me. The relations really had deteriorated dramatically. It even reached the point where when I organized a reception for Israeli Independence Day, a note was sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to all of the officials in Turkey telling them not to attend, and subsequently nobody did.

Things started to change, however, in 1985 when Israel withdrew from Lebanon after the first war, and this was met with strong approval from Turkey. In addition, the oil crisis was now over,

and a regional change occurred due to the war between Iraq and Iran. This weakened both countries, and in turn increased their dependence on Turkey, subsequently making the Turkish foreign policies more independent, and more assertive. Israel began to identify signals that things were improving. The first indication of this was in relation to the tourism field, when the tourism agreement was signed. During 1987-88, as a result of this agreement, Israelis began to visit Turkey for tourism purposes.

The next sign of improvement was garnered from cultural exchanges occurring in 1991, when the Madrid conference took place. During this conference the Turkish leadership saw the Israeli leaders in the same hall with the Jordanian leadership, the Syrian leadership, the Palestinian leadership, and the Egyptian leadership, thereby prompting an apparent change in attitude.

On 1st January 1992, Israel was finally upgraded to the level of an embassy. From this point there was a considerable change in the Turkish approach towards Israel, and the beginnings of a peace agreement began to come into fruition.

In 1993, after the Oslo Agreement, there was yet again another dramatic change in the countries negotiations, and even before Oslo the two armies had been discussing military cooperation. After this point there were many high level visits from Turkish leaders to Israel, which had never previously happened. There had never previously been a visit from a Turkish minister to Israel until the early 90s.

From 1994-2004, the two countries shared exceptional relations, and things were developing very quickly in every possible sense including the military, economic, cultural and political fields. The intimacy on a political level was truly unbelievable, and during 1994-2002 Turkey became one of the three closest countries to Israel.

Despite this very intimate and agreeable relationship, the situation was dramatically affected by the election of Erdogan into the office of Turkish Prime Minister in 2002.

Rifts in the relationship

On 6th of November Erdogan held a press conference in which he referred to Israel as being a "terror state". As the former mayor of Istanbul he had never previously even mentioned Israel, and then suddenly he gives it the label of a terror state.

This was the first indication of how Erdogan perceived Israel, and the policies that were to follow. Ever since the day that Erdogan was elected, there has been an extremely different policy adopted towards Israel. This policy indexed the bilateral relations between the two countries in the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Erdogan was increasingly keen for the Israelis to make peace with the Palestinians before he could continue with the prosperous relationship that they had once shared. In 2004 the relations became very troubled, and increasingly difficult. Israel killed two of the leaders of Hamas, including Sheikh Yassin, which made Erdogan simply furious. For a period of roughly six months Israel was subjected to a barrage of abuse, being constantly referred to as a terror state, and being accused of state terrorism.

In 2005, things began to improve as Erdogan and Abdullah Gul were convinced that Ariel Sharon was going to disengage with Gaza. On 1st March 2005, Abdullah Gul came to Israel to affirm the status of these proposals. Sharon made it clear that these were indeed his intentions, and shortly

afterwards Erdogan visited Israel. A very productive, and amicable, meeting took place where Ariel Sharon defined precisely what his intentions were with regard to Gaza. Turkey was subsequently very encouraging of this process, and it was hoped that relations could continue thereafter. By August 2005 Israel had withdrawn from Gaza, and immediately the effect of this movement was felt on a bilateral level.

In 2006, a new Israeli Prime Minister came into power and the war in Lebanon began during the summer. This action was extremely dissatisfactory for Turkey, and in turn, caused a significant deterioration in the bilateral link. Problems were also starting to occur on a military level with regard to the arms deals.

One significant improvement was, however, witnessed in February 2007. Prime Minister Olmert visited Ankara and asked Erdogan to mediate in the negotiations between Israel and Syria. At this juncture things started to change for the better on a bilateral level. For a period of roughly fifteen months, Turkey mediated the negotiations in secret, and in turn managed to establish an increasing amount of credibility with both Israel and Syria.

During the months of July and August 2007, things continued to deteriorate. This period was dominated by tension between Ankara and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and several other major American Jewish groups. The ADL decided to change its approach toward the Armenian tragedy in World War I defining it for the first time as genocide and in so doing triggering Turkish protests to Jerusalem, which was unjustly seen as responsible for the Jewish organization's behavior.

To make matters worse still, on 8-9th September 2007, a grave incident took place that heightened tensions. Not only had Israel (in unexplained circumstances) attacked Syria, Turkey's friendly neighbor, but on their way back - at least according to Turkey - Israeli aircraft had violated Turkish airspace without any notification and without any reasonable explanation. The new Turkish foreign minister, Ali Babacan, branded the Israeli attack "unacceptable." One of his senior diplomats called the Israeli behavior "unprofessional." It seemed as if Israel had forgotten that to a great extent, Turkish-Israeli relations were based on military ties between the two countries, and that losing that special military link could have an existential impact on ties between Jerusalem and Ankara.

In May 2008, both sides announced simultaneously that official negotiations were indeed taking place. The teams were already established in Turkey at this stage, and there were five rounds of talks, with the last round involving only the heads of state. On 23rd December 2008, the draft agreements were almost finalized in relation to the bilateral issues but not the regional issues. The optimism for a solution was unfortunately premature. At 1am on Tuesday 24th, Olmert told Erdogan that he was returning to Israel in order to hold a meeting with the cabinet and to discuss the drafts. The agreements were never finalized, however, because by Saturday morning Israel had begun attacking Gaza.

That very day Erdogan announced that the talks with Syria were cancelled and that Turkey was no longer to be viewed as a mediator in the matter. Erdogan was furious once again, firstly because Gaza was subjected to extreme attacks by Israel - and Erdogan was always very close to Hamas which is the religious leadership of the Palestinians - and secondly because he thought that Israel had attacked Gaza in order to avoid signing the agreement with Syria.

The collapse was immediate because of the indexation, and the effects were felt immediately,

because not only did the talks between Israel and Syria collapse, but the talks between Israel and the Palestinians also collapsed. After this unfortunate event a new government came into power in Israel and Netanyahu was elected. So since that day there have been no further negotiations with either the Syrians or the Palestinians.

The incident at Davos which occurred between Erdogan and Peres was particularly damaging for relations. However, even some nine months after this incident, Erdogan continually attacked Israel in a particularly brutal manner. Israel ignored these attacks on the most part as Turkey represented a vital ally to Israel. However, the attacks by Erdogan were extremely damaging. At one stage the Secretary General of the UN was asked by Turkey to expel Israel from the UN.

Despite all of these issues, Israel instinctively believed that an issue should not be made of it as it would be likely to create bigger problems. For a while it went relatively unnoticed. It was, however, as if the Turkish Prime Minister was looking for an explosion to occur though, as he had a point to make.

The opportunity that he had been waiting for arose only two weeks ago when in the course of a military exercise that had been prepared, after inviting Israel, he told the Israeli Air Force only the day before the event that they were not to go. This was a very big event, and noticeably caused increasing problems between the two countries.

To exacerbate the problems even further, the Turkish national television station, TRT, broadcast a series of programs depicting Israeli soldiers intentionally killing Palestinian civilians, especially children.¹ After this event things really exploded. The Israeli public was furious. However, the politicians were not as expressive of their feelings on account of their fear that they may lose their relations with Turkey altogether.

It would seem that now the relations had reached their lowest point in twenty years. During the last 10 months, there has not been one conversation between the top leaders of both countries. There is a total paralysis on a political level, but a lot of shared content still exists. The civilian trade is still at a volume of \$3.5 billion, and there are still military trade, tourism and cultural relations. In this respect, it is not quite as bad as it was in the early 80s where there was no content at all, but there is currently the most terrible political atmosphere. We must consider whether the crisis is mostly a result of an overall change in Turkey's foreign policy, or if it mainly stems from Ankara's wish to enhance the momentum of the Israeli-Arab peace process through growing pressure on the government of Israel.

In order to prevent further deterioration, Israel has to make a special effort to regain Ankara's confidence. Losing Turkey's friendship could have devastating regional consequences—for Israel and even for the Americans.

Conclusion

By way of conclusion, it is very noticeable that Turkey is currently exerting tyrannous pressure on Israel in order to get them to move forward in the peace process. Many other countries have also applied pressure on Israel such as Norway or Sweden, but no country in the world has been applying pressure in such a direct and brutal way as the Turkish government has. It does not

¹ Joseph Nasr, 'Turkey TV series further strains Israel relations,' 15 October 2009, *Reuters*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLF150215>.

seem that this will change in the very near future. The policy that is currently in place is an Erdogan policy and not one which was created by Abdullah Gul. Abdullah Gul may have supported it, but I do not think that he created it; it was Erdogan who created it. It would also seem that all the anti-Israeli statements, the fierce ones, were created by Erdogan himself.

Despite these fractions, Israel today is stronger than it was 30 years ago. There is a stronger economy, a strong army, and technically it has the stability to respond to Turkey. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, it chooses not to. This decision is also effected by the fact that Turkey is still seen to be in the moderate camp of the Muslim world. Turkey has completely linked the level of its bilateral relations with Israel to progress in the Arab–Israeli peace process, and the fact that the process is now frozen is at the core of the deterioration of bilateral ties. It is all stemming purely from the regional developments.

As it looks now, the only way to bring about a positive change in the atmosphere would be to re-launch peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians or the Syrians, and to reignite a meaningful momentum toward peace. Nothing less will convince the current government in Ankara to renew the Turkish–Israeli friendship.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION*

Christos Iacovou**

23 October 2009

Ahmed Davutoğlu's Geopolitical Perceptions About Cyprus

Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu's principle academic work can be found in his book entitled *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*,¹ meaning "Strategic Depth: Turkey's Foreign Policy", which analyses Turkey's position in the international arena and advocates a strategy which would put Turkey's Ottoman past in the priority of the Turkish foreign policy and outlined perceptions.

It also epitomizes his geopolitical vision of the current strategic decisions in Turkish foreign policy. In fact, his academic work indicates the way that he perceives the world, as he has described how "The feeling of flow in history' is what excites him most and accordingly, losing that feeling is what he fears most."² He has also stated that what he desires most in a superpower is an innate ability to stop warring parties.³ His life philosophy is that there is no virtue without modesty, and no honor without self confidence and greatness. He is of the belief that if we have the ability to realize a problem, then we have the ability to solve it as well.

One of the basic guidelines of Davutoğlu's foreign policy is the strong effort to deepen Turkey's relations with the Middle East which, according to the Turkish foreign minister, is linked to a shared disappointment alongside the leadership of the ruling Justice and Development Party with the EU decision to accept Cyprus into membership in 2004. Davutoğlu is extremely critical of the EU on the basis of that decision. He strongly believes that the accession of Cyprus is an obstacle which is used by EU leaders that are reluctant to admit Turkey as a member.

The purpose of this discussion is to firstly analyze the ongoing transition of the Turkish foreign policy from Europeanization to Euroasianism, and secondly to address Davutoğlu's geopolitical perceptions about Cyprus in the context of the "strategic depth."

* Text as provided by the speaker.

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¹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, Küre Yayınları, 2001.

² Haber Giriş, 'Inner World of Davutoğlu,' *Hurriyet Daily News*, 6 November 2008.

³ *Ibid.*

Upon analysis, it can be seen that Turkey's foreign policy in the post-Cold War period was merely conceptualized in three distinct phases. Firstly, an initial wave of foreign policy activism in the post-Cold War context. Secondly, a new, or second, wave of foreign policy arguments during the Justice and Development Party governance with a strong emphasis on Europeanization. And thirdly, the current tension between Europeanization and Euroasianism.

Here it is necessary to make a point for the purpose of clarity. The terms Europeanization and Euroasianism will be used throughout. However, these have been borrowed from a distinct Turkish academic professor. He was the first to use these terms. Although I disagree with the term Euroasianism, I use it to describe neo-Ottomanism. These terms have gained wide use amongst the academic community in the last few months, since Davutoğlu was appointed as the foreign minister, and so I will follow the path of the wider academic community on international relations.

The route of the second wave of activism can in fact be traced to the pre-AKP era, to the crucial Council of Helsinki's decision of 1999 on Turkey's EU candidacy, and the reforms undertaken by the coalition government of 1999-2002, particularly in the aftermath of the deep financial crisis of 2001. However, the ruling party, that being the Justice and Development Party, has not been homogeneous in terms of foreign policy.

The central contention of this work is that there is no considerable continuity in terms of foreign policy activism, and a multi-lateral approach to policy making during the AKP era. At the same time a certain discontinuity or corruption may be identified towards the middle of the first AKP government, signifying shifts from a commitment to deep Europeanization to a loose Europeanization, and then a parallel shift to what may be classified as soft Euroasianism. The American academic in strategy portrayed Euroasia as a grand chess board where all the regional and global actors compete anxiously to enhance their geostrategic and economic interests.

Turkey, according to Davutoğlu, is clearly a pivotal country and not a regional one, and here lies one of the most fundamental principles that Davutoğlu raised on the political agenda of the Turkish foreign policy. Turkey is not a regional country; it is a central country which tries to reconcile its long lasting European orientation with a countervailing trend towards Euroasianism.

There are, however, significant tensions on the domestic front when trying to balance different components of its identity such as cultural, historical, geographical and strategic factors. This must be done in addition to instructing to consolidate democracy, whilst preserving sanctuaries within a predominantly Muslim society. The critical equilibrium which emerges on both fronts in the interaction between these domestic and international factors will also ultimately determine the path of the new wave of activism in Turkish foreign policy.

This multi-dimensional approach to foreign policy was, as highlighted previously, very much influenced by Davutoğlu's strategic depth perspective. Foreign policy is no longer perceived as a series of bi-lateral relations of policy moves, but as a series of mutually reinforcing and interlocking processes.

In this respect, Davutoğlu argues that in order to formulate a long lasting strategic perspective one needs to take into account the historical depth which provides a sound assessment of the links between the past, present and future, as well as a geographical depth, penetrating into the integral dynamics of relations between domestic, regional and global factors. This is something

new that appears in Turkish foreign policy. The geo-culture, the geopolitical and geo-economic factors that constitute the strategic depth of a country would only be generally interbred with the intersection of these historical and geographic paradigms. Moreover, making an analogy of a bow and arrow, Davutoğlu argues that if Turkey strains its bow further in Asia, the arrow will extend with more distance and precision into Europe. Therefore, if Turkey does not have a solid stance in Asia, it will have very limited chances within the European Union.

The major premise of this argument is that Turkey is a central country, which is strategically located in the goal of the Euroasian landmass. Hence Turkey has multiple regional identities, and cannot be reduced to one unified character or a single region, exacerbating the need for it to extend its influence over Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Black Sea, Central Asia, the Caspian and the Mediterranean.

As such, it also needs to go beyond a parochial approach to national security. It will become a security and stability provider for its neighboring regions. Here, another important issue is raised which differentiates Davutoğlu's views from traditional academics perceptions about security. Consequently, Turkey's engagements from Central Asia to Africa, from the EU to the organization of the Islamic profiles - and this is a very critical point - as well as its UN Security Council membership and quest for becoming a key player in the regional energy politics are all part of the new foreign policy vision, whilst somehow maintaining Turkey's traditional Western orientation.

In the context of this much more proactive approach towards the Middle East and Asia, an attempt is made to develop friendly relations with the Arab world. A major move with regard to this motive is the participation in the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation.

Nowadays this is the most interesting parameter of Davutoğlu's foreign policy, taking into account the overall developments vis-à-vis the efforts made by Turkey to strengthen relations with the Arab world, and the worsening of the Israeli and Turkish troubles. The AKP's Islamist roots in this context are to be seen as an asset. The crucial decision, made on 1st March, not to allow US troops through Turkish territory during the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and Turkey's EU membership drive generate considerable interest in the Arab world. This has developed closeness between Turkey and the Arab world as I have said before.

There has also been a strong, but at the same time a more pragmatic drive to develop diplomatic and economic relations with Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union. This is another critical step that Davutoğlu has advocated. There have been significant efforts to revive the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project,¹ as this is something that is ongoing, and I think that it will enhance tremendously the Turkish abilities to develop a new diplomacy in the Black Sea.

Relations with Russia are vital especially since Putin became President. The role of Turkey as an important energy corridor is being developed further, and a number of concrete steps are being taken in this direction in order to build upon the achievements of the previous decade.

On the one hand, Turkey has a substantial dependency on Russian natural gas for its domestic consumption leading to cooperation and major joint energy projects. On the other hand, the push towards turning Turkey into a main dual energy hub and a transit country has increased

¹ Initiated by the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) which was created in June 1992.

competition with Russia over energy issues as is clearly revealed by the Russian opposition to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project which was strongly backed by the US.

I would now like to address the point that I raised previously about the loss of momentum of the Europeanization drive, and how the concept of Eurasianism gathered momentum in Turkish foreign policy.

When analyzing Turkey-EU relations during the AKP era we may identify two distinct sub-phases. The first phase which spans from the end of 2002 to roughly the end of 2005 corresponds to the golden age of the Europeanization of Turkey. During this period the AKP government built on the foundations laid down by the previous coalition government, and pushed solely for Turkey's full membership and the associated state of economic and de-mobilization reforms.

There appears to be a significant degree of continuity with respect to foreign policy activism during the post 2005 era. The second sub-phase, however, corresponds to a certain loss of enthusiasm and commitment by the government to what was previously the focal point of Turkish foreign policy efforts, namely joining the EU as a full member.

Indeed, one may proceed further and argue that the foreign policy stance for the AKP government in the post 2005 era deviated from the an all-encompassing Europeanization drive to a possible retreat to what can be described as a type of loose Europeanization or a Eurasianism strategy.

Now, Eurasianism, or soft Eurasianism, in this context does not refer simply to a shift of foreign policy orientation in the direction of imposing more on the former Soviet space in the Middle East. Instead it means that foreign policy activism is pursued in respect to neighboring regions, but with no firm EU axis as was previously the case.

What makes it distinct from hard Eurasianism is that the Western orientation in the system of Turkish foreign policy continues, but in a looser and more flexible form. There was a loss of enthusiasm for the EU membership project of Turkey, both on the part of the government and the public at large within a short space of time, which represents a wide paradox and deserves an explanation. There was, however, no single turning point, but instead several interrelated turning points, and a number of factors in place in order to bring about this dramatic change of mood, both on the part of the AKP elite, as well as throughout the general public. At this point I will come to some conclusions before continuing to the next point that I would like to analyze.

The new wave of foreign policy activism during the Justice and Development Party era had started out with a strong emphasis on Europeanization. However, the AKP era itself has displaced elements of continuity and change in terms of foreign policy behavior. The center of this presentation is that it emphasizes the significance in terms of the multi-lateral approach to policy making. One is able to detect a certain rupture in the early years of the AKP government. This continuity is marked by a shift from a commitment to deep Europeanization to loose Europeanization, and then a final shift to Eurasianism.

What we increasingly observe in the current era is the emergence of an implicit broad and mutually reinforcing coalition of special partnership, which seems to be deeply rooted both in the European and Turkish context. This could lead to significant danger when looking at Turkey's full membership prospects. The opponents of Turkish membership, both at home and abroad, tend to be increasingly less vocal and enthusiastic compared to their Euro-skeptic counterparts.

The retreat of Eurasianism certainly does not signify the abandonment of the Europeanization project altogether. What it does mean, however, is that the EU will no longer take the center stage for Turkey's external operations and foreign policy efforts. This in turn is likely to have dramatic repercussions for the depth and intensity of the political reforms process in Turkey, especially in key areas such as a complete re-adjustment of the military/civilian relations, an extension of minority rights and an operative solution to Turkey's "Kurdish problem".

There is no doubt that there are key elements within the Turkish state and Turkish society, which would be quite content with the loose Europeanization given the perceived threats posed by a combination of deep Europeanization and deep de-modernization for national sovereignty and political stability in Turkey. The fears of deep Europeanization are not simply confined to the defensive national scope. There also exists considerable conservatism even in the much more globally orientated AKP circles when it comes to the deep Europeanization agenda.

A final question that should be raised in this context is whether the retreat to loose Europeanization and to Eurasianism is likely to be reversed. The likelihood of a major reversal in the immediate future, however, appears to be very low.

For some Turkish analysts there are developments, however, which could leave room for optimism. For instance, Turkish analysts have suggested that the change of government in the Republic of Cyprus, followed by the decision taken on the part of the leaders of both communities to start negotiations in the direction of re-unification, suggest that there is a possibility of a peaceful solution of the Cyprus conflict. Such progress may help to clear away perhaps the major hurdle in the path of Turkey's EU membership. Moreover, from a longer term perspective to possibly mutually reinforcing developments may facilitate a renewed impetus to the deep Europeanization agenda. The first element of such a scenario would be a new enlargement wave in Europe which would incorporate the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The Turkish analysts believe that, as Turkey is a country which has already reached a point of accession negotiations, it will be immune to such a process. This is a view that is shared by Davutoğlu.

This, therefore, brings us to the second point of how, within this context of Eurasianism and the ongoing process of the Turkish foreign policy, Ahmed Davutoğlu perceives Cyprus.

This analysis, in part, relies on the classical approach to geopolitics. When the term geopolitics is used in this context, it means the practice of using political power over the given territory. In his book *Strategic Depth*, Davutoğlu does not leave even the slightest doubt in the way he perceives Cyprus in geostrategic terms. He begins with the point that both Greek and Cypriot plans over the bi-communal, bi-zonal federation as a solution to the problem are nothing but hot air.

For Davutoğlu, Ankara has already defined a serious, coherent and strategically semantic policy over Cyprus, as Cyprus is an indispensable accessory of the Turkish geo-strategy. Within Davutoğlu's book there is a chapter entitled "Cyprus: The Gordian knot of the Turkish foreign policy".

Within this chapter he writes that Cyprus is situated in a central position in the global continent. Cyprus lies in equal distance from Europe, Asia and Africa, and along with Crete, it is situated in a line that intersects the route of sea separation and transportation. Cyprus holds a position between, from one side, the Straits that separate Europe and Asia, and on the other side the canal that separates Asia and Africa. At the same time, Cyprus' geopolitical position is a strong base

and an aircraft carrier.

This is how he explains the importance of Cyprus within the context of the Eurasianism. On page 176 he raises a rhetorical question, but then proceeds to answer it. What happens if a country ignores Cyprus? He then goes on to write that “a country that ignores Cyprus can never be active in the international and regional policies. It can never be active in the international arena since that small island has a geographical position that may affect directly the strategic connections between Asia and Africa, Europe and Africa and Europe and Asia.” He continues to state that “also a country that ignores Cyprus can never be active in regional policies since Cyprus lies with her Eastern nose like an arrow turning to the Middle East, whereas her West back forms the foundation stone of the strategic balances that exist in the Eastern Mediterranean, in the Balkans and Northern Africa.”

On page 178 Davutoğlu states that Cyprus should remain out of the so-called Greek/Turkish strategic equation. Indirectly he describes his vision for the solution of the problem. He writes that because of Cyprus’s geostrategic position, “Turkey is affected by a variety of balances and that is why it is obliged to evaluate her Cypriot policy by separating the island from the Greek/Turkish equilibrium. Cyprus is becoming an issue of Eurasia and the Middle East from one side and the Balkans from the other side with the fast track. Turkey’s Cypriot policy has to be placed in a new strategic context so that it can apply to the new strategic context.”

He continues by describing how the importance of Cyprus, from the Turkish perspective, can be defined by two axes. The first one is that it is orientated towards strengthening the security of the Muslim-Turkish community of Cyprus as a matter of the historical responsibility of Turkey. He continues explaining the importance of maintaining the security of the Muslim-Turkish community by giving examples of geo-strategic behavior that Turkey must adopt. “The possible weakness of Turkey to protect the Turkish community of Cyprus may spread like a giant wave towards Western France and Bulgaria, and even more in Azerbaijan and Austria. The second important axis of the Turkish policy in Cyprus is the importance of the island in religious terms.” He writes that, “even if there had not been any Muslim Turkish in Cyprus, Turkey should have been obliged to invent the Cyprus issue. No country can remain mindless to such an island that lies in the heart of its living space.”

So, geo-strategically, once Davutoğlu has explained about the Turkish territories, he goes on to address why these territories are important. This is a classical geopolitical approach based on a classical analysis of how the living space should be perceived. He continues explaining the dimensions of the geostrategic importance of the so-called ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’), and the Greek part in the South. He writes on page 179 that this geostrategic importance has two dimensions. The first is the geostrategic importance that is in the balance between Turkey and Greece. That is between the TRNC and the Greek part of the island in the Eastern Mediterranean. The second dimension of this geostrategic importance is of wide significance, and is to do with the position of the island in relation to international and regional policies.

Finally, Davutoğlu comes to his conclusions which are very appropriate in light of his post as a foreign minister. On page 180 of his book he writes that:

“Cyprus must not be ignored by any regional or international power that forms a strategic policy in the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Gulf.”

He compressed his perceptions about Cyprus in the last paragraph of this chapter and said that:

“Cyprus lies in such a distance from all the above regions that it carries the ability to affect each one directly. Turkey has acquired a strategic advantage over Cyprus since 1974, and over this parameter. Turkey must exploit these, not just as an element of defensive Cypriot policy, aimed only at safeguarding current status-quo, but as a fundamental foothold of a new diplomacy based on strategy.”

In order to conclude this discussion it is necessary to briefly analyze the paragraph which I have just referred to above. This perception that Davutoğlu introduced to the agenda of Turkey's foreign policy is the concept called in international relations transgenic adaptation. Here we can see two different models. The model of acquisitive adaptation adopted after 1974 by the Greek side, and the model of intransigent adaptation adopted by Turkey. The acquisitive adaptation starts from the point that we lost a war, and strategically we have some disadvantages. We cannot change the whole situation, so what we have to do is negotiate to find a solution and we have to compromise. Through that process we may not be the winners, but we may not be the losers, since we have to make some compromises.

The second model is based on the way that the Turkish foreign policy perceived its political advantages from the war of 1974. What Davutoğlu explains very explicitly, is that Turkey must exploit these, not necessarily as a defensive Cypriot policy aiming at safeguarding the current status quo, but as a fundamental foothold of a new diplomacy. According to this perception Turkish diplomacy starts from the point that the negotiations are a zero sum game, and Cyprus is an integral part of our living space. Since the process is a zero sum game we are the winners, and we have to continue to be winners in this case. So, in order to offer a very personal view, there are negotiations in Cyprus based on this perception, and the refugee problem is very important as is the property problem. The territorial problem is also an important one in the negotiations, but the most important is the security issue. Without a new security system being built within these negotiations, the solution will be detrimental for the Greek Cypriot side

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION*

Nadia Arbatova**

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The Russian Response to Western Strategy

Introduction

The recent Caucasus crisis has become a culmination of the Russia-West security differences and raised fears of a new Cold War. Given that “Cold War” is not so much a scientific but rather a journalistic term, any serious confrontation between Russia and the West can be labeled as “a new Cold War”. It is often used to describe any heightened tension between states, but this interpretation does not indicate any starting point from which the rise in tension can be measured and its probable consequences and dangers assessed. As we know from our recent history, the Cold War was a period of conflict and competition between the US and the Soviet Union that began in the 1940s and lasted until the early 1990s. This period can be characterized by several distinguishing features which are in fact missing in the current situation.

Nonetheless, the last decade of mutual dissatisfaction and mistrust has deeply affected the Russia-West relations. After the end of bipolarity these relations passed through several stages beginning with euphoria in early 90s and ending with the recent flare-up in tensions between Russia and the United States during the Caucasus crisis. Why did it go wrong? And what should be done to avoid a new confrontation, whatever the name, between Russia on the one side and the United States, NATO and the European Union on the other? What are the possible scenarios in the Russia-West relations?

The Cold War and its effect on Russia-West relations

The Cold War began in the 1940s, and lasted until 1990 and it was a conflict that had several distinctive features, namely:

- The main parameter of the Cold War was the bi-polar structure of the international system. The world was divided into two camps and the track of this confrontation was a USSR-US military confrontation.

** Text as provided by the speaker.*

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- Global conflicts, how local they may have been, were one way or another connected to the Cold War. As a result, the world was locked down on opposite sides of the East-West barricade.
- The arms race was brought to an unprecedented scale in cost and intensity.
- The East-West ideological confrontation was directed at demonizing each other.

Due to these circumstances, all the classic conditions were in place for potentially unleashing a world war.

If we look at the situation today, it is completely different to the Cold War period. Most importantly, the main component of the Cold War system, namely bi-polarity, is missing. The world is multi-polar and besides the United States and Russia, the European Union, India and China have all emerged as new power centers and regional actors.

Russia and the West are no longer on different sides of the barricades in regional conflicts. They co-operate in Afghanistan and the Iranian nuclear program. They even co-operate regarding the issue of North Korea. As for the arms race, despite the increase in spending by the US and Russian defense over recent years, there has been nothing even remotely resembling what went on during the Cold War.

The Post-Soviet era and who lost the Cold War

The end of the Cold War coincided with the collapse of the communist ideology and the two events have led to a divide which has developed between North and South, between globalism and anti-globalism, and between modernization and conservative values.

Despite the fact that two serious crises happened after the end of the Cold War, namely the Yugoslav war of 1999 and the Caucasus crisis of 2008, there has not been any risk of a new world war. Nonetheless, the last decade of mutual dissatisfaction and mistrust has effected Russia-West relations and created a risk of new confrontation, whatever name may be given to it.

There is a distinct nostalgic notion in the West when the 90s are concerned. However, the causes of many of the problems that Russia-West relations face today have their roots in the 90s.

If we are to look at the Cold War from a world war perspective, it should have ended with a peace conference that would have established the new world order. This was not the case. Russia was too weak and too involved in its domestic turmoil and post-communist revolution, and the West did not see any need to change the existing system because it was the USSR and the Soviet pact that had collapsed. The opportunity to create a new world order adjusted to the post-bipolar realities and identify a new agenda for Euro-Atlantic cooperation was therefore lost.

In a way, the post bi-polar order was replaced by the US, savoring the euphoria when unexpectedly finding itself in the role of a sole super power. The US increasingly began to substitute the role of superior power for the role of international law, and replacing the legitimate UN Security Council decisions with their own agenda and ignoring the prerogatives of those overseas in favor of NATO actions. The US has in many ways failed in its role as “world leader” due to its reluctance to take the opinions of other states into consideration. When the issue of international law is concerned, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and secret prisons in Europe are just some examples of why the US cannot be considered as a role model to follow.

In the last twenty years, the most tragic expressions of the US policy are the military operation in Yugoslavia during the 1990s, its unsuccessful military operations in Afghanistan and its equally unsuccessful invasion of Iraq. These are all expressions of the US plan to enforce a policy that fits its own economic, political and military interests. Lately, it has become involved in the post-Soviet area and exacerbated its relations with Russia.

The West often portrays itself as the victor of the Cold War and Russia was to a certain degree treated in the same way as Germany and Japan were after the Second World War when the USSR collapsed.

However, for the Russians, Russia was the real winner of the Cold War. Even the USSR did not lose the Cold War. The USSR lost due to the emerging multi-polarity and not due to Gorbachev's political thinking. It also became very difficult for the top leadership to justify the huge waste of resources diverted from the nation's wealth in relation to Cold War activities. As Russia was the main driving force for the dissolution of the USSR, however strange it may seem today, Russia played the same role that Croatia played in the breakup of Yugoslavia. Still, Russia was portrayed as the loser and as expressed by British political scientist Lawrence Friedman:

"There is now no particular reason to classify Russia as a great power. It cannot therefore expect the privilege, respect and extra sensitivity to its interest normally afforded to a great power."¹

NATO expansion

The Yeltsin leadership sincerely believed in Russia's integration into the West and accepted the Western model of this relationship offered by the US and NATO. The Russian liberals understood, even in the 90s, that the pendulum would swing the other way when Russia became stronger. This has indeed proven to be the case.

NATO expansion has proven to be the biggest mistake in the relations between Russia and the West. It is interesting to note that NATO is neither a new security institution nor exclusively a military organization. It is something in-between. Had NATO started its internal reforms before its enlargement, Russia's critical position would never have developed. As a result there is a deep distrust towards NATO in Russia.

Putin's 2007 Munich speech can be seen as a kind of watershed in Russia-West relations. It was received as a manifestation of anti-Western sentiments but it had a very distinctive message, namely he appealed to the West to reconsider the order that was established in the 90s.

In most post-communist states, communism was not defeated by democracy but by nationalism. This was not the case in Russia which was the only country where communism was defeated by revolutionary liberals. The main reason for this was that Russian nationalists were in favor of the Soviet empire. But very soon nationalism in the states neighboring Russia had become the main driving force in the state formation and it spread into Russia.

Again, the West made a terrible mistake. When the problem of the Soviet nuclear legacy was resolved, the West started to picture a new Russian empire and it started to encourage these

¹ Laurence Freedman, 'Traditional Security,' in Alexei G. Arbatov, Karl Kaiser and Robert Legvold (Eds.), *Russia and the West: The Twenty First Century Security Environment*, Sharpe, New York, 1999, p. 26.

integrationist trends in the CIS space. This message was picked up by the new independent states of the CIS and to them it became better to go with the West than with Russia. At the end of the day it fuelled Russia's suspicions about the real goals of the US and NATO, and in some respect the European Union, in the post-Soviet space.

Russia and the West today

Russia has been debating its national identity for the last 200 years¹ and it brought up endless arguments over whether Russians are Europeans or Eurasians. This debate is still going on but it has taken the form of a fierce ideological struggle between modernizers and conservative forces. This debate has nothing to do with geography, it has nothing to do with religion, and it has nothing to do with culture. It's about a model for our post-communist development.

The criticism of Putin's administration by Russian and foreign politicians, analysts and journalists is fair in many aspects. However, in the context of a historic analysis it is important to identify clear reference points. Russia started its post-communist evolution from scratch. It didn't have any impressive democratic past like most of the European countries. Despite this, Russia does not differ very much from the rest of Europe. It does lag behind the European countries in its evolution, and Russia could be reminiscent of Germany in the 20s with its intense feeling of unfair treatment by others. It is also similar to France in the 40s when it was trying to heal its troubles or Italy in the 60s as far as the nexus of power, money and crime is concerned.²

Looking back in time, one can't help but recognize that Yeltsin's role was to get rid of the legacy of the Soviet past. Putin's mission was to stabilize the country which was falling apart after Yeltsin's reform. Both achieved their goals but with heavy losses to Russia's democratic evolution.

Today the goal is to modernize the country. The over-reliance on exports of raw materials creates obstacles not only for Russia's economic modernization but also for Russia's integration with the European Union. The model of an economy based on exports of raw materials is a model which is in need of a stable political system. However, the current model fits its role as a dominating factor in the post-Soviet space as it ensures control over energy pipelines.

In the 90s a lot of people in the West naively believed that the new generation of Russian politicians could solve all the problems. However, without radical changes in the system itself, it will only be reproducing the same pattern and the same political forces. This is what has happened now.

Meanwhile, Russia has already reacted to Western strategy. President Medvedev's proposal to build new security architecture in Europe should not be seen as a Soviet initiative to drive a wedge between Europeans and Americans. It is an appeal to the West to do the job as it was supposed to have been done after the end of bi-polarity. It is encouraging to see that some EU countries, including Cyprus, have already supported this proposal. The criticism of the opponents in the West is revolving around the substance of a new treaty and that the proposal establishes general rules of behavior and that it will be established on just general rules of behavior.

A new treaty should be constructed which should address three fundamental contradictions of

¹ The debate began with the "Westernizers" and the "Slavophiles" back in the nineteenth century.

² Dmitri Trenin, 'Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West,' *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 15 March 2007.

the post-bipolar era:

1. Nations' rights for self-determination and territorial integrity. The Helsinki Final Act has given a clear priority to territorial integrity. So we should address this issue and understand whether territorial integrity is still more important than the nations' right to self-determination. And we should define clear conditions for self-determination and in turn amend the international law.
2. A contradiction between nations' right for sovereignty and consequently non-interference with other states and their domestic affairs and a nation's right to humanitarian intervention. In 1999 NATO and the US used this principle to prevent humanitarian tragedy in Yugoslavia but they did not consider the fact that other nations may apply the same right. In the Caucasus crisis, Russia applied this right to prevent tragedy in the Caucasus.
3. Contradiction between nations' rights to freely choose security alliances and nations' right to oppose expansion of these alliances if they're perceived as a security threat. This is a very serious contradiction and usually it is seen through the prism of a NATO enlargement but in principle it can be referred to the existence of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization).

It seems that the only solution to this problem would be to redistribute the functions between the existing institutions. This ideal system will not happen overnight. We can adjust our new security architecture to meet out post-bipolar needs if this is subject to discussions. The necessary precondition is to change the model of relations which exists today between Russia and the EU. Now the existing model is absent because it is based on two approaches which cannot be reconciled by definition as each of these approaches contains deep internal contradictions.

Conclusions

So what does the EU and Russia want from each other? The EU wants Russia to be a reliable energy supplier. Then it wants Russia to be democratic and not to create problems in the post-Soviet space. Russia wants a modern economy based on the most advanced Western technologies. It wants to remain a sovereign democracy, and it wants to maintain its special interest in the post-Soviet space.

All of these goals are, however, incompatible. If Russia remains a sovereign democracy and if it continues to exercise its influence in the post-Soviet space, it will never become a modern democracy without Western help.

In the multi-polar world other centers of power (China, India, Pakistan, Iran) are likely to use the differences between Russia and the West to their advantage. This could have negative consequences on the non-proliferation activities.

As regards the East Mediterranean, its eastern part together with the Black Sea was always a border land between Russia and the West, and since NATO is still a military alliance which is expanding, it is expanding traditional security perceptions. NATO's new bases founded in Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 have increased Russia's interest in the region. Obviously, Russia will not be able to reinstate the Soviet-like presence in the Eastern Mediterranean but it will create new tensions between the West and Russia and between Russia and Israel because one of

the places for a support base is in Syria.

As for Turkey, it has shown dissatisfaction with NATO and the US, for different reasons. Therefore, Russia and Turkey have already manifested unilateral conduct. They oppose NATO and US efforts to expand anti-terrorist activities to the Black Sea area. In my view, this model has one deficiency. It cannot last forever as you cannot balance between the West, Israel and the Arab states. At the end of the day you have to choose sides, which means that this will lead us again to the worst scenario and to a new confrontation.

In order to conclude my analysis I would like to refer to a quote from a Chinese philosopher: “even standing still, one can make a lot of mistakes”. So with this in mind I think it is time to step out of the Cold War shadow.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION*

Maria Stromvik**

27 November 2009

Challenges and Opportunities for the European Security and Defence Policy

Introduction

Throughout the last decade, the European Union's ambitions and attempts to influence the security situation outside its own borders have changed quite dramatically. During the same period, U.S. interests in European security (in general) and NATO (in particular) have also changed.

As a result, the EU members' *possibilities* to collectively provide a strong voice in many issues related to international security management have increased. At the same time, the *demand* from the outside is also growing, with the EU's special characteristics as an international actor proving to be a great asset in many war-torn areas. The EU is still not always able to convert these possibilities into concrete activities, and can often not meet the growing demands from third states and international organizations.

The last few years' experiences with a growing number of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operations – on three continents – have shown where the EU's strengths as well as weaknesses are the most pronounced. While some of the *institutional* weaknesses will be addressed with the creation of the new post of High Representative and the External Action Service, the Union still lacks a common *strategic outlook*. There are also many civilian and military *capability* problems that need to be addressed, as well as *organizational* and *financial* problems that will have to be dealt with in the near future.

In the period of institutional change that the EU's foreign policy will be undergoing in the next few months, those member states that choose to be active in terms of proposing new solutions will have unusually high chances to affect the Union's foreign policy in the long run.

This paper will examine some of the challenges that face the EU, what its relationship to NATO is and how that is changing.

* Text as provided by the speaker.

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Changes within NATO and the EU

NATO has moved from being a collective defense organization to an organization that conducts peace operations on a global scale. An additional change is that NATO members look at the organization in a different way today than they might have done 10-15 years ago.

The US, for example, looks to NATO in hope that the EU member states will contribute troops for various peace operations, whereas the EU perceive the organization for the purpose of providing a collective defense.

Despite these changes within NATO, it still only has a vague political framework and instruments for broad security policy initiatives. NATO does, however, engage in various types of peace support operations and there are currently 3-4 major operations ongoing.

When comparing this to the changes within the EU, one of the major changes is that some ten years ago there were no peace operations conducted by the EU. Today, however, there are several operations in addition to troops wearing EU uniform. One can therefore see that a wider scope has developed within the EU and envisage how it is moving forward.

It is difficult to say whether or not the interests of the EU have become more diverse over the last ten years. It can be argued that the last two enlargements have increased the difficulty of coordinated action than before. This may be the case in some respects but in a lot of situations the new member states position themselves either in the middle or in line with already established camps.

The EU has, however, been successful in establishing a potentially strong political framework and instruments for broad security initiatives. This can be seen as the EU's largest difference from NATO.

The common foreign policy has undoubtedly expanded and there has been an increase in peace relations and relevant operations on behalf of the EU.

The EU has today an equal amount of peace operations running as the United Nations which would not have been perceived ten years ago. NATO only has 3-4 global operations but these are significantly bigger.

National and international consequences

International

The demand for the EU in these types of activities has increased. This also presents a problem because in Brussels and in the PSC Political and Security Committee (PSC), international organizations are requesting more engagement from the EU but the EU has difficulties with meeting this demand.

The EU and the ESDP has inspired others, notably the African Union (AU) to take a more active role in things. The framework set up by the EU has been copied by the AU. The UN has also gained a new regional "partner" that can share the burden in providing peace-keeping personnel.

The EU, as a new power, should provide a balance to the UN; however, the EU/ESDP has not yet

guaranteed any “balancing behavior”. This is largely because of the EU’s inability to act in unity which can also be seen as its biggest weakness.

On an EU level, the consequences are that the European Commission does not have the same type of influence as it does in other EU areas. It is therefore dependent upon the individual member states carrying out the operations, and the cooperativeness of the governments in question. There has been a need for some kind of central actor and the Council secretariat has started to fill that role and visibility has subsequently become dramatically increased.

It should be noted that ESDP operations have, in some cases, brought member states closer together politically. The conflicts in Gaza and Somalia are two examples. Another positive effect is that EU members, and the Commission, have had to discuss broader and more comprehensive foreign policy issues today than ever before. It has led to Treaty revisions, such as Lisbon, which will support the EU’s role in this respect.

National

As the EU has become more active in terms of foreign security policies, several small countries have been “forced” to broaden their foreign policy outlook. This has put pressure on the foreign ministries of smaller states and increased pressure on inter-ministerial coordination as well as an increasing demand for the gathering of information and intelligence gathering.

There have been discussions on revisions and increased pressure on government agencies possibilities to provide civilian and military personnel. It is often difficult for countries to provide military personnel and this has been shown in many of the EU projects involving civilians.

Once you have taken part in these organizations there is an increased influence on international issues when the EU agrees. This is positive from the perspective of small states as they gain an increased possibility to push their issues if they know how to do it and they are handled correctly.

Challenges for EU-NATO relations

Few countries have a clear strategic vision of how they would like the EU or NATO to act as there are different agendas among the members. This is also one of the prime reasons why the EU does not have a clear strategic vision. Troop contribution for international missions is also proving itself to be a problem for member states.

Ten years ago no-one would have guessed that the EU would have carried out this many operations at the same time as it is today. This is, however, putting a lot of pressure on the EU’s capacity and there is therefore an institutional “overstretch”, especially when civilian operations are concerned.

There is still limited knowledge or understanding within the political systems and throughout the general public of how decisions are made within the EU. There is almost no knowledge of how the EU is changing and has changed in the last few years. Many are therefore not aware of all the possibilities that are available.

Financing is also a major problem (including tradeoff between individual and Athena financing). The funding for various operations is limited and is mostly done on an ad hoc basis for every situation. The effect of this is that member states’ foreign ministries have to approach there

finance ministries for previously unforeseen expenses. This is sometimes something which the government then has difficulty in gaining public support for.

There are also flexibility problems, and one can even talk about waging “war by committee” e.g. EUFOR (European Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina), RDC and EUFOR Tchad/RCA (the EU mission in Chad and the Central African Republic). NATO and the UN are experiencing the same problems.

The lessons learnt from each operation have become very political and self-criticism is rarely exercised. Thus, it has become difficult to draw lessons from the various types of EU operations.

There is a lack of general visibility, and Brussels is currently undergoing institutional turf wars as the treaty does not distinguish between what the Commission’s foreign aid activities are, and what the Council’s foreign policy aims are, so this presents an increasing visibility problem.

A main issue in relating to the EU-NATO relations is whether NATO’s *raison d’être* is still being fulfilled. Questions are being raised in some countries over whether NATO is still needed in light of the EU’s presence? Membership of both organisations prompts competition for troop contributions to different projects. There is also an issue relating to a permanent HQ for EU operations. The EU does carry out more operations than NATO, but does not have a base from where it can direct these operations. Instead, NATO & National HQ’s are being used.

Conclusions and opportunities

There are several reasons for why the EU does not have an overall security policy. The EU has often been perceived as being more efficient and less “corrupt” than UN. The EU have been perceived as more “neutral” and less self-interested than some big nation states. In some cases, the EU has been the only accepted third party in peace negotiations (AMM, RAFAH). The EU also has a more of an ability to go where NATO can’t go, for example Georgia and Moldova.

The EU can also be seen as a welcomed addition to the US on the international arena and in some cases the UN even gets increased credibility from joint EU-UN cooperation. The EU states get a greater say in international politics by being part of the EU since it has grown and advanced its possibilities (compared to NATO and compared to bilateral activities). Finally, the EU has become a very unique type of actor in respect to their capability to combine and tailor different foreign policy instruments but also not being perceived as an international organisation. This has given the EU extra possibilities even though they are not yet exploited enough by the member states.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION*

Lars Wedin**

27 November 2009

Cyprus as Security Producer: Policy Options for the Future

Introduction

In the ancient world the notion of *Hubris* had a very important implication. The one who showed signs of *Hubris* was harshly punished by the gods. To express views of the foreign and security policy of a foreign country is already that very close to *Hubris*. In this case, the crime is aggravated by the fact that Cyprus is a very ancient country. Furthermore, the more recent history of Cyprus is extremely complicated – this is nothing new to you but it's important to acknowledge this fact. Anyhow, I hope that I will thanks to the organisers escape a too harsh punishment from the gods.

I will not dwell on the various plans for reconciliation on Cyprus as I'm quite unqualified to do so. I can only state that the outcome of the referendum in 2004 was a disappointment from a European perspective, not the least because of its repercussions to EU's security and defence policy. I'm of course aware of present talks between North and South. Their possible outcomes and their consequences form the latter part of my intervention. But before I do that, I'm asked to give a short analysis of the present geopolitical situation and, in particular, the "arc of crisis".

Geopolitical changes

The first French movie with sound was about the famous Cardinal Richelieu. The movie starts with a messenger entering into the office of the Cardinal saying, "Sir, the thirty years war has just begun"! Well, it was first in the peace of Westphalia in 1648 that one could start talking about the thirty years war. In the same way, we cannot now know where we are heading, we can only see that the world is undergoing great changes. Indeed, there are those who argue that we are in a period of great change that will not end until somewhere around 2025.

The financial crisis is a good example of how fast the international scene may change. The first warnings of an upcoming financial crisis came around 1999. It really started in 2007 but was not identified as a real crisis until the beginning of 2008. Half a year ago, many thought that this was

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the end of market economy. Today, few make that argument and the system seems to be recovering. One notes the general reluctance to act before the crisis had become really dangerous. And then, there was a temptation to draw too far-reaching conclusions.

The financial crisis has, however, showed something else of more lasting importance. Five years ago, it had been G7 or G8 that had been at the forefront. This time, however, the G20 played a leading role. This fact illustrates the ongoing change at the geopolitical chessboard.

An aging Europe will have to cede place to new great powers; not only China but India and Brazil, just to mention the most obvious. Nevertheless, Europe will certainly continue to be an important player. The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty is a great step forward. However, no one seems to believe that our new president will be able – or allowed – to provide the leadership needed to realize the potential of a more united Europe. Too many European leaders give priority to short term and narrow interests instead of thinking of the big challenges of the future. Hence, Europe's power will decline.

It should be noted that the Lisbon Treaty includes paragraph 42.7 about the solidarity towards a country that has been attacked on its territory. As a consequence, Swedish government has made a declaration of solidarity: "Sweden will not be passive in the case of a catastrophe or an attack against another EU-member or a Nordic country. We expect other countries to act in the same way if Sweden is the victim." So there is now a notion of a European defense, a fact that might be of importance for Cyprus.

The future of NATO is in some doubt. It has staged its future on progress in Afghanistan, and may have to face failure. Its new strategic concept – to be presented this spring – must strike a balance between those who want to keep the "old" NATO for collective defense according to article 5 and those who prefer the "new" NATO for crisis management in faraway countries. The concept must also be instrumental in finally realizing the "strategic partnership" between EU and NATO. This issue is directly linked to the situation between Turkey and Cyprus.

The US is still THE superpower, in particular in military terms. Its budget deficit, however, is reaching enormous proportions. Interestingly, China controls a large part of the debt. Furthermore, its military is becoming seriously overstretched. Finally, so far, president Obama has not measured up to the high expectations on him. In particular, he must rebuild the US reputation that has suffered greatly during the Bush years.

China is clearly becoming a world power. We are now witnessing the comeback of China in the Western Indian Ocean after an absence of 500 years. In the 15th century, imperial China made several expeditions to this area but then the court decided to scrap the navy. At the same time, the Portuguese reached these waters and Europe's colonial adventure started. From this perspective, the fact that Chinese naval vessels now patrol these waters is an interesting illustration to the changing structure of world power.

China is also an important investor in Africa. Regrettably, its policy of non-interference in domestic policies tends to hamper Europe's goal of promoting democracy, human rights and good governance. China is also, together with Russia, an important provider of arms to conflict-ridden Africa.

However, enormous social and environmental problems might provoke internal troubles of big proportions.

Regarding, the general trend seems to be in decline, not the least because of its diminishing population and its corrupt leadership. Its future will continue to be very important for us living around the Baltic Sea – are we afraid of Russia because it's becoming strong again or because it's getting weaker? However, for the time being, Russia plays an increasingly important role as Europe's main provider of energy. This leads to a split between those who have strong memories of the Soviet occupation and those who follow the policy of "Russia first".

Arc of crisis

In the end of the seventies, Zbigniew Brzezinski – security advisor to then President Carter – launched the idea of "an arc of crisis" in the wake of, *inter alia*, the fall of the shah. The expression is relaunched in the French White Book from 2008. This time, the "arc" is stretching from western Africa to central Asia.

The population in this area is quickly increasing and will double to 2030. Their governments are generally fragile and the economies are stumbling. Many leaders are ailing and without natural successors. They do possess important resources of gas and oil but are lacking in other natural resources, in particular potable water. Climate change will aggravate this problem and huge streams of migrants may provoke new types of conflict. At the same time, this area is characterized by a large number of tensions: between moderate and extremist Islam, between Shias and Sunnis and the influence of Al-Qaeda in societies.

The "arc of crisis" is also the home of a number of ongoing conflicts: India-Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and, of course, the eternal Middle East conflict. Fragile Pakistan is already a nuclear weapon state and Iran strives to become one. The consequences may become very disturbing as Iran's nukes may push other Middle East states to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

The Mediterranean Sea plays a crucial role in this "arc of crisis" as it leads from the Atlantic to Asia via the Black and the Red Seas. 25% of world trade – of which energy forms a very important part – goes through this sea which also is the link between Europe and North Africa. Recent findings of hydrocarbon in the area between Cyprus, Egypt and Israel further increase the importance of the Mediterranean. From a geopolitical point of view, two countries are particularly important for Europe's strategy in the area: Cyprus and Turkey.

The death of the national state?

Globalization and the rise of the society of information have important repercussions for the national state. This concept has, since the peace of Westphalia, been the basis for the international system. We now seem to be heading towards a looser concept with many non-state actors.

Western states do not any more fight wars – or do crisis management operations – on their own but in coalitions: UN, NATO, EU or coalitions of the willing. The objective is not conquering of territory but of hearts and minds. The "enemy" is, more often than not, a non-state actor. But also on the Western side, there is a proliferation of actors: multinational enterprises and NGOs of various sorts. In Afghanistan, reportedly, there are about 100 big and 1000 small NGOs at work! In addition, we see the increased use of private military enterprises – a reminiscence of the mercenary system once common in Europe.

All Western states have important groups of immigrants. During crisis management operations, the “enemy” will, thus, always have relatives and followers in participating states. The result may be bombings like in Madrid 2004 and destabilizing information campaigns.

Globally, there are more than one billion users of the net. The use of social media (blogs, Twitter, Youtube and Facebook) may have great political impact and is difficult for a state to control. To a large extent, this is good as shown during the demonstrations in Iran – it is more and more difficult for dictators to repress their populations without the world knowing it. But these media also fosters extreme individualism where people tend to follow only such news that corresponds with their own ideas. This might endanger the critical debate so important in a democratic society. And one should not forget that the internet is easy to manipulate.

In sum, these developments lead to fragmentation of the state and to an increasing number of international actors. The old fashioned war between states is not dead, however. The recent war between Georgia and Russia is a proof on that.

An integrated maritime policy

Someone has said that the “21st century will be maritime or not”. Europe is now launching a couple of important initiatives that will be of great importance also for Cyprus – a maritime country.

In its “blue book” on a European integrated maritime policy, the European Commission writes: “The seas are Europe's lifeblood. Europe's maritime spaces and its coasts are central to its well-being and prosperity – they are Europe's trade routes, climate regulator, sources of food, energy and resources, and a favored site for its citizens' residence and recreation.”

The general aim of this policy is to develop the competitiveness of European maritime industry and to further secure, safe and environmental-friendly shipping.

A particular goal is to handle the increasing intra-European transport system. Internal freight will increase with 70% in the coming years. Our already congested roads cannot handle this. The answer is increased use of railways, canals and maritime transport. Regarding the latter, there is a project called “Motorways of the Sea.”

Motorways of the Sea should form a door-to-door logistic network that gives viable, regular, reliable, frequent, and high-quality services. In general, the network should absorb a significant part of expected increase in freight traffic, and give improved access to peripheral and island regions and states.

At the time of writing, four motorways are identified: Motorway of the Baltic Sea, Motorway of the Sea of Western Europe, Motorway of the Sea of South-East Europe, and Motorway of the Sea of South-West Europe (see map below).

It is hoped that Motorways of the Sea also can be used in order to link the northern and southern shores together in the context of the Union for the Mediterranean (or the Barcelona Process).

Cyprus has the potential to play a key role in these projects.



Plate 5: Motorways of the Sea

Policy options for Cyprus

As Dr Strömviik pointed out in her presentation, there is hardly something that one could call “a Western strategy”. Such a strategy must, from a theoretical point of view, contain a political project and a balance between ends, means and ways of action which, put together, can lead to fulfilment of the project. It is, however quite possible to identify a number of general goals: peace, stability, human rights and good governance. From a more narrow European policy point of view, there are important projects as the development of the ESDP, implementation of Berlin Plus agreement on cooperation between EU and NATO, and integration of Turkey.

In this context, Cyprus has both advantages and drawbacks.

Advantages

Cyprus sits in an important geostrategic location; in particular in relation to the Middle East. This fact has already been used, inter alia, after the Israel – Hezbollah war in 2006 by the Swedish Navy. At that time also an important operation regarding refugees was staged in the context of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Furthermore, France in 2007 acquired rights to use ports and airfields in Cyprus, which also is a proof of the island's importance.

Cyprus is a member of the EU and it participates in the ESDP. It has at least one officer in the (European Union Military Staff) EUMS and a military representant in the (European Union Military Committee) EUMC. It is a member of one of EU's battle groups. It has also participated in several operations within the context of ESDP; however, participation has been restricted to staff officers.

Cyprus is also a former colony. This should give it extra credibility in dealing with other former colonies. It has also historically good relations with Middle East states. As a consequence, Cyprus may play a facilitating role between the EU and the Middle East and North Africa.

Cyprus has an important shipping industry and possesses great know-how in maritime affairs. This may be an important advantage in the realization of EU's integrated maritime policy.

Finally, Cyprus is a prosperous country and a member of the eurozone.

Disadvantages

There are, however, also serious disadvantages. As a consequence, Cyprus could be characterized more as a consumer than a producer of security. It is a divided country with UN troops that are needed elsewhere.

The main issue is, as is well known, its relations with Turkey and, to a lesser extent, the "TRNC". It must be realized that Turkey, for Europe, is at least as important as Cyprus, if not more. The EU strives to use carrots and some sticks in order to secure a democratic development of Turkey. It is felt, however, that Cyprus is infringing upon this policy.

A serious consequence of the bad relations vis-à-vis Turkey is that Cyprus is not a member of the PfP and does not have a security agreement with NATO. This situation poses serious problems for the relations between EU and NATO and actually impedes the full realization of Berlin Plus.

More generally, it is felt that Cyprus uses its membership in the EU more to further its interests regarding Turkey and the "TRNC" than to further the common good. As these policies to some extent are directed against the US, the policy also put problems for the Transatlantic link.

Finally, as was clear from the conference, many Cypriots tend to look at security in narrow military terms and as a zero-sum game.

Options and roles

Cyprus now pursues negotiations with the "TRNC"; the outcome is not sure. From a European standpoint, reconciliation is of high strategic importance. It's believed that the problems with Turkey cease to exist in case of reconciliation but we cannot be sure. Hence, some of the ideas below may not be possible to realize. Most of the ideas presented follow directly from the analysis above; hence, it is reasonable to present them as a short list.

The general idea is that Cyprus should establish itself as a producer of security. There is, obviously, no clear definition of this notion but “politics is perceptions”. Cyprus needs to remake its trademark in such a direction. There is a need for a strategy of influence. An overarching objective of such a strategy should be to present Cyprus as a helpful player in EU politics. Furthermore, it is important to understand that security today is a broad issue that cannot be discussed just in military terms.

Cyprus should:

- Use its EU membership to further European interests to a higher extent than today, in particular, Cyprus should feel secure enough to further good relations with Turkey.
- Send home the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNIFICYP).
- Join PfP and develop a partnership program and interoperability.
- Get a security agreement with NATO.
- Actively participate in ESDC (European Security and Defence College).
- Start a crash program in education in NATO affairs: NATO Defence College, SHAPE school in Oberammergau.
- Disarmament should not be an option. Cyprus needs, like all sovereign states, forces that can guarantee its borders and defend its interests. Hence, there is a need for at least some kind of gendarmerie, an air force and an armed coast guard. If this is not possible, Cyprus must ask Europe for help. Given its geostrategic situation, it cannot become a security vacuum.
- Foster its good relations with the Middle East countries in view of possible peace-operations.
- Foster good relations with North African states in order to facilitate the Barcelona process.
- Become an active player in the Integrated Maritime Policy. Pursue a policy of secure, safe and environmental friendly shipping. Why not a Centre of Excellence?
- Use its strategic location to become a cornerstone in the upcoming European integrated maritime surveillance system and in European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX).

The British bases – sovereign areas – constitute a thorny issue. On the one hand, Europe is in need of the British presence as the UK is one of the few member states with real, tangible military resources. On the other, Cyprus is not Gibraltar which has been under the British Crown for centuries. In that perspective, the idea of sovereign areas on a fellow European country sounds extremely odd. It seems preferably to let the British rent the bases. The rent, however, needs to be low as British defence budget is extremely overstretched.

If reconciliation with “TRNC” is not possible, Cyprus should act in order to stabilize the situation – agree to disagree. It should be conceivable to agree on a number of CBMs. In particular, Cyprus must avoid holding Europe hostage to its problems.

Summing up

Europe and its citizens will live through important changes in the geopolitical setting. There are many difficult challenges that need to be tackled. Cyprus with its long history and advantageous geostrategic situation can be an important provider of security. That, however, requires that Cyprus, to the extent possible, reconcile itself with 'TRNC' and Turkey. Cyprus will get respect from other Europeans if it in a proactive way works for Europe.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION*

Phivos Klokkaris**
27 November 2009

The Security Problem of Cyprus

Introduction

As we all know, negotiations are currently underway for a new political settlement in Cyprus. Solving the security problem of Cyprus is a key element in these negotiations. Bearing in mind that solutions are often determined by the way a problem is defined, it is important to cast the Cyprus security problem in its proper dimensions.

The current threats to Cyprus security, both internal and external, can be traced back to the birth of the Republic of Cyprus and before. Historically, external threats came from Cyprus's volatile geopolitical environment and the competing interests of regional and global actors. Internal threats have emanated from the ethnic and religious differences among Cypriots and the way that such differences were exploited by external actors, mainly by Britain and Turkey.

What is important at this point is to assess the current and future relevance of such threats. This will help define the security problem of Cyprus more accurately and help provide solutions that will make sense both for Cyprus as well as for Western security in this troubled region of the world.

Geopolitics

Cyprus, in the course of its long history, suffered greatly and indeed is still suffering as a result of its geostrategic importance. Strong regional and global powers have always sought control of the island as a means of advancing their own national interests. In its more recent history Cyprus has suffered what is perhaps the most serious attack on its geographical integrity and its national identity. The Turkish invasion of 1974 and the ensuing military occupation of a large part of Cyprus was followed by a deliberate attempt to alter the island's demographic

* Text as provided by the speaker.

** Lieutenant General (Retired); Former Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Cyprus National Guard; Former Minister of Defence of the Republic of Cyprus.

character by illegally transferring thousands of Turkish settlers to the island.¹ Turkey's intention is to increase the Turkish Islamic ethnic element in Cyprus at the expense of the island's Greek Christian population (in violation of international law) and establish a regime subject to Turkish hegemony.

The location of Cyprus between the main oil producing and oil consuming regions of the world emphasizes its geostrategic importance. Cyprus is located next to vital trade and oil routes that stretch from Central Asia through the Middle East and the Suez Canal to Europe. It is close to oil sources and their pipeline terminals on the Eastern Mediterranean coast (on the Turkish part Ceyhan and on the Israeli part Haifa). Ceyhan especially is emerging as an important energy link across from Cyprus on the Alexandretta Gulf of Turkey. The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline transfers oil from north Iraq to the West through Ceyhan, and the sea lanes along the northern coast of Cyprus. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline transfers oil from the Caspian Sea to the West through Turkey, and the sea corridor north of Cyprus. There are also plans to ship oil from Ceyhan to India, through the port city of Ashkelon in Israel and then by pipeline to the Red Sea port of Eilat where it can be shipped to East Asia.²

Cyprus also forms a communications and intelligence bridge between Asia, Africa and Europe. The bulk of air transportation from Europe to the Middle East crosses the Cyprus airspace. Important infrastructure supports air and naval military operations in the Middle East, surveillance over the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as intelligence gathering and communications monitoring of the Middle East, North Africa and beyond. Broadcasting stations for military purposes and propaganda, and state-of-the-art intelligence installations on the British military bases form part of the Echelon System.³

The fact that the British military bases in Cyprus are among the few overseas military facilities to have been retained by the UK into the 21 century, underscores their geostrategic importance. They are necessary to the UK to secure its national interests in the area, especially those related to security and energy. The geopolitical importance of both Cyprus and the British military bases on the island has increased in recent years as a result of the increased instability in the Middle East with the escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Lebanon crisis, and the wars in Gaza, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Turkey

Turkey plays a significant role in shaping the security environment of Cyprus. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze its intentions and aspirations for Cyprus. Turkey has made it clear that it aims to become a strong regional power in the Middle East, the Southern Balkans and the Caucasus region. Turkey's efforts to secure this objective include the assumption of a hegemonic attitude over its neighbors coupled with an intensive military build-up. Large military forces backed by large military industrial and procurement programs, and a strong war industry help ensure Turkey's importance as a NATO Member. Its regional role is emphasized with large-scale

¹Laakso Jaakko, 'Colonisation by Turkish Settlers of the Occupied Part of Cyprus,' Report (Doc. 9799), 2 May 2003, Council of Europe Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, <http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc03/EDOC9799.htm>.

² Garbis Koharian, 'The Conquest of Eurasia: NATO's War for the World's Heartland,' Armenian News Network/Groong, 11 June 2009, <http://groong.usc.edu/news/msg272844.html>.

³ Brendan O'Malley, Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, London, 1999, London, p. 81.

participation in UN sponsored multinational forces and EU-sanctioned activities.

Turkey's regional role is further strengthened through its control of vital energy routes to the West, such as the Ceyhan terminal of the BTC, Kirkuk pipelines and water resources to the Middle East through the harnessing of the sources of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.

Exploitation of its geostrategic importance and its considerable leverage over its relations with the US, Russia, the EU, the Middle East, the Balkans and the countries of the Caucasus region has helped Turkey obtain additional political, military and economic benefits. At home, Turkey has discredited the Kurdish independence movement and has succeeded in branding the PKK as a 'terrorist' organization, and therefore undeserving of any international support. On the contrary, Turkey has successfully induced the EU and successive US governments into providing it with billions of dollars and euros in military and economic aid, and has even convinced Russia to accept a redefinition of Turkish role in the Black Sea region.⁴

Moreover, Turkey's declared opposition to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq aims to further frustrate secessionist efforts of its own Kurdish minority and help Turkey pursue additional privileges for Western exploitation and transfer of northern Iraqi oil.

With the encouragement of the US, Turkey has increased its mediation role in the Middle East and even offered to mediate between Russia and Georgia. Similarly, Turkey's efforts to join the EU, with the help of the US and the UK, aim to increase its geopolitical importance. So does its co-operation with the US in the war against terrorism, the cessation of the Iranian nuclear program and the stabilization in Iraq and the Caucasus area. Turkey strengthens its cooperation with Syria and the Palestinians while the Israeli-Turkish strategic cooperation is deteriorating.

In the Aegean Sea, however, Turkey continues its aggressive policy. Through military power projection and systematic violations of Greek sovereign rights over sea and air space, Turkey aims to change the existing status quo between the two countries. In Western Thrace, Turkish policy has focused on using the Muslim minority as a tool for political pressure on Greece.⁵

As far as Cyprus is concerned, Turkey pursues the strategic objective established in the 1950s by Nihat Erim, a well-known Turkish jurist and later politician who was instrumental in defining Turkish policy toward Cyprus. In his 1956 Cyprus-related reports,⁶ Erim called for Turkish intervention rights and the presence of Turkish military forces in Cyprus to ensure the security of the south coast of Turkey and enhance the Turkish role in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. This objective was secured with the Treaties of Guarantee⁷ and Alliance⁸ which

⁴ 'US Declare PKK a Common Enemy,' *BBC*, 2 November 2007,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7074361.stm;

'EU Supports Turkey Against PKK "Terrorists": Interview with EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn,' *EurActiv*, 23 October 2007,

<http://www.euractiv.com/en/foreign-affairs/interview-eu-supports-turkey-pkk-terrorists/article-167805>.

⁵ Leonidas Koumakis, *The Miracle: A True Story*, Third Edition, Independently Published, 1995, p. 127.

⁶ George Angeletopoulos' presentation at the IV International Conference on Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus, May 2008 on Nihat Erim's reports on Cyprus.

⁷ Appendix B of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus - Treaty of Guarantee, <http://www.cyprus.gov.cy>.

⁸ Appendix B of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus - Treaty of Guarantee, <http://www.cyprus.gov.cy>.

were made part of the 1960 Cyprus settlement. Erim further counselled in favor of partition of Cyprus and demographic change of the island by encouraging Turks to come to Cyprus from abroad. Nihat Erim was the Turkish Prime Minister Menderes' adviser on the Cyprus issue and he supported that "Cyprus was never Greek"⁹. Today, with the northern part of Cyprus being under occupation of strong military forces, the Turks felt that they could easily extend their political control over the entire island and could therefore extend their geopolitical control further over the Eastern Mediterranean.

Erim's objectives were fully implemented by the Turkish invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus in 1974. The expulsion of the Greek inhabitants in the north, and their replacement by mainland Turks in violation of international law, as well as the 1983 unilateral declaration of independence of the illegal "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC")¹⁰, can all be traced back to Erim's grand design.

Over the past 35 years, Turkey's objectives have received strong support from the USA and the UK. Such support was particularly manifested in connection with the 2004 plan for the settlement of the Cyprus problem, sponsored by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. The "Annan Plan", as it came to be known, envisioned a demilitarized Cyprus with limited sea and air sovereign rights, with Turkey having effective control over the whole island (intervention rights for Turkish military forces that were to remain in Cyprus indefinitely).¹¹

To further ensure this outcome, Turkey refused to accept inclusion in the Annan Plan of any legislation of the Republic of Cyprus regarding the establishment of the continental shelf and sea zones. The Turkish side also refused to accept the agreement signed in 2003 between the Republic of Cyprus and Egypt on exclusive economic zones (EEZ), and the exploitation of Cyprus' considerable offshore oil and gas reserves. It also refused to incorporate the Montreux Convention of 1936.

Turkey also insisted on separate search and rescue responsibilities between the two Cyprus "constituent states", with the establishment of separate search and rescue co-ordination centres. Turkey demanded, and was successful in incorporating into the Annan Plan, several bilateral agreements between Turkey and the "TRNC" to include the coastal security and search and rescue, which gave Turkey the right to have unlimited access to Cyprus sea and airspace, without having to seek the permission of the "United Republic of Cyprus".¹²

Furthermore, there were limitations placed on the Republic of Cyprus concerning the disposal of its territory to facilitate military international operations. Any such activity would need the consent of both Turkey and Greece. Any participation of Cyprus in EU-ESDP activities could only occur if such activities did not violate any of the terms of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance of 1960.¹³

⁹ Nihat Erim, *Bildigrim ve Gordugum Olculer Incinde Kibris*, 1976, Ankara, pp. 169 – 170.

¹⁰ Under Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) the so-called "TRNC" is not a recognized state.

¹¹ Article 8 of the Foundation Agreement and Annexes III and IV of the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem ("the Annan Plan"), UN, 31 March 2004, Fifth Edition, <http://www.unficy.org/>.

¹² Annex III, attachment 10 and 11, Foundation Agreements of the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem ("the Annan Plan"), UN, 31 March 2004, Fifth Edition, <http://www.unficy.org/>.

¹³ Article 8 of the Foundation Agreement of the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem ("the Annan Plan"), UN, 31 March 2004, Fifth Edition, <http://www.unficy.org/>.

Based on the provisions of the Annan Plan, the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey would not have the right to keep navy and air forces in Cyprus. This restriction, however, actually only adversely affected Cyprus and Greece, and not Turkey. Turkey maintains naval and air force bases on its coast in the Eastern Mediterranean, immediately opposite Cyprus. Turkey would have the right to conduct any aeronautical activity in and around Cyprus without the permission of the Republic of Cyprus, since its bilateral agreements with the "TRNC" gave it that right. The ultimate objective of the Annan Plan was to neutralize the geopolitical role of Greece and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean sea, and to transform Cyprus into a Turkish dependency.

Turkish ability to project air and naval power over and around Cyprus is of great importance because it enables Turkey to control the routes of trade and petroleum from the Far and Middle East through the Suez Canal to the West, as well as the oil pipeline terminals to the Eastern Mediterranean coasts. It also makes Turkey, together with Britain and Israel, the exclusive guardians of Western interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

During the current negotiations Turkey has taken every opportunity to emphasize that the area of the Eastern Mediterranean is of great interest to it for use by its air and naval forces, and dispute the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus over the island's maritime zone and the Nicosia Flight Information Region (FIR).

Turkey's then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Babacan, stated on September 10, 2008, that Turkey does not recognize that the two communities (Greek and Turkish) in Cyprus could even discuss the matter of security. This theme has been picked up by the new Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoglu, who has made it clear that the system of guarantees established for Cyprus under the 1960 settlement cannot be altered as this is a matter that affects the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean and the role of Turkey. Similar statements were made by the Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Basboug.¹⁴ Furthermore, Turkey has established a policy of harassing the research efforts for hydrocarbon resources in Cyprus's EEZ by the use of its naval forces which constitutes a violation of international law.

Despite the accession of Cyprus to the EU, Turkey's occupation forces remain in Cyprus. At present it is estimated that about 43,000 Turkish soldiers, a ratio of 3:1 in comparison with the national guard of the Republic of Cyprus, is stationed in the northern part of the Island.¹⁵

The composition of the Turkish military forces include mechanized and armored formations (296 tanks, 212 artillery guns, 677 armored infantry battle vehicles), which are deployed in a forward offensive formation against the free areas.¹⁶ These forces are meant to exercise strong psychological pressure against the Greek Cypriots in an effort to induce them to accept a solution to the Cyprus problem that would serve the strategic interests of Turkey.

As a result of its 1974 invasion, Turkey perpetuated serious war crimes against the Greek Cypriot people of Cyprus. Many such crimes regarding mistreatment and murder of civilians and

¹⁴ *Politis Newspaper*, 19 September 2008 (ref.code: 817037).

¹⁵ Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus 'The Cyprus Question, A Brief Introduction,' p.1.0., 372/2008,

<http://www.moi.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/All/1A907466A6F4C923C22575940024550F?OpenDocument>.

¹⁶ Letter dated 21 February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, 28 February 2007.

<http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/All/4FC90989378EAD00C225729000290986?OpenDocument>.

prisoners of war have gone unpunished.¹⁷

Turkey is also in violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention. Since 1974, Turkey has continued illegally and systematically to import Turkish settlers into Cyprus (115,000 by 2003¹⁸ and 160,000¹⁹ by 2008) with the clear intention of altering the island's demographic balance. As a result, the Turkish Cypriots (88,000)²⁰ have become a minority in the North. There are now *two* Turkish settlers for every *one* Turkish Cypriot.²¹ Turkey, with provocative statements and actions organises naval and air military exercises, and constantly harasses Cyprus government-sponsored oil and gas searches within Cyprus's EEZ, continues to challenge the sovereign rights of Cyprus – Montego Bay 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. Turkey also refuses to recognize that the islands have their own continental shelf and EEZ.

Turkey is systematically trying to force the Republic of Cyprus to stop its program of oil and gas exploration in the EEZ agreed with Egypt in the sea area south of Cyprus. Turkey also disputes Cyprus's sovereign rights over its air space and continuously violates the Nicosia FIR with military aircrafts which in turn poses a serious threat to civil aviation in the area.

Turkey conducts aeronautical military exercises in this area, notably the exercise codenamed *Sea-wolf*. In November 2008, Turkish warships harassed the activities of a Norwegian oceanographic vessel acting on behalf of the Republic of Cyprus in its EEZ. The latter, having no way to respond and protect its rights, had no other choice but to refer the incident to the UN. To no avail, however, and with Turkey occupying a seat on the Security Council, no remedy is expected.

Ahmet Davutoglu, the new Turkish foreign minister and architect of the “zero problem” theory of Turkish foreign policy, clearly suggests in his theory of Turkey's “strategic depth” that Turkey's benign attitude toward its regional neighbors, by the exercise of a “maximum cooperation” policy in order to bring economic benefits from regional peace, does not include the Republic of Cyprus since it affects Turkish vital interest.²²

¹⁷ European Commission of Human Rights Report, Cyprus Against Turkey (Adopted on 10 July 1976) <http://www.cyprus-dispute.org/materials/echr/index.html>; ‘Greek Cypriot Bodies Identified,’ *BBC*, 11 August 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8196106.stm>; Case of Varnava and Others v. Turkey, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4acc5ef12.pdf>.

¹⁸ Jaakko Laakso, ‘Colonization by Turkish Settlers of the Occupied Part of Cyprus,’ Report (Doc. 9799), 2 May 2003, Council of Europe Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography.

¹⁹ Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, ‘The Cyprus Question, A Brief Introduction,’ p.51, 372/2008, <http://www.moi.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/All/1A907466A6F4C923C22575940024550F?OpenDocument>.

²⁰ Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus, Demographic Report 2006, <http://www.pio.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/B34F2AC2C4546FDCC22573B1003325A9?OpenDocument>.

²¹ Van Coufoudakis, ‘Human Rights Violations in Cyprus by Turkey,’ Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, p.1.0 431/2008, <http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/25F252AA003F82A8C225759400246F88?OpenDocument>.

²² According to the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, Cyprus, because of its strategic location, should be among Turkey's main policies even if not a single Turk lived on the island. Ahmet Davutoglu, *Stratejik Derinlik, Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, Kiire Yayınlan, Istanbul, 2001, p. 179; Uslu Emrullah, ‘Ahmet Davutoglu: The Man behind Turkey's Assertive Foreign Policy,’ *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 6, No. 57, 25 March 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34754.

Greece

The Greek Cypriots (82% of the total population of Cyprus) waged an anti-colonial liberation struggle between 1956 – 1959 against British rule, with the purpose and willingness to unite the island with Greece. They were unsuccessful in the unification and the result of their struggle was the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus as an independent state in 1960. In fact, the nascent republic was imposed upon the people of Cyprus by granting a fettered independence and dysfunctional constitutional arrangements providing extraordinary veto powers to the Turkish Cypriots (18% of the population).

Greece, after the independence of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot rebellion in 1963 inspired and organized by Turkey, transferred military forces to Cyprus to protect the Greek Cypriots from Turkish aggression. These forces were withdrawn in 1967. In 1974, Greece during the dictatorship period, staged a coup in Cyprus on July 15, 1974, and overthrew the legal government of Archbishop Makarios. The illegal intervention lasted one week and just after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus on July 20, 1974, the dictatorship in Greece collapsed.

After the Turkish invasion and the continuation of the occupation of the northern part of the island, the Republic of Cyprus and Greece established defense cooperation in 1993 to discourage further expansionist intentions of Turkey.

Greece, in contrast to Turkey, has never defined itself as a regional actor. Nor has it had any recent imperial history to look back upon with nostalgia. Huge numbers of Greeks were expelled mainly from Turkey as well as other parts of the region. Greece's effort to absorb millions of such victims of ethnic cleansing plagues Greek social and economic order to this day. Today, Greece has neither the political will nor the motivation and mission to project any form of expansionism beyond its borders. Its commitments to the Cyprus issue are focused on helping the solution of the problem, rather than expanding its role in Cyprus. In this respect, Greece supports the suspending of the obsolete treaties of Guarantee and Alliance of 1960, as well as the intervention rights of the guarantors, namely Greece, Turkey and Britain. It's an attitude stressing the dedication of Greece to disengage itself from Cyprus in contrast to Turkey whose strategic interest is to control the island.

Britain

Britain also has an important role for the solution of the Cyprus problem, and the issue of local and regional security. The British intention is to secure and strengthen the regime governing the British bases, and to retain and even extend its control over Cyprus waters. In 2004, Britain insisted on an additional protocol to the Treaty of Establishment of 1960 that included the demarcation by *a single* British expert of sea zones that the Republic of Cyprus would not have been able to claim as part of its territorial waters.²³

The protocol also gave the UK the right to enjoy complete and unimpeded access for *any purpose* to the waters adjacent to the Sovereign Base Areas. Any dispute about the interpretation of this additional protocol would have been resolved by consultation, and would not have been referred to any international tribunal or third party for settlement.

²³Annex II Articles 6 and 7 of the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem ("the Annan Plan"), UN, 31 March 2004, Fifth Edition, <http://www.unficypr.org/>.

The British bases are a colonial remnant, and in some quarters of the British policy establishment, it is apparently felt that this may ultimately create problems. The Annan Plan, therefore, presented the opportunity to have secured the UK's legal rights over the territory by popular referendum. The UK even offered a large part of the British bases to Cyprus to urge implementation of the 2004 Annan Plan. Britain's 2004 offer should be seen in conjunction with efforts to secure the full demilitarization of Cyprus and the elimination of the island's role in the context of ESDP. Such British willingness to swap part of the territory of the bases for strengthening their legal status and expanding their claims over the sea space adjacent to the remaining base areas is consistent with a broader British strategic perspective. Following the end of WWII, Britain together with the US, helped craft for itself a particular strategic advantage in the Eastern Mediterranean. By giving Cyprus, then a British colony, control over a disproportionately large part of the air and sea space of the Eastern Mediterranean, it essentially ensured for itself the *de jure* air and sea dominance over the area. Cyprus's independence meant that this area now belonged to Cyprus. Cyprus's own military weakness and the presence of the British bases meant therefore that effectively this area remained under British strategic control.

Effective strategic control over the air and sea territory around Cyprus is perhaps the one unifying thread that runs through modern Cyprus history, from its independence struggle in the 1950s to the Greek coup and the Turkish invasion that followed in 1974, through the various phases of the negotiations to reach a settlement before as well as after Cyprus's accession to the EU.

At a first glance this would suggest both Britain and Turkey share an interest in keeping Cyprus weak and internally divided without any significant military and political role in Europe or in the region; its internal stability and survival dependent on the preservation of a precarious balance between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Turkish strategic interests over Cyprus and the Aegean on the other hand, are best served by a level of instability and tension which will enable Turkey to continue extending its firm control over Cyprus and the Greek islands of the Eastern Aegean. However, a demilitarized and politically weak Cyprus will not help the achieving stability of the region. Neither will it serve the interests of the EU and Western security

It is important to note that in the context of its own accession, the UK excluded its bases in Cyprus from the jurisdiction of the EU. The bases are therefore not part of EU territory and can be used exclusively for the interests of Britain, avoiding any EU-related responsibilities or constraints. Britain can, therefore, freely use the bases to support any of its allies in the context of NATO, especially the US. British actions can be explained in the context of efforts to sustain its role in the area of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, under a broader US strategic umbrella. The British bases constitute one of the three corners of the triangle that dominates the Eastern Mediterranean under such US umbrella, the other two being Israel and Turkey. The UK shares many of the US's interests in this sensitive area. The recent international developments, including energy security, large-scale terrorist action, Middle East instability, the Iraq and Afghan wars, and the Iranian nuclear development program, all argue for an increase in the importance of the bases. It is also clear that the UK is reluctant to share this role with other EU member states.

It is important to appreciate that unlike Turkey, Britain's interest in Cyprus and in the region involves the ability and potential to project power and does not include intentions of demographic alterations of the island.

Security and defense of Cyprus

Security is a fundamental factor in the existence and proper function of a state. It relates to the preservation of a state's independence and territorial integrity, the implementation of sovereign rights, the preservation of the freedom and security of its citizens, and the protection of its political, economic and cultural way of life.

To fulfil its security obligations, a state must possess adequate defense capabilities against military, economic, diplomatic and asymmetric threats. To secure such defense capabilities, a state must have reliable military forces and must participate in global security organizations and in political and military alliances. The possession of a credible defense capability provides deterrence and contributes to the promotion of peace and security.

Especially after the appearance of asymmetric threats, no country can defend itself alone against all types of threats, but especially the new types of threats that are more diverse, less visible and less predictable. An effective intelligence capability is an indispensable part of an adequate state defense.

The Republic of Cyprus faces serious security problems and threats that emanate from the aggressive and expansionist intentions of Turkey against Cyprus, as well as an increasingly volatile Middle East. Threats that include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organized crime are particularly difficult to deal with.

The Republic of Cyprus has limited defense capabilities, especially with regards to its airspace and territorial waters, which cover an extensive part of the Eastern Mediterranean. The military co-operation with Greece enhances the defense capabilities of the Republic of Cyprus, but not to the required level as far as military forces, strategic intelligence, and psychological and electronic warfare capabilities are concerned.

Because of the continuation of the occupation of Cyprus's northern part, Cyprus established a defense co-operation with Greece in 1993. The *Doctrine of Unified Defense Area* was declared between Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and President Glafkos Clerides with the purpose to discourage any expansionist intentions of Turkey against Cyprus. There was also a purpose of enhancing the deterrent capabilities of the Cyprus National Guard, especially in the sea and air area. The defense co-operation between the two countries was active throughout the period 1993-2000. The main effort was given to the joint aeronautical military exercises in the area between the Greek island of Kastellorizon and Cyprus where the EEZ's of the two states adjoins. This co-operation has been gradually degraded especially when the discussion for a solution of the Cyprus problem started under UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.

The EU umbrella provides the Republic of Cyprus with some degree of security on a strategic level, but the threats still exist because of the geographical position of Cyprus in the vicinity of the volatile area of the Middle East, and the Turkish expansionist policy against the island.

Today, Cyprus sovereignty is de facto split into four parts. The legitimate, internationally recognized government of the, Republic of Cyprus controls the free areas in the southern part of the island. Turkey controls the northern third of the island which its military occupies, the UN controls the buffer zone, while the UK claiming exclusive de jure authority over its extensive military bases (almost 100 square miles of the island).

To be effective, the new Cypriot state, which would be the result of a new settlement, must have a single national security strategy based on common national and state interests. The national security strategy of the new state should focus on the following objectives: the maintenance of the autonomy and power of the state; the protection of national interests; the defense against threats to the security and sovereignty of the state; as well as the preservation of peace, stability and security both in Cyprus and in the region that surrounds it.

To formulate such national security strategy, it is necessary for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to define common national interests for the Cyprus Republic and identify the probable threats against its security, both conventional and asymmetric. The new state must free itself of foreign guardianships and limitations to its sovereign rights. It must also avoid having any part of its sovereignty exercised by any other country.

The 1960 constitutional structure: invitation for abuse

The 1960 regime of international guaranties, based on the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance involving Britain, Greece and Turkey, proved to be a disaster for the Republic of Cyprus due to the fact that they were imposed on the Cypriots under duress. These were not the expression of the public will, and they violated the right of the Republic of Cyprus to freely exercise its independence and sovereignty, and fully enjoy the benefits of international law. The 1960 system of guaranties not only failed to protect the Republic of Cyprus, but was also used as leverage to forward the interests of the guarantors at the expense of those of the Republic of Cyprus. As a result, independence, territorial integrity, security and constitutional order of Cyprus were primarily violated by the guarantors themselves.

The dysfunctional 1960 Constitution offered its guarantors perfect opportunities for intervention. When in 1963 the president of the Republic proposed some amendments to facilitate the functioning of the state, the Turkish community, guided by Turkey, responded with rebellion. In December 1963, the Turkish Cypriot ministers withdrew from the cabinet and Turkish public servants left their posts. After 1963, the declared aim of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, acting on instructions from the Turkish Government, was the partitioning of Cyprus. On the Greek side, the coup that was staged in Cyprus on July 15, 1974, by the Greek military, then in power in Greece, and its Greek Cypriot collaborators briefly overthrew the government of President Makarios. Turkey used this criminal act as a pretext to launch an invasion on July 20 against the Republic of Cyprus. The invasion was carried out in two stages (July 20-22, and August 14-16) in which Turkish troops eventually occupied 36.2% of the island's territory. The invasion caused physical and economic devastation for the Greek Cypriots with about 5,000 Greek Cypriot casualties (killed and missing in action), 10,000 injured, and the entire northern third of the island ethnically cleansed with almost all Greek Cypriot presence wiped out.

Ankara tried to justify the invasion as a "peace operation" aimed at restoring the constitutional order disturbed by the coup, but even after the restoration of constitutional order with the assumption of power by the House President, Glafkos Clerides, on July 23, and the return of President Makarios to the island in December 1974, the Turkish troops remained. Turkey's plan to partition and colonize Cyprus came into full effect. About 200,000 Greek Cypriots, 70% of the population in the north, were forced to leave their homes in the occupied area and were turned into refugees. The few Greek Cypriots who remained in their homes after the completion of the invasion were gradually forced through intimidating methods to leave their homes and move to

the south.²⁴ By 2008, fewer than 500 enclaved Greek Cypriots have remained in the occupied areas, mainly in the Karpas area. Turkey continues with the occupation of 36.2% of Cyprus's territory, in utter disregard of repeated UN resolutions²⁵ calling for the respect of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as the withdrawal of all foreign troops from its territory, and the adoption of all practical measures to promote the effective implementation of the relevant resolutions.

This attitude of Turkey, as well as the continuing violation of the fundamental human rights of the people of Cyprus, has been condemned by international bodies, such as the UN General Assembly, the European Parliament, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth, and the Council of Europe. The declassified report of the Council's Commission of Human Rights reveals the extent of the atrocities committed by the Turkish forces of occupation.²⁶

Several rounds of inter-communal talks between the island's two main communities (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots) have not led to any positive development. To a great extent, the blame should be attributed to Turkey's intransigence and continuing efforts to partition the island by means of maintaining its occupation force and by the systematic colonization of the occupied part of Cyprus in violation of international law, including the Geneva Convention 1949. The systematic destruction of the demographic balance of the island, as well as the alteration of the historic and cultural heritage of the northern part of Cyprus under Turkish occupation are well documented by international observers.²⁷ Turkey has tried to create a separate Turkish Cypriot economy totally dependent on Turkey. Furthermore, in 1983, Turkey established the illegal regime of the "Turkish Republic of North Cyprus",²⁸ where Greek Cypriot properties were illegally appropriated.

Over the past 35 years, Turkey has both exploited and violated the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance of the 1960 settlement. The Treaty of Alliance provides for 650 Turkish soldiers to be stationed in Cyprus; the present number, as mentioned above, is approximately 43,000. Despite the fact that the treaties clearly provide for Turkey and the other two guarantors to preserve the independence, territorial integrity, security of the Republic of Cyprus, by interpreting article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee as giving it right to take unilateral military action in Cyprus, Turkey invaded and occupied the northern part of the island. This interpretation is inconsistent with article 53 of the UN Charter, according to which only the Security Council may authorize the use of military action, as well as with article 2(4) which prohibits the use or the threat of the use of force by states in their international relations.

²⁴Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 'The Cyprus Question, A Brief Introduction,' p.1.0., 372/2008, <http://www.moi.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/All/1A907466A6F4C923C22575940024550F?OpenDocument>.

²⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 353, 20 July 1974.

²⁶ Cyprus v. Turkey, Application No. 25781/94, European Court of Human Rights, 10 May 2001 <http://cmiskp.echr.coe>.

²⁷Jaakko Laakso, 'Colonisation by Turkish Settlers of the Occupied Part of Cyprus,' Report (Doc. 9799), 2 May 2003, Council of Europe Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, <http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc03/EDOC9799.htm>.

Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman Fine Arts Inc. 917F.2d 278, US Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, Decision of 24 October 1990, <http://www.uniset.ca/microstates/917F2d278.htm>.
Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus 'The Cyprus Question, A Brief Introduction,' p.1.0., 372/2008. <http://www.moi.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/All/1A907466A6F4C923C22575940024550F?OpenDocument>.

²⁸ UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983), 550 (1984).

As the 2004 Annan Plan revealed, Turkey's insistence on the preservation of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance of 1960 (and its self-asserted right to unilateral action) clearly reveals Turkey's strategic objective of military and political control of Cyprus.

This view is further supported by the fact that during the Annan Plan negotiations Turkey refused to accept any suggestion to make actions taken under the Treaty of Guarantee subject to approval by the Security Council of the UN. Today, Turkey supports the Annan Plan provisions for the security of Cyprus.

Cyprus accession to the EU

The application of such obsolete Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance cannot be justified after the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU. Cyprus would continue to be under the guardianship of three other states, two of which are members of the EU (UK and Greece), and the third (Turkey) outside of the EU. Incidentally, another unacceptable term included in the Annan Plan put limitations in Cyprus's participation in ESDP activities, to the extent of not affecting provisions of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance 1960.

In the case of the adoption of the Annan Plan, the intervention rights of the guarantor powers would have been enhanced to include not only the federal state, but also the component states.²⁹ The Republic of Cyprus would have been fully demilitarized, but Greece and Turkey would have maintained military contingents in Cyprus under their direct command without the federal government of Cyprus having any say. Despite the fact that defense policy was a competence of the federal government, there was an inability to exercise it because of the lack of military forces and any kind of coordinating staff as the Tripartite Headquarters and the Committee of Ministers provided by the Treaty of Alliance 1960 were to be abolished.

One thing that was made perfectly clear during the Annan Plan discussions was that the Turkish Cypriots, in all instances, supported the interests of the Turkish government over the interests of the united Cyprus state that was being created. One could assume that the reason was the pressure that the Turkish Cypriot community was being subjected to by the Turkish military stationed in Cyprus and the hundreds of thousands of Turkish settlers whose future hinged on the future role of Turkey in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots supported ceding Cyprus's sovereign rights to Turkey regarding maritime zones, continental shelf, navigation, aviation and coastal security, as well as in the area of ESDP and the availability of Cyprus's territory to support international operations.³⁰

With the benefit of hindsight, the results of the 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan are not surprising. The concessions necessary to obtain Turkish acceptance (many of these worked into the plan by the UN arbitrator during the last phases of the process), were sure to doom the plan with the Greek Cypriots.

The fact that EU accession went forward despite the failure of the Annan Plan is in my opinion the most important positive development in the history of the Cyprus problem. There is now finally a chance for both Turkish and Greek Cypriots to construct their common homeland under

²⁹Article 1, Annex III: Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Guarantee; the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem ("the Annan Plan"), UN, 31st March 2004, Fifth Edition, <http://www.unficy.org/>.

³⁰The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem ("the Annan Plan"), UN, 31 March 2004, Fifth Edition, <http://www.unficy.org/>.

the European political economic and ideological concepts that can guarantee security, democratic prosperity, peace and respect for human rights. One would also believe that Turkish accession would create a positive dynamic for the resolution of the Cyprus dispute. Yet one would be mistaken. Turkey's ability to circumvent rules and requirements in its own accession process, aided and abetted of course by particular members of the EU and the United States of America, has meant that this important chance of fairly and honorably resolving the Cyprus problem is also likely to be lost.

Demilitarization

In this context, it becomes necessary also to address *demilitarization*, an issue that features quite prominently in the current negotiations. Today, all EU countries, including the island of Malta, which is smaller than Cyprus, have their own military forces. Military forces are indispensable for the effective protection of a state from threats against its security. They are a country's main instrument to exercise its sovereign rights on land, sea and air, and protect its national interests. In the case that we reach an agreement for the settlement of the Cyprus problem, it is necessary to proceed with the full withdrawal of all foreign military forces stationed on Cyprus's territory. It is essential, however, that the Cypriot state should retain the right to develop its own military forces.

The full demilitarization of Cyprus, in the sense of a ban on Cyprus forces, cannot be justified. The self-defense right is an inherent right of any state. It is secured by article 51 of the UN Charter with the purpose of contributing to peace and security. Cyprus's geographical position is of great geopolitical importance. In the case of a crisis, the demilitarization will easily be violated by other countries. Cyprus is located close to the Middle East, at the most sensitive part of the EU's boundaries where threats could emerge against the security of the EU. Cyprus must be able to contribute to European security, including energy security. Without having military forces, Cyprus will not be able to exercise its sovereign rights and will be unable to fully participate in ESDP. A ban on Cyprus forces would, of course, benefit Turkey. Turkey, because of its location near Cyprus, could easily intervene on and around Cyprus without any resistance. Britain too would benefit. Its military bases are not part of the Cypriot state and, therefore, not subject to demilitarization, would be able to take continued full advantage of the island's geographical position. In my opinion, a demilitarized Cyprus in the long-term will be against the strategic interests of Cyprus, but also the EU and the West, because it will be a source of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Due to its geographical position and its own resources, Cyprus could contribute to the new European Security Strategy (ESS)³¹ and help Europe face its global challenges such as migration, depletion of energy and natural resources, third-world poverty, disease, regional conflicts, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, state failures and organized crime.

Europe shares the responsibility of ensuring global security. Cyprus can assist the EU in its strategic task to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the east of the EU, and on the borders of the Mediterranean.³² Cyprus's geographical position and its infrastructure could support a broad scope of surveillance and other activities in the Middle East. It could provide the EU with a secure base to support operations and control sensitive energy supply routes and take

³¹European Security Strategy, 8 December 2003, Council of Europe, Brussels, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu>.

³²European Security Strategy, 8 December 2003, Council of Europe, Brussels, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu>.

precaution measures to face asymmetric threats such as terrorism, illegal immigration etc.

Security recommendations

Based on the analysis of the Cyprus security environment and taking into account the experience of the discussions for the Annan Plan, my security recommendations move along *two axes*.

The *first axis* addresses the necessity to secure the independence, autonomy and territorial integrity of the new state. This could be accomplished by suspending the obsolete Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance of 1960, and therefore suspending the intervention rights of foreign countries. The withdrawal of foreign military forces from Cyprus as well as the illegal settlers is also an important requirement. No sovereign rights of Cyprus should be ceded to any other country, especially over sea or airspace, as occurred with the Annan Plan. Also, there must be no limitations to the participation of Cyprus in the ESDP, or in the use of its territory for international military operations.

My *second axis* refers to the establishment of a new security system capable of protecting the national interests of Cyprus and efficiently facing the conventional or asymmetric threats against its security, and the security of EU. It is paramount that the new state maintains its own military forces, that it is fully integrated in ESDP and that it participates in alliances and organizations of collective security.

A small country like Cyprus, being in an area of great geostrategic importance in the vicinity of the Middle East, will be in danger of conventional and asymmetric threats and will not be able to exercise its sovereign rights without having its own military forces. Cyprus's military forces could be organized on a professional basis including Greek- and Turkish Cypriots. Cyprus needs a small but modern and capable army to accomplish the security demands of both the state and the EU. An indicative armed forces organization of the Republic of Cyprus, upon the solution of the Cyprus issue is shown in Annex A.

At this point I deem necessary to make a clarification which, in my opinion, is of crucial importance. Namely, that the creation of a successful military organization presupposes that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots share the same values and national interests. The spirit of *confidence* must be allowed to prevail among the members of the military organization, who should be free from the dependence and influence of foreign nations. However, as things stand at present, Cypriots have not shown an inclination to build such a positive environment in order to build a viable and effective military organization in the context of a common state. Nevertheless, if the two sides are unable to build and operate a joint security force protecting the common national interest of the people of Cyprus, it becomes questionable whether the two sides can build a common state.

Despite being a full EU member state, Cyprus has not yet been fully incorporated into the security system of the EU. This presupposes Cyprus becoming a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace program (PfP) and concluding a bilateral security agreement with NATO. Today, Cyprus is the only EU member state that is not a member of NATO or the PfP. For this reason, Cyprus cannot fully participate in ESDP activities and is subject to important restrictions. According to the EU declaration of the Council meeting in Copenhagen on December 12, 2002, and the security agreement of information between the EU and NATO (March 2003), Cyprus is not able to take part in EU military operations conducted using NATO assets – operations known as "Berlin Plus". Cyprus is also unable to participate in EU and NATO consultations on security matters. In

addition, Cyprus may not receive classified NATO information. As such, Cyprus should seriously examine upon the solution of the Cyprus problem the proposition of applying for NATO membership. The EU regards NATO as the basic pillar for its members' collective defense.

My recommendations on the security issue are therefore based on three basic arguments. *First*, such recommendations and indeed the right to self-defense are fully consistent with international law. *Second*, such recommendations do not only favor the Greek Cypriot side. On the contrary, the intention is to secure the autonomy and the sovereign rights of Cyprus for the benefit of both communities. *Third*, such recommendations take into account the geopolitical environment of Cyprus and the demand to fully participate in security systems of Western countries. These recommendations support Cyprus's national interests and strengthen the geopolitical importance of the island for the benefit of the interests of both Cyprus and the West. In addition, these recommendations contribute to the strengthening of the new EU Security Strategy that focuses on asymmetric threats and promotes a ring of well-governed countries to the east of the EU and along the Mediterranean rim. A solution to the Cyprus issue based on a security system which provides for the independence and autonomy of Cyprus will contribute to its long term stability which will be for the benefit of the island, the EU and Western security in particular.

The negotiations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots for the solution of the Cyprus problem are again under way. Based on the public statements, it is clear that the Turkish side insists on retaining the 1960 security system which keeps Cyprus under the guardianship of the guarantor powers. This is not acceptable by the Greek Cypriot side since it violates the independence and the sovereign rights of Cyprus. It is therefore necessary that the Turkish side revises its position with the purpose of reaching a viable solution to secure the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus. We need a security system to support the national interests of Cyprus and the EU, as well as to contribute to the stability, peace and security of the Eastern Mediterranean region and worldwide.

The role of Cyprus in regional security

Cyprus is a small country in an area of great strategic importance involving the international security and energy needs of the Western countries. Despite the fact that it is now a member of the EU, Cyprus unfortunately is faced with serious security problems as Turkey continues to occupy the northern part of the island with a large military force. Over the last 35 years, Turkey has systematically imported more than 160,000 settlers in violation of international obligations, such as the Geneva Convention of 1949 and Security Council resolutions, specifically UNSC Resolution 353/1974.

The 1960 Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee are no longer compatible with a fair and viable solution to the Cyprus problem. The people of Cyprus do not have confidence in the guarantor powers because they have not fulfilled their obligations under the Treaties. Instead of protecting Cyprus, they have used the treaties as a pretext to secure their own national interests at the expense of the island, and they have proved to be dangerous for the Republic of Cyprus. The 1974 coup and the resulting invasion, occupation and colonization of the northern part of the island are the result of actions taken by the guarantor powers.

Any new settlement of the Cyprus problem should therefore do away with any and all intervention rights of foreign countries, and should ensure the withdrawal of foreign military

forces and illegal settlers. The security system, under any new settlement, must preserve the independence of Cyprus by protecting its national interests and securing its sovereignty. This system should provide for effective Cypriot military forces that will be able to participate in EU-sponsored security activities. Cyprus should certainly participate in the PfP, and should seriously consider applying for full NATO membership upon the solution of the problem.

Cyprus's geographical position and its infrastructure could support the implementation of the new European Union Security Strategy (ESS).³³ This support could be enhanced with the contribution of Cyprus's military forces. A fully demilitarized Cyprus will be incapable to perform such tasks. The EU, in the context of its new EES established three strategic objectives in 2003 to defend its security and to promote its values, namely:

1. Active involvement of the EU in tackling new key threats, which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable. These threats include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime.
2. Building security in the regions surrounding the EU by promoting a ring of well governed countries to the east of the EU and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom the EU can enjoy close relations and cooperation.
3. Strengthening of the international order based on effective multilateralism.

The adoption of a security system in Cyprus that supports the national interests of Cyprus and provides for Cyprus's inclusion in the EU security system will contribute to the maintenance of peace, stability and security in the area of the Eastern Mediterranean. The implementation of this proposal, however, challenges Turkey's strategic objectives (established in the 1950s) to have military and political control over the whole island. To accomplish its objectives, Turkey wants to secure the continuation of the treaties of Guarantee and Alliance of 1960 that grant intervention rights and permit Turkey to maintain military forces in Cyprus. Turkey wants to be able to continue its colonization efforts by transferring more Turkish settlers to the island. Being able to effectively control the Turkish Cypriots and induce them to support the national interests of Turkey at the expense of Cyprus is an essential factor in Turkey's ability to achieve its standing objectives. The demilitarization of Cyprus and the limitations on its sovereignty on the sea and in the air are also essential for Turkey. Greece is most likely to accept the suspension of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance of 1960 while Britain's position is unclear.

It is clear that it will be impossible for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to reach a settlement and find a viable solution that would secure the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus if Turkey insists on its strategic objectives. Even if the two communities were to reach an agreement at the negotiations for all other chapters with the exception of security, the whole agreement package would still collapse with negative consequences for the people of Cyprus, and for the stability and security of the region.

³³European Security Strategy, 8 December 2003, Council of Europe, Brussels, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu>.

Conclusion

A viable solution must secure a common future for all Cypriots within the EU, without any third party having the right to intervene and affect its future. If we secure these requirements, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots could define common national interests, which constitute the basis for a common security strategy. These interests should include independence, territorial integrity and full sovereignty over land, sea and air. The new state must be able to protect itself and the lives and welfare of its citizens. It must be able to ensure the application of human rights and safeguard basic freedoms, including economic prosperity and stability for its entire people. If we fail to get rid of the third parties, Cyprus will not be able to solve its security problem, nor will it find a viable solution, and thus will remain a divided island and an area of foreign antagonism. This goes against the interests of Cyprus as well as all Western countries.

The main obstacle to reaching a comprehensive agreement to the security problem of Cyprus is Turkey's strategic interest in controlling the island. To overcome this obstacle, it is necessary to have a more active intervention by both the UN and the EU to ensure that Turkey complies with the fundamental provisions of international law. As things stand at present, the difficulties in reaching an agreement on the security chapter rests on the inability of Cyprus to establish a common security strategy acceptable to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. A common security strategy presupposes the adoption of common national interests and a common perception of the conditions that threaten such interests. Demilitarization of Cyprus only benefits Turkey. It will increase Turkey's regional importance at the expense of Cyprus's strategic space. The demilitarization would neither be in the interest of the EU and Western security because the security vacuum on the island would create instability in an already sensitive area of the Eastern Mediterranean. As long as Turkish Cypriots' support the national interests of Turkey at the expense of those of their own country, it is impossible to establish a common Greek and Turkish Cypriot security for Cyprus, and therefore impossible to reach an agreement on the security chapter and find a viable solution to the Cyprus problem.

Turkey is not only a threat to Cyprus security. A neo-Ottoman Turkey with hegemonic and revisionist aspirations is not only a threat to the region but to Western security as well. There have been great efforts lately to present Turkey as a modern democratic state that is, and will continue to be, a force of stability. Turkey's new "zero problem" foreign policy and its carefully crafted image as a regional peace maker seriously misses the real potential of neo-Ottomanism, as it misreads the true nature and legacy of Turkish Ottoman history: A history of cultural, religious and ethnic oppression, economic exploitation and a total disregard of those humanitarian concepts and democratic freedoms that form the basis of Western liberal civilization. In fact, a closer examination of the "zero problem" and Turkish policy suggests a benign attitude toward neighboring states provided they bow to Turkish hegemony. Cyprus is a victim of this strategy. For those former Turkish subjects in the region with any remnant of historical memory, boasts of a benign golden age of Ottoman regional hegemony sounds completely absurd.

I conclude by stating: that security is a prerequisite to peace, freedom and democracy. The long term stability of the region depends on the application of this principle in equal measure to Cyprus as to all the states of the region.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION*

Ali Biniaz**

8 December 2009

Iran and European Geopolitics of Energy

When seeking to address this topic, it is firstly necessary to determine what the relationship is between energy security and foreign policy. In addition to this, it is important to identify how and when the issue of energy became a high priority on the foreign policy agenda. The classic theory is that it has been incorporated fairly recently and probably at some stage during the 1990s.

The second issue addresses how we understand energy security in the context of the bipolar world, different from that in the quadripolar world. After the fall of the Berlin Wall it seemed that we then had a unipolar world, but in terms of energy it was bipolar. And that has been changed to a quadripolar world. It is important therefore to take note of this changing dynamic.

The third issue examines the relationship between the free markets and geopolitics as far as energy is concerned during the 1990s and 2000s.

The fourth issue focuses on what the implications are of these developments as far as Iran's energy diplomacy is concerned vis-à-vis the Europeans.

When determining the relationship between energy security and foreign policy it is important to look firstly at the events occurring promptly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. One such event was a tide of democratization in the world and the second was the attractiveness of the free market norms because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the central planning way of thinking about the economy.

In terms of energy security, the consequence of these two phenomena was thinking of energy security in a bipolar world consisting of the US and the EU because it was unipolar in the sense that the US was the hegemon of the whole world and therefore everybody was looking to mimic their norms and standards. The two big players in the world at that time, as far as energy was concerned, were the EU and the US. They were making plans as to how to use the energy, how to securitize that matter and how to actually bring about security in the long term perspective.

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

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Thinking this way, it would be accurate to conclude that even though energy security was a latent element in the foreign policy of the EU and the US and therefore not particularly visible.

It can also be seen that between the US and EU there is a division of labor in energy security. Evidence of this division can be found in the report produced by the International Crisis Group in 2007. It states that “the EU was in practice increasingly beholden to the US’s hard security power in places such as the Middle East and Central Asia being deployed to safeguard the interests of the market-democracy West as a whole”.

When analyzing this passage two critical phrases can be identified. The first is “hard security” which is provided by the US, and the second is “the interests of market democracy”, and these phrases serve as our key reference points. From this report we can determine that the US and the EU are divided in their specialty and their labor based on their comparative advantages. One is taking care of the security and other is taking care of the free market norms, and extension of the free market norms to the neighboring countries and where producer states are located.

If one were to examine closely the role of the US, it can be seen that they are in charge of “regions and empire”, which represents a geopolitical dimension, and they also have a responsibility as a guarantor of last resort for international security.

In comparison, the role of the EU is to be in charge of the “markets and institution” approach. It is sometimes referred to as a liberal superpower, sometimes a normative power, sometimes geopolitical imperialism, civilian power or even regulatory imperialism. These terms all represent the labors of the EU as far as energy security is concerned. This demonstrates that despite the use of words such as imperialism and geopolitics, it is equally as accurately described as normative which indicates that it is a soft power.

Having determined these categories it is now necessary to determine why this division of labor occurred. This can firstly be attributed to the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is also due in part to the revolution in information technology and other related industries such as bio-technologies and nano-technologies, meaning that there were a lot of new developments in the world. The fact that there was a new wave of globalization is also has a role in the purpose of division.

The principle that should be applied here is that of economic comparative advantage, looking at the ability of each side to take care of a sufficient part of the issue and finally their self-interest, which is the driving force behind this.

If one should approach an analysis of the energy security of the EU, firstly it is necessary to look at the grand strategy of the US in order to develop a picture of the background as they were also part of this issue. The US grand strategy focuses on the division of labor globally on the basis of the principle of comparative economic advantage. A valuable account of this issue was provided by Thomas Barnett in his book entitled “The Pentagon New Map”, which was published in 2005. This leads us to the question of what having a comparative economic advantage is. Well, this manifests itself in having a world currency reserve medium such as the dollar, which allows for leverage. This also embodies having the best army in the world and the most efficient economic system in the world. This in turn leads to having the strongest and biggest financial center of the world. These are all extremely valuable factors to possess. With all of these advantages, however, it is necessary to finance security.

The next issue is that you must have a global transaction. On one hand you can have goods manufactured elsewhere in the world and on the other hand it is possible to produce and supply security to them. So these are the reasons why the US was acting as the supporter and promoter of security for the world.

When looking at a map of the world in relation to globalization, this can be divided into two parts. Firstly, there is the center which we call “the Core”, then the rest we call “the non-integrated Gap” Within the Core the US had a large number of military responses but beyond the non-intergraded Gap the issues were minimal. So they were looking at shrinking the Gap and taking over the Core. This creates a new Core and an old Core. Within the old Core there is Western Europe and within the new Core there is Russia, China, India and a number of others. This was very integral to the energy security.

I will now go on to describe the world’s four flows that are relevant to this issue. These are energy, people, capital and security. When looking at the flow of people, currently there are 6.78 billion people in the world and by 2050 this figure will have risen to 9 billion. Upon analyzing the distribution, we can see that 2 billion of these will be within the ages of 0-15 (A), 2 billion will be over 65 (B) and 5 billion will be between the ages 15-64 (C). This means that in order to determine the support issue the number of people in group C should be divided by A plus B, therefore determining those people who can work, and dividing the figure between those who cannot.

This provides a very meaningful interpretation. In developed countries the support ratio would currently be represented as 5 over 1, meaning that 5% of the population can support 1%. In 2050 there will be only 2% supporting 1% which illustrates a very sharp decrease. In less developed countries there is currently 10% of the population to support 1% and this figure will remain the same even in 2050. This clearly illustrates that it is necessary to have a flow of people moving from developing countries to the developed countries.

Secondly, we must address the flow of energy. All of the regions of the world that have supplies of energy are located in the non-integrated gap so the supplies have to be exported from the non-integrated gap to the Core. The implications of this is that China and India may have political rivalry with other countries that have energy, so this is a pretext for the US to move forward, put these countries aside and prompt them to use their defense budget.

This situation presents itself as a transaction, and the US can therefore export goods to the rising powers, such as China and India, in a way that means they don’t need to have rivalry in areas where there is energy. When addressing the above transaction, China is a country which is a good producer of global goods which can be exported to the US. India, however, is in a good position for information technology, and so they can export these I.T goods and in exchange the US will support security. So this is an illustration of a logical transaction.

The third flow is of capital. Capital clearly moves between the old and the new Core, and not from the non-integrated Gap to the Core or vice versa. So the capital goes from the old to the new as they want it to keep flourishing and that’s why countries which have energy do not have sufficient amounts to invest in the energy infrastructure as is needed. This subsequently means that the new Core remains capital dependent on the old Core.

However, Asia has identified many problems with this US strategic view, the first being the existence of strong states such as China who prevent the development of private markets. It is necessary to have weaker states throughout the world, and to export democracy and free market

norms. The new thinking is different from classic thinking as in the classic model you have to counter-balance powerful states however in the new thinking, you think of bad bargaining and exporting free market norms to weaker states so the weaker states cannot do anything. Therefore the existence of the stronger states, from the US strategic view point, is something bad.

An additional problem with this concept is that there exists unfair legal treatment amongst all the market players. Concision is given to domestic producers which is unreasonable as it is necessary to have consistent levels of fairness applicable to whoever may undertake the activity.

The final issue is the existence of chronic crisis stricken spots such as Afghanistan and Iraq which must be dealt with. The US rationale for their strategy however, is that the US military presence will reduce the defense budget allocations and will also help the regions to grow more economically.

Looking at the US security strategy in detail, it has many aims. Firstly, to strengthen the security at the Core and help markets to expand. Secondly, to shrink the current gap by controlling it, and pre-empting military action if necessary. Thirdly, by protecting the gap against potential threats of terrorism, and the spread of disease, and lastly, to export US security to the crisis-stricken spots of the world.

Having looked in detail at security provision by the US, it is now necessary to once again address the EU. When looking at the markets versus geopolitics debate in the context of energy security, there are a number of indicators available which demonstrate that the markets are working better. This belief is based partially on historical facts in relation to how the markets have flourished and extended over the years and are ultimately working better.

Then it is necessary to look at the markets interpretation. It can be seen that prices are going up but this is not a cause for concern as it can be attributed to the catch up process. This dynamic means that during the 1990s the prices were low, investments in oil and gas were low, and because of these factors the supplies were reducing. But by the time the demand increases there is a misbalance between supply and demand. It is necessary to have international co-ordination mechanisms which mean you must have good governance, multi-lateral institutions and cooperation but then there are conditions attached to this. Competition must be encouraged by the markets whilst also considering future investments.

Historically we have had growing international markets vis-à-vis oligopolistic markets since the oil crisis in the 1970s. There was the expansion of commodity and financial markets, including oil which is now more susceptible to market dynamics. A connected set of commodity markets developed where competition is the rule and the economy is very effective. The imbalance of power between the states works very unfavorably for the smaller exporting states so that they are left behind and end up shrinking further so that they are no longer able to support themselves in their own right. So these are the developments which happened in favor of functionality.

There is a lot to be gained from the power of market interpretation and as I have previously stated, after 2003 the oil prices rose as part of the catching up phenomenon and there was an oil peak mistake as people estimated that it would peak around the year 2000, however we still haven't yet reached the peak. Due to these miscalculations, there was ignorance to the fact that when prices rise there is also an increase in the cost of further explorations and advances. At the end of the peak there comes a sustainable plateau of oil production. Future prices will be less stable but the key point here is that you have to temper the natural ebb and flow of the market

adjustments. These are a few of the things that we can discover from the functionality of markets so why should we be concerned with geopolitics. The implications of these above factors are that we should not be concerned with the dependence on imports and instead concentrate our efforts on market extending policies. This is therefore the way that practices were developing in the 1990s and into 2000.

Under the feasibility argument we discussed how the US is the guarantor of the last resort. The international coordination is centered on market-based solutions from these treaties in which the comparative advantage of the EU is located, international good governance standards, multilateral institutions and cooperation.

Previously the issues surrounding bipolar and unipolar structures were discussed. One is acting unilaterally so the US is acting unilaterally. When assessing the mechanism of the business of the US with war, the US was focusing on FTAs,¹ while Europe didn't. This means that you think unilaterally, and you join people and join countries who are thinking favorably about you. So you build up as many FTA's as you can.

The EU is a multilateral institution. Thinking about the model of a central institution building, you try to join people and think multilaterally. This demonstrates the division of labor between the unilateral way of thinking and multilateral thinking and both of them will constitute a world of bipolar. This was the way of thinking during the late 1990s. But then the stories changing and that's the new thing that is happening and that's why we have to take care of energy security.

Then you have the political challenge if one is going to be a promoter of the free market, so there is a requirement to encourage competition without discouraging investment in infrastructures and productive capacities. Here the role of the oil and gas multinational companies is important because they are the corrector of the capacity, they have to have the job done very well otherwise they would be in trouble with this way of thinking.

The market then lost the game to the geopolitics of energy because the US withdrew from the European energy game. This was due to the occupation of the US in wars such as Afghanistan and Iraq, so they could not focus their attentions elsewhere.

This quadripolar world of energy consist of the US, the EU, Asia and the Middle East. The core of the mistake is exactly here because they did not think of the Middle East and big players of the game like Iran were in the early designation of the game. This was the source of the problems that have occurred recently. We didn't take care of Asia either. The energy that you have is located in the non-integrated countries. If you are going to help them it is in such a way that they gain access to the energy and grow further but then you do not have sufficient resources of oil and gas left in the world for you. And if you prevent them from accessing and gaining energy then this will present a number of conflicts in the future. So the energy poverty is something that puts a state in a challenging position. This is because all of the issues are not adopted together but instead addressed separately. However by taking this approach, gradually the other issues appear and cause problems.

The multi-national companies were being handicapped because there were no longer any resources available to them accept in the case of Iran because they tried to have access into the

¹ Free Trade Agreements.

Iranian markets but the mechanism of contracts was such that no access to the reserves were given to them. That's why they say that Iran is a Greenfield.

In future there will be a growing concentration of oil and gas producing states as for example you have Russia, Afghanistan and Iran, therefore half of the oil reserves of the world are allocated to these countries. This means that there are no free market norms dominating the oil and gas market in the future because with a small number of the players it is like an oligopolistic game not a free market game. These are the challenges. Then there is the politicization of energy and the mismatch between producers and the consumer's expectations.

If you want to explain about the energy politicization, it is a very critical element that must be considered and in order to do so we must address the question of how the EU is an international energy actor. The EU was wrong in its conceptualization of this issue as firstly experts say that oil and democracy do not appear to mix. More importantly, it is said that the first law of petro-politics is that the price of oil and the pace of freedom always move in the opposite direction in oil rich petrolist states.

I shall address something at this point which is quite to the contrary. Ok, say those in OPEC, countries are contending high prices, but why? It is because of the political liberalization. Because of that they ask for higher prices and from the other side they say that the first law of petro-politics is that the price of oil and the pace of freedom move in the opposite direction. One of the implications of this first law of petro-politics is that the price of oil is brought down, in such a way that you can free these countries from dictatorship. This way of thinking does not provide energy security in the long run. And you can do your business; you can topple down a number of regimes, big ones. But they're not the same, at the end of the day you're not having the stability in the long run or the security. Long run security has a triangle. That's food, water and energy. In a long run perspective we meant that time when we did not have any distortion. All the distortions occur in the short run; therefore this way of thinking is not going to help.

Another proposition is that with energy prices rising and supplies dwindling, the tide of democratization seems to have met a match in the black tide of petrol authoritarianism. So we are setting a very bad example to the people, to the allies, people who are thinkers, the youngsters of these countries, and saying please try to topple down the regimes because that would be authoritarianism, that would not be democracy. This is the way you look at it and the way the arguments go on.

The autocratic regimes in producer states increasingly subsidize domestic fuel prices to shore up their own legitimacy. This is another conventional way of thinking. But if you think carefully, in countries like Iran as far as I know, there is no relationship between the legitimacy of the government and rising of the fuel prices. You know, Iran is a large country as a civilization. When we say civilization, we think of history. It's not history, it's a current status. If you have a big civilization you have the elements of emotion, the elements of value and the elements of wisdom, all incorporated in the same place and your people think in that way. So they think civilly. They have objections. They come to the street and say this is not true, this is true, these are the functions of civilization. Not many countries learnt how to run their bureaucracy, how to insulate their bureaucracy from outside pressures and how to embed sufficiently good norms into their bureaucracy. And that is a source of concern. You have a strong civilization but you do not have a bureaucracy which is suitable for your agenda.

But then it would appear that there is a legitimacy problem. There is around here a state with all those conventional things. I do not challenge them at explaining something. So they explain A cause B, this causes C, but then at the same time there are other considerations. So you have to have a full picture of the whole story so you are not conducted to the wrong way.

And the second thing is that there was insincerity with the EU in supporting democracy. For instance, a cloak for pursuing oil interests. The Milosevic overthrow in the 1990s, people say that it was because of the pipeline reaching from Russia to the west of Europe, so that was the reason. It's their way of thinking. You can challenge it but at the same time you have a pattern which is compatible with other things. You do not have something that is odd with other evidences. So for instance, it is possible to look at peace deal in Sudan. Some people say that's because of oil being bought from the south. People say that the removal of the Taliban. People say pro-democracy policies in the Middle East, that's because of oil and that's because of gas. So this in a long way of thinking is kind of insecure.

The third factor is EU's soft politics against producer states, for instance we have new oil wars vs. the old oil wars. It was a competition and it was a fight against superpowers of the time over energy resources of one country or region. So what are the new oil wars? It involves countries that are in a dominant position like the EU going to producer states and negotiating talking or fighting with them over the resources that they have. This way of thinking is not however going to produce security. And a state building agenda, they are just promoting state building. Then you have the counterbalancing which was the old way of thinking and bandwagoning arguments, which is the new way.

Now I come down the road to the energy game that was supposed to explain about it. And focus on the theoretical challenges and theoretical perspectives. Then you think of the European energy game in the sense of the issue of the 1990s. What are the characteristics? US provider of security and pipeline designers. We have Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeliene (BTC), later on we had Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Pipeline (BTE) and then the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP).² They were designed in such a way that provides the issues and stories of the 1990s. So they were supposed to be produced to transport the oil and gas created in central Asia after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Then the EU was a free market actor and norm promoter in a globalized world. So I say, ok, I am going to extend my internal market to your market, so in such a way that we take likewise and you produce oil and gas and I give you the money or other things or the support that you need. Russia at that time was a fair player, a fair producer and a fair transit country, and we had a number of networks coming from Russia and the former Soviet Union to the West, so it was in a good position. Ok, we honor your right, you are there, and you should be there, there is no problem with that. Turkey is a natural energy hub because it is located in the part of the world which has access to central Asia and to Russia so we have to honor that right.

Central Asia is a producer, so that's ok. The only player that should be out of the game is Iran. While Iran is a good producer and a good transit country, it is located in a crossover where countries have access to the oil and gas. Then we do not consider you, we ignore your natural right and put you aside. And that was the game in the 1990s.

Then, what happened in 2000? There was a reversal. In 2000 the US withdrew due to its

² Trans-Caspian Pipeline

engagement in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. And we had China and India's rise. We had the geo-politic way in the energy common free market. And we have energy politicization as I have already mentioned. A very important factor is Russia's assertiveness. Look, if you see I'm Russia, I see that there is some delicious stuff here - its Iran. It is put aside. And then there is a country that is Turkey here in a shaky position. So I use my power to bring security for me and to take advantage of it. So there you have the Russian assertiveness. And then by the time the other players in the EU are thinking, like Germany and others, they realize that the previous game is not working. Without in a latent way and without mentioning in a demonstrative way they try to change their position. So we have the Nord Stream pipeline coming directly from Russia through the sea and into Germany. So that is not on the basis of the EU as such.

You therefore have a reversal of the game that started with the Russian assertiveness and was followed on by other countries like Germany. Then Turkey started to change the game. Look at the equilibrium. You have the equilibrium of the game. If that equilibrium is going to be sustained then you have to have honored the natural right of each player. Once you do not honor the natural right of each player then an incentive is provided for deviation from the equilibrium. That deviation started by Russia was followed by Germany and other places and very recently by Turkey. So Turkey tried to diversify in foreign parts. Turkey recently could be considered united with the EU as it has been nominated for EU membership. It could be incidentally united with the US. It could be considered united with Israel and it could be united with Iran. So it demonstrates a diversification of foreign policy thinking and puts you in a much more difficult position compared to before.

Then, what will be the implication of these things? Early in the 1990s you had a coordination game. You had two equilibrium, one is coordinated and one which is not. This game has been changed to have a low equilibrium and high equilibrium. Once they will not coordinate then you are forced to take place in low equilibrium. And in low equilibrium you are in a sub-optimum position, not in an optimum position. So this is the game which is in Europe.

Then, what will be the role of Iran? Iran constantly, under the coordination game of the 1990s, or the incipient prisoners dilemma game Iran is a residual player then you have to decide after the other players have decided. They maximize their benefit and you can take advantage of whatever is left. This is the meaning of a residual player. So in this context what should Iran do?

If I was Iran, I would prioritize the gas resources oil enhanced recovery. You know that the functioning of the oil bells, sometimes the pressure comes down and then you have to enhance that pressure by an injection of gas. And the structure of "oil mountains" of Iran would be such that it is more beneficial if you inject gas. If you inject gas, then the gas would be reserved there. You can take advantage of that in the future when the prices go up with the rising trends. So there should be no hesitation about being ignored from the roots, because gas can be injected which will enhance the recovery of oil, the oil can be sold at high prices and gas can be reserved for future use.

The second priority is to build up a regional processing center as you are located in a crossroad so the best thing to do is focus on the processing because we have good technical ability and good engineering. So those engineers and that legacy of the past probably gives you a good position in terms of building up a processing center.

Then the third one is to focus on LNG production. Even Cyprus can take advantage of that. You know you are a small country, you are allocated by the sea, so you are in a good position to build LNG terminals, and you are in a good position because you are part of the EU, so you probably have to have good lobbying power. So you can close up the conflict between Iran and the EU and the US and take advantage of that and make business with them. So it needs to allow for LNG facilities.

And then the fourth priority would be to follow the crossroad rule. It means that you have to eliminate the rivalry in your country. Releasable gas must be allocated and not the gas that you have. It is necessary to take care of individual priorities and if there is anything left then it must be allocated equally to the west and the east to reduce assertiveness against you. Europe is a player which needs gas or LNG in future so I am going to release to you half of my releasable reserves of gas. Then they will either be a direct partner of mine or they may stay away in a non-reconcilable position. They will not be taking care of it and if that is the case then I will divide that allocation into half and give half of it to Russia in order to take care of you and the other half for Turkey to take care of. There is then an incentive for them to use it rather than export it. Then I release half of my gas to you because you are a consumer and I am not going to ignore you. Then I will allocate half of it to the Eastern country, and to the East of my country there are two big players, China and India. So I will separate India from Pakistan and put China and Pakistan in the same axes and provide them with one source of releasable natural gas. Then the other half would be for the India and Asian axes and that would be in LNG form because they do not have common territorial borders with me.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATION*

Andrew Lambert**

8 December 2009

The Enduring Psychology of Warfare

I want to start with talking about the psychology of warfare. And I should say that was my subject for my Master of Philosophy degree at Cambridge. I then want to move on and take the lessons that I think come out of this physical lecture through to coercion, which I say is a modern paradigm of war. Of course, anything I may say does not reflect Her Majesty's Government opinion in the slightest. So that's basically the structure of what I'm going to do. I will aim to have a fifteen-minute break between the two and then if we can leave the questions please to the end, and then we can have a discussion about psychology and interstate relations as one complete access point.

I have to say this is probably the most misunderstood phenomenon of war that there is. Most people will tell you they know everything about warfare, but when it comes to understanding the psychology at warfare, they by and large do not understand it. The great generals of this world generally do, but a lot of people who wear four-star or five-star rank, although they seem to be very important, have no idea about psychology. And the problem is that they tend to think that warfare is a science. But if you measure how many laser-guided bombs you need to hit a various targets with, then this will happen, or that will happen. And they tend to have a very simplistic approach. What I'd suggest to you that actually this is the bit that warfare is all about. This is the bit the people like Alexander the Great would have understood completely. Napoleon probably understood it pretty well. Hitler on the other hand probably did not understand it. So this is the art of warfare. Everything else, the number of weapons you need to take out, targets is the science. This is the real art of warfare. And this is the point that we really need to take on board.

So my content is that war is actually about people's minds. So I want you to forget everything else you know about warfare and think 'minds'. Because that's what it's really all about. Let me just give you a thought for a second. This is a group of models, you can see, found in the grave in the Middle Kingdom of Egypt about 1500 BC. Fairly impressive group of people, as you can see, armed with shields and fairly impressive spears. And certainly, if you were a peasant living in the village and this lock turned up, you would have to be very impressed and you'll probably do pretty

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

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much what they wanted.

But then imagine this little group when they went onto a battlefield and suddenly here we are, Battle of Kadesh, 1274. There's Ramses the Great and somebody's churning around the battlefield with one of these chariots capable of moving at about thirty miles an hour, firing well up to thirty arrows per minute, range of the arrows up to about a hundred yards, probably (*inaudible*) fifty yards. Against the spearmen they could do virtually nothing. They could stand and wait, they could throw their spears but miss if they had arrows, generally they would miss as well, and the only lucrative target there is actually the horses. So these people could move around the battlefield, come into contact, fire a volley of arrows and move away and coming from a different angle. This is generally what that is, what group that comes from? There is a little bit of a clue, 1120, Cappadocia. It's the Assyrians. So we're talking about Nineveh, we're talking about Tiglath-Pileser I, as this particular chap was, as everyone will remember. You'll notice that the terrain they're operating in northern Iraq it's obviously a little bit more mountains, a little bit difficult, three horses opposed to two. We now have somebody with a shield. The composite bow has moved on a bit as you'd expect from 1274 down to 1120. So this is slightly more vulnerable perhaps than Ramses II's little chariots. You can imagine the effect of these on infantry tactics throughout the Middle East. And indeed, these sorts of weapons dominated warfare for at least five hundred years. And the history of warfare in that particular period is the history of the chariot. Very, very effective. The Egyptians could dismantle their chariots within two minutes, load the wheels onto the backs of the horses and then swing them across the river while dragging the chariot and then reassembling 2-3 minutes on the other side. We're talking about extreme mobility, this is the attack helicopter of 1200 BC.

Well, you can see the obvious psychological impact of something like this. But I won't before I go on too much just to consider some different battles and look at different situations. This demonstrates the overwhelming asymmetry of a particular weapon. But I want to look inside the mind of a particular group of people. Now, those of you that were assiduous filmgoers, a couple of years ago would have seen this particular film: '300'. And as you can see, that's Leonidas, and of course he was the man as we all know that defended the pass of Thermopylae. Now as you probably recall, this was not a particularly good film, it was lost somewhere between sci-fi and real history. But nevertheless it does show that when he defended with his other allies defended the pass of Thermopylae which is shown here, a great big mountain on the left hand side, a very narrow strip, and then a drop to the sea on the right. The Great King Xerxes of course that comes from the north, come all the way across the Hellespont, and this was essentially the only way into Greece as I'm sure you'll recall. They fought for three days and then eventually they were never defeated on their back of line, but they were outflanked as I'm sure you will recall. The Immortals had withdrawn to the south, they then outflanked the Greeks. Leonidas said he would send away those that could be sent away and he and three hundred Spartans of those who had left decided to continue the fight for one more day. And at the end of the day, as you recall, they withdrew up onto the hill, they had fought the Persians into a standstill. And at this stage the Persian morale went down and they decided they were not close to the Greeks anymore, and fired on the Greeks who by this stage had no longer any shields, most of them lost their helmets, almost all of them were wounded, and they were fighting with tooth and nail against the Persians. So the Persians withdrew and then finished the Greeks off with arrows.

Now, psychologically that had a huge effect on the Persian morale as I'm sure you could imagine, the fact that these people were so dedicated. At the end of the war I'm sure you all know a

memorial was put up – this is actually a later memorial of Leonidas as you can see. And they then put up this particular quote: “Tell them in Sparta, Passerby, that here obedient to their laws, we lie.” They did just what was asked of them. They were expected to go there, to give their lives willingly and to fight and die in a cause. As you probably recall, only those that had children were allowed to go because they had succeeded, they had produced a new generation, and so they went, and there they all did exactly what was expected of them. Indeed, as you saw from this bit: “Tonight we dine in Hell.” Actually, he said “Tonight we dine in Hades,” which is not quite hell, but this is Americanization of a particular event.

So this is the Spartans. These were the people who were the product of a military training ethos, that makes Sandhurst and West Point pale into insignificance. These people were pulled from birth to go to war and they were extremely competent and willing to die.

I want to move forward to a place round about there where I’m pointing to: Pylos and Sphacteria. Because just fifty five years later the same product of the same education found themselves confronted by a set of circumstances that did not work too well. And let me just talk it through. You will recall that of course Athens was conducting what we now call hit-and-run in strategy, while Sparta which was dominant on land, could ravage Attica at will. The essence, as far as the Athenians was concerned, was to get their fleet and move into the Spartan rear in order to cause hurt and damage. So the Spartans could be persuaded not to continue their attacks on Athens. And indeed, that was going on and happening on a regular basis. And in 425 - this is after Pericles had died by the way, died, as I’m sure you recall, of the plague - the strategos-elect Demosthenes decided that he would take an expedition - this is a picture taken with the long way around - take an expedition around the bottom of the Peloponnese and move down towards this area, to (*inaudible*) to support an Athenian ally. For reasons various, most notably the fact they were caught in a storm, Demosthenes found himself beleaguered on this little promontory near a place called Pylos. This is the town of Pylos you can see here. So not wishing to lose the opportunity, he invaded Pylos, set up a camp and protected himself, sent away the remaining ships that he had and off they went to join the main fleet, which lay off Corfu. Well, of course as far as the Spartans were concerned, the fact that Demosthenes had positioned himself just to the west of Sparta was entirely unacceptable. So King Aegeus, the Spartan king who was ravaging Attica at the time was recalled, the Spartan fleet was activated and everybody started moving towards Pylos to kick them off. So the Spartan fleet arrived, moved into the lagoon, their troops as you can see set up a camp right opposite Demosthenes in this area here. At the same time they decide to put a four hundred hoplites on this island here, which is called Sphacteria. Now, if you read this, this is all in Thucydides - I can’t remember which page it is on - I’m sure you’ll be able to find it without too much difficulty.

So the Spartans had the Athenians in a very beleaguered position. A big fortification there, fleets in the lagoon and of course taking the island of Sphacteria. They then carried out an attempted invasion which did not go well because the Athenians were quite well organized, they had quite well defended themselves. And so the Spartans pulled back, licking their wounds, trying to decide what to do next. Unfortunately for the Spartans, just this time what should come into view was of course the Athenian fleet. The Athenian fleet moved into the lagoon, engaged the Spartan fleet and defeated it, and a huge number of marines disembarked. And now of course the whole balance of power in the area has changed. Now, of course, the Spartans on the ground, blocked by the fortification, find themselves beleaguered and most particularly the people of course on

Sphacteria cannot get off the island, nor do anything else. Because Athens now has control of the lagoon and has control of all the waterways.

At the same time, after this happened there was a brush fire on Sphacteria. Sphacteria is fairly long and low island with hills on either side, a little bit of a hollow in the middle. But has a lot of thorn bushes and a brush fire went from south all throughout the island. So you'll still have the thorn bushes there but without any leaves and it's a lot of ash, a lot of dust, very, very difficult to move. But the decision was taken by the Athenians that they would now invade Sphacteria in order to relieve the people on top of the hills. So the invasion took place, and marines were landed here. You'll recall there are four hundred twenty Spartans and the Athenians landed at least eight hundred hoplites. In addition to that, they landed a lot of archers, and peltasts and allies, maybe another eight hundred as well. So probably a thousand and six hundred in total. So the Spartans of course with four hundred were greatly outnumbered.

What then happened was that the Athenians then started to move in towards the center, and the Spartans who had a little fortification up here moved down to the south. But the Spartans found themselves in the position that wherever they went, they were surrounded by Athenian archers and Athenian slingers. And although they tried to form their phalanx and then move forward to attack the Athenians, the Athenians just retreated and carried on pouring in arrows and slingshots.

The Spartans then decided to retreat back up to the top of this hill where they could fortify to seek further instructions. Unfortunately, as far as the Spartans were concerned, an allied officer said that he thought he could possibly get around this little hill here and get above where the Spartans were. And so with Athenian agreement he then took a small detachment around a coastal route as you can see, and managed to get himself above the Spartan position. So the Spartans who had carried out this tactical withdrawal against some onslaught of arrows and onslaught of slingshots never managing to form phalanx, never managing to form a frontline, never coming to grips with the hoplites - the Athenian hoplites - always coming under bombardment, suddenly found themselves faced with another group of power and that is up on the high ground above them, obviously ready to start the offensive all over again. As soon as they saw that, the Athenian heddles went forward and pointed out at them, they were in a precarious position. Contrary to what happened Thermopylae, the Spartans threw away their shields and came out with their hands up, waving their hands and said, that's it, we do not want to fight anymore. These were the sons and grandsons of those that fought off Thermopylae. These, the sons and grandsons of the '300' who gave up their lives so willingly. And yet here, for some reason their whole morale was unlocked and they decided to give up.

Thucydides in his history of the Peloponnesian War draws attention to a number of factors. He says, first of all, the Spartans were considerably outnumbered. Lots of archers, I mentioned the hoplites, eight hundred archers and eight hundred peltasts, slingers and various others. So they always found themselves in a position of inferiority. Secondly, of course they found themselves surrounded. Wherever they went, there were people overlooking them, firing arrows at them all the time, putting them in a position of perceived weakness. They could never form phalanx, they could never move forward, they could never engage the enemy. They were just acting as targets. Thirdly, he says, well, no front lines I mentioned, no phalanx. And a lot of them were vulnerable because of the way which the arrows were coming. Since there was no frontline, a lot of the arrows were coming in from behind them. So it was sort of complicated here, you know, a lot of arrows were coming in a position in their vulnerable area. Most of them were wounded. And

indeed, those that were left behind in the retreat northwards were then butchered by the Athenians and their cries would do nothing to reinvigorate the Spartans that remained.

But of course the other thing that was important was the dust and the smoke. Don't forget this was a place that was full of thorn bushes. So when they formed the phalanx and started going backwards, they were going back through thorn bushes. The whole place had burnt so as they stand to move across the ground, the dust came up, so it was very difficult to look around and see where the enemy was. Dust and a lot of smoke - it's difficult to breathe. The noise of the Athenians' calls during this particular retreat made it difficult to hear orders. They found it difficult to understand what was going on. And then finally when they had got back to what they perceived to be the great secure area on top of the hill to the north of the island, just when they thought they were secure - thank God that's over! - oh God, they're up on the hill above us, they're going to start the missile storm all over again! And those, according to Thucydides, is essentially what made the Spartans give up. And give up they did. Two hundred ninety two surrendered, and these became absolutely indispensable as far as the Athenians were concerned because they were taken to Athens and they were kept there as hostages. Sparta, if you do anything we don't like, guess what's going to happen to your two hundred ninety two hoplites? And as a coercive strategy it was extremely successful.

So there we have the sort of psychology of these particular people. And it shows that even the Spartans are possibly able to be undermined, to have their morale undermined, and to find themselves in a position of weakness.

Well, let's fast forward and I'm in a fast forward quite away now to this particular gentleman. Does anyone recognize who that is? It's Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz was a man who fought in the Prussian army against Napoleon. He fought all the way through Napoleon's wars. I don't know if he was actually at Waterloo, but he was certainly present at Quatre Bras and after the Napoleonic war he took over the staff college, the Prussian Staff College, and became one of their first commandants. His wife, the baroness, was intimately involved in what he then wrote and he wrote the most famous book "On War", a discussion on war. And he said a number of things that are really quite important. The interesting thing is he unfortunately died of smallpox before he completed the writing and his wife, the baroness, then finished it off for him. So we're not too sure even at this stage how much is the baroness, and how much is the gentleman. However we will take it that they all come from Clausewitz himself. But he said this: "War is an act of human intercourse." And it's important to think about war as human intercourse. Even now when we have robots, UAVs, clever machines, we think, well, maybe war will become depersonalized. But I have to tell you that is never going to be the case. For the simple reason is this: it's people that exult in success. People enjoy success, they enjoy victory. People reap the victories, the fruits of victory. Similarly it is people that pay the price of failure. If you fail, you may lose all your money, you may lose your house, you may lose everything there is, you may even lose your wife and children. You will pay that price if you fail. And so it doesn't matter which robots, which champions fight for you. It's you ultimately who will pay the final price or enjoy the final victory. So war is an act of human intercourse, it's important to remember that.

But he also went on to say this: that war is an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will. That's what it's all about. I don't have to remind you that if you embark on a warfare, once you've killed somebody he has no vote. The dead have no vote. It's the people who stand around and watch him die that decide what to do next. Once you're dead, you're dead. Nothing will change that. But it's the people who look at what happened and how it occurred. They're the people who

will make the next decision and that can be absolutely critical. So war is an act of human intercourse and it's an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will.

Well, why should we study this stuff? And I think I've probably given you a few of the clues. I've been involved in this for some time. I was a planner for Gulf War I. And I asked when Gulf War was starting - we were doing the planning in the autumn of 1990 - what the psychological aspect was? What could we do psychologically to unnerve either Saddam Hussein or the Iraqi people? Or indeed the Iraqi army? And I had to say at the time in Britain we had one person who did psychological warfare and he wasn't available. So that shows you the relative importance as far as the British were concerned. Because we had hundreds of people who could tell you how many bombs we needed, but nobody could tell you why we had the bombs?

So I think why study this particular thing is because there are a number of enduring truths that need to come out. And of course it's particularly relevant today because this is what terror is all about: it's all about psychology. A terrorist is not going to take out fifty thousand people or five million people or twenty million people. Or maybe he would with a nuclear weapon but hopefully that will never occur. Terrorists will kill a few thousand. It's the reactions of everybody else - that's what makes terror successful. Because terror is the art of creating fear.

Now, I don't have enough time sadly to talk too much about strategic bombardment. But I think there are a number of things that I think will be of interest to you when we talk about why. Now, let me show you this particular slide.

This is an analysis. What I'm going to do now is I'm trying to work out a ratio of those who gave up, i.e. deserters divided by those killed. So for every person that was killed, how many people sort of gave up. Well, if you take Korea, the ratio is .38. Vietnam - .19, pretty similar, there's not a whole lot of difference here. So the multiplication ratio is not a whole lot different.

But then we move on to Gulf War I in 1991. We think that about ten thousand were killed. I mean, you can get any number you like out of this, some people will tell you there were millions killed, other people will tell you three thousand, and that can't be true. For the sake of argument ten thousand is probably right, there can be one or two thousand on either side. Deserters. I'm sure I don't have to remind you that while war was taking place, there were death squads operating behind the front line. These are Iraqi death squads who were shooting their own people operating behind the front line. So deserters were likely to be shot. In fact, even the Iraqi death squads found that to be something they couldn't cope with. We think about 160,000 probably deserted. But for this calculation I will use the figure of 100,000. We know this figure precisely because we counted them. So that was the number of POWs. So when you do a calculation, something happened here: .38, .19, .18. So for every guy that died, 18 gave up at least. So what we have to ask ourselves was the factor in this and what made the difference. To a large extent this comes down to the factor that really demotivated the Iraqis. It was seen at the time as being all powerful, a huge great surprise - Oh my God! - a bit like the chariot in the day of the Pharaohs. You know, suddenly these airplanes arrived in, they didn't expect it to happen, and it was seen as something hugely demotivating because it produced not only physical shock, but a huge psychological shock. And I suggest you, it's because it does this: it dominates the fourth dimension which is time. What I mean by that? Well, Saddam Hussein - I think if it wasn't him, certainly one of his friends - characterized Gulf War I as a bit like having to endure a new earth quake every single day. And as soon as you got sorted out one earthquake, guess what, it happens all again tomorrow, and again tomorrow after that. And, say, you find yourself not able to react quickly

enough, because everything is going wrong. The same happens on the front line when people are bombing. Oh my God! We've sorted out all the bombing, we've got all the casualties taken care of, it starts all over again. So suddenly you find that everything you wanted to do has all been pressed together, all the time has been compressed. Now, that can be very successful if you want to make people react very fast: instant decisions. There are times when you don't. And the classic one is the Cuban missile crisis, when you'll probably remember Curtis LeMay offered: I can bomb Cuba tomorrow. And Kennedy thought correctly at the time, you're going to get irrational decisions. What I actually want to do is to extend the time so they have time to reflect, time to consider. So if you want to squeeze the time air power will do that, you have probably irrational decisions or hasty decisions.

And indeed this sort of concept was really brought out in an operation called Operation Strangle that happened in Italy in 1943, when Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin, the German general there who was in charge of XIV Panzer Corps, said: "This is a bit like playing a game of chess where the enemy makes three moves and I only get to make one." So they've expanded their time because they got the freedom and I can only do a little tiny bit.

I'm going to mention that in terms of the sort of a psychological effect. We talk a little bit about World War II, Gulf War, I've already mentioned South Korea and talked about the Iraq War of 1990-91.

I want to then come on to the psychological factors intended to bring it all together and finally talk about combat stress which is essentially what is done to people when you do bomb them and start to impose these sorts of pressure on them.

I'm going to go on to World War II, I just want to start with a little bit about World War I. Now, you will know that World War I contained many innovations. Of course the machine gun, that's why these particular characters were in a trench in the first place. Because you couldn't have an open battle line and move forward as Waterloo occurred or near the great battles of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. So they found themselves in defensive fortifications.

The other thing that you may be surprised about. This is actually the first war in which indirect artillery fire was used. Because up until then, just like Waterloo, you lined up your cannons and you pointed and you fired them. Now you are firing up into the air, over the hill, down the other side. So these are the sorts of innovations that came to start in World War I. Both these innovations I mentioned were exploited by air power. The machine gun was put onto an airplane. That is how the airplanes then started to use their forward firing capability. And of course it was the airplane that made the ability for indirect fire by the artillery possible. Because how did you know where the shots were falling unless you had somebody who can look over the top and see where they were going? And so it was really the airplane that started to make these two weapon systems useful. And indeed, to begin with in 1914, most of these people in the trenches of 1914 had never seen an airplane. Indeed, the first time that they heard an airplane, they used to come out of their trenches and look up: "Gosh, isn't that fantastic? Wow, look at that, it's amazing!" This was an invention of nine years or eleven years by that stage. So, very short space of time. But of course it didn't take long for them to realize that as soon as they saw a little pup pup pup pup as the airplane flew across, it didn't take long before you're notice shortly after the bombs would start raining down upon you. And so the respect started almost immediately.

Well, in 1916 for the first time we started to use aircraft, and in fact it was at the Battle of Aisne we used aircraft for the first time to attack the trenches, using, as you can see, a very highly technologically advanced system for the time.

The other thing that was used also at the same time was the strafing technique. An aircraft like the FE.2bs, as you can see here, pilot sitting in there, and the captain of the aircraft who was often the gunman sitting by the machine gun and being able to attack these trenches.

What was the effect on the Germans when they first felt it? Well, I had to tell you it was absolutely outstanding. Because the Germans who thought that they were in defensive lines suddenly find that actually the trench far from keeping them safe did exactly the opposite. Because if I'm going to do a strafing pass with my gun, guess which direction I'm going to go? I'm going to go along the line of the trench. And quite often a single pass will kill thirty people. Everybody in that trench was going to die if you got this line up properly and fire down on the line of the trench. It presented the target to them in exactly the way that could have been wanted. Well, you can imagine the effect of this on German morale. Oh my God! The last place you want to be now when the airplane turns up is in your trench. Because if they do run down the line of the trench, every single person is going to be killed. Now, fortunately trenches don't go in a straight line from here to eternity. But you find yourself in that particular trench being highly vulnerable.

Well, you can imagine it didn't take the Germans long to repeat the operation the other way around. And there's the German three hundred kilogram bomb. And then they came on to things like this by 1918, a very sophisticated aircraft, and very effective it was too.

So we carried out this strafing. And at the time we identified two forms of strafing. The first of them was trench strafing which I've just described, and the other one was ground strafing. This was a sort of target that would take out in a ground strafing operation. And you can see how lucrative that would have been to somebody in the aircraft. I mean, a concentration of targets that was impossible to imagine. You can, as I'm sure you will, imagine the effect that this would have had in terms of ability of armies to deploy forward and ability of armies to sustain the front line. But it has to be said though that after their first surprise, the Germans in particular suddenly realized that an aircraft flying at ninety miles an hour is not a whole lot more difficult to shoot down than a bird that's in flight. And so then they started to impose losses on the aircraft and indeed the toll on aircraft was extremely high. So it was very effective, but very costly. What it did do is there was no longer a frontline. A frontline would have been demarcated on the ground when the trenches didn't exist because anywhere you had a concentration of people you were likely to be targeted.

Communications were also a problem at the time. These gradually improved, but still they found the best method actually was to put the aircraft forward on the semi-autonomous mode and let it just wreak havoc wherever they came.

Now, those of you that have heard my lecture before, will know that where this particular technique reached its maximum was actually not in Europe, but it was actually here in Palestine. You will recall that Allenby took Jerusalem around about Christmas Day of 1917, and by the summer of 1918, he was faced with three Turkish armies: 8th, 7th and 4th. In September of 1917, he was ordered to move forward and he used his air power with extreme success. He caught the 8th Army as you can see and strafed them all day as they went down the road. And then a couple of days later there's the second day. On the third day he managed to find the 7th Army moving down

another one of these valleys, the Wadi el Fara which is there, and managed to hose them down with gunfire and caused all sorts of mayhem. On the third day the Australians fired twenty four thousand rounds of machine guns into the Turkish troops that were packed along the valley of el Fara. The panic and the slaughter of the people who were trying now to move out of the way of the land army beggared all the imagination. As a result of this one could argue that both 8th, 7th and 4th moved north, towards Damascus and psychologically they gave up their will to fight. Certainly it is true that Damascus fell to the Allies within a few a few weeks.

So we start to see some psychological activities here. Strafing, catching people into a situation where they're surprised, amazed at what the Allies were capable, and using an airplane which is after all something magical to do this sort of damage.

Let me now come forward to the interwar to World War Two. I just tried to remind you of two things that during the interwar years the Allies carried out attacks on surface vessels as you can see. In 1921 there was a demonstration of air power against a captured German battleship or battle cruiser. You can see that it was demonstrated very, very quickly that even the most sophisticated battleship could be destroyed from the air.

And you'll also recall something that happened about the same sort of time, little bit later, was in the Spanish Civil War. This is the Picasso painting of the air attack on Guernica which achieved such notoriety.

But these sort of events set the psychological tone for what was going to happen in World War Two. So question was what sort of war would this be? Well, at the time people believed that it was going to be one of those wars where air power would predominate and everything would then give up as soon as a city was attacked. And indeed, if you recall when Warsaw was attacked, a heart went out of the Polish people to continue the war and it looked like the same probably happened, as you recall, in Rotterdam as the invasion took place. But I don't want to talk too much about that because time doesn't really allow me the luxury of doing so.

What I want to concentrate on is still the army in the field. And this I think is the first point that one needs to look at: airpower and armor together forming what we now call the Blitzkrieg method of warfare. A sudden strike from the sky, as I'm sure you recall the attack that was mounted against the French, and I won't go through the sophisticated way in which the battle plans were drawn up. But essentially the Allies were wrong footed. They believed that the Maginot Line would stop the Germans except the route through Belgium. But as it turned out the Germans actually came through the Ardennes and attacked Sedan, just as the Germans or the Prussians have done in 1870. The Allies might have spotted that one, but they didn't. So on the 10th of May 1940 the Germans moved up through the Ardennes, positioned themselves to cross the Meuse on the 13th and 14th of May. The decision was taken that they would use air power to attack every single artillery piece the French had, to attack all the French positions, but ground troops would come across a little late as you can see there, and airpower continuously rain down offensive fire. Once this bridgehead had been secured, the tanks would pour across and the effect would be as what we now know as Blitzkrieg.

Indeed, the sort of effect as far as the French were concerned, they found that the attacks by the German aircraft were concentrated, they were not just distributed evenly across the line when the Germans attacked, they would take out a particular area and concentrate on it. The French found they had no support. So although they had sophisticated guns, they couldn't call up

reinforcements. These people were isolated under air attack, and likely to be attacked very quickly. The French found they were isolated and abandoned. They felt that no one was actually looking after them, no one was giving them support. What then happened was, as the artillery at the back of one of the fortifications on the west bank of the Meuse moved, the infantry thought the artillery were going. At this stage there was a sudden feeling of oh my God, we're going to be outnumbered, surrounded and we're going to be decimated! And so the infantry turned around and ran. And the next effect was French retreat, the Germans pulled across and the effect of course we know was the fall of France. One of the people who was there, a chap called Marc Bloch wrote this: "Nobody who has ever heard the whistling scream made by dive bombers before releasing their load is ever likely to forget the experience. It is not only that the strident din made by the machines terrifies the victim by awakening in his mind associated images of death (...). No matter how thickly bombs may be sown, they never, in fact, register hits on more than a relatively small number of men. But the effect of bombing on the nerves is far-reaching, and can break the potential of resistance over a large area."

So these are sorts of effect that suddenly were being visited upon the Allies. Let's just move now forward quickly to the Western Desert. And I just want to remind you of a couple of things that you will have seen. Western Desert in '42-'43. Now the boot is on the other foot, and the Allies are starting to use their air superiority now to do the same damage back to the Germans. I'll give you one example. In one week the RAF flew 10,000 sorties, whereas the Axis powers flew just 3,000. Interestingly enough the Germans complained that the Allies always had air superiority. The Allies complained that the Germans always had air superiority. And clearly those two positions can't both be right. But nevertheless that was the sole psychological effect. But when Rommel wrote in his diary, he wrote this: "Officers and men were badly shaken and they're fighting capacity reduced by the disposal, lack of sleep and the strain and waiting for the bombs." Not a popular thing to write in 1942 because the Afrika Korps Diary is going to be read in Berlin in a couple of weeks' time. This was not something you really wanted Hitler to have been briefed on because (*inaudible*) your job. In fact he then went on to say in his own personal diaries, and this of course is very non-PC today, but nevertheless it's what he wrote: "(...) under the same handicap and with the same chance of success." No chance of success whatsoever. This is of course their commanding general, this is Rommel himself that is writing this stuff. And I think it has the sort of ring of truth when you look at what he writes later on. So psychology is there as far as the German ground soldier is concerned that there is a dominating power here that is very difficult to fight against.

Well this went on, and I mentioned Operation Strangle right in the beginning of the Allied invasion. And this was an attempt by the Allies to take the war into the rear areas and to deny the Germans the capacity to fight because they were deprived of all their sources of war material. A very successful campaign it was, but this is the sort of targets that were attacked in this particular campaign - railways, roads. They were forced back to carts and (*inaudible*) German army unable to move. So there we find ourselves in position that whereas the Germans would thrust forward here, thrust forward there, withdraw there, you can imagine a mobile war, but they have no fuel. They can't move forward. So that's why the German commanders thought their tactical ability, one of the key factors for their defeat. And indeed, if you then go on to what people have said. This is a war diary, now May 1944, it is still in Italy: "allied fighter bomber activity makes movement impossible." And this is what Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin wrote: "In the battle of movement commander can only attack by night, like a chess player moving one chess piece back and forth." But what it does reflect is what is going on in your brain. These

bastards have the initiative, they can move three times to every time I try and do something. How can I fight against this? It becomes almost impossible to do so.

Let me move forward now straight into northwest Europe in 1944-45. Learning the lessons of what happened in North Africa, close air support and armed reconnaissance, the Allies started to produce a comprehensive plan and the first of these was to gain air superiority. And if I tell you that on the day of D-Day, 6th of June, the Allies - this includes the Americans, and the Poles, and everybody else - flew 14,000 attack missions and that was across the beaches into a hundred kilometers behind the front line. 14,000. Well, the D-Day was about fourteen hours long, so it's about a thousand missions an hour. In that whole day the Germans flew seven hundred sorties and that's everywhere in Europe right across to the eastern front. So that sort of says something. What it says is that when you look up and see that, how many of those are German? Well, if you're an allied soldier on the ground you think that's ok, the RAF chaps - they're doing their job well. If you're a German, you sit up and look at that, you know every single one of those is after you. Every single one of those has got rockets and guns and it's waiting to have an opportunity to fire at you. You've got a thousand missions coming in. As soon as that thousand is finished, another thousand gets in and they're just waiting.

Say, you end up in a situation where this air superiority is turned into form of air dominance. At the same time weapon accuracy was improving. So that was also increasingly stress on people. Let me give you a quote from German medical reports at the end of the war. It says this: "Prior to 1943, infantry weapons were leading cause of casualties. The artillery second, and aircraft third. During 1944 and '45, aerial weapons were far ahead of the artillery or infantry as a cause of casualties in the German armed forces." It's not civilians in Dresden or Bremen, this is the German armed forces. So air power has moved into dominance in terms of its ability to destroy things on the ground. And psychologically that has to have an effect. But of course even then, even though they had air dominance, remember, at night the Allies could not use their fighter bombers. So night was the one time the Germans could operate. So we end up in the situation where these things dominate the day and have complete control of the tanks that are brought in to fight. Well, this is reflected by this chap, commander of the 3rd Panzer Division, Fritz von Bayerlein. Panzer was a (*inaudible*) German division, you can see that as well. It was somewhere down the Lyon on the start of D-Day. It was moved from the south all the way up into the war zone and fought with some distinction as it turned out once it came into contact. But on the way north, as he says there: "The number of men who survived the pattern bombing surrendered soon to the attacking infantry or escaped to the rear." That's not so good if that's your commander of (*inaudible*) Panzer Division these people are giving up. And he said: "The uselessness of fighting (...). Only particularly strong nerved (...) could endure this strain."

And indeed, the real effect seen by the Typhoons occurred on this battle, the Battle of Mortain, which occurred as you can see 1200 hours. What basically happened is that the Allies were moving down to the south and the Germans, their only opportunity to impact on the movement down to the south was to bring up a number of Panzer divisions. And you can see them up there. Each one of these is a tank division. That's infantry with the X on it, so three infantry divisions and let's see: one, two, tree, four, five - ten divisions. And so in August the counter attack began and they reached this place called Mortain. At this time there were very, very few troops here, most of the troops themselves, the allied troops, were quite a long way forward. And so it looked quite likely the enemy would cut them off and create an encircling movement.

The only option really was to attack them using Typhoons. So Typhoons were sent in and during the course of the morning they found that it was almost impossible to fly because of the low cloud and fog. But by lunchtime when the weather cleared these things then rained and attacked all the German tanks they found. And as Eisenhower recorded in his journal after the battle had taken place, these typhoons destroyed eighty three tanks, probably destroyed a further twenty nine and damaged up to twenty four, in addition to the large quantities of material on motor transport. Some two hundred ninety four sorties were flown, the Luftwaffe were ordered to support at maximum effort that virtually all of them were shot down as they lifted off from their airfields. As far as the Germans were concerned, their last throw of the battle to stop the bridgehead from breaking out had failed.

The net effect was that 7th Army which would become squeezed at this stage, while it was moving down to the south, found themselves in the pockets known as the Falaise Gap. And it was in the Falaise Gap that as the noose was slowly but surely tightened, so the Germans found themselves increasingly squeezed. And once they were fixed like this they became targets, not an army in the field. All concentration into closed pocket in a small area. So the noose tightened, the army became depressed, fewer and fewer roads, continuous air attack. And so what do they do? They dropped weapons and ran. And so when you see pictures of the Falaise Gap, you find an awful lot of abandoned vehicles, abandoned tanks, abandoned material, some people surrendering, but most of them have just given up and ran. So very similar situation to what had happened with the Spartans.

But what was the overall effect? Well, as you can imagine, German troops were becoming increasingly demoralized by this overwhelming Allied air capability. Most of all those who became stranded, of course, that was also going on at Normandy and then of course there was Normandy evacuation. So you can end up in a situation where the (*inaudible*) have come through, do not move by day. And in fact whole divisions would move under cover and stay so they couldn't be seen. At night they could then move forward again.

So let's just have some of the effects. Well, concealment. Conceal yourself, hide yourself away. Make sure nobody notices you. Then you come on to the next thing. I found this... In fact it's a translation from the German book. This is a German motorbike, and the apprehensive glance skyward epitomizes the all-embracing effect of Allies's air supremacy. But a common thing that was said at the time by these people was, where is the Luftwaffe? Here we are fighting and dying, moving forward with our tanks doing what the Fuehrer has ordered. Where's the bloody air gone? What have they done? Why aren't they here supporting us? Why should we had to endure all the punishment all by ourselves? So this is a sense of betrayal: where is the Luftwaffe?

Of course, you'll remember I mentioned Rommel already. This is a letter that he wrote to his wife. So it has the sense of not just something that's for public consumption. This what he actually told his wife: "The enemy's air superiority has a very grave effect on our movements. There's simply no answer to it." And when you psychologically give to the point where you say there is no answer to it, you've gone a long way psychologically to deciding you're defeated. There's no answer to it, there's no way of getting out of this particular situation. In fact it echoes a letter written by von Kluge to Hitler about a week later after Rommel was strafed by a Typhoon. And von Kluge said the same sort of thing. So a sense of hopelessness. There's simply no answer to it.

But the Germans thought they had an answer to this overwhelming dominance by the fighter bombers. And it went something like this: the Germans were told, if you encounter fighter

bomber attack, get out of your vehicles and run. Well, that was fine, Typhoon comes down, takes out the vehicles, pulls off, notice the troops on the field, goes round again, comes in, then machine guns down the troops in the field. That didn't work. Next idea. Let's tell the guys that when they get out of their vehicles to get underneath the vehicles because they get some protection from the vehicles. Well, that doesn't work because there are armor piercing projectiles. They go straight through the vehicle hitting the troops underneath. Next good idea. Get out of your vehicles and go and find somewhere to hide. Well, that's fine except that as your vehicles are moving forward there're probably not too many places to hide. So you still get attacked the second time around.

So this was the psychology of the Wehrmacht: very soon we will be told to take on the fighter bombers with our rifles. We tried little stupid ideas, let's think of something even more stupid. It's totally pointless or totally futile. So you end up in a sense here of pointlessness. There's simply no answer to it and all resistance is futile. There is no point in doing this. We've been told all sorts of nonsense. But you can of course go one stage too far. And that is if you tell somebody he's going to die, and it doesn't matter what he does, you're still going to kill him, then he might just as well fight you like a cornered rat. Because he's got nothing to lose and he will think, "Ok, I'll take some of these bastards with me." And so at that particular stage we're in the situation where he's going to fight you right to the last minute. Because at least he'll get some satisfaction.

So in the way in which this whole build-up of psychological pressures work, if you go too far they'll fight you to the death. And of course to some extent that was what was beginning to happen at Stalingrad, until suddenly the Russians realized they've got to give these guys a way out because otherwise we'll have the whole of the 6th army desperately fighting us for every single corner. And so, with psychological pressures, you must not create that sort of situation.

But I will now fast forward and I want to talk about Gulf War of 1991, and I'm not going to go through this in too much detail except saying that this was the first war when precision-guided munitions were used for the first time. I mean, at the time everybody said how the hell they can do this and it seemed almost unbelievable. The Iraqi Air Force, unlike the Typhoons, could not get that sort of accuracy.

What was the effect? Well, a lot of things sort of came up. We didn't have the effect from the strategic air operations. We thought that the effect really came from the army. The Iraqi army in the field found the attacks by the allied aircraft absolutely devastating. There was a sort of synergy with psychological operations taking place and I'll just mention those very quickly.

We ended up doing a thing called tank plinking and let me just describe to you very briefly what that is. F-111 aircraft would arm up with four laser-guided bombs, they take off at six o'clock at night, they go up into the Kuwaiti theater of operations, come across the Iraqi tanks. But the first cross would take down the first tank, drop the first bomb – direct hit. Okay, on to the next one – direct hit. The F-111 would return to base, get another four laser-guided bombs and return to the theater of operations now eight o'clock, go into the slot and carry on the process. This became known as tank plinking. Because it was like a game of space invaders. That became known to the Iraqis and they found it highly demotivating. And in fact general Schwarzkopf then insisted that this war was never to be used again. Not because he objected to it being used against the Iraqis, but because it was demotivating for our own tank crews. They were thinking, oh my God, if it's that easy, perhaps they're going to do this to us. So that was the sort of capability that was being visited at home. The effect was that some 87,000 surrendered, 150,000 deserted, with minimal

casualties on both sides.

Let me just show you one of the reasons why this sort of thing worked out. Well, we did apply physical stress to them. We cut them off, we made sure the Iraqi army had no communications, no water, no food and no information. For most of the Iraqi soldiers they were attacked every three hours, the attacks by Allied air power are devastating. There was absolutely nothing they could do. In addition, this was amplified by the psychological operations. But of course it's really the combination of what I've described, and these things that really had an effect. Volant solo transmitting on the radio frequencies of the Iraqis in the field who were listening to radios that had been dropped purposely by us so they could listen to our transmissions. You can see lots of leaflets were dropped, and you can see sort of measured message there. A B-52 dropping bombs. "The 16th Infantry Division will be bombed tomorrow. Leave this location now and save yourselves." And this was dropped in huge numbers so much so that some Iraqis said you couldn't see the ground because it was just covered by these particular leaflets.

This was then dropped after the event: we've kept our promise. We kept our promise because, guess what, tomorrow it's your turn. And this was the stage where many of the Iraqi forces in the field suddenly recalled they had an urgent appointment in Baghdad tomorrow, off they went to see the dentist. And so after an awful lot having realized, having seen the success of what happened yesterday or even indeed this morning, when they receive new message, which is essentially a contract: tomorrow morning at ten o'clock I'm going to kick your backside. When they received this message they knew it was true. They knew that at ten o'clock plus or minus a minute they're going to die. And that is pretty demotivating, particularly if you know there is nothing you can do about it. There's no way you can fight against it and there's no way of managing to overcome it.

The psychological operations information. I mean, this is the sort of exposure, so radio broadcast, 58% of the enemy was exposed, but it was leaflets that really had the effect. And you can see the 70% found themselves wanting to surrender, and virtually all of them had seen the leaflets.

But the weapons that they really disliked as much as anything else were things like B-52. Three of these things could drop the same amount of artillery power as a core of artillery. So these things will arrive I say every three hours. Very effective indeed and very, very frightening.

So the psychological effect that we had was really this: the idea of bombing, then leafleting, then bombing, got inside the minds of the people who were subjected to it. This created in turn this sort of sense of anticipation and fear. I have seen what has happened, and this is not going to happen to me. And there's nothing I can do about it. But at the same time we provided leadership substitute, because we said to the Iraqis this is not a battle against you, this is a battle against Saddam Hussein. Leave your trenches, walk in the direction of Jeddah and we will take care of you, we will give you water and food and we will repatriate you. So essentially we gave them a way out and that was most important. Because we didn't want to get them into the position were like a cornered rat they were going to fight to the death.

So what did the POWs think about this? These are some of the comments that they made. "The propaganda leaflets produced the highest threat to our morale, second only to the allied bombing." I would say as well we missed the point that it is the combination of the leaflets and the bombing that has the effect they are talking about. "The Iraqi troops felt resistance was futile as they were against the wall. Radio reports of B-52 bombings caused desertions. The leaflet

campaign told the soldiers to leave their vehicles to avoid injury. It proved what George Bush had said about not fighting the Iraqi people.”

And the weapons that really the Iraqis disliked: B-52 I've mentioned, the A-10 because it was always there, and then the leaflets. They hated the fact that either the airplanes turned up or indeed the leaflets were dropped. So what were the effects? Well, the enemy was always there. That's what the Iraqis kept on harping on about. Every three hours more airplanes would turn up. The Iraqis felt they couldn't affect the battle. There was nothing they could do. Doesn't matter whether they would get up in the morning, didn't get up in the morning, stayed in their trenches. It couldn't affect the outcome of the battle in the slightest degree. In Iran-Iraq war they manned their tanks. As I described in tank plinking, tanks had a nasty habit of just blowing up, because obviously they were hit. And then there was this one here, the B-52 bombs that arrived they were guided by the will of Allah. There was nothing they could do to affect them in one way or another. And finally there was this feeling that resistance was utterly futile.

I just want to bring now these three campaigns to a point just before I go on and look at it very brief lead in the last few minutes. Let's just go through some of the effects that we discussed. So here we are with the Spartans and Thucydides commenting on them. The Spartans felt themselves outnumbered, which was true - they were. In World War II the Germans, well, they hid by day to avoid the fact that they were outmaneuvered, outnumbered by the allied air power. And in Gulf War I the enemy was all-pervasive. So huge asymmetry in capability: we're outnumbered.

What about this one? Surrounded, no frontline, can't form phalanx - we've got to get our phalanx, cause once we form our phalanx, we can advance on the enemy. Well, you can't because every direction you look there're bloody archers.

Where's the Luftwaffe? We can't do anything because bloody airplanes keep arriving. Sense of betrayal.

And here we have the Iran-Iraq war, the tankers are protected. So all the expectations that you have that really come out of this war are all now set at zero. We expect to be able to fight a war with our Spartan frontline, we expect to fight another conventional battle with the Luftwaffe stopping enemy air attacks, but now, every time I go in a tank it blows up.

Let me come on to the physical factors. The thorn bushes, the dust, the smoke and the noise - you can't hear. World War II - same sort of sense of hopelessness. I can't fight against this. It's just not possible. And again somebody else is controlling. So these are sort of the physical things that I can't really control.

And then we come on to the next thing: vulnerability. Lots of wounds. Fight the fighter bombers with your pocket knives. Resistance is futile. Impotence. I can't affect the battle. A sense of pointlessness. And so you end up in a situation where down to there they're all positive, and then you get into a surprise and panic mode and driven to give up and run away. So down to that point we are in a position where we've considerably seen commonality of sort of experiences of armed men in the field being attacked by some sort of capability that is far greater than themselves.

But let's not forget the rage phenomenon and that still is there. That phenomenon is always there wherever we go and wherever we find ourselves. And any commander who doesn't notice that or forgets to take due account of that is probably going to set himself up.

Well, let me talk about the psychology of war. And I think you've probably got some of these messages so I should be able to go through them quickly. Everybody has its limit, everybody in this room can be undermined. And if you look in your heart, I don't know if there any particular heroes here, but I can tell you I certainly know I have my limits. I've been interrogated, I've been into war and there are some things I could tolerate and some things I couldn't tolerate. I frankly would never want to be captured. I'd probably would commit suicide rather than be captured. For everybody, you have a limit and it varies in your age and culture, and indeed your personality. Ultimately, ladies and gentlemen, you are animals. And you will perform quite often as animals. And there's nothing you can do about that. If a ghost suddenly appeared, oh my God, you'd have all sorts of weird reactions. But they will be very animalistic, very zoological.

These are the sorts of things that cause the difficulties. Claustrophobia. Noise. Isolation. Fatigue. Climate in terrain. Discomfort. Hygiene. Idleness. Helplessness. Those are the things that if you are finding yourself under stress, those are the things that will make your situation worse and worse and worse. So what do we get out of this? We've put these people under stress, we give them all sorts of nasty experiences. What you then get out of it is what's known as a combat stress reaction which is the sort of event that occurs to individuals when things go very wrong. So you cease to function or you function in a highly extreme manner. The symptoms are, well, I mean we've all been through these because actually a combat stress reaction is not whole different to being at school and taking exam, particularly when you haven't studied for particularly well. Some expected reactions include anxiety, trembling and sweating, depression. Tears, thoughts of suicide. Then move on to some more interesting ones: dissociation. A lot of people who find themselves in extremely difficult situation pretend they're not there. The most extreme we found was true with some of the Iraqis when they came under air attack, they were going to sit in a corner down there somewhere and just curl up in the fetal position, waiting for it to end. I'm not really here, actually. Because that was the only way to cope with this sort of stress. They would just remove themselves physically, but psychologically mostly out of the way.

So the next ones you get. Personality changes and hysteria. This is typically demonstrated by somebody who goes insane. This used to happen a lot in the trenches in World War I: I can't take it anymore longer! And they ran up onto the parapet to be shot by the first machine gun. But that's the sort of things that can happen.

Then you move on to more sort of a deep-seated effect, some of it eventually becomes unconscious and finally end up with some sort of psychotic reactions.

Down to about here these are reversible. So probably even to dissociation you can reverse that by taking the guy out of the front line. Once you get onto this sort of level and beyond, you've probably unlocked a guy's brain, he's no longer functioning. He's probably a basket case for the rest of his life.

I'm going to leave this because time is not on my side. If you want to carry out attacks on people and flick this sort of stress, but it's important that when you do it you understand what the enemy's values are, what really unhinges him, and you also understand what his expectations are. What did the Spartans expect when they were at Sphacteria? They thought they were going to form a phalanx and drive the Athenians out. A bloody battle, ok. But that's what they expected. When they got the unexpected, that was no good. Because the expectations were considerably exceeded. So when you do this, you must work this out, and exceed whatever expectations he has, because then you will start to get some return. You need also to demonstrate if you're going

to do this psychological bit, that you are omniscient and omnipotent. There's no point for example in saying to the 16th Division in Kuwait, guess what, we're going to kick your head or blow your lights out at ten o'clock tomorrow morning and then to drop your bombs in the wrong place. Or to turn up at half past ten and miss the target. You've got to demonstrate you're capable and you know what you're doing. And then you of course have all the cards. He on the other hand has no capability at all. And it doesn't take him long to realize if he is impotent, then he is in a situation of hopelessness. Now, hopelessness by itself doesn't do the trick, you can wait till it goes away. What you're then going to do is creating in his mind a concept of futility, of pointlessness. You are cannon fodder, your dying achieves nothing. You are here just to die. And if you can get that message through to him, then you would have done your work because then people will understand exactly whatever they do they cannot affect the final outcome. Of course, if you're going to wage the psychological warfare, you must always whenever conducting stressful activities, give them a way out. Because if you don't, then any enemy you have will fight you and fight you hard, and fight you to the last. Because he's going to take you with him and it's just payback time.

So there, ladies and gentlemen, it is. That is all I'm going to say. Let's have a break for ten minutes and return at four o'clock. And I'm going to move from the psychological-tactical up to the interstate level, and see if these sorts of things, see if the Spartan effects experienced at Sphacteria actually relate to the way states start to see their behavior.

So, thanks very much.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Andrew Lambert**

8 December 2009

Coercion – a Modern Paradigm

Okay, ladies and gentlemen, thanks for coming back. I want to talk now about what is essentially, something that's sort of a heart of what I have been discussing earlier: coercion. Because essentially what has been talked about in the psychological sense is applying coercion to troops in the field. I said the dead have no vote. It's how you persuade those that are still alive to do what you want - that is the arts of generalship. So coercion is just a word that covers what you do to people in the army, in the field right up to what you do to Milosevic at the time of the Kosovo operation. You coerce them, you persuade them to do something.

But I suppose the question is then how do you do that? And this seems to me is you will take it that you are the emperor, the king, the prime minister whatever it is, so you have lots and lots of political and other challenges and objectives. The question is how do you persuade your enemies, your friends, your allies to achieve the right sort of political outcome? What sort of mechanism do you use to achieve that outcome?

It won't be any surprise to you to know that lots of strategies failed to produce a theory that works. Some of those who have actually tried it and succeeded, but most have been obsessed with their own theories and are blaming everybody else when the theories don't work. But I'm going to suggest to you that actually this is all about psychology. But it's a rather different sort of psychology in the sense that it's unlike military psychology because there are more instruments available to you. So what I'm going to talk about is how the state uses these instruments. It's not just about the size of the army, the nuclear threat and everything else. It's more about what are the instruments that you can use and how do you use them. Conventionally people tend to think of this as being something to do with nuclear theology. How do you use nuclear weapons to persuade people? How do you use your massive overwhelming power to persuade people?

Now, I'm going to surprise you with actually the most classic, and one that's been around for at least 10,000 years, and probably even beyond the last ice age. (*Shows picture of Louise de Kérouaille*). This is power. This is Louise de Kérouaille. Louise de Kérouaille was born in Britain.

* Transcript of oral presentation.

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She was born to an aristocratic family in the 1650s. She ended up at the court of Louis XIV and he thought she was quite pretty. This is a painting of her that currently hangs in Madingley at Cambridge. And I'll just point out because you probably can't see it. It says Portsmouth. And I'll come to that in a minute. So there she is, she's a painting and she has her left breast revealed with a pigeon. I don't know the full message that is being conveyed by having a pigeon on a left breast revealed, but just take it for its own value. She arrived at the court of Louis XIV and he quite liked her. And he thought, I know somebody who might like her even more. And that was Charles II. So Charles II's sister who was Henrietta, Duchess of Orléans, went back to visit Charles II in 1670. Who should go with her as part of her retinue? Louise de Kérouaille. So Louise de Kérouaille arrives in the court in London as part of the retinue of Charles's sister. She was very clever, she was known to be strong-willed, she was obviously pretty, she had that sort of vulnerable type of demeanor sort of characteristics. But everybody thought that she was somebody who was very attractive and very charismatic. Nell Gwyn who you will recall was Charles II's mistress at the time, called her Squintibella. Louise de Kérouaille, whatever the reason for her successes, by 1671, one year after she arrived in London, she became Charles's official mistress. He then showered her with gifts. Nell Gwyn was kicked out. And one year later she gave birth to a bastard son names Charles who then became Duke of Richmond. A year after that Charles created her Duchess of Portsmouth. So she's now Duchess of Portsmouth. And he wrote to Louis XIV saying, this great girl you've sent me should be created duchess in France. And so Louis XIV created her a Duchess of Aubigny. And she lived with Charles through the rest of his life but she was all the time in the pay of Louis XIV. She did what Louis wanted and she persuaded Charles to do what was required. Charles, as you probably recall, was an Anglican. He was persuaded on his deathbed to become a Catholic. He was persuaded to change the laws of Britain so that his brother James II who was a Catholic could inherit the kingdom. And all the laws that differentiated, discriminated against Catholics, most of them were repealed. Charles even borrowed money from Louis at suitable terms in order to finance his exports.

So this is a lady who had immense power. And she could with a little cry and little squint control the destiny of a nation. And she was doing it on behalf of a foreign power. Now, Charles most certainly knew this, but he didn't care.

So, ladies and gentlemen, we talk about power. Let's not forget that this kind of power is probably one of the most important ones.

So when we talk about power, today let's just talk about this sort of power. But what sort of power is this? Well, we think we all know what sort of power this is. This represents power in a world which is different. You know we live in a different world from the conventional world. The British imperial world would send a gunboat to solve a problem. Those days are gone. Let me give you some thoughts.

We live in a global economy, we all know that. We have the G7, the G8, the G20. We now even have G77. Multinational companies. We have rampant ideologies. Communism was a rampant ideology until the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Some will say Islam is now a rampant ideology. We have supranational organizations. United Nations, OSCE and the rest.

But at the same time that we have all these global things happening, we have some interesting things happening at the micro level. The sanctity of human life in the West is now overwhelming. Oh my God, somebody got killed! Presidents will change direction because Mrs. Smith died: God, this is utterly unacceptable! So we have this huge sensitivity to casualties in the West. And yet in

some places, particularly when you go to places like India where people die of famine, or indeed in Africa, there is very little sensitivity to casualties. So you have a huge imbalance.

There is a lot of inequality these days, lots of debt. And we also have a world that is much less deferential. So we're in a new world, new loyalties and new everything else. We're in a world where population growth is now huge. I mean, you mentioned nine billion this morning. My calculation is about seven right now, but you were pretty close to that. But I think we can stop at nine, so people say, UN says, if things happen, we will get to nine, we'll plateau. To which my retort is, well, how do you know? Why will it stop at nine? It didn't stop before at 2.3. Why would it stop at nine? And indeed, people will say, and if you look at this graph here, it's almost symmetrical. And you could... There are as many people alive now as have ever lived. That's not actually true. But it wouldn't take much to see that if this thing is totally symmetrical, you would end up with that being true. That's a huge number of people. And when you look at that in terms of the global change, you can end up as you can see with major imbalances. So population is a problem.

I'm not going to go into oil just except that I show you that this is the calculation that was done by a group of researchers that was done for the Canadians. Talking about the fact that there may well be a point where there is maximum oil and there is now a runoff. And if you reduced demand down to the maximum you can reduce demand, there could well be a supply gap. Of course there probably won't actually be a gap. It's just that the other supplies, the costly supplies, will fill the gap and there's no reason why oil couldn't cost two hundred dollars a barrel, three hundred dollars a barrel, or even four hundred dollars a barrel, in order to bridge the gap between demand and supply.

So we have that. We have of course water as a pretty critical thing. But in addition to that, maybe the way in which conflict is taking place has changed as well? We're used to interstate warfare, or maybe civil war. But actually Rupert Smith has said, war amongst states. Substate actors in this state are fighting substate actors in another state. Or regimes over here are fighting regimes over there, but the mass of the population really aren't involved too much at all.

We have this phenomenon: globalization of comms. Why is that important? Well, it's now meant that we fight wars 24/7. Prime Minister Blair could sit, as we know, in Gulf War II and actually watch the predator field. So he can sit there in the office in Number 10 and even watch a predator fly around on his TV, and if he wants to give directions. In fact, in the Kosovo war in 1999 that's exactly what general Wesley Clark, the senior Allied Commander Europe, sitting in his office in Brussels, sat watching the predator field on the telephone giving instructions to somebody down in Kosovo: why are those tanks not being taken out? What, is that what a four-star general's supposed to do? That's what corporals are supposed to be doing, taking out of tanks. A general is supposed to be directing, thinking ahead. But the globalization of communications has given that capability. And so you now have people who micromanage down right at the lowest possible level.

We also have the phenomenon of asymmetry. Now people think that asymmetry is something new. But because if you think about asymmetry, it's always been there. I've shown you that with the chariots. When the chariots come into view for the first time, it's a huge asymmetry. So we think this is something new. But what it does mean is this, that whereas in the past we thought we understood conflict, now we've been in a situation where we try and deter everything we possibly can. We don't want, say, Rwanda to invade Chad – not that this is likely to happen – but

we don't want that to happen, so we think about that and think how we can possibly make sure that it never happens. So we will buy the weapons, we will buy the goodwill, we will do whatever we need to do to make sure that can't happen. So when you're the enemy, if you live in Rwanda, and you know already that major activity is taking place to stop you invading Chad, well, how are you going to do it? You're not going to do it the way people are anticipating it. Because if you do, you're a real fool, you've done exactly what they expected. You must do something they don't expect. Well, what's the effects of that? It's this. They're always going to surprise you because that's the only way to work. Because if you do the straightforward frontal assault, just like battles of the past, then you're going to get a very bloody nose. Unless you have overwhelming capability. But given the fact that there is a huge asymmetry, you don't have overwhelming capability.

So we are walking into this sort of game. And then when we come on to the fact that while the West may be playing one particular game, it may well be that other people are playing a completely different game. And it's very, very difficult then to try and work out what game they play. But here's the big problem as far as the West is concerned these days. We can congratulate ourselves on having huge amounts of power. God, we can blow the world apart twenty times over, destroy the world tomorrow. Can we use it? No.

So we have the power, conventional and nuclear. But there's a problem. There are the sort of things that stop us using our power. Things like legal restrictions, legitimacy, how will our publics react to them. What about straightforward political weakness? So given the fact that you owe fifty divisions, what actually comes out in terms of what the enemy gets to face. Of course, on the other hand the enemy, whoever he may be, he doesn't have much power in the first place. This is the difference. He doesn't have much of a constraints mesh. He can do whatever he likes anytime. So there's no mesh that stops him. Legitimacy? Who cares? He says, you know, might is right. I do what I could get away with because that will justify what I've done.

At the same time for the reasons I've mentioned yet there's this huge assumed vulnerability. Oh my God, Mrs. Smith died, this is the end of the world! So we end up in a position where although hugely powerful, we're almost impotent because of our own restraints and concerns. And yet at the same time the person who has virtually no power has got one gun with couple bullets. He could shoot somebody and we'll all jump to obey, jump to do whatever he wants. So we end up in a situation knowing that we have asymmetry in power, but also a lot of vulnerability in terms of the asymmetry of vulnerability.

So given the solar complicated complex world we have to ask ourselves what people are playing at? And it's not until you ask yourself these questions that you can fully understand quite what is going on.

What's this chap playing at? (*Picture of Kim Jong-il*). Those of us that have seen 'Team America' will recall Hans Brix. There was a sort of continuous competition between Kim Jong-il and Hans Brix. But what is he actually doing? Is he there to try and establish himself as a regional superpower? Is he actually trying to just cement his own family's grip on power? I don't know. Or are there much more subtle and less controversial results that one needs to take into account?

One has to ask as well what this particular gentleman is doing. (*Picture of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad*). No doubt the good doctor here will tell us what he's doing. I mean, does he really want to exterminate Israel? Or is actually his intention to cement his control of Iran and the way that we've seen it is the problems that he has in the election? Or is it going to be a new Persian

empire? Let's take over Iraq. But whatever it is, we can't seem to be getting the message. I'll come back to that in a second. We don't understand what Iran's peaceful program is. We only can see the prospect of an Iranian nuclear bomb. Mohamed ElBaradei (*picture*) looking very awkward, very worried. So what is going on? We need to ask ourselves these questions. What sort of power play is being used here?

And let's not forget that if I come back to our good friend Mr. Ahmadinejad - this particular gentleman here - and this gentleman (*picture of Hassan-I Sabbah*), you will know who they are because I had mentioned them before. This is Hassan. He is the leader of the Assassins, later became an Ismaili sect. And if I just described to you - this is how Marco Polo described the Ismaili sect, or this particular sect. This man, Hassan, he was a regional warlord with a small number of castles in the northern part of Persia. And he wants to become a great regional power. So he had all these aspirations, but of course he didn't have enough troops to be able to do anything with it. And so he thought, well, what I will do in my castle of Alamut, I will create a garden of earthly delights. In the garden of earthly delights was everything a man could possibly want: wine, women and song, as much as you could possibly imagine. And his methodology - and this is Hassan's methodology - was to get a young man from the local village, fill him full of hashish, take him into the top of the castle of Alamut while he was out on hashish. While he was there, he would wake up, he would then have whatever fun and games that he wanted, and then a couple of days later Hassan will appear to see this young man and say, "My son, we are in paradise together." When the young man acknowledged that, he was filled in with hashish again, taken back down to the bottom of the hill, whereupon Hassan would come up to him again and say, "My son, yesterday we were together in paradise. If you wish to return to paradise, this is what you must do. Take this dagger and go to Baghdad and stab the caliph through the heart three times." The reaction of the young man, "My God, I've been to paradise, it's pretty good. I'm in for this." So off he goes to Baghdad and gets killed by the caliph guards. But if there are enough people who go through this process, eventually somebody arrives at the palace and kills the caliph. Whereupon Hassan then sends a letter and it reads: Dear new caliph, I was awfully sorry to hear what happened to your previous incumbent, you can rest assured of my absolute support. I wonder if you would like to help me with a few problems I have. And it doesn't take the new caliph long to get used to the idea that of course if he doesn't come up with the answers or do what Hassan wants, of course he is going to be the next one to have a knife stabbed through his heart.

Now, modern scholars have poured scorn on fact there was this garden of earthly delights. But it is clear that this group of people did use assassination as a method of war. It's also clear that they were high on drugs, hashish mostly, and the modern word 'assassin' comes directly from the word 'hashashin', which is what these people were deemed to have been part of. So they were hashashins. And indeed they were successful until 1256. And unfortunately for them, in 1256 the Mongols turned up, all the castles were captured, all people around the castles were murdered, and the problem just went away. But for a time that method of warfare, that terror of the highest level was extremely effective.

So that sort of sets the scene. Let's bring right up to date and ask ourselves then what all this was about? (*Picture of 9/11 attack*). Well, what was it about? Is it retribution for some imagined slight? Is it punishment to the West because you need to be punished, you haven't done what we've said? Or is it actually a persuasion to make us do what Osama bin Laden advised?

Well, you remember this chap (*Picture of Carl von Clausewitz*) and I gave you these two comments earlier: "War as an act of human intercourse." "It's an act of force to compel our enemies to do our will." And you'll remember that of course war is also "politics by other means." So a whole lot is wrapped up together.

Let's just talk a little bit about how you use this thing called force. Well, we've seen how power is used. Louise de Kérouaille used her power in one particular way, by crying at the appropriate moment, being flexible at other moments. She had power. And of course we've also seen how the assassins managed to use their power.

Let's try and break it down a little bit. Force really has these two components, and the components are denial and coercion. Now, let me just talk through those for a second. Let's look at the denial, this is all about the ability to use force in a physical sense. And you can use force to constrain or destroy. Let's say an enemy has an army of 10,000 people. I can go along and put a nuclear weapon on them and guess what, they're all dead, I have now destroyed them, the problem has gone away. I have destroyed them. Alternatively, I can find they still got 10,000 people I didn't drop a nuclear weapon on, but they got across a river. So what do I do then, essentially I knock down all the bridges so they can't get across. So I have denied the enemy the opportunity to use its army to come against me. I have denied him the opportunity. So I either destroyed him, or I constrained him, or I covered him with liquid, or whatever it is, and stopped him from moving by using non-lethal weapons. But I stopped him from doing whatever it was. That does not include any form of psychological warfare, it's purely physical.

But what about the coercive side, the psychological side? Let's just talk a little bit more about that for a second. What are the options that really come out? So if I got all this force, what's sort of things can I do?

Well, let's go back to Saddam Hussein and Kuwait. So the August of 1990 Saddam Hussein is in Kuwait, we could have said to him, Dear Saddam Hussein, if you don't get out of Kuwait by Christmas, you will need to (*inaudible*) Baghdad. That would be a threat. Now, whether they'd believe it or not, that's another matter. But that would be a threat. Or if you don't get out of Kuwait by Christmas, we're going to invade. But you're saying, unless you do something, I'm going to do something really nasty. So that's one.

The next one you can do is just hurt somebody. And that really is reflected by Demosthenes and Pericles' strategy: if you invade Athens or invade Attica, I will go around the corner and kick the hell out of Pylos, or I'll go to, I don't know, wherever it might be. And I will cause all sorts of hurt and damage in the middle of Sparta, but I'll make it not profitable for you to continue what you do. And I'll keep doing it every time you invade Attica.

And the final option that you have is to punish somebody. But of course, the trouble with punishment if it's not done with the idea of making them conform, I mean, all you're really doing is just motivating yourself, building your own population up to make them feel happier. You know, they invaded Kuwait so let's punish somebody else. Who is it who actually caused it in the first place we will punish them. And that makes us feel better about the whole thing. You've done something I don't like, this is our chance to get revenge. But at the same time maybe it's a deterrence for the future. So that's the sort of element that you have in terms of that.

But that of course is all psychological. So we can use force as you can see in a denial or physical sense, or in psychological sense. But the truth of the matter is that of course even as you go down

the physical side, there's always a coercive pay off. And the closer you get to actually destroying something, the closer you get to persuading them, it's a good time to surrender.

But let's just think for a second. I've talked about force. What other instruments of power could we perhaps apply? Let's just think about sanctions. South Africa, when it had the apartheid regime, we can go a denial type of thing, we can destroy the crops, or we can constrain them so they can't physically have baked beans, or weapons, or whatever it is you don't want them to have. But what you're hoping for is that will then produce a coercive type of strategy that will make them then give in. But nevertheless, you do it in the physical sense in order to hopefully have some sort of a coercive pay off.

Diplomacy. You could do the same sort of thing diplomatically. I'll talk about it a little bit more. But you can try and prevent them from getting friends and keeping them isolated in order to have some sort of coercive pay back. So they can fall to what it is you want to do.

Then, of course, we come on to this one: cyber IT. We can take out their banking. We can take out their money supply and take their money away. We can go to Milosevic's account and take his money away, then to his uncle's account and take his money away. And ultimately of course he's been denied the ability to use his money in order to make him do what it is we want him to do.

And then, of course, we come on to the final one, which is not far from anybody's minds, and as many husbands will know there is of course a denial aspect of sex which produces a coercive outcome. Probably that's not politically correct to say things like that.

So we talked about the ways in which you can use power. Let's now talk about what we mean by the semantics of power. And you'll probably know Joseph Nye talked about soft power and hard power. Now, most people think of soft power being the carrots. But actually he wasn't talking about that. He was talking about soft power being the context. And I'll give you an example. Many parts of the world will drink Coca-Cola, eat hamburgers, and walk around wearing jeans, and that is the soft power. And they think it's really great to do these sorts of things. It doesn't necessarily mean they will do what you want in terms of foreign policy and the ways in which you wish them to behave. But when you come onto the hard power, the carrots and the stick is the combination of these two together that actually often produce a sort of outcome that you are after. So let's concentrate now on this area, because this is the background, and this is the methods by which you are going to try and persuade or coerce somebody into doing something.

So let's talk about coercion. Conventionally, coercion has been typified as having deterrent and repellent aspects. And I want to just talk about deterrents and repellents separately. I'm grateful to a chap and friend of mine John Harvey who wrote this particular thing on deterrence. But I think it's nevertheless a good starting position for what I'm going to talk about, which is the more coercive aspects.

We tend to think of deterrence as meaning this (*Picture of a nuclear explosion*). You recall, initially when the nuclear weapon was first produced, of course Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and if Japan did not surrender, there would have been a third one. But of course there was a huge asymmetry. The nuclear weapons were designed to persuade the Soviet Union not to do this, this and this and take over the rest of Europe. So there was a nuclear theology that developed. Then they got a nuclear weapon, then we had a nuclear balance, mutually assured destruction, remember MAD - mutually assured destruction - was the watchword of the 60s, 70s and 80s.

Because both sides could destroy the other with nuclear weapons. So you have a sort of balance. But that's great theological stuff. But that's not really what I want to talk about here.

This is a form of deterrence (*Picture unclear*). You know World War I was the war to end all wars. There was never ever going to be another World War I. And for many it was believed. This would never be allowed to happen again. It deterred a number of states from even contemplating war. The Germans on the other hand thought themselves aggrieved because they've been stabbed in the back. And they were determined to readjust the balance. But for the West, particularly the Allies, they ended up in a situation where they deterred themselves. and so you end up in a situation where the Germans were less deterred because they hadn't agree to this, and they were prepared if necessary to go back and do this again, whereas the West will say never again will we allow that to happen. So now you have a huge asymmetry in power, because the Germans are prepared to hazard everything and the West goes, no chance. And indeed I saw, there was a thing on TV last night, I don't know if anyone else saw it, talking about what happened when the Germans invaded Poland. It was news to me until a few years ago that the French actually marched forward as the Germans punched into Poland, the French said we will support our Polish allies and we will invade Germany. And they marched right up to the border line. That was a total distance of eight kilometers and it never went any further. Because they could not bear the thought of what might happen next. Had they punched on and continued punching on, there was at least some chance that Hitler would've had to bring divisions back from Poland and probably he would've stopped whatever he was doing. So self-deterrence played a huge role in forcing us into weakness.

But what do we mean by deterrence? Well, this is the classical sense: "(...) the state of mind brought about by a threat of retaliation (...)." Whatever you plan cannot succeed, the costs will exceed any gain, failure of costs and the consequences. That's a very logical statement. You can imagine somebody sitting down and drafting that out and saying, this is what deterrence is really all about. But the problem with that sort of methodology is that it almost completely ignores the psychology. It assumes that one is going to be entirely rational with a whole situation. You assume rationality: he's going to look at the expecting costs and the benefits or alternative courses of action and he'll make a logical choice. So Saddam Hussein thinking about whether to invade Kuwait: what's in it for me and what are the downsides? You know you produce a balance sheet. Okay, on the good side I get a huge oil field. What are the downsides? Nothing at all. She (the US ambassador) said it was okay. Off you go, easy. But because it doesn't quite work like that, it's not quite as simple as that. You can't just do it as a mathematical equation.

And the problem is that rational actors don't really work in this particular way. Go back to the Falkland Islands in 1982. Same sort of fault process would have gotten through. Oh my goodness, can we take the Falklands, what should we do about taking them? Is there a deterrent posture? And of course these things become far more built up in terms of what the junta thought in Buenos Aires, and why they needed to attack the Falklands rather than straight forward cost-benefit analysis.

But let's say that somebody does decide to set up a deterrent posture. And that deterrent posture then fails. Let's say, for example, taking the Falklands as an example, we've sent a company of Marines down to the Falklands and then the Argentineans hastily invaded. So our deterrence posture has not worked. What then do we need to do? Well, the answer is, we now need to think about coercion options. And of course once deterrence has failed, then we end up in a situation where things have changed. And it's really this way. When you set up a deterrent posture, the

choice is with the person who is actually starting the campaign. So Saddam Hussein is being deterred from invading Kuwait. But once he invades Kuwait, now the choice passes to you, the assailant, and you must decide what to do with it. And you've got to decide what will be necessary to get back to where you were before. And it's pretty clear that if you put a company of Marines in the Falklands and that did not deter the Argentines, putting another company of Marines is hardly going to kick them out. So whatever you do now is going to be much, much bigger and stronger and harder than the first action that you took to deter them. So now everything comes to you. You now have the choice - Oh my God, what should I do? - and you now have to come up with a force level or the coercive methodology that will be strong enough to achieve what it is you want to work.

But of course now the problem is that there may be a cost asymmetry. So going back to Kuwait, or indeed the Falklands, once you've got possession of that particular new land, what are you prepared to do now in order to retain it? And quite often that's where the asymmetry is: the person who's gained something will do an awful lot to keep it rather than the person they've only had a lukewarm feeling about it in the first place.

So let's see what you should do when you're going to go now for your coercive action. And conventionally - this is purely conventionally - the targets of your coercive force, whatever it might be, Louise de Kérouaille, or nuclear weapon, whatever you're going to use, falls into one of these three categories. So you could either attack the leadership, or population, or the armed forces. Now, you come up with your own list. I mean there are maybe original chieftain that happens to sit down here somewhere who's separate from the armed forces and maybe this is the guy you need to attack. And indeed, as you probably know, on the opening night of Gulf War Two an attempt was made to kill Saddam Hussein at the outset. The intelligence was received that Saddam Hussein was at a certain location. Here was a B-1 bomber which was overhead Baghdad at the time. He was ready to put a bomb on the target, he did so within twenty minutes of the decision being taken. Unfortunately Saddam Hussein had just left. Now, that would have been coercively a great victory. Because those that were left, the remainder of the Republican - what was it - Council would probably have said we don't want to continue with this, let's give up, let's find a way out of this. So may well be that that would have been a very lucrative target on this particular list: top leadership, population or armed forces.

Now, let me just try and be a bit more specific about this. Let's think about Hiroshima at the end of World War II. So what were Hiroshima targets? We're going to use that coercive force. Hiroshima - wrong. We're not targeting the population. The people in Hiroshima are dead. Sixty thousand people died at Hiroshima and unfortunately they had to do the dying so that the pressure could be applied there (*Points at the leadership*). That's the target, not the people that had to do the dying.

If we then look at what happened in Kuwait, who was the target? Well, in that case it was the armed forces. And it really was the armed forces because once they had given up, it didn't matter what Saddam Hussein was all about. They would get up and run away. We have regained Kuwait. So you have to try and be very selective in who you target. Because if you get the wrong one, take World War II. We, as you recall, in World War II did strategic bomber campaign supposedly against the population. Did it work? Well, in some senses it probably did because it's certainly demotivated the German population. But did it actually cause the end of the war? Well, no, the answer is it didn't, because the Gestapo were making sure no one gave up. So we need to think in terms of not only your coercive force and who you target, but also in terms of the counter

coercive force. So the question you have to ask yourself is this one: who is the power broker? Who's the man that can influence what is going to happen? Who's the person you're going to go after? Don't forget he's not the person he is going to die. This is the decision maker. The people that die are the people that are going to influence him to make the right decision. And that is really the question that comes through next. What destruction or what sort of pressure are you going to put on this man in order to get him to change his decision, change his mind, do whatever you like.

Let's look at Kosovo for an example. So let's take this one. The Kosovo campaign of '99, you'll recall, it lasted - the air campaign, there was no ground campaign - it lasted seventy eight days. Quite a long time. Pretty similar in real terms to what happened in Gulf War I. 38,000 air sorties were flown of which 10,000 were attack sorties. That seems like quite a lot until you recall what did I say of a number of attack sorties flown on the first day on D-day. On D-day we flew 14,000 attack sorties and this is 10,000 attack sorties over 70 days. So you can see it's not anywhere near that.

So what are we actually thinking we're doing? Well, this is what SACEUR thought we were doing. SACEUR, Senior Allied Commander Europe, sits in NATO and he directs that we will attack the armed forces in the field, and by attacking the armed forces in the field Milosevic will give up and that will be the end of the problem. But that actually didn't work too well, because General Mike Short who was the air commander, who was sitting down the Aviano Air Base in northern Italy, his view was that actually you need to attack the leadership directly. And so his campaign was to go directly for the heart of the leadership in Serbia and take out all the devices that supported Milosevic: the factories that he owned, his cousins' factories, the banking that he owned, great long targets set. But nevertheless by attacking both of those the effect was that Milosevic was persuaded. As it turned out, the attack on the armed forces probably didn't produce much effect at all. And the real thing that caused Milosevic to give in was the bombing directed against Serbia, its infrastructure and everything else. So the question is then why was it that Milosevic capitulated? Well, what was it then? Was it NATO air power? Okay, maybe. Was it the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, because they told Milosevic he was up for charges? Was it the Russian factor? You'll probably remember, but Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin went to see Milosevic, I think it was twice during the course of the campaign. And then the last time they made it absolutely clear to him that the Russians were not like the 7th Cavalry going to come over the hill and get him off the hook. "You are Mr. Milosevic by yourself, you will be by yourself, and you've got yourself into this bloody muddle, and get yourself out of it. There is no other help." Was it that? Or was it the threat of the land operation that was sitting on the border? Well, the answer is actually very simple. It's all of the above. Because he is a person and these pressures are bearing down him. And you come through to what I've sort of described: the suicide theory of coercion. And that is - I don't know how many have actually considered suicide, but I'm sure somebody here has actually considered suicide. But the thing that actually drives you over the edge to actually fire the bullet or cut your wrist or whatever it is you're going to do, is not the most important thing. You know, the dog has died, the money is all gone, my wife has left me, the house has fallen apart. Oh my God, it's all terrible. You're going to a bit of a stew and then suddenly, I don't know, the light bulb fails. Ah that's it, I've had enough. And you commit suicide because the light bulb failed. You commit suicide because you know they are upon you, they cumulate. And there's just the final thing that makes you finally go. And almost certainly, because he's a person, you know, there's this huge air power, there is this and it's all coming together and he finds himself in a situation that he can't get himself out of.

So that's perhaps why Milosevic gave up. So what did he do to sort of counter, to try and offset this? Well, as you'll recall, I mean what he actually did was he tried to convince the West, that, you know, this was not a battle he should be prosecuted for. So what did he do? Ethnic cleansing, raping of women and children, genocide of women and children, mass deportations. So the West instead of going along to the leadership and saying, "Oh my goodness, let's stop doing this, it's terrible," actually had said, "Let's get this bloke because he's nasty." What he wanted to do was to appear a victim: oh my God, this is poor Milosevic, they're bombing my own forces, they're attacking me directly, I've done nothing wrong. You know it's all your fault. Well, that was the message he tried to get across. But doing a bit of rape and genocide and deportations and ethnic cleansing did not help his case. So arguably, he shot himself in the foot. And that of course then recreates the situation.

Let's have a look in general terms at the current situation in Afghanistan. What are we trying to do in Afghanistan? And I think when you start to look at these sort of issues, the Afghan game plan begins to make a little bit more sense.

ISAF. Well, we could attack the leadership, and that's presumably the Taliban leadership, the population or the armed insurgents. What we actually do, of course, is trying to take out the armed insurgents in order to create the situation so the population feels secure. That is what ISAF is trying to do. So the population in turn will engage their leadership and say, we feel secure, there isn't a problem. So that is the coercive tactic to make the population feel secure. Which is why general Stanley McChrystal has realized that he can actually go to the population and tell them they're being secure, give them money and make them feel happy and contented. There's a two-pronged attack. And that way you will eventually get to a situation where the population will feel happy.

What are the Taliban doing on the other hand? Well, of course they're trying to do a different thing in time. They're going after the Western population - this is not their own population - they're trying to impose civilian casualties and military casualties through the Western media, because these people are the agents of the Taliban and that's essentially what is happening. The Taliban are very happy about that. There are free propaganda devices, it's called the Daily Mail or the Daily Sun, even the BBC. So they are using the media to get the message across to the Western population. Because if the Western population say that's unacceptable, they'll go to their leadership and say, "Let's get out of Afghanistan." Who does the dying? Well, the Western public don't do the dying. It's the Afghans that will do the dying, but they're not the target. These are the target. That's the group they're trying to reach, make the Western population give up and their leadership will get out of Afghanistan. It is actually as simple as that. Unfortunately, until we appreciate this and start taking action, which McChrystal has started to do, we're never ever going to achieve a success.

But let me try and go through some examples to give you some idea of sort of success rates. And I can't go through all these campaigns even if we could or wanted to. Leadership campaigns: World War II versus the Japanese, Hiroshima and Nagasaki failures. Leadership campaign: US against the Vietnamese leadership. Didn't work. World War II in Europe. That failed. And then we come on to population attacks. Vietnam versus the USA population - that was a success. The Vietnamese coerced the United States population and they essentially persuaded the leadership to give up on Vietnam and get the troops home. So that was a coercive success. Failures. You'd see that. But here we are. Taliban versus the Western public - you'll see I've put some sort of hovering between the two. But if you understand that is the population aspect, then we can have

some sort of meaningful discussion about it. Armed forces. Well, generally there's been pretty successful coercive attacks against the armed forces, largely because there's quite a lot of denial in this and so these can be normally seen as less successful in a denial sense. Failures: US versus the Vietnamese arguably was a failure.

But if you then put them all together and try and work it out. Leadership. It can work pretty well. Population. Very difficult to say. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't. Armed forces. The reasons that I said quite often does work if you understand what you're doing.

But when you apply this carrots and sticks coercive force, what should you use then in order to generate the sort of outcomes that you're after? Well, if you're gonna bomb them, then that's great, because you impose pay and once you've bombed them, that's pretty good and indicates resolve. The sinking of the Belgrano in 1982 demonstrated the Argentineans, to the Americans and to the British people this was for real. We'll sink the Belgrano, there's no doubt anymore, this is now going to happen. It's like sort of nailing your colors to the mast.

Pain. The very thing about pain is actually if you bomb them, and then bomb them tomorrow, and then bomb them the next day, it all starts to add up. A bit like the suicide case. It accumulates as time goes by. And it often escalates as time passes as well. It's very difficult to perpetuate the pain. I remember when I was a schoolboy I used to get beaten. And I have to tell you that being beaten the second time was in some ways worse than being beaten the first time. And when you're beaten the third time you probably don't want it to happen too much again. So it tends to build up. But what it also does is it builds resentment. So you think as a result of the pain, I dislike you intensely. And so if you're going to use pain as the only method, force as the only method, there's a good chance that you're going to build up resentment. This is what happened to Germany in between the wars. The end of World War I, the Versailles settlement: they had used all these things on me. And Germany - let's not forget - Germany was not defeated in the field, the army was still intact. They never signed an instrument of surrender. Because this is whole part of the business - lots of pain, lots of coercion. They finally agreed to stop, declared an armistice but the resentment was there.

How about reward? Well, reward is often a one-off. I'll give you money, I'll give you a million pounds. Am I going to give you a million pounds today, than a million pounds tomorrow, or just as one off. And once you've got the million pounds, what do you then do? Put it in your pocket and do what you've been asked to do? Or you just go, thanks very much, that's very nice. So perhaps it's only a one off. And once you got it, it has little coercive effect. I remember one very senior officer telling me that he couldn't wait to be knighted. Whole of his life he wants to be knighted. And finally he was knighted but once of course he got it, it was of zero value, because he now was a knight. It's about like getting your doctorate. I can't wait till I get my doctorate. Now I'm a doctor! But once you are a doctor, you're a doctor. It becomes the new norm. And the trouble with getting a reward is that quite often it creates an expectation that you're going to get something more next time round. so if you give someone a lot of money, then in order to get you to continue to conform and to be compliant you're going to have to give them even more money the next time around.

Well, of course if you're going to use force in classic ways of using coercion, you better consider some other things first before you go and bomb them. What do your populations think about this? Some people don't have to worry about that but others do. What about third-party reaction? What might the Russian reaction be? Might be they suddenly produce sixteen (*inaudible*) and

come drive it straight into Kosovo. So you better understand that as well. But the first step if you're going to use this thing is to establish your credibility and demonstrate its impotence. Which is why air superiority over the area is such a fundamental thing. Because having established air superiority, having established your dominance, and then it's perfectly clear to the person you are persuading that you have all the cards in your hand and he has none of the cards in his hand.

So we've done all this. We've demonstrated that we've got the result, we've demonstrated his impotence – he can't argue about it – and we've demonstrated to him that we have all the cards. But then you're coming through to this idea of what does credibility mean? Well, it's something to do with your resolve and your capability. If I wanted to coerce the Argentines to get out of the Falklands, I could say things like if you don't do such-and-such, I'm gonna bring my massive fleet and I'm going to do this, this and this. Now, do they believe me or don't they believe me? That's the question you have to judge. And you can measure capability of course, but the problem is you can't always measure a resolve.

This is an interesting thing. This is what happened during the Kosovo war, Wesley Clark declared, "We're going to attack, destruct, degrade, devastate (...) destroy." That looks very good. It was very, very good. If you were sitting in Belgrade and you heard these words, you might think, hm, this is not particularly what I want to hear. I mean, diplomatic niceties may be more appropriate, but I didn't want to hear this. But then of course they would think about it and think, well, okay, can he really achieve this? And then you come on to this: it's only the target's perception that counts. You may have lots of credibility, lots of resolve, lots of capability. But if they don't believe you, then you're going to get ignored.

So let's just bring us all the way through to the reactions that you get to coercion. That comes down basically to this thing: psychology and the stress versus time. Many of you have seen a graph like this. If I increase stress on an individual, then actually his performance will rise and then eventually after he's maxed out and he can't perform anymore. His performance will then start to drop off. I'm sure you would see that sort of graph in the past.

What you want to think about is what happens if the stress is put on too quickly? If I opened the door and brought a lion in here, I would get some very interesting reactions. Some of you would jump out of the door, others would fall in the corner and cry for mum, and some would say I'm really strong and try and take the lion on. But the stress factor would be very high and you would do all sorts of things which would be very unexpected, probably very irrational. So that tends to be the sort of reaction you get also to bombing. There's irrationality, the sudden reaction. But conversely if I were to apply the stress over a much longer time, you can tolerate much higher levels of stress, and the deterioration is much less rapid. Well, this is sort of like bombing, and this is quite often what happens in terrorism. So for a population reacting this way, that's the sort of way in which it quite often works.

So it becomes important when you're trying to look at this: what is the gradient of this application, and what is the intensity that's actually applied to a country? And if we then try and work out what might happen in the future – that is of course what people do, they try and think, "well, here I am now, what's likely to happen as time goes by?" if I then tell them that I'm going to do something and I start to apply a coercive effect, then you can start to see that as – this is a state that, let's say, has gone to war – as the build-up to war has happened, the war has then taken place and the war has then finished. What was the state's performance? Well, as the war started

they built up, built up and then they won. So performance stays high for a long time, and there's a lot of euphoria, the stress comes off, everybody has a good time and you've now won the battle. What happens on the other hand if it's gone the other way and you're actually losing the battle? Well, the war is still going to come, the stress is still building up. But now guess what? We're starting to lose the battle. So what happens to the state's performance? Well, state's performance will rise initially. But now it all goes pear-shape and it drops off and eventually comes back to a very low level, and then finally flattens out as peace then comes. So you end up in performance reaching the peak and then falling off. This is largely what happened to Germany in '44-'45. State performance was dropping, dropping, dropping all the time, and although the final defeat actually came on the 8th of May, by this stage down here it was already pretty clear that it's going to be defeated.

So, as far as the victim is concerned, it's important that we do the things that I've got here. We must create an impression in the mind of the person you're controlling that he is incapable of controlling the outcome of events. So whatever you're going to do to him, you must make it pretty hard, but still there's more in your quiver. You haven't run out of options but yet you must know what he expected and then go well above his expectations.

So how will you do that? Let's just talk about concentration of pressures. There are all sorts of weapons in your arsenal if you are a state. And I've mentioned a few of them.

Diplomatic: isolating diplomatically, apply a diplomatic offensive with the coercive aspects that I've mentioned.

Economic: apply sanctions. These do not work all the time as South Africa proves, because rulers can exploit shortages and they could find means of overcoming them. And indeed Saddam Hussein, you recall, we denied him weapons, we also gave him lots and lots of medicines for his children. all he did was take all the medicines, put them into a lock up so nobody got access to them and then handed them out as if they were his own in order to make him seem that he was the man who was the great giver of good things. But economic sanctions can work on what offers leverage. And of course this is Russia trying to use oil imports against Ukraine.

Military: I won't say too much about this because I think we've gone through that so I shall leave that.

Cyber: physically you could take down his IT, you can destroy his bank account, you could take out his cash from his bank accounts, particularly those that were in Switzerland. But of course in doing the cyber physical activities, you're also going to have psychological activities as well. Put viruses into the system, make his computers run slow. Everything takes longer, so none of the cash dispensers work. Cause a crash or threaten to cause a crash and then finally take cash away from him so he can't actually do anything. I could go through these and I'm not going to go through them in too much detail.

Media offensive: this is another option that could be used. Obviously, newspapers and the other option is to use something like this: this lady on Al-Jazeera, I'm not sure that she presents necessarily the right sort of message for what is trying to be a very serious assessment of what is going on. What sort of things could you use? Official announcements, broadcasts, propaganda, leaflets.

Psychological: Use these sorts of things through the media. Can be very, very effective. Let's not forget Dr. Joseph Goebbels in World War Two who did virtually all of this with a considerable amount of success not only against the allies but also to re-motivate his own population.

Let me now come to intelligence. Why is intelligence important? Well, sometimes you want him to know about it because it demonstrates your power. I am all-powerful, I handle this side. So you can let him know your capabilities, your deployments. On the other hand you might want him to guess, you want to deceive him, you want to exaggerate things to make him in some sort of doubt.

There are several religious and ideological things you could do. Threaten to destroy his mosques, legislate against his interests. This was done, well, I mean, Louise de Kérouaille, the Catholics in Britain. They were discriminated against. That was of course done for a particular physical reasons. But of course you can use the ideological as a weapon. I mean, not forget, we used to burn people at the stake. Catholics and Protestants, it was very common, people were burnt at the stakes during the Bloody Mary's rule. Public opinion: undermines his religious credibility. And all these things can be done.

I just show you these not because I suggest you to do it. I'm not suggesting you go ahead and do ethnic cleansing. But you need to be aware that these things can be done against you. These are options. And unless you are aware that they can be done you're going to be wrong footed. Genghis Khan. Tell me Genghis Khan, how do you get on with your neighbors? Very well, I don't have any neighbors. The reason was he got rid of them. Psychological ethnic cleansing. Terrorism. Bosnia '93-'95. Rape as a method of war. And if you think that that is something that is new, I'm sure I don't have to remind you that when Berlin fell, a 100,000 rapes were reported from the three days that the red army took possession of Berlin. Those were the ones that were reported, a hundred thousand. And indeed if you go back into history, many armies that have moved into an area, rape as an act of war, but for start you can increase the number of children of your army but also of course it means that the woman is unclean, probably will no longer procreate again.

So when we bring all this together, what I'm suggesting to you, this is the key. But as you start to use these various instruments, the sanctions, the sort of profile of how sanctions produce stress against time (*inaudible*), have a little offensive here, Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin turn up but that doesn't work, they come back later and shout a bit louder. And then we put in some bombing. That sort of thing starts a bit later and then bombing takes place. When you have put all this together, what you're actually after is what I best described as a synergy. Because as you add up all these things together you will end up with this sort of peak. And this sort of peak, the final yellow peak, just like a man who is committing, or deciding whether to commit a suicide, these things are all imploding on you at the same time. And it's not just the one, but it's all of them together that start to produce the effect. And finally, if you do it right, round about here somewhere he'll say, that's it, I'm out of here. I give in, I do what you want. So that is what it's all important about this whole business of coercion is using the instruments that you've got, and I've discussed several of them. And there are a whole lot more. And you can do them in a way that would actually produce the outcome that you particularly want.

But let me remind you of one thing and that was going back to the psychology that I mentioned before, that if you do these things at such a level of pressure that you create rage, then your enemy will appreciate that he's not going to be able to get away with it. He will then fight you and fight you to the end. So you must give him a way out. Because unless you give him a way out,

all you will do is condense in their mind the idea they must fight and fight hard, because there's no other way.

So there, ladies and gentlemen, a psychology of interstate relations coercion. I hope that if you remember nothing, you'll remember that graph, because it tells you everything there is to know about the way in which states behave. And they not just behave towards adversaries. I'm sure it will not have escaped your notice that these things are taking place even between allies. Now we didn't bomb allies, but everything else is being used continuously. So states are being bombarded by coercive pressures. Slowly, subtly but surely. And that way the West - and you remember Tony Blair was considered to be George Bush's poodle - was convinced that he must behave in a way that is compliant towards the United States. Coercive pressures, ladies and gentlemen.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Dr Klearchos A. Kyriakides**

12 February 2010

The Rule of Law and the Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights: Some Reflections in the Light of the Lisbon Treaty

Can I begin by thanking Mr. Pelagias and ERPIC for the invitation to escape England and to arrive under this palm tree to give you a lecture this evening. And you can probably tell I'm recovering from the effects of our freezing cold weather in England and my voice doesn't carry - can you please tell me at the back and I'll raise it.

I'll begin by declaring interest. I am a university lecturer at the University of Hertfordshire where I teach law and I'm also a non-practicing member of the legal profession in England which is under a professional duty to uphold the rule of law - subject matter of my lecture here today. Second declaration of interest is that my paternal grandfather hails from the village of Petra and my maternal grandfather hails from the village of Lysi, both of which are in the occupied area.

So with those preliminary thoughts behind me let me take you to a very dark and troubling place seventy years ago. Seventy years ago the Second World War was unfolding and part of Europe was sinking into the depths of depravity. It is a troublesome thought that exactly seventy years ago today on the 12th of February 1940 the US magazine Time carried an assessment of the Black Guard, the official organ of the SS elite of Nazi Germany. According to Time, exactly seventy years ago today, the Black Guard "teaches young Nazi troopers to believe in the destiny of a German master race." In seeking to give his theory a scientific basis the publisher of the organ Heinrich Himmler maintained a large research staff which analyzed and broke down into racial groups the gallons of human blood it has collected. Himmler was exactly my age at the time. The newspaper - Time magazine - went on to provide an example of nauseating drivel which corrupted the minds of the Nazis and resulted in unimaginable brutality over the next few years. "If he were really a practical God who would see it that law and order prevail, he would have said to himself long since: I had made things hard for the Germans long enough. Now they will finally have some good luck." Well, we know what happened next, but during that sinister period from 1933 until 1945 Nazi Germany engaged in a series of sinister acts which are now considered to be illegal, unethical and unacceptable.

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

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Within Germany itself the Nazis neutralized legal profession at the very outset of their state and power, they co-opted the judiciary, and they introduced the Nuremberg laws and other legislation which discriminated in favor of the German Aryan population and discriminated against others, especially Jews. As a consequence, Jews were not ousted from their properties, but they were also stripped of their right to own property. Jews were detained without trial, incarcerated in concentration camps and condemned to death. Externally Himmler, to quote Richard Evans in his scholarly analysis of the Nazis rise to power, Himmler in common with Hitler believed in the idea of war as the site of human achievement. Nazi Germany therefore waged the crime of aggression by invading, conquering and occupying the territory of other sovereign states. German forces committed ethnic cleansing and created Lebensraum - living space - so that the conquered territories could be colonized by Germans. Hitler established puppet regimes in the conquered territories where law and order were enforced by decree. Any dissidents who voiced any objections were arrested, tortured or killed without due process of law. Aristotle, ladies and gentlemen, was surely right when two and a half thousand years ago he said that "man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all."

Now, we all know that eventually Hitler, Himmler and their cronies met their fate. Europe was rebuilt and the pillars of the rule of law were gradually erected in the form of various legal instruments, including the 1945 UN Charter, the 48th Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1949 Convention on Genocide, the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights, the principles of the Nuremberg Charter of 1950, the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, and the 1957 Treaty of Rome.

All that had me thinking. The British in recent days or months in the UK have been associated with the arguably illegal invasion of Iraq. The British Foreign Office has been pilloried for its involvement in that escapade. And it's true that Iraq in common with Cyprus in '74 and the Suez adventure of 1956 have cast a very dark shadow on the British foreign policy in the UK. But let us not forget that those pillars of international law in post-war period were constructed in large part thanks to the United Kingdom. And its thanks in large parts of British judges that the rule of the law has been elevated to the status it now has in the European Union. That's a very important point. I can easily engage in brick bashing - in fact if there was an Olympic games with brick bashing I think I'd have a very good chance of winning a gold medal. But that's not my job today. My job today is to explain to you the rule of law as it has been articulated primarily by British judges. And this, I believe, perhaps in common with football, whiskey, the English language, the English literature and the internet is perhaps the greatest contribution that the United Kingdom has given to the world - the rule of law.

Let me move on. The British, as we know, weren't at the forefront of the foundation of the European Union. But the Treaty of Rome in 1957 which gave rise to the European Union was of course a response to what the Germans have done in Europe during the Second World War. It's no coincidence that the six founding fathers of the European Union - the West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg - bore the brunt of German aggression during the Second World War. The Community - as it was originally called - was established according to the Treaty of Rome to ensure the development of prosperity in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the UN, and by pooling resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty. This was an attempt in large part not just to give the French and the Germans an opportunity to control Europe in a different form, but to bury the past. The gradual expansion of the European

Union over the past few decades, the evolution of EU Treaty law and the negotiation of the Lisbon Treaty which came into force in December last year must all be viewed against that blood-soaked wartime backdrop. It must also be viewed in accordance with the (*inaudible*) subjugation of the Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union and the subsequent collapse of the Iron Curtain. Today after all a majority of EU member states were once invaded and occupied by Nazi Germany or by the Soviet Union, or, for example in the case of Poland, by both.

Now, let me just ask a question here. How many of you in this room are familiar with the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty? Put your hands up if you are. Can you put your hands up if you claim to be unfamiliar with the Lisbon Treaty? How much media attention was given to the Lisbon Treaty provisions when the Lisbon Treaty was coming into force late last year? In the UK most of the attention was on whether Tony Blair would assume the presidency. Was it the same here? I was watching RIK actually on the day that the Lisbon Treaty came into force and they were preoccupied with other things.

So I'm going to say a few words about the Lisbon Treaty. But it's against that backdrop, against that historical backdrop. What does the Lisbon Treaty do? Well, I'm not an EU lawyer, I teach constitutional law at my university, but I'm not an EU expert. But as I understand it, what the Lisbon Treaty does is three fundamental things of relevance to Cyprus. It does other things as well, but there are three things it does which I think are of a profound importance for Cyprus. Firstly, the Lisbon treaty reinforces and to some extent expands the fundamental human rights and freedoms of EU citizens, including the citizens of this Republic. Now, the European Convention of Human Rights, remember, is a non-EU treaty. It has non-EU parties such as a Turkey and Russia as parties. It's a non-EU treaty. And people confuse the two. The European Convention of Human Rights has given rise to the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights is not an EU court. But over the years, because the EU was established with a human rights ethic, the European Court of Justice – the EU court – has acknowledged human rights law as part of the European heritage.

But what the Lisbon Treaty has done is that it has further enshrined – if I can use that phrase – further enshrined the status of fundamental human rights in EU law. And that's of great importance to this island. The Lisbon Treaty envisages the European Union as a separate legal entity in its own right becoming a party to the European Convention of Human Rights. That's why the Eurosceptics were against Lisbon – it takes us even further perhaps in the federalist direction. Second thing that it does is that the Lisbon Treaty proclaims the provisions in the European Convention of Human Rights as general principles of EU law. Why is this important? Well, it's important because the provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights are our inheritance, they are the response to what the Germans were doing throughout Europe in the Second World War. Article 2 – the right to life. Article 3 – the prohibition of torture. Article 14 – the prohibition of discrimination. Now, there are a number of qualified rights, I know. But these are of great significance to this island and they've given rights to litigation such as the *Loizidou* case. The qualified right to private and family life – the correspondent article 8. The qualified right to property – article 1 of the first protocol of the convention. Remember ladies and gentlemen, none of these human rights were available to the Jews in Germany. And indeed even if they were available to the Jews in Germany, if a Jew had appeared in a court of law in Germany, the courts were corrupted and it would have been impossible for these rights to have been enforced.

So what the Lisbon Treaty does is it further strengthens the human rights in the European Union, at least on the legal basis. What it also does is that it introduces, or brings into force rather, the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Again, hands up if you are familiar with the provisions of this document. Hands up if you're not - be honest (*raises his hand*). Well, I wasn't until I had a look at it a few weeks ago. It reflects pre-existing human rights and pre-existing rights under EU law. But it goes in some respects a little bit further than the European Convention of Human Rights.

I'll just give you an example in reference to the right to property. This is why I was shocked there was little or no media analysis of this on RIK when I was watching in December. This is what the Additional Protocol of the European Convention of Human Rights says on the right to property: "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions." And then there's the qualification which gives politicians wriggle room for qualifying it. But notice: "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions." That's in the European Convention of Human Rights 1950. When you look at the equivalent provision in the Charter of Fundamental Rights at article 17, you find similar wording, but it's couched in better terms: "Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath between his or her lawfully acquired possessions." And then there's qualification. So the lawyers in this room have to look at that and explain it to the public. Because if we lawyers don't explain the law to the public, we can't rely on politicians to do so on behalf of the public.

The next example I just wanted to give you very briefly is the prohibition of discrimination, which outlaws - this is already pre-existing law but the charter reinforces it - it prohibits "discrimination on any grounds such as sex race color ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation." That's quite significant for Cyprus, as indeed it is for every other EU member states.

Now, I'm not going to go on in any further other than to draw your attention to one other provision in the charter. Its article 52 and this allows for politicians to constrict freedom and constrict (*inaudible*). But it allows it in certain very limited circumstances. This is what article 52 says: "Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by this charter must be provided by law and must respect the essence of those rights and freedoms." So there are other provisions. But the point is, you cannot restrict these rights and freedoms in a manner that violates the essence of these rights and freedoms. Think about that, study the Lisbon Treaty, study the Charter of Fundamental Rights and draw your own conclusions.

The third reason why the Lisbon Treaty is so important. I've already mentioned the European Convention of Human Rights. I've already mentioned the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. The third reason why the Lisbon Treaty is so important is related to my theme today: the rule of law. The rule of law has appeared in recent editions of the EU Treaty which is the overarching treaty governing the EU, and the Lisbon Treaty once again underlined the importance of this constitutional principle. The preamble of the EU Treaty - now that it's been amended by Lisbon - specifies that the rule of law is one of the principles to which EU member states are committed. And it goes on to say that the rule of law is one of the common values upon which the European Union is founded. So the European Union which the Republic forms a very small part of is founded on the rule of law. That's a response to Germany under Hitler and the Soviet Union under Lenin, Stalin and Brezhnev.

The emphasis on the rule of law in the EU Treaty is likewise reflected in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. I don't have time to look at this case in any great detail, but I'd like you to draw your attention to the case of Kadi. Has any of you heard of the case of Kadi? Put your hands up. Fantastic. Again, I'm not an EU expert, but as I understand it, in this case of Kadi - this was relating to the post 9/11 events, the UN Security Council resolutions and the introduction by the EU of counterterrorism measures which allegedly infringed on the human rights and the right to property of individuals - the European Court of Justice underlined that, quote, "measures incompatible with respect for human rights, including the right to property, are not acceptable in the EU." In Kadi, the European Court of Justice - it's the EU court, not human rights court - reiterated that "The Community is based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid review of the conformity of their acts with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty, which established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to enable the Court of Justice to review the legality of acts of the institutions." Is anybody here scared that one day politicians might come along and strip you of your rights? Can you put hands up if you are? Well, this is your safety net. The European Court of Justice is there to act as the guardian of the rule of law. The judiciary of your Member State is a guardian of the rule of law. Your legal profession is the guardian of the rule of law. What this case reiterates is that it is not open for politicians or for EU institutions to violate fundamental rights. Now, the politicians might try and find ingenious ways of violating the human rights and gold plating the violations in the form of the law, or legal measures, but it's open to a citizen to challenge the legality of those measures in a court of law. And I have to say, I had to go one step further. If the court held the state is in violation of the law, the states must comply with the court order. And by the same token, if the citizen loses, the citizen must comply with a court order. So the law is no guarantee that you will win. Access to justice did not mean access to victory. It means access to justice according to a court of law. So instruct the lawyers in the room to prepare a case if and when it's necessary to do so. But as we always say, we don't want to resort to litigation, we want to prevent litigation from happening.

So let me just move on and come to the nut of my analysis today. What is the rule of law? Politicians quote from it, cite it, UN secretary generals refer to it. I noticed a while back that Mr. Barroso came to Cyprus and he said that the Cyprus question must be sold in accord with the rule of law. Politicians love this phrase. We were in Afghanistan and Iraq to establish the rule of law. But what does it mean?

The starting point is that the EU Treaty which refers to the rule of law gives no definition. The rule of law appears in the document that solicitors are bounded by - practicing solicitors which I'm no longer one - there's no definition in the code of conduct for solicitors. It's referred to as a concept in our English acts of parliament, the constitution (*inaudible*) 2005 and the Legal Services Act 2007, but there's no definition. And what about great judges in England? I was little bit amused by this. Why does this fundamentally significant phrase appear in all of these treaties, in all of these acts of parliament, but nobody has given us a definition?

That judge, ladies and gentlemen, is unquestionably the greatest judge of recent years, arguably the most distinguished judge of the past fifty years, and that's Lord Bingham of Cornhill. Now, Lord Bingham has the distinction of holding three of the great judicial offices of state in the UK. He's acted as Master of the Rolls, Lord Chief Justice and Senior Law Lord. He originally analyzed the rule of law in a lecture at the University of Cambridge in 2006. The transcript was subsequently published in the form of an article in the Cambridge Law Journal. And a few days

ago quite fortuitously for my visit to Cyprus he published a book entitled “The Rule of Law”. Can I ask if any of you have purchased the book or are aware of its existence? Has it been reported in the Cyprus media? The solution of the Cyprus question, the solution of political problems in Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, everywhere in the world is to be found in this book. Now, I am exaggerating to the extent that I know of the political and practical realities with ensuring that an ideal can be introduced, but if you want a frame of reference, if you want a framework for settling problems on a multi-ethnic basis, here's your framework. It's set out in Lord Bingham's great book. He's written this with the UK primarily in mind, but he has half an eye on the rest of the world, as emerges from his book. So I encourage everybody to purchase this book - 15 pounds from Amazon I discovered yesterday, 20 pounds from bookshops in the UK.

I want to explain to you what Bingham says over the next few minutes. Now, Bingham is aware of the fact that the expression ‘rule of law’ was reportedly originally coined by Professor Dicey, a great constitutional scholar of the Victorian era in the late 19th century when he wrote his great book published in 1885. But point is fairly made that even if Dicey coined the expression ‘rule of law’, he did not invent the idea behind it. Bingham goes on to say one author Brian Z. Tamanaha who wrote a book on the rule of law has traced the idea back to Aristotle who in a modern English translation refers to the rule of law, although the passage more literally translated says “It is better for the law to rule than any one of its citizens.” Aristotle continues, “So even the guardians of the laws are obeying the laws.” So it's essential according to Aristotle that the guardians of the laws comply with the laws. That's the essence of the traditional classical conception of the rule of law.

Now Dicey, I'm only going to go into what Dicey said other than to pinpoint his cardinal principle: nobody is above the law. Bingham looked at Dicey's definition from 1885 and realized this is a concept, a definition reflecting 1885, we need a twentieth century definition against the backdrop of international terrorism, international warfare, and let me add politicians who have little or no understanding of the rule of law - that's my wording, not Lord Bingham's. And this is Lord Bingham's definition of the core of the rule of law: “The core of the existing principle is that all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of the laws publicly and prospectively promulgated and publicly administered in the courts.” Now, by way of caveat Lord Bingham asked that I doubt if anyone who suggested this statement could be applied without exceptional qualification. But any departure from the rule, he says, calls the close consideration and clear justification.

Lord Bingham reminds us of what John Locke said in 1690 shortly after the English Civil War: “Wherever the law ends, tyranny begins.” Now, what does this all mean in practice for you, for me, for the man in the street and woman in the street? Lord Bingham gave us a little bit more meat in the lecture he gave at the International Bar Association in Madrid last year. What does the rule of law mean? It means that all, not some or many, or the poor, or the weak but all should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of the law of the land, whether they're private citizens or ministers or officials or prime ministers, or presidents, or police officers, or soldiers, or whatever. At the heart of the rule of law surely is the principal that the law binds everyone, including the powerful and the mighty. And I would add - this is Lord Bingham - I would add particularly the powerful and the mighty. So the rule of law (*inaudible*) constraint on the exercise of public power and gives effect to the principle enunciated by curious man called Dr. Thomas Fuller in 1733: “Be you never so high, the law is above you.” And that's what I teach my students. Whenever you see a politician grandstanding, remember those words: “Be you never so high, the law is above you”. Whenever you see kids on the street spray graffiti on the wall, be you never so high, the law is

above you. It's a principle of universal application whether you're dealing with a prime minister or a teenager spying graffiti on the street. Or a soldier who's manning a ceasefire line. The law is above everyone.

I just want to now pick out this phrase with reference to Lord Bingham and two other judges, the point about public promulgation, public laws. US Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, he asserted that rule of law means that the people have a right to have a voice in the laws that govern them. So there's a process element to the rule of law, Justice Kennedy says. But it isn't just process. Because the right to participate in government is nothing less than the right to shape your own destiny.

And I'm troubled by this. I'm just going to move on to the next part of my talk. I'm troubled by this because what are we seeing here in the Republic of Cyprus? We are seeing politicians on the executive branch locked behind closed doors with an Australian diplomat who is involved in the invasion of Iraq. They are following the Annan Plan model – what are they doing? They are drafting constitutional, legislative and another legal instruments which are going to affect your rights as a citizen of the Republic, my rights as a UK citizen who may be coming over to this country every now and again. They are sitting behind closed doors in secret, members of the executive branch, assuming essentially a legislative function. That's a violation of the separation of powers and the rule of law. That is also, I would add, ladies and gentlemen inherently dangerous. I'm not going to compare politicians here with Hitler and Stalin, but the point remains Hitler and Stalin legislated in secret. There was no public participation in the drafting of laws by Hitler and Stalin. Everything was done behind closed doors. And I've traveled here, and I'm going to just give you a quote from one of our own ministers in the UK if I can find it. This is Kris Bryant MP, our own minister for Europe in the Foreign Office in the UK, as reported by the Athens News: "Lots of people," according to Mr. Bryant, "Myself including did not know exactly what has been designed and agreed so far in the talks relating to the Cyprus question. That is a process the UN takes the leaders through. Sometimes the negotiations work better and are most likely to be successful when they are not scrutinized line by line by the public, by the press, by the media." Mr. Bryant concluded: "It's a bit like mushrooms: they grow best in the dark." Well, we know from our experiences in the UK what happens when you allow politicians to fill forms and draft documents behind closed doors without any public access. And it's thanks to new Labour's Freedom of Information Act that we eventually discovered what was going on behind closed doors in Parliament with those forms and those documents that were being drafted behind doors without any public participation or sight.

And that just leads me to three key points on the rule of law. The first is, and this is a quote about having closed courts rather than closed legislative drafting, it's a quote from Judge Keith of the US Court of Appeals: "Democracies die behind closed doors." Remember that. The second quote is from Epictetus, the stoic philosopher: "No great thing is created suddenly, any more than abunch of grapes or a fig. if you tell me that you desire a fig, I answer you there must be time. Let it first blossom, then bear fruit, then ripen." And I would add a fig needs fresh air and sun on it.

Now, I'm conscious of the time, I'm going to try and finish within the next ten minutes if I may. I'm going to take you to Lord Bingham's eight sub-rules, because he realized his definition of the rule of law is generic. It requires clarification for it to be understood properly. So let's have a look at Lord Bingham's eight sub-rules or principles. Sometimes he calls them sub-rules, sometimes he calls them principles. And I think these are of great importance to Cyprus, because you can have a settlement and a constitutional settlement, constitutional settlement I would suggest has

to be built around these eight sub-rules, and if they're not built around these eight sub-rules, then you're asking for trouble in the form of an absence of the rule of law. So let's have a look at the eight sub-rules. I'm just going to skate over these.

One, the law must be accessible and as far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable. Two, questions of legal right should be resolved by the application of law and not the exercise of discretion.

Now I'm thinking of the settlers. I'm hearing in the media 50,000 are going to stay, 50,000 are going to go. You don't deal with human beings on the basis of discretion. You deal with human beings on the basis of legal principle. And it's clear from the Geneva conventions that if Turkey has brought any settlers over, then a war crime has been committed. But you don't respond to a war crime by perpetrating another war crime in the form of sending the police round arresting people who happen to be on a list of names. The settlers, if there are settlers here, they need to go, I mean the settlers should go under any settlement. Settlers should be subject to a process involving principles. They should be subject to a process involving due process. They should be given an opportunity to reject or challenge the deportation order if a deportation order is served on them, and they should have a right to appeal in a court of law to defend themselves. And if a court of law decrees that they are in breach of the law and they must go, so be it. But you cannot have a situation where politicians behind closed doors are cooking up deals with numbers. You have to have a legal basis for any settlement. So that's the second point.

Thirdly, the laws of the land must apply equally to all, subject to extensions. So citizens of the Republic should be treated but on one basis, other people should be treated on the same basis, unless you can justify the distinction as in the case of illegal aliens, for example.

Fourthly, the law (*inaudible*) adequate protection of fundamental human rights.

Five, access to justice is essential.

Six, ministers and public officials on all levels must act reasonably, in good faith and within the established grounds of judicial review.

Seven, the adjudicated procedures of the state must be fair.

And eight - and this is key - the rule of law requires compliance by the state with its obligations in international law.

And in a recent lecture Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, the Senior Law Lord who succeeded Lord Bingham in the then House of Lords, now Supreme Court of the UK, picked up this theme of compliance with international law. You cannot have rule of law if the state disregards the rule of law. And Lord Phillips in a speech in Qatar - that's important because our judges in England want the rule of law message to spread beyond the UK and Europe to all corners of the world - Lord Phillips said:

"There are only two ways to resolve the tensions in the world including those which arise from different religions and ideologies. One is war and the other is law. This is how important the rule of law is. Without a universal commitment to the ultimate authority of the law, law founded on principle and administered through independent, stable and respected judicial systems, the world as we know is not going to survive."

Words of Lord Phillips.

He advanced six propositions. First - this is our president of our new Supreme Court in the UK – first, there must be national respect the rule of law. Respect for the rule of law has to be learned and learned. Government must respect the rule of law in their own countries if there is to be any hope that they will respect it in their dealings with each other.

Second, the commitment to the rule of law must be worldwide. You can't just have the rule of law at home and violated externally. And our case (*inaudible*) in relation to Iraq reinforces that.

Thirdly, everyone shares responsibility for maintaining the rule of law.

Fourth, the rule of law requires constant vigilance. The rule of law is never negotiable - not my words, Lord Phillips' words. The rule of law is never negotiable. It's not a luxury item that can be put away in the cellar in times of emergency to be brought out again when things get better. It is never negotiable.

The fifth proposition is that access to justice must be open to all. You can't have political leaders sitting behind closed doors thinking of ingenious ways to ouster the jurisdiction of the court and to close the opportunity for a citizen of Kerynia or by the same token a settler from going to court. Everybody is entitled to the protection of a court of law, whether it's a Greek Cypriot, a refugee from Kerynia, or a settler from eastern Turkey. The outcome of a court decision may be different in either case but both of those types of person are entitled to protection under the law.

And the sixth and final proposition is that dialogue, understanding and mutual respect are the keys to a rule of law strong enough to withstand stresses that lie ahead.

Now I'm going to more or less reach my conclusions. But I want you to understand that the rule of law as set out by Lord Bingham, Lord Phillips and Justice Kennedy is an inherently humane rule of law. It's a rule of law that Lord Neuberger, the Master of the Rolls and Head of Civil Justice, has referred to as just law. But I think there's a certain resonance there and linguistic logic to it bearing in mind the Greek language. The rule of just law which is the phrase used by Lord Neuberger, is in the sense a translation of the Greek phrase 'κράτος δικαίου', which is the way in which the rule of law is translated into the EU treaty. And also it's the phrase that's used by the Cyprus Supreme Court. So the rule of law as we understand in the West equates the rule of just law. It's not the rule of arbitrary law, it's not the rule of Stalinist law, or Leninist law, or Hitlerian law which is "this is what the law says, you must comply with it." Our law is inherently compassionate, humane and based upon fundamental human rights in compliance with international law. And the same goes for rights. The Greek word for rights is 'δικαιοσύνη', which is in (*inaudible*) within the concept of justice and the rule of just law.

And I just think before I reach my conclusions it's important to remind ourselves that the rule of just law is not one and the same thing as the rule of arbitrary law. The rule of arbitrary law is the type of law that was practiced by Hitler's Germany and by the Soviet Union of Lenin and Stalin. And let me read to you Lenin's interpretation of the rule of law. Lenin said the following – and remember Lenin believed in the dictatorship of the proletariat (*inaudible*) means by which the workers could seize property from the landed class and control society. Lenin believed in, quote, "the scientific concept of dictatorship and this means nothing more or less than completely unrestricted power, absolutely unimpeded by laws or regulations and resting directly on the use of force." Now, Lenin wasn't entirely consistent with his views. He did introduce new laws. But

they weren't laws in a modern humane European sense. These were decrees which you had to obey or you were sent to the gulag. To Lenin - as well as Stalin - the law amounted to a cold, blunt, ruthless instrument to sustain the dictatorship, protect the party, seize property and trench communism, (*inaudible*) the state and subjugate the civilians. In other words, the Leninist rule of law was the rule of arbitrary law, or rule by law. It's a philosophical point as well as a legal point, but I want you to grasp it. There's a difference between the rule of just law as we understand it in the EU, and the rule of law as those with an authoritarian mindset perceive it. And this is the twisted logic, ladies and gentlemen, that gives rise to state entering into our lives and taking our property. And I want you to just remember those words of Lenin. Now I have to add here, Lenin was a lawyer by profession, he was versed in Greek as well as Latin, and he was familiar with the works of Aristotle. He wrote so extensively about law, reason, justice, ethics. But Lenin recoiled from the Greek tradition, he recoiled from the European approach to the rule of law, because as he saw it the ancient Greek capitalist society was a democracy, and freedom in capitalist society always remains the same, as it is in ancient Greek republics according to Lenin - freedom for slave owners and anybody else who owns property. So that communist, Hitlerian approach to the rule of law is not what we lawyers in the West believe in. We believe in something that's inherently humane.

I'm now - and you'll be pleased to know - reaching my conclusions. And I'm going to make some quick points here. Lord Bingham - it's only 174 pages. I think Lord Bingham has written it with the layman in mind, he says it in the introduction. This isn't written for us lawyers, it's written for you, for everybody. And I would like to see politicians read that, understand it and embrace the principles.

The next point I want to make in conclusion is that beware of labels. I've said this before in lectures. We lawyers, we look behind the label. We analyze the label but we look behind the label. We're not tricked by what politicians say and how politicians dazzle us. We want to know what is it lurking behind the label.

Next point. I quote Abraham Lincoln: "Let's have faith that right makes might." Not might makes right, but right makes might. And let us also embrace the words of Lord Atkin, the great English judge. He said that "amid the clash of arms the laws are not silent." That was a riposte to Cicero. This is an ancient question. Do you give in to pressure from outside or do you stick to your principles? I would take the view, ladies and gentlemen, that you stick to principles. I would take the view you should resist the temptation to provide legitimization to war crimes and the violations of the rule of law in the forlorn hope that a surrender of your principles will give rise to temporary peace. History shows the temporary peace doesn't last for very long. And I will also remind you of what Anthony de Matos said, the great American International lawyer: question about human rights is not where do they come from, but who is trying to take them away from us.

I've spent far too long on the rule of law. My paper will be circulated at the end of seminar. But I just want you to take these thoughts with you today. Everybody is bound by the law. Everybody is entitled to the protection afforded by the law. In the very worst case scenario everybody has an opportunity to go to court to protect their rights. Nobody is above the law, however powerful they are. Nobody is beneath the law, however poor or weak they are. And the lawyers in this room have a sacred duty, they have sacred duty to uphold this principle. They have a sacred duty to protect the rights of the citizen. And I would call on the lawyers in this room to prepare the

ground for litigation, just in case the mitigation is necessary, in order to challenge whatever may emerge from those mushrooms that are growing in the dark.

The final word must be left to Lord Bingham. I have to finish with Lord Bingham, and this is what he says at the conclusion of this great book:

“What’s the difference between good and bad government? I would answer no doubt predictably the rule of law. (...) In a world divided by differences of nationality, race, color, religion and wealth it is one of the greatest unifying factors, perhaps the greatest, the nearest we are likely to approach to a universal secular religion. [The rule of law] remains an ideal, but an ideal worth striving for, in the interests of good government and peace, at home and in the world at large.”

Thank you.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Costas Frangeskides**

12 February 2010

The Cyprus Issue and the Rule of Law Following Apostolides v Orams

I should make some disclosure myself. As you may know, my firm represented Meletios Apostolides in the recent Court of Appeal Case and (*inaudible*) Justice case where we succeeded in upholding some very important property rights. Mr. Apostolides won the case.

I wanted to say that the views I put across tonight are my personal views and not the views of my firm or of Mr. Apostolides.

I'm going to give you the more practical talk tonight. Really what I'll do is take the rule of law and take Klearchos' points and use Apostolides as the case study. The case study we have is a Cyprus issue of course. And at the core, and I was just thinking what is the issue, what is the real issue. And what I want to talk about tonight is the comment that I face many times when people talk about the cases I run - another disclosure I should make is that my father is from occupied Cyprus - is the comment that's often made to me which is that you can't solve the Cyprus issue by legal means. It's only going to be solve through political means. And what I want to do tonight is I want to explain how the rule of law in relation to Cyprus issue must be upheld, has been upheld, and mustn't be forgotten, and we mustn't be frightened of it. Because sometimes we seem to be very frightened of standing up and saying what are our rights and why should we uphold these rights.

Now, I put some questions up and it's the questions I want you to have... This is the case study, this is really what we want to be looking at: has the rule of law been upheld in relation to Cyprus issue? Or have its core principles been diluted? Has the rule of law upheld the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the Republic of Cyprus, the rights of the citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, the obligations? Being British I'm very concerned about the obligations of my country back home in the UK towards the Republic of Cyprus. And to answer all those questions and use the Cyprus issue as a case study because I want to answer that point which often comes up. Don't use legal means, we can only go through the political process. But why do we have the legal process? It is

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

** *Partner, Holman Fenwick Willan*

there for all the reasons that Klearchos has just explained and we mustn't forget that.

In structuring my talk... You'll be happy to hear that I'm not going to spend much time defining the rule of law. I will define the rule of law briefly, I will look at it in relation to the English and the EU legal context. I will then look at some international law provisions as they apply to Cyprus issue. I'm going to look at it from the point of view of the UK under English law and that's how the Apostolides case will be treated in the courts of the UK, in the court of England, in the court of appeal, but also the European Court of Justice. And I will conclude. Again, I'm not going to repeat what Klearchos said. I do like John Locke's definition "wherever law ends, tyranny begins." I've also quoted Thomas Paine, one of the founding fathers of the US, the United States of America's constitution, that "... in America the law is King. For as in absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and there ought to be no other."

Again, some definitions, I think I won't dwell on these tonight. I'll get to the core. Obviously the rule of law usually implies that politicians and officials must have legitimate foundations based on authority granted and upheld by law and an independent judiciary and that the state should not be able to interfere with the rights and liberties of individuals other than in extreme situations. Now again going back to something that Klearchos mentioned, there are some jurists and legal philosophers who obviously say the ultimate rule of law has no substantive content. Say, you have a dictatorship and non-democratic legal system, that's probably the most effective rule of law. However the rule of just law in an open liberal democracy of course must have thought adequate protection for fundamental human rights. And that's at the core of the rule of law in our constitution in UK and the EU. Of course all of this is really reinforced by the preamble to Universal Declaration of Human Rights which takes that "it is essential if man is not to be compelled to have recourse as a last resort to rebellion against tyranny and oppression that human rights should be protected by the rule of law." European Court of Human Rights again refer to rule of law as being the notion from which the whole convention draws its inspiration.

Look at an English context. I want to reinforce this because it's very important as a background as to why the rule of law is so significant when we discuss the Cyprus issue and what the political powers have sidelined. And I want to bring it back to the fore again.

Lord Hope in a case in 2005: it is no longer right to say the parliament's freedom to legislate admits of no qualification whatever. "The rule of law enforced by the courts is the ultimate controlling factor on which our constitution is placed." Then a very important act, 2005 act which for the first time enshrined the principle of independence of the judiciary in the United Kingdom, and also clearly says "the act does adversely affect the existing constitutional principle of the rule of law."

Again, in an EU context, the Single European Act of 1986 provided judicial recognition: "The EU is a community based on the rule of law." So that's the EU context. Legislative recognition in the EU, the Treaty of European Union: "The European Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law." Principles which are common to member states. Even going as far as Article 49 which demands that prospective members respect the rule of law. And as one particular prospective member we're well aware of at the moment who would like to become an EU member Turkey must be reminded about that now and then.

Article 7 of Treaty of Nice allows the suspension of existing members in the event of its violation. So again, we must remember this is basic laws - if I can put it like that - which is often forgotten, often sidelined. Now again, this is a case study, the Cyprus issue. When looking at the Cyprus issue we have to assess whether and how the international treaties and obligations become part of domestic law. And that really is what is called the customary international law.

I'm next going to go into UN Security Council regulations. I want to go through those with you. I want to go through the UK's obligations. I see some of the British High Commission in the audience tonight. And the UK's obligations again which the UK purports to support, it is bound by. You must remember the UK is bound by certain obligations of the Treaty of Guarantee through what is called customary international law. Customary international law and laws which derive their authority from the consistent and constant practice of states rather than from formal expression of international treaties. And as Lord Bingham said in 2006, customary international law is part of the domestic law of England and Wales. Now again this is all background.

When considering case studies whether or not the rule of law has been upheld in relation to Cyprus issue, and as you can see at the end of this presentation you can probably be led to conclude that, I'm going to say it has been upheld, particularly because of the recent decision in the Apostolides case. And I'll take you through some of its core decisions.

But they start with a Security Council resolution. Let's remind ourselves the Security Council resolutions. They create obligations that are legally binding on the United Kingdom. There is a legal obligation that serves the United Nations Security Council resolutions not to recognize the 'TRNC'. Now, the United Nations resolution - I'm sure you will remember - I usually put on the basis that they urge states to take certain actions or they call upon states to take certain actions. But they can also state what the law is. And here let's take as an example resolution 541, 1983, The United Nations Security Council "Deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus." It "Considers the declaration as legally invalid." That's the law. The United Kingdom is bound by that. "Calls upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus. Calls upon all states not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus." And you're probably all familiar with these resolutions. I want to remind everyone they're legally binding on the United Kingdom.

Let's remind ourselves of the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Establishment signed by, of course, the UK, Greece and Turkey. The UK again is bound by its terms. The Treaty of Establishment delineate the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. The Treaty of Establishment basically says that the Republic of Cyprus should comprise the whole of the island of Cyprus. The Treaty of Guarantee, let's read that carefully again, remind ourselves the Treaty of Guarantee: "Greece Turkey and the United Kingdom taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus (...) recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity, and security of the Republic of Cyprus. (...). Greece Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit (...) any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the island." And I emphasize those last four words.

Now, the UK has gone on to reiterate its commitment to its obligation under the Treaty of Guarantee through a memorandum of understanding in June 2008. I won't read it out again but again it mentions that UK will comply with United Nations Security Council resolution 541 and 550.

And this has been going on for years. In the case of Caglar 1996, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office said that “Her Majesty’s Government have not accorded assistance in support of the Republic of Cyprus. Her Majesty’s Government have not accorded any form of recognition to the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Her Majesty’s Government recognizes only one state on the island of Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus, established under the Treaties of Guarantees and Establishment. I should make it clear that her majesty’s government views with concern the suggestion that the TRNC should be held by the court to be a foreign state, notwithstanding that it is not recognized as such by Her Majesty’s Government.” Again, I put all this up and summarize on the basis that this is the background, this is what the United Kingdom government has had to say. So why can’t we protect our rights through legal means? Why shouldn’t we protect our rights through legal means? Why are we frightened to protect our rights through legal means? Those are the questions I pose for a discussion, there’s meant to be a discussion tonight. So I’d like to be a bit provocative.

As the status of the so-called ‘TRNC’, some conclusions from what I’ve just said. The UK of course is bound under customary international law not to recognize the ‘TRNC’. But why? Why is it not to recognize the ‘TRNC’? One, it does not meet the criteria of a statehood under international law. Two, the situation in the north of Cyprus was brought about by use of force and flagrant violation of international law. So it’s pretty clear in my view what the position should be legally. The rule of law should be upheld.

Let’s look at some of the cases where the Cyprus issue has been through the English courts. Now obviously I’m going to start with Apostolides case. But then I will look at some other cases. Because what I want to deal with is the concern sometimes raised that do we want to take these risks? What if we do go through these courts and we lose? The rule of law is in our favor. How can we lose? It’s not me saying it, that’s a hypothetical Cypriot citizen. When I talk about citizens I mean all Citizens: Turks, Armenians, Maronites and Greeks. Because the rule of law applies to all of them. So when I talk about Cypriots, I mean all of them.

So let’s have a look. We’ve got a case study, a very recent case – the Apostolides case. What did they argue? Now lots of issues, of course. Lots of issues were argued and eventually they narrowed down to some two main issues and primary issues. The main issue that was argued before Mr. Justice Jack where we lost – ‘we’ being Mr. Apostolides - regarding the construction of article 11 protocol 10 of an Act of Accession 2003. And I’m happy to say that we succeeded before the European Court of Justice and we succeeded before the English Court of Appeal, and British justice got it right. Why do I say that? Because what the other side argued was, this article what it did, it suspended the *acquis* in the occupied areas of Cyprus. Why was it suspended? Because the Republic of Cyprus although it exercises sovereignty and has legal jurisdiction over the whole of the island but it cannot uphold EU law as it is obliged to in the occupied areas. So the EU decided to enter into this transitory derogation from the accession of Cyprus to the EU. And transitory derogations are construed restrictively. You look at them carefully to establish what their purpose is. And the purpose of this derogation was because – it’s a narrow purpose - Cyprus is a sovereign state. We’ve just been through all the principles. It cannot comply with the EU law in the occupied area. Why can it not comply with the EU law in the occupied area? Because it is occupied, illegally. Mr. Justice Jack got it completely wrong. The European Court of Justice got it right. The Court of Appeal followed the European Court of Justice. It should be construed narrowly and restrictively. The intention of the protocol was not to exclude the application of all provisions. The intention was to allow for the provisions that cannot be enforced.

Now, this case was obviously to do with the enforcement of a judgment, a Cyprus judgment in favor of Mr. Apostolides. He can't enforce it in Cyprus. Why can't he enforce it? Because his land is an area which is occupied by the Turkish army. What can he do? Under the rule of law, under the rule of EU law he is able to enforce his judgment in another member state. There are very, very narrow exceptions as to when he cannot, when he's precluded from enforcing the judgment. One is on the grounds of public policy. Now, this isn't the public - it's very important - it isn't the public policy of the government; this is a legal term. It's the public policy, a legal public policy that's fundamental to the order of, in this case, the United Kingdom. The European Court of Justice looked at this and set out some criteria as to what is public policy in this scenario. And I can just read some of those. "The court asked to recognize the judgment cannot refuse to do so on the ground that the law applied by the court of origin" - by Cyprus - "is different from the law that it would have applied itself by English law." The whole point of this regulation - it's a regulation 44/2001 - is to provide ease, the harmony between the states, the principles of justice. If you have a judgment in one state, you should be able to enforce it in another state. You shouldn't have to retry the case all over again. Basically, the European Court of Justice supported that "application of public policy is permitted only where recognition would infringe a fundamental principle of the law of the state in which recognition is sought." If a fundamental principle in the United Kingdom is infringed - well, actually it was the opposite - is true, that fundamental principle that should be supported as the enforcement of EU judgment. So the European Court of Justice (ECJ) concluded that in the absence of such principle recognition cannot be reviewed on public policy grounds.

So those are the two main arguments before first instance court and the European Court of Justice. We then faced two other issues in the Court of Appeal. The primary issue which was introduced for the first time by the EU Commission at the European Court of Justice stage was a novel issue as to whether the recognition enforcement of a Cyprus judgment, if such a judgment contravenes international public policy, since it may undermine efforts to secure a peaceful solution to the Cyprus issue. The Court of Appeal accepted as an international consensus the need to encourage a peaceful settlement. But then had to look at this issue and did so with great care and in great detail - in my view again another example of upholding the rule of law - even to the extent that - and it is in the public domain referred to in the judgment - British Foreign Office wrote a letter. Not formally intervening, but intervening in the case and putting forward its views. Whether or not that was a sensible thing to do I'll leave you to surmise. Supporting the fact that - and I just summarize all the principles that the United Kingdom is bound by. And the United Kingdom, my government, wrote a letter basically saying bear in mind the political situation. Effectively, we can't tell you what to do but put aside for a moment the rule of law, put aside for a moment our obligations, put aside Mr. Apostolides rights and have a think. And what was wonderful about the case was that I don't think the Court of Appeal was ecstatic about that or impressed about that letter. Three judges, all agreed that it is not for the government of the day to tell the judiciary of the day how it should construe a legal issue and the rights of an individual.

So I'll just read through these if you don't mind. Why wasn't this international public policy, this argument that let's not enforce this judgment because it may undermine the efforts to secure a peaceful solution to Cyprus issue? Why wasn't that followed by the Court of Appeal? The Court of Appeal said: "It's manifestly contrary to public policy in the UK to enforce the obligation under community law to register judgments of courts in Cyprus." Remember where we are. Treaty of Guarantee, 1960 Constitution - that's the law that should be upheld, and that's the United

Kingdom's obligations to be bound by that. And none withstanding, they felt they could write a letter intervening in the matter.

The court also said that it had to determine the effect of the of judgment. It would need to assess the issues in the separate dispute obviously, the merits of the political issues, both national and international. And the impact on public posts in the UK under such exceptional circumstances, this was not a function that the court could or should perform. This was not a case where plain breaches of international law have been committed by the Republic of Cyprus, such laws ought not to be enforced in UK courts. It went on to say: "A refusal to recognize the lawfully made judgment of a court in a lawfully constituted state which is an EU member would in fact inflame the situation." And this is telling. Even if - and this is the core of the rule of law being discussed, this at the core of it - even if the UK government made it clear that its policy was to attach absolute priority to not adversely affect the negotiations, because that's not in our perceived British interests, and even if enforcing the Cypriot judgment would create such a prejudice, the court would nevertheless be required to follow the rule of law.

So very much the case study. At the moment we've gone through Apostolides, the rule of law has been upheld. That's what's important about that case in my view. And that's upholding the rule of law in relation to the rights of all Cypriot citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, whatever color, race or creed.

Now, sometimes other cases are thrown at me. What about Hesperides, didn't we lose that one? What about the Polly Peck case, didn't we lose that one? We didn't lose them. They were decided on a principle of procedural law, which is called the Moçambique law. We've got two cases - I'm not going to go into detail, I just want to give your flavor. Polly Peck - all to do with enforcing property rights. At that time, I hasten to add, the law has moved on since then. And the Moçambique rule basically says it's an English principle of procedural principle of law. "(...) the [English] Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an action through a determination of the title to or the right to the possession of any immovable situate out of England (foreign land) or the recovery of damages for trespass to such an immovable [property]." So there the issue concerned in Hesperides, the trespass and the conspiracy by northern Cyprus travel agents in London conspiring to trespass in hotels in the occupied areas owned by Greek Cypriots. And Lord Denning and Lord (*inaudible*) decided that the Moçambique rule operated. But the English Court, because the trespass and the conspiracy, the trespass related to a foreign land, it wasn't for the English court to decide on those issues under the operation of Republic of Cyprus' law.

However, we now have article 22 of the EU regulation 44/2001. My first point there of course is - we didn't lose the case. Our rights were not diluted. The case turned on a point of procedural law. However, article 22 of the EU regulation now in my view, as you've seen in Apostolides, if that case came along now today, perhaps it wouldn't have such a similar decision, we'd have a different decision. Because article 23 says the court of the member state in which immovable property is situated shall have exclusive jurisdiction, as happened in Apostolides. And the northern part of Cyprus is not a separate state under the regulation. So again EU law is now assisting the Cypriot citizen to enforce his rights against trespassers in the English courts. That has happened with Apostolides. The rule of law has been upheld and continues to be upheld.

The Polly Peck judgment was based on the Moçambique rule and involved the effort of the Republic of Cyprus' citizens to preserve their rights in relation to some of the funds collected by

the administrator of Polly Peck and to hold them under a trust. Unfortunately, the Moçambique rule came into play there as well.

The other case that we've mentioned is the Transport for London case. That was a case about advertising northern Cyprus on the London tube. That was the judicial review by a Turkish Cypriot travel agency. And effectively that decision was not appealed. It's based on the fact that the court decided that promoting northern Cyprus wasn't illegal, primarily because the corporate entity, it was felt, was exercising its rights under English law in England to promote holidays. It wasn't a recognition of the 'TRNC'. Now, that was a judicial review and we are open obviously to judicial review of any other decision in the future that may lead to adverts being issued in the United Kingdom.

The final case is this case where we succeeded in preventing a Turkish operator from trying to succeed in judicial review of the decision of the aviation authorities in the United Kingdom to allow direct flights from the United Kingdom to the occupied areas of Cyprus. And we succeeded in that regard, where the court held that it was accepted international law that the Republic of Cyprus had exclusive sovereignty over the airspace over all of Cyprus, and if the Secretary of State had granted permission, such permission would be in conflict with its rights. The Republic of Cyprus was capable of exercising its rights regardless of whether it controlled the territory in the north of the island of Cyprus. The court also asserted that the United Kingdom did not recognize governments; it recognizes states. A legal duty existed whereby the UK Government was obliged not to recognize the 'TRNC' or its government.

Now I'm going to conclude with two more slides with some concluding remarks on my own. Another aspect of the Cyprus issue is this effort by the legal advisers to the 'TRNC', in particular Professor Stefan Talmon. And basically what they're trying to achieve is obviously the holy grail for the 'TRNC' – is legitimacy. As you will know in *Loizidou*, the 'TRNC' was described as a local subordinate administration. So it's accepted de facto as simply a group of people who administer births, marriages in that area. That's the only legitimacy it can have in international law. Professor Talmon appeared on behalf of the British Residents Society in the occupied areas and his efforts, again, he appeared again for the Turkish Airlines, of course, in *Turkish Airlines* case. And his submission was that the 'TRNC' being the de facto authority in northern Cyprus was competent under custom international law to exercise prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction in all matters under its effective control, including expropriated property, of course. The Court of Appeal dealt with the forty- or fifty-page submission - I thought pertinently - in three lines, maybe two lines: "Invoking customary international law notions of powers of de facto authorities does not in this context override or impinge either upon the legitimacy of the judgment of the ECJ or the duties of United Kingdom courts in relation to article 34(1) of the Regulation."

Another slide I've put up is a slide which Klearchos touched on this point, and we're all aware of this point because it came up in the Annan Plan. We're talking about the rights of the Cypriot citizens, the rights of the Republic of Cyprus, which are upheld and have been upheld in my personal view. But can those rights be taken away? Yes, they can possibly be taken away. Don't forget the article 5 of the Annan Plan stated that the common state and the component state shall, pursuant to article 37 of the European Court of Human Rights, request the European Court of Human Rights to strike out any proceeding before it concerning affected property. Article 37 gives the European Court of Human Rights the power to strike out cases if it feels that this would be fair in view of all the circumstances of the case. So we've got to be vigilant. That was the position in 2004 which Lord Hannah thought was a perfectly reasonable way of stuffing the

citizens to the Republic of Cyprus, to put it markedly. Another expression is to 'stitch up', but I wouldn't use that of course.

So I hope my case study has given you not a flavor, but a foundation that our rights are enshrined in law. They cannot be taken away. The only person that can take them away is us. (*inaudible*) I'm making that point, yes there are risks – I'm a lawyer. Of course there are risks going to court. I mentioned the judicial review of the adverts case. I didn't think it was a right judgment, I think it was a very poor judgment. It wasn't appealed. Mr. Justice Jack got it wrong but we appeal that judgment. We've appealed it through the Appeal Court of Justice. We've appealed it through the Court of Appeals. If we hadn't appealed that judgment, we would be lumbered with it. That doesn't mean the rule of law doesn't apply and will not be upheld.

So I will end at that point. I think I've hopefully provoked some discussion, but I actually summarized my views on the simple question I started off with, which is: We're not going to solve the Cyprus issue and I think that misses the point. We're not going to solve the Cyprus issue through the courts. I believe that misses the point about the rule of law and enforcing our rights. I think it misses it not by square mile – a lot more than that.

POLICY BRIEF

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Cyprus, Turkey, and the Crescent of Crisis: the Question of American Strategy

I. American Strategic Priorities in the Crescent of Crisis.

1. American strategy toward the Crescent of Crisis is defined by the following priorities: expanding the security of Israel; maintaining a controlling influence over the world oil market; neutralizing radical Islam and eliminating potential terrorist safe havens; preventing the emergence of a regional power hostile to Israel; and limiting the influence of outside powers in the region, particularly those who do not share Washington's strategic priorities. Turkey figures prominently into American strategy for four reasons.
2. American policy seeks to deny Russia exclusive control over Eurasia's oil and gas resources. Turkey is seen as being one of the main counter-weights to Russia, offering an alternative transit point for the region's oil and gas, as illustrated by Washington's forceful support of the Baku to Ceyhan pipeline.
3. American strategy toward the Middle East is premised on the nearly unconditional support of Israel, and thus it is predisposed to good relations with any country in the region that is willing to make peace with Israel or, even better, that is willing to be a strategic ally of Israel. Turkey has been and remains in Washington's eyes Israel's only ally in the region. In previous decades, Turkey and Israel developed substantial military and intelligence cooperation. Most recently, Turkey has tried to improve its image in the Islamic world and so the focus of Turkish-Israeli cooperation has shifted somewhat. For example, Turkey has served as a go-between for informal negotiations between Syria and Israel, in an effort to capitalize on both its longstanding relationship with Israel and its improved ties with Arab countries.
4. Washington seeks to counter the mistrust, if not hatred, of the United States that pervades the Islamic world. It also seeks to champion a moderate model for the Islamic world. Turkey has become the poster-child of American foreign policy toward the Islamic world - with Turkey-US relations held up as an example of US goodwill to countries with Muslim

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populations and Turkey promoted as an example of the compatibility of Islam and democracy.

5. The United States has encouraged European integration and wants Europe to assume more of the burden for international security but it does not want a Europe that would pose a challenge to America foreign policy or chart an independent course on key issues of critical importance to the United States, especially on issues related to the “Crescent of Crisis”. Washington has sought to advance Turkey’s accession into the European Union, and maintain a close relationship with recently admitted Central and Eastern Europe countries, in order to dilute Europe and to retain US influence on the direction of any collective European foreign policy.
6. In general, American policy toward the region seems to be driven by a lingering suspicion of Russia and its perceived allies. At times, this suspicion seems to spill over into what appears to be a bias against the Orthodox Christian world. Over the past decade and half, the United States has sided against the Orthodox Christian side in every major conflict, irrespective of the merits of the dispute. It favored Azerbaijan over Armenia; the Bosnian Muslims and Croats against the Bosnian Serbs; the Kosovar Albanians over Serbia; Chechnya over Russia; Moldova over the Trans-Dniester, and the Western-leaning political leadership of Ukraine over Russia.

II. Turkey’s Role in American Strategy: A Special Relationship

1. Not surprisingly, American policy has almost without exception put its relationship with Turkey ahead of the interests of Cyprus, in spite of the so-called influence of the Greek lobby in the American Congress. Indeed, Turkey enjoys the status of a special relationship that is second only to that of Israel and Britain.
2. Turkey is largely exempt from the human rights and good governance lectures other countries receive from the United States. In particular, it has been given a free ride on its treatment of the Kurds and the measures it has taken to suppress Kurdish self-determination.
3. The United States has used its power and influence to get the IMF and the European Union to periodically bail out the Turkish economy and to subsidize its economic development—with much more lax conditions than would normally be applied.
4. It has encouraged the expansion of Turkish influence in the Eurasia region and has used its power and influence to re-direct the transportation of the region’s oil and gas resources through Turkey and away from Russia.
5. After an initial embargo of arms sales to Turkey, it has put few if any constraints on Turkey’s occupation of northern Cyprus or on the activities of the Turkish military in the north.
6. It has championed Turkey’s entry into the European Union. In order to further Turkey’s accession to the EU, it has pushed a political settlement of the Cyprus issue that is not in the long-term interests of the Republic of Cyprus.
7. The special relationship is not without limits but the relationship is surprisingly asymmetrical in Turkey’s favor. Where Washington would draw the line on Turkish foreign policy is not exactly clear. There is reason to believe that that Washington would disapprove of any overt Turkish coercion or aggression against Cyprus, but it is doubtful whether it would actively oppose the slow strangulation of Cyprus’s sovereignty or take action to prevent Turkey from

integrating Cyprus into its regional sphere of influence over a longer period time, notwithstanding the presence of British bases on Cyprus. Washington, for example, would probably welcome the end to Cyprus's role as an offshore financial center that facilitates investment into Russia, and would be happy to have Turkey subvert any ambitions on Cyprus's part to expand its role as a regional financial center. This is especially the case if Cyprus itself opens the door to greater Turkish control by concluding an agreement very similar to the proposed Annan Plan.

8. In short, under current circumstances, American strategy provides little if any protection for Cypriot interests, let alone an expansion of its ambitions. For the most part, Washington sees Cyprus as a nuisance that from time to time threatens to complicate its special relationship with Turkey or to get in the way of its goal of promoting Turkey's entry into the European Union.

III. Fault-lines in the US-Turkish Special Relationship

1. There are, however, some cracks or fault-lines in the US-Turkish special relationship and the American strategy. These fault-lines may reduce Turkey's perceived importance to American strategy in the future. They may also force some changes in American strategy. But they are not likely to be so serious as to call into question the priority the United States gives to its relationship with Turkey as it affects Cypriot interests.
2. The refusal of Turkey to allow the American military to use Turkey's facilities and territory for the 2003 invasion of Iraq planted some seeds of doubt, albeit very small ones, into the minds of some American officials about the reliability of Turkey as an American ally.
3. Turkey's goal of limiting the autonomy of the Kurds in Turkey conflicts at times with American policy toward Iraq and with American sympathy for the Iraqi Kurds. Whether there is a potential for the Kurds to become the next cause of American foreign policy idealism, however, remains doubtful.
4. The strategy of seeking to deny Russia control over the oil and gas resources of the Eurasia region has thus far been counterproductive, stiffening Russia's nationalist resolve, and has actually delayed the commercial development of the region's energy resources. It has also added to the cost of the development and transport of these resources since many of the alternatives to Russian transit are commercially less viable and require greater subsidy. Moreover, it turns out that Turkey has less influence in the region than Washington assumed, and thus has not been able to advance Washington's interests in the region. A better strategy would be for Washington to improve relations with Russia and seek greater cooperation in the development of the region's resources. If it did so, Turkey's importance to the US strategy would be greatly reduced.
5. Despite Washington's efforts to promote its relationship with Turkey as evidence of its comity with Islam, Turkey is not seen as a model for moderate Islam in other countries in the region, particularly in the Arab countries. Rather Turkey is seen as a former imperial power who is an Israeli ally. Turkey has improved its Islamic credentials in recent years but that has not substantially changed the suspicion with which it is viewed in many Arab capitals.
6. Even though Turkey has facilitated contacts between Syria and Israel, peace between Syria and Israel and a stable Lebanon would reduce Turkish importance, since it would reduce the

value of Turkey's strategic relationship with Israel. Given Syria's influence with Hamas and its relationship with Iran, Syria's position would increase at the expense of Turkey's.

7. Turkey's human rights and economic problems may be too large for an overstretched European Union to accept especially in light of the stresses created by the world financial crisis. For some time, the leading economies of Europe will have their hands full manage the debt and banking crises of Central Europe and are in no position to take on more financial burdens that Turkey's entry into the European Union would create. If Washington continues to push Europe on Turkey's accession then it is possible that may become an increasing source of irritation in US- European relations, especially if Washington continues to back Turkey's accession.

IV. Cyprus's Strategic Options Given American Strategy

1. What, then, are Cyprus's strategic options given American strategy and Washington's still considerable power and influence in the region? Previous Cypriot governments do deserve credit for successfully maneuvering Cyprus into the European Union and for avoiding an agreement that would have unduly limited Cypriot freedom of action (beyond that of being a good member of the European Union). From an outsider's perspective, the Annan Plan was seriously flawed and would have made Cyprus more vulnerable to Turkey's pressure and would have given Turkey more opportunity to influence Cyprus's future. Avoiding such an outcome while gaining full membership in the European Union has considerably strengthened Cyprus's position, giving it some leverage over Turkey's future while reducing Turkey's ability to influence the course of government and economic development in the Republic of Cyprus. That said, one must face up to the reality that the strategy of resting Cyprus's future security and prosperity upon membership in the European Union has limits given the weaknesses of the European Union and given the emerging neo-Ottoman foreign policy tendencies of the current Turkish government. Cyprus therefore must think seriously about its strategic options before it enters into a bi-communal agreement.
2. The place to begin that thinking is to consider that the Crescent of Crisis is no longer an American dominated region. Rather, it is a region of competing and overlapping geopolitical, geo-economics, and geo-cultural alliances and spheres of influence and interest. Cyprus needs to understand these various forces and how best to align itself with them given its values and strategic interests. It needs to counter the neo-Ottoman tendencies of Turkish regional policy that could limit the island's future security and prosperity and undermine the advantages it now enjoys as a member of the European Union.
3. In addition to Turkey's nascent neo-Ottoman sphere of influence, there are five other overlapping and/or competing geopolitical and geo-economics spheres of power and interest in the region to consider: the American-Israeli relationship; the Transatlantic Alliance as represented by NATO and the US-British relationship, of which Cyprus is tangentially involved as the host to British bases; the European Union, of which it is a full member; the Russian and Christian Orthodox community, to which it is connected by culture and by being a gateway to investment in Russia and an offshore banking center for Russian money; and the New Silk Road as represented by the expansion of commerce from Dubai, Iran, to India and China, of which it has only marginal relations. One must also mention the Sunni Arab-American axis as represented by the Saudi-American oil and security relationship; and the competing Iranian-led Shite alliance, which includes Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas.

4. To oversimplify somewhat, Cyprus has essentially two strategic choices - to deepen or to widen, beyond its current strategy of pursuing an inter-communal agreement. The first choice is to seek to deepen Cyprus's integration into the transatlantic relationship as a complement to its current membership in the European Union and as part of a larger bargain relating to an inter-communal agreement. The touchstone of such a strategy would be for Cyprus to become a member of NATO and to upgrade its security relationship with Britain and the United States. It might also have as a complementary strategy the acceptance of Turkey into the European Union under the theory that Turkey's integration into the European Union would constrain (rather than empower) Turkey's neo-Ottoman foreign policy goals.
5. Such a strategy faces several obstacles. Turkey could use its influence with the United States to block Cyprus's entry into NATO; Britain may not want to share its bases in Cyprus with the United States even as it is forced to reduce its overseas commitments; and even if Cyprus was able to gain entry into NATO, it might not alter Washington's calculations about the priority of its relationship with Turkey. Such a strategy would also have a number of serious costs. It would most likely spell the end of Cyprus's aspirations of becoming a regional financial center and would call into question Cyprus' financial relationship with Russia. It would reduce Cyprus's foreign policy and economic choices but without necessarily improving Cyprus's security from the low-intensity threats that would emanate from an expanding Turkish sphere of influence. And it would reduce the ability of Cyprus to block Turkey's entry into the European Union but without any guarantee that the European Union would be able to constrain or alter the course of Turkish foreign policy.
6. The second choice would be to widen Cyprus's involvement in the region's competing spheres of interest with the goal of balancing Turkey. The principal idea behind this strategy is that Cyprus would be able to make itself less vulnerable to the Turkish foreign policy by increasing its role and usefulness in as many of the other competing spheres of influence as possible. Such a strategy would recognize that the main threat to Cyprus's security is not outright Turkish aggression but its potential vulnerability to Turkish pressure and influence over its political and economic future. Thus Cyprus should avoid an inter-communal agreement that would open itself up to Turkish manipulation and should seek to expand its international ties with the goal of increasing its economic and political options.
7. In addition to using its membership in the European Union to its best advantage, a widening strategy would pursue the following three goals. The first would be to expand Cyprus's role as a regional financial center by extending its existing international financial relationships to include India, China, and the New Silk Road relationships, and to include other petro-dollar states as well as Russia. In addition, Cyprus may be able to capitalize on the crack-down of international tax havens to be able to offer itself as a legitimate low-tax jurisdiction thereby attracting European and American companies to set up international and regional headquarters there for tax purposes. The second goal would be for Cyprus to establish itself as an international meeting place - to become a transnational geo-economic and geo-cultural hub, if you will, for the exchange of ideas and information. The third element would be to build on Cyprus's potential as a place of higher education and scientific research, which would go hand in hand with the second element of enhancing Cyprus's importance as an international meeting place. If successful, Cyprus' emergence as a transnational hub for meetings and higher education would replace mass tourism as one of the main sources of economic growth. Becoming an international meeting place and a place of higher education

would yield more political and economic influence than would mass tourism while being more compatible with Cyprus's long-term ecological health.

8. This second strategic option would also face a number of obstacles, including the question of whether there is the necessary political leadership to implement such an ambitious international strategy. It also would have some potential downsides, including the possibility of furthering alienating Washington and making Cyprus a target of American pressure. But the United States is likely to be distractive by more critical challenges for the foreseeable future.
9. As a non-Cypriot, it is not for me to say what the best strategic course of action is for Cyprus. But I can lay out what I see as Cyprus's options in light of American strategy and in light of emerging forces within the region. And that is what I hope I have done with some clarity in this paper.

POLICY REVIEW

Sherle R. Schwenninger*
May 2010

The EU and the US

The Great Recession of 2008-09 has put enormous strain on the social contracts of Western economies. This paper provides an American perspective on how well the social welfare systems of the United States and the European Union countries have performed in cushioning their populations against the economic dislocations associated with the Great Recession and how effective US and European policy has been in softening the severity of the recession and in creating the conditions for future socio-economic progress. In many respects, the responses of the United States and the European Union to the onset of the Great Recession have followed very predictable patterns. With a tradition of an activist and Keynesian-oriented macroeconomic policy but with a relatively weak social safety net, US authorities responded with a large \$787 economic recovery program and with swift Federal Reserve action to stabilize the financial markets, including measures to buy mortgage-backed securities. By contrast, the core European economies were generally more conservative in their fiscal response, relying on the automatic stabilizers in their social welfare systems to soften the blow to the economy.

Thus, it is not surprising that while the US economy shows signs of a more vigorous recovery than does the European Union as a whole, the core European economies can claim to have weathered the Great Recession with less social and economic dislocation than the United States. But the Great Recession has also revealed wide variations in the experience of countries within the European Union showing that the Union is far from offering a shared European standard of social security. While the Germans, Dutch, and French weathered the crisis comfortably in spite a serious fall-off in economic growth, those in the economies on the so-called periphery are experiencing double digit unemployment and facing prolonged economic slumps and fiscal crises that will erode living standards for years to come.

The Great Recession has also exposed serious structural weaknesses in the capacity of the European Union to respond to serious economic downturns and to generate ongoing socio-economic progress among all its member countries. Not only does the Europe's Stability and Growth Pact inhibit robust macroeconomic responses to economic downturns, the very structure of Eurozone membership eliminates many of the standard tools of adjustment, such as exchange

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rate depreciation, to such crises, and places the burden of adjustment on the weaker members. Indeed, the Great Recession has more than ever cemented the reality of a two-tier Europe and puts into question the very model of economic growth that the European Union has pursued over the past decade. In that sense, the experience of the European Union is very similar to that of the United States, where the Great Recession has also reinforced America's growing two-tier society and put into question its model of economic growth. The question for the future is whether the United States and Europe can find a common agenda to expand their social welfare systems or whether they are forced to become greater competitors in a demand-constrained world dominated by Asian mercantilism and producerism.

Comparing the American and European Safety Nets

The Great Recession may have revealed the advantages the United States has with its tradition of expansionary macroeconomic policy. But it also clearly exposed the many holes in America's rather porous social safety net. Ironically, it was the much touted modernization of the safety net for the new economy that has caused the greatest gaps in America's economic security. In the late 1990s, reforms in America's social welfare system made many benefits contingent upon work not anticipating that unemployment might climb to double digits. Other so-called modernization measures embraced the notion of the ownership society, ignoring that housing and equity prices can go down as well as up. Since the Great Recession began, the inadequacies of America's social and economic security system have quickly showed up in the data. To begin with, the ranks of America's poor have swollen by at least an additional 2.5 million; child poverty has climbed to 19 % from 17.8 % a few years earlier. One in eight Americans, including one in four children, is now on the food stamps because they are not eligible for unemployment compensation or any other social welfare program. Nearly 50 million Americans lack health insurance, and over 17 % of households report that they have postponed or delaying seeking healthcare over the past year for financial reason.

As to the ownership society, for a period of time rising home prices and access to credit helped mask the effects of stagnating wages. But now the debt left in the wake of the housing crash, is dragging down millions of American families. As of October 2009, nearly one in four mortgages was underwater, meaning the mortgage holder owes more on the mortgage than the underlying home is worth; that number is expected to increase to 48 % by 2011. Overall, American households have suffered a \$12.6 trillion loss in household wealth, a significant portion in their homes and retirement accounts, and as a result, one in four Americans over 62 are putting off retirement because they cannot make ends meet.

By contrast to this American picture, there has been little increase in poverty in the core EU countries, no precipitous drop in household wealth or income, little or no evidence of people having to forego health care for financial reasons, and little or no increase in the number of people who are putting off retirement for financial reasons. If one were not rich and one could choose where to experience an economic downturn as serious as the Great Recession, one would clearly choose Germany, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Italy, or the Nordic members of the European Union, not the United States. The experience of working and middle class in other European economies of course has been more difficult but these economies do not have the same level of social welfare protections as do the richer core economies.

There are three reasons why the United States has done so much more poorly in cushioning the impact of the Great Recession on its working and middle class than has these core European

Union economies. First, the American system of social and economic security revolves much more closely around employment - having a job - than does Europe's. As is well known, health insurance in the United States is still largely employer-based; if you lose your job, you most likely lose your health insurance as well. But so are other features of America's social welfare system. As a result of the welfare reforms passed under the Clinton Administration, America's principal welfare program - Temporary Assistance for Needy Families - is now linked to work requirements. Not surprisingly, the number of people accessing the program has scarcely expanded during the recession because employment itself has declined, even as the number of poor has increased alarmingly.

Likewise, America's main program for helping the working poor - the earned income tax credit - is dependent on being in work or having earned income. Individuals who can show they have earned income up to a certain level is eligible for a refundable tax credit to supplement their income; those who have not been employed and have no earned income are not. And what is true for America's working poor is as true for America's middle class.

Many of America's most important social welfare state benefits relating to education, child care, home ownership, and retirement are delivered through the tax codes as deductions against income. This has created a social welfare state that heavily favors upper and middle income groups; indeed the majority of benefits now go to the top 20 % not to those who need them most, creating in effect a two-tier welfare state. But that also means that as unemployment and underemployment rise and the incomes of those in the middle decline, so do their social benefits for education, child care and retirement. As a result, they can quickly find themselves pushed into the bottom tier of America's social welfare system fighting for limited resources. Yet even as the economic security of Americans has become ever more linked to employment, America's job machine has broken down. Since 2000, the economy has created very few new private sector jobs, and the number of the effectively unemployed (a wider measure of unemployment has steadily increased). As of December 2009, the official rate of unemployment was 10%, but that number rises to 17.3% when people who have given up looking for work and those working part-time of necessity are included. That means the one in six working Americans are effectively unemployed, and because they are unemployed, many of them have lost their access to health care and other social insurance benefits.

Second, US labor markets are characterized by less unemployment protection than those in Europe where it is more difficult to fire or let workers go. Thus job losses occur more quickly than they do in Europe. It is therefore doubly tragic that the unemployment insurance programs available to workers in the United States are a lot less robust than they are in the core European Union countries. Since the beginning of the recession, the official US unemployment rate increased by 5%, while the unemployment rate in the Euro areas during the same period increased by just 2.5%. But unlike in Europe, many of those experiencing unemployment have not been able to have the protection of unemployment insurance. In most European countries, unemployment benefits are available to nearly all workers, cover well over half of an employee's earlier salary, and extend for more than a year.

By contrast, in most states in the United States, unemployment benefits are restricted to a narrow group of workers, often compensate workers for less than half of their previous wages, and generally last less than one year. Less than half of unemployed workers in the United States are eligible for and receive unemployment insurance benefits. That is because many states in the United States have very rigorous eligibility requirements that exclude low-income or part-time

workers and that limit any compensation to a very short period of unemployment. As a result, while 15 million workers in the United States are officially unemployed, less than 10 million are receiving unemployment insurance benefits, either because they did not qualify initially or because they have already exhausted their benefits. In sum, America's system of economic security works reasonably well during periods of full employment but quickly collapses during periods of rising unemployment.

Another reason why workers in the core EU economies have faced less hardship than their American counterparts has to do with these economies' successful experience with what are called short-time work programs, which have limited the number of jobs losses. Although the details of the programs vary country to country, the purpose is consistent - to subsidize employers to keep people in their work by reducing the number of hours they work. These programs have enabled European companies to keep much of their work force in tact but at the same time cut costs. They have also helped hold down unemployment and to avoid the loss of human capital associated with long periods of joblessness.

To be sure, there are reports of a few interesting experiments in job sharing among US employers. But for the most part, American companies have resisted these measures and have continued to rely heavily on layoffs to control labor costs. And despite a few advocates on the left, expert opinion continues to oppose the idea of short-time work programs. According to the critics, these programs end up protecting jobs that are not viable even when the economy recovers; they drag down labor productivity and make companies less competitive; and they will only lead to an artificial spike in unemployment later. Moreover, as the critics contend, these programs work best if at all in short downturns, as the name short-time work implies, and are not well suited for a prolonged period of negative or weak job growth such as we are now experiencing.

This American resistance to short-time work programs reflects a major difference in the US and European approach to the Great Recession. In the United States, there is still a prevailing view that economic downturns should lead to market-enforced restructuring and downsizing (banking being an exception), while in Europe there is the view that governments must take care if possible to preserve their industrial capacity. This difference in philosophy was evident in the different approach Washington and European capitals have taken to their ailing auto industries.

In the United States, Chrysler and GM were forced into bankruptcy and were downsized and reorganized. As part of the restructuring plan, nearly two dozen North American plants were shut down and thousands of car dealerships were closed. By contrast, in most of eurozone Europe, with the government's blessing and help, automakers have resisted shutting down plants, and have chosen instead to temporarily idle capacity or put workers on partial pay. The contrast between how the United States and core European economies have responded is all the more striking given that the left-of-center Obama administration took a tough-love approach while Mr. Sarkozy's and Ms. Merkel's center-right governments took pains to soften the blow on French and Germany auto workers.

Finally, the United States has embraced much more readily the idea of ownership society than has Europe, and thus the American social contract has come to rely much more heavily on home ownership and private pension plans than has the European counterpart. This embrace obviously has advantages when asset prices are rising but it wreaks havoc in a bubble-prone economy when the bubble bursts. For the past decade, rising home values compensated American workers for

stagnant wages, allowing them to maintain and even improve their standard of living by tapping home equity. In addition, easy access to credit allowed families to weather economic downturns or medical emergencies but at the expense of rising household indebtedness. With the bursting of the housing and credit bubble, this essential feature of the Clinton-Bush era imploded, leaving many households with a large debt hangover. As a result, the Great Recession has dealt a double blow to many Americans; not only have they lost their job but they have lost their home and their life savings as well. Worse, there is little in the way of programs available to help them pick up the pieces.

By contrast, most Europeans in the core Eurozone economies have been relatively unaffected from housing price declines and from the tightening of consumer and household credit, because home ownership and credit have never played the same role in core European countries as they have in the United States. Europeans have also been largely protected from the collapse of the value of private retirement programs, which have hit many Americans hard. Over the past two decades, American companies have steadily shrunk their private pension contributions and have put more of the risk onto employees. They have done so in two ways: either by eliminating company retirement plans altogether or by shifting from a defined benefit to a defined contribution pension program. In a defined benefit system, a retired worker knows exactly how much he or she will receive each month; in a defined contribution system, the employee makes a contribution into his or her retirement account - most likely a 401k - that is then invested in the bond and equity markets with attendant risks.

The experience of the past decade shows that this shift in the nature of US retirement system has worked to the disadvantage of American workers while creating more vulnerability and uncertainty. Seniors who retired in the late 1990s before the collapse of the stock market in 2000-01 may be able to enjoy a comfortable retirement but those who were planning to retire this decade face a much bleaker retirement future having seen much of their retirement savings lost during the past two market crashes. That is why for nearly 70% of seniors, social security is the main source of retirement income but social security is less generous than most European pension programs. To be sure, Europe's state-supported or state-run pension systems face their own solvency questions but they have not experienced the kinds of shocks America's private retirement accounts have in the decade culminating in the Great Recession.

A Two-Tier America, and a Two-Tier Europe

Unlike other economic downturns, which are largely transitory events that have little lasting impact on American society, the Great Recession is likely to be a multi-year society-shaping force that leaves deep and ugly scars. The most significant effect is likely to be the further collapse of the American middle class, particularly that part of the middle class that has withstood three decades of stagnant wages only by enjoying the benefits of rising home prices and easier credit. The greatest concentration of housing foreclosures to-date has occurred among sub-prime and Alt A mortgages, mortgages that carried greater risk because the owners had more limited means and incomes. This means that the housing bust is having its most concentrated effect on people on the lower and middle rungs of middle class life, hitting particularly hard those who have bought a home in the last three years. Many of these were first-time home buyers that had achieved a tentative hold on middle class status but now are being pushed back into poverty with the loss of their home and their job. Others were upwardly mobile middle class families who got caught up in the optimism of the housing bubble and moved from a starter home to a more

expensive (and overpriced) house during the same time, and these families now are confronted with a staggering mortgage debt that they will never be able to work off.

The overall effect of the housing bubble bursting, then, has been to make the United States even more of a two-tier society than it was before the crisis, with large number of the middle class falling to a more precarious position in the American economy. The uneven jobless economic recovery from the Great Recession that is beginning to take shape will only further accentuate this move. From all indications, employment and wages will lag behind GDP and profit growth, resulting in a top-heavy recovery in income and consumption. While the top 10 or 20% are currently enjoying a recovery in equity prices and benefiting from the trickle-around growth of the return of Wall Street bonuses, much of the rest of the population struggles with high unemployment, stagnant wages, soft housing prices, and a huge debt burden.

Because housing and credit play a much less central role in the European social contract, the core countries of the eurozone will largely avoid the harmful societal effects of the Great Recession that the United States is now experiencing. But the Great Recession will affect European Union in other equally profound ways, creating or more accurately reinforcing a two-tier Europe. While the impact of the Great Recession in the United States falls principally along class lines (although some geographic areas have been hit much harder than others), the main effect in Europe is seen between countries, between the core economies of the eurozone, which have stronger safety nets, most of which avoided the worst of the housing and the credit bubbles, and the so-called periphery economies, which experienced credit and property bubbles even larger than those in the United States and which have weaker economic bases and social safety nets.

Viewed in this way, there are more parallels between the United States and Europe than either Europeans or Americans may care to acknowledge. In the United States, the bursting of the housing and credit bubble has hit disproportionately the subprime and the Alt A mortgage space (although it has not spared the prime mortgages entirely), and with it the lower and middle rungs of the middle class. In Europe, it has struck the European bubble economies - Ireland and the United Kingdom and the peripheral economies of Greece, Portugal and Spain within the eurozone and the Baltic states in the larger European Union. In many respects, the national economies of Britain, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain and the Baltic states were part of the larger bubble economy with the United States. Like the United States, these economies ran massive current account deficits, and experienced large credit-fueled property bubbles and private spending surges. And like the US household sector, the private sectors of these countries were spending far more than income, accumulating unsustainable debts that were backed by inflated property values.

And now like parts of the US economy, these European bubble countries are experiencing many of the same wrenching economic and social consequences. Among the eurozone economies, the bubbles were biggest in Ireland and Spain. Not surprisingly, the bursting of the credit and property bubbles has sunk the Spanish and Irish economies into deep recessions and sent unemployment soaring into the double digits. As of December 2009, the jobless rate in Spain was 18.8%, with youth unemployment at more than 40%. The bursting of the bubble has also wreaked havoc with these countries' public finances, with budget deficits as a percentage of GDP climbing into the double digits. Greece and Portugal have similar problems, with Greece being the first to experience a full-fledged market-driven debt crisis.

Among the Baltic States, the consequences have been even more severe. The Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian economies have all contracted by nearly 20 %, and their public deficits have ballooned to unsustainable levels as tax revenues have dried up. And what is worse, these economies lack the robust automatic stabilizers that core European economies have to soften the impact of economic downturns on their populations and the economy. A recent study by economists Mathias Dolls, Clemens Fuest, and Andreas Peich found that while in Germany automatic stabilizers absorb approximately 48% of an income shock, they absorb just 25% in Estonia, 28% in Spain, and 29% in Greece, even less than in the United States, where automatic stabilizers absorb 32% of an income shock.

Moreover, while the core eurozone economies show at least some signs of a tentative recovery, with France leading the way, the Baltic State economies face even more difficult choices in the months ahead. Indeed, these economies find themselves in something of an economic straight-jacket created by their fixed currency pegs to the euro and by the huge euro-denominated debts they have incurred. If they attempt to correct their budget deficits while maintaining their fixed currency arrangements, then they will most certainly deepen their economic depressions and heighten social tensions. But if they decide to abandon the peg to the euro, they will set off a series of debt defaults that could provoke a larger banking crisis.

The peripheral economies of the eurozone face similarly tough choices as they cope what looks like several more years of stagnant economies, high unemployment, and gaping budget deficits. Their task is made more difficult by their membership in the European monetary union. Their initial entry into the union provided a big boost to their economies by lowering interest rates (which in part contributed to their credit and real estate bubbles), but now it threatens to put their economies in a straight-jacket almost as restrictive as that of the Baltic States. As economist Desmond Lachman points out, these economies “have the unenviable task of trying to restore fiscal sustainability in the midst of deep recessions, and at a time when their countries’ international competitive positions have been greatly eroded.” And they must do so within the constraints imposed by their eurozone membership, which denies these countries the use of an independent exchange rate to restore competitiveness or interest rate policy to mitigate the contractionary effects of their fiscal policy tightening.

That means that we should expect prolonged downward pressure on wages, chronic recessions, and reduced national spending in most of the peripheral economies of Europe, creating a further divergence with the stronger core economies of the European Union. To the extent European Union aspires to be more than a collection of nation-states, to the extent that it seeks to promote a common experience of a being a European citizen, with a common set of standards and roughly a comparable degree of economic and social security, then the Great Recession has struck a huge blow to that ideal.

The only hope these peripheral economies have of avoiding a prolonged Great Recession would for the core eurozone economies to mount a major financial rescue or for Germany, France, and the Netherlands to lead a major Keynesian-inspired economic recovery. But the European Union lacks the political institutional arrangements for such a rescue and the political leadership of France, Germany, and the Netherlands are not inclined for full-throated Keynesian spending or ad hoc financial arrangements. Indeed, they may face their own struggles to sustain an economic recovery given their previous reliance on demand from the previously fast-growing peripheral economies.

The Challenge of Finding a New Model of Economic Growth

Future socio-economic progress in both Europe and the United States depends upon finding a new economic growth path. Over the past decade, US economic growth was driven by a housing bubble and by a consumer spending surge made possible by an unsustainable increase in household debt. Economists rightly worry that the United States faces a decade of Japan-style stagnation as the private sector is forced to de-lever and consumption is constrained. The problems with the pattern of American economic growth and its overreliance on debt-financed consumption are well known.

But what is less known is that Europe also faces a similar problem. US commentators often mischaracterize the problems Europe must overcome. The main obstacle to European growth is not Europe's inflexible labor market or its lack of entrepreneurship, as many conservatives argue. It is the structural weaknesses of the European monetary system combined with an antipathy to demand-led growth and a commitment to export-led growth in the core economies of the European Union, above all in Germany. Over the past five years, economic growth in the eurozone has been driven by growing demand in the peripheral economies of the European Union fueled by credit and property bubbles and rising debt. This in turn has provided the demand that has allowed Germany and a few other core European economies to enjoy an export boom.

This pattern of economic growth is reflected in Europe's own internal imbalances, with Germany and the Netherlands running large current account surpluses and the peripheral economies running large current deficits. Germany's current account surplus, for example, rose from 2% of GDP in 2002 to 7.5% in 2007, while the current account deficits of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain all increased proportionately - Greece's expanded from 6.5% of GDP to 14.2%, Ireland from 1% to 5.3%, Portugal from 8 % to 9.4%, and Spain from 3.3% to 10%. Germany's trade surplus with other EU economies increased from 94.6 billion euros in 2002 to 174 billion euros in 2007, reflecting the fact that trade within Europe accounted for the growth of most of Germany's current account surplus.

The development of these imbalances was in part the product of the European monetary union of the past decade that brought into being the euro. The entry of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain into the eurozone had the benefit of dramatically reducing the cost of credit in these economies, as interest rates converged across the eurozone. But these lower interest rates in turn contributed to the property and credit bubbles of the past decade, fueling the rapid expansion of debt-financed demand in those economies. It also led to huge loss of competitiveness because of the rise these economies' relative unit labor costs, relative to the core countries of the European Union. At the same time, core countries like Germany and the Netherlands committed themselves to tight fiscal policy, which slowed wage growth and with it domestic demand, while improving their labor competitiveness. Germany also pursued labor reforms which weakened the power of labor further restraining wage gains and domestic demand. As a result, their trade surpluses with peripheral economies surged, and their economies became even more export-oriented.

Now, as noted before, with the bursting of property and credit bubbles, domestic demand in the peripheral economies has collapsed, and they face a long period of slow growth and economic stagnation. But with the peripheral countries in such trouble, the question becomes what will drive demand and economic growth in the future, not just in the peripheral economies but the

core countries as well? After all, the core eurozone economies have relied on the peripheral economies to supply demand for their excess capacity, and without that demand sustained economic growth is problematic. As the Financial Times' economics columnist Martin Wolf notes, "there can be only two answers: external demand, with the eurozone moving into external surplus or private demand in core countries, particularly Germany."

From an American perspective, the latter option would clearly be preferred but is not considered very likely given the German political leadership resistance to the kind of changes that would be needed to make Germany a more demand-oriented economy and given the limited mandate of the European Central Bank focused on price stability. But the first option of expanding Europe's external surplus would put Europe into direct competition with the United States, which must replace excess domestic demand with global demand in order to help offset the effects of private deleveraging. That is because it runs smack into the reality of the unmovable object of China and more generally Asian high-savings mercantilism, which both structurally and as a matter of economic development policy is committed to running current account surpluses. As long as China and the other Asian economies are committed to mercantilist oriented development, it will be very difficult for both the United States and the European Union to improve their external balances simultaneously.

If Asia is committed to continuing its decades-long practice of running current account surpluses, then either Europe or the United States will have to give in its effort to restore growth and improve employment conditions by tapping external demand. While the European Union is in a much better position to pursue an expansionary domestic demand oriented recovery given the strong fiscal positions of Germany, France and the Netherlands, the question of who gives is likely to be determined by who ends up having the strongest currency. A stronger currency will make export-led growth more difficult for both the United States and the core European economies as they compete for each other's markets and for competitive advantage in Asia. Ironically, it is here that the fiscal crises of the peripheral economies may come to help Europe because these crises could provoke concern about the future of the euro resulting in a weaker euro vis-a-vis the dollar. But it is a sad day for both Europe and the United States and their long partnership that they are in a race to have the weakest currency. It is hardly the partnership that over the past 50 years helped create the world's largest middle class and the world's most advanced social welfare systems.

There is a third alternative, which unfortunately is not on the political agenda of either the American or European political class. That would be a common front against Asian mercantilism to defend their middle class way of life and a commitment to a major trans-Atlantic Keynesian project to expand public investment and social quality of life spending in both Europe and the United States and to develop the Rim of emerging economies along the European Union and North America. Such a program would clearly benefit the working and middle classes of Europe and the United States. It would also be in the interest of the aspiring middle class in China since China would need to rely more on domestic demand for future economic growth than it does now. But neither the political leadership of Europe nor the Obama administration in the United States is currently thinking along these lines. We must therefore brace for a difficult period in US-European relations and a bleaker future for Western style middle class societies.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Khalid Najjar**

8 June 2010

Ending the Israeli Occupation

When addressing this situation, it is necessary to start the analysis from the beginning of the negotiations. As you are probably aware, we started to negotiate with Israel in 1993, after the signing of the Oslo Agreement.

Since then, and for almost seventeen years now, the negotiations with Israel have been in progress, having made, however, very little progress in establishing a state for Palestine.

We had been promised by President Bush that by 2008 the Palestinian state would come back to life. However, we are currently in 2010, far beyond 2008, and back to zero. This is due to the fact that, all of a sudden, the most extreme right wing government is in power, a government which has declared that they no longer recognize anything signed previously.

Having refused to recognize all previous agreements, they state that the Palestinians had imposed conditions before the beginning of negotiations. They have continued, of course, to build settlements throughout the past seventeen years. Not only that, but they have already started to build walls in the area. The wall they have built is similar to the Berlin wall, but three times higher. If you could see it for yourself, it is much different than I describe. Even I was shocked the first time I saw it. In Gaza, life can be compared to a twilight zone, as if it is not real. There is this wall running like a snake around every part of the West Bank. Not to mention the continuous destruction of the various previously existing walls. In Jerusalem now, they want to destroy hundreds of walls claiming that they were built illegally.

In addition to all the above, two months ago Netanyahu claimed that there are seventy thousand Palestinians who have entered the West Bank on permits, illegally. I personally, do not understand how Palestinians can be considered illegal in their own homeland.

Furthermore, there is the problem of the confiscation of land: nearly sixty percent of the land in the West Bank is now under Israeli occupation. A number of killings take place by the Israelis every single day. I will give you some numbers concerning this fact, which are particularly shocking. Most of you probably know that in the last year, during the war in Gaza, the Israelis killed one thousand five hundred and injured five thousand people. Since the end of the war and

* Transcript of oral presentation.

** General Delegate of Palestine in Cyprus

up until now, Israel has killed in total five hundred people in the West Bank and Gaza.

When the Israelis attacked the ships in the sea, I was neither shocked nor surprised. Would you like to know why? It might have been the first time that the world witnessed these kinds of atrocities by the Israelis, but I see these types of crimes every day in the Palestinian territories, and their occurrence has been documented. Every day killings of Palestinians take place - they have become the targets of the Israelis.

There is no doubt that the situation in the West Bank was extremely dramatic, but it presented a different kind of siege, in comparison to Gaza. Every town was in siege. Throughout the West Bank, which is almost the size of Cyprus, there are almost five hundred military blocks. Imagine driving around Cyprus, and having to stop five hundred times. There is no way that developments can be made when the situation is like this. Even the United Nations are having difficulties. After the continuous development of Europe, and with hundreds of millions worth of funding from Europe and the United States, we could not make any progress in any sector, because of all of the obstacles mentioned above, and this is the situation until today.

Now, I will go back to Gaza, and I will tell you a story. Since 1948, 80% of Gaza has consisted of refugees. Almost 60% of Gaza is populated just by children. That is sixty percent of one and a half million. People have elected Hamas due to frustration at the lack of progress with the peace process. They thought that if they elected extremism, then this would provide them with a solution. Most of the people of Gaza are less educated than others because of their economic situation. This is how they perceive things, they have not elected Hamas because they actually support it and agree with its political positions, but because it represents an alternative option, totally different than the others that had produced no results. Seventeen years of very disappointing and depressing results have gone by, and no progress took place in their economic lives or in their aspirations.

During the last UN meeting I attended, Cyprus declared: "This is it. By the end of this year, if there are no results, then we will stop negotiations." Cyprus has been in negotiations for three or four years. We, however, have been in negotiations for seventeen years, and yet no results! People still blame us though, and say that we should go back to negotiations after seventeen years of lies and jokes. Is this situation acceptable for the international community?

Gaza has been under siege for three years now. Starvation and sicknesses decimate the area's population, 60% of which are children. Half of these children, as stated by the World Health Organization, are anemic and suffer from malnutrition. Only 10% of the water in Gaza is suitable for human consumption because Israel has destroyed the whole of the infrastructure. Not only this, but they have refused to allow water installations and clinical supplies to arrive from international aid organizations, thus resulting in the slow death of the people.

The international community is represented by fifty nations, seventeen of which are members of the parliament of the European Union. There is a continuous deception on the part of Israel, and a quiet massacre of people takes place. Citizens are not only being killed by weapons, but they are being killed slowly and deceptively, without anyone knowing about it. The international activists are extremely aware of this situation, but as far as anyone else is concerned, the world lives in ignorance.

Do you know what we call Gaza when we want to joke about it? We compare it to the twilight zone. There is no other place on earth like it. Twenty four hours in Gaza is worse than living

under ground, or even in a grave for six months. I can describe the situation to you, but you will never understand what I am talking about, unless you witness it with your own eyes and realize how miserable it is being under siege. It is like the biggest jail on earth. You feel like you are choking. It is not just about being in jail. Every day Israel attacks us in any way possible. One day they will be attacking, and the next day, for example, they will refuse to let flour go into Gaza, or stop supplies of energy arriving. Every day they want the people to feel like miserable and tortured citizens, and lead them to desperation. It is definitely a nightmare to live there.

Now, I would like to deal with the attitude of Israel, and its intentions. They are being very deceptive towards the international community, and claim to have left Gaza, refusing to talk about it. The truth here is revealed by the recent events with the ships to Gaza. The peaceful activists want to get some food to the people, but Israel immediately stops it. If Israel says that Gaza is not under occupation, then why are they stopping those boats from coming in?

They want the siege to continue forever, and to punish people for electing Hamas. However, the root of the problem is not Hamas. These are just the “symptoms” of the “sickness”. The “sickness” is the refusal of Israel to meet the conditions. They left Gaza as a prison and they took the keys with them. The keys are the siege, and they have locked everything. Even though they have deceived the world that they have left Gaza, they have still got the keys to the jail. They control the wall, and they control the borders. They control everything, but they still claim that they have ended the occupation.

Of course, there is much more to say about the situation there, but I think that I have given you a brief, but concise image of what is going on, and I hope that you realize the tragedy of the situation.

In conclusion, I would like to tell you that I lived in the United States for sixteen years, where I was educated and worked as a businessman. Just a few minutes ago, while watching TV, it was reported that Helen Thomas, who is the most famous reporter in the White House, 89 years old, has resigned because of a statement she made yesterday. I know of this reporter very well, having lived in Washington, and every president admired and respected her. I was shocked by the news of her resignation, but then I understood, when I heard the nature of the statement she made. She stated that the Israelis should leave Palestine! I thought at first that she was talking about the West Bank, and Gaza, but she was talking about the whole of Palestine. When asked what she meant, she said that they should go back to Germany and Poland. You may wonder why she has said this, but it is because the international community is fed up with this entity which is continually breaking international laws and having such a lack of respect for human life. Not only that, but the world community is fed up with these double standards. Israel has been playing victim for sixty two years now. The most powerful nation of this sea is playing the victim, and this is very difficult to understand because there is so much hypocrisy. In this international community, the biggest demonstration of continuous lies, hypocrisy, double standards takes place on the part of Israel, which continues to attack innocent people, whilst claiming to be the victims of the situation.

Have you ever seen Israel once admit having even the minimum element of responsibility for their actions in killing anybody? This has never happened, not in any occasion, or under any circumstances. They left Lebanon in 1992 completely destroyed, killing perhaps a hundred thousand people, but have never once, however, acknowledged having any responsibility, or apologized for this.

The international community has the responsibility not to allow oppressive forces to destroy world peace and international security, and to force them to end occupation. You cannot leave this decision up to them. I think that it is also a war crime to remain silent, when you witness the killings of all these people. What is happening in Gaza is the slow massacre of children and women, who are already suffering from malnutrition and various sicknesses. We have to consider whether this is really acceptable.

I think that I have given you enough of an insight to the real situation in Gaza, and have opened your eyes to the truth.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Avishai Ehrlich**

22 June 2010

Politicization of Humanitarian Aid

I was thinking what aspects to concentrate on. I called the meeting “politicization of humanitarian aid”. But this will be just one part of what I will speak about. I want to talk about three interrelated questions. One has to do with the flotilla of the 31st of May and the incident on the Mavi Marmara and its repercussions, or in other ways what it represents in terms of relations of Israel and Turkey. The second question that I wanted to raise and probably just start a discussion because I can't say that I'm a great expert on Turkey - some of you know much more than I do - has to do with all this talk about axial changing Turkish foreign policy. And you see how the first question is related to this. Was it just an incident? Was it something evolving and just being the last incident of a process that has been maturing for some time before? So this will be the second question. The third question which is the politicization of humanitarian aid is also related to the first question.

This is a topic that has interested me for some time in my academic work. I'm interested in what is called the new wars, or the wars after 9/11, or what is called asymmetrical wars. “War on Terrorism”. All this kind of aspects because they raise a lot of questions in terms of the way that they're being fought, the technologies that are being used, the international law and its suitability to this kind of international law of war, and its suitability or applicability to the new situation which is emerging from this kind of war. And as part and parcel of that question, I was also interested in the question of what happens to foreign humanitarian aid under the conditions of the new wars. How is this related to the first question is the whole question of whether the flotilla was humanitarian aid, or was it something masquerading as humanitarian aid? And to show you the importance of the question, I could just raise few of the news which I saw just in the last few days since the flotilla. One is that Iran is going to send a flotilla, or that the Revolutionary Guard will be on the flotilla which Iran will send, or when Erdogan said that he will be on the next ship that will come to Gaza, or the Turkish navy will escort the next flotilla. And that could be a major cause for war. Right? So the whole gray area of humanitarian aid has become open for lots of questions. And this is why I called it by this name. But I think that the three questions are related and I want to start with the first one.

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

** *Professor of Sociology, University of Tel Aviv, Israel*

In Cyprus, I know that many of you are legal experts and lawyers turn every conflict into a legal question. As a political sociologist I don't believe we can reduce conflicts just to their legal aspect. Although this is an important aspect, it's not the most important. But I'll start with several legal questions. There was a lot of talk that Israelis stopped the Mavi Marmara in international water and that is equal to piracy. So what I can say here, yes, it will stop outside of territorial water of Israel. Ships have been stopped many times before in international water. The most famous example is the Cuba missile crisis, and it raised the question of whether was the United States was within international law when it stopped the ships.

The second thing is there are no territorial waters. There are no territorial waters because Gaza is not Israel. And therefore even if they stopped the ship closer claiming that it is in territorial waters, international law doesn't recognize it as international border in the sea.

Third, the law about piracy is not applicable to states. States by definition of international law are not pirates.

I'm not raising it in order to discuss the international but in order to show that the question goes much beyond international law. And I thought that interesting is to raise much more, not formal, not legal issue, but to raise the substantial issue. And that is the siege on Gaza. Although I am Israeli, I'm also British. I have no particular sympathy to the policies of Israel in Gaza. Especially not to how this situation of shortage in a deliberate creation of scarcity has evolved. And there, whether legal or not legal, it disturbs me as a human being, first and foremost. And not only me. I think it disturbs everyone who really knows the situation on the ground.

Now, few words about how the situation has emerged. There was not free but not restricted so much movement of people and commodities from Gaza through Israel and to the West Bank until 2000. Between 2000 and 2003, at the time of the Second Intifada the Israelis took control because of hostile activities. After the campaign to crush the Second Intifada it was Sharon's - then the prime minister - decision to make the control of Gaza indirect rather than direct. What I mean by indirect and direct is that prior to 2005 the Israelis had settlements in Gaza, in the middle and in the north, and the result was that a lot of Israeli military was employed and involved in running the daily affairs of Gazans. And that was a cause for a lot of friction. So Sharon with the advice of a lot of other people from all over the world decided to remove the settlement. The number of settlers there was relatively small, about 8,000, that's all. I'm saying small because if you look at the West Bank, the numbers there are depending how you refer to it, with Jerusalem or without, its 300,000 or more. So 8,000 was a small number. And yet if you remember there was a whole theater around the removal of the settlers, for the settlers behaved towards the army as if they were Nazis, wearing yellow stars and creating a whole kind of tragic comedy. But Sharon was determined and removed the settlements, and from now on control over Gaza was indirect. Everything goes to Gaza through passages and the same from the sea Israel controls - everything goes through the port of Ashdod. So here what appeared is a misunderstanding. The Israelis at least at home talked about "we've moved out of Gaza, what more do they want"? There are no settlements in Gaza. While the Gazans claimed that Israel still controls - one may say controls but doesn't occupy - the Gaza Strip. The control became even stricter once Hamas split from the PLO after 2006. Again, just to mention, Israel was very much advising the United States against running elections. It was the United States with the then policy about democratic Middle East and so on which insisted on it, with the result that Hamas gained the majority democratically. And as Hamas was not part of the negotiations and announced that it would not accept whatever negotiations agreed before, Israel behaved as a hostile entity in a state of belligerence. Not a state

of war, but a state of belligerence – not a state of war because war happens only between states - and treated it as such: no negotiations, nothing.

The situation became even more severe after the attempt by the PLO to take over Gaza in 2007 which failed. And there was civil war, a lot of cruelty by Hamas against PLO people. And yes, there was another incident in June just this month four years ago. It was the capture of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit who's been incarcerated, not allowed to see anyone from the International Red Cross, and complete abrogation of all human rights. In all the negotiations to return him, to exchange prisoners, even to the tunes of several hundred to one have failed till today. So since 2006-2007 what we see is growing usage of the control from its original reason of making sure that no arms or war materials enter into Gaza, to the siege or the controls becoming a method of punishment of the population, either for voting for Hamas, or in terms of trying to topple Hamas which has failed, or in terms of retaliation for not willing to exchange.

Here I must say that the actions of Israel enjoy quite a lot of popularity among the Israeli population, where there is the whole movement, the mass movement for the release of Gilad Shalit, which put quite a lot of pressure on the government. But the obstinance of Hamas on this creates actually a whole momentum in Israel which creates vengeance or bad feelings to such an extent that there is a wailing through retribution on the whole population. I'm saying it because I think that I'm very much against it, its collective punishment. It is also against international law, the UN said so, everyone said so, and it still continues. The result is that Gaza is more or less paralyzed. And that was the situation even before the 2009 - what is it called - Cast Lead Operation. The situation became more severe and more untenable after 2009, with tens of thousands of houses in Gaza demolished, with the Israelis actually controlling the amount of calories per day that a Palestinian would have.

But what I'm trying to say is that it didn't start like this; it evolved like this. In many respects kind of by one order following another one until it cascaded into a whole policy which has a lot to do with arbitrariness and not really thought out. Now, the reason that Israel gives us security, amounted also in the past to Israelis boarding and searching ships outside of Israeli territorial waters. There was I think in 2007 the Karin B ship which was intercepted more than a thousand kilometers away from Israel, boarded and brought to Ashdod, and nobody said much. Because they could show that it carried a lot of missiles and a lot of arms for the Hamas. There was another case near Sudan where they bombed the ship, and another case where they intercepted the ship. So the question of interception when it comes to security is looked upon by the international community, different from when there was no reason to think that there is a security risk involved.

Now, this sail of the flotilla was not the first time that people abroad tried to break the siege on Gaza. There were five ships, small ones, that came to Gaza from two 2008 and were allowed in. It was symbolic the amount of food or whatever, medicines or whatever they brought was minute. They included Israelis. These two, three people that are known to all my friends were aboard the ships. The five went in, they even took some people from Gaza out and so on. The sixth ship was rammed by the Israeli navy and was commanded to sail back I think to Cyprus. And the seventh was ordered to turn around and go back to Lebanon. The eighth was a flotilla with a lot of fan fair beforehand. Now, what exactly happened depends on whose channels you believe. I've really been following this as close as one can, and I don't think that following propaganda I'm a naive person. I've been doing it for many years of my life. And I cannot tell you what is propaganda and

what is true. And I'll tell you even more that I do not think that after an inquiry committee - not just because it's run by Israel - after an inquiry committee I will be much wiser.

What has become clear to me is that there was a lot of exchanges between Israel and Turkey about this sail. Israel made clear to the Turkish government that under no conditions will they be able to reach Gaza. So in that respect everything could be anticipated what will happen. Now, was it intended killing of these nine people or was it not, I cannot say. I've seen the different movies circulating around. Some of the movies you have to believe the voice because what you've seen - pictures - is not clear enough and can be interpreted in more than one way.

There is another question to do with this. I think that it was a tragedy of errors. Experts on both sides did not believe that it will amount to that level of violence. And then the question is, was this violence planned or not? The Israelis claim that most of the people who were on the ship were really people who claimed solidarity, peace activists and so on. But there was a group that boarded the ship separately from the others and these people were trained in hand-to-hand combat and they anticipated and prepared for a confrontation with Israel. This is what the Israelis are saying. There is another possibility. I mean, we know from what we've seen from the pictures taken, you know that a lot of pictures emerged after from smuggled filming, digital filming, which was sent by people from the Marmara during and after. They managed, despite all the Israeli electronics, which I also think is stupid, I mean the Israelis think that they are very good on electronics, but we had just year ago in Iran the demonstrations with Twitter, with Facebook, and we saw maybe Israelis are better on electronics than Iran, but no one can block nowadays completely the electronic (*inaudible*). So if they thought that they could block it, they failed. Did they (*inaudible*) some of the films? I believe they did, the Israelis.

But we have later what's the people from the ship showed. And that too is not completely clear. I'll give you just one example. There is a short film which was taken which shows three Israeli commandos on the lower deck of the ship being treated by medical doctors from the expedition, from the people who were on the ship. Now this, the people who showed this show that the people treated the soldiers nicely. The Israelis look at it and they say, how did they get wounded? Somebody didn't treat them nicely to start with. The second thing is another... I'll give you a scenario. I started by saying that one of the things which is really very sensitive in Israel is the case of Gilad Shalit. I just throw here a possibility that the Israelis landed, three of them were captured, there were beatings, three of them were captured, were taken down to the lower deck. The Israelis do the counting, they see the three are missing. They tell their head command three are missing. The order is do whatever is necessary, we do not want anyone left behind in this. This could be another kind of negotiations which can bring down the Israeli government. So you see, I don't know what really happened on that, and I don't think why do we have to go so far? Just few days ago we had a class on what happened on Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland. How many years after? Thirty years? In thirty years will (*inaudible*) in Mavi Marmara?

So what is important is not so much this incident. It's terribly regrettable that nine people were killed or what. There are lots of questions, you see. I heard also that they boarded the ship, and Mavi Marmara is a Turkish ship. I have something new to tell you. It's registered in Comoros. So it's not a Turkish ship. It was a Turkish ship on the Bosphorus until it was sold few months ago by the municipality of Istanbul, which is run by the AKP. So this is why I said the legal thing is good for the lawyers. This is not the main thing. The main thing I think is the Gaza siege. And the Gaza siege I believe has to go. The only question is how can you get rid of the Gaza siege without an agreement between Israel and Hamas? Because both sides use the humanitarian issue for political

reasons. Israel, and I think very wrongly so, uses pressure on the population of the humanitarian situation of the population in order to pressure Hamas. Hamas on the other hand - I don't know if you followed what happened - the things from the Mavi Marmara, 10,000 tons of what we brought to Ashdod. The Israelis said we are willing to bring it to Gaza from Ashdod. Hamas said no, not under these conditions. So the question is not humanitarian, the question is control. It's a political question. Who controls Gaza? There will be no solution to the question of the control of Gaza without an agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

Now, the question is who represents the Palestinians? Is it Abu Mazen? He's willing, Egypt recognizes him. That is why Egypt has closed each side of Rafah, and there is a siege from Egypt on Gaza as well. They opened it up. At the moment of crisis with the Mavi Marmara they opened it up. But as far as I know, very little goes in and they're restricting it again. In other words, Egypt is also maintaining political pressure using humanitarian situation in Gaza to put pressure on Hamas to renegotiate or to reunite with a PLO. This is the disastrous situation which opens the question, the humanitarian question for Gazans for the whole world to play. And everyone plays it on the back of the Gazans according to their interests. Who represents the Gazans? The Iranians, who send the missiles to bomb Israel and then Israel retaliates? Now, there is a new one who claims to represent Palestinians in Gaza: Erdogan. So the solution is, Israel will not relinquish its control over Gaza without a political settlement. Now, if you think that I put the blame squarely on the Palestinians, the Israelis did whatever they can in order to split the Palestinians and the present Israeli government is doing everything within its ability to prevent negotiations. Two days ago they announced that they're going to ease the siege on Gaza and yesterday they announced that they were going to demolish twenty two houses in East Jerusalem. Why is it being done like this? Because this is a government that relies on settlers in Israel, and on nationalist religious parties. And it does under the pressure from the Quartet with Blair, it releases the siege little bit, and then because of the home pressure it does something which annoys now the sort of peace loving Abu Mazen, right? And what it does, I mean the first thing that happens to all this is that Abu Mazen is becoming weaker and weaker, and is entirely seen as a puppet of the United States. And I don't know how long it will take, but he will not be able to negotiate.

But now I come to the second question that I raised, and this is a 'shift'. Is there a major shift in Turkish foreign policy? And I'll start with the small things to connect it to the first question. Turkey could be on the side of Abu Mazen and the PLO together with the United States to pressure Israel for negotiations. But they decided to side with the Hamas, and not Fatah. They decided not to side with Egypt. They decided to side with Iran. Which means also that they've decided on a policy which goes against what the United States wants, at least on this issue, the United States who regard Hamas as a terrorist organization. So in that respect Turkey is supporting now a terrorist organization. The United States defines the PKK as a terrorist organization, so everyone have their own terrorists. Turkey is doing exactly and more what Israel does towards the Palestinians with irredentist groups within Turkey. So anyone who looks here for morality or immorality or what, the case of Israel and the case of Turkey are exactly the same. Both want integrity of the state as it is - I'm not raising here the question is it a good state or is it a bad state or whatever - and the state is taking measures to what fits its own defense against groups that are aiming to actually split, destroy the state. And is doing it in a quite ruthless way on both sides. I was reading recently that in the last week or so more than a hundred and thirty Kurds were killed in northern Iraq, including children and women. The number of people killed

in the war with the PKK is now about 30,000. More than the Palestinians killed over all these years.

So you see, once you step down from this moral tree and you start to really see realpolitik behind these things, Turkey is not actually seen in the Middle East as a benevolent force. And that, I don't need to tell you, goes back to the First World War and so on. Arabs hate the Ottomans. Basically, it's because of the hate of the Ottomans that France and Britain could have entered into the Middle East and divide it and so on.

Now, about strategic depth of Turkey. You know the new thesis of the new Kissinger and so on. It's not new. You know, when I was reading this I thought about Nasser. Nasser defined the foreign policy of Egypt as having three circles: the Arab circle, the African circle, and the Islamic circle. Egypt should have strategic depth. So Davutoğlu is doing exactly the same as Nasser. We can see how successful Nasser was or not. So back there is something, I mean I don't want to belittle this. You see, I believe that Turkey is a major player and will become even a bigger player in the Middle East. And maybe Cypriots don't like it, but Turkey is the 18th or 17th biggest economy in the world, and it's taking its position in the world. It's a major nation and I don't see any reason why they should not take their share with possibilities within this global world.

I also am reluctant about all these analogies to the past. I was driving today in a taxi and the taxi driver asked me where I am from, and I said Israel, and said, "We support you," - he's Greek - because you are the last station of civilization". I said, "Like Poland?" Because the Poles say that they've saved the world three times: from Russia, from the Ottomans... I don't see the history of the world in those terms. We're not replaying the Crusaders and we're not playing again the siege of Vienna and so on, so forth. In any case, I like always to annoy my Viennese friends by telling them that the three best things in Vienna are all Turkish: the coffee, the strudel and what most people don't know the Philharmonic Orchestra. If you go to the Askeri museum in Istanbul, every day at noon they have a parade of Ottoman traditional military orchestra. And there for the first time they explained and showed how not the instruments - the instruments are really Turkish - but the organization of the orchestra. You know, the left wing, the right wing, the conductor, the whole military structure of the Philharmonic Orchestra comes from the Ottoman military. And indeed, before every battle or what they had much of all these orchestras and so on. The Viennese can't take it. So I don't have this kind of hatred against anything that comes from Turkey.

That is not the question. The question is that Turkey is positioning itself now not just on the Israeli equation, but on several fronts in opposition to the United States. The key question in the Middle East now is not Palestine, but is Iran for the United States. The United States still calls the tune and sets the agenda. And the coming few years will be derived from American-European policy toward Iran. How is it going to evolve? Shlomo Avineri whom you know because he comes here quite often wrote an article after the Mavi Marmara and he was for an inquiry committee - an independent one, not one chosen by the government - to look or to overlook what the government has done, because that is the criticism in Israel, that the ones who will be punished will be the ones that are at the lower ranks of the whole thing. There was a peculiar thing, you see, that Netanyahu was in Canada on his way to visit Obama when it happened. So happens, he just left the day before, twelve hours before he left. The head of the military was not in the central command when the operation took place. Neither was his deputy. So who was responsible for this faux pas? So everyone is trying to gather the facts as we say and nothing will come out. And what Avineri said is that in the coming few years the government will have to make much bigger decisions about the future of the state of Israel. And we must be able to know how these decisions

are being reached in Israel. Because we had already in 2006 a very hasty decision to go to war with Lebanon, also over capturing three Israelis, and so on.

So what I'm saying is that the major event in the coming years in the Middle East is going to be the development of relations of the world, of Europe and America towards Iran. And the attempt to determine - in London slang we say to catch - the decision which Obama was working hard on through Brazil. Turkey's decision annoyed the United States quite a lot and allowed Iran to make a lot of leeway in terms of propaganda, and Americans don't like it.

So there is now a disagreement between the United States and Turkey on the question of northern Iraq, on the question of Syria. The United States is not willing to send an ambassador and renew its relationship with Syria as long as Syria is part of the Iran axis, and Syria has become now a major friend of Turkey. The reason this agreement I said on north Iraq with Israel and the Palestinians, with Iran, and with Syria. Now, I've heard a thesis which I find quite intriguing though I cannot vouch that it has any substance in it. The part of what is happening is a competition between Israel and Turkey in terms of who will be the major ally of the United States in the area. And it's not just a question of who will be the major ally because both of them are pushing different policies in the Middle East, in the United States. Israel is pushing the United States through the anti-Hamas policy, at least this government, and Turkey doesn't want to. So the question is how will this evolve in the coming few years. It didn't start just now. And therefore the Mavi Marmara should not be seen on its own - suddenly one blue day the Israelis drop their commandos and they kill. It's also not just a coincidence that on this ship there were more than six hundred people, all from thirty-something nations, and all those killed were Turks, and all of them were from that particular group. And I've seen one of the films taken by the people from the Mavi Marvara that they had captured from the Israelis lists with pictures of the people that the Israelis were looking for. The Israelis claimed that the IHH - the organization which bought the ship and organized the flotilla - is part of an international charity organization. It's the Union of the Good that collects money for activities of the Hezbollah and Hamas all over the world.

Which brings me directly to the third question about humanitarian aid, the politicization of humanitarian aid. I think it was Henry Morgenthau, the great American political scientist, who said that all aid is political. And it's true. If I go with my child and there is a poor man begging for money and I give him money, I could think that I'm doing a nice thing. But I look at my child and what influence it has on them. Do they think that I'm a good daddy? In that sense it's also political. It is the politics in the family. Henry Morgenthau was the one responsible for the rehabilitation of Europe after Second World War. Economic aid was political. We gave to those who are on our side and we didn't give to those who are not on our side. I had a debate about this issue with some of my friends and they said, "What about Haiti"? And I said Haiti is a very good case to discuss, you see, because Haiti, it's an earthquake, it's a natural disaster. Nobody has here a reason to claim that if we do not help, they'll go to one side, and if we help they will go to another side and so on. And yet there was criticism against the United States because it was prioritizing US aid organizations security over the speed in which the foods and whatever was given. And people started to shout that Americans are here for New Imperialism or whatever. I said, so even in this kind of thing where there was no question about the need, it's not an issue between one camp and another one, there are political aspects. But there is something which is more sinister in this, and this has to do with the new forms of war. One sees it more clearly from Kosovo, to Iraq, to Afghanistan. What I mean here is that part of the war effort is the reconstruction and development after the military takeover. And that has meant that the Bush

administration has started to use in a massive way. Aid, as Condoleezza Rice called, it is a multiplier of American force. In other words, aid is the other side of what the military does. And you could see this very clearly in Iraq. The result was that in Iraq the organizations which were brought, which brought aid were seen by the ones who objected to the Americans as being an arm of the American occupation. And the result was that they targeted them. And a lot were killed. There was a major report by Médecins Without Borders*, the French organization, and the head of Médecins Without Borders said look, we must not politicize humanitarian aid because this endangers the possibility of giving aid altogether. And indeed, if you remember the person who was responsible from the UN in Iraq was bombed. He became a target. And since then it's happening all the time in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in all these places.

More so, it has become even more sinister. That means that aid organizations are afraid for the life of the workers with two results. One is that they need security, and they rely either on the UN or on private companies, private military companies like Blackwater and the others, which are doing it for profit. One of the major aid and development organizations that the United States' Bush pushed forward was Halliburton. Why? You see, this is a major problem for all the possibility of aid. The other thing was that the companies being afraid that their personnel might be killed started to hire more and more of the people from locals, in other words locals are being killed, instead of foreigners, Westerners.

There is a question here of when does aid shades off to become not aid but solidarity. The flotilla was organized by an international movement called Free Gaza. Free Gaza is an umbrella of many organizations, like Viva Palestina in UK and other places which organize convoys and so on. Is this humanitarian aid, or is this political aid? I can't answer this, you see, because the distinction has been completely blurred. I'm not saying that they're bad people. A lot of these people are really idealists who are coming to express their support. One of the ships together with the Mavi Marmara was called Rachel Corrie, the Irish ship. Rachel Corrie was an American youngster who came to protest what Israel does in Gaza, she sat next to a bulldozer which was kind of destroying houses and was buried under the bulldozer. Now, how many people, how many parents will send their kids to this kind of situations? Is this humanitarian aid? Is she doing demonstrations in a war zone? Do people do it in Africa? Did you hear about organizations who send kids to Iraq or Afghanistan like this? Now here when you send kids into situations like this, the likelihood they're going to be hurt, killed from crossfire from one side or what is quite high. I don't know if these kids are aware of what they're putting themselves in. I don't know if those who encourage them to be in these situations are really not doing it from another interest. And that is to create the situations where Israel can be seen as inhuman. So the propaganda war in the Israeli-Palestinian situation is perhaps the most developed this kind of work in any other area in the world. The media war, the use of other people in order to morally de-authorize and destroy the other is taking in this conflict new forms that still do not exist in any other conflict in the world. In many cases the humanitarian organizations have come together and they have now a charter in which they demand neutrality and independence of the organizations who give aid. And there is a whole debate in journals of human rights, the Harvard Journal of Human Rights or whatever, exactly on this issue. Because the question is when you say that it should be neutral? Does it mean that you're neutral in terms of who you help? Does it mean that you're neutral in terms of who you take money from? These are two completely different issues. I could say I can take

* Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders

money from anyone, providing that I will be the one who decides how to use them. But it doesn't work like this. Usually people who give the money want to know how it's being used.

Now, there is another new phenomenon which is neither good nor bad. Most of the big organizations, international organizations which were distributing humanitarian aid where Western until the end of the Cold War. Since Kosovo we have, with the help of Saudi Arabia and the money from the Gulf, we have a lot of international Muslim organizations, not just the Red Crescent, but other organizations which started on a global scale to send help to Muslim countries. And you know that a lot of Muslim countries are now in turmoil. And they're doing work which is also humanitarian. In other words, what I'm saying is not, I mean it's not a clear-cut idea. I'm sharing with you some of my problems on this. It's not that they're not doing humanitarian work. But they're doing humanitarian work 'plus'. And it is this 'plus' which is very difficult. And it can easily deteriorate as one friend wrote to me. It was the whole debate that I created among my friends, and a lot of them were against the Israeli government. They said don't muddy the water now with the issue that you are raising now, we want black and white, we want Israel to be black now and don't raise other questions. I said I have to raise it. One friend said to me yes I'm bothered with this as you are, because when humanitarian aid becomes solidarity and when solidarity is supported by states, it becomes something else. And in the future I think we'll have lots of cases where incidents will be created through use of indirect actors who masquerade as humanitarian aid.

Now, having said all that, I do think that Gaza needs the siege to be lifted and that Gaza needs a lot of humanitarian aid. I think I read that Hamas said, when they heard that the Iranians are going to send a flotilla, they said thank you, no. Hamas. Because they also understand the implications of what it means.

I've followed the flotillas that are being organized. There is a women's flotilla from Lebanon coming. There is a Jewish ship coming from Germany. There is an Iranian one coming, and the IHH is organizing a sixty-something ships-flotilla. Will any of these flotillas really materialize? I'm not sure. But this is part of the whole propaganda game, you know, and everyone's guess. In the meantime, the Americans have said to the Israelis, okay, you want us to back you that there should not be a UN inquiry committee – because the Israelis have been hurt terribly by the Goldstone Report after the 2009 operation. And it caused them a lot of damage. They hate him even more so because he's a Jew, and a Zionist, and a supporter... I mean, he was on the board of governors of the Hebrew University and was chucked out about three weeks ago on the pretext that he did not attend the meetings for the last few years. So some of my friends counted who attended the meetings in the last few years and sent them a letter and said, would you please sack also all the others who didn't attend all this thing? Goldstone created a lot of damage to Israeli propaganda because he was Jewish and a supporter of Israel. So the Israelis dread an international inquiry committee and this was a leverage for the United States to say to these Israelis if you don't relax the siege, we will not support you on your inquiry committee. So the Israelis have promised - I'm careful here to say because only time will tell whether they will relax the siege or not. They are saying that they will relax the siege, whether they will or will not - time will tell. Maybe they'll have a pretext in few weeks' time when they put it again or so on. So what I'm saying is the major thing here is to make sure that at least for the time being until there is some negotiation and agreement, there's no shortage of anything in Gaza. I'm not saying of missiles, I'm saying of everything, building materials, raw materials for renewal, because eighty percent of the population can't work and is completely dependent on humanitarian aid. This is a

terrible situation. So making Gaza work again, whatever the results in terms of the continuation of Hamas, has to take place.

The second thing is that all these things should not be a pretext for not renewing negotiations between Israel and Palestinians which is scheduled for now.

The third thing which can ease the situation quite a lot is an exchange of Gilad Shalit. It is symbolic gesture, but it is very important. I don't know how to explain to you when a whole nation kind of stands and wishes that this takes place. And it means a lot because they say this is a state where most of the kids go to the army and it can happen to everyone. Now, the Palestinians say - and rightly so - we have in Israeli prisons more than 8700 prisoners, depends how you count them. Some are criminals, some are security. The majority are security. So the ratio should not be one to one. But the ratio negotiated by the Germans and others were four hundred fifty for one. Then they started arguing with blood on their hands or without blood on their hands, right? They agreed on blood on their hands included. See, this should stop becoming an issue because this is causing harm to the population of Gaza.

Okay, I'll stop here and take now your questions.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Andrestinos N. Papadopoulos**

29 June 2010

The Rise of Turkey and the Cyprus Problem

The purpose of this presentation is to offer an analysis of recent developments concerning Turkish foreign policy with a view to encouraging your comments, rather than your questions. Your interpretation of the moves of the Turkish diplomacy will be of value to all of us, and will certainly help us to gain a better understanding of the situation. I intend to refer to the new strategy of Turkey, to some of the changes that have occurred affecting the Cyprus problem, and to the positive and negative aspects of this strategy, before reaching my conclusions.

It is generally accepted that the appointment of Ahmet Davutoglu to the Foreign Ministry has greatly contributed to the rise of Turkey. The new strategy of Turkey is based on his theory of “strategic depth” and neo-Ottomanism. Through his Ottoman lenses, Davutoğlu sees Turkey as being concurrently part of the Middle East and the Caucasus, Europe and Asia, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. We will explore how this is implemented in practice.

The end of the Cold War, and the fall of the Soviet Union created new opportunities for Turkey to expand its zone of influence in the Turkish speaking countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus. At the time, the excuse was to bar Iranian influence. American funds were given to Turkey to develop television programs, and to provide books for this purpose.

With Russia, Turkey used its economic influence. The volume of their bilateral trade is forty billion US dollars, with Turkey importing sixty-five percent of its natural gas, and forty percent of its oil from Russia.

With Bulgaria, their relations are normalized, since the Turkish minority of Bulgaria is represented in the country’s coalition governments.

In the Balkans, which represent a stepping-stone for Europe, Turkey established her position by participating in the peacekeeping operations of the UN, NATO, and the EU, in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), investing in various projects, and supporting the Muslims of these countries.

* Text as submitted by the speaker.

** Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus (a.h.); Honorary President, ERPIC

There have been big changes in the Middle East. Firstly, regarding Israel, we are all aware of what happened in Davos when Prime Minister Erdogan attacked the Israelis for the bombing of Gaza, in front of Shimon Peres. We also know that Erdogan received the leader of Hamas. There are, however, several other events that we should mention, such as the fact that Turkey cancelled military exercises with Israel, in accordance with the Treaty of Military Co-operation of 1996, and instead held common military exercises with Syria. Ten years ago, Turkey was ready to go to war with that country, because, as you know, Syria was supporting the PKK. More importantly, there is the recent development concerning the blockade of Gaza, and the fact that Turkey did not allow an Israeli military aircraft to pass via her airspace. This represents another escalation.

Within the framework of the Middle East, Turkey has made visits to Iraq where they were speaking with the Kurds, and to Iran, where President Gul was received at the highest level by Ayatollah Khamenei, despite the fact that he is the leader of a NATO country and an ally of the US. I should also mention here, that even when Rasmussen was in the process of being elected as Secretary General of NATO, Turkey created some problems at the beginning, saying that he comes from a country that attacked Muslims, and by having indecent pictures of Prophet Mohammed published in the press. We, therefore, observe that Turkey has openly chosen the Arab camp.

In general, through a multi-dimensional foreign policy, Turkey managed to project the image of a strong regional power. They participate in peace-keeping operations all over the world. They promote economic co-operation with various countries, especially in the Caribbean and Latin America. As you know, they are the sixth largest economic power in Europe, and the seventeenth in the world, hence their participation in the G20. They pay visits at the highest level to various countries, and have done so in more than sixty countries, in order to promote their interests at an international level.

Without producing a drop of petrol or natural gas, they are energy players. East and West need Turkey as a transit country, as it is demonstrated by the Nabucco, and South Stream projects.

As a result of all these efforts, Turkey was elected as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, gaining an additional margin of diplomatic maneuvering.

Having such capital at his disposal, Prime Minister Erdogan visited President Obama last December, reciprocating Obama's April 2009 visit to Turkey. Allow me to open a parenthesis here, and make a reference to the US-Turkey relations. President Obama had a stepfather from Indonesia, who was a Muslim, and Obama lived in Indonesia for some time. So he has been influenced by the Muslim faith. In his mind, therefore, there was a mixture of democratic values from his American mother, and the Muslim faith from his stepfather. Due to this mix of values he was of the belief that Turkey was the model to be projected. In this respect, we should not forget that Obama's first visit overseas after his election was to Turkey and that he described US-Turkish relations as "a model partnership", asking the Europeans in Prague to accept Turkey into the EU.

On the basis of the above, we observe the importance of Turkey for the US and NATO. We also note that there is support for the European perspective of Turkey that serves American interests, and the question is why?

As you know, the US has in the European Parliament its British "cousins" to support it, as it has the representatives of the former communist countries of Eastern Europe, such as Poland, the

Czech Republic and Hungary. These people no longer have the security umbrella of the Warsaw Pact, and they do not trust the Germans and the French, so they look towards the Americans. There are also occasional “allies” such as Aznar’s Spain or Berlusconi’s Italy. Imagine having an additional ninety or more parliamentarians from Turkey, which is more than those of Germany. This would be a substantial means of controlling the European Parliament. We should also keep in mind the strategic importance of the Muslim world for the US, since terror emanates from there.

Coming back to the visit of the Turkish prime minister to Washington, we should mention that they discussed various issues of common interests, but it is remarkable to note that, on four issues that are of capital importance to the US, Erdogan said “no”.

On the question of Afghanistan, Turkey was asked to send more troops as other NATO Member States did but the answer from Erdogan was “I will not send Muslims to kill Muslims”.

On the question of Iran, they were asked to apply stricter sanctions, but Erdogan’s reply was that “they are not effective.” In actual fact, when the draft resolution was discussed in the Security Council to apply stricter sanctions against Iran, Turkey voted against it, although Washington backed that decision.

On the question of Armenia, a protocol has been signed to normalize the relations between the two countries; they have to open the borders, and establish diplomatic relations. The Americans wanted Turkey to expedite the implementation of that protocol. Erdogan answered that a condition should be met: the withdrawal of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. Likewise, a negative answer was given on the question of mending fences with Israel. We, therefore, observe that Turkey is making an effort of disengagement from the US through the differentiation of its policies on many international issues. Erdogan said clearly that: “We look towards the West, without neglecting the East.”

Let us examine now some changes that have occurred as a result of the Turkish efforts, which also affect the Cyprus problem. A good example is the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). In the past, this organization had a pro-Cypriot stance, which was due to a number of factors:

- The Arabs under the Ottoman Empire suffered economic, political, racial and linguistic oppression.
- Secession of minorities represents a menace to certain Arab countries.
- Turkey is a member of NATO and a US ally, something that provokes the sentiments of certain hard-line Arabs, like Kaddafi.
- Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel.

Together all of these factors have created a negative climate towards Turkey.

The friendly feelings of the Arab world towards Cyprus were confirmed after the Turkish invasion of 1974. At the time, Makarios visited Sadat of Egypt, Boumediene of Algeria, and Tito of Yugoslavia to ask for help. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) created a contact group which prepared the draft for Resolution 3212, which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1974.

Turkey's failure to associate itself with the Non-Aligned Movement in whatever form led it to the Organization of Islamic Conference, in order to promote its interests. Working methodically, after the illegal declaration of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", and upgrading its participation in the work of the organization, Turkey gradually managed to have its positions on the Cyprus problem accepted in the texts of the Organization of Islamic Conference, by using its Islamic influence.

In January 1984, I was present at the Islamic summit in Morocco, where, for the first time, Turkey was represented by General Evren, the Head of State. This took place two months after the illegal unilateral declaration of independence. Until that time, they had been sending either a Foreign Minister or an Ambassador. On that occasion, however, and ever since, they are sending someone from the highest level.

At the beginning, in the texts of the OIC reference was made to the full equality of the two sides, including the right of the Turkish-Cypriots to be heard and represented at all international fora. After the referendum on the Annan Plan in 2004, Turkey exploited the negative climate affecting our side and managed to pass more advanced positions. Turkey interpreted the separate referenda as underpinning the existence of two states in Cyprus. There was an appeal to end the so-called "isolation", and a call for an effective solidarity with the Turkish-Cypriots. Even the request to upgrade the status of the "Turkish Muslim people of Cyprus," as they are registered in the OIC, from observers to full members was presented as being made by the "Turkish-Cypriot side of Cyprus".

More importantly, it was decided that the "Turkish Muslim people of Cyprus" should continue to participate in the work of the OIC with the name provided for in the Annan Plan. It is obvious that they wanted to conceal the reference to the "Turkish-Cypriot Constituent State". Last, but not least, Turkey managed to have Mr. Ihsanoglu, a Turk, elected as Secretary General of the OIC.

In general, the climate in the Arab world has changed in favor of Turkey, whose arguments are now more persuasive. It seems that economic and other interests are influencing traditional friends of Cyprus. A good example is the case of Syria, which allowed the maritime connection of Latakia with the illegal port of Famagusta, although Cyprus is voting in favor of the Arab positions concerning the Golan Heights. In a more recent example, Lebanon presented amendments in favor of Turkey to the UNSC Resolution concerning the renewal of UNIFCYP.

In the past, the European Court of Human Rights had been doing justice to our cause. A good example can be seen in the Loizidou case. Recently things have changed. Political, and certainly not legal considerations, produced the decision recognizing the so-called Immovable Property Commission (IPC) as a means of exhaustion of local remedies. Within the framework of the Council of Europe, we should also mention the election of a Turk to the Presidency of the Consultative Assembly. This represents yet another development in favor of Turkey.

In the United Nations, efforts are being made to use the renewal of UNFICYP as a means of exercising pressure on our side. We have already referred to the recent Security Council resolution, and the tabling of a Turkish draft. However, we must not forget the mid-2009 unprecedented efforts in the Security Council, which raised questions about the future of UNFICYP, aiming at the revision of its mandate. The warning showed how the climate is changing, and at the same time reflected a broader international impatience with the continuation of one of the UN's longest-running peacekeeping operations.

On the basis of the developments that have been mentioned, we observe that the new Turkish strategy has positive and negative aspects. By being stronger and more prosperous, today's Turkey is more inclined to defy the European Union than in the past. We have already referred to Turkey's negative stance on American demands. EU members are now openly asked by Turkey to choose between the seven hundred and fifty thousand Greek Cypriots, and the commercial and strategic opportunities in Turkey, a country of seventy five million.

Knowing that France and Germany, among other countries, are against its accession to the EU, Turkey is de-motivated by the sense that whatever it does, it will not be accepted by Europe, and that even if it helps solve the Cyprus problem, core EU states would find another issue to block accession. Why then make concessions on Cyprus?

By playing the Arab card in the Middle East, Turkey is presenting itself as the big Islamic power which can create problems for Israel more effectively than Iran, without calculating political costs and alliances, if it is to expose Israel. The other side of the coin has negative connotations. Turkey's stance is embarrassing to some similarly US-allied Arab states, such as Egypt and Saudi-Arabia, who have shied away from confronting Israel despite popular demands to do so.

By projecting itself as the champion of the Muslims in the region, and providing a fresh path for the Arabs, one might expect a strong reaction from these countries in the future. On the other hand, the advantage that Turkey could offer in bringing together people like Hamas and Israel, has definitely gone. The region has, therefore, lost its mediator.

It is common knowledge that following the recent killings by Israeli forces of nine Turkish activists on board of a ship that tried to cross the Israeli blockade of Gaza, the relations between the two countries have hit rock bottom. As it was expected, the reaction of the Jewish lobby in the US was furious. US lawmakers warned Turkey that its ties with Washington would suffer if it continued to follow an anti-Israeli path. At a news conference, Republicans and Democrats denounced Turkey for supporting the activists. Moreover, the lawmakers criticized the Turkish opposition to a recent UN Security Council resolution, extending punitive sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program, which was strongly backed by Washington.

As for the cost that Turkey might pay for its stance, Mike Pence, the third highest Republican in the US House of Representatives, said he was ready to re-evaluate his past reluctance to support a congressional resolution denouncing as genocide the World War I era killings of Armenians by Ottoman forces. It seems as though the law-makers in the US are gradually becoming aware of the hypocritical stance of Turkey. On one hand it projects itself as an anti-occupation power, denouncing the occupation of Palestine, and on the other hand, it illegally occupies the northern part of Cyprus, and refuses to recognize the genocide of the Armenians.

From the picture which I have adumbrated, we can conclude that the rise of Turkey within the regional and international framework is a reality. There are certain weaknesses in its neo-Ottoman policies that Cyprus should exploit, in particular the expected reaction of the Jewish lobby, and some core Arab states. Moreover, there is an ongoing conflict between the deep state, the secular Kemalist establishment, and the AKP - the Islamist party of Erdogan. We do not know which of them will have the upper hand in the end. In this respect, we should not forget that wrong calculations made by the West in Iran at the time of the Shah brought Ayatollah Khomeini into power.

In conclusion, I feel that regarding the question of Cyprus Turkey will never give in to pressures.

This is a pessimistic conclusion, but as you know, a pessimist is an optimist who is well informed.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Guy Sevrin**

13 July 2010

The Belgian Presidency of the Council of the European Union

Throughout my presentation, I will try to give you an idea about the program of the Belgian presidency, but I will not go into all of the intricate details. I have brought some detailed documents with me for those who want to see the last letter of this program. I have also brought some books about the Belgian model. If you have any questions about the Belgian federal model, there is a very good explanation inside these books.

This Belgian rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union started on the 1st of July, and will run until the 31st of December of this year. Last Tuesday I did this presentation in the EU house for the press, because they are as interested as you are, and it created some waves, which I was surprised about. I do not think that this topic is so special, however, because everybody here is so focused on the Cyprus problem that they will see the Belgian presidency, the Spanish presidency, or the Hungarian presidency in light of these problems.

I will begin by outlining the position of the Belgian rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. I think that you will all understand this principle of rotation in the new framework, which was created by the Lisbon Treaty. We now have a permanent President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy. He was our former prime minister of Belgium, and his position now means that the rotating presidency no longer presides over this type of council. However, we still preside over a lot of other councils.

Apart from the European Council of heads of state and government, we have ten other formations of the Council. One of them is responsible for foreign affairs, and is sometimes enlarged with the participation of ministers of defense or ministers of development. This type of council is presided over by Lady Ashton. Belgium will preside over all of the other ones so there are the nine other council formations, including the General Affairs Council, the Education Council, the Transport Council and the Economic and Financial Councils. These will be presided over by Belgian ministers, but this does not necessarily mean that they will be Belgian federal ministers because more than half of them will be presided over by regional ministers. There was

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

** *Ambassador of Belgium to the Republic of Cyprus*

an informal meeting of the Council of Environment yesterday, which was presided over by the Flemish environmental minister, and she will also preside over the meeting in Cancun at the climate summit, so it is not the case that we cannot function because we do not have a government yet. We have six governments altogether, so if one does not function, then the other five will still work.

This is the outline of my presentation today: I will focus on three points. Firstly, I will describe the Council presidency, which I have already explained a bit about. Then I will proceed on to how the six-month program has been prepared, and in what context. Finally, I will address the main elements of the Belgian program, as there are five main clusters of major importance, which I will explain to you. The 'transversal' theme is the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, which started under the Spanish presidency, but it has not yet finished, so it will continue under the Belgian presidency, and probably also partly under the Hungarian presidency. Finally, I will present my conclusions.

The main characteristics of the Council presidency are given in Article 16.9 of the Treaty of the European Union as amended by the Lisbon Treaty. It now reads that: "The Presidency of Council configurations, other than that of Foreign Affairs, shall be held by Member State representatives in the Council in the basis of equal rotation."

It means that we will preside not over Foreign Affairs, but over the nine other Council configurations, plus all of the corresponding working groups that go with the preparation of these Councils. This is also what Cyprus will do in two years from now, during the second half of 2012. As Europe is experiencing a lot of changes following the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, there is a general opinion held by my colleagues in Brussels that the rotating presidency will gradually disappear. Even with our current presidency, it is only because we are situated inside Europe that it still has a small role to play, because outside of Europe it would be the European delegation that would take over the complete rotating presidency of all of the countries that are outside of Europe. Little by little, the rotating presidency is losing some of its weight, and we are no longer able to influence the decision-making process within the European Council. We can try because we are Belgians, and the president is Belgian, but that is only applicable in this specific context.

As we are responsible for the nine remaining council configurations, this means that we have to program them, organize the dates and locations, chair them, and have respect for the rules of procedure. We also have to work at formulating compromises and negotiating agreements with the European Parliament. This is now very important in the context of the Lisbon Treaty, as the European Parliament has become very powerful. About 95% of decisions are now taken via the co-decision procedure, which means that the Parliament and the Council have to convene on a decision, which is not always easy, and can be very time-consuming. This is something new for the Parliament as well, and its members will have to act in accordance with what the capitals of the individual Member States instruct them to do. It is a new context, which will take some time to adjust to, but once it has settled down, this European Parliament will be one of the most powerful in the world. We can compare it to the American parliament in a way, but it will have a lot of influence, as nothing can be decided without the approval of the Parliament. This is the new European context in light of the Lisbon Treaty.

Our ministers were asked many times about how they will manage the presidency when we do not have a real government in place. We had elections on the 13th June, and discussions are still

taking place so it will probably be some time before we will have a new government. The answer that the ministers have given is that we have a lot of experience. We have a Belgian tradition of doing this type of thing, as it is our twelfth presidency, so we believe that even a caretaker government can take care of this one. As I mentioned before, a lot of these councils will be presided by regional ministers, so if we do not have a federal government, it is not so bad.

We have a lot of experienced diplomats in Brussels, and normally we have about one hundred and twenty in our permanent representation in the EU. Since it has been reinforced, there are up to two hundred experienced diplomats working there day and night in order to make this presidency a success, so we think that it will go well. We also hope that by September we will have a government. We are going to continue discussions throughout the summer, so that hopefully after the summer holiday we will have a government in place for the four months of presidency, because the second half of the year is a shorter presidential term. During the two months of the summer, there are not so many things happening, so in fact, the period between September and December is when the real action takes place.

We are among the six founders of the EU, and when there were only six, the rotation was, of course, a lot quicker than it is now with twenty-seven. That is one of the reasons why they say that if we reach thirty or more members, the rotating presidency will be every fifteen or sixteen years, and will not have the same type of continuity, therefore it will have less power, and maybe it will disappear altogether.

Over time, Belgium has built up a tradition of being an honest broker in the European interest, and we have always tried to strike a good balance between ambition and realism. We are also known for our pragmatic attitude. I think that in times of crisis, such as those which we are experiencing now, it is good to maintain a quiet and pragmatic attitude.

It is now necessary to look at the context in which this presidency is taking place. We call it a radically new and difficult context. It is radically new because of the Lisbon Treaty, and because we now have twenty seven member states. Our last presidency was in 2001 when there were a lot fewer members. I think there were about fifteen at that time, and then there came the big enlargement in 2004. These twenty seven member states are of course all different with their different histories. We have big and small countries from the north, south, east, and west, and they also have their own different regional groups, so we try to have good co-ordination between all the different interests of the countries. In this context, it is worth noting that, since Lisbon, we work in a trio for the presidencies, which is a better way to coordinate. My presidency is part of a trio with Spain and Hungary. We have a country from the south which is Spain, one from the middle which is Belgium, and one from the east which is Hungary. Already, because we have formulated our common program, it has meant that we have combined different views and determined a common ground between these views. The next trio presidency will include Cyprus, as you know, with Poland and Denmark, so once again three different regions of the European Union are incorporated.

The Lisbon Treaty has introduced some new procedures. The main one is the procedure of co-decision, which gives a lot of power to the European Parliament. We also have new roles, such as the permanent President of the European Council, Mr. Van Rompuy, and the Vice-President of the Commission, Lady Ashton, who is also presiding over the Council of Foreign Affairs, and who is to become the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Europe under the Lisbon Treaty. In addition to this, we also have a new European Diplomatic Service which is underway.

We have had a new Commission since February 2010, and a new European Parliament since last year, which holds increased powers, as I have already mentioned. We are currently faced with a substantial legislative backlog as a lot of new directives have been waiting for the new Lisbon procedures to be applied. One of the decisions which has been on standby is the direct trade regulation. This has now been raised again through the Lisbon Treaty, so the Parliament has selected it for consideration.

The difficult context here is the financial and economic crisis. This was the biggest crisis in eighty years, and it is not something that will disappear tomorrow. It needs to be addressed in a serious way, if the European Union, and particularly the eurozone, wants to be a strong economic block compared to China, Russia, the US, India, Brazil, and all of the other emerging powers.

I will now speak about the preparation of the presidency program. We did this together with Spain and Hungary, our trio colleagues. It is a program designed for eighteen months, which means that there will be more continuity, rather than having a change every six months. We will share the same program for a year and a half, so it aids enhanced coordination and “mutual assistance” if needed. Of course, those who have more experience with a particular subject will help the others. A Mediterranean country will know more about the Mediterranean context, for example, and it would be helpful to a Scandinavian country if they shared their experiences, and vice versa.

We have placed a lot of importance to the principle of bringing the EU closer to its citizens. In preparing our program, we held a lot of consultations with the civil society. We also created an interactive website, and I think that Cyprus is doing the same now, to see what people want to put on the European agenda, and to see what is important to them, and also to consider any questions they have, and to take these elements into account in the presidency program. We had seven seminars with the civil society, and different meetings with the ministers from each domain. Our presidency program was adopted after the European Council of June 2010, because we had to wait and see if the Spanish presidency would finish or not. On the last day, they opened a chapter in their negotiations with Turkey, so we had to wait and see what we could put in our program.

During the next six months, in coordination with our regional governments, we will have twenty-seven Council sessions, sixteen informal Council sessions, including “Gymnich”, and a big meeting of forty eight heads of state, which is the ASEM meeting, and the Asian and European countries will meet in October. We will then have European development days in December, and more than five hundred meetings and conferences in different areas, the most important one being the Climate Summit in Cancun, Mexico, from the 29th November until the 10th December. This is the follow up of the Copenhagen Summit, and then we have probably got an EU Africa summit in Libya. I was told that the Libyan leader has already sent out invitations, and he has also invited Al-Bashir. However, there are not many people who want to sit at the same table as Al-Bashir, since he is being sought after by the International Criminal Courts, so we will see how this issue is going to be solved.

In addressing the five main clusters of this presidency, the top priority is combating the economic and financial crisis. As you probably know, a task force was created around President Van Rompuy, which works with the twenty-seven ministers of finance and the European Central Bank. They will bring out a report in October with proposals for a strong economic government and more effective control of the financial and economic systems. This is of course necessary in order

to regain the confidence of the international markets, and to avoid new crises, like the ones we have seen taking place in Greece. Of course, these crises are not over yet, but measures are being taken to solve them, and to come back to a sustainable growth, which will bring more jobs for the people, and more jobs in a green economy, because we think that this is the future, and also more jobs for retired people because we want them to work beyond the age of sixty five.

In reducing the budget deficits, we must not forget the social dimension of the EU, as this is very important. As we say, "the medicine may not kill the patient," so we cannot reduce the budget deficit to the extent that we leave nothing as a stimulus for the economy, or to inject into social policy. Moreover, 2010 was described as the year for the fight against poverty, so we must not create more poverty through austere measures, but instead we need to find the right balance.

We will also implement a Stockholm Program Action Plan in matters of Justice and Home Affairs. This is about better coordination and cooperation in terms of civil and criminal law, asylum, migration, and the fight against organized crime and human trafficking. This is for the period of 2010 to 2014.

In terms of the environment and climate, we have prepared this important summit in Cancun. In Copenhagen, we witnessed a big gap between the EU and the development of emerging countries. We will now look at a pragmatic way of building more of a consensus between these groups of countries, and we would also like to reach legally binding rules. I think that it is important that we do not only have principles, we need to have legally binding principles, so that if they are not obeyed, sanctions will be applied.

The fifth priority is the enlargement of the EU. We look at Croatia which has done quite well so far. About two thirds of the route has been completed, and we hope to see them in the final stages by the end of this year, but probably under the presidency of Hungary. The last summit approved the start of the accession negotiations with Iceland, and we are now building up the framework for these negotiations. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is still discussing their name, and other things, but we are hoping that some progress will be possible there. Then of course we have Turkey, which I think will be of more interest for you here. We hope for improvement, but we know that it is a long-term effort. If possible, we look at the opening of two chapters, or at least one chapter, which would be competition and public procurement, but of course they have to meet all of the benchmarks in order to do so. There was quite a lot of criticism when Spain pushed to open the chapter of food security on the last day of their presidency, because this fast track procedure was not well accepted by all the members in the EU.

We come to another important thing, which is the 'transversal' theme in the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. I have already mentioned the European External Action Service and the European Diplomatic Service. The target date to start with this is the 1st December of this year. A few days ago the European Parliament accepted the proposals of Lady Ashton, so now we can really work towards the implementation. It will start with about one thousand five hundred diplomats in Brussels working as a sort of Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Lady Ashton. All of the EU delegations outside of Europe will be transformed into EU embassies. This will result in a lot of countries closing embassies, because the EU will take over a lot of these competences. We will have different budgetary adaptations following the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. Of course, this foreign service will also have a price. They say that it will be a zero operation, but it means that they will have to make cuts, or the Member States will have to bring in their diplomats so this has to be sorted out under our presidency.

There will be the implementation of some treaty innovations like the citizens' initiative. You need one million signatures from a relevant number of member states, and if you succeed in this then you can bring a particular subject directly to the European agenda. There are still a number of details that need to be clarified, however, such as whether an electronic signature is acceptable for this purpose. The European Convention on Human Rights is about the implementation of the EU membership of this convention. It is mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty, that, as well as the individual membership of the EU states, the EU as an institution also has to be a member of the Convention on Human Rights.

Comitology refers to the various different Committees, of which there are probably over a hundred. These are financial committees, regulating committees and advisory committees and so on, but all of these have to adopt the relevant Lisbon procedures.

Then we have to help the new institutions to work and find a good balance between the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and the rotating presidency. Those are the main participants, and they have to work together as a team otherwise, Europe will not be speaking with one voice.

I would like to conclude that Belgium will be conducting a sober and pragmatic presidency, with the strong will to keep the EU going in times of crisis and institutional changes. By 'sober', I refer to the fact that Belgium will pay the price of approximately 11 euros per Belgian citizen for the sixth-month presidency, that it is about 110 million euros in total. I think I read that it will cost about 50 million for the Cypriot presidency, which is rather cheap in comparison. We will also overlook the smooth relations between the EU institutions, with special attention given to the European Parliament, as this has become a very strong Parliament now.

That concludes my presentation, and I will be happy to accept any questions that you have.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Andrew Lambert**

10 September 2010

Warfare: A New Paradigm

(Picture on the screen) Okay, hands up all those who see a duck. Hands up all those who see a rabbit. The point, by showing you this particular picture, is that one man's duck is another man's rabbit, by which I mean, it depends on the way in which you look at things, it depends on the way in which you interpret things. Because for those who thought it was a duck, if I were to start talking about ducks you'd be very happy, but if on the other hand you thought it was a rabbit and I talked about ducks, you'd think, my God, what's he on? So it's important therefore to get some sort of context, but when you get a paradigm and you're asked to shift as some of you now have had to look at it the other way around, you suddenly, think oh my God, all my preconceptions have changed, everything is different, my goodness me, how come I didn't see it that way in the first place. So changing paradigms - and this in some sense is a paradigm - is always very difficult.

But some paradigms actually are very interesting because they have been taken for granted. And here is one: the Cold War. Well, that's a bit of an oxymoron itself - how can you have a Cold War? It's either hot or it doesn't exist. When actually, of course, it's a very interesting event because it was a standoff. It was a standoff between two military powers but the war did take place in many, many parts of the world, mostly places like Vietnam. And a war fought quite often by proxies. Yet we accept this thing called Cold War did exist and it existed up and down an Iron Curtain which again by itself is a bit of a paradigm.

Well, of course now we've left the period of Cold War. We're now into, well, not cold wars and not hot wars, so I'm going to call them warm wars. And the reason I call them warm wars is because if you're out there as my son is right now in Afghanistan, it seems pretty jolly and intense and it seems pretty much like a hundred percent war. If conversely you're sitting here in Nicosia and you'll probably just had a few drinks at lunchtime and it's all very calm and collected, it seems an awful long way away. It's difficult to imagine that people are actually fighting and dying in these places a long way away.

So what I want to do is talk about warfare and ask the question: are we at the point where there's going to be a new paradigm? A lot of people are saying that the war since the end of the Cold

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

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War has changed. The paradigm of the Cold War is now over. We need to get rid of that, get it out of our mindset, nothing will be the same, everything will be different. So we have to ask the question: is this actually the case? Because here's the next thing I want to make you think about, is if I told you there was a new paradigm and I produced it like a rabbit out of a hat, this is the new paradigm, maybe warm wars, I don't know. You would then say - at least I hope you would say - "but is this the same paradigm that the Taliban use." because there's a very good chance gentlemen that the Taliban's paradigm and our paradigm is not the same.

Well, part of a problem with this business, why is that we need paradigms to explain the complexity of war? If you see these words coming out, and I'll read you a sentence now, and you see at the point where I stop whether you think you've got the message. "To those of us in the front line we need to have a clear operational strategy to defend our position for our long-term security and for the success of our sweet shop." Now that's gibberish when you think about it. What has happened is these words have been taken by others. Here's another one: "The National Health Service hospitals need to have a clear strategy to preserve the front line." What front line? National Health Service's not the front line. You don't deal with strategy if you're in a health service. These are the words of generals of generalship that have been taken up by others and have been misused and adulterated. So the problem is that we can't therefore use these words effectively because we tend to misunderstand them. And so we tend to think in paradigms, we tend to think in terms of what is appropriate and what can we naturally use that would actually cover it.

The problem with paradigms is that they're a great danger. Because if you have a paradigm that is very evocative, then it may make you start to think, well is this so good? I can extrapolate from this and try and interpret the future according to the paradigm that I've dreamt up. And worse, you can even get to the stage where you think this paradigm is so good that I will get my equipment program in accordance with this paradigm, and I'll recruit in accordance of this paradigm. And to a large extent the Cold War was on a similar tack. So we need something that will replace what I would describe as classic head-to-head warfare: two armies lined up in front of them with some sort of novel concept. We need something that's going to give us a meaningful image so that we can understand the strategy, because strategy is difficult, it's not easy.

And if you think back in history, how about David and Goliath? David did not take Goliath on head-to-head, he used the indirect approach. And so you can see already we're starting to think we don't have to fight them straight head on, we can start use different concepts.

Well, of course the concept you'll be very familiar with from World War II, of course, is Blitzkrieg - a Lightning War. Very effective paradigm. This was the way the Germans were going to, well, take over Poland very successfully, take over France very successfully. But then something went wrong when it came to Barbarossa. Here they had convinced themselves, this is what was going to happen in Barbarossa. And of course it did, they drove themselves into the middle of Russia. And the Lightning War was going to be so lightning so they wouldn't even need any cold weather kit. But unfortunately it wasn't a lightning war. They got dragged down in the mire and the slush and everything else. And the distances were too fast. But the mindset was there. So this is the damage that you can have if you have Blitzkrieg on your mind and you think it'll always work, and there's a good chance that it won't.

The paradigms actually feed off technology. And so you can see, the chariot arguably was the attack helicopter of its day. And one wonders what sort of paradigm the Egyptians might have

had to go to war? And I'll suggest to you that perhaps one of the ones they should have had was that chariots don't tend to float too well, because when you cross the Red Sea it doesn't work as well as you might've thought.

I want to look at five paradigms that have actually changed the way in which people have thought. And I'm going to start right up here with Pericles and talk about walls and ships and maritime versus continental strategies. And if we look at Pericles, and here's him obviously looking at the Acropolis while it was being made. His concept was this: Athens was too small and too weak to fight Sparta on the plains of Attica. So how are we going to do it? Well, the first option is just to go into the Acropolis, shut it all down and just wait till they have gone. But then you'd starve, so how about this for an idea? We'll protect the Acropolis and the center of Athens itself, we'll protect Piraeus - as you can see - and we'll create these long walls. And so, of course, what will happen is the Spartans can arrive, they can't manage to knock down the walls, they can't get across the walls. So we are protected, we the Athenians are protected.

But how would we then take the war to the enemy? Well, the way the war is taken to the enemy is by ships. So now instead of meeting them head-to-head in a straightforward denial type of campaign, the idea is to impose costs on the Spartans. So a raiding party goes out to, say, Sparta, raids the town itself, helps itself to whatever it needs, and the costs will then prevent the kings from deciding to continue with this particular form of warfare. So here we have no longer a battle, we have an imposition of costs which is, of course, coercion. A great strategy.

Unfortunately, of course it had one failure, and that was that if you shut people up in little tiny confined space for a long time, you will probably get the plague. And as you know, Pericles himself actually died of the plague. But he was looked after by his mistress, certainly says one good thing.

The next person I want to turn to is Sun Tzu. And I would say he was writing just a bit before Pericles and they never communicated. But I put up there that he was the father of coercion. I mean what you get from Sun Tzu is these bamboo planks upon which pithy maxims are written. And you can see here Paris Hilton was actually reading Sun Tzu. And I wonder if she hasn't a little bit of coercion herself in her time. So there we have Sun Tzu, father of coercion. He said things like: "The supreme importance of war is to attack the enemy's strategy." So we're starting to think a little bit different about tactics again. "All warfare is based on deception."

And then he went on to say: "For to win 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." And what he meant by that is if you get your army and position it in the way that it's pretty obvious to the opposing general but he's going to lose, there is no point in fighting, in which case he will give in and you will have won your battle.

So we have Sun Tzu writing about these sorts of ideas: seizing the enemy without fighting, being the most skillful. And this was something that general Giáp after the Vietnamese War, this is what he said, that he read Sun Tzu and he followed him to a great extent.

The next person I want to look at is Alexander. Now, a lot of people think that Alexander was a little bit of a maverick, a man that just happened to be dead lucky. That he was a gambler who risked everything on the throw of a dice. Actually, I would argue that he didn't. His greatest claim to fame was this: he understood what Clausewitz would have called the *Schwerpunkt*, the decisive point. And how did he do that? Unlike many of the generals of the era who would set

out their armies and then as the armies came into collision, the generals had very little control over what took place. This guy always led the companion cavalry and you could just about see him on a horse there. And his methodology was essentially to move the companion cavalry sideways along the battle line until a gap opened up. And when he saw the gap open up, he would throw his cavalry straight into the gap and therefore make a bridgehead and then drive on through.

Essentially, he was looking for the decisive point: where can I suddenly apply my force and where can I exploit the gap that I've created? And as you can see in this particular picture, the battles of Issus and indeed at Gaugamela, there's Alexander going for the strategic gap. And who is on the other side of the strategic gap? Darius. And so by concentrating on what is the decisive point in this case is going to be the gap that surrounds or is next to Darius, he was able to drive the initiative to victory. Darius as you can see looks a little bit unhappy and leaves, and of course Alexander has then got himself into the right position. Unlike the last two, this is not really so much coercive, this is very much a denial type of strategy, where he's just denying the ability of Darius to employ his forces in the way he would like.

I want to move on quickly now to have a look at the Romans. And very surprisingly, there's no real corpus of war theory in Rome. We have Frontinus and Vegetius who write about warfare, but they don't write in a way that sort of all-encompassing that tells us how to do a war. Frontinus for example gives a lot of historical anecdotes and if you are the legate, you look through the list of anecdotes and you use that anecdote for that circular event. I mean, one of the things that he points out is Scipio Africanus who said this: "A road not only ought to be afforded the enemy for flight but somebody ought to pave it as well." Which is quite a clever thought because that encapsulates the idea when you are winning a battle, you do not want to create a cornered enemy, because as soon as they're cornered, they'll fight to the last man. What you got to do is give them an out, and so you not only give them an out, you give a sign-posted way out so they can run at the earliest possible opportunity. So very clever in that sense.

Or if you look at Vegetius, he said: "An army is strengthened by labor and enervated by idleness. Valor is superior to numbers." But probably the one that the Romans are best known for is this particular comment: "If you wish for peace, prepare for war." Vegetius is the person that codifies it. A lot of people believe that Augustus said this first, which is why he made sure he had strong legions, because in making sure he had strong legions he believed he could suppress any possible activity against him. "Si vis pacem, para bellum." And that is probably the watchword, indeed I've used this on a couple of my papers and I've seen other people do so as well.

I want to fast forward to 'the German', as the Americans sometimes call him, or 'the dead Karl', which I think is a little bit derogatory. I apologize to Marshal Maurice de Saxe and Frederick the Great that I've missed them out. But I guess that Clausewitz was really the first and the greatest of all theorists of the entirety of war. And you'll recognize some of the things that he said, some of the paradigms that he's given us because they're now just taken for granted.

Who'd like to speculate on the first one I'm going to put up? No one. You will recall that one: "War as politics by other means." That's probably his most famous quote and it's interesting that he was the first person to say it. Why hadn't nobody else said it, it is so obvious. And then he went on to say this: "War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." That's coercion. You put him in a position where he has to do what you want him to do. Now, he went on to say that if you look at tactics and strategy, tactics teaches the art of a battle, strategy teaches you how

to use the battles to achieve the political end. And many people mistake that. He said tactics therefore cannot be examined mathematically, where a strategy is an art form.

Now, he disagreed completely with this chap here, Jomini. Jomini said it was a science and if he was to move three divisions at five kilometers and probably occupy high ground, you could see the sort of mathematics that are coming out. And therefore it was guaranteed that if you did x, y and z, you would then win the battle. But, of course, he didn't then think any more than just tactics, and tactics, and tactics. And he didn't go beyond that particular point.

Clausewitz went much, much further, and these are some of the things that you will have seen. "Everything in war is [very] simple. But the simplest [thing] is difficult," because of a kind of friction. And this is true as much for managers today as it is for generals today. If you have a plan that hangs by a thread, the chances are the thread will break and you will not have a plan. Well, you certainly won't have a successful plan. So you must anticipate friction, you must anticipate the difficulties. And if you do so, you have a reasonable chance. So that's one of his little things. And I mentioned 'war is politics'. Napoleon and Hitler both followed Clausewitz.

But the other ones I want to come on to are these two: centers of gravity and indeed the idea of a slaughter. Here's one that again is now in common usage. A center of gravity develops. Doesn't this sound very much like Alexander talking about his decisive point? Except the differences that Clausewitz meant both strategically and tactically. So obviously there could be a center of gravity in a particular tactical engagement. But what he was saying is if you are the strategist, what do you have to do to gain this center of gravity and exploit it, and therefore defeat the enemy? I mean, popularly it either would be the king, if you get control of the king. Or maybe it's the army in the field? If you defeat the army in the field, they have no army left. That is the center of gravity, then you can do whatever you wish with the rest of the force.

But he went on and this is where he disagrees really. This is Battle of Kursk - by the way I'm sorry, it didn't come out particularly well in this particular photograph or picture. He disagreed though essentially with Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu said: if you can win without fighting, you've done extremely well. Clausewitz said that's a waste of time because that leaves the enemy armies still in existence. According to Clausewitz there had to be 'Die Schlacht', there had to be a slaughter. Because it's only by having the slaughter that you kill the enemy's army, and once they're dead, they stay dead. And so this battle here, Battle of Kursk, he would have fully understood that essentially the German armies had the heart taken out of them in the middle of Russia. And, of course, he would also have agreed very much with things like Hiroshima, Nagasaki. As slaughter has a final splendid ending that brings everything to a final conclusion. That's very much a physical thing rather than a psychological thing.

But then we have other people who talk about morale. Charles Ardant du Picq. Has anyone here actually heard of him? I guess that probably nobody has. He pointed out that the critical thing is having the morale of the army, because unless your army has high morale, even if you I have exactly the same arms and you go to war with, say, an enemy that is exactly against you as yourself, if that is the state of play, and you'll probably exchanged shots, and you probably had the same sort of losses. But at the point at which one army gives up, that is the point of which everything changes, that's the point where all the attrition takes place and suddenly all the losses occur and, of course, you give up the field of battle. So he pointed out the value of morale and the critical importance of attacking the enemy's morale. Thoughts went on a little bit. People like Giulio Douhet who was one of the first air power advocates, and I should mention at least a

couple of airmen in this context. Douhet taking it on from the idea of morale said, if you attack a city and you have some twenty tons of high explosive incendiary and gas, and then as the hours pass, then, of course, the poison gas paralyzes all life, eventually the life of the city will be suspended. He wanted to use five hundred bombers per day against Constantinople. Because he thought using this sort of tactic against Constantinople would guarantee that the Porta would no longer be able to operate, and therefore coercive victory would have been gained, and the war would have been won.

His successor in this sort of idea was probably Harris. But Harris, although he mounted the thousand bomber raids which we know about, and although people say he attacked civilian morale, if you actually read what Harris said he attacked, it really wasn't that. He was a man who attacked the war economy. So his view was rather different. He said that if you stopped producing all the essential material for war, it doesn't matter what they want to do - they can't do it. They haven't got any airplanes, they haven't got any guns, they have no ammunition. And so that was his purpose: take out the war effort and eventually you would win.

Let me move now forward into more modern things. And I want to obviously move into the nuclear period. Those of you who have seen Dr. Strangelove will probably recall Peter Sellers and 'Buck' Turgidson as the CINCSAC*, and so you can see him saying: "I'm not saying we wouldn't get our hair mussed, but I do say no more than ten to twenty million killed, tops." How very easy it is, it just rolls off the tongue, doesn't it? Ten to twenty million tops.

But people thought about this very seriously and the man who thought about it more than most was Herman Kahn who wrote his book thinking about the unthinkable and talked about escalation ladders and how it would be possible to win a nuclear war. And a lot of new thoughts came out. Ideas like counterforce. Counterforce meant taking out the enemy's missiles before they hit you, so you can continuously target them, and if you target them first, they can't fire back at you. Or you can have counter value, and counter value means one thing in particular - it means cities. So you have these sorts of concepts. And he said the US, they win either by annihilating the enemy just completely bombing them back to the dark ages - or stone ages I think somebody said - or you can coerce them, you can play this game of how much do you take out and does that then cause them to surrender. And indeed, if you look at his ladder, you can see the sorts of ideas.

Now, I know you can't read this, but he's saying that this is the escalation that you go through. And if I read you some of the yellow stuff, you'll understand how he sees it. And he was taken seriously because this is a little computer that people had all the time which told you if a nuclear bomb or three megatons is dropped five hundred yards away from you, you must shield yourself for this period of time and you know all sorts of clever stuff like that, and eventually we win the war. Of course, if you're only five hundred yards away from a nuclear bomb of three megatons, you don't have a chance.

But this is the sort of thinking it starts with. So this is down at the bottom. We're starting Cold War here. Don't rock the boat, so that's the first thing. Keep everything calm, keep it under control. The next one is nuclear war is unthinkable. Okay, we're not going to go nuclear, we're just going to keep this down where it is, no one's going to get upset about this. No nuclear use threshold. So we're not going to use nuclear, we're just going to keep it down below nuclear. But

* Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command

as we punch through that one there, then we get on to exemplary local nuclear. War exemplary, local nuclear war.

I have to tell you I have actually sat on a nuclear weapon and have been prepared to go to war and actually quite a lot of this rings quite true. I can't go into too many details even now. But there we are: exemplary nuclear war. Let me get up to a central sanctuary threshold, that means whether you attack actually the Heartland, the Washington area of America, or do you to begin with just attack the areas around, I don't know, New England, somewhere up in Vermont or whatever. So you've gone now from the Vermont attacks, we're now going very rapidly towards the central sanctuary. Then we have central war threshold and finally city targeting. The gloves now gentlemen are off, and it's bye-bye everything, and one's essentially using the ultimate coercive game of poker. And it depends on who can out-bluff who. Because, obviously, what is at stake is not just the future of the USA but the future of mankind.

Well, the problem with these sorts of things is that it was based on this concept of mutually assured destruction. MAD. And that's just about what it was – mad. You get into a position when you start looking at this, you think, well is the United States going to be prepared to go to war and use the full panoply of its nuclear capability, just because somebody's walked into Berlin? And that was the question that many people asked themselves in the 60s and the early 70s. At what stage do you actually go to war?

And that's why we then started with another paradigm – the idea of flexible response. And this was the view that we would buy time, we would have a flexible battle and that would allow time for mature thought, sober thought and diplomatic activity to try and prevent nuclear war or keep it down. So eventually the problem with this whole strategy, and to some extent this is still there, is that how credible is it? How usable is it? And I think it's quite interesting to recall this stuff when you think Iran is probably on certainly the first step of getting a nuclear weapon. If Iran gets a nuclear weapon, who knows who may follow? We already know that India has nuclear weapons according to their own people. North Korea has nuclear weapons and, of course, there's a Pakistani weapon with probably about sixty warheads. So these sorts of issues become quite important. Where do you use them and how to use them?

We now move from the 60s and through the 70s indeed to this particular chap called Colonel John Warden. And this was the era when the first precision weapons were used. We can't really see, there's the target there and you can see it's just hit the bottom of the target. So we're starting to see precision weapons for the time. And to give you an example of the change that this represented. On the 13th of May 1972, right at the end of the Vietnam War after the Americans had been using or tried to use eight hundred sorties against the Thanh Hóa Bridge in North Vietnam had failed. The bridge was still there. I think the Air Force came in and dropped precision-guided weapons and the Bridge fell down. So eight hundred unguided weapons failed and two precision-guided weapons succeeded.

So this chap, John Warden, said: well, we have to think how it is we can possibly use this capability effectively. What can we do with it that will suddenly give us a way, a new way of looking at conventional warfare? We still have nuclear behind us, but how do we use this conventionally? And he said that thus far one of the problems we have is that many of the people have been thinking far too much about tactics. What we have to now start to address is that we need to think about the strategy. If we're going to use conventional warfare effectively, we need to think like an architect and not as many people have been doing in the past, like a bricklayer.

Because all bricks in the world piled one on top of the other doesn't make a very good city. You need someone who has the scope, the understanding, the purpose. What are we trying to achieve?

And so his view was that now for the first time we need to use conventional weapons in a way that looks at the overall picture. But he went on to say, if you look at an enemy state, it's a bit like a dart board. There's the dartboard. The outer ring as you can see is the fielded forces, the army, navy, and the air force. The next ring that you come to, yellow, is the population. Then behind that, of course, you have the infrastructure. Then you have all the processes that support the infrastructure, the links, and the banks, and the networks and everything else. And then finally in the middle you have the leadership.

Now, in a Clausewitzian term, he would have said, what is the center of gravity? Is it the fielded forces? If I defeat the fielded forces do I then win? Or maybe I have to go and defeat the leader, the Adolf Hitler or whoever it is sitting at the center? But what John Warden said was: this is the difference between ground forces and air forces. Air forces don't have to attack the fielded forces first, they go straight to the leaders. They attack the leaders, they create strategic paralysis, and the enemy can do nothing about it. And what you then do by imposing enough costs is you cause them realizing their strategic paralysis they give up.

And indeed, this was the purpose or the principle that was used in Kosovo. If you think about it, the air war took place against Serbia through the spring of 1999 and no one did actually invade, no one went through. But we used the power right against the heart of Milosevic, his empire, and eventually he was persuaded to give in.

The problem is that it doesn't always work. Because arguably, that's what happened to Hitler. I mean, the bomber force went every day to Berlin - not every day but lots of days - to Berlin and bombed the hell out of Berlin. What did Hitler do? Just went deeper in his bunker and closed the doors. So maybe it works, maybe it doesn't work. The one thing these sorts of thoughts demonstrated was the fact that we are in an era of precision attack. It was extremely useful at time of Gulf War One and Gulf War Two and it was a very good starting point. But it did demonstrate the fact that we now have a very high technology and a huge form of asymmetry.

But there are some downsides. And the first and perhaps the biggest downside of this sort of capability is this. Because we have links that guide all these aircraft with real-time communications, politicians then try and become tacticians. And indeed, I remember General Wesley Clark say on one briefing that I went to that he sat in his office and actually directed a flight of, I think they were F-16s, to attack four tanks. And you think, what is going on? So we have a four-star commander of all forces in the field directing an attack on some tanks. There's something a bit wrong here. That's not what a full star commander does. Which is why you end up with this sort of business: LBJ. They can't even bomb an outhouse in North Vietnam without my approval. But it did demonstrate, this capability did demonstrate very much that it was unprofitable to combat the West face-to-face. And indeed, as we've said, Gulf War I, and indeed Gulf War II, demonstrated the dominance very clearly. Indeed, I'm sure you'll recall that the Iraqi air force, particularly in Gulf War I were shot down and they finally decided they would not fight anymore. On early one morning they all lifted off and ran. They didn't run to Syria, they didn't run to Saudi Arabia, they didn't run into Turkey. They ran to Iran which up until just recently had been their worst enemy, which is a little bit strange.

But the paradox then that comes out of this is because we're so good, we no longer have to fight. And indeed as an airman, and I can tell you in Gulf War II no Iraqi attack aircraft lifted off and fought at all. So they didn't even fight and the second thing they didn't do is they didn't even take their aircraft and hide them behind mosques, or next to hospitals, which is what they did in Gulf War I. What they did was bury them. Now, I don't know how your car likes being buried, but I tell you most of the airplanes I've flown don't enjoy being buried very much at all. It's not that I've ever flown an aircraft that has been buried. But there you go, that's what they did to try and get them out of harm's way.

So given the fact that we are into this form of conventional superiority, particularly in the air, one has to ask then what are the options for the underdog? What can the enemy do against this form of overwhelming conventional superiority? Well, I guess the thing to think about is this, that it isn't actually as good as we think. How good is air power against caves? How good is air power against people who live in the drains and the sewers? How good is air power against vehicles that are underwater? How good is air power in discriminating amongst the mass of population, the thousands of people? And, of course, the thing is that it isn't that good.

So if you're the underdog, you need to think what the options are. Well, let's first of all try and find the West's weaknesses and to a considerable extent that is what is being done. Find our weaknesses and exploit them. Use camouflage, and I don't mean that by having a net across the top of you, I'm talking about getting in amongst other things that make it difficult for you to use the high technology systems. And instead of thinking about a high-tech war that happens very quickly, how about fighting a long war that goes on for some time? As somebody once said, a great historian asked the Chinese what they thought the effect of Napoleon had been on the history of Europe. And the Chinese actually said: look, it's far too soon to tell. And so you must expect a war that's going to take place over a long period. And that's probably where we are right now.

We're down here in this idea of asymmetry. Or as General Sir Rupert Smith has said, we're now in this business of war among the peoples whatever that might mean. And it's certainly what Osama bin Laden thinks. And this is the insurgency that we find ourselves in. Well, as you know, a human being is the best computer available. It's the only one that could be produced using unskilled labor. And indeed, if you look at the ability of the suicide bomber, we can't detect him, we can't alter or seemingly can't alter his conviction and his delusion. And also using the global media that's probably the wonder weapon of the age. So what is the counter then to this particular person? I was going to say, gentlemen, of course it's important to realize that there've probably been as many girl suicide bombers as there probably have been men. Well, the problem is that the more we commit ground troops in to try and organize and control the enemy territory, or frankly territory wherever it might be, the more we are at risk. And so one ends up in a situation as we commit more people forward, so we end up with more and more targets for the enemy to take on. And this paradox shows that the US is more reluctant than ever really to take on these sorts of campaigns. And I'll say a bit more about that in a second.

But we don't start with a clean sheet of paper, unfortunately. And if I showed you - this is from a British perspective of how our equipment program is going, it'll give you some idea of the sort of duration that each capability will last. So Typhoon lasts about twenty-thirtyish, carriers come in, say, twenty-fiftyish, Trident replacement beyond twenty-fifty. That is the same period from 1918 all the way through World War Two, Great Depression, Korea, Vietnam. And you think of all the

changes that are likely to take place over that sort of duration. How can we possibly predict what is likely to happen in the future?

Let me flash up some aircraft and things to remind you. Typhoon and our new air-to-air refueling tanker, the new carriers that are likely to come in, the JSF - Joint Strike Fighter - all these are subject to review, of course. There's the Joint Strike Fighter in all its glory. The reason this is important is because it's stealthy. And this will be the only aircraft that we will have in the West, apart from what the Americans will have, that can go into a highly hostile environment. Nothing else will penetrate without very significant losses. New frigates. Total number of these so far ordered - six.

Moving on to the ground campaign. Things like, obviously, AC17 to get, A400M to get, the new future rapid effect system which looks a little bit like a tank, which is what the army are busy buying at present. So these will be deployed in large numbers on aircraft out to trouble spots. Obviously helicopters to support them. One moves on now into the new form of warfare using things like Predator, and this is a picture of Predator, or in its later form, Reaper, which actually has an air-to-ground capability. This perhaps is our suicide bomber of the future. The reason it's the suicide bomber is because it can go in harm's way and we don't mind too much about it. More weapons of the future. All underpinned, of course, by this high technological space and cyber capability that gives us the ability not only to look at bridges and this sort of a degree of granularity. And you can tell exactly what is going on with that particular bridge. A photograph taken, of course, from space to things like this: this is the British equivalent of J-Stars, the ground surveillance capability. This was actually taken out of a Tornado. The Litening III I've got up there. And you can see one, two, three, four. This is a video taken in March of this year. A four men digging holes alongside a road, you can see the road there. This was a known route used by British forces. These people started digging at about two o'clock in the morning, they were detected by a tornado, they watched them dig and while they were digging this, our side was wondering: why would you dig a hole in the middle of nowhere at three o'clock in the morning? Well the answer is pretty obvious. They're laying improvised explosive devices. So very shortly after this a little platoon came out and surrounded them and they were taken away.

A further capability you can see here - this is from Raptor, another remote sensor. So we can see that we're looking down, a very busy urban environment. We can see lots of people underneath, the tree and a vehicle down here so we know the vehicle left these people and drove down. And we can see there are two people in there, by the tree. What it doesn't tell is what they're going to do next. It tells you what they have done but it doesn't tell you enough about the future. And, of course, we go further forward.

Let me just talk now about the desired style of warfare that we have. What does the West want to do? When it wants to fight remote wars with high technology, it wants them to be high intensity, short duration, so we don't get our democrats worried. We want to use relatively few troops with low casualties. That's what we would like to do. But, of course, nobody is going to allow us to do that, and it's going to become more and more difficult. Because if you look at wars of the future this is war amongst people, here are the people. And what we can't afford to do is to end up bombing the wrong person. So we have a B-2 dropping sixteen JDAMs, each JDAM is capable of taking out a target within meter or two, fixed target. Each one can go to different endpoints. But then if we're not careful, we end up with doing this sort of thing. We end up taking out a lot of innocent civilians, and we end up with the problem of discriminating accurately and

not trying to get our souls into a bit of a fix. So a point about discriminating and still having a capability for “hot” wars.

Let me turn now to look at the future world according to defense concepts and doctrines. And they said that the drivers of the future are going to be these. We're going to end up with a demography, a population that is going to explode. And I know those that have listened to me in the past will have heard me on that. They in turn will exacerbate the climate change by placing demands, increasing sea levels, reducing the size of Bangladesh, causing dispossessed minorities who then move as refugees into camps nearby. That in turn is, of course, all interpreted by the global media. Then, of course, all these people that live on land and end up as refugees, all create demands with the demography on energy and all the other raw materials. And this creates failing states, which are then essentially hijacked by warlords or by people like Osama bin Laden. So one has a difficulty that this whole thing is starting to act in a way that is spiraling out of control.

So what can we say about the West then? I think we're going to retain our souls. Our position of being casualty sensitive, wanting to keep small forces and having, sadly, an antipathetic public. What about our competitors? Well, arguably our competitors, whoever they may be, are going to think very much the opposite. They probably will be ruthless and many of them, of course, do not live subject to the rules of law. As far as they're concerned they don't care about casualties; indeed casualties are one of the methods by which they coerce us. They don't require small forces, in fact they'll get us whatever size a force they can produce. They're not high technology and they will try and get their public to be on their side.

So what sort of paradigms can we see for the future? And I'm going to rush through these a little tiny bit. What are all the paradigms that are going to apply? Well here's one. Many people still think it has an awful lot of validity: the clash of civilizations. Is this the paradigm for the future? And I'm not going to answer that but I throw this up. Something you may disagree on. I know Cyprus doesn't even appear on this, but you can blame Sam Huntington for this. But nevertheless, is that the paradigm? Clash of civilizations? So warfare will be along the borders, along these borders here. Is that the paradigm? Or are we as general Smith has said in a paradigm of war among the peoples? What sort of warfare are we going to have to fight? Well, I'm not going to spend too long on this. This is the insurgency style of warfare with IEDs rockets and prolonged losses and costs. Is that the sort of war that we're going to have to fight? I don't know. Lots of casualties. I mean obviously Afghanistan is the classic one we can think of. But we should also think of things like Lebanon 2006, one stage beyond the Afghanistan type of experience. We shouldn't forget as well the nuclear biological and chemical aspect to these sorts of things.

So that's one possibility of war. The next one to think about is this: is it going to be a proxy war? I mean, Robert Gates has said, and I'll give you his comment here: the U.S. is unlikely to repeat Afghanistan and Iraq - that is forced regime change, building a nation under fire - unlikely to do that. That's what he said in June of this year. So that doesn't sound like war amongst the people as far as the united states is perceiving it. And he goes on to say, we will provide them with the equipment training and other forms of security, so they can either fight alongside us or do it by themselves. That sounds to me like proxy war. Using somebody else to do your fighting for you.

And I have to say it didn't work too well when the Romans tried it because the Visigoths then took Rome itself and helped themselves to all the treasure. But one thing's for sure, other people are doing this.

Does someone know what that is? This is a Chinese K-8 fighter ground attack aircraft. They're selling them across the world, gentlemen, right across the world. Let me tell you some of the people who bought them. Venezuela has just taken delivery of eighteen. Philippines are probably going to buy it. Indonesia is probably going to buy it. Bolivia has bought it. And this one here has just been delivered to the Zimbabwean Air Force. And you wonder why it is that Zimbabwe needs a fighter ground attack aircraft? But they will. China is selling, China is selling far and wide right across, as I set up there, Africa and South America. And we can talk in discussion afterwards about the extent of that.

So that's one sort of form of war. The other one I think we ought to think about is a war, one which is short of war. We go into cyber warfare, maybe using anti-satellite techniques, maybe using trade, maybe using energy. One thinks to the cyber war that the Russians have just exercised on Estonia to turn down their cyber capabilities. One thinks of the Russians turning off the gas supplies to Europe.

Then we can move up a stage and look at maybe a next stage of war which, of course, will be more of a state-on-state war, perhaps versus Israel or perhaps another enemy state. Probably not in this case with an aim to destroy the enemy state, but certainly with an aim to getting a positive result. Sort of state on state activity, with a fair number of casualties, and that, of course, is going to be the instrument that they use.

Why is this chap (*picture of Ahmadinejad*), for example, buying this sort of capability? This goes out to six hundred miles and then fires cruise missiles, at least that's what they say it does. And then sometimes one wonders why he would need that when he already has intermediate range ballistic missiles. So this is the next sort of hardware that is possibly out there and available.

Then we ought to ask ourselves: what about this, the most conventional, the oldest style of warfare: the land grab? Here one is interested not so much in coercing the enemy but just helping oneself. So, of course, this was the classical land grab by Iraq in Kuwait: help yourself to the oil. State-sponsored, probably a fairly sophisticated enemy. Casualties are not really important there because all you want to do is just take the land and hold it. I mean the Korean War of the 1950's, the Vietnam War culminated in the fall of Saigon. Georgia just two years ago falls into this category. And, of course, Kuwait in 1990, not forgetting, of course, that as far as the British are concerned, the Falkland Islands would fit into this category very neatly as well.

And then finally we come to the war that we hope will never happen. And this is the high-technology all-out war. And I'm not going to say too much, you can have your own views on this. I mean, we would hope that this would never happen. And I've put the Chinese at the top. I'm not suggesting for a second they are going to be the cause of the war, but nevertheless this is probably the one that we guard against, because ultimately it becomes escalatory, it then indeed goes on to large casualties and one would end up perhaps in a nuclear exchange.

Why do I mention that? I mentioned that because this is what the Chinese and the Russians for example or equipping themselves for. This is PAK/FA T-50. This is the stealth aircraft of Russia. First flight was in January this year. It'll be operational about four-five years' time. Russia has ordered two hundred. The Indians have ordered two hundred. And they expect to export this aircraft widely because it's cheaper than the F-22. And, of course, the first person almost certainly at the top of the shopping list will be China.

And then we have things like this: the S-400 capable of controlling area up to some four hundred kilometers; the S-300, of course, was due to come here to go and sit on Mount Olympus, but it's now, of course, in Crete. Well, this is one stage beyond that and a very capable weapon it'll be. And the Chinese are developing a concept known as area denial. So using the Russian PAK-FA and things like the J-10, their aim is to guarantee that no foreign power can actually go into an area. Because by using their great long-range surface-to-air missiles, by using their stealthy aircraft they guarantee that they will inflict a terrible attrition. And if that isn't bad enough, the latest thing that they're working on is using intermediate range ballistic missiles as part and parcel of that capability. That would be used against troops in the field, against air bases, and against any other vital targets such as headquarters.

But here's the clever bit. On top of that there is a tracking device, and a tracking device that can track things like carriers, goes out to 1,500 miles. Now I know that it's causing a considerable heartache in the Pentagon right now, because with the Soviet capabilities that I have shown China and indeed Russia could have this sort of capability and essentially deny air space and ground space to anybody who wanted to go in there. And the only thing you could use against that will be something that is very, very stealthy. And, of course, we shouldn't forget there is always the nuclear problem as well.

Let me just wrap up by talking about the enemy's paradigms. Because I think it's important that we try in this concept - and I've gone through an awful lot of paradigms, an awful lot of ways of looking at the war. But the critical thing is to think what might my enemy do? Because you can have the best paradigm in the world and if it isn't matched up to what the enemy is likely to do, it's probably the worst paradigm in the world. So what are the enemy's possible paradigms? Well, jihad of course. Using a combination of media and violence. And I would suggest that Taliban right now are using the media hell a lot better than we in the West are using it. Very good coercive method of getting the instinct that you want. How about the controlling aspect, the use of gas supplies and cyber? I don't know quite what the Russians might call this sort of style of warfare? A gentle coercion? Coercion short of war, but using coercion in a way that gains the sort of results that you want can all be portrayed as being very, very defensive.

And then, of course, we come on to one that has always been there - a *casus belli*, this idea of restoring rights or supporting the dispossessed. You know, Argentina would say, we had the Falklands first, it's ours, or they're ours. Ok, that's a good *casus belli*. That nevertheless is going to be one that's going to go on. Taiwan springs to mind, and there are many other locations, Spratlys and Paracels, for example. So this is ours and we're going to take it. We're going to use diplomacy media and ultimately will even invade. So perhaps that's the paradigm we need to think about.

Are these the paradigms that apply? Because although I've given you five different possible scenarios for warfare, each one of these paradigms, the jihad could be used for example not just for insurgency, but for total global nuclear war, if you want it. So you have to work out what it is what the enemy is thinking and try to understand. And similarly, of course, this could be used in the most isolated and localized form of warfare.

So I would suggest that the role of people right now is to try and distinguish whether the paradigms that you're applying are contextual. Is this a clash of civilizations that we're actually involved in? Is that the context in which we currently operate? But then think: what is the purpose? Are we actually witnessing an ethnic cleansing? Is that the purpose of what it is we're

doing? Let's think that's the Kosovo example. Or we can think about means. What means are we using? That brings us to blitzkrieg.

We have paradigms that fit the context, the purpose and indeed the means. And we've got to ask ourselves just which ones would apply and how they fit. Not forgetting of course that all the way through everything that we are doing is going to be mediated through this little group of people - they're our friends in the media. Because they will exploit the horrors of war and use it in a way that may be beneficial or may be highly adversarial, highly detrimental to our cause.

So my thoughts to leave you with are these: if you are keen to understand how warfare of the future will develop, you don't need to worry quite so much about our own paradigm, whether our paradigms have changed, whether we have more paradigms, fewer paradigms, whether we have a new paradigm or an old paradigm. The critical one is to understand the enemy's paradigm, the adversary's paradigm, understanding what it is he thinks he's doing. Because if you can understand that, then you may be able to negotiate with him, but if you can't negotiate, then hopefully you can find his weaknesses, and maybe you can even just turn it to your advantage.

So what is it? Was it a rabbit, or is it indeed as you can see there, a duck?

Ladies and gentlemen thank you very much.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Klearchos A. Kyriakides**

10 September 2010

The Special Relationship Between the UK and Cyprus: A New Decade, a New Mindset?

Over the next half an hour - I'm going to limit myself to half an hour - I want to really do four major things. First of all, give you a little bit of contemporary rationale for this paper that I've written. Secondly, explore the origins and characteristics of this special bilateral relationship. Thirdly, I want to explain particularly to the people from Cyprus who are in this room that the UK is not the devil that they are sometimes portrayed, and I'm going to illustrate that point with reference to the de facto partition. Well, I don't want to get too bogged down into the Cyprus problem. And fourthly, I want to offer some practical suggestions as to how the bilateral relationship may be strengthened for the benefit of both countries.

Let's now look at the rationale therefore for the paper. And I offer five thoughts here. I'm on page three if anybody wants to follow my train of thought with the reference to the document. The rationale. Well, first of all, ladies and gentlemen, fifty years have now elapsed since the Republic of Cyprus was established in extraordinary circumstances in 1960. When the United Kingdom established the Republic under the terms of the Cyprus Act - not the Cyprus Independence Act - under the terms of the Cyprus Act - piece of domestic legislation - and under the terms of the Treaty of Establishment - a piece of international legislation - the United Kingdom was locked into the infrastructure of the Republic of Cyprus. As you know, under the terms of the Treaty of Establishment the UK retained its two Sovereign Base Areas together with rights spread across the island and various retained sites, and the UK was also built into this extraordinary guarantee arrangement under the Treaty of Guarantee. And that state of affairs prevails to this day. The UK is locked in to the infrastructure of the Republic and the island of which the Republic forms part.

The second rationale for this paper is to do with what happened earlier on in the summer a little bit to the east of here with the episode of Gaza. Now, it's very easy to talk about turning points rather than milestones. I think this was a milestone rather than a turning point although the media dressed it up as a turning point. You will recall what happened, that there was a flotilla that approached Gaza and the Israelis attacked it. A number of people were killed and it resulted

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

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in a loss of blood and a rupture in Turkey's relations with Israel. According to Mr. Erdogan, the Prime Minister of Turkey, "Today," - and I think this is the 1st of June - "Today is a turning point. They," - the Israelis - "once again showed their ability to perpetrate slaughters. We," - the Turks - "warn Israel not to test Turkey's patience." He also said Israel had to be punished absolutely by all means. "This bloody massacre by Israel on ships that were taking humanitarian aid to Gaza deserves every kind of curse." The Guardian reported at the time that Turkish analysts viewed the flotilla attack as a tipping point in the balance of power in the Middle East with Turkey finally forfeiting its strategic links with an emerging regional power. And one of these analysts, Hugh Pope of the International Crisis Group, a veteran observer of Turkish affairs, reportedly said that we were moving into a new era. Other commentators have suggested that the episode of Gaza was merely a pretext for Turkey to cement its increasingly Islamist profile, to step up its campaign to become a leader of the Islamic world, and to promote its aim of re-emerging as a major power.

Now, I'm not going to show you every single one of these slides, but I just wanted to show you this. This is a speech given by Mr., or rather I should say Professor Davutoğlu, the Turkish Foreign Minister last year in Damascus, of all places.

"As a matter of fact,"

he stated,

"We observe gradually the restoration of a strong Islamic identity and self-perception; a new geostrategic, geopolitical and geo-economic culture is emerging in the Muslim world. The fundamental characteristic of which can be identified as 'plurality within the unity'. (...) It is incumbent on us to project the true image of Islam and protect it from defamation."

Time will tell as to whether this ideology of Professor Davutoğlu is entrenched in the Turkish culture and lives beyond his tenure as foreign minister. But I'd encourage everybody to read the book that he wrote a few years ago called "Strategic Depth" which has now been published in Greek. I'm trying to make my way through the Greek edition. As far as I'm aware, it hasn't been published in English, but if you go to the website of the Turkish Foreign Minister you can read Davutoğlu's speeches which are very clear and they demonstrate that he is a sharp cookie, who is developing a strategy, if I may use that word, to ensure that Turkey develops into a major power. And the Republic should take note, and the United Kingdom should take note.

Side by side with the Gaza incident Turkey, as we know, has been developing a relationship with Iran, or I should say the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Our defense secretary in the UK Dr. Liam Fox has reportedly said in July this year that there is a real risk of nuclear proliferation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. I quote from Dr. Fox as reported by the BBC: "Should Iran become a new nuclear weapons state, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey would likely to follow suit. And we could see ourselves in a new nuclear arms race." Dr. Fox made a similar point in the House of Commons in 2009 when he was shadow defense secretary. So that observation to the BBC wasn't an idle comment. It is something that is in Dr. Fox's mind - I'm not privy to any secrets or details - but that's something that should concern us in the UK, and it's something that should concern us in the Republic of Cyprus, in view of the location of the Republic of Cyprus.

The third rationale for the paper and the need - as I see - for a closer bilateral relationship is that the Republic, as we know, remains under ongoing military occupation by Turkey in breach of international law. Now, we know that British ministers don't like using the words 'invasion' and 'occupation', but we have three branches of government in the United Kingdom: the executive, the parliament legislature and the judiciary. And our judges in the UK have on a number of separate occasions, including this year in the Apostolides and Dorrans case, used the words 'invasion' and 'occupation'. And I'm going to use them as well, because if our great judges in the UK use the words, I'm going to use them too. The Republic remains subject to an invasion and occupation, and by the look of it the Turkish military doesn't look as though it wants to change its approach.

I said I wasn't going to use every single one of these slides, but here's another one. This is taken from the transcript of a speech given by the then commander of the Turkish Armed Forces General Ozkok in 2005. And this is taken from the official website of the Turkish Armed Forces. And according to the general, Cyprus represents one of the main issues about which our concern shall never decrease. He went on to say that the importance of Cyprus to Turkey from the security point of view is based on two fundamental principles. The first is the security responsibilities which Turkey has to their 'Cypriot kinsmen', as he put it, and he links that point to the Treaty of Guarantee. And the second security connection that Turkey has with the island of Cyprus is the strategic role that Cyprus plays in terms of the security of Turkey as is, he says, clearly expressed in the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. These two principles, he comments, have continuity since stability and balance in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean can only be ensured in this way.

Now, I'm starting to plow through professor Davutoglu's excellent book, though I disagree with a lot of what he says. And in the passage devoted to Cyprus he makes the very same twofold approach. It's very difficult to see any difference between the traditional Kemalist militaristic approach of the general and his colleagues, and the more politically-flavored approach of Professor Davutoğlu. Save in one material respect. In professor Davutoğlu's book he refers to the Turkish Islamic Cypriots. The use of the qualifying word 'Islamic' of course doesn't appear in any of the military literature that you find from the Turkish Armed Forces. And that gives you a little bit of an insight into the Turkish approach to this island and the region as a whole. So that's the third rationale for my paper: the emergence of Turkey and its presence here and what seems to be its perpetual presence, which they do not wish to see extinguished under any circumstances.

The fourth rationale for the paper relates to the United Kingdom and our politics over there which we've already alluded to earlier on today. And perhaps I can show you this map here. This was from the army website of the UK and it shows you Operation Telic, which has now come to an end in Iraq, and Herrick, the operation in Afghanistan which is ongoing. The UK in over the past few years has been engaged in two major operations in two key battlegrounds. And yet over the past few years, thanks in large part to misters Blair and Brown, our armed forces have been effectively overstretched and underfunded. That's the allegation. Labour ministers would disagree with that assertion but it's an assertion that I subscribe to. And I've picked up the Sunday Telegraph at the news agents in Larnaca on Sunday, and General Dannatt, the retired chief of the general staff, is publishing his memoirs. And on the front page The Daily Telegraph reports on those memoirs and the allegation is as follows: how Blair and Brown betrayed our troops. The last ten or twelve years, in spite of these massive operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the armed forces and their budgets have been subject to colossal pressure. And what we're now seeing in

the United Kingdom is a strategic defense and security review - an alleged strategic defense and security review - which is taking place at exactly the same time as a comprehensive spending review. And as I've concluded - I've written a paper on this separately - as I've concluded, the strategic defense and security review is really camouflage to enable the politicians to rationalize deep cuts to the armed forces, once the spending review is published in October.

The political context of this, or rather the economic context to this, is the whopping great deficit and national debt that the outgoing Labour Parliament left behind. On page 4 you can see some of the statistics there. Labour mismanaged our economy, they spent wildly and excessively, they allowed the social security budget to spiral out of control, they didn't control the banks properly, their financial services infrastructure didn't work, the banks collapsed, or five or six of the banks collapsed. We, the taxpayers, rescued the banks. And as a consequence of all that we, the taxpayers, are having to pay the consequence. And the armed forces are going to bear the brunt of it, once the strategic defense review is published later this year. I bought the Daily Mail - which I don't normally do in the UK but it's cheaper than The Times and The Telegraph on weekdays in Larnaca. And what do I find? Max Hastings, former editor of The Telegraph, distinguished historian and pundit claiming that these cuts could leave Britain defended by rowing boats, airfix jets, and Girl Guides. That's Daily Mail of September 9th - yesterday.

So Cyprus's rather weak and impoverished armed forces may one day be able to compete with the rowing boats. That's an exaggeration of course. But the point that I'm trying to bring across to you is that the United Kingdom may not remain the great power that it once was. And it may very well be on the slide. As we were saying the other day, we may be at the stage where the Roman Empire was in 300 AD or so. I hope that isn't the case, but I rather fear it is. Everybody here in Cyprus should take note of that. Can I just ask the question those of you who are permanent residents here? Has the local media picked up on this? Has it been reporting on the strategic defense review and the collapse... Not really. There's no interest.

Well, it may affect the SBAs in two ways. I'm just speculating here. One is that they may run out of money and the prime minister says: well, there's no rationale for Dhekelia in particular, let's discard them and put pressure on Christofias and Dr. Eroglu to reach a deal, and then we can cast off these relics of empire and spend less money on them, and less money on UNIFCYP. That's maybe what they're saying, I'm just purely speculating here. The other reason where the SBAs may be affected is that the UK will have... If they've got no armed forces, and no global aspirations, and no need to fight any more in Afghanistan or Iraq - Iraq's already closed, Afghanistan is due to close in 2015 - we don't need Akrotiri for long-range operational deployments. I'm speculating, I emphasize, but I would imagine these discussions are taking place in Whitehall. So the SBAs may be affected directly with, say, the closure of Dhekelia. They may be affected indirectly because their significance to the UK may be diminished. And in the question and answer session perhaps you can return to that theme and explore it. But I would urge everybody here in Cyprus to think about this. What if Dhekelia is shut down? What if the British have no need for the island anymore? But if they retreat into their shell and become... I'm going to mention a country, hopefully there's nobody from that country here, but Belgium used to be an empire, used to have Congo and a few other places, and are just squabbling among themselves. They're about to collapse as well, aren't they? We may collapse with Scottish devolution, who knows? That's what could happen to the UK. Do the people here care? Everyone here wants the British to go, don't they? I used to think that. My heart says yeah, keep the Brits out. My point: let's think about this

a bit more seriously, with a bit of sophistication before we allow our emotions and our knee-jerk reaction to take over.

Which brings me neatly to the fifth of the reasons for this paper, and that is that President Christofias and Dr. Eroglu are embarking upon yet another series of secret meetings with the stated aim of negotiating a settlement to the long-standing Cyprus question. How does this affect the British and the special relationship? Well, firstly the British, as we've said, are locked into the infrastructure of the Republic and it's inconceivable that President Christofias and Dr. Eroglu will not discuss the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee to which the UK is signed up to. More broadly - and I've made this point on previous occasions, and I won't develop it much today - is that we could very well see a bi-zonal bi-communal federation established here, or as I like to call it a racially-based, racially-defined and religiously expressed bi-zonal bi-communal federation, which sees the fragmentation, or the formal fragmentation, of the Republic into Turkish Cypriot in Greek Cypriot constituent states. Fantastic from the British point of view because it means there will be a settlement, there will be a rationale for withdrawing from UNFICYP and spending less money on UNFICYP as a rationale, for maybe surrendering land and casting off Dhekelia. But is that really in British interest?

I've taken the view that that would be a catastrophe for the UK and for the European Union. Firstly, because it would legitimize the fragmentation of the state as a consequence of a use of force, which would damage the reputation of the UK as a guardian of the rule of law. Secondly - this is my view, you may disagree with it - the establishment of a racially based and religiously expressed bi-zonal bi-communal federation will set a very dangerous precedent within the European Union when there are rising numbers of Muslims and other minorities in the European Union. The Muslim population of the UK has increased from 1.6% ten years ago to, what, 2.7% today? And it's rising. Do we want to set up a precedent whereby a religious community - religiously phrased ethnic community, because that's how they are defined by the 1960 constitution - do we want a religiously expressed community to acquire the right to set up their own homeland? I pose that as a question. And thirdly, if this bi-zonal bi-communal federation is legitimized, or rather seeks to legitimize restrictions on individual freedom on the basis of ethnicity or religion, it seeks to restrict the ability of people to do things such as buy property, or move freely on the basis of their religion or ethnicity, is that not the equivalent of legitimizing discrimination? Is that not the same as eroding the rule of law and one of its fundamental principles which is that there should be equality under the law? My view is that is exactly what a bi-zonal bi-communal federation would produce. And that would be devastating for the UK as a great guardian of the rule of law.

Let me move on to offer you some concluding thoughts and suggestions for the future. I won't go into great detail on the characteristics of the relationship which I've already outlined. Let me just offer you these thoughts. Let me now spring to the defense of the UK. The UK - and this needs to be developed, this theme that I'm going to put to you today - the UK is, as we said, locked into the infrastructure of the Republic by virtue of the 1960 Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee. It's also locked into the Republic by virtue of the interest, the strategic interest that the UK had within the Republic. I'm not privy to any secrets, but having seen some of the classified material from the earlier periods, having read the newspapers and seen the wonderful websites the British government has and parliamentary records, if you're operating over here in Afghanistan and in Iraq, well, how do you take your heavy equipment there? How do you take your armed forces there? You either do it through the sea or through the air. And in

the 19th century Benjamin Disraeli said that Cyprus was the key to Western Asia. And by the same token if Cyprus is the key to Western Asia, Egypt is the keyhole, a) in terms of the Suez Canal for ships, b) in terms of airspace.

Now, because of that, over the last 30 years in particular, the United Kingdom has, it seems pretty clear to me, adopted a twin track approach to Cyprus. On the one hand the United Kingdom has done nothing to stop Turkey achieving its strategic objectives. 1974, as we've said, the UK didn't honor its guarantee. But on the other hand, 99% of the media attention here in Cyprus focus on that fact, isn't it? The British didn't honor their undertaking. But equally the United Kingdom - and this really ought to be remembered - never recognized the purported UDI¹ in the occupied area. It engineered Resolution 541 which branded the secession as invalid. Why? Well, one reason I suspect is because the UK is a guardian of international... Remember the UK founded, or helped to found, the United Nations. They were instrumental behind the Nuremberg Tribunal, they pushed through the European Convention of Human Rights. And the British, notwithstanding Suez and Iraq, have been champions of the rule of law on the international sphere. That's partly because the rule of law is good for security because it promotes stability. But the British, as I see it, have not recognized the Republic because they want to ensure that these principles, these cardinal principles of international law remain in place. You cannot acquire sovereignty through the use of force and the conquest of territory in breach of the UN Charter.

But there's a second reason why the British haven't, in my view, recognized the occupied area as a separate sovereign state. And that's because if the British did that, the 1960 arrangements would just unravel and the legal rationale for the British presence here would be undermined. Similarly, the Turkish guarantee... Because remember, the Treaty of Guarantee doesn't just guarantee the security of the Republic; it guarantees the availability of the SBAs and the retained sites to the UK. Look at article 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee. The British do not want to see, or hitherto they have not wanted to see the 1960 treaties unravel, which they would in the event of recognition. And that those two points, ladies and gentlemen - I may be wrong and I said I'm not privy to any inside documentation - those two points are I think quite significant. And when you hear these scare stories in the media that the British may formally recognize the 'TRNC', I would cast doubt on the validity of those assertions. Maybe they're just an example of psychological warfare by stealth.

I just want to make one other point on this with regard to the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom, as we've said earlier, does not just consist of the executive and legislative branches of government which are dominated by the office of prime minister. We have a third branch of government, the judiciary, which we often overlook. Another one or two lawyers here in Cyprus. But does the local media think about the judiciary as being an integral part of the UK? We just think the UK is the prime minister and that's it, and the Foreign Office, and the British High Commission, perhaps. But this goes beyond that into the third branch of government: the judiciary.

And we have a number of cases, including the Apostolides case, which have really underlined a number of fundamental principles. I'm on page 13 of my notes and you'll see there, I have a reference there to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Apostolides and Orams. The primary importance of that case is to do with the enforcement of the judgment of the court in Nicosia in the United Kingdom. But one of the other reasons that case is important - which, again, the

¹Unilateral declaration of independence.

media didn't seem to grasp when the case was reported, was what the judge said in relation to the Treaty of Guarantee. By way of backdrop the court of appeal affirmed that there had been an 'invasion' and 'occupation'. Those words were used by the Court of Appeal and by Lord Justice Pill in particular. But he went on to engage in a discussion on the Treaty of Guarantee in response to Cherie Booth QC's argument that the public policy considerations should be taken into account by the Court of Appeal. I'm not going to the legal details. The point is that the judge referred to the Treaty of Guarantee in reaching his decision. And he even referred to the United Kingdom as having a subsisting obligation under the Treaty of Guarantee to maintain the security, territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Cyprus. And that's a very important point. It's on page 10, that particular point. This is what the judge said, the paragraph 34 on page 10:

"The independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus was recognized and indeed guaranteed by the United Kingdom in the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. Moreover, by a succession of Security Council Resolutions, consistently reaffirmed, all states are called upon 'to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus'."

Now, again we are not going into the details. The judge took that into account in reaching his decision, which was the judgment of the court in Nicosia could be enforced in London. And he went on to say that on account of the Treaty of Guarantee and the various UN resolutions the UK remains under a subsisting - that means ongoing -subsisting obligation to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic. Hence the outcome of the case.

So what does that say to us? Well, that, together with a number of other cases, such as the one to do with the attempt to put direct flights in the occupied area which went to the High Court, that case together with others has enabled the Republic to continue to assert sovereignty, if not controlled sovereignty over the occupied area. That's a terribly important point and it's thanks to the UK. It's thanks partly to the Foreign Office because they engineered resolution 541 back in 1983, and it's thanks in part to the judiciary as a consequence of these cases. Which have affirmed the reality, the legal reality here on the island of Cyprus. So that's a really key point that I want you to grasp.

On page 15 - I'm conscious of the time - on page 15 I also make a number of other points. When relationship is special for reasons beyond the 1960 treaties, three of the six presidents of the Republic were called to the bar by (*inaudible*) in London during the 1950s - believe it or not. We have an estimated 60,000 British nationals who are residents in the south of Cyprus. As the Foreign Office puts it, half of those are dual nationals. Cyprus has the seventh largest concentration of British nationals overseas after Spain, France, Germany Ireland and Italy. The UK includes 63,000 people who were born in Cyprus. This puts Cyprus in 28th place in the league table of the 60 most common countries of birth in the UK. India, Poland, Pakistan, Republic of Ireland, Germany, South Africa, Bangladesh, the USA, Nigeria, Kenya are at the top of the league table. According to the office of national statistics, Cyprus in 2000 was the eighth most popular destination for UK tourists. The UK is the Republic's third largest trading partner. And then there are people like me who are British, born in the UK, love the UK, but have a symbiotic relationship with the Republic because of our roots. And we're troublemakers for the Foreign Office and for the British government because we're well-educated, we're proud of our British education and we use that British education to try and impede British policy to impose un-British settlement.

And we're actually acting in British interest. Because I take the view that my philosophy is in British interest. The British haven't yet grasped the point, at least the political and diplomatic sides haven't grasped the point.

And I make that point because my grandfather's generation... My grandfather was in Cyprus in 1959-60, he opposed the Zurich-London agreements. But my grandfather was a barber by profession, he went into the (*inaudible*) trade. And he was at the heart of the Greek community in London at the time. Most of the Greek Cypriots in London at the time were immigrants who spoke limited English, they were barbers, they had fish and chips shops, they weren't in the professions. Our generation, we've had the privilege of an education, hard-working parents, and we've become lawyers, we've become academics, we've become doctors, and we're in a much better position to ensure that the Greek Cypriot diaspora is part of the campaign - if I can use that word - to ensure that the rule of law is preserved here in Cyprus. And that's a major development over the past fifty years. As I said, fifty years ago there wasn't that diaspora that the Republic could fall back on. Now there is.

Page 16, some quick points here. What should happen in the future? Well, I make the point that the UK should do more to promote the rule of law and explain what the rule of law means. And the judiciary may have a role to play there. The legal profession does, and I'm going to hopefully stir up the legal profession in the UK to get more involved. But our judges have been fantastic though in terms of articulating what the rule of law means. I refer you all to Lord Bingham's new book "The Rule of Law" and the speeches of Lord Phillips, Lord Neuberger - the Master of the Rolls - and others.

Couple of other points. Going back to the strategic defense review, the UK, in my view, should ensure that the strategic defense review refers to the Treaty of Guarantee and ensures that the UK is in a position to honor the guarantee. Now, leave aside Turkey. We've heard earlier about Iran. We know about the other risks to national security that may emerge from the Eastern Mediterranean. The UK according to the Treaty of Guarantee - by the way, I'd like to see it swept away at some point - but in the meantime we have article 2 which says the UK is under an obligation to guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic. And that according to the court of appeal is a subsisting obligation. So the strategic defense and security review must, in my view, ensure that the UK is in a position to spring to the defense of the Republic and protect the independence, territorial integrity and security. We'll see whether that happens.

The other thing that the UK should do is now, that the operation in Iraq has come to an end, the UK should formally give a vote of thanks to the Republic for all of the assistance it provided during those eight or nine years. As far as I'm aware - six years - as far as I am aware, there hasn't been a public expression of thanks in the House of Commons. I remember, even at the time of the Lebanon crisis in July of 2006 the Republic opened its ports - as it was obliged to do under the Treaty of Establishment, I might add - opened its ports and it assisted the UK. The US offered a vote of thanks through its ambassador. The prime minister in the House of Commons had a chance in Question Time. The front secretary Margaret Beckett had a chance in the debate they had over Lebanon to say something about the assistance that Cyprus offered. There was nothing said. And why was that? These are the failings of politicians. That gesture would generate such goodwill here on the island. So that's what the UK should do.

One final point. The UK should ensure that there's an independent Republic of Cyprus which might act in the future as a counterpoint to any adverse developments in Turkey. And that leads me to that point about the bi-zonal federation which should be kicked into touch. The Republic - what should the Republic do? It should recognize that it's left the Non-Aligned Movement, it's now part of the European Union, it's effectively part of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. It's not a member of NATO. It should think about joining NATO. I'm in two minds, I take the view that perhaps non-membership of NATO may be in the interest of the Republic, and also in British interest for various reasons, and gives Cyprus a rather clean image in the dealings of the countries to the east. That may be in the West's interest to have a non-NATO Cyprus locked into the European Union, but outside NATO. But that's for the Republic to think seriously about.

However, on the other hand I take the view that Cyprus should, the Republic should apply to join Partnership for Peace in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Why is it, as far as I'm aware, that the Republic is the only member state of the European Union that isn't a member of those two bodies? Seems to me bizarre. And that's maybe something to be with the Cold War mindset, the lingering Cold War mindset one finds here.

Beyond Europe, the Republic and the UK should look east. We've got these emerging powers in China and India, Russia to the north. There needs to be thought given to how the Republic develops its global connections. I find it bizarre that last year the Republic chose to open an embassy in Cuba - a dictatorship led by Castro and his brother - and it doesn't, as far as I'm aware, have a physical ambassadorial presence in two members of the G8, namely Canada, which is served by Washington DC, and Japan, which is served from Beijing. That seems bizarre, isn't it? The Republic is going to grow up in the world... (*comment from the audience*).

That takes me back to the title of my talk: the new mindset is needed. The Cold War has come to an end. And of course, that decision to go to Cuba was a little bit bizarre, given the fact that there are large numbers of Cuban American senators and congressmen who support the cause of Cyprus, and they were put in a very embarrassing position having to justify their relationship with the Republic of Cyprus. Remember how the Americans think. If you live in Iowa, you think that Missouri is on a different planet. You had Latin American congressmen of Cuban extraction supporting the Republic of Cyprus, island miles away, and they suddenly wake up to discover that the president of the Republic of Cyprus has gone to Cuba and decided to open an embassy there. So there needs to be waking up here in Cyprus. And that's going to take time. The younger generation is gradually coming into power in Cyprus, to far greater extent than before. Not entirely, but gradually they'll come to power.

A couple of other suggestions. India. Natural partner for the UK and Cyprus. Think of the Commonwealth. Not enough, as far as I can see, has been done to take advantage of the status of Malta, and Cyprus, and the UK as members of the Commonwealth and the EU. Leave aside strategy and politics. Educational, cultural and other trading ties should be built up between those three countries and India. And more broadly, I'd brought the Irish here. The countries that were formerly under British rule: Ireland, Malta, Cyprus and the UK should form a club - club within the EU - and try and do more to support one another and promote their interest in and beyond the European Union. I know that my ideas need to be fleshed out but I just want to plant some seeds here and get people thinking about this.

But for all of this to happen, ladies and gentlemen - and I'm reaching rapidly towards the end - for all of this to happen there needs to be a change of mindset in London and in Cyprus. And I've

given you all of these ideas, and in my paper at pages 6 and 7 I've listed a number of fundamental questions that need to be addressed. Should the Republic apply to join NATO? Should it apply to join Partnership for Peace? What should happen to the Treaty of Establishment, and the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance? Should the status of the British presence be altered? If so, how? Should the British military presence be encouraged to stay? How can there be military cooperation between the UK and the Republic? What should happen in relation to nuclear strategy? How can the UK, or should the UK be involved in Cyprus in terms of protecting it from any emerging nuclear threat? The whole host of questions I've posed there. These questions need to be addressed now before things are settled, but not afterwards. Are these questions being discussed and agreed? Or are they just muddling through and hoping to reach a settlement? And there needs to be clear strategic thinking, clear strategic planning. And I would encourage everybody here to encourage their leaders to do that. I rather fear - rather like David Cameron and the five-year plan for Afghanistan - that our politicians here are just blinded by the next general election, the hope of a Nobel Peace Prize, and carving their name into history.

So, the way of conclusion. There's a lovely passage here from (*inaudible*) in 1994. David Davis, who was rather a renegade Conservative MP, was a minister of state at the Foreign Office and he made the following point:

"Cyprus is important to the United Kingdom. Our countries are bound by shared history and personalities and common political interests. Our common history gives us shared values and outlooks and we are bound together in the Commonwealth, and now in the European Union. Cyprus is one of the major British tourist destinations and the integration of Cypriots in Britain, especially here in London, proves the closeness of the relationship. It is also fair to say that our sovereign bases in Cyprus are strategically important to Britain as was demonstrated clearly during the Gulf War of '90 to '91 and subsequently by Iraq and Afghanistan."

So I hope the bilateral relationship will be strengthened. I hope that the British will try and review their policy toward Cyprus. It's a tall order but I hope that happens. I hope that the Republic reviews its relationship with the UK. It's a tall order, I hope that happens. I began with Zeno of Kitium: "Follow where reason leads." But I will finish this paper in Lord Byron's words. He once wrote "Those who will not reason are bigots. Those who cannot reason are fools. And those who dare not reason are slaves."

Thank you ladies and gentlemen.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Herbert Reginbogin**

13 October 2010

Reviving a Dying Empire: Reawakening US Vital Interests in the Middle East

Leading up to the crash of 2008, the global economy rejoiced with unparalleled prosperity when at once the lives of millions of people were devastated financially with aftershocks of an economic meltdown expected to last for some time still to come. While the almost economic collapse of the financial markets and increased unemployment launched a new process of internationalization among the financial community and major trading countries in coordinated efforts to find antidotes to the excesses of unregulated capitalism, new threats face the West between growing alliances of radical-left Western groups and Jihadists from the Caucasus to Pakistan to Western Sahara. How can some of the ethnic and sectarian conflicts of these regions be resolved? How does Turkey's strategic regional expansion affect security and resolving conflicts in the region?

A Great Depression had been averted especially through the G-20 including emerging market countries Turkey, Russia, India, China, and Brazil. At the same time emerging market countries like Brazil and Turkey undermined United States' security efforts to strengthen sanctions against Iran's effort to develop its nuclear energy program without any really effective solution to monitoring Iran's uranium enrichment needed to develop a nuclear bomb. What security architecture can be developed to integrate the resources of emerging market countries to affect the long-standing regional conflicts in the Greater Mediterranean, Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East to benefit American, European and other interests in the regions themselves?

Economic integration has gained center stage more and more. It is the theoretical perspective into which the USA must adapt its foreign relations to strengthen regionalism and multilateral cooperation because of its threatened economic viability by preparing a way to reconsider its international role. A transformation of the Lockean heartland is at the crossroads of a greater cosmopolitan interdependency to tackle the global challenges of the 21st century which rests on a sound economic pillar. Will a moral institutionalism of good governance as a formal structure beyond the nation-state be an asset to the United States as it seeks peace and prosperity in the

* Text as submitted by the speaker..

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Middle East? Is it possible to have regional security organizations take care of threats and challenges causing instability and even revamp the entire concept of the trading states model?

A reconceptualization of globalization, government and civil society is needed to offer an alternative to the now dominant, even hegemonic, growth paradigm. While John Maynard Keynes from the inter-war years wrote that the goal of economics should be the prevention of war through high levels of employment and stable prices, the excesses of the Lockean heartland needs to be embedded in an economic and security architecture critical to the unharnessed growth model of economics linked to both an individualistic libertarian ethic lying behind it and the morality of states approach in international relations. In their place a stewardship based economy founded on principles of competitive markets and profitability designed to be accountable for the risks/costs and benefits associated with mother nature and life on the planet is needed. A trusteeship role is developed for the next generation in which sovereignty is transparent by which the role of governments and civil society and the market need to be oriented towards relieve from famine, malnutrition, violence, unjustified taxes and corrupt authority set in the context of protecting life and the basic rights of all people while allowing its people opportunity to increase their prosperity.

Introduction

One of the fundamental ideas of late 20th century America was that the collapse of communism reflected a permanent turn in human affairs. "The end of history" meant the end of endless pursuits for utopian alternatives to the liberal democratic state. It has been largely accepted by American scholars that the global economy was an autonomous outcome of globalization. The geopolitical considerations of the American state in shaping globalization - a vision of endless growth and the commercialization of everything - are often set aside in favor of viewing it as a free market utopia entailing a powerful cultural process of liberation for the masses through consumption. America's influence since the end of the 19th century has endeavored to spread these ideas of an open capitalist society.

Economic Impact of the Crash of 2008

With the Crash of 2008, an open capitalist society came to a halt. Economic consolidation had occurred with economic integration gaining center stage more and more. Due to the global economic downturn, America is more dependent on other state actors than in 1989 meaning that its foreign relations are directed towards strengthening regionalism and multilateral cooperation while reconsidering its international role. A transformation of the American Lockean heartland is at the crossroads of a greater cosmopolitan interdependency to tackle the global challenges of the 21st century which rests on a sound economic pillar. But America has serious structural economic problems with the national housing market industry and the nation's two largest mortgage finance lenders Freddie Mac and Fannie-Mae.

Geo-political Impact of the Crash of 2008: Economic Outlook

Leading up to the crash of 2008, emerging-market countries China, India, Brazil, Russia and Turkey had effectively succeeded in profiting from their insertion into the ongoing globalization. They had become part of an organization called the G-20, heavily responsible for averting a 'Great Depression' along with the G-7, which will appear as a bunch of emperors without clothes unless they come to grips with their fiscal household deficits due to their economic decline. The economic power and money is moving eastward to emerging markets with China becoming the second largest economy replacing Japan in the 21st Century.

In the last 20 years, during a “New Age of Globalization”, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States entered what Charles Krauthammer called a “unipolar moment”¹ wielding until the Crash of 2008 nearly absolute power by effectively regulating a global market with an interwoven worldwide network of production and communication. Since 2001, a global order emerged with a new logic and structure of rule – in short a new form of sovereignty where everyone from the extreme left to the far right began to label the United States of America under President George W. Bush Jr. as an imperium. Scholars began to discuss and criticize the United States as a sovereign power that governs the world as an imperial empire comparable with Rome by forcing all countries to join Rome’s system of alliances, opening up a far larger frame of reference to understand America’s history, role in the world, and future responsibilities.² Hannah Arendt in her book, *On Revolution*, writes, “The ambition of Rome was not to subject the whole world to Roman power, but to throw the Roman system of alliances over all countries of the earth.”³ In a conference held in Hildesheim, Germany, end of April 2010 called *Imperien und Reiche in der Weltgeschichte: Epochenuebergreifende und Globalhistorische Vergleiche* (Imperiums and Empires in World History: Overreaching Epics and Comparative Global-History), it became clear that the history of the USA is a history of expansion which became a prime instigator or core of an “irresistible Empire”⁴ (Victoria de Grazia) or an “empire by invitation”⁵ (Geir Lundestad). The liberal-democratic character of the 20th century hegemonic policy of the USA was changed at the beginning of the 21st century into an aggressive actor of state interests which often violated the codex of international law. Having saved the capitalist financial system from collapsing in 2009, the economic erosion still continues in the United States.

Is America Really In Decline?

For decades debate and warnings about the decline of US power and dominance have been in the making. Already in the 1950s, there was the doomsday scenario about America’s decline with the rise of the communist USSR’s space program, followed by the Vietnam War in the 1960s and Third World revolutions like Iran in the 1970s, to the emergence of Japan, Europe and now China as major economic powers. In 1987 Paul Kennedy in his famous book, *The Rise and Decline of the Great Powers*, wrote of ‘imperial overstretch’ of the mismatch of political and strategic goals with economic and, not least, fiscal, reality, setting the stage for a flood of literature predicting the decline of America.⁶ In his valedictory lecture on January 30, 2008 Professor of International Relations, the late Fred Halliday, said:

“That one day the US’s control of, and dominance over, the world will lessen is indisputable, but that another power will emerge in the foreseeable future that is equal to it, or able to rival it, on the world stage, as the USSR did for four decades, albeit from a position of overall weakness, is less clear. A world of one dominant, and several medium powers, seems more probable. America is, and will remain number one, but there are many

¹ Charles Krauthammer, ‘The Unipolar Moment,’ *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1990/1991.

² Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. xi

³ Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution*, Penguin Books, 1963.

⁴ Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance Through Twentieth-Century Europe*, Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press, 2006.

⁵ Geir Lundestad., ‘Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952,’ *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 23, No. 3, September 1986, pp. 263-277. Such as after World War II when almost everywhere in Europe everything was destroyed, people were welcoming America and the Marshall Plan to help rebuild Europe.

⁶ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*, Random House, New York, 1987.

who do not accept it.”⁷

The emerging international order is likely to be quite different from those that preceded it. As Fareed Zakaria in his article written 2008 in *Foreign Affairs*, “The Future of American Power”, points out,

“The world will not stay polar. On every dimension other than military power – industrial, financial, social, cultural – the distribution of power is shifting, moving away from U.S. dominance.”

Certainly not a very encouraging statement. But Zakaria continues on to say:

“The world is changing, but it is going the United States’ way. The States that are rising are embracing markets, democratic governments (of some form or another), and greater openness and transparency.”⁸

The principal characteristic of 21st century international relations is turning out to be about scores of actors possessing and executing all kinds of power. The inability to reach an agreement in the Doha Round of global trade talks is a prime example. What needs to be done by the United States to achieve a consensus among the different countries in various regions of the world like the Middle East?

Challenges Facing the Obama Administration

Contrary to his predecessors, the Obama Administration must choose a new security architecture to include new regional players and strengthen the moderates in the region to agree on compromises on global issues and distance themselves from the radicals in the Middle East. There is a shift between moderates and radicals in the region. How is one to interpret Turkey’s President Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) government’s multilateral diplomacy of rubbing shoulders with Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and Sudan while maintaining ties with NATO and the West? What is one to make of Saudi Arabia resuming talks with the Hamas and strengthening relations with Syria? The question arises if there is plan in the making to create a Middle East Union as a regional equivalent of the European Union, with Turkey becoming a hegemonic power in the region along with Russia. Endorsed recently by a resounding constitutional referendum win by the AKP is a sign of Erdogan’s political consolidation. As Eric Walberg reports,

“Erdogan re-established the Caliphate visa-free tradition with Albania, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya and Syria last year. In February Turkish Culture and Tourism Minister Ertugrul Gunay offered to do likewise with Egypt. Turkey also has concluded a strategic partnership with Russia during the past two years, with a visa-free regime and ambitious trade and investment plans (denominated in rubles and lira), including the construction of new pipelines and nuclear energy facilities.”⁹

⁷ Fred Halliday, ‘International Relations in a Post-Hegemonic Age,’ Valedictory Lecture as Montague Burton Professor of International Relations LSE, 20 January 2008.

⁸ Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,’ *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008, p. 43.

⁹ Eric Walberg, ‘Turkey and Russia Defy America’s Imperial Design in the Middle East and Central Asia,’ *Global Research*, 1 October 2010, www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=21273.

In order for President Obama to influence Erdogan's expansionism as a power broker in the region, he needs to embrace a normative architecture to support comprehensive policies to accelerate economic, social and political development in the Middle East. And the same time take into account historical injustices and concerns of the Israeli and Palestinian people such as the acceptance of a Jewish right to the state of Israel and recognition of the historic injustice suffered by the Palestinian people. America's foreign policy needs to be based on a commercially scientific, technological, ecologically driven public policy involving greater investments in areas such as medicine, education, water, natural resource allocations (gas and oil), alternative energies such as sun, and infrastructure projects to attract investors for projects with sustainable development for the people, market and Mother Nature. America should embrace such a strategic alliance with military superiority if needed but without hegemonic overtones and US-domination of international financial organizations. In other words, to exert less formal and informal domination over the politics of a number of other countries in which the principles of partnership, human rights and international law will be codified, respected and implemented.

It also means that the material power of the United States is further integrated in global financial and trading institutions in which cooperation becomes existential in dealing with systemic challenges. The hegemonic power of the USA should not primarily be based on its affluence and military power but on values and respect for international law to which societies of other countries will be attracted to and desire to emulate. The United States and its partners should draft new conventions, treaties and charters to address the new threats to state sovereignty like terrorists that don't fall neatly into existing categories and how such people shall be treated and prosecuted. Because of the stateless and transnational nature of non-combatants/terrorists, the United States should collaborate with its partners like Turkey to construct an international arrangement that prevents nations from exporting their security risks and opens channels for inter-communal dialogues about each other.¹⁰ All these efforts will help defeat radicalization in the Middle East and influence Erdogan's government to approach countries whose arch-enemy is the United States of America with less interest.

Although power is shifting away from the dominance of the USA in the world causing a change in the nature of the international order, the United States can contribute to stabilizing the tumultuous changes in the world in trying to convince the new rising nations that there are but two choices:

- 1) Giving up some of their own power, with America being prepared to do likewise by accepting a world of diversity and different voices;
- 2) or having to watch fragmentation through greater nationalism, disintegration of states and increasing civil unrest in the world.

Another challenge facing the Obama Administration is to alter America's decision makers in Congress to overcome the dominant strands in American foreign policy, which has been the unquestioned assumption that the USA, as torch-bearer of liberal democracy and the free market, has the capacity to transform the world in its own image. The "Revolutionism" of the Obama administration is a broad challenge and has still to prove of being able to demonstrate both "change" in strategy and attitude.

¹⁰ Michael Chertoff, 'The Responsibility to Contain,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, Nr.1, January/February 2009, p. 141.

Decline of the Sovereign Country

When looking at the economic setbacks in the USA and the emergence around the world of several centers of power, many of them not even nation states, the Obama administration needs to realize that sovereign states are in jeopardy of becoming obsolete. Indeed, one of the characteristics of the global world order today is that the nation state has lost its monopoly on power, and in some cases their preeminence as well. In an article "The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance" in *Foreign Affairs*, Richard N. Haas writes:

"In addition to the six major world powers [China, the European Union (EU), India, Japan, Russia and the United States], there are numerous regional powers: Brazil and, arguably Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela in Latin America; Nigeria and South Africa in Africa; Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East; Pakistan in South Asia; Australia, Indonesia, South Korea in East Asia and Oceania. A good many organizations would be on the list of power centers, including those that are global (the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the World Bank), those that are regional (the African Union, the Arab League, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the EU, the Organization of American States, the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation), and those that are functional (the International Energy Agency, OPEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the World Health Organization). So, too, would states within nation states, such as California and India's Uttar Pradesh, and cities, such as New York, Sao Paulo, Shanghai. Then there are the large global companies, including those that dominate the worlds of energy, finance, and manufacturing. Other entities deserving inclusion would be global media outlets (al Jazeera, the BBC, CNN) militias (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Mahdi Army, the Taliban), political parties, religious institutions and movements, terrorist organizations (al Qaeda), drug cartels, and NGOs of a more benign sort (the Bill Gates Foundation, Doctors Without Borders, Greenpeace). Today's world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than concentrated power."¹¹

Due to the increased fragmentation through non-polarity in the international world order, economic integration has gained center stage more and more trying to stabilize the different centers of power, but still unable to subdue the ethnic, sectarian and nationalistic discrimination against minorities living in the EU, USA and other parts of the world. The Great Recession has caused unequivocal social unrest in the world. People stigmatizing minorities to correct their economic desolation, be it the estimated 3 million illegal Mexican immigrants in the United States, the bigotry displayed in Europe towards the Romas or a large part of Americans wanting to deny religious tolerance by prohibiting a Muslim Center to be opened near Ground Zero in New York and labeling Muslim diasporas of supporting extremism and unwilling to integrate in European society. Change is needed to quell the growing extremism and domestic unrest in the USA. America is a country founded on the principles of liberties and justice for all. If American foreign policy focuses on imbuing its values in meeting the three inherent challenges of the 21st century, namely perception of international law, changing traditional concept of sovereignty, and trading states model economy and mother nature, then moral internationalizing will assume good governance, while America copes with a denationalization, which can have far reaching impact in the region to use moral persuasion unless its leaders are Sophists making assertions like the Holocaust is a lie. After all, God gave us a tongue as well. And in today's age, with Al-

¹¹ Richard N. Haas, 'The Age of Non-polarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance,' *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008, pp. 45-46.

Jazeera, CNN and with NGOs, a good tongue-lashing about child labor, inequality of women, discrimination of foreign labor, etc., is far more powerful sometimes than sanctions imposed by governments whose own credentials often are not unblemished.¹²

To deal with the increasing non-polarity in the world the objective of American foreign policy should be to integrate emerging countries' policies through regionalism and multilateral cooperation to assume greater responsibility. But America needs to continue in reassessing its international role and moral standing since the Bush-Cheney era. A transformation of the Lockean heartland into a greater cosmopolitan interdependency would be an alternative to tackle the global challenges of the 21st century in a non-polar world by perceiving international law differently.

1) *Perception of International Law*

International law is increasingly taking over several issues for which the state is deemed ultimately insufficient in a "non-polar" world. First, the global management of the global market especially since the crash of 2008 is taking a more international nature, be it through the spread of regulation of international trade and of international financial flows (i.e. WTO, upcoming DOHA Round, IMF, Basel III). Secondly, the global protection of life on earth. This encompasses the boundless and global nature of threats to the environment that is seen through international law in the form of conventions dealing with climate change, protection of wildlife, etc. Moreover, international law is imbued in many facets of human affairs dealing with their protection in the case of international humanitarian law, international refugee law, international human rights law as well as parts of labor and migration law.

The change in American foreign policy to a more imperial policy since 9/11 is marked by several developments during the presidency of George W. Bush Jr. As Professor Rainer Baumann of the University of Bremen points out, America's foreign policy during the Bush-Cheney Era is ascribed as:

- A preference for ad-hoc cooperation ("coalitions of the willing") instead of a more institutionalized cooperation based on universal principles;
- A strict opposition against all aspirations to strengthen the rule of law in international politics (see, for instance, the case of the ICC);
- More open breach of existing international law (see, for instance, the Iraq War);
- Strong resort to military power at the expense of other, "softer" (see Nye 1990; 2002) forms of power (see the almost global drops of U.S. reputation as witnessed in recent years' Pew polls¹³).¹⁴

¹² Jagdish Bhagwati, 'In Defence of Globalization: It Has a Human Face,' Angelo Costa Lecture, Rome, Italy, 20 January 2005, <http://www.columbia.edu/~jb38/papers/papers.html>.

¹³ The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press is an independent, non-partisan public opinion research organization that studies attitudes toward politics, the press and public policy issues. In this role it serves as a valuable information resource for political leaders, journalists, scholars and citizens.

¹⁴ Rainer Baumann, 'Incompatible Conceptions of Global Order? Empire, Hegemony, and Global Governance,' Paper prepared for presentation at the 6th Pan-European Conference of the Standing Group on International Relations in Turin, 12-15 September 2007.

President Obama and his administration are facing an enormous uphill battle as he tries to alter the perception of international law. Among members of Congress and within the Washington beltway, he will need to deal with uncompromising “realists”, who continue to see world affairs solely in terms of an international system of states, rejecting the relevancy of international law. George Kennan, a highly distinguished diplomat in the U.S. Department of State, expressed his scorn for ‘the legalistic-moralistic approach to international relations’ as the most serious fault in formulating American foreign policy.¹⁵ Others perceive international law like Henry Morgenthau, as simply an acknowledgement of state compliance in practice with most of the rules of international law, but think that this is no more than a ‘self-enforcement’ of what in any case simply reflects complementary state interests, while neo-realists do not even discuss international law. They perceive it as a relic of the nation-state, unsuited to the challenges of a global market state. In 1968 Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard University wrote an article “The Uses and Limits of International Law” saying:

“ (...) so many political scientists seem to believe that international law is at best a farce, and at worst even a potential danger: what they tell us is that *the nature of the international system condemns international law to all the weaknesses and perversions it is so easy to deride*. International law is merely a magnifying mirror that reflects faithfully and carefully the essence and the logic of international politics.”¹⁶

He continues:

“The permanent plight of international law is (...) the tragedy (...) between the old liberal dream of a world rule of law, and the realities of an international system. (...)”¹⁷

Scepticism about the sincerity of American foreign policy aspirations and international law is summed up by the legal scholar Michael P. Scharf:

“With the end of overarching bi-polar superpower politics and the pure geopolitical ‘realism’ that accompanied foreign policy decision-making on both sides in that era, it became possible again to pay lip-service to the rule of law in international affairs and the principle of universal jurisdiction that Nuremberg did so much to establish – always allowing, of course, that the current world hegemon, the USA, reserves the right not to play by the rules it is happy to insist on selectively elsewhere (i.e. invasion of Iraq and opposition to the Rome Treaty for the International Criminal Court.).”¹⁸

Nevertheless, it needs to be said that the argument that American exceptionalism is a costly mistake because it resists to recognize the jurisdiction of International Criminal Court did not preclude it supporting the Hague Tribunal or using its influence with Serbia to bring Slobodan Milošević to justice.

Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the double standards of the United States supporting authoritarian regimes while ignoring their human rights performance came back as a national

¹⁵ George Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 95.

¹⁶ Stanley Hoffmann, ‘The Uses and Limits of International Law,’ in: Lawrence Scheinman and David Wilkinson (Eds.) *International Law and Political Crisis*, Little, Brown and Company, New York, 1968, p. 15.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Michael P. Scharf, ‘The ICC’s Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the US Position,’ *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Vol. 64, Nr. 1 (2001), pp. 67-117.

security threat. The incidence of Abu Ghraib prison demonstrated to the world that there is a country that thinks it is too virtuous, too exceptional to pay respect to the Geneva Conventions. Rules about detention and interrogation by using water-boarding as a technique of torture, contrary to America's obligations under the 1984 Convention against Terror and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, as well as the special status of non-combatants held at Guantonomo Bay raises serious questions about America's commitment to international law, including human rights, and the treatment of detainees, all which ends up violating every principle that America officially dearly embraces.

If it were to be that the United States would consider human rights standards in accordance with the United States Constitution as an indicator of assessing a country's domestic stability and external danger to US vital interest, this would reflect far better judgment about supporting foreign governments. If the US used its security relationships to influence regimes toward better human rights performance not only rhetorically but financially/economically, it would mean a turning point. Instead of human rights abuses rampant in the Arab regimes overlooked by the US, strong public narratives would be voiced and political action demonstrated that the US is critical about regimes that have lost the confidence of their people by giving such governments opportunities to alter violations of human rights or bear the indignity in an open and public discourse.¹⁹ Human rights and security interests related to seeking a measured justice for only some perpetrators of injustices of the past has changed with the harsh traditional concepts of international politics as the domain of the powerful experiencing a major overhaul.

2) *Changing Role of Sovereign States*

After World War II, The London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the UN Charter provided a normative architecture. In particular the London Charter challenged the idea that Westphalian sovereignty was absolute and leaders of countries were immune against prosecution for hideous crimes, laying the groundwork for extending international jurisdiction to humanitarian law (and ultimately human rights) violations even during peacetime.²⁰ The contributions by the United States in spawning the Nuremberg Trials of 1945/46 includes its determination to change the legal understanding of sovereignty.

Sixty five years later sovereignty has changed with growing interdependence due to globalization with human rights, private enterprise and ownership as a dominant feature of modern post-industrial society. Consequently, international politics have drafted a new body of international laws profoundly impacting the relations among sovereign states with greater detail and enforceability impacting democratic governance and accountability. An independent and increasingly powerful international judiciary emerged within the EU deciding on issues from human rights, trade, environmental protection to foreign investment. The EU is made up of

¹⁹ Michael Ingatjeff (Ed.), *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006, p. 24.

²⁰ The London Charter of the International Military Tribunal usually referred to simply as the London Charter or Nuremberg Charter was the decree issued on August 8, 1945, that set down the laws and procedures by which the Nuremberg trials were to be conducted. See Herbert Reginbogin and Christoph J. M. Safferling (Eds.), *The Nuremberg Trials: International Criminal Law Since 1945*, K.G. Saur, Munich, 2006.

'sovereign' countries greatly interdependent to a system of rules and regulations as a result of treaty obligations to become an EU member state.²¹

In a normative perspective, the state-centered model with its Westphalian principle of sovereignty is being continuously challenged by the establishment of global normative standards. The debate in America about US foreign policy in the second decade of the second millenium is the question if America is giving up its sovereignty to international organizations like the United Nations. The concern is that global issues and cosmopolitan perspectives are anchored with international organizations and not remaining within the nation-state. There are others who argue that a new world order needs to develop international organizations to be democratically accountable while others envision governance without government and accountability without formal representation, such as non-governmental organizations, better known as global public sphere.²²

At a global trade level the two sovereign powers EU and USA have contributed to meeting the challenges of globalization and a new strategic environment. When it comes to globalization, both pillars of the transatlantic relationship display a remarkable convergence of interests and objectives, mostly because their economies are so interdependent, being each other's main economic partner. In short, the political elites and concerned individuals of the international community are seeking accountability under international law, which has developed into a culture transforming diplomacy towards international organizations to seek to rectify grave violations of the past. What is the role of the sovereign state?

Although broad discrepancies between international law and international politics still exist among the states making up the USA and Middle East region, the sovereign state plays a significant role. A more detailed strategic conceptual understanding among the multi-polar states between the West and the Islamic world of the Middle East region is needed, be it together with a greater spirit of neo-Kantian values for seeking justice imbued by respecting other countries' sovereignty, but committing to universal ideals of human rights and democracy as the common goal of all people. In joining together in this endeavor, countries comprising the Islamic world, Israel and the West can more effectively address the past and present issues of civil society and the market need to be oriented towards relieve from famine, malnutrition, violence, unjustified taxes and corrupt authority set in the context of protecting life and the basic rights of all people.

The International Criminal Court in The Hague has contributed in Europe's effort in this 'change' towards seeking justice - meaning through moral institutions perpetrators are punished for crimes against humanity and genocide. Today the EU endorses a policy empowering people and humanity to give greater respect to multilateral diplomacy and obligation to abide by the rules of international law. The governments and non-government organizations of the West must continue to examine earlier policies and redress claims of injustices related to the distant past through its executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government, but the Islamic states as well need to embark on creating a stronger regard for the rule of law through democratic institutions committed to transparency, humanity and human rights to alter both

²¹ Philippe Sands, *Lawless World: Making and Breaking Global Rules*, Penguin Books, London, 2005, p. xvii.

²² Simon Chambers, 'Deliberative Democratic Theory,' in: *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 6 (2003), p. 313, <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901.085538>.

sides perception of each other committed to a reciprocal, consent-based legal instruments adopted by democratically elected representatives.

3) *Trading States Model Economy and Mother Nature – “Stewardship Economics”*

The “stewardship economics” argues, as Keynes did in the interwar years, to protect human life and culture. Viewing the disruptive effects of unemployment in the USA and fiscal austerity programs in Europe, trade wars between emerging and developed countries and other conflicts could be sparked, such as holy racial crusades in America. There are constant pressures on the racial fault lines giving conservative newsmedia opportunities to open channels for extreme racist groups to become a part of mainstream America with slogans like “Take America Back – USA, USA!!!” based on anti-immigration laws to protect American jobs.

The aim of a “stewardship economy” is a formula to reverse the justified criticism of the neo-liberal economy by providing a solution grounded on enhancing earth’s life rather than around human desires alone. It is a Lockean-based economy with individual rights and protection of property, but has the concept of resource availability built into its price analysis where the idea of supply and demand is harnessed into an equitable system of needs to be modified if and when there is a to prevent ultimately the development of war and civil unrest in the 21st century.

The objective of the state trading concept should be derived from the understanding that human life is part of a whole ecological system and see humans species therein. In other words, the stimulation of overall demand and creation of jobs and social stability must be generated from the perspective of its impact on the welfare of life of its people and the world.²³

A reconceptualization of America’s security architecture is needed, which is based on a sound economic pillar. In other words, open competitive markets need to be upheld taking into account life on the planet in which a stewardship role as a trustee is developed for generations to come. While John Maynard Keynes from the inter-war years wrote that the goal of economics should be the prevention of war through high levels of employment and stable prices, the excesses of the Lockean heartland has created the opposite. A reconceptualization of America’s security architecture is needed which deals with globalization, government and civil society critical to the unharnessed growth model. It means that government has a role in society beyond an individualistic libertarian ethic of limited government lying behind it, and the morality of states approach to which states have a legal and moral claim against outside interference and are free to organize their domestic politics free from interference by other states.²⁴ A stewardship-based economy should be put in their place, based on competitive capitalist markets and profitability, but also taking into account the costs and benefits associated with Mother Nature and life on the planet. The direct duty of the government is to protect private property and also the property that belongs to all persons, such as national preserves, clean water, etc. The issue is not about simple economic growth, but the sustainable quality of economic development without the excesses of unregulated capitalism, which is flawed by continuous periodical recessions, the last

²³ See Peter G. Brown, *Ethics, Economics and International Relations*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2008; Nigel Dower, *World Ethics: The New Agenda*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1998; Henry Shue, *Basic Rights*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988; Richard Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics and Lock’s Two Treatises of Government*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986.

²⁴ Mikhail Bakunin, ‘Ethics: Morality of the State 1814 – 1876,’ in G.P. Maximoff (Ed.) *The Political Philosophy of Bakunin*, The Free Press, New York, 1953.

having potentially thrown the world into an unequivocal catastrophe closely related to the Great Depression of the 1930s.

U.S. – Turkey Relations

With new threats facing the West through growing alliances of radical left Western groups and Jihadists from the Caucasus to Pakistan to Western Sahara, a new security architecture is needed to resolve some of the ethnic and sectarian conflicts of these regions. Does Turkey's strategic regional expansion affect security, resolving conflicts in the region and reawakening America's vital interests?

Failed Barcelona Process Should be Revived with US Support

Back in November 1995 fifteen member states of the EU and twelve Mediterranean non-member states: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, the Palestinian Authority, Cyprus and Malta set out to turn the Mediterranean into a more economic, political, cultural region with strong security cooperation beyond the traditional trading and cultural ties between North and South. It was counted as a notable achievement that Syria and Lebanon were involved as well as Israel, notwithstanding the unresolved conflicts between them. Fifteen years later, instead of an integrated region around the Mediterranean, all that has remained of these ambitious plans are bilateral regional and international agreements with separate states and the EU dealing with economic and cultural aspects as well as human rights agenda embodied in the initiative. Ironically, the partners of the European Mediterranean Program (EMP), also referred to as the Barcelona Process, emerged agreeing to act in accordance with principles laid down in the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as other international obligations to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.²⁵

As of 2008, there is the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), which has buried the EMP without adding any real new perspective. In addition, the EU is more and more attracted towards other strategic priorities: Central-Eastern Europe, Russia and, most of all, the destiny of its own project of integration. On the other hand, the Arabs are more and more looking elsewhere: Turkey, Asia and normalization with Iran (with an eye to Afghanistan) and, most of all, to Iraq and Palestine. This is not to say that the Euro-Med framework will collapse tomorrow. The idea of a framework of relations limited to the Mediterranean Arabs and including Israel cannot work unless a more comprehensive scheme is adopted by resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through compromises among all parties by addressing the human deprivation of both Israelis and Palestinians based on observance of essential principles of international law, human rights injustices of the past and to reaffirm common objectives in matters of internal and external stability. This can be encouraged by adopting a commitment through a transatlantic political and security partnership by the USA together with other Muslim countries in the Middle East with the aim of strengthening the inter-communal and regional political cultural dialogue.

Obama - the Challenges of Change: From Realism to Cosmopolitanism

In order for the USA to participate in the initiation of a USA - Middle East alliance, Obama

²⁵ Summary of EU Legislation - Barcelona Declaration and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/mediterranean_partner_countries/r15001_en.htm.

administration has still a lot to achieve. The challenge to the Obama administration is to uphold America's leadership while converting US primacy and exceptionalism into multilateral diplomacy. America's hegemonic power was important for the initial establishment of cooperation with international institutions and with the circumstances of hegemonic decline cooperation will continue by working through international organizations because they have the ability to attract countries with shared interests to cooperate.²⁶ Yet there is apparently no wish in the USA, either in the political elite in Washington, or in the Democratic Party, or in the nation as a whole, to abandon US primacy and exceptionalism. However welcome the new tone of "change" in US politics by President Obama may be, the economic uncertainty has perpetuated conservatism in America to continue assuming US dominance, mirroring the outlook of the public, which has scant interest in, or even awareness of, the need for diplomacy and working with international institutions.²⁷

These goals cannot be achieved unless the Obama administration can succeed to demonstrate the cost/risk benefit to gain the support of a large part of American society that America's sovereignty isn't jeopardized by threats as portrayed by organizations like the Tea Party or ultra-conservatives demagogues. Even the conservative commentator Robert Kagan has called on US policymakers to "welcome a world of pooled and diminished national sovereignty," arguing the US "has little to fear and much to gain in a world of expanding laws and norms based on liberal ideals and designed to protect them."²⁸

Back at the time of 9/11, there was absolutely no understanding about the correlation between the narratives of past injustices and that culture and identity was at the root of the world's most intricate security problems in the aftermath of 9/11. Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis became the mainstream opinion in public American media.²⁹ The effects of culture on U.S. foreign policy, international institutions, globalization, that is grounded in knowledge of particular societies, religions and political contexts was unheard of. Most of the studies and work on cultural differences had been left to generalists whose contributions have dangerous side effects like Samuel Huntington and other theorists, theologians, philosophers, whose intentions are generous, often tolerant, but who actually know very little about the countries or issues they are talking about. The contention that the hatred for America has more to do with Islam itself with its backward treatment of women and hatred for the non-Muslims has been about the tragic history of the relations between the West and the Islamic world and the possibility that the attacks of 9/11 might constitute a misguided retaliation for America's mistakes of the past. The War on Terror meant for the average Arab on the street a political pretext to subjugate the Arab world given the hegemonic overtones of American foreign policy 'for us or against us'.

"Western aggression" against the Arab and Muslim world is the leitmotif of the leading Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram. Prominent Egyptian journalists like the commentator Salama Ahmed Salama explains that Islamist terrorism is simply to be understood as a reaction to Western

²⁶ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1984, p. 216.

²⁷ Anatol Lieven, 'Relearning the Art of Diplomacy. Most candidates have no idea what it involves,' *The Nation*, 10 November 2007.

²⁸ Michael Chertoff, 'The Responsibility to Contain,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 1 (January/February 2009), p. 133.

²⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49.

provocation and the United States planted the seeds of terrorism supporting Israel's policies.³⁰ When the war broke out in Gaza in 2009, such narratives perpetuated the feelings among the Muslim people on the streets of Turkey leading to an estrangement in Israeli-Turkish relations. When recently the Israeli Navy raided a Gaza-bound humanitarian aid flotilla resulting in nine deaths, of which eight were Turks, the incident rekindled previous narratives, which culminated into an almost religious war. Turkish government officials called Israel's attack "state terrorism" and withdrew its ambassador to Israel as thousands of protesters hit the streets in spontaneous demonstrations.

According to Gerald Steinberg of Bar Ilan University, the violent confrontation between the "Free Gaza Flotilla" and the Israeli Navy is a blurring of terrorist and civilian activists in a newly added dimension to the security challenges and threat in the region. Professor Steinberg says, "The entirely legal naval blockade is designed to prevent arms, primarily from Iran, from reaching the terrorists in Gaza, from which Israel withdrew in 2005," describing the flotilla's aim "was not to free ordinary Palestinians, but to help Hamas break the embargo so that it can bring in weapons."³¹

In the case of the Middle East stretching from Morocco, to Oman and Afghanistan, the USA, EU, Israel, Turkey and other Muslim states' policies are needed to engage in handling the profound historical rivalry between the "others" - Islam and the West - caught in a cycle of political, cultural and sectarian conflict enhanced by a socially constructed "clash of civilizations".³² Turkey's openly demonstrated criticism of Israel and support of Iran's nuclear energy program by rejecting United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 imposing new sanctions against Iran hailed sympathy for Turkey among Syrians and Palestinians. The security constellation has begun to change with Turkey's increasing power in the region and addition of Iran to Turkey's strategic circle.

Still, in 2005, Turkey's government was hailed an antidote to the portrayed wedge between East and West as Erdogan strived to join the European Union. But before the end of the decade Erdogan's role as a unifying leading figure in the Middle East promoting a synthesis of democracy, modernity and Islam will have shifted. Instead of focusing solely only on joining the European Union, Erdogan's ambitions to strengthen his role as a regional power led to his power brokering a deal together with Brazil to enrich Iranian uranium for medicinal purposes. However, the deal brokered by Brazil and Turkey won't prevent Iran from continuing to enrich uranium, including to higher concentrations, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman said.³³ For several weeks the USA had been unsuccessfully trying to negotiate a similar atom deal while pressing Iran to change its policies on reporting sensitive enrichment and reprocessing activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency. As the United Nations Security Council voted to impose more sanctions to persuade Iran to stop enriching uranium, Brazil and Turkey voted against the motion with Lebanon abstaining. A month later Erdogan of the Islamist Justice and Development Party was rubbing shoulders with the Hamas-Hezbollah-Iran resistance front against Israel while at the

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Gerald M. Steinberg, 'The War Against Israel,' *The Wall Street Journal*, 7 June 2010.

³² Edward Said, 'The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations,' <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=boBzrqF4vmo&NR=1>; Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49.

³³ Ladane Nasser and Henry Meyer, 'Iran Signs Nuclear Fuel Swap Deal with Brazil, Turkey,' Bloomberg, 17 May 2010, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-17/iran-signs-nuclear-fuel-swap-agreement-with-brazil-turkey-state-tv-says.html> as of June 26.

same time, warmly receiving in Ankara Sudan's President, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, who has been indicted by the International Criminal Court on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity for his role in the bloodshed in Darfur, and at another occasion politely hosting Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose government killed and jailed countless Iranians demanding freedom and democracy.³⁴

Clearly, the political landscape has changed between 2005 and today. Firstly, a decade of promises telling the Turkish government that if they wanted EU membership they had to reform their laws, economy, minority rights and civilian-military relations, which the Erdogan government has systematically completed, although there is still much to do. In the last couple of years with the Gaza War of 2009 and EU's skepticism about accepting Turkey as a full member into the EU very probably influenced Erdogan to move closer to Iran and the Arab world. As the US Secretary of Defense Gates said following Turkey's vote to reject sanctions against Iran, "if there's anything to the notion that Turkey is moving eastwards, it is in no small part because it was pushed, and it was pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the kind of organic link to the West that Turkey sought."³⁵

Secondly, Israel has failed to resolve the humanitarian issues surrounding the Palestinian problem by satisfactorily addressing the human rights abuses in the territories. In addition, no Arab country demonstrated enough leadership in the Arab-Muslim world to draw a very hard line against Israel, giving Erdogan an opportunity to fulfill a leadership role by supporting the lifting of the Israeli blockade through a Turkish-led flotilla with the above-mentioned results. Erdogan's condemnation of the Israeli military action bolstered his reputation as one of the most popular leaders in the Arab world and vastly increased Turkey's standing in the Arab and Muslim world.

Erdogan seems to have no real opposition in what appears to be a radical move away from the West by catering to the Hamas. Interesting is his government's claim that it is conducting a successful multi-faceted and proactive foreign policy as a mediator in the context of attempting to reduce the tension between different countries, even becoming "a model partner" to some. Turkey's economy is strong and through its influential role in the fields of energy, food, security, water supplies, environment, transportation and communications has been able to weather the financial global recession until now. Turkey is perceived as influential, holding positions in regional and international organizations.

As Samuel Huntington portrayed that human conflict in the 21st century will be cultural and principally between western and non-western civilizations (Muslim and Confucian), 9/11, the War on Terror and the war in Afghanistan and Iraq subsequently strengthened an already popular belief that the arch-enemy of the West were the fundamentalists of the Muslim world. Reading Michael Rubin's commentary "Turkey, from Ally to Enemy," one would think that Turkey has become an Islamic republic and should now be perceived as a potential new enemy.³⁶ It is true that eight years of the AKP and the Erdogan government has encouraged a consolidation of power, bringing Islamists to occupy influential positions in the government, the administration,

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Daniel Dombey, Alex Barker, and Najmeh Borzognmeh, 'Iran Slams Latest Turkish Sanctions,' *Financial Times*, 10 June 2010, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/15cd24ee-73c4-11df-bc73-00144feabdc0.html> last accessed June 26.

³⁶ Michael Rubin, 'Turkey, from Ally to Enemy,' July/August 2010, <http://www.michaelrubin.org/7639/turkey-ally-enemy>.

banking, finance, trade and commerce. Nevertheless, Michael Rubin's conclusion seems to be too far-fetched.

The roots of the current policy date to the late President Ozal. His slogans and initiatives, as the Cold War came to an end, served well to play Turkey's multilateralist card in the new era emerging in Europe and Central Asia. Erdogan and Davutoğlu have effectively used current issues (Islam, energy, terrorism, etc.) to define and enhance Turkey's position towards the EU, the US, the Arab and the Islamic world, and to build on Atatürk's tradition of an "independent" foreign policy. Even though Turkey is not completely trusted in the Arab world (Ottoman past, Cold War past, ties to Israel, etc.), the recent openings constitute a marriage of convenience at a time of a leadership vacuum in the region, while Egypt and Saudi Arabia have their own domestic problems. Effective PR in the US has helped consolidate Turkey's "new image" despite the recent events regarding Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean and the consequent loss in the United States of the support by AIPAC and other Jewish-American organizations enjoyed by Turkey.

Turkey, until recently, had been able to manipulate the US policy establishment by claiming to be the Western stepping stone into the Islamic world, a bridge into an unstable region. Turkey used American support (i.e. UNSC non-permanent seat, Islam, EU accession, etc.) to build its image as a powerful G-20 regional player. It is hard to know when the bubble will burst but, so far, these foreign policy "successes" have served the AKP domestic and foreign policy objectives quite well. Had the EU, or the US, been more supportive or more far sighted, Turkey would not be doing what it is doing now. So, what can be done in order to reduce the tensions between Turkey, Israel, the Arab world and the USA? An organization is needed to be established to strengthen the regional integration of the area through a solid transatlantic Middle East security and economic/trade package. Security and culture must be at the forefront of a trading state model based on consideration of culture/identity and prosperity through ecologically oriented sustainable growth to develop a political communal identity that would help to accelerate a regional integration of the member states to contradict the popular perception of a "clash of civilizations". Through America's presence Turkey's foreign policy ambitions would be integrated with the regional security, cooperation and enhancing the economic potential as a whole instead of being marginalized.

Transforming the nature of prejudices towards Muslim-Americans and Islam require a policy to engage in the convergence of civilization both through domestic and foreign policy. In the case of the US foreign policy, America has been reawakened. But the question arises whether an American plan for a Middle East union can create a strategic alliance for lasting peace and prosperity for its people. This requires to look beyond state and regional borders to create a greater identity as a political community.³⁷ In order for the West and the Islamic world to achieve a different perception of each other, a multi-polar system of states is needed that will manage to cope with the challenges of non-polarity and sometimes war within and among its members with the set goal of steering towards a "convergence of civilizations".

It is unclear at the moment what the consequences for NATO and US-Turkey relations are, but if Turkey, and other Middle East countries are to deal with the non-polarity in the world, it must complete a strategic security plan envisioning a larger alliance of states converging together to stabilize the integrity of the state and civilization against extremists by assuring the same

³⁷ Jerry Z. Miller, 'Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism,' *Foreign Affairs*, March/April, New York, 2008.

common regard for humanity, international law and human rights in the region as in the West.³⁸ As US Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff points out,

“This modern international legal order must be predicated on a new principle, under which the individual states assume reciprocal obligations to contain transnational threats emerging from within their borders so as to prevent them from infringing on the peace and safety of fellow states around the world. This framework will be successful only if the sovereign consent of individual nations remains the bedrock of international law and only if it resists the trend within international legal circles to forcibly impose broad and abstract legal norms through nondemocratic means.”³⁹

In other words, the reciprocal obligations referred to by Michael Chertoff must also include internal reciprocal obligations as well to assure the principles of self-determination, freedom of expression and the emergence of a normative entitlement to participate in electoral or other decision-making process. This is democracy. It doesn't have to be liberal democracy, or representative democracy, or it could be direct democracy, but it's the transparency that there are more decisions being made through the consensus of the people. So forthcoming universal cultural cooperation with each other will be ever more immediately required in seeking humanity's common values in the search for peace and justice in the future, the dealing with the new growing threat of alliances between radical left Western groups and jihadists.

Now lastly, President Obama needs to focus on maybe the most central and controversial issue. And that is the already mentioned “stewardship economy”, which aims at protecting life and nature. By understanding that human life is part of a whole ecological system and seeing human species there in, objective should be derived from within the state trading concept. In other words, the stimulation of overall demand and creation of jobs and social stability must be generated from the perspective of its impact on the welfare of life of its people and the world. It's not a question of just gross economic prosperity; it's a question of sustainable development in continuity without the periodic recessions.

So how does this model effect relation in the Middle East and Central Asia? And this is maybe the primary aspect of this evening's presentation. Because when we talk about Turkey as being a catalyst of change, of taking on a different role, at least being perceived as playing on two sides of the fence, the question is: can Turkey's ambition as a regional power be inspired by America to participate in such an organization with a different perception of international law, with a changing traditional concept of sovereignty and the trading states model economy which is focused on the mother economy, or the Mother Nature and its resources.

With regard to the Middle East the question is: is this “clash of civilizations” a construct that fits into the economic structures of industry, of services, global markets? Or is there another type of perspective, such as the convergence of civilizations, where people who are in other countries, whose leaders despise each other or despise America, yet these people have the same feelings, the same emotions: children, life, family, community. Is this a clash? Is this a construct?

³⁸ Wendell Bell, ‘Humanity's Common Values: Seeking a Positive Future,’ *The Futurist*, September/October 2004, pp. 30-35.

³⁹ Michael Chertoff, Lee H. Hamilton, *Homeland Security: Assessing the First Five Years*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, p. 162.

So today Turkey has openly demonstrated criticism of Israel and support of Iran's nuclear energy program has, of course, changed the perception of Turkey. The world, or the West, is skeptical about Turkey's objectives. We should not forget that the roots of Turkey's strategic policies go back to the 1990s, to President Ozal. His initiative was for Turkey to forge relationships with other countries in the East. Now it is Davutoğlu and his concepts of "strategic depth", focused on Turkey's neighborhood.

So there are many domestic reasons for Turkey to extend a hand to the East. The question is: is this a changing tactic of Turkey? Is it going to become a regional power, a hegemon in the Eastern Mediterranean? Or is it because Europe and America have marginalized Turkey as well as the Middle East and Central Asia? Is it because America, because of its predominant military strength, remains engaged in numerous wars? The legitimacy of these attitudes is not to be questioned as it affects all of us who live in this world. But the myopic focus on just the security issue has driven America to where it is polarized in saying: "America, America and the others for tomorrow."

So the question - and I'm concluding here - is: can a political community's identity be accelerated in the region with the integration of the member states to contradict the populist perception of a "clash of civilizations", while through America's presence Turkey's foreign policy ambitions will be integrated with the regional security cooperation, enhancing the economic potential as a whole instead of being marginalized?

Thank you.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Demetrios A. Theophylactou**

9 November 2010

Turkey's Transformation and Regional Balance of Power

I will try to explain as briefly as possible what is a rather complex transformation, Turkey's transformation, from a rather... What I will refer to here is "praetorianism". "Praetorianism" is a term that describes the role of a minority in the system, in this case the military, that pretty much distinguishes a modern democracy from a rather old-style authoritarian democracy. And then to see how Turkey's evolution towards liberal - what we call in the West - liberal democracy holds, and what does this tell us about Turkey's ambitions to becoming a regional power, and effectively what the Turkish foreign minister himself refers to pursuing a rather neo-Ottoman strategy, which again is a cliché, but there is a point. Again, we follow what they themselves... It's a self-description, it's not imposed from outside.

So, I will start my presentation by first referring to the reform process within Turkey as well as the strategic option. So again, it's a mix of internal transformations and dynamics with external changes and orientations Turkey itself is contemplating with. So, basically, we have a very charismatic and quite popular leadership in Turkey – that's something to underline. For the first time in the history of modern Turkey we have a party which is a non-Kemalist party, which represents the Islamic movement and is very popular, and is quite assertive, and is trying for the first time to limit - just to put it very simply - to limit the influence and power of the military. So we have the ongoing reforms that are driven basically from the EU accession, from the process of Turkey's membership to the European Union. What are the strategic orientations? Well, Turkey obviously has pursued a Western policy. It's a member of NATO, of all Western institutions. However, it has always had an eastern perspective, especially with respect to economics, to investments, but also, again, because of its location and tradition it cannot afford just to look west. And what we call in political science a multifaceted foreign policy, therefore Turkey seems to navigate at once towards the EU, for obvious reasons, but at the same time eastward.

So in my analysis three considerations come out. The first one is the relative decline of what I refer to as "praetorianism", which is, again, this control of both society and politics as well as economics - as I will show later - by a powerful minority, in this case the military. Secondly, there

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

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is an evident decline in terms of the Turkish people's interest in the European Union per se. And we'll see why. And the third is that the new role that Turkey itself is cultivating, both in regional, but also in international affairs, that is its geopolitics, its geo-strategy with respect to the wider region, which is by no means unknown, and it's of course by all means very, very important because of resources, as we know, because Middle East has its very tense political agenda, because of security considerations and what-have-you. Then the question is whether this policy would be successful, and I would try to analyze here and contemplate. I will try to be as objective as possible. A Greek Cypriot of any denomination, when you start talking about Turkey, you may be prejudged, you're biased. And I will try to be as objective and academic as possible and try to paint a picture that is as, let's say, generic in terms of the dynamics rather than personalities - I would refer to only a couple of personalities.

Now, in my view to be successful this policy has to first of all complete and fully implement the reform process. This is not yet the case. We can say that they have covered one-third of the ground, maybe 40%, but that was a very difficult start. Of course, there is a lot of credit to be given for transforming, for example, one third of their constitution. That's by no means something easy, and yet there is still a lot of ground to be covered. Secondly, the objective is full accession to the EU that is becoming a liberal democracy, and then obviously part of it, which is what the Turkish prime minister is arguing, is that they have engaged into the "zero problem policy", meaning no problems with any neighboring country, where a country that is proactive, that is friendly, that is looking forward to active collaboration and what-have-you. Third, they have to successfully negotiate a set of complex problems with the neighbors with whom they have had problems. And, therefore, Cyprus of course is one, but it's not just Cyprus. Obviously you have Syria, you have Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece - the Aegean - and what-have-you. So, basically, you have Turkey that's surrounded with countries with whom they have not really had historically a very amicable relations - it was always rather either conflictual, or to say the least tense.

But what I'm arguing is that even if those reform processes are successful, the journey of what I call the Turkish locomotive - not a really fast train, it's a locomotive - it will get there. It would be rather long and I think rather painful. And we'll see how.

Now, (*inaudible*) direction will depend on, first, its own internal ambiguities, because we see there are both contradictions in their domestic as well as external policies, but also ambiguities, and secondly, its ability to maintain what I refer to as a fragile equilibrium between obviously secularism on one hand, and Islamism on the other. There's obviously an effort to marry the two, to say, okay, I'm a Turk, it means Islam, but I'm also secular. It doesn't always work that easy.

This in itself, its direction in whatever orientation first will have an effect on the image of a state, which is very important for political scientists, but also for any politician. The image of your country determines pretty much your status and your relations with others. Secondly, it will shape its ties very specifically with states in the region, namely the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, etc. So we're talking about the host of countries, most of which are not necessarily the easiest neighbors. We're not talking about Sweden and Norway and Denmark in Scandinavia, we're talking about countries with very conflictual relations.

Now, the request for internal stability. That has been the objective of Mr. Erdogan. Again, for the first time in the history of Turkey one single party managed to rule with a majority, clear majority,

without any coalition partner. Before, as you recall, in the 70s, in the 80s, it was coalitions, it was quite fragile, there was low trust in politicians. They happened to be Kemalists. Once we had Mr. Erbakan - that was short-lived. Then Mr. Erdogan came in, of course we have to remember that just couple of years before he became prime minister, he was jailed as well. And then just recently, couple of years ago, we had very, very strong warnings to the prime minister who was elected the majority vote to respect and ensure the country's secular underline orientation. It's a religious aspect for the right-wing parties of the traditional Kemalists parties - that's the essence of modern Turkish democracy.

Now, with that came the so-called Ergenekon trial, what I refer to as the litmus test for Turkish democracy, that is how is that going to go? Are they going to persecute all the people who are considered the enemies of the government? It depends. Are we going to have another coup? In my view, it's very difficult today to have a coup because the stakes are much higher than they were a few years ago. Namely, if you want to join the EU, forget about the coup. So that's a 'no', it doesn't go.

And then, finally, there is this quest to increase its share in economic activity that is the Islamist party... Essentially, the Muslim class is becoming a bourgeoisie. What does it mean? They are becoming rich, as simple as that. And because they are becoming rich, they are having a bigger share in the economic pie, which previously was quite controlled by the elite: the military and the Kemalists. So now it is becoming an internal threat to people. So think, if you are a businessman with ties to the military and you control a hundred hotels, and then the Islamists are becoming richer and richer, they buy fifty of them - okay, it's fine. But then they want to buy another seventy. What does it mean when political influence...

The post-Ottoman image that the foreign minister has cultivated: a former academic - like me - but of course he was an adviser of Mr. Erdogan. And what we see today, in my view, eight years after the book was written, which has not been translated yet into English - and this has been noted by academics - even though it is essentially the foreign policy of Turkey, as we speak. Written nine years ago, Mr. Erdogan has embraced the idea. What does it mean? Well, its ambitious in one word, it's probably over-ambitious. And I put some questions here because the post-Ottoman it implies that Turkey is becoming probably the regional actor. And we'll see later who the others are - I mean the players - to maintain the balances. And it will become quite clear later how we maintain the balance. How do we, in reverse, prevent kind of upset of the balance? Why is it important - just to make a parenthesis here - why is it important to talk about the balance of power? Because essentially, if you have a balance of power, it's a preventive measure of sorts, a factor for world. If there's no balance, it means one of the countries that is too strong and it cannot be contained. And therefore, if the balance of power is upset, the likelihood of war is high.

Now, the EU. What is the geography of Europe? That's important because one has to really contemplate whether the European Union ends, let's say, at the borders of Turkey. There is, as you know, a huge debate in the EU today, so Turkey has an important role to play in this aspect. So if we enlarge the borders of the EU, it means that we also enlarge its economic leverage, even the territorial waters, but I don't want to get into that. It means also that Turkey will assume the role of a post-World War - at least in the eyes of some Europeans - buffer, meaning to prevent the Islamic fundamentalists from spreading further west. At least that's how the Turks want to portray themselves. That's questionable, debatable. But it is, if you ask for example - I don't want to name any countries from the European Union - but in the eyes of some this is the role of

Turkey, as it was through the Cold War in terms of the Communist spread to the West. Expanding the EU? Again, massive territorial waters.

What are Turkey's national interests? In this respect we have to really look at the national interests vis-à-vis its community interests. If it is a member of the EU, Turkey has to have interests that are beyond its just pure national. And the main question in this respect is whether these are perceived as a threat to others. You pursue your national interests, you project your power, your influence. Is it perceived as a threat or as an opportunity? For some it is a threat, for others opportunity.

Now, Turkey's neighborhood, as I said before, it's a problematic one. There is instability, ongoing tensions, increasing concerns, for example with Iran's nuclear program, ethnic conflicts, which in my view they seriously impinge on its own Kurdish issue, because if you have ethnic concerns in Azerbaijan, in Cyprus etc., well, that in itself has an impact on the Kurds. So combined all these, number one, they increase the Praetorian military sensitivity toward security, in other words you cannot downplay or disregard the role of the military. Because if anything, for any state to be secure and to ensure its integrity, you have to have a strong military. And in Turkey not only is it strong, but it has a big stake in stability, internally as well as externally. And, of course, constitutionally in a way it is the guarantor of Turkey's integrity. Therefore, it gives the military an added, let's say, dimension in this debate, so you cannot necessarily argue that Mr. Erdogan is going to take away the role of the military, because in democracy the military does not (*inaudible*). Turkey's a special case. And, of course, all this has further heightened the level of uncertainty.

The Turkish military considers itself the guarantor, as I said, but also the authentic guardian of domestic order. It's the most important part here, because we know about the other: it is the most respected still institution. If you look at the opinion polls, the Turks trust more the military than any other institution, including the governing party. It is used as a last resort if there is instability, especially internally, that will impose law and order. And people essentially confer upon it political legitimacy that no other institution in the West enjoys. That's something to be underlined.

Now, the Euroscepticism - where does it derive from? If one looks at the media, let's say, in the last year, the Turkish media: what are the main concerns? One, there's some economic concerns, obviously. But the Turks will tell you: if capitalist Western institutions don't work, why do you want to impose it on us? We have our own system. Yes, it's a capitalist system we have, but we don't necessarily want to emulate too much and to have you, European Union, tell us how to run because we are...

Sovereignty - very, very important for the Turks. Sovereignty - it means I decide, you don't tell me what to do. I'm a sovereign state, I have the right, therefore, also to maintain my political and cultural integrity.

National pride. I don't say that I've talked to any Turk, they are very proud, very patriotic, there is a certain pride, which is fine, and many countries have a patriotic attitude. They don't want others to interfere in their affairs. And, therefore, if the EU was perceived as providing more benefits than costs, perhaps their national pride will allow more room for the EU. But now there's a lot of skepticism, let's say, resistance. There's a fatigue with reforms. And there is a lot of internal concerns. What are we trying to do? To become EU? Does it help us? And then there is

perception that the costs are prohibitive. We don't want to give more unless we get. It's also the Anatolian bazaar in a way: okay, what do I get? Do I just give? So sometimes you have to get more than give and there's a negotiation.

Now, when I refer to the symptoms, which goes back to Erdogan, how the Turks, the modern Turks view the assumption of political power by an Islamic party, even though it is progressive, but in my view it's more conservative than we think? And there is a noticeable increase of conservative values. I talked to many Turks. They think that on certain issues that are considered a given in the West, for example gender equality, well, not exactly they progress. Because, for example, Mr. Erdogan will say that actually his daughters, he doesn't want them to go to university, they want to get married at twenty, have four or five kids. And that's not exactly what they do in Sweden. I'm not saying they have to emulate. I'm saying this is part of the conservative values. Alcohol... It's not exactly the name of the game.

There's a disquieting symbolism in the strong, very, very strong statements concerning Israel's policy in Gaza. That has put Turkey in the spotlight, but at the same time it has really created tension between the two. The AKP is seen as the most recent reincarnation in my view of political Islam in Turkey. It's supported by 40% or 50%.

Now, the military itself is convinced that the party aims "to consolidate" – I quote here a very recent study – "to consolidate this position in the Muslim world even at the expense of its traditional alliance with the West."

But to study objectives now in the relation to the domestic reforms and what they want to do. The new strategy is presumably designed to, number one, calibrate this profile in the region. Not only we are the buffer, but we will essentially promote and project the interests of the EU. They highlight the new role (*inaudible*) original player. They try to better their position in order to promote these interests. Energy is one. Also - and that's not very widely discussed, you're not going to see it in many papers - they're trying to fill in the balance of power vacuum, I mean the gap. Well, that's something that politicians and academics discuss today. There is a vacuum. Why? Because Iraq, a Sunni Muslim country - not a Shiite - that is not fundamentalist... Saddam Hussein may have been a dictator, but essentially he was a realist player, pragmatic, so he was very conscious of his role as a stabilizing power in terms of Iran, and of course Israel. So that in itself is something that Turkey is trying to employ in its strategy: trying to fill in the balance of power vacuum.

Of course, they try to project themselves as a reliable mediator, and they have done that, they have done quite well, I would say. And they played quite well their cards in the energy sphere as a so-called energy hub. Now, what I call instrumentalism. Certain principles or values that can be values and principles in and of themselves because they're important, and we really believe in Islamic identity. Or, as Kemal Ataturk has done years ago, they use it as an instrument in order to promote what?

Number three here is that essentially Turkish nationalism was the main objective of Kemal Ataturk. Strong Turkey. What do you need to achieve that? You need, well, secularism, because fundamentalism will erode the country, etc. You need economic capitalism, because that will make us modern, but not necessarily Western. And I get to the Huntingtonian view - Islamic identity, obviously. I mean, we don't deny it that Ataturk himself was not against it, it's just how you use it. And then is essentially used in order to promote the higher goal: Turkish nationalism.

So to strengthen the role of the other nation in the world, but you don't necessarily need to get Western. And I think that holds today. If you ask any Turk if they want to become Western, no. Member of the EU, yes. But we're different, we're special case. So Euro-orientation is useful for the Turks and their leadership only if it serves this larger objective.

Now, obviously there're contradictions in their foreign policy, whether it is internally or externally. That is, the military itself, obviously, has promoted secularism. At the same time it has really promoted the spread of Islamic culture, because it has helped to consolidate, solidify, the Turkish identity. Well, if you're Greek, you don't count. If you're Jewish, you don't count. If you're Armenian or you're Christian... So Islamic identity was a very important component of Turkish nationalism, in my view. The old style, obviously. It doesn't necessarily work today. But in Turkey itself it is considered as a very important value. And that's why the military promoted, instead of destroying, Islamic culture and religious identity. And this is what I refer to as the Huntington view. It basically wants to have the European level of economic and technological capability: capitalism, economic growth and what-have-you. But it has to be undergirded by the "Turkish spirit" of which one critical component is Sunni Islam. There is essentially no contradiction between Kemalism or even the Islamic party of Mr. Erdogan and a potential anti-European direction that Turkey might choose in pursuit of their national interests.

Now, what is the "zero problem" in a nutshell? Because it's a book that's 700 pages. It has been translated in Greek recently and most people have really struggled to read it. So Davutoğlu thinks that consolidating this problem will really facilitate Turkey's role in the area. Obviously, he's right. He's in a way emulating what Joseph Nye is calling a soft power. So essentially we're there not to impose, but to persuade. I will refer to that. It has proven to be rather selective, this approach. It has not applied, of course, in Cyprus, obviously. But it's not just that. It is seen as a... Not devious, maybe it's genuine, I cannot say if it's correct, if it's genuine, or if it's just a fake approach in order to project Turkey's positive image. But on the other hand it is not consistent. So the fallout with Israel obviously has upset what I think was the most stable, the most balanced relationship in the region. And the Kurdish issue, obviously, has not been resolved. So even though there's zero problem with the neighbors, well, the Kurdish is internal and external. So, basically, we have to start internally before we get to the neighbors. So consistency in soft power thinking is very important in this respect.

Now, Turkey also wants to be portrayed as a bridge. The AKP has consistently attempted to exploit its geographical position, to facilitate, for example, the shipment of oil and gas resources, which are vast, from east to west. And that's where they have an advantage, obviously, they for very good reasons take full advantage of their geographic position in this respect. It's something they have cultivated for years now, it's not a new policy. Also, they want to turn Turkey into strategic, basically, energy hub, which they have - to a great extent I think - mastered. But the new assertiveness of the AKP, especially their relation with Israel, may prove to radicalize and upset this venture, including, of course, the balance of power. In other words, Israel was more of a facilitator in terms of Turkey's role. Even though if you really have a multi-faceted foreign policy, sure, I'm not saying just go with Israel only; you can engage with Arabs (*inaudible*). So there is a bit of a tilt which is upsetting the balances here. And also, in my view, it jeopardizes the energy investments and strategy of Turkey for the near future.

The search for direction. Are we going east, or west, or both? All my Turkish friends which I've had the chance to meet, whether academics, or diplomats, etc., they tell me: why do you say this? We are both. We're not going east, we are not going west. I said, well, yeah, but sometimes you

have to choose a direction, you cannot go like that. To me it's at least are you going more east or more west? It makes a difference. As an academic, I would like to... As a political scientist, I think physics sometimes... You cannot just play cards. It's not the best approach and it shows. Therefore, there is disillusionment, obviously, with the West, and they look at alternative orientations, even though they look at those by keeping the relationship with the West. With the EU especially, they keep the option of becoming a member. And the new identity in prominent place is one of the (*inaudible*). Perhaps we're going to stay in the West, but we would like to cultivate a modern, different identity, modern Islamic - it doesn't matter. But it is actually not what you knew of Turkey in the past. And in my view it has been accepted to a great extent. Not only they have achieved that, but at least they aim to reassert and redefine themselves in the region, and in the world.

So this venture, of course, it is accompanied by a great deal of uncertainty, unpredictability. Because, number one: we don't know yet whether the internal transformation is feasible - it hasn't ended. And we don't know if the external orientation, the external, let's say, strategy is sustainable and if it's consistent with the others. And I will refer to that when we pursue our natural interests - that's something I learned last year from Joseph Knight. We have to always take into consideration the national interests of others. If we don't, then we may be surprised on the way.

So basically, the opening to the east is understandable, especially from an economic perspective, because the region undergoes rapid economic development, it has a lot of resources, it provides for business people in Turkey tremendous entrepreneurial activities and opportunities. Also, I think the Turks are very, very pragmatic in many ways and they're quite astute students of diplomacy. And if you read Brzezinski, and Kissinger and others, certainly they have said five years ago at least that there the shift of the center of gravity in terms of power from Euro-Atlantic to the East. That's clear, at least to the people who want to look at the dynamics. Because East, meaning China, but it's not just China, its Central Asia and Caucasus. And Turkey's role obviously, my view, naturally it has tilted more towards East. Because you have economic very clear opportunities and benefits, but you can also take advantage of your political liberation, your historical ties. The question is whether you can afford to do all of the above - that's a question. So, basically, it's the realist and pragmatic calculations. Well, we don't know if they're going to be realizable.

Now, this eastern shift, just to summarize, it seems to be logical in my view and timely, because whether you do it now or not, somebody's just going to fill the vacuum, for example Iran. Secondly, it is because of the change in redistribution, as I said before, of global power. It's because Turkey's attempting to obviously cultivate new and very concrete alliances, not just with NATO and with the US, but with others as well. And, therefore, it pursues both political and economic objectives, including obviously and notably, energy security. Now, this is what I refer to as a multi-faceted foreign policy. In this multifaceted foreign policy which wants to be everywhere, there's a certain gravity eastward than westward. Obviously, it is not likely to abandon the Euro-Atlantic sphere, it will remain part of NATO - why not - and will pursue the western-style market economics because it is in its own interest. And, as we've seen, it does serve the bigger purpose of maintaining a strong state. And then, at the same time it wants to seek a leadership role in the region and increasingly amongst the Islamic states, hence the new image and the new identity. There are some consequences always in what we do in life, especially in politics. There're also unanticipated consequences that we cannot necessarily predict. Obviously,

our objectives cannot be all mutually beneficial. So, in my view, Turkey's not going to compromise its unity by granting, for example, excessive rights to the Kurds. Why? Because of the internal problematic. They are not sure if this could be sustainable or if it's going to open Pandora's Box. It's not going to accept the Kurdish state. That's possible, it could have been one option, but it's not going to do it, because, again, spillover effect.

And thirdly, with respect to Cyprus, unlikely whether they would give up on Cyprus. Not only because traditionally the military, the "praetorian state" has viewed Cyprus as a recaptured Ottoman land for the first time since 1923, and they were very adamant. So it was a military approach. But now the Davutoğlu doctrine very clearly refers to Cyprus as having a geostrategic importance of the highest order. He said, even if there were not one single Muslim in Cyprus, it would be naive for Turkey not to be involved. So that I think talks in itself. And I was surprised because I was looking for quotes just to prop a little bit my theory of Turkey's geo-strategic aspirations, which of course our politicians have been referring to. But it's good to see it coming from their own progressive, pro-western, pro-European voices, etc.

Always the dilemma: is it going to be a change, a continuity, or we go back? I mean, obviously there is change in continuity, but there is also tradition.

Another contradiction in the domestic and foreign policy - it's inevitable to have some contradictions you cannot have everything on your own - by logical extension, what I think is the "praetorian" role of the military is likely to be maintained, even though of course it has been diminished. But to what extent? I don't think that the AKP will choose to get rid, to weaken it for what I explained before, because the neighborhood is unstable and we cannot really want to take it all the way. Yes, you want to be in the European Union. Yes, you want to be a democracy. Whether you are Islamic democracy, doesn't matter. But you want to maintain the essential role of the military for very pragmatic security and strategic reasons. And, therefore, they will tolerate at least its constitutional part. Now, whether the EU pushed Turkey to change that - that I doubt. That's really getting into the sovereignty of a state. They may have to accept, and the EU is very good in, as you know, offering exceptions and accepting, let's say, deviations of sorts. But again, I cannot forecast what is going to happen in five years. And, therefore, they will tolerate because the internal-external exigencies remain very fluid.

Now, the pace of reforms. There are certain questions I posed here. Yes, reforms - how quick, and how much, and at what cost? Because that for Turkey seems to be the case. Now, let's just slow down. We had a slow down after 2005 and then again there was a bit of an acceleration. Well, the questions whether they are sustainable, and therefore whether the people, the military, the civilian elites are willing to - and it's not always up to them - but how much are willing to... A very good politician has to detect the pulse, and therefore obviously Turkey... It's a democracy, and therefore there are opinion polls, they can follow to a great extent what the public opinion prefers and what they tolerate.

In spite of significant constitutional reforms, in my view the military still guarantees, at least in the eyes of the Turks, including with the leadership, the stability and order of the state. And I will use here the words of Martti Ahtisaari who's the chairman of the Turkey-EU association or committee. He has done a very, very interesting report a couple of years ago, a year ago or something. Well, in a way he was saying that they have done a lot and blaming the EU for the most part. But Turkey's democracy is not always comfortable in its own diversity. And that in a way speaks for itself.

Now, I'll just refer to two major policy objectives which are first, in terms of getting to the EU... For example, you have to ensure the smooth implementation of reforms which - that's a very important caveat - they must comply - yes, some deviations - with the European *acquis communautaire*. It has to comply. And that's, if anything, that's the benchmark. You have to really comply. And that's not always easy, and it's not always going to be accepted by the Turks, for various reasons, which has to do, again, with the way we function, with the consequences and the unpredictable policies. Secondly, they are resolving at least two obviously major obstacles on the way to the EU. One is the... I get back to the Kurdish population. You have to grant more rights, there's no choice there in my view. But then, how much the EU will tolerate? And then, secondly, it's very simple. I'm not saying to solve the Cyprus problem, but the Ankara Protocol is crucial. I listened to the news today (*inaudible*) from the EU. The Ankara Protocol is *sine qua non* for Turkey's minimum obligations *vis-a-vis* Cyprus, and that's very difficult to escape.

Now, the new perspectives, basically meaning how to anticipate Turkey to even contemplate these changes? Why should they accept it (*inaudible*). Well, first of all, they have to be more consistent and credible in their foreign policy. They need to have a more forward-looking policy and to abandon to a great extent the traditionalist, rather static "we don't like change". But its power/military kind of oriented. Mr. Erdogan, obviously, wants to move in a different direction, but we haven't seen tangible proof of that. Rhetoric, yes, but in reality there is a state behavior as we say it, state behavior is such for the time being.

And, therefore, just the last quote from Robert Cooper's postmodern... Many people question that, it's a bit of a debatable. Post-modernism, well, again, is like liberal democracy. It means a state in itself cannot be sustainable, you have to depend on others, you have to have supranational institutions, you have to work with others. It is kind of the alliance theory but in a more sophisticated way. So it's ill-designed if you maintain authoritative political state that in itself is ill designed for promoting change. And there is some truth with that in the sense that they have to persuade new perspectives.

Soft power. I referred to that before. Basically, I think the Turks are very good students of soft power theory and they have done quite well, and, therefore, the goal of attracting and persuading the neighbors, some of them at least, to some extent it was successful, instead of using coercion, like in Syria for example. If you look at the time of the Kurdish leader, it was clearly coercion. Now it's persuasion, so they managed with Syria a different type of relationship.

Obviously, again, their regional ambitions are very clear. Leverage on conflict resolution, but that has to include Cyprus as well. Obviously, Turkey has a role and they want to play it. They say that it is the changing nature of power. The old thinking which is really grounded in the hard power, is ineffective today. I'm not saying that hard power is not necessary, but you don't rely on it to the extent that we used to in the past. Otherwise, it won't be really either effective or acceptable.

I also think of asymmetrical power relations that really have to be accounted for. As I said before, balance of power is very important for the stability, for economic flow, for investments and what-have-you. Because if you have one power, whether you're in Europe of the early 1900s and you have Germany that asserts itself, or you have any regional power, China, or you have Turkey that is going to be perceived as this strong man - that in itself will create a lot of (*inaudible*). You have to maintain, to the extent possible, the balances there. So essentially you have Israel, Iran, Turkey, but then, of course, it depends on your projection of your power and your national interests, and how far you go with that will determine this balance.

The other aspect is whether your power is used intelligently. Therefore, again, soft power is more effective than military. And also it really presupposes modern not just alliance behavior, meaning that you have to at least try to think in terms of a collaborative partnership with others. Not simply military but economic collaborations. And to a great extent Turkey's doing that. So the partnerships they have used now in the Caucasus (*inaudible*), they have more economic thinking behind than military. On the other hand in other relationships is not exactly the case. But in terms of modern (*inaudible*) behavior you have to think more economic, which is of course the EU model, the EU is more economic. There's no military. If it was the case, it would have been perceived as more of a threat to the neighborhood. So that's part of the EU context that I'm getting into, that is, I take Cyprus again as an example, but it's not the only one. Obviously, we have many others. I think that if there is a resolution of this problem, Turkey will potentially benefit more than at the present. The likelihood for that is higher in the absence of hardliners. Because I believe the major obstacle, even though we can argue that today the government of Mr. Erdogan is equally reluctant, because they made the opening in the first place and once there was no solution, now they cannot afford to push for more if the military is reluctant. So the key to this, I presume, (*inaudible*) is essentially the hardliners in the military. And therefore one can even give credit to what Erdogan did five-six years ago by opening the border. I think he was genuinely interested in promoting a solution. But again, unanticipated consequences, and also very strong reaction from within. Today he cannot afford to open all his cards. He knows how to surprise and he can take the initiative, etc. So it is possible.

Ankara must shift its policies and rhetoric towards a softer and more intelligent policy and this (*inaudible*) it will have the potential of creating obviously win-win scenario.

I'll get to the conclusions, I've got three-four sets of conclusions here. Which, number one, refers to the internal. For the first time the AKP has seriously affected both the domestic structure and foreign policy orientation of the country. Secondly, it has to face major obstacles, effectively from the hardliners, as I mentioned, whether Cyprus, or more reforms, or less military, what-have-you. And also, there is the major party. Maybe they have managed the last referendum, but most of the people I talked to think it's a major victory. But I say 56% - what was it, 57? - well, it's not exactly a 70%. It's a divided country today. That's my assessment. So I don't see it as a clear victory of Mr. Erdogan that gives him the comfort to do as he wishes. I don't think so. The new Republican Party which essentially has an Atatürk origin so it is a secularist party that argue that they will defend the Kemalist ideology. They have a different agenda and they're very much against Mr. Erdogan's further reforms and openings.

The regional ambitions. In spite of the Euro-orientation, Turkey seems determined, and I think they're quite confident, in pursuing this Davutoğlu doctrine, which means new Ottoman - I don't want to refer to neo-Ottoman - I just want to say very assertive, very ambitious foreign policy. Both of them are the architects of that. I think that both the EU and the USA do realize that Turkey has become effectively the center of geopolitical interests, whether it's oil or power balances, or new regional hegemony, if you wish, or major actors. And finally, Ankara's natural interests are projected clearly towards all of this area. I mean, there's not one-dimensional, regional area where Turkey is focusing. Caspian (*inaudible*) oil. The Balkans, obviously, you have Kosovo, you have Bosnia, etc. You have the Middle East. Very clearly they have demonstrated they are potential leverage, and in the Caspian. So there is a lot of room, a lot of homework and a lot of resources. I always tell my Turkish diplomatic friends it's fine to have all these policies, but do you have the diplomatic corps which is going to engage in all these policies? I mean, that

requires human resources in order to have a successful policy. I wonder. So this (*inaudible*) to some extent by my European colleagues (*inaudible*) and they think that they don't have the capacity to pursue all these different objectives. It's one thing for Mr. Davutoglu to write an academic book, which is great because there's a visionary aspect. But it's another thing to implement.

Now, the shift of axis means that we move from Kemalism to democracy to political Islam. I don't know if it's a move, if it is a progress or not. But well, Turks will tell you why not, this is democracy, but it's more Islamic, etc. It's not fundamentalist, it's a Sunni - I don't dispute that. But this in itself, this Turkish transformation, because it is situated where it is, it is of major geopolitical significance. The shift of axis from your Euro-Atlantic, obviously, to more eastern, to projecting itself as an eastern outpost towards the Islamic Middle East, not just Middle East anymore, and in Mr. Davutoglu's words former territories of the Ottoman Empire.

In my view it was a bit unnecessary to kind of resurrect the Ottoman past. It doesn't sound very good. If you talk to any Balkan people, they will say they don't want to hear about Ottoman. It doesn't sound very good, but in any case that's obviously the way they want to refer to it. And of course, this marks a serious reassessment of Turkish role in the region and the world at large. But also, and that's something to account for, an erosion of internal pillars of Kemalism. There's an erosion of that and I'm not sure that it will allow for the country to pursue all these policies.

The last conclusions section refers to the balances. I think that these radical changes that are increasingly becoming quite obvious, they are witnessing the rise of a new geopolitical actor. And Iran and Israel remain obviously the major regional players with whom Turkey either has to work with, or at the minimum it has to acknowledge. In other words, you can't just pursue your own foreign policy, or your own regional aspirations without accounting for both. And obviously they do. The only problem is that the opening towards Iran, at least for the time being, it's not exactly balanced. So you had had the relationship with Israel which has been now changing because of preferences, or because of certain events. We don't know if the change is radical, if the damage is done. But, obviously, already the perception is there, and a lot of analysts, especially from the US, are quite alarmed. And on the other hand, we have more opening towards Iran which for some reasons has been interpreted with latitude, depending if you want to give credit or if you want to criticize.

And finally, the one of the main thrusts of this analysis is that if anybody wants to evaluate Turkish foreign policy - that is the external posture of Turkey, the external dynamics - it has to do it in conjunction with internal dynamics. One cannot go without the other. They are intertwined. And here I'll close, and I will be very glad to response to your questions.

Thank you.

Concluding Remarks to Volume 1

The material covered by this Volume witnesses the emergence of several themes that promise to affect the East Mediterranean in fundamental ways. The discovery of commercial quantities of hydrocarbons in the Israeli EEZ triggered new geopolitical dynamics for the region. The promise of similar discoveries in Cyprus waters reaffirmed the strategic importance of the Island of Cyprus and initiated a new discussion of its relationship with Britain, its role in Western regional security structures, and the urgency of settling the Cyprus problem.

Another theme that can be seen developing is the rise of Turkey as a regional economic, political and military power. With its eyes set on re-establishing relationships and re-harnessing sources of power that contributed to the rise of its imperial predecessor, Turkey is looking to utilize its historical strategic depth as a foundation for projecting soft and hard power in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the broader Middle East. At the same time, Turkey's deepening rift with Israel indicates the ongoing reorientation of its foreign policy away from the West, undermining Western security architecture in the region.

The material of this Volume also hints at an Iranian decision to embark on a journey for re-admission to the international system. Finally, the material on alternative types of modern warfare, especially coercion and psychological warfare, highlights many of the strategies and tactics that will define the more turbulent phases of this decade.

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East Mediterranean Chronicles: The last decade bore witness to several important changes that have and will continue to affect the historical development of the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East. These volumes are a record of such changes as they took place. The changing security landscape, the new hydrocarbon discoveries and the so-called “Arab Spring” and its aftermath have given birth to new dynamics and challenged the validity of old paradigms. These publications contain transcripts of conferences, round-table discussions, interviews, as well as reports and first-hand analyses, all by people that bore witness to the underlying events.



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