

East Mediterranean Chronicles

A Decade of Change 2009–2019

**Volume 2
2011–2014**

Editors:

Chr. G. Pelaghias

Marta Murzanska

George Chr. Pelaghias



ERPIC

European Rim Policy and Investment Council

East Mediterranean Chronicles

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ERPIC
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Larnaca
2020

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In memory of
S. R. Schwenninger
1951 - 2020

In memory of
R. P. Collins
1949 - 2017

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AGP	Arab Gas Pipeline
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (<i>Turkish</i>) - Justice and Development Party
BCM	Billion Cubic Meters
BP	British Petroleum
BTC	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline
BTU	British Thermal Unit
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CERA	Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (<i>Turkish</i>) – Republican People’s Party
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DEFA	Δημόσια Επιχείρηση Φυσικού Αερίου (<i>Greek</i>) – Natural Gas Public Company
DEFSΑ	Εθνικό Σύστημα Μεταφοράς Φυσικού Αερίου (<i>Greek</i>) – National Natural Gas System
DEPA	Δημόσια Επιχείρηση Αερίου (<i>Greek</i>) – Public Gas Corporation of Greece
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
ENI	Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (<i>Italian</i>) - National Hydrocarbons Authority
EU	European Union
FPSO	Floating Production Storage and Offloading
FSA	Free Syrian Army
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
IGI	Interconnector Greece-Italy

IMF	International Monetary Found
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
IS/ISIS/ISIL	Islamic State/Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/Levant
ITGI	Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
LNA	Libyan National Army
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Organization
NAVTEX	Navigational Telex
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NOBLE	Noble Energy
NTC	National Transitional Council
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation in Europe
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (<i>Kurdish</i>) – Kurdistan Worker’s Party
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
SBA	Sovereign Base Area
SDF	Syrian Defense Forces
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SEEP	South East Europe Pipeline
SHELL	Royal Dutch Shell
SNC	Syrian National Council
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
SYRIZA	Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς – Προοδευτική Συμμαχία (<i>Greek</i>) – The Coalition of the Radical Left – Progressive Alliance
TANAP	Trans-Anatolian Pipeline
TAP	Trans-Adriatic Pipeline

TCF	Trillion Cubic Feet
TPAO	Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (<i>Turkish</i>) – Turkish Petroleum Corporation
‘TRNC’	‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
WTO	World Trade Organization
YPG	Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (<i>Kurdish</i>) - People’s Protection Units
YPJ	Yekîneyên Parastina Jin (<i>Kurdish</i>) – Women’s Protection Units

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PREFACE

The Eastern Mediterranean region, often referred to as the 'Levant', occupies a unique place in the world. Geographically, it is situated at the crossroads of three continents: Asia, Africa and Europe. It is the cradle of several ancient civilizations: Egyptian, Babylonian, Assyrian, Phoenician, Greek and Roman, as well as the root of European and Western cultures. It is the birthplace of three of the world's great religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. At present, the Eastern Mediterranean forms a part of the wider Arab and predominantly Sunni Muslim world. But due to its rich heritage and history spanning over millennia the region is very diverse, consisting of a colorful mosaic of cultures, ethnicities, religions and sects. A place of strategic importance, it has a long history of civilizational clashes, imperial conquests and inter-state conflicts. It is, without doubt, one of the most volatile and conflict-prone regions in the world. Nevertheless, the peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean have over centuries developed a distinct and recognizable culture.

For most of the Common Era, the Eastern Mediterranean formed a part of the Roman and Byzantine Empires and several Islamic caliphates. The abolition of the last caliphate in 1924 following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was a watershed moment in the modern history of the Eastern Mediterranean and the wider Middle East. The French and the British divided the Ottoman regions into their spheres of influence. The artificial borders of new protectorates were drawn arbitrarily with little regard to demographic realities. Modern nation-states of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan born out of those arrangements have to this day not managed to fully develop a sense of national identity able to bridge ethnic, tribal and sectarian loyalties. This unresolved identity crisis when pitted against a drive for state nationalism has been one of the main causes of the repeating cycles of conflict over the last century.

One of the most important issues in the attempt to fashion a new regional order has been the role of religion in the political sphere. Disillusionment and frustration equated Western secularism with injustice and oppression. The emergence of a potent movement of Islamic revival was driven by the nostalgia for Islam's past glory and a contempt for Western values. The Iranian revolution of 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic has been one of the most important examples of such 'Islamic awakening'. After consolidating power internally, Iran's religious establishment found fertile ground for the export of Shia Islamism in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

In the Sunni Muslim context, the 'Islamic awakening' was best advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood whose influence and presence spread throughout the region and far beyond. The

Brotherhood came to power by a popular vote in the Gaza Strip in 2006 and briefly in Egypt on the initial wave of the Arab Spring. In Syria, although brutally suppressed in the early 1980s by Hafez al-Assad following a rebellion against the Baathist regime, the Brotherhood played a key role in the 2011 uprising against Hafez's son Bashar. The subsequent Syrian civil war forged close ties with Turkish Islamists and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) whose ideology has been greatly influenced by the Muslim Brothers. The Brotherhood's ideologues, in particular Sayyed Qutb – 'the architect of worldwide jihad'* - inspired a variety of Islamist currents, including al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). In Turkey, the rise to power of the AKP under the leadership of Erdogan led to Ottoman nostalgia and legitimized the ideology of political Islam. The new regime began challenging Turkey's secular and pro-Western orientation. This change of direction has been manifested in irredentist, expansionist and pan-Islamic tendencies often described as 'neo-Ottomanist'. But, despite its Islamist character, the ruling party has not rejected nationalism but rather emphasized the religious component of Turkish national identity, leading to a blend of nationalism and Islamism.

The struggle for the hearts and minds of the Middle East has been complicated by Western involvement. The United States in particular has a long history of prioritizing economic and strategic interests over democratic and liberal values. The West's apparent failure therefore to practice what it preaches has reinforced the sense of disillusionment with Western values, adding to the appeal of religious fundamentalism. The murderous Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88 was followed two years later by a massive US-led Western intervention against Iraq's genocidal treatment of its Kurdish populations and its invasion of Kuwait. Just over a decade later, the US and its allies invaded Iraq a second time to dispose of the Hussein regime. The subsequent occupation of Iraq led to a long and bloody insurgency with a staggering human death toll. It created a favorable environment for sectarianism, radicalization and the emergence of an al-Qaeda branch in Iraq - a precursor of IS. Similarly the nearly nine-year-long Syrian civil war has brought a death-toll of around half a million and a humanitarian crisis on a scale unseen since World War II. The influx of Syrian refugees put an enormous economic and social burden on neighboring countries of Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. The conflict triggered the migration crisis in Europe which undermined Schengen, bitterly polarized Europeans and many believe contributed to Brexit. The chaos caused by the war enabled ISIS to wreak havoc in lands that fell under its control. IS-organized or inspired terrorist attacks swept across Europe and the West, undermining a sense of security, deepening the rift between indigenous and Muslim populations and leading to erosion of civil liberties.

Over the next few years, the Syrian civil war became a regional quagmire. In 2015, Russia launched a military intervention in Syria to aid Bashar al-Assad's regime. The intervention turned the tables of the war to the regime's favor. It enabled Russia to secure its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean marking its resurgence in the Middle East, thereby challenging the US

* Jonathan Raban, 'My Holy War,' The New Yorker, 4 February 2002, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/02/04/my-holy-war>

regional supremacy. Following the withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq and capitalizing on the rise of the IS, Iran through several Shia militias including Hezbollah established a strong political and military presence in Iraq. Therefore, it has moved closer to completing the so-called 'Shia crescent' – the sphere of Iranian influence stretching from the Persian Gulf through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. This 'axis of resistance', as Iran calls it, seeks to challenge the West's and Israel's presence in the region.

The decades-long Arab-Israeli conflict continued to have grave regional and global repercussions. At the outset, it led to the flight of Palestinians and Jews from Palestine and many Arab countries. Palestinian refugees triggered internal strife in Jordan and Lebanon. The fifteen year-long Lebanese civil war led to the Iranian Hezbollah permanently establishing itself in the country leading to continuing terrorism and intermittent conflict on the Lebanese-Israeli border. The outbreak of the Arab Spring was initially interpreted as a long overdue wave of democratization. Except for Tunisia, however, the results of the uprisings fell below expectations. When President Mubarak stepped down after thirty years in power, Egyptians were full of hope for a better future. However, after a brief experience with the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood in power, Egypt returned to traditional politics. Following the NATO-supported ousting of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya descended into civil war which allowed al-Qaeda, IS and other jihadi groups to establish strategic footholds. As in Syria, the involvement of external actors complicated the situation even further. Similarly, since the AKP came to power, Turkey saw a gradual unraveling of democratic norms and institutions. Crackdowns on freedom of expression, purges and mass arrests of military and state employees and constitutional changes concentrating power in Erdogan hands, all testify to Turkey's slide to autocracy. Secularism – the country's official policy since the time of Atatürk – has also come under attack in the foreign policy sphere. As a result, Turkey has been drifting away from the West. Its relationship with Israel has become strained, while ties with Russia were strengthened. Its neo-Ottomanism found expression in the Aegean, the Eastern Mediterranean, Iraq, Syria and Libya.

The last decade also saw promising hydrocarbons discoveries in the Levantine Basin that could potentially remold the region economically. At the same time, due to the region's complicated political and strategic environments, such discoveries could turn into flashpoints for new conflicts. Without question the modern history of the Eastern Mediterranean has been turbulent. The region has suffered from interstate wars, civil strifes and unresolved conflicts. Sectarianism, radicalization and religious extremism have bred intolerance and widespread persecution of religious minorities. Ancient communities living in the Levant for centuries have been systematically wiped out. At the same time, rampant corruption and limited political accountability have led to widespread unemployment, poverty and growing sense of injustice.

* * *

The last decade bore witness to several important events that have and will continue to affect the historical development of the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East. These volumes are a record of such events as they took place. Adopting a three-pronged approach, we

tracked evolving security challenges, the rising promise of the region's energy potential, and grassroots bid for political reform. The changing security landscape, the new hydrocarbon discoveries, the so-called "Arab Spring" and its aftermath have given birth to new dynamics and challenged the validity of old paradigms. The complexity of such developments was compounded by the ebb and flow of superpower involvement. The return of Russia, the softly treading but growing Chinese presence and an uncertain US response risked a new round of superpower competition in the region. Fallout from the Second Gulf War and the frustrating process of Iraqi regime-change added to the effects of Syrian destabilization and fanned the flames of political Islam and the dream of a new caliphate. International and regional efforts to confront the Islamic State triggered dynamics that promised to further change the face of the region. The specter of the creation of a Kurdish corridor along the southern Turkish border, as well as the prospect of an Iranian arc from Tehran to the Mediterranean fanned the flames of long-standing disputes, such as the Turkish-Syrian territorial feud, the Israel-Iran confrontation, and the ageless Israeli-Palestinian struggle.

To this volatile mix one must add the challenges to Western hegemony. During the last decade, the East Mediterranean has witnessed a growing disillusionment with Westernism, liberalism and Western-style democracy as the basis for good governance, economic prosperity and social and political stability. The last decade has also revealed the political impact of demography when combined with the latest products of the electronic age. Populations of key states in the region have not only increased, but so has the ratio of young to old. Moreover, these larger, younger populations are now interconnected and their voices amplified by electronic social media. Social and political mobilization has found new tools used with considerable effect in Egypt and elsewhere in the region. This new interconnectivity, however, has not worked in favor of Western political and social concepts. On the contrary, disillusionment with Westernism by ever larger and younger populations of the region has made it easier for both regional and global actors of non-Western powers to challenge American regional hegemony. Targeting liberalism as the driving concept behind globalism, Russian, Chinese and Turkish Eurasianists seek to legitimize illiberalism and even authoritarianism as a better organizing principle for states seeking political reform and economic prosperity. Eurasianism has been offered as the foundation of a revised concept of communalism, representing the sacred link between 'peoples' and their homelands, the link that gives rise to national and cultural characteristics to be savored and protected against the leveling effects of Western globalism. Rejection of the West has given new impetus to competing paradigms, paving the way to hegemony and dominance by powerful regional actors. In this context, new concepts of autocratic democracy resonate among advocates of political Islam, both Shia and Sunni. A Russian-Turkish-Iranian coalition has held up surprisingly well over their common Syrian undertaking despite some developing rifts, especially between Russia and Turkey over Ukraine and the Libyan internecine conflict. Turkish neo-Ottomanism based upon and fueled by intense nationalism and Islamism is another point of concern. Without doubt, efforts to re-legitimize the idea of empire, if allowed to bear fruit, will have a profound effect on the future of the region and beyond.

When seen from the perspective, the need to deal with the consequences of the region's energy potential takes on a new element of urgency. Energy discoveries in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) have triggered a confrontation between the ROC on one hand, and the Republic of Turkey and its internationally unrecognized proxy, the "Turkish Republic of North Cyprus". Turkish claims against Greek maritime and insular territories, as well as involvement in other low and high intensity conflicts, including Syria and Libya, further threaten the stability of the region. On the other hand, the regional character of the nascent energy industry has contributed to a new East Mediterranean dynamic for regional co-operation. Israel, Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus, with the apparent approval of the United States, slowly moved multilateral institutional cooperation that could help develop and ultimately defend the energy resources of the Eastern Mediterranean. Such cooperation, although explicitly non-exclusive of Turkey, aims nevertheless to avoid regional dominance by any single power.

* * *

Volumes 1 through 4 of the East Mediterranean Chronicles contain the product of ERPIC's activities over the last ten years. During this period, the Council organized and hosted international conferences, roundtable presentations and discussions, formal interviews, as well as online interviews and presentations. These volumes contain timelines and transcripts of such conferences, discussions and interviews, as well as reports and analyses by people that bore witness to the underlying events. The timelines mentioned, although not exhaustive, are meant to mark the significant events of the period being covered. All material originally recorded in electronic form have been transcribed, translated and edited where necessary by the Council's permanent staff. Such editing, however, especially of material transcribed verbatim, has sought to ensure continuity and clarity while preserving the stylistic, grammatical and syntactical characteristics of the original material. We are deeply grateful to all who have so kindly, graciously and diligently contributed their valuable time to complete these volumes and compile the materials they contain. The Editors wish to thank all the literary contributors whose names appear in the List of Contributors at the end of each volume. In particular, the Editors wish to thank Andrew Lambert, Andrestinos N. Papadopoulos, Klearchos A. Kyriakides, Gary Lakes, Fanoulla Argyrou, Habib C. Malik and Marios L. Evriviades for their contributions, as well as Jacqueline Booth for her organizing skills. Our thanks are due to Ephraim Sneh, David Ben-Bashat, Eran Lerman, Yair Hirschfeld, David Altman, Baruch Spiegel and Elie Friedman, for their invaluable help.

The Editors
December 2020

Introduction to Volume 2

This Volume 2 of our series, covering the years 2011-2014, begins with several briefing notes (see Contents, Contributions: Items 1-5, 7, 9-11, 14, 15-18 and 20-25) by Gary Lakes, the Director of ERPIC's Energy Program. This material drawing on the author's long experience as an energy journalist, traces the development of Turkish claims against the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) and Turkish efforts to re-cast the maritime borders in the Eastern Mediterranean. Peter Wallace (Item 19) reviews Cyprus energy development alternatives, while George Pelagias (Items 8 and 28) focuses on the political and regional environment of the Cyprus energy program, as well as the prospects of a new Eastern Mediterranean energy corridor to Europe.

The relationship between Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and Israel is traced by Efthimios Petrou (Item 12), Dimitris Meritis (Item 13) and Yiannos Charalambides (Item 26), while Brigadier General Christos Minagias (Item 36 – Greek text) examines in depth the offensive capabilities of the Turkish military machine as it looms over the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel's Ambassador to Cyprus, Michael Harari (Item 27), discusses some of the challenges facing Israeli foreign policy, while John Munro (Item 29) provides a brilliant insight into the nature of the so-called Arab Spring.

Several pieces that follow, including those by Constantine Partassides (Item 30), Klearchos Kyriakides (Items 31, 39 and 40), Ambassador Andreas Mavroyannis (Item 38), deal with the efforts to settle the Cyprus problem, while Ambassador Andreas Jacovides (Item 32) deals with maritime legal issues as they affect Cyprus and its dispute with Turkey. Finally, Iranian Ambassador Ali Akbar (Item 34), Russian Ambassador Stanislav Osadchiy (Item 35) and Professor Mustava Zahrani of the Tehran Institute of Political and International Studies (Item 37) discuss the roles of their respective countries in shaping the future of the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader region.

East Mediterranean Chronicles

Timeline

2011-2014

2011

1. *1 January 2011* – 23 people were killed and 97 injured in a jihadi terrorist attack against the Coptic Christians in Alexandria. It was the deadliest anti-Christian attack in Egypt in a decade.¹
2. *11 January 2011* – Royal Dutch Shell was chosen as the preferred bidder to for a 20-year supply of natural gas to Cyprus. The deal, however, did not materialize due to Cyprus' subsequent decision to prioritize the search for its own gas discoveries over LNG imports.²
3. *14 January 2011* – Tunisian President Ben Ali stepped down and fled to Saudi Arabia as a result of protests over dire economic conditions.³
4. *25 January 2011* – Popular protests broke out in Egypt demanding that President Hosni Mubarak step down, marking the beginning of the Egyptian revolution. The unrest was caused by decades of authoritarianism, police and security forces brutality, and poverty.⁴
5. *5 February 2011* – The Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP) was attacked near the Gaza Strip in the Sinai Peninsula. The natural gas pipeline originating in El-Arish was built in 2008 to export Egyptian gas to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. A section of the pipeline supplied Israel as well

¹ 'Egypt Church Blast Death Toll Rises to 23,' Reuters, 4 January 2011,

<https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE7010M020110104>.

² 'UPDATE 1-Shell Has Best Offer for Cyprus LNG Supply-Minister,' Reuters, 6 January 2011, <https://www.reuters.com/article/cyprus-lng-shell/update-1-shell-has-best-offer-for-cyprus-lng-supply-minister-idUKLDE7051NW20110106>.

Anastasios Giamouridis, 'The Offshore Discovery in the Republic of Cyprus. Monetization, Prospects and Challenges,' The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, July 2012, p. 11, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NG_65.pdf.

³ 'Tunisia: Ex-President Ben Ali Flees to Saudi Arabia,' BBC, 15 January 2011, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12198106>.

⁴ Jack Shenker, 'Cairo Protesters in Violent Clashes with Police,' The Guardian, 26 January 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/25/egypt-protests-mubarak>.

through an El-Arish-Ashkelon connection. The bombing was the first of a series of attacks on the AGP in the Sinai Peninsula carried out in the following years that halted gas supplies to Israel and Jordan.⁵

6. *6 February 2011* – As a sign of deepening relations between Syria and Turkey, the two countries laid foundations for the construction of the Friendship Dam on the Orontes River on the Syrian-Turkish border west of Aleppo.⁶
7. *11 February 2011* – After losing support of the military, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stepped down after a nearly 30-year rule. Egypt's military dissolved the country's parliament.⁷
8. *15 February 2011* – Anti-government protests erupted in Libya sparked by the arrest of a human-rights lawyer Fethi Tarbel. Within a few days, opposition forces took control over Benghazi – the third largest city in Libya – and spread to Tripoli. The government used lethal force against the demonstrators, including tanks, warplanes and helicopter-gunships, drawing international condemnation. The violence descended into civil war.⁸
9. *26 February 2011* – The UN Security Council called for sanctions against the Libyan authorities. This was followed by United States and European Union-imposed sanctions as well as a travel ban, arms embargo, and the freezing of Muammar Gaddafi's family assets.⁹
10. *27 February 2011* – Rebels in Libya formed the National Transitional Council (NTC) to officially represent the country.¹⁰ In March 2011 the NTC declared itself the sole representative of Libya.¹¹
11. *6 March 2011* – In the southern Syrian city of Daraa, police arrested several children for writing anti-government graffiti. They were held for days and allegedly tortured, prompting local demonstrations calling for their release. Peaceful protests against President Bashar al-Assad quickly spread across the country, and were met by security

⁵ 'Saboteurs Attack Egypt Gas Pipeline,' ABC News, 5 February 2011, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-02-05/saboteurs-attack-egypt-gas-pipeline/1930904>.

⁶ 'Syria and Turkey Reconcile Water Dispute with Friendship Dam,' Water Politics, 14 April 2011, <http://www.waterpolitics.com/2011/04/14/syria-and-turkey-reconcile-water-dispute-with-friendship-dam/>.

⁷ 'Egypt Crisis: President Hosni Mubarak Resigns as Leader,' BBC, 12 February 2011, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12433045>.

⁸ 'Violent Protests Rock Libyan City of Benghazi,' France 24, 16 February 2011, <https://www.france24.com/en/20110216-libya-violent-protests-rock-benghazi-anti-government-gaddafi-egypt-tunisia-demonstration>.

⁹ 'Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Libyan Authorities in Bid to Stem Violent Repression,' UN News, 26 February 2011, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/02/367672-security-council-imposes-sanctions-libyan-authorities-bid-stem-violent>.

¹⁰ 'Libya Towns Fall to Rebels as World Moves to Isolate Gaddafi,' The Telegraph, 28 February 2011, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocan/libya/8351811/Libya-towns-fall-to-rebels-as-world-moves-to-isolate-Gaddafi.html>.

¹¹ 'Founding Statement of the Interim Transitional National Council,' The Interim Transitional National Council, 5 March 2011, <https://web.archive.org/web/20110310051658/http://ntclibya.org/english/founding-statement-of-the-interim-transitional-national-council/>.

forces with a wave of arrests and shootings.¹² The country quickly descended into civil war. Among the most important factors cited as contributing to the outbreak of Syria's war were the regime's decades-long authoritarianism, brutality and institutionalized violence, as well as the contagious effects of rebellions in Tunisia and Egypt, and especially the failed management of the several-year-long drought that led to crop failures causing a humanitarian crisis.¹³

12. 7 March 2011 – Turkey laid a foundation for Alakopru Dam initiating the project to supply water to northern Cyprus, known as the “Project of the Century”. The project would transport water from Alakopru Dam on the Turkish mainland through a subsea 80km-long pipeline to a smaller dam in the village of Panagra (Gecitkoy in Turkish) in north Cyprus. The project was estimated to cost more than 1.5 billion Turkish Lira (\$680 million).¹⁴
13. 15 March 2011 – Major anti-government protests erupted in Damascus.¹⁵
14. 17 March 2011 – The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 which authorized military action and an imposition of a no-fly zone in Libya to protect civilians.¹⁶
15. 19 March 2011 – A NATO-led coalition launched military strikes in Libya on humanitarian grounds, known as Operation Odyssey Dawn.¹⁷
16. 24 March 2011 – Syria launched a second offshore licensing round for three offshore blocks.¹⁸
17. 30 April 2011 – NATO launched airstrikes against Libya's capital Tripoli. Gadhafi's youngest son and three grandchildren were killed.¹⁹
18. 2 May 2011 – The founder and the first leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, was killed in

¹² Hugh Macleod and a Reporter in Syria, ‘Syria: How it All Began,’ 23 April 2011, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2011-04-23/syria-how-it-all-began>.

¹³ Robert S. Ford, ‘The Syrian Civil War. A New State, But Is It the Final One?’ Middle East Institute, April 2019, Vol.6, Issue 3, 2014, https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2019-04/Ford_The_Syrian_Civil_War.pdf, Peter H. Gleick, ‘Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria,’ *Weather, Climate, and Society*, <https://journals.ametsoc.org/wcas/article/6/3/331/970/Water-Drought-Climate-Change-and-Conflict-in-Syria>.

¹⁴ ‘The Project of the Century Inaugurated,’ ‘Deputy Prime Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs,’ ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,’ 19 October 2, <https://mfa.gov.ct.tr/the-project-of-the-century-inaugurated/>.

¹⁵ ‘Mid-East Unrest: Syrian Protests in Damascus and Aleppo,’ BBC, 15 March 2011, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12749674>.

¹⁶ ‘Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone Over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,’ Security Council, 17 March 2011, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm>.

¹⁷ Jim Garamone, ‘Coalition Launches ‘Operation Odyssey Dawn,’ U.S. Air Force, 20 March 2011, <https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/113888/coalition-launches-operation-odyssey-dawn/>.

¹⁸ Gary Lakes, ‘Syria Launches Offshore Licensing Round,’ European Rim Policy and Investment Council, 2 April 2011, <https://erpic.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/2011-04-02-syria-launches-offshore-licensing-round.pdf>.

¹⁹ Lin Noueihed, ‘Libya Says Gaddafi Survives Air Strikes, But Son Killed,’ Reuters, 1 May 2011, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya/libya-says-gaddafi-survives-air-strikes-but-son-killed-idUSTRE7270JP20110501>.

Pakistan by US Navy SEALs.²⁰

19. 18 May 2011 - The United States imposed sanctions on President Assad and six other senior Syrian officials.
20. 23 May 2011 - The EU imposed sanctions on President Assad and other senior officials.²¹
21. 12 June 2011 - The Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the general election in Turkey, Erdogan was re-elected as Prime Minister for a third term.²²
22. 29 June 2011 - The Greek Parliament passed a 28-billion-euro package of spending cuts and tax hikes in the face of two days of violent protests that saw some 300 protesters and police injured.²³
23. 1 July 2011 - Germany's ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems signed a €2 billion contract with Turkey for six submarines.²⁴
24. 11 July 2011 - An ammunition dump exploded at the Evangelos Florakis Naval Base, located a few hundred meters from the Vasilikos Power Station in Cyprus. The explosives were seized in 2009 from an intercepted ship travelling from Iran to Syria. The explosion killed 13 and completely destroyed the power plant, cutting nearly 53% of the island's electricity and severely affecting the island's economy.²⁵
25. 12 July 2011 - The Kurdish Supreme Committee was established in northern Syria seeking to fill the power vacuum left behind by the retreating Syrian Army.²⁶
26. 15 July 2011 - The United States recognized the NTC as the legitimate government of Libya.²⁷
27. 29 July 2011 - The Free Syrian Army was founded by officers of the Syrian Armed

²⁰ '2 May: As It Happened,' BBC, 3 May 2011, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-13257972>.

²¹ Justyna Pawlak, David Brunnstrom, 'EU Imposes Sanctions on Syria's Assad,' Reuters, 23 May 2011, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria/eu-imposes-sanctions-on-syrias-assad-idUSLDE73N02P20110523>.

²² Constanze Letsch, 'Recep Erdogan Wins by Landslide in Turkey's General Election,' The Guardian, 13 June 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/13/recep-erdogan-turkey-general-election>.

²³ Renee Maltezou, Dina Kyriakidou, 'Greece Backs First Austerity Package, Violence Worsens,' Reuters, 29 June 2011, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone/greece-backs-first-austerity-package-violence-worsens-idUSTRE75R23T20110629>.

²⁴ 'Germany: ThyssenKrupp Confirms Turkish Submarine Contract,' Sea News, 1 July 2011, <https://www.seanews.com.tr/germany-thyssenkrupp-confirms-turkish-submarine-contract/65995/>.

²⁵ 'Cyprus: Zygi Naval Base Munitions Blast Kills 12,' BBC, 11 July 2011, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-14102253>.

'Cyprus Industry Shows Impact of Mari Explosion,' Financial Mirror, 4 October 2011, <https://www.financialmirror.com/2011/10/04/cyprus-industry-shows-impact-of-mari-explosion/>.

²⁶ Sakar Abdullazada, 'Now Kurds Are in Charge of Their Fate: Syrian Kurdish Official,' Ekurd Daily, 29 July 2012, <https://ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/7/syriakurd563.htm>.

²⁷ Sebnem Arsu, Steven Erlanger, 'Libya Rebels Get Formal Backing, and \$30 Billion,' The New York Times, 15 July 2011, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/world/africa/16libya.html>.

Forces whose stated goal was to bring down the Assad government.²⁸

28. 29 July 2011 – Twenty two suspects of the ‘Sledgehammer’ alleged military coup were charged with carrying out an internet campaign to undermine the government. Turkey’s four key military chiefs – among them the head of the armed forces and commanders of the ground, naval and air forces – resigned over the charge. Prime Minister Erdogan appointed Necdet Ozel as the new head of the armed forces, marking it the first time in modern Turkish history when the military chief was chosen by the civilian government.
29. 9 August 2011 – Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu visited Damascus to demand that the Assad regime end its crackdown on demonstrators.²⁹
30. 14 August 2011 – Egypt launched Operation Eagle, a military operation against the Islamist insurgents in the Sinai Peninsula.³⁰
31. 18 August 2011 – The United States imposed economic sanctions on Syria, including freezing Syrian government assets in the US, barring Americans from making new investments in the country, and prohibiting any US transactions relating to Syrian petroleum products.³¹
32. 2 September 2011 – Turkey downgraded diplomatic ties with Israel and suspended military co-operation after the UN released its report of the Mavi Marmara raid. Israel’s ambassador to Turkey was also expelled.³²
33. 6 September 2011 – Turkey suspended military ties with Israel over the Mavi Marmara raid.³³
34. 8 September 2011 – Israel’s internal security service Shin Bet accused Ankara of allowing Hamas to establish its command post in Turkey.³⁴
35. 19 September 2011 – Noble began exploratory drilling in Block 12. Cyprus’ drilling program gained the support of the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations.³⁵

²⁸ ‘Syrian Colonel Claims Big Defection,’ News24, 30 July 2011, <https://www.news24.com/World/News/Syrian-colonel-claims-big-defection-20110730>.

²⁹ ‘Syria Unrest: Turkey Presses Assad to End Crackdown,’ BBC, 9 August 2011, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14454175>.

³⁰ ‘Egypt Launches Massive Operation to Control Sinai,’ Jerusalem Post, 14 August 2011, <https://www.jpost.com/Defense/Egypt-launches-massive-operation-to-control-Sinai>

³¹ ‘President Obama Signs New Executive Order Isolating the Government of Syria from the U.S. Financial System, Impose Sanctions Against Syria’s Energy Sector,’ U.S. Department of the Treasury, 18 August 2011, <https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1280.aspx>.

³² ‘Turkey Downgrades Ties with Israel,’ Al Jazeera, 2 September 2011, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/09/2011927226423902.html>.

³³ ‘Turkey Suspends Israel Defence Ties Over Gaza Aid Raid,’ BBC, 6 September, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-14800305>.

³⁴ Yaakov Katz, ‘Shin Bet: Hamas Operating in Turkey, China,’ The Jerusalem Post, 8 September 2011, <https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Shin-Bet-Hamas-operating-in-Turkey-China>.

³⁵ ‘Cyprus Begins Controversial Oil and Gas Drilling,’ BBC, 19 September, <https://chc.com.cy/activities/block-12/>.

36. 21 September 2011 - Turkey signed a continental shelf delimitation agreement with the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' ('TRNC').³⁶
37. 21 September 2011 – The Republic of Cyprus' (RoC) President Christofias made a statement suggesting the hydrocarbon revenues could be shared with the Turkish Cypriots even before the settlement to the Cyprus problem is reached.³⁷
38. 22 September 2011 – 'TRNC' illegally issued offshore licenses for hydrocarbons exploration to state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation in the RoC's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (see Image 1).³⁸




Plate 1: 'TRNC' offshore hydrocarbon exploration licenses

39. 22 September 2011 – Mahmoud Abbas submitted an application to the UN Secretary General

³⁶ 'Press Statement on the Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement Signed Between Turkey and the TRNC,' Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 September 2011, <https://cutt.ly/2z6ppOF>.

³⁷ 'Statements of Foreign Minister Lambrinidis and the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Christofias, Following Their Meeting at the 66th UN General Assembly (21 September 2011),' Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 October 2020, <https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/statements-of-foreign-minister-lambrinidis-and-the-president-of-the-republic-of-cyprus-mr-christofias-following-their-meeting-at-the-66th-un-general-assembly-21-september-2011.html>.

³⁸ Erciyes, Çagatay, *Maritime Delimitation and Offshore Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean*, TUROGE, 21st March 2012, Ankara, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 27. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/maritime_delimitation.pdf.

Ban Ki-moon for the recognition of Palestinian statehood.³⁹

40. 25 September 2011 – Turkish Cypriot leader Dervis Eroglu presented the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon with a proposal solving the issue of Cyprus' hydrocarbons exploration.⁴⁰
41. 27 September 2011 – Turkey's first domestically made warship, the TCG Heybeliada was delivered to the Turkish navy on the anniversary of the 1538 Battle of Preveza.⁴¹ The ship had been built as part of the MILGEM project, Turkey's national warship project that aimed to build four Ada-class corvettes.
42. 28 September 2011 – Turkish seismographic vessel Piri Reis and two Turkish warships came into close range of Noble Energy's platform south of Cyprus, and on some occasions encroached into Block 12. Two Turkish F16 jets were spotted flying over the area. The activity was monitored by US, British, Russian and Greek warships.⁴²
43. 6 October 2011 – Cyprus' communist leader Demetris Christofias secured a €2.5 billion loan from Russia to be drawn in 2012.
44. 20 October 2011 – Muammar Gaddafi was killed during the Battle of Sirte.⁴³
45. 23 October 2011 – The National Transitional Council (NTC) declared victory in Libya and announced its plan to hold general elections within eight months.⁴⁴
46. 23 October 2011 – Tunisia held elections to choose constituent assembly members tasked with drafting a new constitution. It was the first free election held in Tunisia since the

³⁹ 'Abbas Submits Palestinian Statehood Application,' Voice of America, 22 September 2011, <https://www.voanews.com/world-news/middle-east-dont-use/abbas-submits-palestinian-statehood-application>.

⁴⁰ 'Turkish Cypriots Proposals to the UN,' Parikiaki, 26 September 2011, <http://www.parikiaki.com/2011/09/turkish-cypriots-proposals-to-the-un/>.

The proposal envisaged: 1. Simultaneous suspension of oil and natural gas exploration until a comprehensive solution is found to the Cyprus problem. 2. If this did not happen, then there should be an ad-hoc committee shaped by representatives of both sides. The committee would have authority regarding a) explorations, agreements and licences should depend on written approval of both sides, and b) a negotiation of the ratio of sharing the richness that will be discovered. 3. The revenue should be used to finance the comprehensive talks. 4. Adoption of the plan should not harm the positions of both sides. Eroglu also stated that the Turkish Cypriots were entitled to all underwater wealth around the island of Cyprus and the 'TRNC' had the right to grant hydrocarbon exploration licenses in the north and the south of the island. The RoC rejected this as a Turkish ploy to derail the Cyprus energy program that should benefit all Cyprus citizens without special ethnic or communal rights or entitlements.

⁴¹ 'Turkish Naval Forces Fleet Strengthened with F-512 "Buyukada",' Defence Turkey, Issue 47, <https://www.defenceturkey.com/en/content/turkish-naval-forces-fleet-strengthened-with-f-512-buyukada-1299>.

⁴² 'Turkish Exploration Vessels Piri Reis and Warships from Several Countries in the South of Cyprus,' Cyprus Updates, 29 September 2011, <http://www.cyprusupdates.com/2011/09/turkish-exploration-vessel-piri-reis-and-warships-from-several-countries-in-the-south-of-cyprus/>.

⁴³ 'Gaddafi Killed by NTC Forces in Battle for Sirte,' France24, 20 October 2011, <https://www.france24.com/en/20111019-libya-gaddafi-sirte-captured-dead-national-transitional-council>.

⁴⁴ Rana Jawad, 'Tripoli Celebrates, But on a Smaller Scale,' BBC, 23 October 2011, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15424278>.

country's independence in 1956.⁴⁵

47. 2 November 2011 - A "Petroleum Services and Production Sharing Contract" was signed between northern Cyprus and TPAO for exploration in 'Blocks' 'A' through 'H', namely RoC's Blocks 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 12, and 13, including within few kilometres from the Aphrodite gas field in Block 12.⁴⁶
48. 28 November 2011 – 11 January 2012 – Egypt held parliamentary elections which brought an overwhelming victory for Islamist parties. The Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party and the Salafist Nour party jointly gained more than 70% of the parliamentary seats.⁴⁷
49. 28 December 2011 - Noble announced discovery of the Aphrodite gas field in the RoC's Block 12.⁴⁸
50. Throughout 2011, Turkey carried out a series of seismic surveys off the south coast of Cyprus, but also along its northern and eastern coastline (see *Plate 2*).⁴⁹
51. 2011 - The Delek Group, in partnership with Noble Energy, proposed the construction of an LNG terminal at Vasilios in Cyprus. The terminal would serve for the liquefaction of natural gas from Israel's Leviathan and Cyprus' Aphrodite gas fields.⁵⁰

2012

1. In 2012, Turkey proceeded to reissue the fifth licensing chart with which it extends the licensing areas to the south-west within the Republic of Cyprus EEZ, and south of Kastellorizo, covering the entire area which Turkey against Greece (see *Plate 3*)⁵¹
2. January 2012 – The so-called Al-Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda branch, was formed in Syria.⁵²

⁴⁵ Toby Vogel, 'Tunisian Election 'Free and Fair'', Politico, 26 October 2011,

<https://www.politico.eu/article/tunisian-election-free-and-fair/>.

⁴⁶ Activities, Turkish Petroleum Corporation, p. 11,

http://www.tpao.gov.tr/tpfiles/userfiles/files/2011_activities.pdf.

⁴⁷ Kevin Connolly, 'Egypt Holds First Elections Post-Mubarak,' BBC, 28 November 2011,

https://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/learningenglish/language/wordsinthenews/2011/11/111128_witn_egypt_elections.shtml.

⁴⁸ 'Noble Energy Announces Significant Natural Gas Discovery Offshore Republic of Cyprus,' Press Release, Noble Energy, 28th December 2011, <http://investors.nblenergy.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=635912>.

⁴⁹ Konstantinos Stylianou, *Hellenic Response to Turkish Aggressive Energy Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean*, European Rim Policy and Investment Council, 2014, p. 81.

⁵⁰ Hubert Faustman, Ayla Gurel, Gregory M. Reichberg (Eds.), 'Cyprus Offshore Hydrocarbons: Regional Politics and Wealth Distribution,' Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and PRIO Cyprus Centre, PCC Report 1/2012, pp.81-82, <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/zypern/10657.pdf>.

⁵¹ Konstantinos Stylianou, *Hellenic Response*..., p. 83.

⁵² Rabua Abouzeid, 'Interview with Official of Jabhat al-Nusra, Syria's Islamist Militia Group, Time, 25 December 2012, <https://world.time.com/2012/12/25/interview-with-a-newly-designated-syrias-jabhat-al-nusra/>.




Plate 2: Turkish seismic surveys in the Cyprus EEZ carried out in 2011.




Plate 3: Fifth licensing chart issued by Turkey in 2012.

1. 23 January 2012 – The launch of the EurAsia Interconnector project for the establishment of an underwater electricity cable connecting Israel, Cyprus and Greece was announced in Nicosia.⁵³
2. 11 February 2012 – The 2nd licensing round for hydrocarbons exploration was opened in Cyprus for Blocks 1-11 and 13 (see Plate 4).⁵⁴




Plate 4: Cyprus 2nd licensing round.

3. 16 February 2012 – Benjamin Netanyahu arrived for a historic visit to Cyprus. It was the first visit by an Israeli prime minister to the island.⁵⁵
4. 26 February 2012 – Israel signed a \$1.6 billion arms deal with Azerbaijan that included drones, anti-aircraft and missile defense systems.⁵⁶

⁵³ 'Cyprus: Energy Bridge Between Europe and Asia,' EuroAsia Interconnector, <https://euroasia-interconnector.com/news-cyprus-energy-bridge-between-europe-and-asia1period2012-11/?Period=2012-11>.

⁵⁴ 'Notice from the Government of the Republic of Cyprus Concerning Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Conditions for Granting and Using Authorisations for the Prospection, Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons,' Official Journal of the European Union, 11 February 2011. [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1521208877385&uri=CELEX:52012XG0211\(01\)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1521208877385&uri=CELEX:52012XG0211(01)).

⁵⁵ Herb Keinon, 'PM Arrives in Cyprus for Historic Visit,' The Jerusalem Post, 16 January 2012, <https://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/PM-arrives-in-Cyprus-for-historic-visit>.

⁵⁶ Joshua Kucera, 'Azerbaijan Makes Massive Israeli Weapons Purchase – But Not Because of Iran,' Eurasianet, 27 February 2012, <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-makes-massive-israeli-weapons-purchase-but-not-because-of-iran#:~:text=Azerbaijan%20has%20agreed%20to%20buy,officials%20have%20told%20news%20agencies>.

5. February 2012 – The head of Turkish intelligence Hakan Fidan was called by an Istanbul prosecutor to testify as part of an investigation into the government's secret talks with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The event was seen as a major rift in the relationship between Erdogan's AKP and the so-called Gulen movement, also known as Hizmet, led by an influential Islamic scholar Fethullah Gulen. The followers of Gulen were estimated in millions in Turkey and abroad, and were believed to hold influential positions within Turkish bureaucracy, police and judiciary. Until recently, Gulen had been a political ally of the AKP against Turkey's secularist establishment, which undermined the AKP's Muslim support base.⁵⁷
6. February 2012 – Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan said his government wanted to 'raise a pious generation' sparking outrage among Turkish secularists accusing him of Islamization agenda.⁵⁸
7. 4 March 2012 – Cyprus and Israel signed a cooperation agreement for conducting the feasibility study for the construction of the EurAsia Interconnector.⁵⁹
8. 26 March 2012 – As a sign of deteriorating relations with Syria, Turkey recalled its ambassador and closed its embassy in Damascus.⁶⁰
9. 30 March 2012 – Turkish parliament passed a bill reforming the country's educational system. The new legislation allowed children as young as 11 to attend religious schools, known as imam hatip schools, therefore reversing the 1997 law imposed by the army that allowed only high school students to attend these schools. The reform also exempted imam hatip schools from entrance examinations. The bill had been hotly contested sparking nationwide protests as opposition claimed it attempted to Islamize Turkish educational system.⁶¹
10. 30 March 2012 – Foundation for the Geçitköy Dam in occupied Cyprus was laid as part of the 'Project of the Century' – a Turkish water pipeline to Cyprus project.⁶²

⁵⁷ 'Turkish Spy Chief Summoned over PKK Talks,' Financial Times, 9 February 2012, <https://www.ft.com/content/12733aa0-5328-11e1-8aa1-00144feabdc0>.

Mustafa Akyol, 'What You Should Know about Turkey's AKP-HizConflict,' Al-Monitor, 3 January 2014, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/akp-gulen-conflict-guide.html>.

⁵⁸ Fulya Ozerkan, 'Turkey PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan Sparks Furor by Saying He Wants to 'Raise a Religious Youth',' National Post, 9 February 2012, <https://nationalpost.com/news/turkey-pm-recep-tayyip-erdogan-sparks-furor-by-saying-he-wants-to-raise-a-religious-youth>.

⁵⁹ 'Israel-Cyprus Underwater Power Cable Takes Shape,' Financial Mirror, 5 March 2012, <https://www.financialmirror.com/2012/03/05/israel-cyprus-underwater-power-cable-takes-shape/>.

⁶⁰ 'Syria: Turkish Embassy Closed, Senior Intel Officer Assassinated,' Albawaba, 26 March 2012, <https://www.albawaba.com/main-headlines/syria-turkish-embassy-closed-senior-intel-office-assassinated-418505>.

⁶¹ 'Turkey Passes Hotly Contested School Reform Bill,' Fox News, 29 March 2012, <https://www.foxnews.com/world/turkey-passes-hotly-contested-school-reform-bill>.

⁶² 'The Project of the Century Inaugurated,' Deputy Prime Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,' 19 October 2, <https://mfa.gov.ct.tr/the-project-of-the-century-inaugurated/>.

11. 23 April 2012 – Due to interrupted supplies and payment delays, Egypt cancelled a 20-year old gas deal with Israel delivering 40% of the latter's supplies.⁶³
12. 26 April 2012 – TPAO began onshore drilling near Famagusta ('License H', see Plate 5).⁶⁴
13. 23-24 May 2012 – Egypt held the first round of presidential elections, considered to be Egypt's first free and fair vote.⁶⁵




Plate 5: TPAO exploration blocks in the Cyprus EEZ.

14. 6-7 June 2012 – During the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Beijing, Turkey was accepted as a dialogue partner.⁶⁶
15. 22 June 2012 – A Turkish military aircraft was shot down by the Syrian army after having

⁶³ Ari Rabinovitch, 'Egypt Cancels Gas Deal with Israel,' Reuters, 23 April 2012, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-egypt-gas-idUSBRE83LOES20120422>.

⁶⁴ Bahceli, Simon, 'Turkey launches oil drilling in northern Cyprus,' 26 April 2012, <https://www.reuters.com/article/turkey-cyprus-energy/turkey-launches-oil-drilling-in-northern-cyprus-idUSL6E8FQ6DM20120426>.

⁶⁵ Ben Wedeman, Richard Allen Greene, 'Election Day: 'Finally, Egypt is Born', CNN, 23 May 2012, <https://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/23/world/africa/egypt-elections/index.html>.

⁶⁶ 'Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,' Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/shanghai-cooperation-organization.en.mfa#:~:text=On%2023%20March%202011%2C%20Turkey,on%206%2D7%20June%202012>.

violated Syrian airspace. The incident escalated tensions between the two countries.⁶⁷

16. *24 June 2012* – Egypt held second round of presidential election. The Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi became the first democratically elected president in Egypt.⁶⁸
17. *25 June 2012* – Cyprus became the fifth EU member to seek Eurozone bailout in order to shore up its two biggest banks that had suffered heavy losses from the restructuring of Greek debt.⁶⁹
18. *7 July 2012* – General National Congress (GNC) was elected in Libya to draw a new constitution within a deadline of 18 months. However, the Congress failed to draft constitution before that deadline.⁷⁰
19. *11 August 2012* – During a meeting in Istanbul, the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Turkish PM Ahmet Davutoglu discussed ways to support the rebels fighting against the Assad regime in Syria.⁷¹
20. *20 August 2012* – President Barack Obama used the phrase 'red line' with reference to the Syrian civil war, warning that a potential use of chemical weapons would prompt the US intervention.⁷²
21. *3 September 2012* – The Republic of Cyprus delegation visited Israel to discuss the possibility of transferring to Cyprus natural gas from Israel's reserves as an interim solution until Cyprus exploits its own reserves.⁷³
22. *11 September 2012* – Militants belonging to the terrorist group Ansar al-Sharia attacked the US consulate building in Benghazi. US Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans were killed.⁷⁴
23. *12 September 2012* – Mustafa Abushagur became Libya's prime minister. He was elected by

⁶⁷ 'Syrian Military Says It Downed Turkish Fighter Jet,' BBC, 23 June 2012, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18561219>.

⁶⁸ David K. Kirkpatrick, 'Named Egypt's Winner, Islamist Makes History,' The New York Times, 24 June 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/world/middleeast/mohamed-morsi-of-muslim-brotherhood-declared-as-egypts-president.html>.

⁶⁹ Bernd Riegert, 'Cyprus Becomes Fifth Country to Seek Bailout,' Deutsche Welle, 26 June 2012, <https://www.dw.com/en/cyprus-becomes-fifth-country-to-seek-bailout/a-16049277>.

⁷⁰ 'Q&A: Libya's General National Congress Election,' BBC, 7 July 2012, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18341022>.

⁷¹ Hadeel Al Shalchi, 'U.S., Turkey to Study Syria No-Fly Zone,' Reuters, 11 August 2012, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-idUSBRE8610SH20120811>.

⁷² 'Obama Warns Syria not to Cross 'Red Line',' CNN, 21 August 2012, <https://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/20/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html>.

⁷³ 'Cyprus-Israel Discuss Interim Solution for Natural Gas Import,' Financial Mirror, 3 September 2012, <https://www.financialmirror.com/2012/09/03/cyprus-israel-discuss-interim-solution-for-natural-gas-import/>.

⁷⁴ David D. Kirkpatrick, Steven Lee Myers, 'Libya Attack Brings Challenges for U.S.,' 12 September 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/13/world/middleeast/us-envoy-to-libya-is-reported-killed.html>.

a vote of the General National Congress of Libya out of eight nominees.⁷⁵

24. *21 September 2012* – Following the ‘Sledgehammer’ probe, three hundred suspects were sentenced to prison for plotting a coup to overthrow the Turkish government, including three former army generals who received a 20-year sentence.⁷⁶
25. *27 September 2012* – Cyprus’ Natural Gas Public Company (DEFA) published an invitation for the expression of interest for the supply of natural gas to Cyprus.⁷⁷
26. *29 September 2012* – A new proposal on hydrocarbons was submitted by the Turkish Cypriots. The proposal included a bi-communal technical committee for natural resources and related agreements and revenues, with a chairman appointed by the Secretary General of the UN, and a pipeline transporting hydrocarbons through Turkey. The proposal was rejected by the Republic of Cyprus as containing distinct ethnic communal ownership rights and privileges.⁷⁸
27. *30 September 2012* – Turkey’s AKP organized a congress which was attended by nearly 200 foreign representatives, including the newly-elected Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi. Morsi expressed his admiration for the Turkish government and emphasized the two countries’ ‘shared vision’. The congress was also attended by the leader of Hamas Khaled Mashal who described Erdogan as the leader of the Muslim world. The event indicated close relationship and ideological affinity between the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey’s Justice and Development Party.⁷⁹
28. *11 November 2012* – The Syrian National Coalition (SNC), a coalition of opposition groups in the Syrian Civil War, was founded in Doha.⁸⁰
29. *14 November 2012* – Israel launched Operation Pillar of Defense in the Gaza Strip with the stated aims of halting the indiscriminate rocket attacks originating from the Gaza Strip and disrupting the capabilities of militant organizations. 174 Palestinians and 4 Israeli civilians were killed in the operation which ended a week later with a ceasefire.⁸¹
30. *21 November 2012* – A bus bombing in Tel Aviv took place. Twenty eight civilians were

⁷⁵ Ashraf Abdul Wahab, Michel Cousins, ‘Abushagur Elected as Prime Minister,’ Libya Herald, 12 September 2012, <https://www.libyaherald.com/2012/09/12/abushagur-elected-prime-minister/>.

⁷⁶ ‘Turkish Ex-Generals to Serve 20 Years for Coup Plot,’ France 24, 21 September 2012, <https://www.france24.com/en/20120921-former-top-generals-sentenced-20-years-coup-plot-dogan-turkey-military>.

⁷⁷ ‘Annual Report of Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority for the Year 2013,’ Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority, July 2014, p.56, <https://www.cera.org.cy/Templates/00001/data/ektheseis/annualreport2013eng.pdf>.

⁷⁸ ‘Talking paper on the Hydrocarbon reserves around the island of Cyprus,’ 29 September 2012, <http://www.innercitypress.com/trmc1hydrobkm092912.pdf>.

⁷⁹ ‘Morsi: We Are Headed towards Our Shared Vision with Turkey,’ Daily Sabah, 1 October 2012, <https://cutt.ly/4z6jHID>.

‘Turkish Ruling Party Model for Muslim States – Erdogan,’ BBC, 30 September 2012, <https://cutt.ly/6z6jUNp>.

⁸⁰ Neil MacFarquhar, ‘With Eye on Aid, Syria Opposition Signs Unity Deal,’ New York Times, 12 November 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/world/middleeast/syrian-opposition-groups-sign-unity-deal.html>.

⁸¹ ‘Hostilities in Gaza and Southern Israel, Nov. 2012,’ The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, https://www.btselem.org/gaza_strip/gaza_nov_2012_operation.

injured in the attack.⁸²

31. 22 November 2012 - Mass protests erupted in Egypt against Morsi's presidential decree granting him extensive powers. Demonstrations resulted in violent clashes between Morsi-supporters and anti-Morsi protesters, with dozens dead and hundreds injured.⁸³
32. 22 December 2012 - A constitutional referendum was held in Egypt in which a new constitution was approved by 64% of the voters. The opposition declared the referendum fraudulent.⁸⁴

2013

1. 4 January 2013 - DEFA published the request for proposals for the supply of natural gas to Cyprus. Seventeen applications were submitted.⁸⁵
2. 24 January 2013 - RoC granted exploration licenses for Blocks 2, 3 and 9 to the Eni-Kogas consortium.⁸⁶
3. 6 February 2013 - RoC granted exploration licenses for Blocks 10 and 11 to Total.⁸⁷
4. 11 February 2013 - Noble's 30% exploration rights in Block 12 were transferred to Delek Drilling and Avner Oil Exploration.⁸⁸
5. 24 February 2013 - Nikos Anastasiades won presidential election in Cyprus.⁸⁹
6. 21 March 2013 - Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan declared ceasefire with Turkey as an historic gesture to end the 30-year Kurdish-Turkish civil war.⁹⁰

⁸² Ben Hartman, 'Terror Attack Rocks Dan Bus in Tel Aviv,' The Jerusalem Post, 21 November 2012, <https://www.jpost.com/national-news/terror-attack-rocks-dan-bus-in-central-tel-aviv>.

⁸³ Abigail Hauslohner, 'Egyptians State Mass Protests Against Morsi Edict,' Washington Post, 27 November 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/egyptians-stage-mass-protests-against-morsi-edict/2012/11/27/166d71ca-38c4-11e2-b01f-5f55b193f58f_story.html.

⁸⁴ 'Egyptian Voters Back New Constitution in Referendum,' BBC, 25 December 2012, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20842487>.

⁸⁵ 'Annual Report of Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority for the Year 2013,' Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority, July 2014, p. 56, <https://www.cera.org.cy/Templates/00001/data/ektheseis/annualreport2013eng.pdf>.

⁸⁶ 2nd Licensing Round. Hydrocarbon Service. Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism, <http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/hydrocarbon.nsf/All/9D1FB4E966F93F27C2257FA200235A16?OpenDocument>.

⁸⁷ 2nd Licensing Round. Hydrocarbon Service. Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism, <http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/hydrocarbon.nsf/All/9D1FB4E966F93F27C2257FA200235A16?OpenDocument>.

⁸⁸ Rights in Cyprus, Delek Group, 12 February 2013, <https://ir.delek-group.com/static-files/9ab8874e-406d-45d1-b246-d3c70bb15df5>.

⁸⁹ Emilia Christofi, 'Presidential Elections 2013 - Nicos Anastasiades Becomes 7th President of the Republic of Cyprus,' Cyprus News Agency, 28 February 2013, <http://www.cna.org.cy/webnews-en.aspx?a=518b5feb433847ccb887dfde63dad67>.

⁹⁰ Constanze Letsch, 'Kurdish Leader Abdullāh Ocalan Declares Ceasefire with Turkey,' The Guardian, 21 March 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/21/pkk-leader-ocalan-declares-ceasefire>.

7. 22 March 2013 – During a phone call with Erdogan, Netanyahu apologized for the Gaza flotilla incident. Israel also promised to compensate the victims' families. Erdogan accepted the apology on behalf of the Turkish people.⁹¹
8. 24 March 2013 – A €10bn bailout deal was reached between Cyprus and the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. In return, Laiki Bank entered into liquidation, and a bank deposit levy was imposed on large depositors of the Bank of Cyprus.⁹²
9. 31 March 2013 – Israel began gas production at the Tamar field.⁹³
10. 8 April 2013 – Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, renamed his group to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS) indicating its formal expansion to Syria. Al-Baghdadi took control of most Nusra fighters in Syria, causing a rift within Al-Qaeda.⁹⁴
11. 1 May 2013 – Lebanon launched its first hydrocarbons licensing round.⁹⁵
12. 25 May 2013 – Hassan Nasrallah announced that Hezbollah is fighting in the Syrian Civil War against Sunni extremists. It was the first public confirmation that his militia was fighting in Syria.⁹⁶
13. 27 May 2013 – Mass demonstrations and civil unrest began in Turkey, sparked by the urban development plan for Istanbul's Taksim Gezi Park. The protests spread across Turkey and included issues such as freedom of speech, growing authoritarianism of the AKP regime, Islamization of the country and Turkish involvement in the Syrian war. The protests lasted till August 2013 and were brutally suppressed, with twenty two people killed and hundreds injured.⁹⁷
14. 7 June 2013 – Noble began appraisal drilling in Block 12.⁹⁸
15. 18 June 2013 – Russia started delivering a \$1 billion-worth military equipment to Azerbaijan raising concerns over military balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan that remained at

⁹¹ Herb Keinon, 'Netanyahu Apologizes to Turkey over Gaza Flotilla,' The Jerusalem Post, 22 March 2013, <https://www.jpost.com/international/obama-netanyahu-erdogan-speak-by-phone-307423>.

⁹² Ian Traynor, 'Cyprus Strikes Last-Minute EU Bailout Deal,' The Guardian, 25 March 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/25/cyprus-eu-draft-agreement-bailout>.

⁹³ Shoshanna Solomon, Gwen, Ackerman, 'Israel Starts Tamar Gas Production,' Bloomberg, 31 March 2013, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-30/israel-begins-gas-production-at-tamar-field-in-boost-to-economy>.

⁹⁴ 'What is 'Islamic State'?' BBC, 2 December 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144>.

⁹⁵ Mohamed El Amin, 'Lebanon Launches First Gas and Oil Licensing Round,' Daily Star, 1 May 2013, <https://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Lebanon/2013/May-01/215647-lebanon-launches-first-gas-and-oil-licensing-round.ashx>.

⁹⁶ 'Hezbollah Admits Its Troops Fighting in Syria,' Times of Israel, 25 May 2013, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-admits-its-troops-fighting-in-syria/>.

⁹⁷ Constanze Letsch, 'Turkey Protests Spread After Violence in Istanbul Over Part Demolition,' The Guardian, 1 June 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/31/istanbul-protesters-violent-clashes-police>.

⁹⁸ Evripidou, Stefanos, *Appraisal drilling begins today*, Cyprus Mail, 7 June 2013, <http://cyprus-mail.com/2013/06/07/appraisal-drilling-begins-today/>.

loggerheads over Nagorno-Karabakh region. It followed a previous, larger Russian delivery estimated at \$2-3 billion.⁹⁹

16. *13 June 2013* - Barack Obama said that Syria had crossed a "red line" with its use of chemical weapons against rebels. His administration indicated that it would be stepping up its support of the rebels, who had been calling for the United States and others to provide arms needed to battle Assad's forces.¹⁰⁰
17. *23 June 2013* - Cyprus signed a memorandum of understanding with the 'Aphrodite' consortium including Noble Energy, Delek Drilling and Avner Oil Exploration that initiated talks on the construction of the LNG terminal in Cyprus.¹⁰¹
18. *30 June 2013* - Anti-government protests erupted across Egypt calling for Morsi's resignation.¹⁰²
19. *3 July 2013* - Egypt's President Mohamed Morsi was ousted from power by the Egyptian Armed Forces. He was arrested alongside other Brotherhood leaders.¹⁰³
20. *July 2013* - Noble Energy approached the Cyprus government with an offer to supply Cyprus with natural gas from the Aphrodite field. The gas would be brought to the Vasilikos power plant by early 2016 at a cheaper price than offered by their bidders.¹⁰⁴
21. *5 August 2013* - Verdicts were announced in the so so-called Ergenekon trials - a series of trials against high profile members of Turkish military, political and intellectual elite accused of membership in a terrorist organization plotting to overthrow Erdogan's government. 254 defendants received long prison sentences, including the former chief of staff of the Turkish Armed Forces who was sentenced to life imprisonment.
22. *13 August 2013* - Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev said after his meeting with Putin in Baku that his country's arms deals with Russia amounted to \$4 billion.¹⁰⁵
23. *15 August 2013* - As an indication of worsening relations, Egypt and Turkey recalled their ambassadors to Ankara and Cairo respectively after Erdogan's criticism of Cairo's

⁹⁹ 'Russia Starts Delivering \$1 Billion Arms Package to Azerbaijan,' Reuters, 18 June 2013, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-azerbaijan-arms-idUSBRE95H0KM20130618>.

¹⁰⁰ Barbara Starr, Jessica Yellin, Chelsea J. Carter, 'White House: Syria Crosses 'Red Line' with the Use of Chemical Weapons on Its People,' CNN, 14 June 2013, <https://cutt.ly/Hz6xFto>.

¹⁰¹ 'Update 2 - Cyprus Aims to Be Region Energy Hub with LNG Terminal, Reuters, 26 June 2013, <https://cutt.ly/pz6x8qc>.

¹⁰² 'June 20, the Tale of an Epic Civic Uprising,' Egypt Today, 30 June 2019, <https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/72240/June-30-the-tale-of-an-epic-civic-uprising>.

¹⁰³ 'Egypt's President Morsi Is Ousted from Power by Military,' NPR, 3 July 2013, <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/07/03/198282481/showdown-in-egypt-wednesdays-developments>.

¹⁰⁴ Elias Hazou, 'Can Gas Drive Down Our Electricity Prices?' Cyprus Mail, 7 July 2013, <https://cyprus-mail.com/2013/07/07/can-gas-drive-down-our-electricity-prices/>.

¹⁰⁵ Zulfugar Agayev, 'Azeri-Russian Arms Trade \$4 Billion Amid Tension With Armenia,' Bloomberg, 13 August 2013, <https://cutt.ly/hz6cyvY>.

crackdown on supporters of Mohammed Morsi.¹⁰⁶

24. *14 August 2013* – The Rabaa massacre in Egypt took place. Egyptian security forces killed at least 900 people during the crackdown on pro-Morsi protestors on Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda squares. Human rights groups called that the worst massacre in Egypt's modern history.¹⁰⁷
25. *21 August 2013* – Chemical attack took places in Ghouta, the opposition-controlled suburb of Damascus. Estimates of the death toll ranged from 281 people to 1,729. The attack was the deadliest use of chemical weapons since the Iran–Iraq War. The Syrian opposition as well as many governments, the Arab League, and the European Union stated the attack had been carried out by forces of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Syrian and Russian governments called it a false flag operation by the opposition to draw foreign powers into the civil war on the rebels' side.¹⁰⁸
26. *29 August 2013* - The UK Parliament voted against any military intervention in Syria.¹⁰⁹
27. *5 September – 18 November 2013* - Turkish seismic survey vessel Barbaros Hayreddin Pasa (Barbaros), accompanied by MV Bravo Supporter and MV Deep Supporter conducted seismic surveys in the area overlapping with the RoC's EEZ and continental shelf to the north-east of the Cyprus' coast (see *Plate 6*).¹¹⁰
28. *13 September 2013* – Talks with Itera on interim gas supply to Cyprus ended due to unprofitability.¹¹¹
29. *27 September 2013* – China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corp (CPMIEC), a company under US sanctions, won Turkey's bidding for a \$4 billion co-production deal for long-range air and missile defence system. The deal raised security concerns among Turkey's NATO members.¹¹²
30. *27 September 2013* – The second corvette of Turkey's MILGEM warship project, TCG Buyukada was commissioned to the Turkish navy.¹¹³

¹⁰⁶ 'Egypt Recalls Its Ambassador in Turkey: Report,' Reuters, 15 August 2013, <https://cutt.ly/gz6cnQD>; 'Turkey Recalls Ambassador in Cairo for Consultations, Egypt Reciprocates,' Hurriyet Daily News, 15 August 2013, <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-recalls-ambassador-in-cairo-for-consultations-egypt-reciprocates-52642>.

¹⁰⁷ Louisa Loveluck, 'Rage and Disbelief as Egypt Reels, Counts Its Dead,' The World, 15 August 2013, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-08-15/rage-and-disbelief-egypt-reels-counts-its-dead>.

¹⁰⁸ Haroon Siddique, 'Syria Crisis: Rebels Claim Hundreds Killed in Government Chemical Weapons Attack – Wednesday 21 August,' The Guardian, 21 August 2013, <https://cutt.ly/Lz6v7wl>.

¹⁰⁹ Nicholas Watt, Rowena Mason, 'Blow to Cameron's Authority as MPs Rule Out British Assault on Syria,' The Guardian, 30 August 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/aug/30/cameron-mps-syria>.

¹¹⁰ Letter dated 29 October 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, Nr. A/68/555–S/2013/634, General Assembly Security Council, 29 October 2013,

¹¹¹ 'Talks on Interim Gas Supply Fall Through,' Cyprus Mail, 13 September 2013, <https://cutt.ly/Uz6bho8>.

¹¹² Jonny Hogg, Can Sezar, 'Erdogan Aims to Turn Turkey into a Major Defence Industry Power,' Reuters, 27 May 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-election-defence-idUSKBN0OC0FT20150527>.

¹¹³ 'TCG Büyükaada, DZKK'ya Teslim Edildi,' Deniz Haber Ajansi, 27 September 2013, <https://www.denizhaber.net/tcg-buyukada-dzkkya-teslim-edildi-haber-51326.htm>.




Plate 6: Turkish seismic survey in the Cyprus EEZ – 5 September - 18 November 2013




Plate 7: Turkish seismic survey in the Cyprus EEZ – 12 December – 14 January 2014

31. 3 October 2013 - Noble announced results for appraisal drilling in Block 12 and estimated that Aphrodite gas field held 5 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas.¹¹⁴
32. 14 October 2013 - Syria acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and a US-Russian agreement to dismantle Syria's chemical weapons capability was signed in Geneva.¹¹⁵
33. 4 November 2013 - The Turkish media reported that the government was preparing to close down private preparatory schools in Turkey under the pretext that they hindrance equal opportunity in education. Since the vast majority of them were run by the Gulenists, the move was interpreted as an attack on Hizmet and its influence in Turkey.¹¹⁶ At the center of the scandal was a 'gold-for-oil' scheme, namely a covert trade operations between Turkey and Iran. The scheme was made to bypass the US and EU sanctions on Iran, while Turkish state-owned Halkbank was used for money transfers.¹¹⁷
34. 22 November 2013 - Turkey issued navigational telex (NAVTEX) reserving maritime areas for the purpose of carrying out seismic surveys in the territorial sea, as well as in the EEZ and the continental shelf of the RoC. Seismic operations were scheduled to continue until 18 December 2013 and were carried out by Barbaros escorted by the Turkish frigate *Gokceada*.¹¹⁸
35. 23 November 2013 - Egypt expelled Turkish ambassador over Erdogan's criticism of the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi that had sparked accusations of Turkey meddling in Egypt's internal affairs.¹¹⁹
36. 12 December 2013 - 14 January 2014 - Barbaros conducted seismic survey along the northern coast of Cyprus, partly overlapping with the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the RoC (see Plate 7).¹²⁰

¹¹⁴ 'Noble Energy Announces Appraisal Drilling And Flow Test Results Offshore Republic Of Cyprus,' Reuters, 3 October 2013, <https://www.reuters.com/article/nobleenergy-brief/corrected-brief-noble-energy-announces-appraisal-drilling-and-flow-test-results-offshore-cyprus-idUSASB0898620131003>.

¹¹⁵ 'Syria's Accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention Enters into Force,' Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 14 October 2013, <https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2013/10/syrias-accession-chemical-weapons-convention-enters-force>.

¹¹⁶ 'Turkish Government Determined to Close Private Tutoring Schools,' Hurriyet Daily, 5 November 2013, <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-government-determined-to-close-private-tutoring-schools-57375>; 'Turkey Coup: What is Gulen Movement and What Does It Want?' BBC, 21 July 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36855846>; Mustafa Akyol, 'What You Should Know about Turkey's AKP-Gulen Conflict,' Al-Monitor, 3 January 2014, <https://cutt.ly/PgZBggK>.

¹¹⁷ Jonathan Schanzer, Mark Dubowitz, 'Iran's Turkish Gold Rush,' Foreign Policy, 26 December 2013, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/26/irans-turkish-gold-rush/>.

¹¹⁸ Letter dated 5 December 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, Nr. A/68/644-S/2013/720, General Assembly Security Council, 5 December 2013, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/762151?ln=en>.

¹¹⁹ 'Egypt Expels Turkish Ambassador,' BBC, 23 November 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25066115>.

¹²⁰ Letter dated 13 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, Nr. A/68/759, General Assembly Security Council, 18 February 2014, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/765943?ln=en>.

37. 17 December 2013 – 52 AKP-affiliated people were detained in Turkey over corruption allegations, marking the beginning of the biggest corruption scandal in modern Turkey. The probe had been triggered by prosecutors widely believed to be linked to Fethullah Gulen, marking another phase in the breakup of relations between the Gulenists and the AKP.¹²¹
38. 26 December 2013 – Russian energy company Soyizneftegaz and the Syrian regime signed a 25-year deal for the hydrocarbons exploration off the Syrian coast.¹²²
39. December 2013 – Part of the water supply project from Turkey to occupied Cyprus was completed.¹²³
40. December 2013 – The Cyprus government rejected Noble Energy's offer for the interim gas supply from Aphrodite field as it prioritizes its use for export through the planned LNG terminal at Cyprus' Vasilikos.¹²⁴
41. Turkey proceeded to reissue the sixth licensing chart which included the licensing areas under the agreement between the TPAO and northern Cyprus (see Plate 8).¹²⁵

2014

1. 14 January 2014 – ISIS took control over Raqqa.¹²⁶
2. 27 January – 13 May 2014 – Turkey's Barbaros conducted seismic surveys in north-west of Cyprus (see Plate 9).¹²⁷
3. January 2014 – Cyprus' DEFA issued the second invitation for the expression of interest for the supply of natural gas to Cyprus. Bids were submitted from four contenders: the Dutch company Vitol, the Greek conglomerate M&M made up of Mytilineos & Vardinoyiannis,

¹²¹ Constanze Letsch, 'Turkish Ministers' Sons Arrested in Corruption and Bribery Investigation,' The Guardian, 17 December 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/turkish-ministers-sons-arrested-corruption-investigation>.

¹²² 'Russia Tightens Links to Bashar al-Assad with Syria Energy Deal,' Financial Times, 26 December 2013, <https://www.ft.com/content/9e8040e0-6e3f-11e3-8dff-00144feabdc0>.

¹²³ 'The Project of the Century Inaugurated,' 'Deputy Prime Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs,' 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,' 19 October 2, <https://mfa.gov.ct.tr/the-project-of-the-century-inaugurated/>; 'Trelleborg Offshore – Mediterranean Subsea Water Pipeline, Phase 1, 2013,' Trelleborg Group, YouTube, 12 December 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ST9nOuvia_w.

¹²⁴ Elias Hazou, 'After 15 Years, We're Still Waiting for Gas, Cyprus Mail, 14 June 2020, <https://cutt.ly/cgZB3t1>.

¹²⁵ Konstantinos Stylianou, *Hellenic Response...*, p. 87.

¹²⁶ 'ISIL Recaptures Raqqa from Syria's Rebels,' Al Jazeera, 14 January 2014, <https://cutt.ly/vgZBM2>.

¹²⁷ Letter dated 13 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, Nr. A/68/759, General Assembly Security Council, 18 February 2014, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/765943?ln=en>.




Plate 8: Sixth licensing chart reissued by Turkey.




Plate 9: Turkish seismic survey in the Cyprus EEZ – 27 January – 13 May 2014

the Azeri company Socar, and Israel's Delek Group. The latter proposed the construction of a pipeline to Cyprus from the Leviathan firm.¹²⁸

4. *1 February 2014* - Turkish navy harassed a Norwegian vessel *Princess* near Block 7 in Cyprus EEZ. The vessel was carrying out hydrocarbon surveys on behalf of Total.¹²⁹
5. *3 February 2014* - Al-Qaeda cut ties with ISIS, leaving Jabhat al-Nusra the sole representative of al-Qaeda in Syria.¹³⁰
6. *23 February 2014* - Turkey signed a \$3.5-billion deal with the US Sikorsky Aircraft company to buy 109 Black Hawk helicopters.¹³¹
7. *11 March 2014* - EU adopted an Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance II (IPA II). The aim of IPA was to provide support to EU candidate countries in their efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law, reform public administration, carry out economic reforms and prepare them for the implementation of the *acquis communautaire*. IPA was originally established in 2006. Under the IPA II, Turkey was allocated €4.4 billion for the 2014-2020 period.¹³² Under IPA I for the 2007-2013 period, it was allocated €4.795 billion. Before that, from 2002-2006 pre-accession assistance was provided to Turkey through the Turkey Pre-Accession Instrument, with allocation of €1.3 bln.¹³³
8. *23 April 2014* - The Gaza Agreement was signed between Hamas and Fatah with the purpose to form a national unity government followed by general elections. As a result, Israel suspended talks with the Palestinian Authority and threatened sanctions.¹³⁴
9. *8 May 2014* - After a three year-long siege Syrian regime forces recaptured the city of Homs, regarded as the capital of anti-Assad uprising. Hundreds of rebels were evacuated from the

¹²⁸ Elias Hazou, 'Possible Delek Pull Back over Interim Gas Supply,' Cyprus Mail, 6 August 2014, <https://cyprus-mail.com/2014/08/06/possible-delek-pull-back-over-interim-gas-supply/>.

¹²⁹ Psyllides, George, Turkish frigate harasses research vessel in EEZ, Cyprus Mail, 3 February 2014, <http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/02/03/turkish-frigate-harasses-research-vessel-in-eez/>.

¹³⁰ Liz Sly, 'Al-Qaeda Disavows Any Ties With Radical Islamist ISIS Group in Syria, Iraq,' The Washington Post, 3 February 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/al-qaeda-disavows-any-ties-with-radical-islamist-isis-group-in-syria-iraq/2014/02/03/2c9afc3a-8cef-11e3-98ab-fe5228217bd1_story.html.

¹³¹ 'Turkey Signs \$3.5 Bln Deal for Sikorsky Helicopters,' Hurriyet Daily News, 23 February 2014, <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-signs-35-bln-deal-for-sikorsky-helicopters-62810>.

¹³² 'Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 Establishing an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II),' Official Journal of the European Union, 15 March 2014, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/financial_assistance/ipa/2014/231-2014_ipa-2-reg.pdf; 'Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II). Indicative Strategy Paper for Turkey (2014-2020)', European Commission, 26 August 2014, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2014/20140919-csp-turkey.pdf.

¹³³ 'Turkey: How the Pre-Accession Funds Have Been Spent, Managed, Controlled and the Monitoring System?' European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, 23 May 2016, p. 38.

¹³⁴ 'Hamas and Fatah Unveil Palestinian Reconciliation Deal,' BBC, 23 April 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27128902>.

city.¹³⁵

10. *16 May 2014* – Libyan National Army (LNA) led by General Khalifa Haftar, one of the leaders behind Gaddafi's overthrow, launched Operation Dignity with air support from Egypt and the UAE, a coup against the Islamist-dominated GNC elected in Libya in July 2012.¹³⁶
11. *24 May 2014* – Jewish Museum of Belgium shooting took place. Three people were killed on the spot and a fourth victim later dies in hospital. The gunman, a French citizen of Algerian origin, was a returnee from Syria with links to ISIS.¹³⁷
12. *25 May 2014* – Lebanese President Michel Suleiman ended his term of office, leaving a power vacuum in the country.¹³⁸
13. *2 June 2014* – The Palestinian Unity Government was formed following the April Hamas-Fatah reconciliation agreement. Amid Israel's objections, the Obama's administrations declared its intention to work with the new Palestinian unity government stressing its technocratic character, which also gained support from the UN, the EU, and China.¹³⁹
14. *10 June 2014* – ISIS took control of Mosul.¹⁴⁰
15. *8 June 2014* – Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was sworn in as President of Egypt.¹⁴¹
16. *19 June 2014* – Turkey's highest court ordered the release of 230 military officers jailed over the 'Sledgehammer' plot – an alleged 2003 attempt coup to remove Erdogan from power.¹⁴²
17. *25 June 2014* – Parliamentary election was held in Libya for the House of Representatives (HoR) meant to replace the GNC. Defeated Islamists rejected the results of the election accusing the parliament of being dominated by supporters of Gaddafi.¹⁴³

¹³⁵ Nicholas Blanford, 'Retreat from Homs Assad Conquers Cradle of Revolution,' The Times, 8 May 2014, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/retreat-from-homs-assad-conquers-cradle-of-revolution-zzmhp9qc5tm>.

¹³⁶ Barak Barfi, Khalifa Haftar, 'Rebuilding Libya from the Top Down,' The Washington Institute, August 2014, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/khalifa-haftar-rebuilding-libya-from-the-top-down>.

¹³⁷ 'Brussels Fatal Gun Attack at Jewish Museum,' BBC, 24 May 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27558918>.

¹³⁸ Ben Hubbard, 'Lebanon's Political Standoff Leaves Leadership Vacancy,' 24 May 2014, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/world/middleeast/lebanons-political-standoff-leaves-leadership-vacancy.html>.

¹³⁹ Dalia Hatuqa, 'Palestinians Form Consensus Government,' Al Jazeera, 3 June 2014, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/palestinians-set-swear-unity-government-20146281348223961.html>.

¹⁴⁰ Martin Chulov, 'Isis Insurgents Seize Control of Iraqi City of Mosul,' The Guardian, 10 June 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/10/iraq-sunni-insurgents-islamic-militants-seize-control-mosul>

¹⁴¹ Yousuf Basil, 'Egypt's New President Vows to 'Correct the Mistakes of the Past',' CNN, 9 June 2014, <https://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/08/world/africa/egypt-presidential-election/index.html>.

¹⁴² 'Sledgehammer: Turkey 'Erdogan Coupt Plotters' to Be Freed,' BBC, 19 June 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27925911>.

¹⁴³ 'Libyan Elections: Low Turnout Marks Bid to End Political Crisis,' BBC, 26 June 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28005801>.

18. 29 June 2014 – Al-Baghdadi announced the establishment of a caliphate named Islamic State (IS) and declared himself a caliph.¹⁴⁴
19. 8 July 2014 – After the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers and an Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) search operation followed by Hamas rocket strikes, Israel launched Operation Protective Edge in the Gaza Strip, marking the beginning of the 2014 Gaza war.¹⁴⁵
20. 13 July 2014 – In response to Haftar's Operation Dignity, Tripoli's Islamists and Misratan militias launched Operation Libya Dawn and took control over Tripoli. Egypt and UAE conducted airstrikes against the Islamists, who were backed by Qatar and Turkey. Violence in Libya escalated.¹⁴⁶
21. July 2014 – Israel launched a ground offensive in Gaza targeting smuggling tunnels from Gaza to Israel.¹⁴⁷
22. 22 July 2014 – For the first time, Armenia criticized Russia for selling weapons to Azerbaijan and aiding Baku's increased militarization.¹⁴⁸
23. 3-14 August 2014 – The Sinjar massacre took place. An estimated 5,000 Yazidi men were killed by IS fighters and around 7,000 Yazidi women were taken captive. The US carried out airstrikes on IS units and convoys in northern Iraq.¹⁴⁹
24. 10 August 2014 – Presidential elections were held in Turkey. Incumbent Prime Minister Erdogan was elected in the first round.¹⁵⁰
25. 25 August 2014 – Members of the Libyan GNC who rejected the June election reconvened as a new General National Congress with Tripoli as their political capital. As a consequence, the HoR was forced to relocate to Tobruk and aligned itself with Haftar's forces – the Libyan National Army – eventually nominating him army chief. The country split into two

¹⁴⁴ Matt Bradley, 'ISIS Declares New Islamist Caliphate,' The Wall Street Journal, 29 June 2014, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/isis-declares-new-islamist-caliphate-1404065263>.

¹⁴⁵ 'Israel Launches Operation Protective Edge in Gaza Strip,' NBC News, 8 July 2014, <https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/middle-east-unrest/israel-launches-operation-protective-edge-gaza-strip-n150281>.

¹⁴⁶ Jomana Karadsheh, Ashley Fantz, 'Rival Libyan Militias Battle for Tripoli Airport,' CNN, 13 July 2014, <https://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/13/world/africa/libya-airport-battle/index.html>.

¹⁴⁷ Matthew Weaver, Chris Johnston, Alan Yuhas, Michael Safi, 'Israeli Military Begins Ground Offensive in Gaza,' The Guardian, 18 July 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/17/gaza-crisis-humanitarian-truce-due-to-start-live-updates>.

¹⁴⁸ Tigran Gevorgyan, 'Yerevan Angry at Russian Arms Sales to Baku,' Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 22 July 2014, <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/yerevan-angry-russian-arms-sales-baku>.

¹⁴⁹ 'Iraq Crisis: Yazidi Villages 'Massacred' by IS,' BBC, 16 August 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28814633>.

¹⁵⁰ Umut Uras, 'Erdogan Wins Turkey's Presidential Election,' Al Jazeera, 11 August 2014, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/erdogan-wins-turkey-presidential-election-2014810172347586150.html>.

governments based in Tripoli in the west and Tobruk in the east.¹⁵¹

26. *26 August 2014* – A ceasefire was brokered by Egypt between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. More than 2,100 Palestinians were killed in the Gaza Strip, along with 66 Israeli soldiers and 7 civilians in Israel in the Operation Protective Edge.¹⁵²
27. *16 September 2014* – ISIS launched the siege of Kobane canton in the Kurdish-controlled region of Rojava.¹⁵³
28. *22-23 September 2014* – The US and its allies launched airstrikes against IS targets in Syria. The airstrikes helped Kurdish forces turn the jihadist tide but created friction with Turkey.¹⁵⁴
29. *25 September* – Eni/Kogas consortium began drilling in Block 9 of the Cyprus EEZ at the Onasagoras well.¹⁵⁵
30. *25 September 2014* – The Cairo Agreement was signed between Hamas and Fatah according to which the unity government was to take control of the Gaza Strip.¹⁵⁶
31. *27 September 2014* – The US began air support for the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) against ISIS.¹⁵⁷
32. *20 October – 30 December 2014* – Barbaros, accompanied by support vessels *M/V Bravo* and *M/V Deep Supporter*, as well as the Turkish warship *TCG Gelibolu*, conducted seismic survey in RoC's Blocks 1,2,3,8 and 9. This was the first time that Turkey carried out a seismic survey in specific blocks, some of which had been assigned to international companies, within the southern part of the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus. The action pushed President Anastasiades to pull out of peace talks.¹⁵⁸
33. *October 2014*– Protests erupted in south-eastern Turkey as well as Istanbul and Ankara

¹⁵¹ Feras Bosalum, Ulf Laessing, 'Rival Second Libyan Assembly Chooses Own PM as Chaos Spreads,' Reuters, 25 August 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security/rival-second-libyan-assembly-chooses-own-pm-as-chaos-spreads-idUSKBN0GP0NZ20140825>.

¹⁵² 'Gaza Conflict: Israel and Palestinians Agree Long-Term Truce,' BBC, 27 August, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28939350>.

¹⁵³ 'Islamic State 'Retreating' in Key Syria Town of Kobane, BBC, 16 October 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29629357>.

¹⁵⁴ Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, 'Airstrikes by U.S. and Allies Hit ISIS Targets in Syria,' The New York Times, 22 September 2014, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/23/world/middleeast/us-and-allies-hit-isis-targets-in-syria.html>.

¹⁵⁵ Elias Hazou, 'Saipem Starts Drilling in Block 9,' Cyprus Mail, 26 September 2014, <http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/09/26/saipem-starts-drilling-in-block-9/>.

¹⁵⁶ Khaled Abu Toameh, 'Text of Fatah-Hamas Agreement,' The Jerusalem Post, 25 September 2014, <https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/text-of-fatah-hamas-agreement-376350>.

¹⁵⁷ Barak Barfi, 'Kurds Now Our Best Ally Against ISIS in Syria,' The Washington Institute, 9 October 2015, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/kurds-now-our-best-ally-against-isis-in-syria>.

¹⁵⁸ Letter dated 6 October 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, A/69/425–S/2014/723, General Assembly Security Council, 8 October 2014, <https://www.cyprusun.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Letter-to-the-SG-from-Cyprus.pdf>.

against the government's inaction during the siege of Kobane and its lack of support for the Syrian Kurds fighting ISIS. At least 30 people were reported to have been killed and 360 injured during the protests.¹⁵⁹

34. 29 October 2014 – New presidential palace was opened in Turkey. Apart from 1000 rooms, the €280 million-residence includes bunkers and tunnels to protect against chemical attacks and a room with military communications and satellite systems. The complex was built illegally on land donated to the Turkish state in 1937 and the area declared a protected site in 1992. Three different administrative courts ordered the construction stop, but without success.¹⁶⁰
35. 4 November 2014 – Noble announced prioritizing regional pipelines over an LNG facility plans in Cyprus as a monetization option for exporting Cyprus gas.¹⁶¹
36. 6 November 2014 – The Tripoli-based Libyan Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the June elections were unconstitutional due to a very low turnout and that the Libyan HoR should be dissolved. The the Libyan HoR rejected the ruling, saying that it was made by the court controlled by armed militias.¹⁶²
37. 13 November 2014 – Jihadi militants in Egypt's Sinai and in Libya pledged allegiance to Islamic State, setting up Egyptian and Libyan branches of the group.¹⁶³
38. 1 December 2014 –Russia cancelled the South Stream gas pipeline due to the EU's objections over non-compliance with European competition legislation. The pipeline was meant to supply Russian gas to southern Europe via the Black Sea and Bulgaria. Russia named Turkey as a partner for an alternative pipeline.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁹ 'Protests and Deaths around Turkey over Handling of Kobani,' Deutsche Welle, 10 October 2014, <https://www.dw.com/en/protests-and-deaths-around-turkey-over-handling-of-kobani/a-17986274>.

¹⁶⁰ 'The Extravagance of Turkey's Presidential Palace,' Euronews, 31 October 2014, <https://www.euronews.com/2014/10/31/the-extravagance-of-turkeys-presidential-palace>.

¹⁶¹ Elias Hazou, Pipelines Favoured Option for Gas Finds, Cyprus Mail, 5 November 2014, <https://www.cyprusprofile.com/articles/pipelines-favoured-option-for-gas-finds>.

¹⁶² 'Libya Supreme Court Rules Anti-Islamist Parliament Unlawful,' The Guardian, 6 November 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/06/libya-court-tripoli-rules-anti-islamist-parliament-unlawful>.

¹⁶³ Jason Warner, Charlotte Hulme, 'The Islamic State in Africa: Estimating Fighter Numbers in Cells across the Continent,' Combating Terrorism Center, August 2018, Vol. 11, Issue 7, <https://ctc.usma.edu/islamic-state-africa-estimating-fighter-numbers-cells-across-continent/>.

¹⁶⁴ 'Russia Drops South Stream Gas Pipeline Plan,' BBC, 1 December 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30283571>.

CONTRIBUTIONS

BRIEFING NOTE

Gary Lakes*

3 February 2011

The Effect of Civil Unrest on the Egyptian Oil and Gas Industry

Days of massive protests and rioting in Cairo and Egypt's other key cities have yet to result in a disruption of traffic through the Suez Canal. Reports from agencies monitoring the passage of vessels through the strategic 200 kilometer waterway say the Egyptian army has taken positions to guard the canal should protesters make an attempt to prevent ships from passing through.

So far that appears unlikely as citizens calling for President Hosni Mubarak to abandon his 30-year rule and leave the country seem to be primarily focused on bringing about political and social change within Egypt.

Furthermore, closing the canal would only result in more hardship for the country as tariffs for passage earn Egypt some \$5 billion annually.

Concerns over the events in Egypt and the safety of the canal have contributed to the rising price of crude oil. Brent topped \$100/B on January 31, the highest it has been since October 2008.

A report issued by the IEA on 31 January said Egyptian oil and gas production facilities do not appear to be at risk as they are far from population centers when the demonstrations are taking place. While several foreign operators have stopped their activities and sent their staff home, for the most part, production operations continue.

Some 2 million barrels of crude oil and products pass every day through the canal along with 30 million tons of LNG annually. Disruption to the flow of traffic through the canal could impact crude oil prices further as it would take more tanker days to sail around the Cape of Good Hope at Africa's southern tip.

"While disruption to the Suez passage through the canal and [the SUMED] pipeline could have an important impact on oil and gas markets, it does not currently appear likely," a statement released by the IEA said. "If such a disruption did occur, a closure of the canal or pipeline could add considerably to the time needed to ship oil from the Middle East to markets in Europe and further westward, but would not remove the oil from the market. Commercial stocks are ample, including in Europe, where most of these volumes are destined," the agency added.

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To avoid incident, shipping companies are instructing their ships not to change crews in Egypt.

Egypt produces about 740,000 bpd of crude oil and consumes about 700,000 bpd domestically, therefore it is not a large net exporter. During 2010, the country exported some 98,000 bpd of crude and 61,000 bpd of products. The country produces some 64 billion cubic meters/year of natural gas and consumes 45 bcm/y.

Egypt has a capacity to process 16 bcm/y into LNG and exported the equivalent of 14 bcm of LNG during 2009. The country exports about 5 bcm/y of natural gas, most is shipped through the Arab Gas Pipeline to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, while the Arish-Ashkelon subsea pipeline delivers gas to Israel.

BRIEFING NOTE

Gary Lakes*

3 February 2011

The Future of the Trans-Balkan Pipeline

Trans-Balkan Pipeline B.V. is comprised of Russian, Greek and Bulgarian consortiums and was formed in 2008 with the purpose of building and operating the 280 kilometer crude pipeline from Bulgaria's Black Sea port of Burgas to the Greek city of Alexandroupolis on the Aegean Sea. Russia holds 51% of the Trans-Balkan Pipeline joint venture through Transneft, Rosneft and Gazprom Neft. Bulgaria and Greece hold the remaining 49%, divided evenly at 24.5%.

The US\$1.5 billion pipeline would have an initial capacity of 35 million tons/year (750,000 bpd) that would later be expanded to 50 million tons/year (1 million bpd).

Burgas-Alexandroupolis (also referred to as BAPLine) was conceived as a means to bypass Turkey's busy Bosphorus and Dardanelle Straits and was expected to transport primarily Russian and Kazakh crude.

Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov had said on a couple occasions in 2010 that the project would not go ahead – primarily on environmental grounds. The Black Sea cities of Burgas, Pomorie and Sozopol had expressed their concerns that the pipeline could pollute beaches and countryside that support the region's tourist industry.

While Sofia had not rejected the project outright, Bulgarian officials said in November last year that the country's final decision on the pipeline would not be taken until the environmental impact assessment is complete. In early November, the Bulgarian Ministry of Environment and Water rejected an environmental study and returned it to Trans-Balkan Pipeline B.V., saying the report was "unclear and incomplete." The ministry said the report failed to provide details on how a possible oil spill would affect the local fishing and tourism industries, or how to deal with such incidents.

The idea of a Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline to bypass the Turkish Straits has been around since the late 1990s, but Russia did not get serious about the project until 2007 as it began to prepare for increased crude oil shipments of Kazakh crude out of Black Sea ports through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline and other terminals.

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As it became increasingly clear to Moscow that the Trans-Balkan Pipeline project might fall through, it began to shift its attention to the proposed Trans-Anatolian Pipeline across Turkey connecting Samsun on the Black Sea to Turkey's Mediterranean oil terminal at Ceyhan, where crude arriving from Azerbaijan through the 1.2 million bpd capacity Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is loaded for export.

The Trans-Anatolian Pipeline Company (TAPCO) is a joint venture between Italy's Eni and Turkey's Calik Enerji. The pipeline is planned to carry 1.5 million bpd of crude out of the Black Sea and thus serve as Turkey's own bypass to its crowded straits.

BRIEFING NOTE

Gary Lakes*
2 February 2011

Syria's Licensing Round

Syria's Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources and the General Petroleum Corporation (GPC) on March 24 announced the launch of a licensing round for three offshore blocks in the East Mediterranean.

The International Offshore Bid Round 2011 covers a total area of 9,038 square kilometers with Block 1 covering an area of 3,176 square kilometers, Block 2 covering 2,977 square kilometers and Block 3 covering 2,885 square kilometers. The blocks begin 5 kilometers off Syria's Mediterranean shoreline.

GPC announced on its website that the tender book document includes a technical part, basic contractual and commercial conditions and the production sharing contract (PSC) model agreement. International oil companies (IOCs) that have already prequalified with the Syrian government need not do so again, but those that have not must submit all financial and technical qualification documentation and complete a questionnaire by August 1.

The tender book can be obtained for €1,000. Those firms wanting to participate in the bidding must also obtain the 2D seismic survey data and interpretation report from Wavefield Ineis, a subsidiary of CGGVeritas, which is providing technical support.

A bid bond of €150,000 will have to be submitted for each block bid upon. The bid round will close on October 10 this year.

This is Syria's second attempt to license its offshore territory. The results of a 2007 bid round failed to attract much attention. Only Dubai's Dove Energy placed a bid. However, the recent successes offshore Israel in the Levant Basin are expected to renew interest in Syria's offshore, which lies in the northern section of the basin.

Jim Martin, CGGVeritas vice president for multi-client and new ventures, said in a company statement announcing the Syrian bid round that the data his company has gathered "shows key seismic indicators including bright spots, flat spots, gas chimneys and dimming, which point to the presence of an active petroleum system."

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CGGVertias said it will co-host a roadshow with the Syrian government in Damascus, London and Geneva for companies interested in the official data. It said central to this project is 5,000 kilometers of long-offset multi-client 2D seismic data acquired by CGGVeritas in 2005 in water depths ranging from 500 to 1,700 meters. It added that a minimum of 3,000 kilometers of this data must be licensed by companies interested in participating in the bid round.

Meanwhile, the Syrian government is expected soon to announce the award of contracts resulting from a 2010 onshore bidding round for eight blocks. Thirteen companies have placed bid, seven of which are already active in Syria.

Syrian crude oil production is currently around 390,000 b/d, down from its peak of 600,000 bpd in 2009.

The government is keen to reverse this trend.

BRIEFING NOTE

Gary Lakes*
7 May 2011

The Nabucco Project

First proposed in the early part of the last decade, the Nabucco consortium envisions a pipeline that is now likely to be more than 4,000 kilometer in total length. It is designed to carry 31 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) through Turkey to Europe for the purpose of supplying southeastern and central Europe with natural gas originating in the Caspian Sea region and the Middle East. Recent reports say the initial estimated project cost of €7.9 billion – based on a 2005 feasibility study – is no longer realistic and that it would probably cost €12-15 billion to construct the pipeline – including the feeder line to the northern Iraqi border. However, Nabucco officials claim that new cost estimates are only speculation.

The big problem for Nabucco has been its inability to secure agreements from long-term supplies from Azerbaijan, Iraq – and preferably in the long run – Turkmenistan. Azerbaijan's state-owned Socar is to decide by the end of this year which companies it will give supply contracts to for the 10 bcm/y that will become available from the SD2 project – a total of 16 bcm/y will come on-stream, 6 bcm/y of which is allocated to Turkey.

In its May 6 statement, Nabucco confirmed that the negotiations with gas supplies are encouraging. "All gas supply negotiations are being led by the shareholders and by third party gas buyers from Turkey and from Europe and are undertaken completely separate from Nabucco Gas Pipeline International, which acts as an infrastructure company," the statement said.

Azerbaijan is reported to be favoring Nabucco partners for the sake of good politics with the European Union, which backs Nabucco, and for the sake of long-term sales. Socar's partners in Shah Deniz, BP and Statoil are said to be leaning to Nabucco's competitors, the Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) project and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) because sales to those smaller projects would bring faster return on investment.

Nabucco, ITGI and TAP comprised the Southern Corridor concept, which envisages pipeline systems moving gas through Turkey to Europe and thus reducing the EU's dependence on Russian natural gas or supplies through its territory. For its part, Russia is keen to maintain its importance to the EU gas market and has launched the South Stream project, which involves that construction of a gas pipeline across the Black Sea in an attempt to sideline the entire

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Southern Corridor idea.

It has been suggested previously that Nabucco and the ITGI pair-up and work together to bring gas through the Southern Corridor, but until now, Nabucco has dismissed the idea. Speaking to reporters on May 6, Mr. Mitschek said Nabucco is open to new partners if there is added value. "If that can deliver added value, then we'll take all shippers on board," he said, adding: "We see Nabucco as a backbone and frontrunner. We are open to links with branch lines."

Nabucco partners OMV of Austria and MOL of Hungary are active in northern Iraq, which is administrated by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The KRG has stated previously that it is looking to export gas to Nabucco, but political issues at a federal level in Baghdad must first be worked out. Also, it will be a couple years before the gas in northern Iraq will be available for export.

Turkey, which is also a Nabucco partner through its pipeline company Botas, is in disagreement with other partners, including Germany's RWE, Romania's Transgas and Bulgaria's BHE, because it prefers that the Nabucco starting point be at Sivas in central Anatolia near Ankara, rather than the proposed extension of the pipeline's starting point to the Sangachal oil and gas processing terminal on the shore of the Caspian Sea in Azerbaijan.

Earlier this year, RWE unveiled a proposal that would put the mouth of Nabucco almost at the wellhead of SD2 gas. That proposal is seen not only as a means to make Nabucco more attractive to Azerbaijan, but to also put the pipeline in place to connect with a trans-Caspian gas pipeline, if one should ever materialize.

The long-proposed Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) would carry gas across the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan and on to Europe. Turkmenistan, where gas reserves are estimated by the state at more than 24 trillion cubic meters, has stated frequently that it is open to the prospect of selling natural gas to Europe, but when that day will come is every much a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma as the Nabucco project and the entire Southern Corridor is coming to be.

BRIEFING NOTE

Gary Lakes*

17 July 2011

Contested Maritime Border between Lebanon and Israel

In the eastern Mediterranean Sea Lebanon and Israel are claiming overlapping offshore exclusive economic zones (EEZs). As Lebanon and Israel continue to be technically in a state of war with one another, it will be up to the United Nations to resolve the issue as quickly as possible in order to prevent a clash that would jeopardize the development of the possibly huge offshore hydrocarbon reserves expected to exist in the East Mediterranean.

A year ago, Beirut registered the coordinates of its EEZ with the UN. Israel last week announced the coordinates of its own maritime territory as well as its intention to register them with the UN.

Israel has in the past two years announced the discovery of two large offshore fields – Tamar with 8.4 trillion cubic feet (tcf) and Leviathan with 16. It was recently announced that two other blocks offshore Israel – Myra and Sarah – may hold as much as 6.5 tcf. Since its creation in 1948, Israel has been dependent on energy imports. Now with reserves that are estimated at more than 700 billion cubic meters, the country will soon be capable of meeting its entire gas demand for decades to come and stands prepared to become an energy exporter through a proposed LNG plant to be based in Cyprus.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on July 10 announced that a draft of the northern maritime border of Israel had been approved by his government saying that the “line demarcates the area of the state’s economic rights, including the exploitation of natural resources.”

Israel is to submit its version of the maritime border to the UN in order to go on record as not accepting the delimitation line made by Lebanon. Israel is not a signatory of the International Law of the Sea, while Lebanon has signed the treaty.

Mr. Netanyahu said Lebanon’s interpretation of the offshore boundary was significantly farther south than the one it had been proposed. The Israeli line runs out to sea at a northwest angle from the UN-demarcated land border. Lebanon’s runs more in and east to west direction. At the farthest point, there is around 15 kilometers of overlap. Mr. Netanyahu said Lebanon’s map “also conflicts with the line that we have agreed upon with Cyprus and, what is more significant in my eyes, its conflicts with the line that Lebanon itself agreed upon with Cyprus in 2007.”

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Cyprus, which is considered as having offshore hydrocarbon reserves of its own, has signed delimitation agreements with Egypt, Israel and Lebanon to determine its own EEZ. The accords have been fully ratified with Egypt and Israel, but the Lebanese parliament has yet to endorse the Cyprus line.

Speaking in Beirut last week, British Ambassador to Lebanon Ms. Frances Guy said Lebanon's maritime borders must be demarcated under the supervision of the UN because Lebanon and Israel do not recognize each other. "We ask the Lebanese authorities to be patient," she said. "The United Nations and European Union will work on demarcating Lebanon's borders with Cyprus because Cyprus belongs to the European Union."

With Israel under pressure to bring the Tamar gas field on-stream in 2013 in order to cope with uncertain future gas supplies from Egypt and reduce its dependence on coal for power generation, Lebanon is keen to get its own hydrocarbon sector in operation. But it is also keen to prevent Israel from encroaching on reserves that may exist in the territory that it claims as its own.

Lebanon's Foreign Minister Adnan Mansour, who last month criticized the delimitation accord between Israel and Cyprus, on July 10 said Beirut would complain to the UN over Israel's filing of maritime coordinates that overlapped its proposed southern offshore border. "This is an aggression on our gas and oil rights and we will not remain silent," Mr. Mansour was quoted by Lebanon's *Daily Star* newspaper as saying. "This is a *de facto* policy that will not bring peace for Israel. Israel is creating a new area of tension."

Lebanon's domestic political problems are prone not only to exacerbate the differences with Israel over the maritime boundary but also create differences within the government, which is now dominated by the pro-Iranian Hezbollah organization. For Lebanon to move ahead with establishing a hydrocarbon industry, a Petroleum Administration must be formed by the government. But there are questions within Lebanon itself about whether that body will be able to work without the political interference of the country's political groups.

Lebanon has commissioned offshore seismic survey work to be carried out in its offshore territory and plans to hold its first bidding round in early 2012, provided the government manages to form the relevant administrative offices.

It goes without saying that the sooner the UN could delimit the eastern Mediterranean, the smoother the future of hydrocarbon exploration and development in the region will proceed.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Dr. Klearchos A. Kyriakides**

25 July 2011

Fueling the Future of a ‘Special Relationship’: the United Kingdom, the Republic of Cyprus and the Need for New Thinking.

The central argument is that the strategic and economic interest of the United Kingdom will be served by the Republic of Cyprus becoming an energy producer. There are opportunities and there are dangers. I'm not going to go into these in any great detail, other than to skate over them. And this is very much the product of a few days of thinking rather than any extensive research. I'm not an expert in oil and gas, and I'm not an expert on energy security. My expertise, if there is any expertise, is drawn from my study of the UK-Republic of Cyprus relationship in its various different guises.

Now, more specifically what I propose to do is: outline the essential characteristics of the UK-Republic of Cyprus relationship, which you will be familiar with; assess the existing significance of the Republic in relation to the energy security of the UK which goes beyond gas; thirdly, to highlight the emergence of the UK as a net importer of gas - and this is where I want to really focus on, because the UK, I would argue, will need the Republic of Cyprus to become a gas producer. And I suppose if one looks at Germany and France, and Sweden, and the Netherlands, and other European countries, one might find a similar picture emerging. But I'm going to zoom in on the United Kingdom, because of its special relationship with the Republic, and also in view of its size.

And finally, I want to say a few words about the word ‘security’, as it appears in the 1960 Treaties, which govern the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Cyprus.

So let me begin with the first of my four objectives. I've spoken about this and written about this extensively. I'm giving you an example of one of my written pieces, which is the paper I gave at London Met University a year ago. The United Kingdom's relationship with the Republic is a special relationship, let's not beat about the bush. It is a unique relationship. It's based upon a historical framework. There are these unique legal ties which go back to the Treaty of

** Transcript of oral presentation.*

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Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee, and they're now supplemented of course by the Treaty on European Union. There is a military dimension to this: the island of Cyprus encompassing both the Republic and the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) are the hinge around which UK operations in Afghanistan turn. Libya has now erupted - the Republic of Cyprus and the SBAs are no doubt performing a discreet role in support of the Libyan mission. And I have no doubt the air traffic control of the Republic is playing a part. There is an international dimension here. The United Kingdom and the Republic of Cyprus are in common with Malta the only countries in the world which are members of the European Union, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations. And that gives Cyprus in the UK a special role. And there are popular ties. People like me were born in the UK of Greek Cypriot origin. There are vast numbers of Brits living over here. And we do share the same values: the rule of law, democracy and other noble values which are encrusted on the Treaty on European Union. So that's all by way of overview.

Let's now go to the second objective which is to assess the existing significance of the Republic in relation to the energy security of the UK. In the 50s, Anthony Eden, the British prime minister, said that if there was no Cyprus there would be no oil supplies to the UK. He was exaggerating to make a point which was that Cyprus is favorably located in relation to the Suez Canal and the oil-producing areas of the Gulf and the Middle East. And that chart illustrates the point very well in relation to the Gulf in particular. You will note also from this chart that the countries, developed countries such as the United States, consume far more oil and energy generally than they produce. And that's the pressure that is reaching pinch point with regard to the United Kingdom.

Suez Canal point has already been made and that means that Cyprus is part of the global architecture of shipping. And we are aware that Cyprus has one of the largest ship registries in the world and is favorably located in relation to the Suez Canal. It's also favorably located in relation to the existing and proposed pipelines which are sneaking their way across Central Asia. Turkey claims most of the bragging rights on this score, but I think the Republic of Cyprus shouldn't be afraid to highlight its role. It's no coincidence, therefore, that the United Kingdom has used the Republic of Cyprus in relation to Afghanistan, Iraq and more recently Libya. And if there's a crisis erupting in Lebanon, or Egypt, or Qatar, or Oman, one can expect Cyprus to fulfill its historic role.

Now, let me move to the third and key part of this presentation which is really to highlight the emergence of the United Kingdom as a net importer of gas and the role of the United Kingdom as a country which is seeking to diversify its gas imports. This is quite crucial and it's something that has been bubbling away behind the surface, but people are sensing this, because our gas and oil prices are going up. Only this week in the news in the United Kingdom there was a report that gas prices are going to go up yet again. This is an observation drawn from the parliamentary Office of Science and Technology from 2007.

"Electricity..."

that's just an example of what's happening in the UK,

"Electricity generation accounts for around 30% of UK carbon dioxide emissions. In the next decade many coal and nuclear plants will close, leaving the United Kingdom increasingly dependent on imported gas."

This is a trend which I wasn't really aware of before I sat down to do the research for this presentation. In 2006, gas provided 39% of electricity. The figure has grown from 1% in 1990. I mean, that's quite an astonishing development. And it's predicted to grow further. Gas is also used to heat approximately 70% of homes in the UK. High gas prices mean household electricity bills have risen 45% since 2003.

So here we have a case study within the European Union of a major player that has become increasingly dependent upon imported gas. Now, where does this imported gas come from? And why is it necessary? Well, the reason it becomes necessary is that UK gas and oil resources are gradually diminishing. We had the North Sea energy upsurge in the 70s and 80s, and that's gradually diminishing - you can read these statistics in your own time. But this is really where the key problem lies as far as the United Kingdom is concerned. This is an observation made by the Minister of Energy in February 2009:

"This winter,"

he says,

"There have been gas shortages across continental Europe caused by the Russia-Ukraine dispute. We have seen the lowest temperatures in Britain in more than a decade. The picture in the longer term is indeed a challenging one. Declining stocks of North Sea gas will increase our dependence on gas imports."

Now, just under one fifth of our gas comes from Norway. Now, that's one fifth of the gas collectively, and it comes from Norway. Indeed, if you look at the import statistics, 71% of natural gas imports come from Norway. And as we've discovered in the last week, it's dangerous to rely upon one major source. I mean, look at Norway - who would have expected that Norway would have been the location for a terrorist attack of the scale, the magnitude, and the destruction that we saw last week? That was a lone assassin, allegedly. We will find out the details as the court case unfolds. But that shows to us dramatically how dangerous it is for the United Kingdom to rely upon Norway: 71% of its natural gas import. And the minister added: "Given our increased reliance on international markets to deliver gas, we need to ensure that those markets are diverse and that we do not become over-reliant on particular sources of energy. We need to have an adequate gas supply for obvious reasons." So this is where Cyprus comes in. There is a huge commercial and economic rationale for Cyprus developing its gas resources, if they exist.

Lloyd's of London in that report I cited earlier revealed the following: that over half of conventional natural gas resources are concentrated in three countries: Russia, Iran and Qatar. And indeed, the United Kingdom imports gas from Qatar, as well as Trinidad and Tobago and Algeria - that's in addition to Norway. The question for the European Union beyond the United Kingdom is really whether they want to pin themselves down to relying on gas from Norway, Russia, Iran and Qatar. The Lloyd's of London report adds that the problem with Russia, Iran and Qatar is that there are political, geological and technological obstacles that may restrict international supplies in the short to medium term. And that episode between Russia and Ukraine was a real wake-up call for the European Union a couple of years ago. Now, the think tanks in London have their eyes fixed on this. I've already cited the Chatham House report. The Policy Exchange issued a research note in 2010, and they made a point here for the United Kingdom which is as applicable to the Republic of Cyprus as it is to the United Kingdom: "The challenge of energy security is not insurmountable, but it requires determined, strategic

leadership from government. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office of London should have energy security as a strategic priority protecting British national interests.” I would change the wording here and say that the Republic of Cyprus requires determined strategic leadership from its government, the ministry of foreign affairs and the other ministries here in the Republic should have energy security as a strategic priority protecting Cypriot national interests. That principle must not be forgotten.

The long-term prospects are reinforced by that image, which I think illustrates the point that I've just made. There's an increased dependency upon natural gas as coal diminishes in importance and as nuclear diminishes, and that's given rise to all sorts of political problems.

So that's really the third objective. I'm going to move on to the fourth. Before I do, Ray has a question. [*Question inaudible*]. Yeah, that was a temporary drop and it's going up again, comparatively speaking. But the long-term trend is for gas to be going up.

UK imports and exports of energy. We have gone from being, by and large, a net exporter in the 80s and 90s to becoming once again a net importer of oil and gas. That's an image drawn from the House of Commons library research report on energy imports and exports of July 2010.

So let me now move to the fourth and final part of my presentation, which brings me to the 1960 Treaties. I have placed before you a bundle of documentation relating to the 1960 Treaties. Now, the question here that I want to really... This is in the days of Makarios' negotiations with then British governor Field Marshal Harding. And Makarios is saying to Governor Harding: "I'm perfectly willing to go your way if you go mine." And that image encapsulates the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Cyprus. They are joined at the hip: through the 1960 Treaties, through the history that I have mentioned earlier. But they are regrettably pulling in different directions. And there's this constant tension between the two. And what I'm going to try and hopefully articulate is the argument that there needs to be movement in the same direction, for mutual benefit. And I can criticize the Brits until the cows come home, but I won't do that. I'm going to be positive here and try and project a positive argument.

Now, my starting point are the 1960 Treaties. I've been a critic of the Treaty of Guarantee, but it appears as if the two countries regard the Treaty of Guarantee as being in force. So on that basis, on that basis we might as well look at the Treaty of Guarantee. Article 1 says that the Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity, and security. So the Republic of Cyprus is under a treaty obligation to maintain its security. So when we talk about that the Republic must... When I argue, or others of my ilk argue that the Republic must have a national security strategy, all we're doing is asking for the Republic of Cyprus to comply with its treaty obligations. Article 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee says that Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity, and security of the Republic. That didn't work as we know in 1974. It hasn't worked by and large since 1974, hence the de facto partition. But the treaty provision is there. And there is an obligation on the United Kingdom therefore to guarantee the security of the Republic of Cyprus. So if there's an attack upon these gas installations, I would argue that the treaty could be invoked and would come into play.

But leaving aside the Treaty of Guarantee, we have the Treaty of Establishment. And in one of those provisions of the Treaty of Establishment which is being overlooked, article 3 says that the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to cooperate and consult

in the common defense of Cyprus. There's a further treaty obligation there on the Republic to consult with and cooperate with the United Kingdom, as well as Greece and Turkey, in relation to the common defense of Cyprus. And I noticed there they put 'Cyprus', they didn't put 'the Republic of Cyprus'. And that I suggest means that the Republic is under an obligation to cooperate in relation to the defense of the SBAs as well as the Republic itself. Interestingly enough, article 10 has a provision as to dispute resolution which you can read in your own time. But I now want to move on, if I may, to the point that the ambassador and one or two others raised earlier, which is the restrictions on what the UK can do in relation to the sovereign base areas. And we have article O - it was originally article O of the command paper which was presented to Parliament, page 11 of my bundle if you're interested - but over the years it's been referred to as Appendix O to the Treaty of Establishment. And you can see here that the United Kingdom has given itself the obligation - even though it doesn't use the word obligation - to cooperate fully with the Republic of Cyprus.

So why am I saying all of this? I'm saying all of this in order to illustrate the point that there is a treaty and legal framework already in existence to enable the Republic of Cyprus to call upon the services of an assistance of the United Kingdom. Now, in the past the politics and the diplomacy of the region and the special circumstances of Cyprus inhibited the willingness of both countries to cooperate on sensitive matters to do with security and strategy. Now, there is a strong case to suggest that the Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom must cooperate. Firstly, under the framework set out in the 1960 Treaties which is defective - and it ought to be renegotiated in due course - but the framework is already there. And secondly, within the framework of the European Union. The Treaty on European Union is the glue that connects the United Kingdom, the Republic of Cyprus and the remainder of the European Union.

So to conclude, ladies and gentlemen, what I have tried to do, I tried to just remind you that there is a special relationship between the Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom. I've tried to show you that historically the Republic has played a role in support of the energy security of the United Kingdom. Thirdly, the United Kingdom has metamorphosed from being a net exporter of gas to becoming a net importer of gas. And indeed a country that is becoming increasingly dependent upon gas. And fourthly and finally, I've tried to illustrate that there is a security dimension to the 1960 Treaty arrangements, and that the Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom ought to come together to a far greater extent. As to the details, that's something that we can discuss and it's something that I'll have to think about too over the coming weeks. But there is a framework for us to discuss. I'd close on that point.

BRIEFING NOTE

Gary Lakes*
11 August 2011

Turkish Objections to Cyprus Gas Exploration

Nicosia announced earlier this month that Noble Energy of the US could begin drilling in Block 12 of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as early as 1 October. The Houston-based firm will be drilling in a structure that Cypriot energy officials have estimated could hold up to 10 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The structure lies some 40 kilometers to the west of Israel's 16 tcf Leviathan gas field, which Noble discovered in December last year. Drilling will take about two months to complete using a rig that is already in Israeli waters.

Nicosia's announcement of the impending start to drilling prompted Turkey's Foreign Ministry to issue a statement saying that Cyprus' offshore exploration activity was illegal and that it would "show the appropriate reaction if any further step is taken." Ankara does not recognize the Greek-Cypriot government, which is a member of the European Union. Turkey recognizes only the Turkish-Cypriot Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and has maintained a military presence on the island since 1974, when its forces invaded in the wake of a coup lead by pro-Greek extremists. Ankara's argument is that offshore exploration work in the waters off the southern coast of the island does not take into consideration the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot community.

Cypriot Foreign Minister Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis responded to the statement from Ankara by saying that Nicosia would launch an international campaign to expose the aggressive foreign policy that Turkey shows towards the island. She stated that Cyprus would make strong representations to international organizations, including the European Union and the United Nations, according to the *Cyprus Mail*. She said that Cyprus' actions are "in full compliance with international law."

Cyprus has signed maritime delimitation agreements with Israel, Egypt and Lebanon, although the accord with Lebanon has yet to be ratified by the Lebanese government. The Cyprus EEZ covers an area of 51,000 square kilometers, but only one block has been awarded: Block 12 to Noble Energy following the island first bidding round in 2007. A discovery in Block 12 is expected to lead the government to launch its second licensing round in 2012.

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REPORT

George Ch. Pelaghias*
26 August 2011

Hydrocarbon Exploration & Production in Cyprus: the Legal and Political Environment

Executive Summary

The European Union (EU) has lobbied for increased natural gas production and consumption in an effort aimed at cutting greenhouse emissions. At present, the EU imports 59.6% of its natural gas (a total of 492.5 billion cubic meters *BCM*), primarily from countries such as Russia, Norway, Algeria and Qatar.¹⁶⁵

It is estimated that the Levant Basin holds potential reserves of 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil, and 122 trillion cubic feet, (tcf), (approximately 3.2 trillion cubic meters) of recoverable natural gas. Historically, this region has seen little evidence of energy resources; however, new technology and data gathering techniques have increased capabilities for discovering and developing deep-water deposits, thus providing new possibilities for energy exploration to Eastern Mediterranean countries.

The Republic of Cyprus is currently dependent on heavy fuel oil (HFO) for its energy consumption, and under its EU obligations, Cyprus is looking to reduce its dependence on HFO, and switch to natural gas based energy production. In order to facilitate the introduction of natural gas to Cyprus, the Government have decided to construct the Vasilikos Energy Centre on the island's southern coast, next to the Vasilikos Power Plant. The Energy Centre will comprise of two adjacent onshore terminals, one for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) re-gasification, and one for storage and handling of petroleum products, including Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) and bio fuels. The Government is planning to import LNG via an onshore LNG import and re-gasification terminal (the "LNG Re-gas Terminal") in order to introduce natural gas to the island by 2014.

At the same time, Cyprus has conducted several seismic surveys within its Exclusive Economic

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¹⁶⁵ BP Worldwide, Statistical Review of World Energy 2011, www.bp.com.

Zone (EEZ) in 2006, 2007 and 2008-2009, which indicated potential hydrocarbon deposits. A first licensing round was held in 2007, resulting in a three-year exploration licence in the area known as Block 12, being granted to the Houston based company Noble Energy International ("Noble"). Noble is expected to start drilling in Block 12, in the beginning of October 2011.

Noble has been active in the Eastern Mediterranean since 1998, and holds several licences in Israel together with its Israeli partner, the Delek Group ("Delek"). In 2010, the partnership confirmed that the Leviathan field, offshore Israel (and only 50-60 km from Cyprus' Block 12), holds deposits of approximately 16 tcf of natural gas. It has been estimated that Block 12 could hold between 8-10 tcf of natural gas. Because the Leviathan fields and block 12 are so close to each other, Noble and Delek have approached the Government of Cyprus with a proposal to jointly export gas from the two fields.

On July 11, 2011, an ammunitions dump caught fire and exploded at the Evangelos Florakis Naval Base, located a few hundred meters west of the Vasilikos Power Station. The explosion resulted in a mass destruction of the Power Plant, cutting nearly 53% of the islands electricity.

While the import of LNG and the construction of the LNG Re-gas Terminal remains the core of the Cyprus Government's natural gas policy, Cyprus is finding itself in the position that it may have to revise this policy due to the destruction of the Vasilikos Power Plant. In addition, the substantial natural gas findings in Israel, and potential discoveries within Cyprus' own EEZ, would make long-term importation of LNG a less favourable alternative to importing natural gas from a source only a few hundred kilometres from the Cypriot border. Provided that Noble's drilling is successful, Cyprus may become a self-sufficient natural gas producer within the near future.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Scope

The Report will focus on natural gas developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the energy policy of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as the legal, political and economic landscape, and provide a clear understanding of the process of applying for, and acquiring, exploration rights within Cyprus EEZ.

1.2. References

In connection with the above-mentioned Report, ERPIC have examined the following legal and regulatory framework:

- The Hydrocarbon (Prospecting, Exploration and Exploitation) Law (No. 4(I)/2007);
- The Hydrocarbons (Prospecting, Exploration and Exploitation) Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009);
- The Model Production Sharing Contract of 2007;
- The Submission of Applications and Guidance Note for the First Licensing Round Offshore Cyprus (2007);
- The Law to Provide for the Proclamation of the Contiguous Zone by the Republic of Cyprus (The Contiguous Zone Law of 2004);
- The Law to Provide for the Proclamation of the Exclusive Economic Zone By the Republic of Cyprus (The Exclusive Economic Zone Law of 2004);
- The Assessment of Impact on the Environment from Certain Plans and/or Programmes Law (No. 102(I)/2005);
- The Regulating of the Natural Gas Market Law (No. 183(I)/2004);
 - The Regulating of the Natural Gas Market Amendment Act of 2006 (No. 103(I)/2006);
 - The Regulating of the Natural Gas Market Amendment Act of 2007 (No.199(I)/2007);
- The Electricity Market Regulatory Law (No.122(I)/2003);
- The Income Tax Law (No. 118(I)/2002);
- The Special Contribution for the Defense Fund of the Republic Law (No. 117(I)/2002);
- The Companies Law Cap. 113;
- Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the

conditions for granting and using authorizations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons;

- Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC;
- Directive 2008/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 concerning a Community procedure to improve the transparency of gas and electricity prices charged to industrial end-users (recast);
- Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC;
- Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products;
- Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone 17 February 2003;
- Agreement between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone, signed in Nicosia on 17 December 2010.

The information in this Report is based on the current legal and regulatory framework and government policies in force as at the date of this Report. Taking into account that the natural gas market in Cyprus is in its early stages, Laws, Regulations, and Government policies relating to oil and gas in Cyprus are currently being developed. As such, the information in this Report is subject to change and readers are, therefore, cautioned to confirm the current validity of information contained herein.

2. Cyprus Energy Sector and Hydrocarbon Discoveries

2.1 Cyprus Energy Policy

The local energy sector in Cyprus is currently characterized by a high dependence on imported energy, in the form of oil, a rapid growth in energy demand, difficulties interconnecting with European networks (due to Cyprus' geographical location), and a low penetration and utilization of renewable energy sources.

As a member of the EU, Cyprus is obligated under EU Directive 2009/119/EC to reduce its air pollution. Cyprus also has a similar obligation under the Kyoto Protocol. The Cyprus energy system is currently passing through a period of significant changes, with the liberalization of the energy markets, the introduction of natural gas and renewable energy sources, modern cogeneration systems, and other energy saving changes.

The energy policy of Cyprus is fully harmonized with the energy policy of the EU. The main axis of this policy involves the safeguarding of a healthy competition in the market, the security of the supply of energy and the fulfillment of the energy demands of the country, with the least

possible burden on the national economy and the environment. The implementation of this policy is formulated by:

- a liberalization of the electricity market and the allowance of free competition;
- the liberalization of the oil sector by abolishing the pricing control system and the cross-subsidization between the different oil products and the adjustment of the prices on the basis of the market events and the excise duty in force;
- the establishment and operation of a strategic oil stock terminal;
- the implementation of development programs related to the use of energy conservation, technologies, utilization of renewable energy sources and the protection of the environment from industrial pollution; and
- the promotion of oil products and other sources of energy friendly to the environment, such as natural gas.

2.2. Cyprus Gas Policy

Cyprus relies on HFO for its power grids. In the wake of the island's upcoming membership to the EU, Cyprus was inclined to switch to more environmentally friendly and cleaner forms of energy in order to comply with EU regulations. The Government, recognizing the positive contribution that the introduction and use of natural gas would have on the economy and the environment, by decision of its Council of Ministers (No.20/2001), assigned a Committee of Ministers (Commerce, Finance and Agriculture), to formulate terms of reference for the preparation of a study regarding the transfer and use of natural gas in Cyprus. Following this decision, the Cyprus Government engaged the US based energy consultant Nexant in 2002, with the purpose of receiving advice on how to provide natural gas to the island. The study prepared by Nexant, showed that the most economic and secure way to supply and transport natural gas to Cyprus would be by ship, in liquefied form. The study also indicated that the use of natural gas in Cyprus, at least at this stage, was limited to the production of electricity, in view of the lack of other large industrial consumers. The Cyprus Government started discussions with Egypt and Syria in order to acquire natural gas by 2006 or 2007.¹⁶⁶ However, the project never materialized.

The decisions by the Government to end the operation of the Cyprus Petroleum Refinery, located in Larnaca, and relocate the import and storage terminal of petroleum products by the year 2010, led to the need for the establishment of a modern, automated and more efficient oil terminal. Under its EU obligations, Cyprus also had to maintain national security stocks of oil equivalent to 90 days consumption. For this reason, in conjunction with the need to introduce natural gas to Cyprus, the Government decided to establish a new energy center at



Plate 10: Location of the Vasilikos Energy Center

¹⁶⁶ Jean Christou, 'US Consultants in Meeting over Natural Gas,' *Cyprus Mail*, 2002, www.cyprus-mail.com

the Vasilikos site (the “Vasilikos Energy Centre”). The new Center would include facilities for the import, storage of strategic and operational stocks, management, distribution and export of oil products, as well as facilities for the import, storage and re-gasification of LNG.

The Vasilikos Energy Centre is located on the south coast of Cyprus, at a distance of 25 km east of the city of Limassol. This area was considered as the most appropriate for the erection of storage and distribution facilities for petroleum products, as well as for the establishment of a receiving and storage terminal for LNG. Initially, natural gas would be used by the nearby Power Stations (Moni and Vasilikos) belonging to the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (the “EAC”).

As the Cyprus gas market is under development, the Government’s gas market policy for the next decade (2011-2020) has taken the following parameters into consideration:

- There are no indigenous gas resources;¹⁶⁷
- No interconnections with other gas systems;
- No underground or undersea gas storage;
- Supply only by LNG because Cyprus is an island;
- Cyprus is a new and small market which will be based on the power generation (90% of total gas consumption);
- The gas demand growth is expected to reach a plateau within 10 years because of the political decision to convert almost all existing oil fired power plants to gas fired;
- The other gas consumption sectors (industrial and residential/commercial) are very small compared to the power generation sector (0.23 bcm/y to 2.0 bcm/y at the plateau) and these will probably be developed much later;
- No big linepack as the main capital city (Nicosia) is in the center of the island, and the Power Generation is in the south;
- Significant diesel oil storage quantities in existing reservoirs which will not be dismantled.¹⁶⁸
- The gas market model under consideration consists of the establishment of a gas company which will be the sole importer and supplier of all natural gas quantities in Cyprus, also undertaking the transmission system operation. A separate company will be established for the construction of the LNG Re-gas Terminal, possibly undertaking the terminal’s operation as well. The following measures have been identified, but not finalized, in view of enhancing security of supply:
 - Interruptible contracts;
 - Interruption under a priority list;

¹⁶⁷ The potential gas deposits offshore Cyprus remains to be proven. The first drilling is scheduled to take place first week of October 2011.

¹⁶⁸ Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority (CERA). ‘CERA National Report to the European Commission in line with the Electricity and Gas Directives for the period July 2009 to July 2010.’ 2010. www.energy-regulators.eu.

- Temporary storage kept by the Network Operator (the Transmission System Operator and Distribution System Operator);
- Supply sources diversification;
- Long term supply contracts;
- Reserve fuel arrangements for gas fired power plants;
- Elaboration of an Emergency Plan;
- Security of supply being responsibility of the Regulator. (Cyprus Regulatory Authority “CERA”);
- Security of supply monitoring performed by the Regulator;
- Monetary penalties (e.g. for cases of non-delivery by the producer or in cases of non-delivery by the shipper or in cases of LNG Re-gas Terminal operator failure).
- It should be noted that some of the measures adopted by other EU member states would not be applicable to Cyprus, since Cyprus is not connected to the EU gas transmission network. The situation in Cyprus is, therefore, similar only to some of the outlying EU member states (e.g. Finland, the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ireland) where there is effectively only one source of gas supply.¹⁶⁹

2.2.1 The Market Gas Law of 2004 (with Amendments of 2006 and 2007)

Despite that natural gas is not available in Cyprus yet, the Government has the intention to make natural gas (in the form of LNG) available, primarily for power generation. The islands electricity regulator CERA prepared the Natural Gas Market Regulatory Law (No. 183(I)/2004) (the “Gas Market Law”), which was approved by Parliament on 30 April 2004. The Gas Market Law implements Directive 2003/55/EC¹⁷⁰ into Cyprus legislation. In addition, CERA also prepared Regulations relating to:

- Issue of licenses (Import, Storage, Transmission, Distribution and Supply);
- Register of Licenses;
- License Fees.
- Other pertinent Regulations are currently being drafted.

The Gas Market Law establishes CERA as the sole authority responsible for regulating the natural gas market. In 2007, the Gas Market Law was amended with the Law on Regulating the Natural Gas Market, (No. 199(I)/2007) (the “Amendment”). The Amendment declares the gas market in

¹⁶⁹ Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority (CERA), ‘CERA National Report to the European Commission in line with the Electricity and Gas Directives for the period July 2009 to July 2010,’ 2010, www.energy-regulators.eu.

¹⁷⁰ European Parliament and The Council of The European Union, ‘Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC,’ Official Journal L.176 (2003): 0057 - 0078.

Cyprus as emergent,¹⁷¹ and provides that in the event that the Council of Ministers decides to assign the import and supply of natural gas in Cyprus in one undertaking and the creation of a land based energy center as the exclusive Receiving Terminal, with storage facilities and installations for re-gasification of LNG, certain provisions of the Gas Market Law would have to be suspended in order to establish a monopoly and limiting the role of CERA.¹⁷² The Amendment also states that until such time as the Council of Ministers takes that decision, CERA should deviate from the above articles by refraining from issuing licenses to avoid endangering any future monopoly.

In 2008 additional draft bills were prepared by CERA for the purpose of amending the natural gas legal framework, fully implements Directives 2003/55/EC¹⁷³ and 2004/67/EC¹⁷⁴ into Cyprus Law. The draft legislation had been forwarded to the Council of Ministers for approval. However, it was never approved. In 2009, the draft bill regarding implementation of Directive 2004/67/EC, relating to the security of supply by natural gas, submitted in 2007, was withdrawn in order for a new Law to be drafted.¹⁷⁵

2.2.2 Cyprus' Expected Natural Gas Consumption

Based on current projections, the natural gas consumption for power generation in Cyprus is expected to range from 0.68 million tons per annum (mtpa) in 2014, 1.054 mtpa in 2015 and will gradually increase to 1.47 mtpa by 2035, with an annual increase of approximately 2%. The figures (total LNG demand) are subject to change due to the fact that natural gas is to be used for electricity generation and is perceived to increase in tandem with an increased LNG demand.¹⁷⁶

2.3 The Vasilikos Energy Center

In the context of implementing the Vasilikos Energy Center Project, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism engaged consultants for the preparation of the Basis of Design of the Vasilikos Energy Center. The Basis of Design was submitted to the Ministry in September 2006 by a consortium of companies led by MW Kellogg, together with Gas Strategies and Watson, Farley & Williams.¹⁷⁷

The Vasilikos Energy Centre will comprise of two adjacent onshore terminals, one for LNG re-gasification, and one for storage and handling of petroleum products including LPG and biofuels. The responsibility for the materialisation of the LNG Re-gas Terminal has been assigned to the

¹⁷¹ In accordance with articles 28(1)(2) of European Parliament and The Council of The European Union, 'Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC,' Official Journal L.176 (2003): 0057 - 0078.

¹⁷² Articles 8 -14, 16(1-3), 18, 21, 22(5-6), 23, 27, 28, 31, 32 and 33 of The Regulating of the Natural Gas Market Law (No. 183(I)2004).

¹⁷³ Relating to article 22 'New Infrastructure' of European Parliament and The Council of The European Union, 'Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC,' Official Journal L.176 (2003): 0057 - 0078.

¹⁷⁴ Relating to Security of Supply by Natural Gas.

¹⁷⁵ Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority (CERA), 'CERA National Report to the European Commission in line with the Electricity and Gas Directives for the period July 2009 to July 2010,' 2010, www.energy-regulators.eu.

¹⁷⁶ Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority (CERA), 'CERA National Report to the European Commission in line with the Electricity and Gas Directives for the period July 2009 to July 2010,' 2010, www.energy-regulators.eu.

¹⁷⁷ Watson, Farley & Williams, www.wfw.com.

EAC, while the responsibility for the Oil Terminal rests with the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism.¹⁷⁸

2.3.1 Vasilikos Oil Terminal

Cyprus as an EU member country must maintain national security stocks of oil equivalent to 90 days consumption. Under the provisions of Directive 2009/119/EC, imposing an obligation on Member States, to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products, the quantity of strategic oil stocks was estimated to be 435,000 metric tons for the year 2015. Since the accession of Cyprus to the EU, oil products' prices are set freely, however, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism have the authority to set a price ceiling for specific oil products, for a specific duration.¹⁷⁹

The suppliers of oil products in Cyprus, for retail, industrial and commercial purposes, are the local operating oil importing companies: Petrolina (Holdings) Public Ltd, Hellenic Petroleum (Cyprus) Ltd, Exxon Mobil Cyprus Ltd, Lukoil Cyprus Ltd, BP Eastern Mediterranean Ltd, Intergaz Ltd, Synergaz Ltd, and STAROIL Ltd. Transportation of oil products within Cyprus is carried out by road tankers by the above companies, as well as by independent companies. The table below depicts the type of product imported/traded, and the storage capacity owned by each of these companies (for confidentiality purposes the names of the companies have been replaced by alphabetic characters)¹⁸⁰:



Plate 11: Vasilikos oil terminal. Source: Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism of the Republic of Cyprus

Company	Type of Products imported/traded	Storage capacity (cubic meters)	Comment
Company A	Gasoline, diesel, gasoil, jet fuel, kerosene, HFO, LPG, bitumen	47,000	LPG storage capacity excluded

¹⁷⁸ 'Invitation for Expression of Interest to Prequalify Potential Strategic Partners for Participation in the Joint Venture That Will Be Responsible for the Development, Financing, Construction and Operation of the Vasilikos Oil Terminal,' *Electricity Authority of Cyprus*, 2010, www.eac.com.cy.

¹⁷⁹ 'Invitation for Expression of Interest to Prequalify Potential Strategic Partners for Participation in the Joint Venture That Will Be Responsible for the Development, Financing, Construction and Operation of the Vasilikos Oil Terminal,' *Electricity Authority of Cyprus*, 2010, www.eac.com.cy.

¹⁸⁰ 'Invitation for Expression of Interest to Prequalify Potential Strategic Partners for Participation in the Joint Venture That Will Be Responsible for the Development, Financing, Construction and Operation of the Vasilikos Oil Terminal,' *Electricity Authority of Cyprus*, 2010, www.eac.com.cy.

Company B	Gasoline, diesel, gasoil, kerosene, LFO, LPG, bitumen	27,000	LPG storage capacity excluded
Company C	Gasoline, diesel, gasoil, kerosene	30,000	
Company D	Gasoline, diesel, gasoil, kerosene	nil	
Company E	Jet fuel, diesel, gasoil	23,000	
LPG importing companies	LPG	9,000	4,800 MT

On 8 October, 2010, the Council of Ministers decided to authorize the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism to issue, in cooperation with the Cyprus Organization for Storage and Management of Oil Stocks (COSMOS), the Cyprus Petroleum Storage Company (CPSC), and the EAC, an Invitation for Expression of Interest to prequalify potential strategic partners, for participation in the joint venture that will be responsible for the development, financing, construction and operation of the Oil Terminal., according to the Expression of Interest, the Oil Terminal will include:

- facilities for the storage of operational oil reserves;
- facilities for the storage of strategic oil reserves; and
- facilities to operate as an oil trading hub.

2.3.2 The LNG Re-gas Terminal

The planned LNG Re-gas Terminal will consist of a single 160,000 m³ full containment tank, a medium pressure boil off gas compressor, and open rack sea water vaporizer system to be potentially integrated with the existing power station cooling water system. It is estimated that the LNG supply would be imported in tankers of capacity between 65,000 m³ and 155,000 m³ using the outermost berth of a trestle based jetty shared with the Oil Terminal. Land space has been allocated for a second LNG tank later in the project when the demand for LNG has risen to the point to justify it. The LNG Re-gas Terminal has been designed to meet both the current energy needs of Cyprus, and the forecast requirements for import and storage of LNG, for a period of at least 25 years. The Basis of Design used a basis of 180 Megawatts (MW) net per Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGT) Unit. On this basis, the average annual gas send out rate at 100% loading and 20°C (average annual temperature) is 362.6 Mega Watts Thermal ("MWth"). At lesser load factors the annual rates reduce proportionally. It should be noted that the CCGT unit that the EAC is currently commissioning at the Vasilikos Energy Center has a maximum output of 220 MW.¹⁸¹

Natural gas is expected to be used, at an initial phase, mainly as fuel for power generation in CCGT and the 3x130MW conventional steam turbines at Vasilikos Power Plant to be converted

¹⁸¹ 'Invitation for Expression of Interest to Prequalify Potential Strategic Partners for Participation in the Joint Venture That Will Be Responsible for the Development, Financing, Construction and Operation of the Vasilikos Oil Terminal,' *Electricity Authority of Cyprus*, 2010, www.eac.com.cy.

from HFO to natural gas, replacing the HFO which is currently used for power generation purposes. In the context of introducing natural gas in the power generation sector, the EAC has already installed a 220MW CCGT unit, which is currently operating with gasoil, and plans to install another two 220MW CCGTs by the time natural gas becomes available (2014). The second CCGT unit is expected to be in operation by early 2012, initially with gasoil as its fuel.¹⁸²

2.3.3 Supplying Cyprus with LNG

On 10 November 2009, the Public Gas Company of Cyprus (“DEFA”) issued a call for an Expression of Interest by potential LNG Suppliers in order to purchase and import the LNG pursuant to a LNG Sale and Purchase Agreement (“SPA”), preferably on a delivered ex-ship (DES) basis. The deadline for this Expression of Interest was 11 December 2009. On 14 December 2010; DEFA reported that, until they had selected its own consultants, in the interim period it would be using the services of *Simons & Simons* and ECC, a consortium that was advising the EAC at the time. However, DEFA announced that there was nothing untoward with this arrangement, since the consortium would not be involved in the substance of the negotiations for the LNG.¹⁸³

On 30 December, 2010, DEFA concluded their negotiations with three shortlisted companies and gave its recommendations to the Government. According to the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, DEFA had originally received Expression of Interest’s from thirteen companies. Six were then shortlisted and the list was then whittled down to three. DEFA refused to reveal its preferred supplier recommendation, due to a confidentiality clause in the Expression of Interest. While previous exploration contacts conducted by Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism and the ECA had revealed that the natural gas state corporations of Egypt, Algeria, Qatar, Libya and Greece had shown interest, it was later revealed that Royal Dutch Shell, BP and the UK’s BG Group, were the three short-listed companies, with Shell being DEFA’s favorite.¹⁸⁴

Royal Dutch Shell had made Cyprus the best competitive offer for a 20-year supply line of LNG worth 4.6 billion Euros.¹⁸⁵ According to information leaked to the media, the target price set by EAC was around \$7.0 per million British thermal units (“Btu”), while the final price agreed with Shell was over \$11 per million Btu. Despite the discrepancy, Shell’s bid of \$6.2 billion (€4.6 billion) for 20 years was deemed as the most advantageous of the three offers. The offers by BP and the BG Group was \$6.8 billion (€5 billion) and \$7.0 billion (€5.2 billion) respectively.¹⁸⁶

2.3.4 A Change of Policy

Despite the fact that the official gas policy of the Government remains that of the construction of the LNG Re-gas Terminal as part of the Vasilikos energy Center, and the import of LNG, it has been speculated in the media that Cypriot authorities may be in the process of discarding the plans of building the €600mn LNG Re-gas Terminal due to the recent explosion at the Evangelos

¹⁸² ‘Invitation for Expression of Interest to Prequalify Potential Strategic Partners for Participation in the Joint Venture That Will Be Responsible for the Development, Financing, Construction and Operation of the Vasilikos Oil Terminal,’ *Electricity Authority of Cyprus*, 2010, www.eac.com.cy.

¹⁸³ ‘Paschalides: 13 Is a Lucky Number for Cyprus in LNG Stake’s,’ *Cyprus Mail*, 15 December 2009, www.cyprus-mail.com.

¹⁸⁴ ‘Anna Hassapi, ‘Tenders Close for Construction of LNG Plant,’ *Cyprus Mail*, 31 December 2010, www.cyprus-mail.com.

¹⁸⁵ ‘Shell Offers 4,5 Billion Euro for Cyprus LNG Supply-minister,’ *Ordnons News*, 8 January 2011. <http://www.ordons.com/>.

¹⁸⁶ ‘Call for Resignation over LNG,’ *Cyprus Mail*, 15 January 2011, www.cyprus-mail.com.

Florakis Naval Base. Another reason for this change of policy also relates to Noble's plans of commencing its drilling in Block 12 by the beginning of October 2011. In addition, the possibility of cooperation between Cyprus and Israel, in the area of hydrocarbon exploration is also likely to have changed the minds of Cypriot officials.¹⁸⁷

2.4 Hydrocarbon Discoveries and the First Bidding Round in Cyprus

2.4.1 Seismic Surveys in Cyprus EEZ


In 2006, the Norwegian-based Petroleum Geo-Services ("PGS") signed an exclusive Multi-Client 2D and 3D (MC2D and MC3D) seismic agreement with the Cypriot Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism. The survey included 6,770 line-km of new 2D seismic data covering an area of approximately 51,000 km² within Cyprus EEZ. The 2D survey covered the Eratosthenes structure, the Levant Basin and the Prolific Nile Delta. It was made public in November 2006.



Plate 12: Seismic survey in Cyprus EEZ. Source: Petroleum Geo-Services

In 2007, the first 3D seismic surveys were acquired offshore Cyprus and Lebanon.

Direct hydrocarbon indicators associated with the large anticlines were apparent, and indicate that several petroleum systems were active in the area.



Plates 13&14: Seismic survey in Cyprus EEZ. Source: Petroleum Geo-Services

During 2008 and 2009, 12,200 line-km of 2D seismic data was acquired by PGS using GeoStreamer® technology. It supplements the existing 2D grid, and improved the understanding of the petroleum potential of the unexplored area.

¹⁸⁷ MEES LIV.30 (2011), *Review of Middle East Energy, Finance & Politic*, www.mees.com.

2.4.2 Companies Participating in First Bidding Round in 2007

The first bidding round was officially opened on 15 February 2007, and closed on the 16 August 2007. In total, 11 of the 13 blocks¹⁸⁸ within Cyprus EEZ were offered. Three groups entered bids on three separate Blocks (06, 11 and 12). Block 06 and 11 were bid on by two consortia of companies from the U.K., the United Arab Emirates and Norway (Cyprus media reported that the companies involved were the Norwegian firm DNO, UAE Company Larsen Oil & Gas, and British Increase Oil Recovery), while Noble placed a bid on Block 12. An Exploration License for Block 12 was granted to Noble on 24 October 2008.

The main reasons for the low interest shown by international oil companies (“IOC”) was because the cost of undertaking exploration and development in Cyprus will undoubtedly be high, and some companies that initially expressed interest may have been put off by not having the technology to do deep-water drilling, as the Cypriot blocks will require. Turkey’s emerging role as a regional energy hub also added to the political factor that kept IOC’s from bidding. Some IOCs, such as those involved in offshore Egypt, had not placed bids due to their concern over the possibility of harming their relations with Turkey.¹⁸⁹ The bidders chose to focus on Blocks near existing operating fields in Israel and Egypt.

2.5 Government Authorities

2.5.1 The Energy Service

The Energy Service of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism has the overall responsibility of energy in Cyprus, and specifically for:

- Monitoring and coordinating the supply and availability of sufficient energy capacity for domestic needs;
- Monitoring and participating in the formation of the European policy for energy issues;
- Suggesting ways for the implementation of the European *Acquis*, assist in the preparation of Laws, Regulations, Rules and implements programs for their promotion;
- Preparing and implementing programs for energy conservation, the promotion of renewable energy sources and the developing of technologies for the utilization of renewable energy sources;
- Assisting the Government in the formation of the national energy policy for Cyprus, and the coordination between the various bodies involved.

2.5.2 The Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC)

The EAC is a statutory authority with an independent Board of Directors. As a vertically integrated organization it is engaged in all sectors of the Cyprus electricity market (i.e. Generation, Transmission, Distribution and Supply). The Board of Directors is appointed by the Council of Ministers and the normal tenure is three years. There are no shareholders or other

¹⁸⁸ Blocks 03 and 13 were excluded due to a MC3D seismic survey that was conducted during the time of the 1st Licensing Round.

¹⁸⁹ ‘Low Interest in Cyprus Offshore Bidding Round Attributed to Political Risk,’ *MEES* L.46 (2007), *Review of Middle East Energy, Finance & Politics*, www.mees.com.

private interests involved in the running of the organization.

The EAC is currently the main power generator in Cyprus, and it owns and operates three thermal power stations:

2.5.2.1 Vasilikos Power Station

The Power Station is situated around 25 km east of Limassol on the southern coast of Cyprus. The first phase of the Station was commissioned in 2000 and consists of 2 x 130 MW heavy fuel oil/steam units and 1 x 38 MW diesel oil fired gas turbine which was commissioned back in 1999 and mainly serves as a black start unit. The second phase consists of 1 X 130 MW heavy fuel oil steam unit. This unit is also equipped with a Flue Gas Desulphurization Unit ("FGD") for reducing the dioxide emissions below the limits set by the European Large Combustion Plants Directive. Vasilikos Power Station generated in 2006, 2.293.410 Megawatt hour ("MWh"), which corresponds to 49.66% of the total electricity generated from the Authority's Power Stations. During the same period the Station exported, 2.160.237 MWh, which corresponds to 49.52% of the total electricity exported from the Authority's Power Stations. The thermal coefficient of efficiency of the Steam Units for units generated reached 39.22% whereas the corresponding thermal coefficient of efficiency for the Gas Turbines reached 23.45%. Moreover, the thermal coefficient of efficiency of the Steam Units, for units exported, reached 36.95% whereas the corresponding thermal coefficient of efficiency for the Gas Turbine reached 20.49%.¹⁹⁰

2.5.2.2 Dhekelia Power Station

The Power Station is located on the south east coast of the island. Dhekelia Power Station consists of 6 x 60 MW conventional steam units burning heavy fuel oil. The first unit was commissioned in 1982 and the last one in 1993. The Dhekelia Power Station generated in 2006, 1.860.781 MWh which corresponds to 40.29% of the total electricity generated from the Authority's Power Stations. During the same period, Dhekelia Power Station exported 1.768.290 MWh which corresponds to 40.53% of the total electricity exported from the Authority's Power Stations. The thermal coefficient of efficiency of the Power Station for units generated reached 31.26% whereas the respective coefficient of efficiency for units exported reached 29.70%.¹⁹¹

2.5.2.3 Moni Power Station

The Power Station is located on the eastern side of Limassol on the southern coast of the island. It consists of 6 x 30 MW conventional steam units burning heavy fuel oil and 4 x 37,5 MW diesel oil fired gas turbines. The first two steam units were commissioned in 1966 and the sixth in 1976. The first two gas turbines were installed in 1992 and the other two in 1995. The gas turbines are mainly used during system peak loading as well as emergency and stand-by plants. Moni Power Station generated in 2006, 463.888 MWh which corresponds to 10.05% of the total electricity generated from the EAC's Power Stations. During the same period the Station exported 434.180 MWh, which corresponds to 9.95% of the total electricity exported from the Authority's Power Stations. The thermal coefficient of efficiency of the Steam Units for units generated reached 25.04% whereas the corresponding thermal coefficient of efficiency for the Gas Turbines reached 23.42%. Moreover, the thermal coefficient of efficiency of the Steam Units for units exported

¹⁹⁰ Electricity Authority of Cyprus, www.eac.com.cy.

¹⁹¹ Electricity Authority of Cyprus, www.eac.com.cy.

reached 23.42% whereas the corresponding thermal coefficient of efficiency for the Gas Turbines reached 21.39%.¹⁹²

2.5.3 Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority (CERA)

2.5.3.1 Establishment

CERA is an independent authority with executive powers and competences in the energy field. The Board of CERA is appointed for six years by the Council of Ministers in accordance with the Electricity Market Regulatory Law (No.122(I)/2003) (the “Electricity Market Regulatory Law”) and the Gas Market Law (No.183(I)/2004). CERA reports directly to the President of the Republic. Its annual budget, however, is approved firstly by the Council of Ministers (after the Council receives comments and recommendations from the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism and the Ministry of Finance) and then by the Parliament.

The Electricity Market Law provides for the creations of a new licensing regime in respect of the generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity. The law also: Establishes the framework for the arrangements between the Transmission System Owner and the Transmission System Operator; Regulates access to the transmission system and the distribution system; Allows for provision to be made in respect of Public Service Obligations and Regulates issues concerning consumer protection. CERA also oversees the setting of tariffs and charges levied by authorized license holders.

2.5.3.2 Duties of CERA

The duties of CERA are:

- to safeguard effective competition in the electricity market and avoid undue discrimination between both authorization holders and applicants for authorizations;
- to protect the interests of consumers;
- to secure that all reasonable demands and needs for electricity are satisfied;
- to secure that authorization holders operate efficiently and are capable of financing the undertaking of the activities which they are licensed to undertake;
- to promote the development of an economic and efficient electricity industry;
- to promote the security, safety, continuity, quality, and reliability of supplies of electricity;
- to take account of the protection of the environment;
- to encourage the efficient use and production of electricity;
- to take account of the needs of rural customers, the disadvantaged consumers and the elderly;
- to encourage research and development into the generation transmission, distribution, and use of electricity; and
- to promote the use of renewable forms of energy.

¹⁹² Electricity Authority of Cyprus, www.eac.com.cy.

2.5.3 Functions of CERA in respect of the Natural Gas Industry

CERA shall have the following functions in respect of the natural gas industry:

granting of authorizations for the construction and operation of gas pipeline systems, including direct pipelines¹⁹³;

granting authorizations for the generation, transport, distribution, supply or storing of natural gas;

taking measures to avoid the abuse of any dominant position in the gas industry;

the settlement of disputes with respect to access to gas pipeline systems;

ensuring that necessary measures are in place to allow interested persons to obtain access to gas pipeline systems and other facilities including the terms upon which access to the gas pipeline systems will be granted.

2.5.4 The Public Gas Corporation (DEFA)

In the framework of implementing the Council of Ministers decision (No. 20/2001), DEFA was created in November 2007. DEFA is owned by the Government of Cyprus, while the EAC has an option to hold 44%. The purpose of DEFA is to purchase, import, acquire, possess, use, exploit, store, transfer, provide, distribute, sell, supply and trade natural gas, to make use of the LNG Re-gas Terminal, as well as manage the distribution and supply network of natural gas.

DEFA is also in charge of developing the gas pipeline network that will connect the LNG Re-gas Terminal with, initially, the three EAC Power Stations. It is expected that in the future the gas network will be further developed to supply other potential industrial, commercial and domestic customers. Prior to the civil and pipe laying works, various studies are expected to be carried-out mainly of technical and design nature. On 2 March 2010, DEFA issued a call for tenders (Tender No.: DEFA A006/2010) for consultancy services for the development of a gas pipeline network. It is envisaged that natural gas will initially be delivered to the neighbouring Vasilikos Power Station via a 0,6km pipeline. Natural gas is also planned to be transferred to the island via a 10 km pipeline and a 55 km pipeline.¹⁹⁴

3. Legal Framework: Hydrocarbon Exploration and Application Process

3.1. Introduction

Hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation activities in Cyprus are governed by the Hydrocarbon (Prospection, Exploration and Exploitation) Law (No. 4(I)/2007) and the Hydrocarbon (Prospection, Exploration and Exploitation) Regulations of 2007 and 2009 (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009). The ownership of the hydrocarbons, wherever they are found, including the territorial waters, the continental shelf and the EEZ of Cyprus, shall always be deemed to belong

¹⁹³ 'Direct pipelines' refers to natural gas pipeline complementary to the gas pipeline system.

¹⁹⁴ 'Tender No.: DEFA006/2010: Engineering Consultancy Services for the Development of a Gas Pipeline Network,' *Electricity Authority of Cyprus*, 2010, www.eac.com.cy.

to the Republic of Cyprus.¹⁹⁵ The ownership rights of the hydrocarbons situated offshore the Republic, as determined in the Exclusive Economic Zone Law, shall be exercised in conjunction with the rights in the continental shelf as determined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).¹⁹⁶

EU Directive on the conditions for granting and using authorizations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons (Directive 94/22/EC) and other relevant EU legislation also applies to Cyprus.

3.1.1 The Contiguous Zone Law of 2004

Enacted on 2 April 2004, this law provides for the proclamation of a contiguous zone of Cyprus. The outer limit of the contiguous zone, which is identical to the inner limit, is set at 24 nautical miles. In case of an overlapping with part of the Contiguous Zone of any other State, the Contiguous Zone Law provides delimitation effected by agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the other State in accordance to the relevant provisions by the UNCLOS. In case of the absence of an agreement, the delimitation of this zone is defined by the median line, measured from the respective baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. Within the Contiguous Zone, the Republic of Cyprus exercises the control to prevent and punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations and controls traffic of objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in this zone. The Contiguous Zone Law came into force on 21 March 2003.

3.1.2 The Declaration of the EEZ Law of 2004

Enacted on 2 April 2004, this law provides for the proclamation of an exclusive economic zone, setting the outer limit of the EEZ of Cyprus at 200 nautical miles. In the case of an overlap with another state’s EEZ, delimitation is reached by agreement. In absence of an agreement, the zone is delimited by the median line, measured from the respective baselines. Within the EEZ, in accordance with the provisions of the UNCLOS, Cyprus holds sovereign rights for exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing its natural living and non-living resources. Moreover, Cyprus holds jurisdiction with regard to establishment of artificial islands and structures, marine scientific research and environmental protection and preservation. The EEZ Law forbids any exploration and exploitation of the living and non-living resources without permission by the Minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment concerning living resources, or the Council of Ministers concerning non-living resources. For a violation of the provisions, the EEZ Law provides for a pecuniary penalty or imprisonment. Exclusive jurisdiction is held by the District Court of Nicosia or the Criminal Court. The EEZ Law came into force on the 21 March 2003.

3.2 Hydrocarbon (Prospection, Exploration and Exploitation) Law of 2007

3.2.1 Introduction

The below sections summarize the main provisions with regards to the application and granting of a hydrocarbon license under the Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) (the “Law”) and the Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009) (the “Regulations”).

¹⁹⁵ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 3.

¹⁹⁶ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 3.

3.2.2 Types of Licenses

The Law facilitates three types of licenses—Prospecting, Exploration, and Exploitation.

3.2.2.1 Prospecting License

Prospecting is defined as the attempt to locate hydrocarbons, and/or to evaluate the hydrocarbon potential by any appropriate method other than drilling. Such a license can be granted for a limited period not exceeding 1 year.

3.2.2.2 Exploration License

Exploration is defined as the exploration for the discovery of hydrocarbon deposits by any appropriate method, including drilling. An Exploration license is granted for an initial period not exceeding 3 years, and can be renewed for up to two terms, each term not exceeding 2 years provided that the licensee has fulfilled all their obligations with respect to the current exploration term. Upon each renewal of the term of the exploration period, the licensee relinquishes at least 25% of the initial surface of the licensed area.

3.2.2.3 Exploitation License

Exploitation is defined as the development and production of hydrocarbons, or any treatment in order to make them marketable, and the storage and the transportation of the hydrocarbons, and their by-products to the loading installations for further disposal. The definition does not include refining. The term of the exploitation license is maximum 25 years, and it may be renewed for a maximum of 10 years, subject to the provisions of the contract. A Hydrocarbon Exploitation License, with respect to a commercial discovery during exploration, is granted after the approval of a Development and Production Plan.

3.2.3 Grant of Authorizations and Conditions under which they are granted

The Council of Ministers grants an authorization after an application has been sent to the Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (the “Minister”) after an invitation to participate in a licensing round has been issued. An invitation can be issued in the following manners:

- either at the initiative of the Council of Ministers, through notice by the Minister inviting applications, to be published in the Official Gazette of the Republic and/or the Official Journal of the European Union at least 90 days before the closing date for applications.
- or through notice inviting applications by the Minister, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, to be published in the Official Gazette of the Republic and/or the Official Journal of the European Union, following submission of an application by an entity. Any other interested entities shall have a period of at least 90 days after the date of publication in which to submit an application.¹⁹⁷

The invitation specifies (1) the type of authorization; (2) the geographical area or areas in part or all of which an application has been or may be made; (3) the proposed date or time-limit for granting authorization; (4) any conditions or requirements which the Council of Ministers deems expedient to be made public during the procedure for submission of the applications; (5) whether preference is given to applications by entities which are autonomous and non-dependent natural

¹⁹⁷ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 5 (1).

or legal persons; and (6) anything at all that is deemed expedient to be determined in the invitation.¹⁹⁸

When the geographical areas which are made available for the grant of hydrocarbon exploration or exploitation authorizations are not delimited on the basis of a prior geometric division of the territory, the Council of Ministers shall determine, by a notification published in the Official Gazette of the Republic and/or the Official Journal of the European Union, the extent of each area in such a way that it does not exceed the area justified by the best possible exercise of the activities from the technical and economic points of view.¹⁹⁹

The procedure for submitting applications and granting authorizations may not be initiated by announcing it to the public, however, may still be granted by the Council of Ministers when the area for which a authorization is requested:

- (a) is available on a permanent basis and this has been set forth in the notice that has been initially published for the submission of applications; or
- (b) has been the subject of a previous procedure of by invitation to the public which has not resulted in the grant of an authorization; or
- (c) has been relinquished by an entity and does not fall automatically under (a).²⁰⁰

In this case, the Minister shall, by publishing a notification in the Official Gazette of the Republic and/or a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, indicate the areas which are available and where relevant detailed information in this regard can be obtained.²⁰¹

The Council of Ministers may decide not to issue an invitation to the public, if and to the extent that geological or production considerations justify the granting of the authorization for an area to an entity being the holder of an authorization for a contiguous area. In such case, the Council of Ministers shall ensure that the holders of an authorization for any other contiguous areas are able to submit relevant applications, and are given sufficient time to do so.²⁰²

3.2.4 The Advisory Committee

The Law establishes an Advisory Committee²⁰³ which has the duty of: (1) examining the contents of the applications; (2) evaluate the applications for granting authorizations to prospect, explore for, and exploit hydrocarbons to evaluate any matters that arise in relation to the applications or matters which are laid before it for examination; and (5) to advise the Minister on any matter arising in the implementation of the Law.²⁰⁴ The Advisory Committee may examine and submit its opinion to the Minister in relation to the following matters:

- any matter that may arise prior to the commencement of the procedure for the submission of the applications;

¹⁹⁸ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 5(2).

¹⁹⁹ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 5(3).

²⁰⁰ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 5(4).

²⁰¹ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 5(5).

²⁰² Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 5(6).

²⁰³ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 9(1).

²⁰⁴ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 8(1).

- whether an application submitted pursuant to this Law shall be approved or rejected;
- the transfer of an authorization or the assignment of rights arising from an authorization by the holder of authorization to another entity;
- the imposition of any conditions to the applicant on the approval of his application, as well as any revision of these conditions;
- the degree of threat to the environment that may arise from the grant of an authorization for exploration and an authorization for exploitation to any entity and any protection measures thereof;
- the safety measures to be imposed in every case and the measures to ensure that persons who take part in the said activities have the necessary scientific qualifications;
- measures for the protection of navigation;
- any other matter that the Advisory Committee deems expedient to examine and which is related to the applications.²⁰⁵

The Minister shall, upon receiving the applications, convene a meeting of the Advisory Committee by a notice in writing to the Chairman of the Committee in order to commence the procedure for the evaluation of the applications.²⁰⁶ The Advisory Committee shall act as a quorum when the Chairman and at least four members are present. Any matter regarding the internal functioning of the Advisory Committee may be regulated by a relevant decision taken by absolute majority.²⁰⁷

3.2.4.1 Advisory Committee Members

The Advisory Committee consists of the following members:

- (a) Director General of Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (Chairman of the Committee)
- (b) Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus
- (c) Director General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- (d) Director General of Ministry of Finance
- (e) Director General of the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment
- (f) Director General of the Geological Survey Department
- (g) Director of Energy Service

3.2.5 Conditions and Requirements for Granting Authorizations

An authorization may be granted on the following conditions and requirements, in order to

²⁰⁵ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 8(2).

²⁰⁶ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 6(2).

²⁰⁷ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 7(2).

ensure:²⁰⁸

- the proper performance of the activities permitted by the authorization;
- the financial contribution in money or a contribution in hydrocarbons;
- national security;
- public safety;
- public health;
- security of transport;
- protection of the environment pursuant to the Law and the terms specified in the Regulations;
- protection of biological and mineral resources and of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value;
- safety of installations and of workers;
- planned management of hydrocarbon resources, such as particularly the rate at which hydrocarbons are depleted or the optimization of their recovery;
- the need to secure revenues to Cyprus.

The conditions and requirements for granting authorizations shall be applied in a non-discriminatory manner.²⁰⁹

The authorizations may be granted on such conditions and requirements in order to ensure:²¹⁰

- the proper performance of the activities permitted by the authorization;
- the financial contribution in money or a contribution in hydrocarbons;
- national security;
- public safety;
- public health;
- security of transport;
- protection of the environment;
- protection of biological and mineral resources and of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value;

²⁰⁸ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 13(1).

²⁰⁹ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 13(2).

²¹⁰ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 13(1).

- safety of installations and of workers;
- planned management of hydrocarbon resources, such as particularly the rate at which hydrocarbons are depleted or the optimization of their recovery;
- the need to secure revenues to the Republic.

Once an applicant has been selected, the Minister shall negotiate the terms and provisions of the Production Sharing Contract (the “PSC”) with the selected applicant. In cases where the negotiations are successful, the text of the PSC shall be submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval, and thereafter, if approved and signed by both parties, the relevant authorization shall be granted.²¹¹

3.2.6 Grant of Rights to the Holders of Authorizations

The authorization for the prospection of hydrocarbons shall grant to the holder the right to prospect for hydrocarbons, under the conditions stated in the authorization.²¹² The authorization for the exploration of hydrocarbons shall grant the holder exclusive rights to explore for hydrocarbons in the area for which the authorization applies, and in the case of a commercial discovery of hydrocarbons, the right to be granted an exploitation authorization related to such a discovery.²¹³ The authorization for the exploitation of hydrocarbons shall grant the holder of an authorization, exclusive right to exploit hydrocarbons under the conditions and requirements of the authorization.²¹⁴

3.2.7 Duration of Validity of an Authorization

The duration of validity of an authorization shall not exceed the period necessary to complete the activities specified in the authorization. The Council of Ministers shall renew or extend the authorization for such a time period, as provided in the PSC between the Government and the authorization holder, and in accordance with the conditions specified in the authorization.²¹⁵

3.2.8 Duration of an Authorization for Prospection

An authorization for prospection shall be granted for a period not exceeding one year.²¹⁶

3.2.9 Duration of an Authorization for Exploration

An authorization for exploration shall be granted for an initial period not exceeding three years and may be renewed for up to two terms, each term not exceeding two years, provided that the holder of the authorization has fulfilled all his obligations under authorization and has submitted an application to the Council of Ministers two months prior to the expiry of the current term.²¹⁷

The PSC may provide that in case where an appraisal work program with respect to a discovery is in progress, and has not been completed at the expiry of the second renewal, the holder of an

²¹¹ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 7.

²¹² Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 14(1).

²¹³ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 14(2).

²¹⁴ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 14(3).

²¹⁵ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 15.

²¹⁶ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 8.

²¹⁷ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 9 (1) (2).

authorization may apply to the Council of Ministers for an extension of the exploration period, which, however, may not exceed six months, in case of crude oil discovery and twenty-four months in case of natural gas discovery. In case of natural gas discovery the Council of Ministers, may extend the exploration period for a term over the twenty-four months, if it deems that such period is necessary to determine whether a commercially viable natural gas market exists or/and is to be created.²¹⁸

Where the holder of an authorization has not fulfilled his obligations under the authorization, the Council of Ministers may decide to renew the authorization under such terms and conditions as the Council of Ministers may deem proper to impose.²¹⁹

3.2.10 Relinquishment of an Exploration Area

Upon each renewal of an authorization for exploration, the holder of an authorization relinquishes at least 25% of the initial surface of the area that is included in the authorization granted.²²⁰ Upon expiry of the renewal of the authorization for exploration, as possibly renewed and/or extended pursuant, the holder of an authorization relinquishes all the remaining part of the area that is included in the authorization granted, provided that the area to be relinquished under this paragraph shall not include the areas included in an authorization for exploitation.²²¹

3.2.11 Duration of an Authorization for Exploitation

The duration of an authorization for exploitation for each exploitation area shall not exceed twenty-five years and may be renewed for a period up to ten years, subject to the terms of the PSC.²²² The authorization for exploitation may be renewed, provided that the holder of such authorization has fulfilled all his obligations under the authorization and has submitted an application to the Council of Ministers, through the Minister, one year prior to the expiry of the current term.²²³

3.2.12 Information that Has to Be Provided by a Holder of an Authorization

The Minister may require a holder an authorization to provide information on actual or intended sources of procurement in relation to its obligations under the authorization, or for any other matter that is deemed necessary by the Minister, either at regular intervals or when he deems it necessary. The Minister may request the said information to the extent justified on the following grounds:²²⁴

- public morals;
- public order;
- public security;

²¹⁸ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 9(3).

²¹⁹ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 9(4).

²²⁰ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 10(1).

²²¹ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 10(2).

²²² The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 11(1).

²²³ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 11(2).

²²⁴ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 17.

- protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants;
- protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value;
- protection of industrial and commercial property;
- compliance with the national and international law.

3.2.13 Transfer of Authorization/Assignment of Rights from an Authorization

No holder of an authorization may transfer an authorization or assign the rights arising from an authorization to another entity, except upon the consent of the Council of Ministers. Such a transfer may only be granted if:

- it does not endanger national security;
- the Council of Ministers is satisfied that an entity to whom the authorization would be transferred or the rights arising from an authorization would be assigned has sufficient technical knowledge, experience and financial resources to secure the proper exercise of the activities of prospecting, exploring for and exploiting hydrocarbons;
- the entity to which the authorization would be transferred or the rights arising from an authorization would be assigned undertakes to comply with such other conditions and requirements as the Council of Ministers may deem proper to impose.²²⁵

If a holder of an authorization transfers an authorization or assigns the rights arising from an authorization without the approval of the Council of Ministers, that holder shall be committing an offence and shall be liable under the Law.²²⁶

3.2.14 Control of a Holder of Authorization by a Third Country or a National of a Third Country

No entity may, after the grant of an authorization, come under the direct or indirect control of a third country, or a national of a third country, without the prior approval of the Council of Ministers.²²⁷ Any holder of an authorization that comes under the direct or indirect control of a third country or a national of a third country without the prior approval of the Council of Ministers shall commit an offence and shall be liable under the Law.²²⁸

3.2.15 Protection of the Environment

A holder of an authorization must ensure that hydrocarbons operations are conducted in an environmentally acceptable and safe manner, consistent with the environmental legislation in force and the good international industry practice.²²⁹

The holder of an authorization has the obligation to take all the necessary measures in order

²²⁵ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 27(1).

²²⁶ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 27(2).

²²⁷ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 28(1).

²²⁸ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007) Section 28(2).

²²⁹ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 15(1).

to:²³⁰

- minimize any avoidable environmental pollution or damage to the water, the soil or the atmosphere, in relation to hydrocarbons operations;
- comply with the provisions of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, which entered into force internationally on the 19th June 1975, its Protocol which was signed on the 19th November, 1976 and entered into force internationally on the 8th April, 1981 and the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of 1969 and its Protocol of 1976 (Ratification) and Matters Connected Therewith Law of 1989.

If the holder of an authorization omits to comply with the provisions of the Law relating to the protection of the environment, and any environmental pollution is caused in water, the soil or the atmosphere, the holder of an authorization shall take all reasonable and necessary measures to remedy or eliminate such pollution.²³¹

If the Minister deems that any works or installations erected by the holders of an authorization or any operations conducted by the holders of an authorization endanger or may endanger persons or property of a third-party or cause pollution or harm to the environment, wildlife or marine organisms to a degree which the Minister deems unacceptable, the Minister may require the holder of an authorization to take corrective measures within a reasonable time period specified by the Minister, and to repair any damage to the environment. If the Minister deems it necessary, he may submit a proposal to the Council of Ministers, and the latter may suspend the authorization until the holder of an authorization has taken such corrective measures or has repaired any environmental damage.²³²

The measures and methods to be used for the purpose of minimizing any avoidable environmental pollution or damage to the water, the soil or the atmosphere, in relation to hydrocarbons operations shall be agreed in consultation with the Minister upon the commencement of the hydrocarbons operations or whenever there is a significant change in the scope or method of conducting hydrocarbons operations. The measures and methods must comply with the international standards applicable in similar circumstances.²³³

Prior to the commencement of any drilling operations, the holder of an authorization shall prepare and submit to the Minister for evaluation and approval, a contingency plan for hydrocarbon leakage and fire. In such case, the holder of an authorization shall immediately apply the relevant contingency plan. In case of any emergency or accident, which affects the environment, the holder of an authorization shall take all reasonable and necessary measures, in accordance with the generally accepted international petroleum industry practice.²³⁴

3.3 Application Procedure

3.3.1 Introduction

²³⁰ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 15(2).

²³¹ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 15(3).

²³² The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 15(4).

²³³ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 15(5).

²³⁴ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 15(6), (7).

The following section contains the legal and regulatory framework for the application of a license. At the first licensing round in 2007, a Submission and Guidance Note was released by the Ministry of Commerce, industry and Tourism to be used by applicants. To this date there have been no updates to the Guidance Note, but it is anticipated that the Ministry will release an updated version for the upcoming bidding round. This section will, however, only refer to the sections in the Law and the Regulations.

3.3.2 Information Submitted by the Applicant for a License

Applications submitted for an authorization for *prospection*, must contain the following general information:

- a) the name, address and nationality of the applicant;
- b) the applicant's place of registration or incorporation, its principal place of business, the members of the board of directors and senior management, the nationality and domicile of the members of the Board of Directors, the capital structure and the factors constituting control of the applicant by other natural or legal person;
- c) the manner in which prospecting activities shall be financed if the application is successful, and how performance of the applicant's obligations shall be guaranteed; and
- d) the applicant's previous experience in hydrocarbon prospection.²³⁵

Applications submitted for an authorization for *exploration*, must contain the following general information:

- e) the name, address and nationality of the applicant;
- f) the name, address and nationality of the applicant;
- g) the applicant's place of registration or incorporation, its principal place of business, the members of the Board of Directors and senior management, the nationality and domicile of the members of the Board of Directors, the capital structure and the factors constituting control of the applicant by other natural or legal person;
- h) the form of organization of the applicant, including information concerning the relationship of the applicant with its parent company, if such exists, and other affiliated persons;
- i) the financial structure of the applicant and its parent company, if such exists, including annual reports, audited balance sheets and profit and loss statements for the past three years, and any other reports which the applicant and its parent company may have filed to the competent authority for capital market and transactions in securities regulation, during the past three years;
- j) the manner in which exploration and development activities shall be financed, if the application is successful, and how performance of the applicant's obligations shall be guaranteed; and

²³⁵ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 6(1).

- k) the applicant's previous experience in hydrocarbon exploration, development, production, transportation and marketing.²³⁶

In case where an application is submitted by a group of two or more natural or legal persons, the information required for a prospection and exploration license shall be submitted for each person and the group shall designate in its application one person as representative of the group.²³⁷ In case where, following the submission of the application but prior to the selection of the successful applicant, there has been any change in the information so submitted, the applicant shall inform the Minister, specifying all the relevant particulars of the changes concerned.²³⁸

Upon payment by the applicant of the aggregate amount for the application, the Minister shall register the application in the register of hydrocarbons, including the date of submission of the application, the designation and map of the area applied for, the amount payable and the status of the application.²³⁹

An application for an authorization for *exploration* shall, in addition to the above, contain the following information:

- a) the designation of the area or areas for which an application has been made, and if the application is made in respect of more than one area, the priority assigned to each area;
- b) a detailed description of the exploration program proposed for the area or areas applied for and its geographical distribution over such area or areas;
- c) the minimum obligations to be undertaken relating to work and expenditure during the exploration period;
- d) a brief note concerning the exploration activities and the effects which are likely to have on the environment, and the measures that the exploration work program intends to take for dealing with;
- e) proposals relating to the training and employment of nationals of the Republic and the minimum expenditures to be incurred to that effect;
- f) proposals relating to the economic terms and conditions required as criteria for the evaluation of the application, such as the financial consideration and/or the sharing of production between the applicant and the Government of the Republic;
- g) any agreement between any persons relating to the manner in which hydrocarbons operations are to be financed; and
- h) any other information as may be required by the Minister or under the applicable model contract or which the applicant wishes the Minister to consider.²⁴⁰

The applicant is bound to supply to the Minister, any additional information which the Minister

²³⁶ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 6(2).

²³⁷ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 6(3).

²³⁸ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 6(4).

²³⁹ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 6(5).

²⁴⁰ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 6(6).

may require.²⁴¹

An application for an authorization for *exploitation* related to a commercial hydrocarbon discovery within an area included in an authorization for exploration shall be submitted together with the development and production plan, in accordance with the terms of the PSC.²⁴²

3.3.3 Environmental Impact Study

The entity that submits an application for obtaining an authorization to explore for hydrocarbons shall include in its application a brief note stating the activities of exploring hydrocarbons and the effects which those activities are likely to have on the environment and ways of their effective handling.²⁴³ An entity that submits an application for obtaining an authorization to exploit hydrocarbons is bound to comply with the provisions of the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Projects on the Environment Law. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Projects on the Environment Law, the applications, reports and other documents whose submission is provided in the said Law, shall be submitted to the Minister when they refer to works falling within the provisions of this Law, and the Minister shall forward them in due course to the town planning or environmental authority, as the case may be.²⁴⁴

3.3.4 Procedure for Examining the Application by the Advisory Committee

Upon receipt of the application, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee shall send a copy of the application to the members of the Committee and shall convene a meeting within 30 days to examine the application.²⁴⁵ The Advisory Committee shall examine whether the application has been submitted in accordance with the provisions of this Law and whether the information that it contains is adequate for the evaluation of the application and the grant of an authorization.²⁴⁶ If the Advisory Committee deems that the information before it is not sufficient or complete, it may request by the applicant or a third party any additional particulars or information it deems necessary as well as the carrying out of inspections or obtaining the opinion of or reports by consultants or other experts.²⁴⁷

If the Advisory Committee considers during the meeting that the information that is before it is sufficient, it shall proceed to examine the application and shall submit a reasoned opinion to the Minister as to whether the authorization is to be granted and on which terms or as to whether the application is to be rejected. The opinion shall be contained in a preparatory report, prepared by the Advisory Committee, on the basis of a procedure decided by it. The Minister shall submit his opinion in relation to the applications and the preparatory report of the Advisory Committee to the Council of Ministers for the taking of a final decision.²⁴⁸

3.3.5 Criteria for the Evaluation of the Applications

The criteria, on the basis of which the applications are evaluated, shall be drawn up and published

²⁴¹ The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 6(7).

²⁴² The Hydrocarbons Regulations (No.51/2007 and No.113/2009), Section 6(8).

²⁴³ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007), Section 11(1).

²⁴⁴ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007), Section 11(2).

²⁴⁵ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007), Section 10(1).

²⁴⁶ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007), Section 10(2).

²⁴⁷ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007), Section 10(3).

²⁴⁸ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007), Section 10(4).

in the Official Gazette of the Republic and the Official Journal of the European Union before the start of the period for submission of applications. Any change in the criteria shall be published in full in the Official Gazette of the Republic and the Official Journal of the European Union. The criteria may relate to:

- national security or public interest;
- the technical and financial ability of the applicant;
- the ways in which the applicant proposes to carry out the activities specified in the authorization;
- when the authorization is put up for sale, the price which the applicant is prepared to pay in order to obtain the authorization;
- any lack of efficiency and responsibility displayed by the applicant in operations under a previous authorization.²⁴⁹

In case where two or more applicants that are evaluated in accordance with the above criteria have equal merit, then the Council of Ministers may adopt additional relevant criteria in order to decide to which entity the authorization shall be granted. These additional criteria shall be published in the Official Gazette of the Republic and the Official Journal of the European Union.²⁵⁰ The Council of Ministers shall apply the above-mentioned criteria in a nondiscriminatory manner between applicants.²⁵¹ The Council of Ministers may refuse the granting of an authorization provided that this option does not give rise to discrimination between the applicants.²⁵² When an application is rejected, then the reason for rejection shall be communicated to the applicant.²⁵³

4. Political and Economic Landscape

4.1 Political System

The Republic of Cyprus was founded in 1960 as a presidential representative democratic republic. The President of Cyprus officiates both as head of state and head of government. Executive power is exercised by the government. Legislative power is vested in both the government and the House of Representatives. The Judiciary is independent in its sphere of competence, authority and jurisdiction. Since 1974, the Republic of Cyprus maintains control over the southern two thirds of the island, while the northern one third is under illegal occupation by the Republic of Turkey. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus is the only internationally recognized authority on the island (as well as the UK being internationally recognized with respect to the “Sovereign Base Areas”); though in practice its power extends only to the government controlled area. The Republic of Cyprus is divided into six districts: Nicosia, Famagusta, Kyrenia, Larnaca, Limassol and Paphos.

²⁴⁹ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007), Section 12(1).

²⁵⁰ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007), Section 12(2).

²⁵¹ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007), Section 12(3).

²⁵² Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007), Section 12(4).

²⁵³ Hydrocarbon Law (4(I)/2007), Section 12(5).

4.2 Executive Power

4.2.1 The President

Under the 1960 Constitution, executive power is vested in the President of the Republic, elected by universal suffrage to a five-year term of office. The current president, Mr. Demetris Christofias was inaugurated on 28 February 2008 following his victory at the Presidential Elections of 24 February 2008. He is a member of the Communist Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL).

4.2.2 Ministries and Council of Ministers

The President exercises executive power through a Council of Ministers appointed by the President. The Ministers may be chosen from outside the House of Representatives. The Council of Ministers are responsible for the governance of the Republic. It coordinates and supervises the public services, and processes the budget and bills before they are presented to the House of Representatives. There are a total of eleven Ministries:

- a) Ministry of Defence;
- b) Ministry of Agriculture;
- c) Natural Resources and Environment;
- d) Ministry of Justice and Public Order;
- e) Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism;
- f) Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- g) Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance;
- h) Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Finance;
- i) Ministry of Education and Culture;
- j) Ministry of Communications and Works;
- k) Ministry of Health.

4.3 Legislative Power

Legislative power is exercised by the House of Representatives.

4.3.1 Functions of the House of Representatives

The House of Representatives performs both a *legislative functions* and a *parliamentary control*.

Legislative functions – comprise the enactment, amendment or abolition of legal rules (bills and regulations), which are submitted to the House by the executive (The President) and private bills, which are tabled by Representatives of the House.

Parliamentary control – exercised by the House in order to check Government policies. This is done mainly through questions to the competent Ministries, concerning social, economic, political, cultural and other issues, as well as matters of general or special interest, introduced by Representatives of the House for debate.

4.3.2 Committees of the House

Legislative work is carried out through the House Standing Committees, which are set-up by the Committee of Selection. For the purpose of carrying out legislative work more effectively, the Committee of Selection may set-up temporary Committees, established for a specific task (Ad Hoc Committees), as well as Specialised Committees.

4.3.3 International Affairs

Beyond its legislative functions, the House of Representatives has developed significant relations and activities on the European and international scene. These include bilateral relations with other national parliaments, as well as relations with and/or participation in European and international parliamentary organisations (e.g. the Inter Parliamentary Union, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe the “OSCE”).

4.4. List of Political Parties

Cyprus has a multi-party system, with the following six main parties dominating the political scene.

Abbreviation	Party Name	Description
DISY	Democratic Rally	Right/Nationalist
AKEL	Progressive Party of Working People of Cyprus	Communist
DIKO	Democratic Party	Center/Liberal
EDEK	Movement of Social Democrats	Social Democratic
EURO.KO	European Party	Center Right
KOP	Ecological and Environmental Movement	Ecologist

4.5 Parliamentary Elections of 22 May 2011

4.5.1 Election Results

A legislative election to the House of Representatives was held in Cyprus on the 22 May 2011. The election was won by DISY, which increased its number of seats from 18 to 20. The governing AKEL also gained an additional seat, giving them 19 seats in total. DIKO lost two seats from their original 11 and EURO.KO lost one seat from their original tally of three. EDEK held on to their five seats.

Parties	Votes	%	+/-	Seats	+/-
Democratic Rally (DISY)	138,682	34.28%	+3.76%	20	+2
Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL)	132,171	32.67%	+1.36%	19	+1
Democratic Party (DIKO)	63,763	15.76%	-2.22%	9	-2
Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK)	36,113	8.93%	-0.03%	5	±0

European Party (<i>EURO.KO</i>)	15,711	3.88%	-1.91%	2	-1

4.5.2 Split of the Coalition Government and new Ministerial Appointments

On August 3, Government coalition partner DIKO, announced that they were leaving government after exhausting all room for further cooperation. The pull-out is not seen as endangering the survival of incumbent President Christofias, whose term expires in 2013. But passage of essential economic reforms, needed to tackle an energy crisis, largely depends on parliament, where President Christofias's AKEL party lacks majority. The pull-out also weakens President Christofias in peace talks on Cyprus, where the U.N. is attempting to broker a reunification deal between his Greek Cypriot side and Turkish Cypriots.²⁵⁴

4.5.3 New Cabinet

On August 5, President Christofias, following DIKO's withdrawal from the Government, announced his new cabinet:

- Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis - *Minister of Foreign Affairs*
- Kikis Kazamias - *Minister of Finance*
- Neoclis Sylikiotis - *Minister of Interior*
- Demetris Eliades - *Minister of Defence*
- Giorgos Demosthenous - *Minister of Education and Culture*
- Efthymios Flourentzos - *Minister of Communications and Works*
- Praxoulla Antoniadou-Kyriakou - *Minister of Commerce Industry and Tourism*
- Sophoclis Aletraris - *Minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment*
- Sotiroulla Charalambous - *Minister of Labour and Social Insurance*
- Loucas Louca - *Minister of Justice and Public Order*
- Stavros Malas - *Minister of Health Business and Financial Environment*

4.6 Business and Financial Environment

Cyprus has been a stable financial and business-friendly jurisdiction since the 1970s, with a large attraction of foreign investment and capital flows. Cyprus' financial and regulatory environment is harmonized with that of the European Union since the island's membership, and the Cyprus tax system is aligned with European principles of equality within the framework of the European Union Code of Conduct for business taxation and demonstrates a commitment by Cyprus to the

²⁵⁴ Michele Kambas and George Psyllides, 'Party Deserts Cyprus Government, Fiscal Reforms at Risk,' *Reuters*, 3 August 2011, <https://www.reuters.com/article/cyprus-government/update-3-party-deserts-cyprus-govt-fiscal-reforms-at-risk-idUSLDE7720JH20110803>; George Psyllides, 'Fresh Promises as New Cabinet Sworn in,' *Cyprus Mail*, 6 August 2011, <https://archives.cyprus-mail.com/2011/08/06/fresh-promises-as-new-cabinet-sworn-in/>.

OECD against harmful tax practices. In April 2009 the OECD included Cyprus on its original white list as one of only 40 countries in the world that have substantially implemented internationally agreed tax standards. In 2010, Cyprus attracted 3,600 million Euros in Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI"), while in 2009 Cyprus attracted a total of 4,122 million Euros in FDI compared to 2,764 million Euros in 2008 and 1,626 million Euros in 2007. The leading sources of FDI inflows to Cyprus in 2008 by geographical/economic zone were European countries (over 2,357 million Euros), America (187.8 million Euros) and Asia (138.3 million Euros).²⁵⁵ The legal system in Cyprus is based on British Common Law, and all statutes regulating business matters and procedures are based on English Law. British Case Law is also closely followed. In 2010, there were a total of 19,278 new companies registered in Cyprus. At present, Cyprus has, as of July 2011, a total of 247,994 registered companies registered in Cyprus.²⁵⁶

The banking system of Cyprus conforms to EC Directives, under the regulation of the constitutionally independent Central Bank of Cyprus, as integrated with the Euro system. The Bank's governance is compatible with the provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. The Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission ("CySEC") supervises and controls the operation of the Cyprus Stock Exchange and the issuers of securities listed on the Exchange. The Central Bank and CySEC supervise and license the growing number of investment services companies, collective investment schemes, brokerage firms, investment consultants and mutual fund management companies.

4.7 Financial Crisis and Its Effect on Cyprus

In recent years, Cypriot banks have invested heavily in Greek government bonds, and could now risk a hit of more than 1 billion Euros to shoulder their Greek bailout obligations. This could force Cypriot banks to raise capital and potentially deepen the concerns over the island's own sovereign debt. At the end of 2010, Marfin Popular Bank held 3.4 billion Euros of Greek bonds while the Bank of Cyprus held 1.7 billion Euros at the end of May 2011. Neither has yet committed to join a voluntary private sector plan to rescue Greece, whereby investors will take a 21% loss on the country's bonds. Marfin, the biggest overseas creditor, faces a loss of more than 700 million Euros. Marfin had 18.7 billion Euros of loans to Greece at the end of 2010 while Bank of Cyprus had 11.2 billion Euros. There is a risk is that those loans will sour as Greece's austerity plan may fail. Cyprus' banks are still seen as profitable and well regulated, and they have successfully raised capital in the past. The Central Bank and Bank of Cyprus have warned that Cyprus could risk having to turn to the EU and/or the IMF for a bailout if it does not take urgent action to repair its finances. In that case, Cyprus would become the fourth EU member state to request a rescue along with Greece, Ireland and Portugal. However, accounting for only about 0.2% of the 17-nation Euro zone's economy, it is unlikely that Cyprus would strain Europe's resources.²⁵⁷

4.7.1 Destruction of Vasilikos Power Plant

Following the explosion at the Evangelos Florakis Naval Base on 11 July, 2011, and the destruction of the Vasilikos Power Plant, the Cypriot economy has suffered from rolling power cuts as a

²⁵⁵ *Cyprus Investment Promotion Agency - Invest in Cyprus - CIPA*. www.cipa.org.cy.

²⁵⁶ 'Registrar of Companies and Official Receiver Companies Section Statistics,' *Department Registrar of Companies and Official Receiver*, www.mcit.gov.cy

²⁵⁷ Steve Slater, 'Banks Risk One Billion Euro Hit from Greek Rescue,' *Cyprus Mail*, 9 August 2011, www.cyprus-mail.com.

consequence of the explosion. The explosion was caused by negligent storage of 98 containers of ammunitions confiscated by the Cyprus authorities from the Cyprus flagged ship, MV Monchegorsk, in 2009. The ammunition originated from Iran and was intended for the militant group Hezbollah in Syria. The destruction of the plant has cut the EAC output by around 53%.

It has been predicted that Cyprus' GDP will drop 2.4% annually due to the accident. Unemployment is also expected to rise by 1.0 per cent. It has been estimated that the drop in GDP will result in an average loss of €1,400 per household.²⁵⁸ The cost of reconstructing the Vasilikos Power Station will cost around €1 billion. Furthermore, the EAC is expected to run up millions of Euros in costs as it works to install and operate temporary measures to restore electricity.²⁵⁹ Electricity prices are expected to rise as a result of the destruction of the Power Station. The exact figure is yet to be known, and the EAC have assured that any increase would be lower than 10%.²⁶⁰

4.7.2 Rating Agencies

On 27 July 2011, Moody's cut Cyprus' credit rating from A2 to Baa 1 and warned another downgrade was possible. The rating agency highlighted the energy crisis and Cyprus' exposure to Greek debt as the reason for the downgrade.²⁶¹ On 29 July, Standard & Poor's cut the long-term foreign currency credit rating for Cyprus by one notch to BBB-plus, citing inconsistent commitments to spending cuts in the face of declining revenues.²⁶² On 10 August, Ratings Agency Fitch downgraded Cyprus' credit rating two notches to 'BBB', saying the island was headed for an EU bailout despite planned tax hikes and spending cuts to tame a runaway deficit.²⁶³ The agency forecast Cyprus' fiscal deficit would climb to 7% in 2011, jeopardizing the government's ability to fund itself.

4.7.3 EU Commission

On 5 August, Olli Rehn, the European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary affairs, stated that the economy of Cyprus was fundamentally sound even though its public finances were in need of urgent reform. Rehn denied that the island's economy was overly exposed to the situation in Greece. However, Rehn warned Cyprus' new government that it had to take "upfront expenditure-based consolidation measures", reducing the budget deficit by 2012 and adopting a binding, multi-annual budget law.²⁶⁴

4.7.4 Austerity Package

On 10 August, the new Ministerial cabinet drew up a 600 million Euro austerity package including Value Added Tax ("VAT") and income tax hikes as well as spending cuts to shore up its finances.²⁶⁵

²⁵⁸ 'Naval Blast Will Cost Every Household €1,400,' *Cyprus Mail*, 4 August 2011, www.cyprus-mail.com.

²⁵⁹ MEES LIV.30 (2011), *Review of Middle East Energy, Finance & Politics*, www.mees.com.

²⁶⁰ Alexia Saoulli, 'Consumers Kept in the Dark on Electricity Hikes,' *Cyprus Mail*, 19 August 2011, www.cyprus-mail.com.

²⁶¹ Michele Kambas, 'Moody's Cuts Cyprus as Markets Weigh Bailout Risk,' *Reuters*, 27 July 2011, www.reuters.com.

²⁶² 'S&P Cuts Cyprus Credit Rating to BBB-plus,' *Reuters*, 29 July 2011, www.reuters.com.

²⁶³ George Psyllides, 'UPDATE 3-Fitch Downgrades Cyprus despite Austerity Package,' *Reuters*, 10 August 2011, www.reuters.com.

²⁶⁴ Toby Vogel, 'Cyprus's Economy Is 'Sound',' *European Voice*, 5 August 2011, www.europeanvoice.com.

²⁶⁵ 'Cyprus Prepares Austerity Package to Fend off Crisis,' *Reuters*, 10 August 2011, www.reuters.com.

The austerity measures will include a 2 percentage point VAT hike to 17%, an increase in income tax to 35% from 30% for those earning 60,000 Euros per year or more and higher tax on interest on bank deposits. Authorities had previously said that they were aiming at a general government public deficit of 4.0% of GDP or less for 2011, down from a 2010 shortfall of 5.3%. But that forecast was made before the munitions blast on 11 July 2011.

However, the government faces difficulties in getting the package approved in parliament due to opposition majority. The austerity measures have been heavily criticised by the opposition of being too union friendly and not addressing the root cause of the problem.

5. Current International Relations and Risks in the Region

5.1 Turkey

5.1.1 Turkey–Cyprus Dispute

Relations between Cyprus and Turkey have been strained ever since the independence of Cyprus in 1960. The strained relationship primarily derives from Turkey viewing Cyprus as being part of its sphere of strategic interest. In July 1974, a Turkish invasion of Cyprus' northern part took place in response to a Greek military coup inspired by the Junta in Athens. This action resulted in the current UN-monitored 'Green Line' dividing the Republic of Cyprus and the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). To date, Turkey is alone in its recognition of the TRNC and non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. The current dispute between Cyprus and Turkey has put Turkey's EU candidacy and NATO cooperation at risk.




Plate 15: Territory of the 'TRNC'. Source: BBC News

5.1.2 Turkey-Cyprus Maritime Border Dispute

Turkey has made claims to a segment of the EEZ under the Cyprus/Egypt Delimitation Agreement, west of the 32.16.18 parallel. Turkey, a non-party to the 1982 UNCLOS, asserts that its EEZ extends half way between the south coast of Anatolia to Egypt's coast, encroaching on Cyprus EEZ, as agreed with Egypt on the basis of the UNCLOS. Turkey has notified its position to the UN Secretariat (which, as is the practice, simply noted it). Cyprus has protested repeatedly to the Security Council, as well as to the UN Secretariat, and to the EU regarding Turkey's claims.

Turkey's claims are based on the assumption that islands have no continental shelf.²⁶⁶ In this context, the Kastelorizo issue needs to be mentioned. The island of Kastelorizo is a Greek island situated 72 miles east of Rhodes and only 2 km from the Turkish coast. The island has a total surface of 9.2 km² and a population of approximately 400. Greece is making the argument that islands' have a continental shelf extending 12 nautical miles from the island coast. If the Greek argument were to be applied, the EEZ of Greece would connect to that of the Republic of Cyprus, something that Turkey strongly objects to.

In order to prevent this the connection of the Greek and Cypriot EEZs, and the promotion of connecting its own EEZ with that of Egypt, separating Greece and Cyprus, Turkey has asked Egypt to disregard Kastelorizo in its negotiations with Greece. It seems, however, that Egypt is unwilling to accept the Turkish demands and is ready to accept that Kastelorizo has an EEZ.

5.1.3 Turkey's Reaction to Cyprus' Drilling Announcement

The Turkish Government has reacted strongly toward Cypriot exploration within the islands EEZ and Turkey is currently blocking Cyprus' efforts to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), an essential pre-requisite for the state's planned accession to the Paris-based International Energy Agency ("IEA").²⁶⁷

In 2007, Turkey submitted a letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon protesting about an offshore bidding round in February 2007. Turkey claims that the Greek Cypriot administration does not represent the entire island, and, therefore, should not move ahead with its plans for exploration without finding a settlement to the Cyprus problem. Turkey also expressed its opposition to the bilateral agreements made by Cyprus with Lebanon, as well as Egypt, that determines the boundaries of the EEZs. Despite this, Cyprus received full backing from the EU for its actions.²⁶⁸

Turkey's state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation announced in 2007 that it would open international tenders for licenses to explore for hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. The move was seen as a counter measure against the opening of an international licensing round launched by Cyprus.²⁶⁹

Ankara has conveyed its views to the US Embassy in Ankara and the US State Department in Washington, urging the administration to postpone exploration activities by Noble. Turkey also plans to express its concerns to members of the UN Security Council. Cyprus has, however, reaffirmed its stance on the matter stating that Cyprus had begun plans under UNCLOS and it would continue doing so.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁶ Andreas Jacovides, 'Current Issues of the Law of the Sea and Their Relevance to Cyprus,' *European Rim Policy and Investment Council – ERPIC*, 23 June 2009, <https://erp-pic.org/current-relevance-cyprus/>.

²⁶⁷ MEES XLIX.12 (2006), *Review of Middle East Energy, Finance & Politics*, www.mees.com.

²⁶⁸ MEES L.6 (2007), *Review of Middle East Energy, Finance & Politics*, www.mees.com.

²⁶⁹ MEES L.12 (2007), *Review of Middle East Energy, Finance & Politics*, www.mees.com.

²⁷⁰ Alexia Saoulli, 'Nothing Will Stop Drilling,' *Cyprus Mail*, 17 August 2011, www.cyprus-mail.com.

5.2 Egypt

5.2.1 Delimitation Agreement of the EEZ between Cyprus and Egypt

On 17 February 2003, The Republic of Cyprus and the Arab Republic of Egypt agreed to strengthen cooperation by recognizing the importance of the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone for the purpose of mutual development. The treaty determines the delimitation of the EEZ between the two countries by the median line, which is defined by eight points according to the annexed list of geographical coordinates. Taking into consideration article 74 of the UNCLOS. It also provides a possible reviewing or extension of the geographical coordinates in the light of future delimitation of the EEZ with other concerned neighbouring states. The Treaty stipulates cooperation to reach an agreement on the modalities of the joint development and exploitation natural resources, including hydrocarbons reservoirs, extending from the EEZ of one party to the EEZ of the other.




Plate 16: Cyprus-Egypt delimitation agreement: the median line. **Source:** Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism of the Republic of Cyprus

5.2.2 Al-Arish Pipeline

The Arish – Ashkelon pipeline is a 100 km submarine gas pipeline connecting the Arab Gas Pipeline with Israel. Although it is not officially a part of the Arab Gas Pipeline project, it branches off from the same pipeline in Egypt. In 2010, the pipeline supplied approximately 40% of the natural gas consumed in Israel, with the other half being supplied from domestic resources.²⁷¹

²⁷¹ 'Arish-Ashkelon Pipeline,' *Gulf Oil & Gas*, <https://www.gulfoilandgas.com/webpro1/projects/3dreport.asp?id=100808>; Desmond Shephard, 'Egypt to Have Gas Pipeline Fixed within 10 Days,' *Bikya Masr*, 14 July 2011.

The El-Arish terminal has been attacked four times since the regime of uprising President Hosni Mubarak on 11 February 2011.²⁷² The first attack took place at 5 February 2011. As a consequence, the gas to Israel was cut off for the period of 38 days. It was also reported that the gas pipeline to Jordan was damaged in the explosion.²⁷³ Jordan consequently switched its power stations in order to burn fuel oil and diesel as a precautionary measure.²⁷⁴ The second attack took place on the 27 April 2011 halting gas exports to Israel and Jordan once more. As a result; Israel's officials announced that the country intends to cut its reliance on Egyptian natural gas and step up efforts to develop its own gas fields. Israel expressed its view by recalling that the Egyptian revolution might threaten the gas supply to Israel and consequently, will affect the ties between Israel and Egypt.²⁷⁵

A third attack took place on the 4 July 2011,²⁷⁶ followed by a forth attack on the 12 July 2011. Due to the halt of export of gas from Egypt to Israel, Israel's electricity price could rise by 20 per cent as the country shifts to diesel and other expensive fuels. Israel is forced to use its traditional fuels like coal, heavy oil and diesel since Israel's Tamar field in the Mediterranean Sea will not be available until 2013.²⁷⁷

5.3 Lebanon

5.3.1 Delimitation Agreement of the EEZ between Cyprus and Lebanon

Cyprus and Lebanon signed bilateral agreements in January 2007 listed coordinates marking edges of the EEZ. The treaty including clauses allowing for the amendment of said coordinates dependent on future agreements and negotiations with neighboring states, i.e., Israel and Syria. This agreement has since been ratified by Cyprus' Parliament but has yet to pass in Lebanon. Since the Treaty has not been passed by the Lebanese Parliament, it has not been officially published in Cyprus and, therefore, is not available to the public.

5.3.2 Israel-Lebanon Boundary Dispute and Cyprus

The discovery of Tamar and subsequent Leviathan gas field led to quick action on Israel's part in 2009 to parcel 9,600 square kilometers of exploration blocks and issue exploration licenses. In doing so, it appears as if Israel was accounting for possible Israeli-Lebanese EEZ boundaries by angling its northern blocks concurrent to that of probable boundary locations.

²⁷² 'Masked Gunmen Blow Up Egypt Gas Terminal,' *Sky News HD*, 12 July 2011, www.news.sky.com.

²⁷³ 'Terror Attack on Egypt-Israel Gas Pipeline in El-Arish,' *The Jerusalem Post*, 2 May 2011, <https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/terror-attack-on-egypt-israel-gas-pipeline-in-el-arish#:~:text=A%20group%20of%20masked%20men,pipeline%2C%20Egyptian%20state%20televisio n%20reported>.

²⁷⁴ Tom Perry, Edmund Blair, 'Egypt Gas Pipeline Attacked; Israel, Jordan Flow Hit,' *Reuters*, 5 February 2011, <https://uk.reuters.com/article/egypt-gas/egypt-gas-pipeline-attacked-israel-jordan-flow-hit-idUKLDE71406620110205>

²⁷⁵ Heba Saleh, Bekker Vita, 'Gunmen Attack Egyptian Gas Terminal,' *Financial Times*, 27 April 2011, <https://www.ft.com/content/62b270c4-70e0-11e0-9b1d-00144feabdc0>

²⁷⁶ 'Blast Hits Egyptian Gas Pipeline,' *Al Jazeera English*, 4 July 2011, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/07/2011740176861868.html>

²⁷⁷ 'Gunmen Blow up Egypt-Israel Gas Pipeline for Fourth Time This Year,' *The National*, 13 July 2011, <https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/gunmen-blow-up-egypt-israel-gas-pipeline-for-fourth-time-this-year-1.414931>




Plate 17: Cyprus-Lebanon EEZ delimitation: the median line. Source: Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism of the Republic of Cyprus




Plate 18: Israel-Lebanon maritime boundary dispute. Source: Lebanon Wire

The two countries disagree upon the natural resources discovered by Israel at Tamar and Leviathan since the maritime border between Israel and Lebanon has never been delineated. Lebanon and Israel have offered conflicting proposals for the delineation of their EEZs which has caused a dispute that could lead to a military conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. The disputed zone formed by the maritime boundary proposals submitted by Lebanon and Israel consists of approximately 854 km³. Both states have declared that they intend defend their economic interests. For that purpose the Israeli navy reportedly drew up a maritime security plan in December 2011, costing between \$40 million and \$70 million, to defend its gas fields. As the two states remain formally in a state of war and the UN has been asked to mediate. The Israeli line gives it more territory than the one that Lebanon submitted to the UN in October 2010. Lebanon's proposed EEZ boundary begins at Ras Naqoura, which marks the land border between Lebanon and Israel, and ends at Point 23 which lies 133 km from the coast at an average angle of 291 degrees. This line conforms to the northern edges of two of Israel's oil and gas exploration blocks, named Alon E and Alon F. It also matches a line of buoys unilaterally placed by the Israelis stretching from Ras Naqoura which is patrolled by Israeli naval vessels. Lebanese army geographers determined the location of Point 23 based on a standard cartographic rule of measuring a maritime boundary coordinate that is equidistant between three points on land. As such, Point 23 lies 133 km not only from Ras Naqoura, but also from the Akrotiri peninsula in Cyprus and from the promontory of Haifa in Israel. Israel's line also begins from Ras Naqoura (albeit 35 meters north of Lebanon's starting point) and stretches 127 km at 298 degrees to terminate at Point 1, which lies 17 km north east of Lebanon's Point 23. Point 1 marks the beginning of the respective EEZ agreements Lebanon and Israel have with Cyprus. Lebanon's EEZ boundary with Cyprus heads north east from Point 1 and Israel's boundary with Cyprus runs southwest from Point 1. Israel justifies adopting Point 1 as its most westerly marker in its EEZ boundary proposal with Lebanon based upon Beirut's previous EEZ agreement with Cyprus. The EEZ agreement between Cyprus and Israel as well as the agreement between Cyprus and Lebanon contain a clause leaving open the possibility of amending Point 1 in the future depending on negotiations with a third party. Lebanon has shown some flexibility in seeking a mediated solution to the dispute. However, Lebanon's ability to act is limited by its refusal to negotiate directly with Israel, a country with which it is in a state of war and has never formally recognized.²⁷⁸

5.3.3 Lebanon Licensing Round

Since enacting the Offshore Petroleum Resources Law in August 2010, the Lebanese Ministry of Energy and Water is expected to launch its first licensing round in the first quarter of 2012.

5.4 Syria

5.4.1 World Reaction to Events in Syria

Syria is engaged in a bloody civil uprising stemming from the pro-democratic Arab Spring currently underway in the Middle East and North Africa. Although Syrian-Cypriot agreements remain in place, the uncertainty of Syria's political future may undermine said agreements. In

²⁷⁸ Blanford, Nicholas, 'Diplomacy is Key to Maritime Border Dispute', *Daily Star*, 27 July 2011, <https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2011/Jul-27/144722-diplomacy-is-key-to-maritime-border-dispute.ashx>.

2011, Syria signed an initial cooperation agreement with Iran regarding natural gas. According to the report of the public relations of the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC), the Iranian gas pipeline will procure energy needs of Iraq and Syria and by passing through the territories of these two countries, which is connected to the Mediterranean Sea, via south Lebanon and then to Europe.²⁷⁹ Iran will start exporting 3 to 5 million cubic meters of gas per day to Syria by the end of 2011.²⁸⁰ The construction of the 5600-km pipeline will be done jointly between Iraq, Syria and Iran.²⁸¹ The pipeline will be 56 inches in diameter and is projected to cost 5-6 billion dollar. The pipeline will ultimately have the capacity to transfer 110 million cubic meters of gas per day.²⁸²

5.4.2 Syria's Licensing Round

On 27 June 2007, The Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources and the Syrian Petroleum Company (S.P.C) announced the first Syrian offshore licensing round covering four blocks totaling an area of 5000 km³. Only one bid was submitted, however, no blocks were awarded. On 24 March 2011, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources and the General Petroleum Corporation (GPC) of Syria announced a second offshore licensing round for three offshore blocks totaling 9038 km³. The bid closing date is 5 October 2011.²⁸³

5.5 Israel

5.5.1 Israeli-Turkish Relations

5.5.1.1 Mavi Marmara

In May 2010, the Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation owned Mavi Marmara set sail from Cyprus and became the center of attention when Israeli naval commandos attempted to seize the vessel as part of the Gaza flotilla raid. During the clash, nine activists, including seven Turkish nationals, were killed. Turkey has since demanded, but yet not received, a full apology and compensation from Israel. As a result relations between Turkey and Israel has deteriorated and created a diplomatic vacuum between the two states, leaving room for increased cooperation between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece. Following the Gaza flotilla incident, the Cyprus government has denied port access to all Gaza-bound boats operated by the Cyprus-based Free Gaza Movement, increasing the ties between Cyprus and Israel.

5.5.2 Improvement in Israeli-Greek Relations

Escalating Israeli-Turkish tension has proven favorable for Israeli-Greek relations. In August 2010, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Greece, the first Israeli Prime Minister to do so, with the goal of developing new forms of cooperation on defense and security issues.²⁸⁴ Accordingly, Israeli and Greek Air Force personnel completed a series of joint military exercises just two months later. Such actions are certain to lessen Israeli-Turkish military, intelligence,

²⁷⁹ 'Iran to Host a Trilateral Meeting,' *National Iranian Gas Company*, 9 February 2011, www.iraniangas.ir.

²⁸⁰ 'Iran to start gas export to Syria in 2011,' *National Iranian Gas Company*, 12 March 2011, www.iraniangas.ir.

²⁸¹ 'Syria, Iraq to transfer gas from Iran to Europe,' *National Iranian Gas Company*, 14 February 2011, www.iraniangas.ir.

²⁸² 'Iran to sign gas deal with Iraq and Syria,' *National Iranian Gas Company*, 11 May 2011, www.iraniangas.ir.

²⁸³ 'Syrian Arab Republic Opens an International Bid Round for Three Offshore Blocks,' *Deloitte*, www.psg.deloitte.com.

²⁸⁴ Allyn Fisher-Ilan, 'Israel and Greece Seek to Expand Military Ties,' *Reuters*, 17 August 2010, <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE67G1FV>.

and economic dimensions, allowing Greece to fill the vacuum and signaling a change in political and economic relations between Israel, Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus.

5.5.3 Delimitation Agreement of the EEZ between Cyprus and Israel

On 17 December 2010, The Republic of Cyprus and the State of Israel agreed to strengthen mutual cooperation by recognizing the importance of the delimitation of the EEZ for the purpose of mutual development.

The Treaty determines the delimitation of the EEZ between the two countries by the median line, which is defined by twelve points according to the annexed list of geographical coordinates. Taking into consideration article 74 of the UNCLOS, the Treaty provides a possible reviewing or extension of the geographical coordinates in the light of future delimitation of the EEZ with other concerned neighbouring states. It also stipulates cooperation to reach an agreement on the modalities of the joint development and exploitation natural resources, including hydrocarbons reservoirs, extending from the EEZ of one party to the EEZ of the other State.




Plate 19: Cyprus-Israel EEZ delimitation: the median line. Source: Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism of the Republic of Cyprus

5.5.4 Future of Israeli-Cypriot Relations in Hydrocarbon Exploration

With exemption to Egypt, the Arab League refuses to export oil and gas to Israel who has become isolated from its oil-rich neighbors. To accommodate the lack of gas, Israel has been burning

coal, primarily imported from South Africa. As Egypt's political future is uncertain, future natural gas imports may very well be cut off. With the relationship between Israel and Turkey deteriorating, Israeli oil and gas companies have found it difficult to secure an outlet for their potential exports of natural gas from the Leviathan and other fields. Therefore, the possibility of establishing an LNG facility in Cyprus in order to export Israeli gas to the international market would allow Israeli companies to overcome a potentially cumbersome regulatory process in Israel, while benefiting from EU status when shipping into Europe. In March 2011, President Christofias met with the Israeli Prime minister, President, and Foreign Minister in order to discuss political and economic cooperation with an emphasis on exploitation of hydrocarbons and possible transportation of natural gas from the Leviathan reservoir to the EU via Cyprus. A potential Israel-Cyprus gas venture would provide substantial quantities of natural gas to Europe, which the Nabucco pipeline is unlikely to ever deliver.

6. International Energy Companies and Their Activities in Cyprus

6.1 Introduction

There are many international oil and gas companies that either are established or have connections to Cyprus by way of holding or investment companies. The following Section has provides a short-list of companies that have shown interest, or are actively participating in the hydrocarbon developments in Cyprus.

6.2 BG Group PLC

In December 2010, media reported that Britain's BG Group Plc, together with the Korea Gas Corporation, were the preferred bidders for the role of strategic partner in construction of the LNG Re-gas Terminal at the Vasilikos Energy Center. It was also reported that the BG Group had indicated that it would withdraw its offer if it was not chosen as the LNG supplier for Terminal.²⁸⁵ As a result, the Korea Gas Corporation was left as the only bidder for role as joint venture partner with the EAC.

6.3 British Petroleum

BP has been active in Cyprus since 1972. BP was, together with Royal Dutch Shell and the BG Group, one of the companies short listed by DEFA in the bid for supplying Cyprus with LNG to the LNG Re-gas Terminal. It has been suggested that BP are interested in bidding for Blocks 03 and 13, abutting the Lebanese border, in the upcoming bidding round in Cyprus.²⁸⁶

6.4 Chevron

In July, 2009, Cyprus media reported that Chevron had shown interest in exploring the area around Cyprus. This was also confirmed by the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism at

²⁸⁵ Stelios Orphanides, 'BG, Korea Gas Lead Bidding for Cyprus LNG Terminal, Politis Says,' *Bloomberg*, 31 December 2010, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-12-31/bg-korea-gas-lead-bidding-for-cyprus-lng-terminal-politis-says>.

²⁸⁶ Cable 07NICOSIA675, 17 August 2007, Raw data, US Embassy Nicosia, Nicosia.

the time.²⁸⁷ As of this date, there has not been any update to this information.

6.5 Comtrack Ventures Ltd.

Comtrack Ventures Ltd. is an Oil & Gas Exploration and Production Company based in and managed from Cyprus since 1995. It has been involved in offshore exploration in West Africa and the North Sea. The principle activities of Comtrack are investments in upstream oil and gas projects, by establishing or acquiring subsidiary or associated companies, which participate in oil & gas exploration licenses.²⁸⁸ Comtrack holds 51% of EastMed Energy Ventures Ltd, a company registered in the British Virgin Islands for the purpose of participating in hydrocarbon exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, focusing on opportunities offshore Lebanon and Syria. The company is also paying close attention to developments in Cyprus. The remaining 49% of EastMed Energy Ventures Ltd., is held by Cypriot individuals.²⁸⁹

6.6 Delek Group Ltd.

The Delek Group Ltd., founded in 1951, is one of the largest corporations in Israel by market capitalization, and has been listed on the TASE since 2000. Delek's core focus is on energy, and infrastructure through the exploration, development and production of oil and natural gas in Israel, sales and marketing of refined petroleum products in Israel, Europe and the U.S., and crude oil refining in the U.S., as well as the design and project management of desalination facilities in Israel and globally, and the development of independent power plants principally in Israel. Delek is a long time partner of US based Noble and their operations in Israel. In January 2009, Delek announced its intent to acquire a 30% stake in Noble's Block 12 offshore Cyprus, and submitted an application to the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism in mid-2011. Both Cypriot and international media has reported that Delek have plans for the development of an LNG export facility at the Vasilikos Energy Center. The facility would process natural gas for export purposes, received from the Israeli Leviathan field and Block 12. The facility would also have ample space for third party access.²⁹⁰

6.7 Gazprom

Cyprus is preferred investment jurisdiction for many Russian businesses, including Gazprom, who controls many of its investments out of Cyprus. In 2009, Gazprombank, founded by Gazprom in 1990 to provide banking services to the gas industry, established a wholly owned Investment Firm, GPB Financial Services Ltd., in Cyprus.²⁹¹ In 2008, the Cyprus government was negotiating with Gazprom about purchasing LNG on several occasions.²⁹² Gazprom had shown interest in the Cypriot request. However, no reports were ever made that Gazprom had submitted any bids for supplying Cyprus with LNG. It is, however, likely that Gazprom will show interest in

²⁸⁷ "Chevron to Search for Gas and Oil off Cyprus," *Cyprus Weekly*, 18 July 2009, <http://www.cyprusweekly.com.cy/main/92,1,283,0,1912-.aspx>

²⁸⁸ *Comtrack Ventures Ltd.*, <http://www.comtrackventures.com/>

²⁸⁹ *MEES* LIV.21 (2011). *Review of Middle East Energy, Finance & Politics*, www.mees.com.

²⁹⁰ 'Cyprus: Transportation of gas from Block12,' 17 April 2011, Pegasus Network, www.ethnos.gr; 'Proposal for Cheap Gas Made by Noble Energy,' *Phile News*, 15 April 2011; *MEES* LIV.30 (2011). *Review of Middle East Energy, Finance & Politics*, www.mees.com.

²⁹¹ *GPB Financial Services Limited*, www.gpbs.com.cy.

²⁹² Kerin Hope, Delphine Strauss, 'LNG Talks with Gazprom Raise Heat on Cyprus,' *Financial Times*, 7 December 2008, <https://www.ft.com/content/5808761a-c48e-11dd-8124-000077b07658>.

the next bidding round.²⁹³

6.8 ITERIA Oil and Gas Company

ITERA was established in 1992 and has been involved in marketing natural gas since 1994. The company has nearly 150 representative offices, branches, and affiliated companies in Russia, the CIS, the Baltic States, Europe, and the USA. The ITERA Group controls the ITERA Group Ltd. (Cyprus) which owns ITERA Holdings Limited (Cyprus) which in turns holds 99.99% of ITERA Oil and Gas Company, LLC.²⁹⁴ ITERA Oil and Gas Company Ltd. is the parent company of the Cyprus based company Suntera Resources Limited (see 6.12).

6.9 Jasper Offshore (Cyprus) Ltd.

Jasper Offshore (Cyprus) Ltd. is the holding company of Singapore based Jasper Offshore, an offshore drilling contractor that provides drilling services to the oil and gas industry. The company owns and operates mobile offshore drilling units, including Neptune Explorer and Neptune Finder. It also offers project and operational management services. The company was originally established in 2005 as Neptune Marine Oil & Gas, but changed its name to Jasper Offshore (Cyprus) Ltd. in March 2010. Jasper Offshore (Cyprus) Ltd operates as a subsidiary of Jasper Investments Limited.²⁹⁵

6.10 Lukoil Cyprus Ltd.

LUKOIL began its commercial activities in Cyprus in 2002 as Lukoil Cyprus Limited. Lukoil Cyprus Ltd. At present, Lukoil controls 33 gas stations in Cyprus, controlling around 12% of oil-products market in Cyprus. Lukoil Cyprus Ltd is aiming to double the market share with 20 more new gas stations and sales around 7.3 tons of oil products per gas station/per day. Lukoil Cyprus Ltd is one of the biggest investors in the economy of the Republic of Cyprus.²⁹⁶

6.11 Noble Energy International

Noble has been operating in the Mediterranean Sea, offshore Israel, since 1998. In December 2008, and as part of the process of being awarded the license for Block 12, Noble incorporated a 100% owned subsidiary in Cyprus. At present, Noble has confirmed 234 bcf in its eastern Mediterranean fields. Out of the total 65 Blocks issued by the Israeli Government offshore Israel, 19 are held by Noble, together with the Delek. Noble is intending to commence drilling in Block 12 by the first week of October 2011.

6.12 Royal Dutch Shell

The Cyprus government had chosen Shell for the supply of LNG to the proposed LNG Re-gas Terminal at the Vasilikos Energy Centre. According to information leaked to the media, the target price set by EAC was around \$7.0 per million Btu, while the final price agreed with Shell was over \$11 per million Btu. Despite the discrepancy, Shell's bid of \$6.2 billion (€4.6 billion) for 20 years

²⁹³ 'Proposal for Cheap Gas Made by Noble Energy,' *Phile News*, 15 April 2011, www.philenews.com

²⁹⁴ ITERA Group, 'ITERA International Group of Companies,' www.itera.ru

²⁹⁵ 'Jasper Offshore (Cyprus) Ltd: Private Company Information,' *BusinessWeek*, www.businessweek.com

²⁹⁶ *Lukoil Cyprus Ltd*, www.lukoil.com.cy.

was deemed as the most advantageous.²⁹⁷ It is uncertain whether the Cyprus Government is willing to proceed with the purchase of LNG under the terms agreed with Shell following the destruction of the Vasilikos Power Plant. However, taken the amount of interest that Shell has invested into the development of the natural gas industry in Cyprus, it is likely that Shell intends to participate in the upcoming bidding round.

6.13 Sheer Energy (Cyprus) Ltd.

Sheer Energy (Cyprus) Ltd. is based in Nicosia, Cyprus. As of August 23, 2004, Sheer Energy (Cyprus) Ltd. is a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation.

6.14 Suntera Resources Ltd.

Suntera Resources Ltd. is a Cyprus based company engaged in exploration and production of oil and gas. Suntera Resources Ltd. was incorporated in 2005 and is based in Nicosia. The company operates as a subsidiary of ITERA Oil and Gas Company Ltd. and SUN Energy Limited.²⁹⁸

6.15 Vanco Group

The Vanco Group is a Texas based oil and gas exploration and production organization with projects and interest's offshore West Africa and the Black Sea. Vanco Overseas Energy Ltd. is the holding company for the Vanco Overseas Energy Group. The shareholders of Vanco Overseas Energy Ltd. are a subsidiary of Reserve Invest Holding (Cyprus) Limited, a member of the IFD Kapital Group, and the Vanco Energy Company. The IFD Kapital Group is one of the leading diversified groups in Russia with equity of US\$4.9 billion and investments in oil and energy industries with offices over most of the regions of Russia as well as in Ukraine and Cyprus.

6.16. Vitol Tank Terminals International

Vitol Tank Terminals International ("VTTI") has started building an oil product terminal and a jetty facility at the Vasilikos area. Built in three phases, it will offer a total capacity of 900,000 m³ across 43 tanks serving as a regional trading hub while supplying the domestic market in Cyprus with truck access to a loading rack. It is currently set to cost €200M. VTTI is based in Rotterdam and is owned 50/50 by the Vitol Group and MISC Berhad of Malaysia. VTTI operates 11 terminals in The Netherlands, Latvia, Russia, United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, USA, Belgium, Nigeria, and Argentina with a total capacity 5,857,000 Cubic Meters ("cbm"). Estimated at over €100 million, Phase 1 of the project is scheduled for completion in the second half of 2012 with a start-up of the terminal date in early 2013. It will provide 345,000 cubic meters of storage for gasoline, gas oil, jet fuel and fuel oil. VTTI has secured a long term lease with Hellenic Mining Company (EME) and leased 59,000 sq ms of land from the Church of Cyprus for the construction of the terminal. It has contracted Cyprus' Joannou & Paraskevaides to build the facility. A ground breaking ceremony took place in January 2011 and civil and ground works and engineering activities for jetty construction have begun. Phase 2 will increase the terminal's capacity to 550,000 cubic meters and 19 tanks resulting in an approximate investment of more than €200 million. Focused on acquiring land for a Phase 2 expansion in order to meet significant demand from local marketers, VTTI is looking to acquire adjacent plots or to land-reclamation on the

²⁹⁷ 'Call for Resignation over LNG,' *Cyprus Mail*, 15 January 2011, <https://archives.cyprius-mail.com/2011/01/15/call-for-resignation-over-lng/>.

²⁹⁸ 'Suntera Resources Limited: Private Company Information,' www.businessweek.com.

shoreline.²⁹⁹ Despite being constructed in the same area as the Vasilikos Energy center, VTTI does not make part of the governments intended plans for the area.

²⁹⁹ 'VTTI News,' *VTTI: Terminals With More Energy*, www.vtti.com; 'VTTI Seeks Expanded Operations Area At Vassiliko Terminal Site,' *MEES*, Vol. LIII, No. 51, 20 December 2010, www.mees.com.

ENERGY BRIEF

Gary Lakes*
28 August 2011

International Sanctions against the Syrian Oil Industry

President Bashar al-Assad continues to crack down on demonstrators, with more than 2,200 civilians reported killed after five months of civil unrest.

Earlier this month, US President Barak Obama signed an executive order that froze assets held by the Syrian government in the US and banned the import of Syria crude oil or petroleum products of Syrian origin. The move is largely symbolic in that the US does not import crude from Syria. President Obama's action follows calls by a number of Congressional representatives who urged the president to take some action in response to the violence perpetrated against civilians in Syria. It also follows the introduction in 2004 of sanctions against Damascus imposed by then President George W. Bush. US oil companies operating in Syria at that time exited the country and there has been almost no connection between the US and Syrian oil industries since.

European sanctions, however, could cost Damascus serious concern. Depending on the strength of EU sanctions, European refineries and trading companies could also feel the brunt. Germany and Italy are the main importers of Syria crude and the UK's Shell and France's Total have large stakes in the Syrian crude operations through the Al-Furat Petroleum Company (AFPC) and Deir al-Zour Petroleum Company respectively.

Syria is producing around 380,000 bpd of crude oil. Last year, Europe received around 160,000 bpd of the country's exports. An EU ban of oil trade with Syria would create a serious cash flow problem for the state, but already Damascus has begun to look for new markets in east Asia, notably China and India.

** Journalist; Director, Energy Program, ERPIC*

BRIEFING NOTE

Gary Lakes*
3 September 2011

Turkish Threats over Cyprus Gas Exploration

Turkey's Minister for European Affairs Egemen Bagis on September 2 threatened that Ankara would send its warships to stop US-owned Noble Energy from drilling in Cyprus' exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Noble Energy was awarded a production sharing contract by the government of Cyprus in 2008 for Block 12 as the result of a 2007 licensing round. Noble plans to start drilling in the Aphrodite field in Block 12 as early as October 1.

Turkey claims that exploration activity by Cyprus is illegal. The Cyprus EEZ is recognized internationally as the island's legal offshore territory.

During the last two years, Houston-based Noble Energy has made two significant discoveries in the Israeli EEZ, Tamar and Leviathan. Both lie less than 100 kilometers from Block 12, in which Noble's main Israeli partner, the Delek Group, has a 30% option. The situation is complicated by the current diplomatic dispute between Turkey and Israel over a May 2010 raid by Israeli commandoes on a flotilla of ships embarked from Turkey and bound for the blockaded Gaza Strip. Nine Turkish citizens were killed when the ships were intercepted. Turkey has demanded an apology from Israel, but Israel refuses to do so. On September 2, following the release of a UN report on the affair, Turkey expelled the Israeli ambassador.

Since Cyprus began to explore its offshore territory earlier this decade, Turkey has objected, sending warships into the area at times in the past. Cyprus has signed maritime delimitation agreements with Egypt, Israel and Lebanon, although the deal with Lebanon has yet to be sanctioned by the Lebanese parliament. Turkey has previously rejected these agreements. It claims its offshore territory in the east Mediterranean extends as far south as Egyptian waters.

An announcement by the Cyprus Energy Department earlier this summer that Noble Energy would begin to drill in Block 12 on or before October 1 led Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to state that Ankara would take "the appropriate reaction" if drilling went ahead.

In response to the renewed threats by Turkey, Cypriot Foreign Minister Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis visited Greece and Israel to garner support for the start of the drilling program. While

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in Jerusalem, Ms. Marcoullis met with Israeli President Shimon Peres, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, all of whom expressed their support for Cyprus offshore exploration. It was later announced that President Peres would visit Cyprus in the autumn.

Cyprus, which has signed the UN International Law of the Sea, while Turkey has not, also received expressions of support from the US and Russia. Nicosia has also made representations to the EU, of which it is a member, regarding Turkey's statements. Ms. Marcoullis was in Poland on September 2 attending a gathering of EU foreign ministers, where she was expected to further present the situation.

Earlier this year, Noble Energy and the Delek Group made a proposal to the government of Cyprus that an LNG export facility be built in Cyprus that would process both Israeli gas from the Leviathan field and any natural gas discovered offshore Cyprus. The proposal called for a \$10 billion investment in a facility that would produce 15 million tons/year of LNG and come into operation in 2020.

BRIEFING NOTE

Gary Lakes*
17 September 2011

Turkish Naval Activity in Cyprus EEZ

US energy firm Noble Energy moved the Homer Ferrington drilling rig into Block 12 off the southern coast of Cyprus on 16 September in preparation for drilling the first well in the island's maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Working under a production sharing contract awarded by the Republic of Cyprus in 2008 as the result of a 2007 licensing round, Noble Energy is expected to start drilling before October 1 on a structure that is estimated to hold some 10 trillion cubic meters of natural gas.

The advent of the Houston-based company drilling in Cyprus' internationally recognized sector of the eastern Mediterranean has enraged Turkey, which refuses to recognize EU-member Cyprus as a sovereign state. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and other Turkish officials have warned Cyprus with military action if it continues to explore for hydrocarbons in the region on the premise that any discovered resources also belong to the Turkish-Cypriots.

Turkey maintains the largest military force in NATO and a large navy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus on the other hand maintains only a limited coast guard and no blue water navy.

While Cypriot officials have stated on several occasions that any hydrocarbons found within the EEZ will be used to the benefit of both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, Ankara has insisted that exploration work should stop.

The arrival of the drilling rig offshore southern Cyprus prompted the Turkish-Cypriots to warn that they would launch their own offshore exploration program. Also Turkey announced that it would begin exploration in a region of the Mediterranean that is claimed by Greece.

Turkish warships followed the Homer Ferrington rig as it was moved from Israel's Noa North field into Cypriot waters.

The rig is located some 200 kilometers south of Cyprus and is anchored in a depth of around 1,700 meters in a field named Aphrodite after the mythical Greek goddess who made Cyprus her

** Journalist; Director, Energy Program, ERPIC*

home. The Aphrodite field lies less than 100 kilometers from two significant gas discoveries made by Noble in the Israeli offshore during the last two years. Those gas discoveries will provide Israel with enough gas to meet domestic demand for several decades, plus make it a potential energy exporter.

Nicosia has stated that its actions in the Eastern Mediterranean are in accordance with its rights as a sovereign state operating under international law. Cyprus is a signatory of the International Law of the Sea while Turkey is not. In an effort to counter Turkey's threats, Cypriot officials have sought and received support from the European Union, the US, Britain, Russia and Israel. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has repeatedly pledged that under a federaly unified Cypurs any natural resources would benefit all Cypriots.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Euthymious Petrou**

20 September 2011

Assessing Turkey's Threats Regarding the Eastern Mediterranean and Israeli and Greek Responses

We have to deal with a situation in Eastern Mediterranean as it develops after the recent events. So we may assess that the situation appears dangerous. The escalation of a crisis should be considered very likely. Turkey appears aggressive, no matter that the international community is reacting to these aggressive declarations by Prime Minister Erdogan and other state officials. At the same time, it's quite difficult to predict what their real intentions are, and to which extent they intend to go on a crisis escalation or to undertake military action to deter Cyprus and Israel from continuing the research.

Up to few years ago it was quite easy to assess the military threat from Turkey. We knew very well the ways of the old-fashioned Kemalist (inaudible). We knew that they were afraid of a defeat. So, if escalating a crisis, they had to be a 100% certain that they are going to win. A potential failure might be catastrophic not for the military forces themselves, but for the very heart of the Turkish society. The respect to the armed forces was the core of the Kemalist regime. Now, recently, for the first time, we have a leadership of the Turkish armed forces not coming from the Kemalist core. They are of the absolute choice of Prime Minister Erdogan. And the resignations of the previous chiefs are a serious indication that the armed forces at least are not under the control of the so-called Kemalists anymore. So we don't know this new front of the government and the military leadership of Islamic (sic) origin how this is going to work, and to what extent they are going to be risky.

At the same time, the Turkish government using also the hostility with Israel and the support given to the Palestinians appears trying to have a leading role for the Muslim world and at least to become a regional power in the Eastern Mediterranean. This policy indeed leads Turkey away from the spirit of the collective security organizations of the Western world. However, Turkey insists to maintain her place in these organizations requesting as many benefits as possible out of all the allies in both sides of the Atlantic.

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

** *Former Advisor to the Greek Ministry of Defense*

Let me mention at this point that recently Turkey agreed to have in her soil one of the radars of the anti-ballistic defense system. Anti-ballistic defense is supposedly to protect the area from the potential threat from Iran. Iran indeed has ballistic missiles, however we are not certain whether they possess mass destruction weapons so far. In any case this is something worrying Israel very much. And that's why the anti-ballistic defense project in Eastern Mediterranean has a center in the protection of Israel. Turkey continues to participate in that project as deeply as possible. I have to mention that so far to maintain an efficient anti-ballistic capability in the Eastern Mediterranean the US navy has nine ships on the rotation patrolling. So it seems that by two land bases, one in Turkey, and another one I don't know where, they may reduce these ships to three. So it's interesting for them. And I'm sure that the Turks when agreeing to facilitate (inaudible), they are going to ask something in return – they always do.

Now, it seems that the relations between Greece and Turkey have improved. However, this to me appears just on the surface. Turkey feels strong militarily, and for that reason doesn't pay much attention. From the other hand they continue to have the violations of the airspace and of the FIR of Athens almost every day. They just had a week break during the Ramadan celebrations.

On the other hand, we have a completely new geopolitical situation in the Middle East with the so-called Arabic Spring. It seems that Israel should re-evaluate completely its doctrine and its strategic priorities. Egypt is in a transition period with expected political instability and there are the so-called anti-Zionist feelings of the Egyptian population coming to surface. We've had many examples of that recently. So after almost thirty years, Israel should start worrying about its southern borders, it should start worrying about the Palestinians in Gaza Strip receiving aid from Egypt, etc. And they still have the problem with Hezbollah in the north. And Hezbollah proved to be quite strong, recently.

Now, the diplomatic field in the few days in Israel has to face the effort of the Palestinians to be accepted as a member of the United Nations. We expect that in the General Assembly of the international organization, Turkey will try to take the lead of the Islamic countries to gather support for Mahmoud Abbas in his effort. And in the midst of this situation Cyprus is going through one of its worst periods politically after the tragic explosion at the Florakis naval base. But at the same time, there is quite instability in the financial side because the Cypriot banking system is closely connected with the shrinking economy of Greece. Also, for some years the defense spending in Cyprus has been dramatically reduced as well as has the training of the personnel. And there is always the problem of the UN-sponsored talks which may present additional diplomatic problems.

Greece, on the other hand, appears to rely exclusively on the diplomatic efforts and the so-called international community to support her case. Few days ago, after the meeting of defense ministers of Greece and Cyprus, the Greek Minister Panos Beglitis stressed that Greece's stance to respect the international legislation and agreements created a strong front of solidarity with the countries of the EU, the USA, countries of Eastern Mediterranean, Russia and the international organizations. That's were exactly his words. He added that he hopes the Turkish administration will see the need to respect international legality. Apart from that, this government of Greece as well as the previous one undermined the efficiency of the armed forces as well as the morale of the personnel. Regarding the doctrine of the unified defense space

between Greece and Cyprus, this typically still exists as part of the national security policy. However, nobody can be certain whether the armed forces can really support that. And under these circumstances that means that the deterrence capability is reduced. And we know very well that diplomacy is not very effective if not supported by the military might.

Now, on the other hand, Turkey trying to become the regional power as we said has two things to do. First, as I stated, they are increasing their patrols in the Eastern Mediterranean using their navy. And here is the risk of a crisis escalation. I don't like to use the popular word 'a hot incident', because 'a hot incident' is something coming out of control. It's something that may happen, if one or the other side is not in absolute control of the developments. What, however, is under control is a crisis. And a country may escalate a crisis on purpose. So this is what we may expect in this case from Turkey if they decide to go that far. To deal with the crisis you need a mechanism. And it seems that the ministry of foreign affairs should be very aware and should be on alert. Crisis management is a foreign policy affair. If it becomes a military affair, it means that we have a really serious situation.

Now, apart from that Turkey is trying to support her own defense industry capabilities. And this is a policy that started few years ago. They tried to produce as many defense system as they can by themselves. And there is a problem in the Turkish-Israeli relationship, because they relied quite a lot on the Israeli defense industry. It seems, however, that Erdogan's administration considers that Israel is gaining too much and Turkey too little. They are blaming the Israelis that they are not firm in their commitment to support and maintain the defense system they have sold to Turkey. This may be true or may not. What is also true is that Israel has become dependent on Turkey, has become for the last fifteen years or more a good market for the Israeli defense industry. And this is the reason for which Tel Aviv is so concerned today for the future of its relationship with Turkey. The governor of the Israeli Central Bank is pointing out that the cost for the Israeli economy will be too much. However, it seems that the situation is not anymore in the hands of bankers and businessmen in this case, and that Israel should face the new reality that they have to deal with the international market without Turkey among their clients. I have to note that Israel is the third major supplier of Turkish armed forces after the United States and Germany. United States have supported almost 30% of the Turkish military equipment, while Israel is offering some 10%, which is quite considerable.

Now, in the process of becoming independent, it seems that the Turks are also copying the Israeli industry. I've seen myself last week a copy of a new weapon developed supposedly by Turkey. It's a missile, air-to-ground missile with the range of 185km. It looks identical with the Israeli Popeye missile. The Turks have bought forty six Popeye missiles from Israel. It seems that the Turks are trying to continue on their way by copying Israeli systems so that they can support those already in their arsenal.

Having said so much about the Turkish might and the Turkish intentions, I have to point out something which is slightly good news, at least for the next couple of years to come. The Turks do not really have the military superiority in the area. Yes, they have now new kind of problems in their borders. But they have to deal with them with their army. Why? In the Eastern Mediterranean they may use their air force and their navy. And these forces are not connected with whatever happens in their northern or southern borders.

At the same time, it's useful to have a look at the balance of power between Greece and Turkey in the air, because this is the main field in the Aegean and might be in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is true that Turkey has slightly more fighter aircrafts than the Greek air force. They have 209 F16s, 51 F4 Phantoms, which have been modernized in Israel. Some 60 non-modernized F4s which gives a total of 310 fighter aircraft. The Greek air force has today 159 F16s, forty five Mirage 2000s, 35 modernized F4s and some 40 A7s. That's a total of 280 fighter aircrafts. It's a difference of 30 aircrafts – not very important. But if we will put out of the picture the non-modernized F4s of the Turkish air force and the obsolete A7s of the Hellenic air force, then the first line air crafts are for Turkey 260, and for Greece 240. That's 20 air craft- difference, which is not very critical. However, Greece has at the moment a very clear superiority in terms of quality. That's because the Hellenic air force has in service fighter air crafts of increased capabilities. Turkey doesn't possess any for the moment. Of course, they have modernized some F16 but they have not started deliveries of the modernized ones.

Greece has 5 squadrons of air crafts of increased capability. That means four squadrons of F16s Blk 52, eight (*inaudible*) aircrafts, and one squadron of Mirage 2000-5 which is twenty five air crafts. These five squadrons (*inaudible*) are making the difference quality-wise. The F16 Block 52+ have radar SAR – synthetic aperture radars. They are very improved in comparison with all the others of the previous generation of F16s. Talking about air-to-ground attack very simply the SAR radar makes any existing type of camouflage and concealment obsolete. All the camouflage nets cannot cover anything from an SAR radar. Just some developments have started (*inaudible*) better concealment techniques able (*inaudible*). Additionally these radars have increased performance in the air combat and they allow better use of the long range AMRAAM air-to-air missiles. So they are better also in the long-range air engagement which means air superiority.

They also can have the combination of the shorter-range missile (*inaudible*) with (*inaudible*) JHMCS which allows the (*inaudible*) to track and (*inaudible*) the target without necessarily being exactly at the tail of the aircraft, has more flexibility and more agility. So the Greek F16s are more efficient in the (*inaudible*). So it seems that for few years in the future the superiority will continue to exist.

Mirage 2000 (*inaudible*) they have also an excellent and increased capability radars, they have the (*inaudible*) missiles which are good air combat long-range missiles, and also they are (*inaudible*) to the strategic (*inaudible*), a long-range strategic missile able to hit targets deep inside the (*inaudible*). Additionally, these two types of aircrafts have the capability to exchange data between them using (*inaudible*), and so have increased the situation awareness which is very important, especially for the air combat. Greece started also using the Airborne early warning system (*inaudible*). These flying radars, as we call them, have a typical range of 360 km and they can also (*inaudible*) data link to pass the image to fighter aircrafts to increase their agility and capability.

Maybe Turkey will start (*inaudible*) some such capability (*inaudible*) in the year 2012 having in service the first modernized F16 (*inaudible*). Again, these aircrafts (*inaudible*) all the aircrafts. Just being modernized, not very compatible with the newly (*inaudible*) fighter aircrafts. So we will continue to have for a while the superiority in the air.

The future may, however, have some surprises. Because I'm afraid that Greece has no plans for the future. Greece chose some thirteen years ago the Eurofighter as their next generation fighter aircraft. But so far did not continue with the program. But the Turks are in the program of the F35 JSF aircraft. To my view, this is not a great threat. I have followed the development of this aircraft which is optimized ten-grade ground-air defense system, not very efficient in the air combat. They consider it stealth – yes, it is stealth under certain conditions. Especially if you try (*inaudible*) from the ground. Because the idea was to have an aircraft capable to penetrate the (*inaudible*) Russian heavy ground-air defenses and also to avoid weapons that the terrorists may have, so they fire missiles, etc. You may hide an aircraft, but you can never hide the high temperature produced when the aircraft is flying. Hot air around it is always spotted by the good sensor of the modern Eurofighter.

So I don't consider that the F35 will give the Turks and absolute superiority. It will improve their situation, yes. But they will not become able to be in absolute control of the situation, at least if we are talking about Greece and Turkey.

We did not mention Israel. And the Israeli air force is the most efficient air force of the Eastern Mediterranean. Apart of the fact that they have combat experience, they have the best air craft in the region. They have a hundred and sixty two F15s. The F15 is the best aircraft for either air superiority or ground attack, and we don't consider the four-generation fighters, which means Eurofighters and F22s. But no one possesses this aircraft in the area. They have a big number of F16s – two hundred and forty five, and they are now (*inaudible*) and other types of aircraft.

However, what the Turks do not have is air-to-ground weapons able to deal with naval (*inaudible*). They have such missiles on their ships. And this is more important in this case, because we are not talking about the full-scale war - we are talking about the crisis, and about means to deter the crisis. The aircraft cannot deter the crisis, the aircraft cannot demonstrate (*inaudible*) in the area. Only a warship can do that.

The Israelis have quite clever designs of small ships, which are very heavily armed and very efficient. I'm sure that the Turks who were never feeling so comfortably at sea will consider that quite serious. The fact that the Israelis also have six very modern submarines is not at the moment of great importance. Because, again, the submarine is a weapon of interdiction, not a system to use the space. However, in case of an escalating crisis, they may become critical factor. Many years ago in the shipyards of Kiel in Germany I saw one of this Dolphin-class submarines and I was really impressed. The only problem is that they are very automatic, they are doing everything automatically. As an old-fashioned person I am quite skeptical about that much of automatic capabilities. However, they are very efficient. And I consider the first submarine of the new class 214 the Greek navy has in service better than the Israelis'. This submarine is in service for almost one year now, they have tried its capabilities, and next month there will be the first missile firing from this submarine.

So having all this information about the military possibilities in the area, I consider that the question is in the intentions of the Turkish leadership - which is not exactly their reaction to the international community - is a question how much they are ready to risk. Yes, they are unpredictable (*inaudible*), we haven't seen them under stress. We don't know how they will react.

However we know that they are new in their experience, and maybe this means that they are careful – maybe not the government, but for sure the military leadership. It's the first time that they are non-Kemalists as the chiefs of the general staff. I don't think that they will risk to have a failure in their first operation. And all this information about the air superiority they are well aware of. They try that almost every day in the Aegean. So, we cannot say that we are safe, that nothing will happen. But I think it's, again, a matter of agility in the crisis management. Because this is what we are going to face – a crisis. And we have to be prepared first – politically. We are sure that the Turks on that field they are ready. Their government has the planning and has the power to go on to whatever end. The question is whether the governments of Greece and Turkey will react in the right way. With had with Turkey two crises in the past years: on 1987 (*inaudible*) crisis. The crisis of 1987 was a very good example of crisis management. If the records are kept, and if these records are used by the staff officers today to use the experience of their predecessors – that's fine, it will be ok. I hope that they kept the records from the Imia crisis just to know what they should not do.

Thank you.

PRESENTATION*

Dimitris Meritis**
20 September

Recent Developments in Cyprus, Turkey and Israel Relationship

The Turkey-Israel relations started pretty much to deteriorate. The catalyst was the Mavi Marmara incident that happened on 31st May of last year when a Turkish-sponsored flotilla attempted to cross Israeli naval blockade of Gaza and Israeli naval commandos attempted to seize one of the vessels and in the attempt nine activists were killed, seven of those being Turkish nationals. And the incident, like I said, served as catalyst for Turkey-Israeli conflict within the region.

There was a UN report from a panel of inquiry and the findings were that the naval blockade was imposed as an illegitimate security measure and complied with the requirements of international law. However, it did say that the flotilla acted recklessly attempting to breach the naval blockade and also said that Israel's actions were excessive and unreasonable. And they also (*inaudible*) statement of regret should be made by Israel, and reparations paid to families of deceased and injured victims. And above all, Turkey and Israel should resume full diplomatic relations.

The Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's reply to these findings was they were 'null and void'. Erdogan demands a full apology. Israel has yet to apologize. Erdogan, who accused Israel of committing 'state terror', said that Israel's actions on the Gaza flotilla were a 'cause of war' and announced that Turkey will escort ships carrying aid to Palestine. So now we're going to have more flotillas escorted by Turkish navy. They recalled the Turkish ambassador to Israel, suspended military and military trade agreements. And these comments run concurrent with Prime Minister's comments on Cyprus drilling.

So this month the Turkish Prime Minister said that Ankara was ready to deploy its navy in dispute over the naval blockade and Noble's drilling in Block 12. Cyprus fell under the same (*inaudible*) due to Turkey's protesting Noble's drilling and possible cooperation with Israel, whose rights to offshore reserves Turkey still calls into question. Erdogan threatened to attack Cyprus, and EU member state, if drilling in Block 12 will commence on schedule. Cyprus, Greece and the EU all issued statements condemning Turkey's naval action threats. EU energy commissioner warned that such action could hamper the peaceful settlement of the border dispute in Cyprus, and

* Transcript of oral presentation.

** Fellow, ERPIC

Greece stood committed to Cyprus' security stating that any attack on Cyprus would be considered an attack on Greece. President of Cyprus condemned the Turkish prime minister's threats and announced his intention to fully exercise Cyprus' sovereign rights.

Now, as you all know the rig was placed on 18th of September. Turkish ships and aircraft observed, however they didn't violate Cypriot and Israeli territorial waters or air space. At the same time Israeli missile ships and drones kept a watch on the rig's movement and tracked Turkish surveillance.

The Energy Minister of Turkey called for Greek Cypriots to halt gas exploration. He further announced that Turkey and the Turkish Cyprus would be setting up maritime boundaries. Moreover, a Turkish rig was being placed in the waters off the coast of northern Cyprus by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation, and would start drilling as of 26th September. It remains to be seen what their capabilities are, if they can go ahead and conduct this drilling. Preliminary findings indicated great amount of hydrocarbon resources north of Cyprus. He warned again that Turkish naval ships would escort the drilling operations.

So, again, the Prime Minister of Turkey said if the Greek Cypriots begin drilling, Turkey and northern Cyprus will retaliate by signing a continental shelf delimitation accord to pave the way for their own exploration. He also said that Turkey would freeze its EU relations if Cyprus takes over EU presidency. Then he said the main crisis will be between the EU and Turkey. Some observers have reported that Turkish troop reinforcements are already in the north of Cyprus along with the drilling equipment. And reports have claimed that Turkey has seventeen warships in the Aegean close to Rhodes and Kastellorizo. Cyprus has received support from Russia, the EU and the US.

BRIEFING NOTE

Gary Lakes*
3 October 2011

Caspian Sea Gas

Nabucco Gas Pipeline International, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and the Interconnector Greece-Italy (IGI) Poseidon, which is a segment of the larger Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) project, submitted their proposals to transport gas to the Shah Deniz consortium on October 1.

BP recently announced a pipeline project of its own to carry natural gas produced from the Shah Deniz Stage 2 (SD2) development into Central Europe. BP is operator of the Caspian offshore Shah Deniz gas field, which first came on-stream in 2006. SD2 will produce 16 billion cubic meters of gas per year (bcm/y). Of this, 6 bcm/y has already been committed to Turkey, which receives the same amount from Shah Deniz's first stage development.

It is understood that BP's reason for making its own proposal to carry SD2 gas to Europe is that it has doubts about the abilities of the other three pipelines to be credible partners.

The Shah Deniz consortium, which includes Azerbaijan's state-owned oil and gas company Socar, had set October 1 as the deadline for bids on the tariff cost to transport the gas. The group is concerned about pricing the gas for European customers. A decision on which pipeline will be awarded the contract is expected by the end of the year.

One of the three: Nabucco, TAP, ITGI – or now the South East Europe Pipeline (SEEP) proposed by BP – will be the vanguard of the proposed Southern Corridor, the route across Turkey that will transport gas from the Caspian, and eventually the Middle East, to Europe.

Nabucco, the largest project of the four pipelines in the bidding, said in a statement on October 1 that it sees itself as “the European flagship project of the South East European Gas Corridor,” and that it is commercially viable and competitive. While supported by the European Union and the US, Nabucco will have a design capacity to carry 31 bcm/y, far too much capacity for SD2 gas alone. SD2 will be able to offer only 10 bcm/y. The Shah Deniz consortium is concerned that the pipeline's huge capacity will push up the cost of the tariff Nabucco must charge will make the price of SD2 too high. The pipeline will be 3,900 kilometers in length, running from Turkey's eastern border to central Austria.

* *Journalist; Director, Energy Program, ERPIC*

Nabucco has said that its commercial operation capacity is 21 bcm/y. It is looking to also transport gas from Iraqi Kurdistan, where consortium partners OMV, MOL and RWE are active for the purpose of exploring for and exporting natural gas. Nabucco has also attempted to gain favor with the Shah Deniz consortium by offering to extend the pipeline further east from the border of Turkey to Baku. It is also likely to extend the pipeline westward into Central Europe. Nabucco got a boost in late September when it was announced that Munich-based Bayerngas would become the seventh member of the consortium.

The EU has recently looked to strengthen Nabucco's hand in the bidding further by announcing several weeks ago that the European Commission would negotiate a treaty between the EU, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan for a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Large volumes of Turkmen gas flowing into Nabucco would assure the pipeline's success.

TAP announced that it, too, had submitted its bid, expressing confidence that it would win the SD2 contract on the basis that it is the shortest and most financially viable. TAP has an initial throughput capacity of 10 bcm/y and will run from Komotini in northern Greece, across Albania and the Adriatic Sea to southern Italy. Eventually, TAP's capacity will expand to 20 bcm/y.

Greece's Public Gas Corporation (DEPA) and Italy's Edison submitted bids for the IGI Poseidon, which will cross northern Greece and enter southern Italy through the Poseidon underwater pipeline. It has a capacity of 10 bcm/y.

While the smaller pipelines may appear to be the most economical at this point, the Nabucco project will be new-built pipeline for its entire length. TAP, ITGI and the BP-proposed SEEP, will rely on Turkey's existing gas grid operated by Botas to move SD2 gas to western Turkey or the Interconnector Turkey-Greece (ITG) to move it to eastern Greece.

BP's SEEP pipeline will begin in western Turkey and run 1,300 kilometers into Europe through Bulgaria and Romania, ending near the Hungarian border along a route similar to the one planned by Nabucco.

A spokesman for the Shah Deniz consortium said in London on October 3 that three compliant bids had been accepted from the three pipeline projects. "They will be evaluated over the next few months with a view to making an award around the end of the year," the spokesman was quoted by *Reuters* as saying. He also said that the consortium would consider the option to use the BP pipeline.

This will not, however, be the last chance to purchase Azerbaijan gas. A recent discovery by Total in the Apsheron Block and the chance of developing huge reserves some 7,000 meters deep in the Shah Deniz Block mean that Azerbaijan position as a gas producer and exporter will strengthen.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Pawel Dobrowolski**

19 October 2011

Poland's EU Presidency: Overview of the Challenges

Thank you very much for inviting me to ERPIC's meetings and I really appreciate it very much. It's a distinguished body of scholars and professionals. And as you may know and as you feel - at least I feel so - that there is a certain danger in inviting a currently serving ambassador as a guest speaker. As many of you know, this job - at times at least - consists of reiteration of quite well known facts and positions and repetition of things that you have heard from many other sources and many other people. And my task is even more difficult here today because many of you had, or are currently having, the same knapsack on your shoulders as I am having. But I perceive the only edge I may have in order not to bore you this afternoon in two elements. One is that I shall assume off the record approach which comes not so much from my twenty years' - as Mr. Chairman reminded me - twenty years' experience in the Polish foreign service, as from the fact that I firmly believe that my own educational background - and in this case it is history - provides an angle by which current political issues may often be assessed in a much more non-biased manner, and an unbiased perspective. And point number two is that I think that diplomacy itself has changed significantly, at least over the last decade. One could say that we have left the world of Talleyrand and Metternich and we have firmly entered the WikiLeaks universe. That is to say that while the tools of classical diplomacy may not have been totally forgotten or discarded, the challenges of ever changing social and information environment place much greater demands on a foreign policy executives, and not to mention the fact that the entire process has become much more global, and in many senses of the word 'global'. These are the general conditions in which each post-Lisbon presidency operates. In such conditions also the Polish presidency's operating.

Let me just give you the basic and I would say encyclopedic facts. The country of a size roughly that of Spain, country of 37 million people population, not counting those who live in the wide world. There is a famous question in the Polish lessons of geography at schools: please name the second largest Polish city. And the answer is Chicago. But I am not counting those, actually. The economic parameters of the holder of a presidency look at present encouraging. I'll just give you a few: the 2011 ratio of public debt versus GDP - this is something that is talked about in Europe as one of the classical parameters answering whether we do have a crisis or we don't have a crisis. As you know, Italy, to name one, has 114% ratio. Polish ratio is 53% and the tendency in the next

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

** *Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to the Republic of Cyprus*

few years is on a decline. The GDP annual growth - this is always difficult depends on what mood are you in and what rating agency you listen to at the moment - but apparently we seem to be doing about 3.7% +. The view for the next year - which looks like a more difficult year - looks like about 3% percent. According to the European Global Analysis Center, Poland is now among the United Nations member states 22nd in the world. I was surprised to find that the United States is still number one and China is still number two. The direct foreign investments are moderate: 10 billion dollars this year. Used to be better, used to be over 20, but that shows the shortages of cash or rather the uncertainty among the investors world how to invest their money. Annual inflation - about 5%. Unemployment - the classical European 11, which is an average of the EU, more or less.

I'm not going to talk in detail about the presidency priorities. I know that thanks to ERPIC's management you could receive the electronic version of thick documents, two of them, to be precise, one is the 18-month (*inaudible*) program, and another is published "Presidency for the next six months". However, I will emphasize couple of points that I think have a bearing on the reading of our environment, European environment mainly, and how we came to establish those principles and those priorities which we think are relevant for the EU at present.

The initial list of priorities - and the process took about two years to clarify - which will be the national priorities, was published in July 2010, that means one year before assuming the presidency. We try to identify the external conditions of what is today called not so much the EU presidency, but some say EU management. After Lisbon presidency has - as you know very well - lost some of its charm. Some, I would say, treated with a certain nostalgia that the political edge of running the EU has changed to a much more managerial approach. But perhaps even at that point I will say that managing things at times is equally difficult than running them from a political perspective.

I will name some facts that I think will influence the current presidency, or the current presidencies. These are things that will shape our understanding of international surroundings and conditions that we operate in not only during the Polish presidency but I think for the entire trio. And most probably, maybe with certain changes, in the next trio, which - if I may remind you - will be Ireland, Greece and Lithuania - another interesting trio. Those factors that I'd like to concentrate on briefly is that each presidency needs to assess the internal political state of play within other member states. This is not of primary importance, but it is important. It is important to see what kind of political mood is within the 27. We observe a shift to the right, let's say, in Finland, or Sweden, or in the Netherlands. We see the impact of elections - classical case would be France, and I'm very happy to say that we are one of the few that managed to hold the parliamentary elections during the presidency one week ago. Not only the government won, which is an outstanding event - in the history of Poland in the last twenty years no government was able to survive after four years in power; this one has - but of course one thing that it does, it makes the running of the government, and the running of the presidency cheaper and much more efficient. The new faces would be those that have to learn from the beginning sometimes. In this case the cabinet simply does the entire job as it had done prior to that. Also, you have to take into account the internal tensions within each member state because they can shift the balance of a dialogue on the Brussels level. When I say that I have in mind Italy, which is obviously... Or very recently I would say our southern neighbor Slovakia - this is a very interesting case in itself because you never have seen the collapse of the government because of a debate on

assisting the financial facility: this big-budget, the super budget of Europe. This simply created the internal pressure. These things have to be assessed or at least tried to assess.

Let me say that I always repeat that we have learned from our predecessors, we have talked to countries holding the presidency since we are the newcomer before. And I remember a few years ago talking to our friends from Finland, and they said that after the presidency, when they did a sort of a list of what happened or what did not happen, they came to the conclusion that out of a 100% program that they put forward, 45% was actually carried out. The 65 remaining percent were the surprise elements that you have to be ready. And this is one thing that each presidency coming into that should have in mind. We remember the cases of Czech presidency which was faced with Russian-Ukrainian energy crisis during the presidency. You can always be surprised, you can always find that there is a tsunami somewhat, if it's a political tsunami, sometimes even worse than the original.

The second element that needs to be taken into account when you prepare and when you actually run later on is something that is with us all the time. I will not dwell on it for too long, but it is something that all of you know very well: the eurozone crisis, the Greek domino effect. Speaking today in front of you, waiting for the EU summit on the 23rd I would not dwell too long. We will see what happens, but at least we know one thing that the virus has to be curbed, and it is a political decision how to do it. We have a certain chain of countries that are under the cloud, I would say. Italy, of course, Portugal... Question would remain - and then this is something that I am not an expert on, you are much better here - do we put Cyprus on that list, considering the turbulence at least, I would say, around budget from a couple of days ago. But these are the relevant questions that every presidency or indeed every country in the EU has to ask itself.

The mood itself is important. We study on a daily basis the opinion polls all over the world, practically, in Europe, daily, as I said. When I read that 75% of Germans are against pledging more money to the euro rescue and 44% start to think gently about returning to a Deutsche mark, which is an interesting indicator in itself, you do have elements that make you worry. We look at it from a very particular perspective - being a presidency of a country that is not a eurozone member makes it, on one hand, much more difficult. Just to give you the inside gossip, we had a serious problem, for example, at the beginning of a presidency chairing the ECOFIN³⁰⁰, the eurozone finance ministers were doubtful whether a non-eurozone member should chair such a meeting, to which we answered that we have implemented some of the reforms about ten years ago, that most of the eurozone countries haven't done yet until today - that is a good indication. For example, when I mentioned this, the indicator that I started with, the growth of sovereign debt versus the GDP - the Polish case, as I said, this year is 53 - it is a constitutional barrier. No government of whatever political orientation in Poland can surpass 60%. If any government does that, the prime minister faces the tribunal of state. This is a good mechanism to keep politicians in their place, not to throw around money, of course. That's why in our case going over 100% is practically suicidal for the government. You know that the fear of suicide is usually a very good fear to keep people alive.

But the eurozone as a problem is an interesting academic issue that one may pursue. I read in the Financial Times few days ago, the former British minister Lord Owen proposing to set up a non-Eurogroup composed of UK, Sweden, Denmark and Poland as a balance to the EU17. He says EU17 lack determination. The non-euro group members have much better economic indicators.

³⁰⁰ Economic and Financial Affairs Council

Perhaps we should gently close our eyes at the British statistics at this moment, but generally it's okay. This shows how difficult it is to assess the debate within the EU, because it goes on every level. And part of the job of a presidency is to at least monitor every possible interesting impulse. I'm not saying that Lord Owen's proposition is something that will be taken up further - probably not because it shows that he's thinking of selecting parts of Europe, cutting it up into pieces. This is something fundamentally against our philosophy of how Europe should function. But it shows how it goes.

External factors influencing the decisions and your position as a presidency - or our position as a presidency - I could mention something that is very obvious and known to all of us: the so-called Arab Spring effect. Look at it, and this is something that we all read, that we all know, that we all experience. Cyprus is practically on the doorstep of the things that are happening in the North Africa. But try for a moment to see that for a Central Eastern European country that has been preparing with the view of investing into a different EU policy - I will come to that in a moment - the Eastern Partnership policy which is, together with Sweden, our baby. This is where we invested money and an intellectual capital for years to try to make the Eastern neighborhood of the European Union pro-democratic one. It's not easy, as I will say in a moment, but this is our obvious area of our, say, mental development: Central-Eastern Europe. Suddenly as a presidency we have to take care and invest into areas that are... Today the world is a global village, of course, you can say we don't go that much beyond our natural habitat. But after all, Libya, or Tunisia, or Syria are not natural areas of Polish political development. And at the same time we have - when the events in North Africa happened - we have redeployed, so to speak. It was a major political decision out of necessity, because this is what is important for the EU, and that's where the presidency should work. As an example, last week - I mentioned the Polish parliamentary elections - we brought a plane full of Egyptian and Tunisian NGOs to watch how the election is done. They will be doing it, they have to learn it, they have never done it before in the normal democratic sense. So this is a sample of things that we were doing, not to mention the division of labor with High Representative Lady Ashton, the foreign ministers - I'm not betraying any secret - the foreign ministers of Poland, Denmark and Cyprus have a working arrangement with Lady Ashton during the trio. Some of the jobs, some of the trips, some of the visits that she should be taking, will be accomplished and taken over by the three foreign ministers of the trio countries. We have done that in early July and the Polish foreign minister was the first EU minister to go to Benghazi - this was before Tripoli has fallen - representing EU: Cathrine Ashton.

Of course, the Arab Spring has many faces and it's a question to all of us how it will develop. But one of the issues that is slowly creeping up - I am not saying that this debate is within the EU very vibrant, and it should be - is what's called the Schengen debate, the debate on migration. This is something that is facing us sooner or later, and as you know very well - I don't have to go into details - but as you know and understand, not everybody is very keen on raising that issue in the European Union. We all know that we are aging, we all know that we need migrants, we don't know how to do it up to now. But this is also one of the, I would say, Stockholm program or Schengen package things that need to be taken into account.

The presidency faces one more general problem in its course of action, and it is something that is called *embarrass de richesse*. After Lisbon Europe has become a much more multi-facial institution. There is a wealth of institutions that have through the Lisbon Treaty a hold on forming the policies. The Parliament, of course, is the newest arrival, so to speak, but its powers have grown tremendously. Presidencies' necessity to cooperate with Parliament - we have only

found out how important it is to be in the Parliament, to brief the MEPs, etc. Then, of course, you have the Commission, the member states. And the general view that everybody has – at least the EU citizens have - that the decision-making process in the EU after Lisbon is slower than before. Perhaps the decisions to be made are more difficult, that's why we are slower – that would be a sort of a positive attempt of answering this question. But at least there is an obvious (inaudible) for a post-Lisbon presidency. The first three are investigated how it goes, the second three does the same - we are still, I think, in the learning mode knowing that although not political, but managerial, it's still very, very difficult.

Having these things in mind, about a year ago we envisaged what we would want to put into the priorities of the presidency that would face European problems. And in a way the process was fairly simple: it is the answer to a question what kind of Europe do you want? And we identified out of these many initial points three basic clusters of ideas: one is that we want growing Europe, second that we want a secure Europe, and third that we want an open Europe. Let me say just a few words on each three concepts, because of course you feel - just as I feel - it's easier said than done. But I think one of the things that the presidency should not escape from is trying not to be ambitious. Over-ambitious - definitely not. Ambitious - definitely yes.

The growing Europe. This, of course, has to do with economy. The only way to prevent the second wave of crisis and the recession according to us is to stimulate those instruments like the internal EU market. That's why the Polish presidency is pushing for something that's called single market act - it is a crucial legal framework for doing business in an unhindered way. Such instruments that guarantee growth, the Franco-German idea of recapitalizing the banks seems to be one step forward, it's only a partial solution. A discipline of the public debt is crucial. As I mentioned - and I will mention it again, because this is something that we are proud of - the 60% constitutional limit on debt is something that is useful. And some countries are introducing it: Italy is, France is debating - it's still in the upper house.

We think also that - and this is something that actually will touch much more on our successes, in particular on Cyprus, and multi-annual financial framework which is a very nice word about EU budget, or EU money, the crucial element that makes the whole thing go. In this debate already initiated by the Commission there are different views. We have for obvious historical and civilizational reasons, I would say, somewhat different view than the net payers. We think if we diminish the budget or - as I keep reading now - limit the coherence funds for example, we shall cut off investment resources and in effect we may face a rise of unemployment, and that is inevitably a course toward recession. A Polish position on the budget at this phase - this is the beginning of a debate – is we want to keep it as high as possible. The growth package is not the easiest one to put forward because there are so many ideas that you are faced with simultaneously. But of course there are major institutions in the EU - the President of the EU included - who is going to speak this weekend on the 23rd on how we break the deadlock. Presidency in this case is only a part – a small part, let's be very frank - of the entire deal.

Security - which I mentioned - relates to many areas from food security to hard security. From our point of view - and this is something I guess that has become a very hot topic in Cyprus - the energy security is one of the priorities that we wish to push. We want to make Europe independent from outside sources, if possible, and depend on each other. As I said, again, easier said than done. But things need to be done. There is the energy chapters, so to speak, to be debated within the EU, we are working hard on that. On the margin of this I think - and please treat this as an off the record issue - the carbohydrates issue of the Eastern Mediterranean is of

course of interest to us. This is one of the potential providers of EU independence, let's be very, very frank. And I regret to say that I think it has been mismanaged from the very start. I mean, some of my Cypriot friends tell me that the (*inaudible*) goes back about ten years ago, because this was the beginning when it was known that the Eastern Mediterranean possesses a large deposits of gas. But even if we go only a year or two ago, I think that that what could have happened is that the Eastern Mediterranean energy deposits could have become a platform of exchange of experiences, of exchange of financial visions for the future, and finally the platform that builds peace in that region in more meanings than one, I would say. I think, unfortunately, we are past that phase. In politics sometimes the words do more harm than the flying planes, and I am afraid that the words have been very harmful in the last months or so.

One more sentence perhaps on that. The gas and oil seem to change people's perspective. There is something that I call the gas craze, it is not something that is indigenous to Cyprus in recent weeks and months. Just to point to the speaker himself, we have found a different kind of gas: it's called shale gas, the one in the rocks. And obviously there are economists who count how much an average Pole will get per head in the next three years. Our deposits are perhaps not as large as the Aphrodite field, but we talk of billions of cubic meters of shale gas as well. The Polish energy sheet is negative in a sense that we have to buy much more than we produce. We have to buy about 70% of our needs. The contract is with Gazprom who is a major provider, of course, in that part of Europe. The shale gas that will be operational, as far as I read the optimistic views, within the next two years will reduce the dependency on the Russian pipe from 70% to 30%. So you can imagine that the gas craze is fully there.

The final point is open Europe. Open Europe, of course, relates to issues of enlargement in which the presidency shares some of the burden with DG Enlargement, that means Commissioner Füle, and of course High Representative. In matters dealing with the trade policy, the presidency is still very robust and active. In others, after Lisbon things have been taken over by other institutions. But as we read - or as you have read the same as I - the recent progress reports on the candidate countries issued on October 12, and I may try to give you the view that we have on the basic issue, whether we enlarge, how we enlarge, I'm not going to even risk answering when do we enlarge - this is another story. Of course, Polish position as a new member state - please remember we are baby brothers with Cyprus, we joined on the same day the European Union - and our position is firmly that the enlargement perspective should be kept because the perspective itself has 'civilizing value'. It is something that we remember very vividly. One example, perhaps, is something that easily comes to my mind. The enlargement commissioner of the previous commission whom we were doing most of the business with - a gentlemen well known in Cyprus as well - Günter Verheugen, was the most hated German that ever stepped on the Polish soil in 2001-2002. And as you can imagine, most of the media used the fact that he was a German even to enhance all the possible stories of Polish tragedy and the German who is squeezing the last drop of blood out of this poor candidate country. Today Günter Verheugen I think has about five honorary degrees in Polish universities and he's honorary citizen of about six Polish cities. This shows how the perspective can change. In the shortest possible version, what he made us as a candidate country do is to do our homework. The homework was blood, sweat and tears, but it paid off. I just showed you the Polish economic parameters. This is part of the same story. If we hadn't done it then, then you pay the price of a very difficult readjustment - you are like a child of a special care in a class. Nobody likes that. So Europe should remain open. The perspective should be vital for others. So you know, we will conclude Croatian membership either within this year, or we shall pass that pleasure and honor to our Danish colleagues. Talks

with Iceland are proceeding, this seems not to be the most of the difficult cases, although there are, I understand, questions that need to be answered by Iceland and by the EU itself.

This leaves us with a debate and a process on four areas which not only we identify, but everybody else has identified. These are things that we are as a presidency at present engaged in. One: Ukraine. Two: Turkey. Three: Western Balkans. That's for a general view of the so-called eastern EU neighborhood. Few words on each.

We expect to conclude the association agreement with Ukraine in December despite recent tiny - I'm emphasizing the word and this is a hope that I express - tiny problems that we have: the postponement of President Yanukovich's visit to Brussels that was announced - my Ukrainian colleague will confirm - today, I think. It's an obstacle, it can be surpassed, and I say that we shall try to do it despite the fact that our position on Julia Timoshenko trial is the same as the entire EU position. It is not a good outcome, let me say this, and I say this out of great friendship to Ukraine, to a country that, first of all, my entire family comes from - not only my father and my mother, but ten previous generations as well - and the country that I have been to during my work in the Foreign Office on numberless occasions. I think that each country that looks to the EU should sooner or later ask itself a vital and basic question: What do we bring to EU? And then the second - but this is only the second - what will we get out of it? First is the input. That question is valid for every member. EU is a set of countries that do have certain rules of the game, you do not change them in any situation. This is a very difficult question on a national level. It's not easy to answer. It takes time, but it needs to be asked and it needs to be answered.

Second, of course, the famous issue - and I think I would not really dare to raise it - but Turkey is something that we all have on our mind. Let me say that I observe many reasons for which Turkey is reluctant to engage in their accession negotiations. And not only because most of the chapters are blocked. Well, I'm saying that there are reasons - political, social, cultural reasons - which slowed down Turkish fervor for EU membership. And what I just said before is equally relevant to Turkey. It needs to ask itself and answer that very question. I also wish to say that I believe that the so-called threats policy that it is pursuing is totally counterproductive, totally counterproductive. It makes it very difficult for us to maintain a dialogue with Turkey, and we do. Let me say that there is a certain, I would say even - although you may find it surprising - synergy between Poland and Turkey. We are going to celebrate next year six centuries of diplomatic contact with the Ottomans and the Turks - six centuries. That means that at least somebody in Europe knows his Turk - we do. It doesn't make it easier because we do observe that there is obvious cultural, political shift. I spent part of April in Ankara, and one of the questions that I asked to my Turkish partners was that... This was before the elections in Turkey, so despite not understanding Turkish I was staying up all night watching television, the talk shows. But as you can imagine, after five hours of watching the language that you don't understand, you suddenly begin to understand everything. Just depends on the determination. Especially if you want to know what's there. And after all, watching TV, political debates is not that difficult and you, more or less, know what the agenda is. And speaking of the agenda, I was surprised that the EU agenda was not there - it was 10% of what they were talking about. This is telling. This shows how much within the public discourse EU is infused, or not infused. And I'm saying these critical remarks despite the fact that I recognize, and we recognize very well, that EU and Turkey do have a number of shared interests, political and economic. Turkish economy is basically a pro-European economy. These are important elements which may in the future prove productive.

Area number three of enlargement: the Western Balkans. The presidency - excluding the Croatian example which is more or less settled, but taking the Croatian example and as the European perspective for other countries of that region. A perspective of EU membership at the beginning of the talks does have - and again I speak from my own national experience - a transformative power. It does change, hopefully, societies as well, but it is the institutional structures, the economic structures of a given country. And let me say that I know Balkans more or less well. I've been to Kosovo day before - and to Belgrade - the day before the first bombs fell. At the time Poland was holding the OECD presidency and this was the last mission of peace that the Western community was sending to Milosevic's government before the military campaign started. One of the most unforgettable visits that I remember. But we do see that the wounds of the war - because you have to say this pretty straightforward - the wounds of the war in that area are - some slowly, some still to stay - but healing. There is a process of approaching different goals, social goals. This is seen in Serbia despite the problem that have come up recently with Kosovo. This is not so much seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina which is a problem. It is not so much seen in Albania, and it is not so much seen in a my favorite country - because the name is always something that I like to say aloud - meaning FYROM, of course. And I always have a problem of what do you call the citizens of FYROM - they must be 'Fyromians'. We will - and for years we have - invested a lot as an example of transformation in the Balkans. This has been one of the areas in which Polish foreign policy was active, and during the presidency we are doing exactly the same.

Third and fourth elements are the last one. I said I hope I will not bore you, but I'm beginning to worry, so I will better draw to the conclusions. The recent Eastern Partnership Summit in September in Warsaw proved that most of our eastern neighbors - I am speaking here excluding Ukraine - are not ready for the in-depth structural reforms. As you know, the summit put forward a very clear message, message based on conditionality: you do your homework, we do our homework. Many leaders of what's usually called former Soviet republics - but it's an old-style terminology - many leaders of that region do not understand that EU is much more than the provider of money: it is a provider of a civilizational security. And when they come to this, they will, I hope, come to a responsibility to react. I leave aside one more completely different case: our neighbor in the east Belarus. But here this is rather a tragic story. I don't want to say this is the Syria of the east, but there are equally worrying elements of repression against any democratic standards and against any people who say that they do not agree, (*inaudible*) from members of opposition are full and the plight of the opposition is very difficult. This is something that we need to work on for years to come. But as they say, totalitarian countries seem like a wall, but once they break, they break, and there's no way of stopping them break.

The target and project-oriented approach that we will do toward the Eastern Partnership country members - non-EU members that is - will be upheld and will be a long process. Please remember that from the EU financial point of view this is one of the two major EU external policies. The second one, of course, is the Union for the Mediterranean. And despite the fact that the balance of payments goes heavily in favor of the Union for the Mediterranean - there's two thirds for the south and one-third for the east - we are not going to knock on the door for more money. I think the money on our southern neighborhood that we need to spend is a well spent and invested money.

This is the overview of the challenges of this presidency, of perhaps the next one. And may I say, even Cyprus presidency may face very similar choices and challenges. So as I would say in my

conclusion, managing the presidency is equally challenging as exercising political leadership of the past. Management seems to be now a scale of facilitating compromise, but at the same time a skill in which a certain of your own ambitions need to be showed for. The challenges have grown considerably while the responsibility is shared between many. That's why we have often criticized the EU for not taking full opportunities of performing as a leader. I think this has to be looked in the perspective because so many decision centers are there on the table. There is no single leader to tell me that black is black and white is white. We have to come to the shades of grey. But I believe that as the evening is setting in Cyprus, the shades of grey is the answer that I would - in a positive sense - give to the Polish presidency as well.

Thank you very much for your attention.

BRIEFING NOTE

Gary Lakes*
30 October 2011

Turkish Reaction to Cyprus Gas Exploration

The government of Cyprus on October 24 announced that the European Council will discuss the aggressive moves and statements that Turkey has made against the island's government when the Council meets in December.

Cypriot President Demetris Christofias said in Brussels that the Council "will address the issue of Turkey and its behavior" during its next summit in December. "Depending on the circumstances prevailing at the time, we may propose also a draft Council decision on the EU's relations with Turkey and of course its behavior towards Cyprus," Christofias said.

Ankara in August had warned Cyprus not to proceed with drilling in its offshore Block 12, which lies some 150 kilometers south of the island and adjacent to Israel's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) where 25 trillion cubic feet of natural gas has been discovered by Noble Energy of the US.

In September, Noble Energy moved the Homer Ferrington semi-submersible drilling rig into Block 12 and started drilling in the Aphrodite prospect which is expected to hold some 10 trillion cubic feet of gas.

Turkey declared that the Republic of Cyprus had no right to undertake exploration in the island's EEZ because it does not represent the Turkish-Cypriot population that resides in the northern 40% of the island that has been occupied by the Turkish military since 1974.

In response to the start of drilling by Noble Energy, Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot administration signed a "continental shelf agreement" that supposedly gave Turkish Petroleum (TPAO) the right to explore for hydrocarbons in the waters claimed by northern Cyprus. Turkey then proceeded to send an aging seismic vessel, the Piri Reis, into the Cyprus EEZ in the southeast Mediterranean, accompanied by several warships. The Turkish vessels also entered Block 12 and continue to sail in Cypriot waters.

Since then, the region has attracted the attention of other armed forces, including Israel's, which has sent its aircraft into Cypriot airspace. Consideration is under way by the governments of Cyprus and Israel to create an LNG facility on the southern side of the island that would process and export natural gas discovered in the offshore territories of both countries.

** Journalist; Director, Energy Program, ERPIC*

The EU, the UN, the US, Russia, Greece and Israel have expressed their support for the government of Cyprus' right to explore and develop hydrocarbons in its EEZ in the eastern Mediterranean. Russia will be sending its aircraft carrier into the region in mid-November. Russia and Cyprus have historical and cultural ties. The island is home to a large Russian expatriate community and many Russian businesses use the island as a base of operations.

Noble Energy is expected to complete the first well drilled in the Cyprus offshore in late November or early December, after which the government is expected to launch its second licensing round. The results of the well are expected to have an impact on the expressions of interest in the licensing round.

The Cypriot media is loaded with reports that large international companies are interested in participating in the bidding round and politicians have taken steps to ensure that the round will follow an open tender procedure by submitting legislation in the House of Representatives that binds the government to that process. A number of politicians fear that the government of President Christofias is looking to award blocks to interested parties outside an opening licensing round.

BRIEFING NOTE

Gary Lakes*

6 November 2011

Plans for a New Gas Pipeline through Turkey

Azerbaijan's state-owned oil and gas company Socar announced last week that Socar and Turkey's Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (Botas) would form a consortium to build a new pipeline to carry Azerbaijan's natural gas across Turkey to Europe.

The pipeline is to have a capacity of 16 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y). That is the volume of gas that Shah Deniz Stage 2 (SD2) is expected to produce when it comes on-stream in 2017, 6 bcm/y of which is promised to Turkey while the remaining 10 bcm/y is to be contracted to shippers using one of three already proposed gas pipeline projects: the 31 bcm/y Nabucco gas pipeline, the 10 bcm/y Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) pipeline, or the 10-20 bcm/y Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP).

Socar's announcement followed a statement made a month ago by the Shah Deniz operator, BP that it would consider a consortium (the South East European Pipeline (SEEP)) that would carry SD2 gas from Turkey into Central Europe.

BP's reasoning behind proposing the SEEP is thought to be that it considers the Nabucco, ITGI and TAP projects as unreliable partners – for a variety of reasons. The move by Socar and Botas is seen as necessary in order to provide reliable infrastructure for gas shipments of that size through Turkey. Turkey's existing gas pipeline network is considered to be too disjointed to provide a clear transit route across the country. The consortium that the two state-owned firms plan to put together is expected to include other Shah Deniz partners.

Turkey and Azerbaijan signed an agreements in late October. The agreement provided for the upgrade of the existing Botas network or the construction of a new pipeline.

The Socar-Botas plan appears to jeopardize the Nabucco project. Like ITGI and TAP, Nabucco submitted to Shah Deniz shareholders its bid to transport the gas to Europe by the October 1 deadline. While it is probably months away before the transport contracts are awarded, Nabucco has hoped to win despite the fact that the 10 bcm/y of SD2 gas would be less than half its full capacity. Nabucco is looking to also transport gas from northern Iraq and from Turkmenistan, with which the European Union is discussing the construction of a gas pipeline across the Caspian Sea. In an attempt to make itself more attractive to Caspian gas producers, Nabucco has

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proposed extending its pipeline from eastern Turkey to Baku, where it could theoretically connect with a Trans Caspian Gas Pipeline.

The gas route through Turkey and into Southeast Europe is known as the Southern Corridor. The Shah Deniz consortium is expected to decide over the next year on which route to choose for the export of gas to Europe. Socar has announced that because Turkey's existing pipeline infrastructure is complex, Socar will explore the opportunity to construct a new gas pipeline across the country. Such new pipeline project, however, would not prevent the implementation of the Southern Corridor Pipeline projects, including Nabucco, ITGI and TAP.

BRIEFING NOTE

Gary Lakes*

7 January 2012

Cyprus Gas Discoveries

Houston-based Noble Energy on 28 December announced the discovery of 5 to 8 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas in Block 12 offshore Cyprus. Noble said in a statement that the Cyprus A-1 well encountered some 94 meters of net natural gas pay in multiple high-quality Miocene sand. Using the Homer Ferrington semi-submersible rig, the well was drilled to a depth of 5,860 meters in a water depth of 1,689 meters. The company, which has made several significant discoveries offshore Israel, said “results from drilling, formation logs and initial evaluation work indicate an estimated gross resource range of 5 to 8 tcf, with a gross mean of 7 tcf (198 billion cubic meters).” Noble said further appraisal of the field, which covers around 100 square kilometres, is needed prior to its development.

“We are excited to announce the discovery of significant natural gas resources in Cyprus on Block 12,” Charles D Davidson, Chairman and CEO of Noble, said in the statement. “This is the fifth consecutive natural gas field discovery for Noble Energy and our partners in the greater Levant basin, with total gross mean resources for the five discoveries currently estimated to be over 33 tcf (934 bcm). This latest discovery in Cyprus further highlights the quality and significance of this world-class basin,” he said.

In Cyprus the discovery was well received by the Greek-Cypriot population and media, which has shown considerable excitement over the prospect of potential hydrocarbon deposits offshore. Demetris Christofias, President of the Republic of Cyprus, which is recognized internationally as the sovereign government on the divided island, called the discovery “historic,” saying that it “opens great potential for Cyprus and its people, which with prudence and in a spirit of collectiveness we will utilize in the service of public interest.” He added: “New favorable economic prospects have opened for the future of the country. Both the present as well as the next generations will benefit.”

The Cyprus A-1 well was the first ever drilled offshore Cyprus, which imports all of its energy needs and still uses heavy fuel oil for power generation. Noble Energy and its key partner offshore Israel, the Delek Group, have proposed to the Cypriot government the creation of a LNG facility on the southern coast of the island with a capacity of 15 million tons/year. Such a facility would be designed to process not only Cypriot gas but also that in the Leviathan and Tamar gas fields

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offshore Israel. The Israeli fields hold reserves of 17 tcf and 9 tcf respectively. The Cyprus A-1 discovery is located near the maritime delimitation line with Israel, with the Leviathan and Tamar fields located less than 100 kilometers away. The Block 12 well is located some 180 kilometers south of the island.

Exploration work in Block 12 sparked a mini-crisis with Turkey during the second half of 2011 after the Cyprus Energy Department announced last August that Noble was scheduled to begin drilling in October. Turkey, which invaded Cyprus in 1974 and which continues a military occupation of some 40% of the island, demanded that exploration work stop until a settlement between the divided Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities is agreed. Ankara's argument is that the government of the Republic of Cyprus, which is a member of the United Nations and the European Union, does not represent the Turkish-Cypriots, who, Ankara reasons, have an equal right to the island's natural resources.

The start of drilling in late September brought profound protests from Turkey, which sent warships into the Cyprus exclusive economic zone (EEZ), along with an ageing seismic exploration vessel. Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot administration signed in September in New York during the UN General Assembly a document demarcating the northern waters between the island and Turkey's southern coast, and in November the two signed an agreement giving Turkey's state-owned Turkish Petroleum (TPAO) a license to explore offshore Cyprus in an area that includes Block 12 and much of the Cyprus EEZ.

The Greek-and Turkish-Cypriot sides are due to meet with the UN Secretary General in New York in late January in a last-ditch attempt to find a settlement to the 37-year-old 'Cyprus Problem.' After three years of negotiations, the two sides have failed to make any major advance towards a resolution.

Commenting on the discovery in Block 12, President Christofias said the gas find "can and should become a tool to promote peace and cooperation in the region. The exploitation of hydrocarbons can become an incentive for a solution to the Cyprus Problem, a solution that will terminate the illegal occupation and the illegal colonization that will reunify our country and our people, and will restore the human rights and the basic freedoms of our people, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots alike."

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which oversees the Energy Department, is preparing to launch the island's second licensing round. It will include the 12 remaining blocks in the Cyprus EEZ. The Energy Department has revised the terms of the model production sharing agreement and the documents are to be delivered to the European Commission in early January for translation and subsequent publication in the EU's official gazette. The round is expected to be announced within the next few weeks. Cyprus had been waiting for the results from the Noble well before launching the bidding round, which is expected to attract the participation of some major international oil companies.

During the course of 2011, relations between Cyprus and Israel have improved with a particular focus on energy cooperation. Minister of Commerce and Industry Praxoulla Antoniadou is due to visit Israel in late January for further discussion on the topic. The LNG plant in Cyprus proposed by Noble Energy and Delek Group is expected to be a near the top of the agenda.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Peter Wallace**

11 January 2012

Cyprus Gas: A View on the Short and Long-Term Alternatives and Options

There's been a lot of hype as well about the value of the gas. In fact an article from the Cyprus Mail on Sunday, I believe, quoted something in the region of a hundred million dollars. Okay, today's gas price, the gas price has been dropping since about 2008. If we look at 7 trillion cubic feet (tcf), which is about 198 billion cubic meters (bcm), today's gas price at three dollars per million BTUs is right about twenty three billion - that's if you sold it today on the commodities market. And I say there is a figure being bandied around that it's a hundred billion dollars, but from what I believe this has been based on what the cost saving of using Cyprus gas would be instead of liquid distillate over a two hundred and ten year period. At 7 tcf this would run the island for somewhere around about two hundred years. If we were using any gas now instead of liquid distillate, we would be saving money. Liquid distillate serve three times the price when it comes to an energy factor of what natural gas were to generate electricity using natural gas.

This is what the gas market did during the last six months. There's been a slow decline down to around about three dollars per million BTUs. If we then looked at that from if the gas was discovered at 7 tcf in June, we're looking at about 36 dollars, 33 to 36 dollars. The gas price there in US dollars per 1000 cubic meters, so you can see that the 7 tcf discovered in June was worth thirty three billion, today's worth twenty three. I know it's not the right way I know it's not necessarily right way to look at it, but a figure has to be put on it. And this is I believe a far more realistic figure than a 100 billion dollars that's been mooted at present.

It looks as though the gas prices are going to remain under pressure for quite some time. They're much lower than the figure we had back in 2008 that was about 13 dollars per million BTU. And the figures have been seen as reducing as a reflection of a number of factors. The credit crisis being one resulting in recession and the improvements in exploitation technology. And what happens when the gas price is high they actually drive the drive the push to discover more reserves. And that is exactly what has happened. The high prices themselves they drove the technology that allows you to exploit fields that have previously been unexploitable, or seen as unexploitable. So these are set prices coming down since 2008. And prior to the gas discovery

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

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that's been made in Israeli waters the island was looking at bringing on liquefied natural gas and building a regasification facility. This was put on hold which at the time may seem quite a wise decision because apparently we were going to be going into a long-term supply agreement. And at the time it was decided to halt this, and at the time it did make very good commercial sense.

Okay, now canceling the supply agreement, the problem was what this did was it stopped all concept development for building a regasification facility. So that was put on hold as well, which means that we've lost now eighteen months to two years of any development being made from building a gasification terminal. Everybody says to me, well, if we built a regasification facility, what would we be able to do with the equipment? Would we be able to use it? We'll go on to that in a bit. But the problem is as I say, the EAC no longer has any gas planned, there is no long-term strategy or even short-term strategy of getting gas to the island. With the fact that Noble have now said that this exists, I believe the domestic strategy should be reviewed. And in some form of decision made as to what we're going to do about fixing the EAC's problem.

Now, 7 tcf - putting this into a life expectancy perspective. 198 bcm, as I say, would supply the gas needs to the island for about 200 years. And if we looked at the 30-year gas needs for the island, we'd look at about 30 billion cubic meters. That'd leave an exploitable balance of 168 bcm. Now, if we were to build an LNG facility which is one of the options or one that will get mentioned... I'll go back to why I've said 30 years. The reason I've said thirty years here is the fact that most of the equipment we use in an LNG facility is designed for about twenty five to thirty year lifetime. After that time we normally have to replace a lot of the major equipment compressors, condensers, pumps. So we normally look at designing and building a plant for around about a twenty five to thirty-year life. So, therefore, I've used a thirty-year plan to allow Cyprus to use the gas and its own discoveries for that period of time plus exploiting and therefore having the potential to bring in export revenue for the same period of time. That's without taking into account that they will probably be future discoveries. At the moment they haven't been made, but if any other area of the world that's got gas and oil discovered, it's very, very rare that it's a single one-off find. And in fact, I mean even to the point that we already know that Tamar, Leviathan, Noa and now Block 12 they've all produced. So there's a very good possibility, I wouldn't put any money on them not finding any more, put it that way. But there's a very good opportunity that future finds will be made.

The liquefaction facility. Again, this would leave an exploitable amount of about 5.9 tcf if you took away the 1.1 tcf per Cyprus' only own domestic market needs. As I say, again, this is the declared discovered and not what potentially is in the field. And again, I discuss the thirty-year model being mooted here is the fact that it's based around the life of the equipment within the plant.

Another option would be to bring a pipeline to Cyprus. I've done quite a bit of research on what the costs are involved with the depths involved, and I will move on to it. I've used some of the figures from the Galsi project between Algeria and Italy as a base for that 2-billion-dollar figure. The cost of planning, designing, and constructing a 5-million tons per annum (Mtpa) liquefaction facility, including the marine infrastructure, etc., will cost somewhere between 5 and 8 billion dollars. Again, these are figures that I've been getting quoted from the industry. And the variation in price depends on the way that the plant is built and the level of modularization which I discussed in an earlier talk. If we were to build the plant, it would probably be really closer to the 5 or 6-billion mark instead of modularizing as much of it as possible. But it's open for review, it needs a 5 Mtpa plant. All the equipment exists now, there is nothing new, it's not brand-new

technology so you're not breaking the barrier anywhere with any new technology, fines, or anything you need to actually source. Plants of 5 Mtpa now are relatively common, and so is the equipment that goes into them. So in total you'd be looking at a complete development costs with an LNG facility, pipeline (inaudible) everywhere, somewhere between 7 and 9 billion dollars. And the problem with this is that even in today's market we probably wouldn't get much of this built before 10 years' time.

There's also the fact that I've talked about the value of the gas. The gas, there are other people who take a chunk of that, obviously the people who found it, the people who operate the equipment that brings it ashore, and the government take their cut. So there is a lot of people who have a hand in the pie, so to speak. And as we've said the current market value of the gas is around 23 billion dollars. And you'd need then obviously to do a Capex versus income cost comparison. And obviously, if a future finds are made, they would obviously act in your favor, because you've got the infrastructure to handle any future finders.

As I've said, I've compared together some concepts of the pipeline. I've used the Galsi project that crosses between Algeria and Sardinia, goes the entire length of Sardinia up to... I can't remember the name of the place - is it Olbia? It goes to Olbia and from Olbia it goes to Piombino in Tuscany. This project was split into three sections. I've actually got friends working on this project and it was split into three sub-projects. So although it's a much longer pipeline than we've got here, the section between Algeria and Sardinia has got a lot of similarities. Although it's a hundred kilometers longer than a pipeline would need to be from block 12 to Cyprus, the depth involved is a thousand meters deeper, and the pipeline size is in fact almost exactly the same as the size the pipeline would be from block 12 to Cyprus. This is a 26 inch line, it's about a 36.7 millimeter wall thickness. And the pipe isn't buried over 40 meters deep, it just lays on the seabed surface. But it's been designed in such a way that the pipe has been stressed to actually allow for any seismic and current movements. Basically, it just sits on the bottom of the ocean and it's been calculated where to anchor it. It's actually very, very, very similar conditions as the Block 12 in Cyprus. Now, to give you some idea of that, it's been designed for 10 bcm, the idea being to put 8 bcm per annum into the Italian network and Sardinia would take a draw-off of 2 bcm over that period of time. But this isn't identical to the size of the pipe that we would use here because our demand is about eight billion cubic meters per annum with a liquefaction plant. In our specific case, because of future finds you'd allow for some future possible expansion. But we could probably drop down to a 24-inch, even possibly a 22-inch line. But we know it can be done. It's currently estimated the final cost of the Galsi pipeline is going to be in the region about 5 billion dollars. And the deep water submarine Algeria to Sardinia section is accounted for about just over in fact 2 billion dollars' worth of (inaudible). Now, take into account that this is all going ahead, it's being built now, all the works have been done on it. So, the 2 billion for the pipeline that's a 100 kilometers shorter, 2 billion is probably a very realistic cost value for the pipeline from Block 12 to Cyprus.

Now, the timeline for the Galsi pipeline, to give you some idea how long it took to plan and design this. The Galsi company was formed in 2003. The feasibility study took about 18 months to two years, and feasibility work was still being done during the FEAD stage - FEAD stands for front-end engineering and design. And this took quite a long time because of the way the pipeline had to cross Sardinia, and also the problems they were having with seismic modeling from Algeria to Sardinia. But the feed, it's a much longer pipeline, was split into three sub-projects. At that time all three sections of the project were all running concurrently. So there's an overlap of all of the

feed work being done here, and three different projects. For each of the individual part the project a timeframe was still at least four to five years for each section.

Now, the agreement between Algeria and Italy was signed in 2007 and the authorization procedures which wouldn't affect what was happening here as much as it did here because this went through, I think, thirteen different political regions of Sardinia, and they're Italian, so you can imagine how long it took to actually work out who was going to get what. But that was all going on while the feed was happening. So it's not as if this was taking up time or extending the time. It was all still being done while the engineering design work was being done. They didn't even decide on a final route until 2009 because of the level of modeling that was being carried out. And construction started last year and is expected to take around about two and a half years, and expected completion date is 2014. This is eleven years. So this just puts things into perspective. I'm trying to explain how long it takes, or can take, for things to get done. And as I've said it's not a completely fair comparison as the Galsi pipeline is considerably longer and traverses the entire length of Sardinia. And as I said, it's split into three primary sub-projects.

The big thing to note here though is that both Algeria and Italy have huge amount of world-class experience when it comes to building oil and gas infrastructure. Saipem - the guys with the biggest cranes in the world, cranes called Saipem 7000. They are the biggest cranes in the world and they can lift 14,000 tons in a tandem. And in fact Saipem 7000 can actually be converted to a pipeline barge, well, pipeline vessel. And it's this type of equipment and knowledge that Italy has already to start with. We don't have that here, we don't have it. So we'll have to go on an education program for people to understand how we're going to do it or how it would be done.

And we've mentioned the EAC requirements of 1bcm per year. That's the capacity once they've installed unit 6 at Vasilikos. At the moment these are what we call dual fuels. They run on distillate, a liquid, or they can run on gas. And the whole idea with the EAC was that they would eventually convert all of the units to gas by around about 2015. I think the first unit is going to be up and ready the latter part of this year or early part of next year that would be able to run on gas if there was gas available. As I've said, the timeframes even with the pipeline are considerable, and even if Cyprus adopted a fast-track approach to building a pipeline, it would not be designed and installed before four years. And that's been extremely optimistic. But four years is probably very earliest we could get one in. Please, dispute if I say anything that you think is completely wrong, but...

There are other considerations. If we did have a pipeline coming onshore, who would own it? Who would pay for it? Again, we design the pipeline for a possible LNG use and domestic market? And who would operate and manage it, and what land-based facilities would be required? Now, the land-based facilities, again, it's the same thing: it's an ownership issue, who would own it, manage it, who would operate it. And if we were just bringing natural gas onshore, would we want any buffering capacity? Depending on the pressure coming out of the well, which I believe is something in the region about 400 bar. The pressure drop on that line between Block 12 and here you lose about 0.6 of a bar per kilometer on a 16 to 20-inch line. So you've got some pressure drop that you lose. You'd have to do some calculations and decide if you need to recompress at this end.

To put in perspective what one year's supply of gas would look like, it would all fit into one container at ambient pressure if the container was 1.5 kilometers in diameter and 600 meters

high. That's how much gas. And I've actually laid it over the top of Vasilikos to give you, from a circular point of view, some perspective on the amount of gas the island needs in a year.

So that's what it looks like in perspective. We don't normally store gas at ambient pressure anymore. They used to in the UK, but we don't store it under ambient pressure anymore. We normally store in horizontal vessels called bullets - or we refer to them as bullets - or we put it inside spheres, depending on the pressure. Normally, if it's very high pressure, then it will go in to spheres and we would normally take those up to 200 bar. The more you squash the gas, Boyle's law simply says that you double the pressure, you double the volume, but looking at one month's capacity here, the pressure will require a sphere of 100 meters diameter. So that would obviously need to be split. If we just wanted one week's requirement at 200 bar, the sphere would need to be thirty meters diameter, which is pushing the envelope on the size that we normally take them to. So one option would be to consider monthly deliveries and storing this gas in 12 spheres of around forty four meters diameter. This is just what you did if you were just to simply bring natural gas onshore but not from a pipeline. And this moves around a bit, the whole presentation moves around a bit because there are various different options: either bring in natural gas onshore, and I'll show you later, there's a possibility of bringing it onshore using what is referred to... It's a trademarked name called Energy Bridge by Excelebrate and they can actually bring gas onshore as natural gas from a remote location offshore. And in fact, there's one Excelebrate's northeast gateway bridging Boston Bay that the way the gas actually comes onshore is from a boy that's seventeen miles offshore. So that way you limit the amount of infrastructure on the land, you don't have heavy civil and marine costs when building a terminal onshore to collect the gas, and you can have it delivered offshore where you can't even see it, which has got possibilities. But the problem is, they can only do that now with natural gas, and if you did that with natural gas, you'd have to come up with some method of storing at least a month or at least two weeks supply of gas. And that's the physical constraints on the size of the equipment you would need onshore. So what I was saying there, as we simply wanted to import natural gas without a pipeline, there are numerous options available right now. And really, a feasibility work should be actually getting worked on right at this moment.

This is what I was talking about from the offshore facility. This is a floating liquefied natural gas storage and regasification unit. What this thing does, it goes to the well, it pulls gas out from where the well is, it liquefies the gas at sea, and it then travels with its liquefied natural gas as a cargo and pulls up to one of these turret mooring facilities. This normally sits about 30 meters down in the water. It has a small boy on it, the small boy is drawn up through a hole in a ship on a floater - we normally call these things moon pools. The turret is then pulled up through the ship and connects to the ship, then converts the liquefied natural gas to natural gas and sends it through a pipeline onto shore. And this is what I'm saying. This ship, this boy could be located up to 17-21 miles offshore. So you wouldn't even see the ship coming in to collect it or deliver it. Your minimum infrastructure here is simply doing a beach crossing and bringing a pipeline on shore. Your major expense is from the 40 meter to beach level where you've got quite extensive infrastructure. But it's only one pipeline, so the effects on the beach are minimal. And because that's the size of the things.

So this is a liquefied natural gas plant on top of a ship that has got regasification ability and in here, at the storage, is where the LNG is stored as a liquid gas.

This is Excelebrate's LNG and Energy Bridge. It's exactly what I've been talking about. They've got a number of carriers that can do this, even to the point that the Cyprus field - you don't need to

have a permanent structure over the top of it, or manned permanent structure. It can be done through various different means, this is just one of them. But the concept of what in the oil business we call them FPSOs – floating, production, storage and offloading vessels. And exactly the same concept is now being used for LNG. But the LNG is actually being produced at sea.

The cargo can be discharged as liquid at a traditional LNG facility regasification terminal. But this you need in marine infrastructure. At the moment Excelerate haven't designed - as far as I know - haven't designed a system for actually pumping liquefied natural gas onshore from so far out at sea. As I've said, there is one that I'm going to show you on here, that's in Boston Bay, about 17 miles on the shore. Now, there isn't a system at the moment that can pump 17 miles of LNG, but it can compress seventeen miles of natural gas. So the cargo can be discharged as liquid at a traditional LNG regasification terminal or as gas via Excelerate's Energy Bridge buoy-based STL - the STL is a turret loading system - and by the onboard high-pressure gas manifold. So you can send it at light pressure, and if you've got somewhere to put it. If you've got a huge big gas network like they've got in the States and throughout Europe, you just pump into the gas system, you pump into the network. We don't have that on Cyprus, there's only a million people here. We don't have a gas network. Normally most gas networks are at such a pressure you can just pump straight into them. But we don't have that here. So we could either go for the storage method that I've discussed earlier where you need a big amount of storage, or you can actually build buffering into the system. But you'd have to then maintain your entire gas system at around about 200, or at least somewhere between 100 and 200 bar.

And this is what it looks like. All that sits out at sea is this buoy. And that buoy underneath there is the turret system, and this gets drawn up into the ship - this is the actual connection - it actually gets drawn up into the ship and this is how the gas would then get sent ashore. This is the one that's in Boston Bay. And the reason it's there is because of the price of real estate in northeastern America, there's minimal disruption to what's going on the shore and they're not taking up a huge amount of real estate by building a conventional jetty and the dolphins to collect the gas from the ships.

We've seen that there are potential disadvantages with regard to storing natural gas if it was delivered by any other means. If a pipeline was installed in the future of the bulk of any gas storage equipment, (inaudible) would become obsolete. This is another thing. If you bring natural gas on in this method that I've just shown, and you decide to build a big gas network infrastructure, technically it would become obsolete. It depends how much you wanted to integrate it into your gas distribution pipe network planning for the island. So this is another study that could be looked at, at the beginning. What I've gone back to is a revisited possibility of building a regasification facility. One of the questions you get asked is how much of the regasification facility could be incorporated into an LNG or a liquefaction facility. Primarily all you could really say, all you'll keep from it, is you'll keep whatever the infrastructure is for the loading and the LNG storage tanks. But then taken to account that these two is about 70% to 75% of the total cost of this entire development. And I've got a quote on these tanks this morning, and I've been told if they were being built to specifications, designed to meet the international requirements for storage of LNG, these cost between 650 and 750 dollars per cubic meter stored. So for the size that we'd need on Cyprus I've got these coming out at around up to 270 million dollars. So the total gasification facility, regasification facility, shouldn't cost more than a half a billion dollars. What I've done is I've looked at it as if the tanks being of use at a later date if a liquefaction plant was built. I've received an email this morning from one of the world's biggest

manufacturers and these are the prices they've quoted me: 650 to 750 dollars per cubic meter. And I've worked those figures out on what the island's requirements are. To configure the tanks what I did was I looked at a diameter of 40 or higher than 35. If we had two tanks like that we'd need 19 deliveries per year of gas. The two tanks I've shown, 70 and 75, don't exist yet. This one's in the planning, but they don't actually exist yet. The biggest tanks we've got at the moment are somewhere between 199 and 250. But what I've done is I've just simply tried to show the size of the tank. So I've looked at about 190,000 cubic meter tanks that would require with the two of them five deliveries a year. The ideal tank size for Cyprus would be somewhere around there. And most of the world's LNG carriers there are some super huge ones that now carry up the quarter of a million cubic metres. But the bulk of the world's LNG fleet all around is this sort of size. So all 75% of the world's fleet is around about this sort of size. So these would be the sort of sizing you'd look at building tanks because you know you can take a full load from an LNG carrier. And they are the figures that I based... I've got prices on this morning.

And to give you some idea these two tanks here at Sakhalin are 190 thousand cubic meters. These are exactly the same sort of size that I say would work for Vasilikos. Right now is a storage for LNG with the regasification facility and in the future. You'd still be left with some equipment and regasification facility's primarily vaporizers or heaters. What you do is you have to gas up to bring it back to ambient temperature. And then these are simply regasification facilities.

We wouldn't necessarily need a full-time or something permanently over the well. This is something that was permanently over a well but a lot of it these days is all done on what we call umbilicals. This is turret mooring where the same ship, the FPSO with a turret mount comes over the well, liquefies a natural gas at sea, and then sails ashore.

Before any decisions we make, the various options open to the EAC... When I say EAC I say also mean DEFA, because I did a very similar talk at the request of the EAC a few weeks ago, where they wanted to know what their options were. And I obviously went through all of these with them. But then EAC said to me, we don't even make the decision, we are forced now, we have to buy our gas from DEFA. So technically, it should be DEFA who're making these decisions. So putting aside any commercial aspects on gas supply agreement, because at the time and I gave the talk with the EAC Noble hadn't confirmed the finds in block 12. So I broke the various options they had down into three categories. First, a fast-track 15-30 months, by using the Accelerate Gateway possibility, minimum infrastructure costs, but you could actually get something built, you could get natural gas onto the island somewhere between 15 and 30 months. And then I've looked at a medium term and the long term option obviously being a liquefaction facility.

Fast Track Option 1. Natural gas with the 1 bcm handling capability. Gas delivered by pipeline from an LNG FSRU using turret mooring. I've talked to Accelerate on this and they said, if you had a green light on all of this they could probably get something done within two years. So there is a possibility if that was a one option that everybody wanted to go for, then it could be done. The disadvantages too are that the natural gas would probably need to be re-compressed and stalled in spheres or bullets which I've discussed. And the only recommendation here is to do a high level concept study, which shouldn't take longer than a month. That really needs to be getting done now. I'm not sure what the team of experts are doing that have been appointed by the government because everybody that I talked to who supplies major LNG equipment haven't been getting calls from anybody. So I don't understand why they're not getting called.

Natural gas facility. Another option is to bring natural gas coming from LNG FSRU with conventional infrastructure. Now, this takes a lot more time to build. The disadvantages are exactly the same as option 1. But any long-term facilities you build you'd have to decide if you needed to incorporate them into the gas transmission network for the island. Again, this is one option, but while doing this one you would actually be looking at what the costs are for building an onshore facility for deep sea trips.

Medium Term Option 1. This is a regasification terminal. Now, talking to the manufacturer of the tanks this morning, they said that they could build these tanks at 190,000 meter cube within four years. But that would be without... Having worked on a lot of these projects over the last couple of years and the biggest ones in the world, the problem is that we normally have to... The major owners of these pieces of equipment - people like Shell and BP - tend to stipulate their specifications on you, and the specification and signing off process. That takes time. It can take a year just to get sign off on a design. You've also then got to do everything to the way that you're being dictated to buy the majors. Now, one way or another I would assume that one of the majors is going to get involved in this, which means that they are then going to dictate to you what specifications you need to follow, how you design it, so you're then going to go back to basics. And normally we wouldn't install an LNG tank within six or seven years. But you could do it in four, and I've heard that from the horse's mouth - from the natural manufacturers of these tanks. So it depends on how somebody would want to play it. The disadvantages are that because of the size required, design and planning construction, this would probably not be ready for commissioning in anything less than three years - I'm being extremely conservative. And period of time required to design and plan them, it's just a very long time. And its major capital costs. You've got to spend 300 million, the best part of three hundred million dollars just with two tanks, and you're not gonna be able to do anything with them for four years. Again, I would recommend they look at this... I really believe regasification facility is the best option for Cyprus because we can use the bulk of the major equipment at a later date. We're literally only writing off about a 150 million dollars' worth of equipment. But over the period of time we're going to be without gas here for at least six years, the difference in time between building a regasification facility and a liquefaction facility is about six years, if we pulled our finger out and started doing something about it now. So for six years we're going to still be running on liquid distillates and paying through the nose for our electricity. The thing that's probably why the EAC haven't come here today.

Medium Term 2. LNG regasification terminal with marine infrastructure. Again, it's the same thing - re-gas. A natural gas pipeline from Cyprus fields probably linked to Israeli field. Advantages to this is it's a permanent feature. It's expensive because as I've shown with the Galsi project, we're looking at probably around about a 2-billion-dollar mark. And if we really did pull our finger out, we could probably do it in about four years. We'd be pushing our luck to do it any sooner, then this comes up with sizing questions, including possible future needs. Would you put the pipe in, and you don't need to bring a pipe here about eight to twelve inches, but you would normally lie a pipeline of that diameter in that depth of water with the amount of hassle you've got to go with it, just to bring it on for the domestic market. So, you'd probably size it and you can put more gas through it at a later date, and therefore run an LNG facility off of it. Again, somebody needs to do a high level feasibility with this now.

An LNG liquefaction plant that can liquefy Cypriot gas and possibly future gas from Israeli fields. Again, this is the liquefaction discussion, but at the moment where we are, I personally believe

that the best strategy we could have would be to build a regasification facility as soon as possible. And design that around as much of the equipment being used at a later date in a liquefaction plant. And that plant could be designed to accept gas, I reckon, within, as I say, four to five years, if work was started on it immediately.

This is a quote there from Sir Ian Wood. I don't know if any of you have heard of the Wood Group. The Wood Group started off in the 60s as a fishing company in Aberdeen, fishing in the North Sea. Ian Wood went to study philosophy and his dad asked him to come into the business when he wasn't feeling too great. Well, Ian took the business, then started supplying the rigs in the North Sea from the 40s right the way through to current day. And what started off as a two-trawler fishing fleet, the Wood Group last year grossed 2.4 billion, and has 14,000 employees, and in fact owns the company called MSi Kenny who are doing the modeling for Noble of the subsea pipework, I believe. The Wood Group owns the company that's actually doing the subsea modeling for Noble. And Sir Ian Wood, his advice to anybody who's looking at moving into the oil and gas business is take a global perspective of it and not a local one.

Ok, thank you.

BRIEFING NOTE

Gary Lakes*

16 January 2012

The Future of Nabucco

The Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and the South East Europe Pipeline (SEEP) have been proposed as alternatives to Nabucco to convey Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz Stage 2 (SD2) gas to Europe.

Nabucco's future could also be affected by the agreement between Turkey and Russia to build the uber-expensive South Stream gas pipeline across the Black Sea.

While it has seemed like a good idea all along, Nabucco faces a bigger challenge now from TANAP and SEEP than it ever did from South Stream, which with a planned capacity of 63 billion cubic meters/year (bcm/y) was designed to supersede Nabucco at every opportunity. With a design capacity of 31 bcm/y, Nabucco was deemed too large for viability with only 10 bcm/y of SD2 gas available for transport to Europe. With sanctions putting Iran out of the picture as a source of gas supply to Europe, Nabucco consortium members OMV, MOL and RWE turned to Iraqi Kurdistan as another source to fill the pipeline.

To make the pipeline more attractive, Nabucco partners proposed extending the pipeline as far east as Baku and further west into Central Europe. The extension to Baku was mindful of Nabucco's real goal – gas supplies from Turkmenistan. But without a deal to build the long-elusive Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, which is strongly opposed by Russia and Iran on both political grounds and for reasons of gas market competition, shipments of Turkmen gas through Nabucco will not happen.

At this point it appears that only a China-like deal that would send 30 bcm/y of Turkmen gas through Nabucco to Europe would put the project back on its feet. The European Union last September sanctioned the effort to negotiate a "legally binding treaty" between it, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan for the construction of the TCGP, but there has been no report of progress.

Throughout its existence, Nabucco has sought to cross all the 't's and dot all the 'i's. It has all its intergovernmental agreements in place, and while the cost of the project now probably goes well beyond the original €7.9 billion, it is still probably a bargain compared to South Stream, which is being estimated by the media at €25-30 billion. Russia must be asking itself just how much gas it

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is going to have to sell in order to cover the cost of maintaining a firm hand on the European market with its Black Sea pipeline adventure.

Now with TANAP, an 80%-20% joint venture between Azerbaijan's Socar and Turkey's Botas, on the scene, it is unlikely that Nabucco can hope to be awarded the contracts to carry SD₂ gas. TANAP is carry the full 16 bcm/y that SD₂ will produce, with 6 bcm/y promised to Turkey's domestic market.

Furthermore, the fact that SEEP–proposed by Shah Deniz operator BP–will essentially follow the planned Nabucco route through Eastern Europe and that its shareholding will essentially be open to Shah Deniz partners must be discouraging to the Nabucco partners. Perhaps the only bright note for them would be if they – after having spent millions on developing Nabucco as a project – would be given the option to buy into TANAP and into SEEP, which has an initial design to carry 10 bcm/y.

TANAP and SEEP combined hold little promise for the Greek-Italian Interconnector Greece-Italy (IGI) Poseidon gas pipeline or the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). While both have been included in the Southern Corridor scenario, both have been on the periphery and both planned to carry gas to Italy, not disperse it more widely into Eastern and Central Europe.

Should SEEP not be built in conjunction with TANAP, which is expected to cost \$5 billion or more and come into operation in 2017 when SD₂ comes on – stream, then either IGI Poseidon or TAP will likely be awarded the gas contracts awaited from Azerbaijan.

There is little doubt now that Azerbaijan will decide in favor of its own project as the pipeline through which it will chose to carry SD₂ gas across Turkey. Nabucco, IGI Poseidon (part of the Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy project) were made to jump through a number of hoops prior to their submission of bids for gas contracts last October. In the end it appears that Baku has decided to do for itself what it doubted that others could do for it. And for Ankara, TANAP is a message to the EU that it too can take an independent course.

Even as more gas supplies come on-stream in Azerbaijan in the future, there are questions as to whether there will ever be enough Azeri gas in the future. The country's energy minister, Natiq Aliyev, has said TANAP's initial capacity of 16 bcm/y can be expanded to 24 bcm/y.

Meanwhile, the political situation in Iraq is deteriorating and spreading to the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), making, at this time, the future of gas exports from northern Iraq more questionable than ever–another star in the wrong place for Nabucco.

It is not quite clear if this is the finale for Nabucco or just an intermission. The project has indeed been like a long, melodramatic opera. There have been moments of enduring love and times of harrowing melancholy. It has at times been panned by the critics and applauded by the crowd, and the cast has put in a strong performance throughout its tour of Europe and the Caucasus. Without a doubt, Nabucco set the stage.

BRIEFING NOTE

Gary Lakes*

18 February 2012

Cyprus' 2nd Licensing Round

On February 13 the Republic of Cyprus launched its second licensing round, opening 12 blocks of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to bidding by international oil companies. Companies have 90 days to submit their bids. Evaluation of the applications is expected to take place over a six month period, and blocks could be awarded before the end of the year.

Following the discovery in December by Noble Energy of around 7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in Block 12, as well as the numerous and sizeable discoveries made by Houston-based Noble in the Israeli offshore, the Cyprus bidding round is expected to attract considerably more attention than the first round in 2007. While Cyprus made 11 blocks open for bidding then, few bids were placed and only Block 12 was awarded.

Noble Energy holds a 70% working interest in Block 12 after a farm-in by two subsidiaries of Israel's Delek Group, Noble's main partner in the Israeli offshore. Noble is assessing the results of the Cyprus A-1 well, the first offshore well ever drilled in Cyprus, and is looking to carry out appraisal drilling during the latter half of 2012.

As expected, Turkey voiced its objection to the launch of the licensing round through a statement from its foreign ministry. Ankara holds that the government of Cyprus does not have the right to explore or exploit hydrocarbons in Cypriot waters because the Greek-Cypriot republic does not represent Turkish-Cypriots, who reside in the northern side of the island, which has been under Turkish military occupation since 1974.

In the statement, Ankara said: "We protest this unilateral step, which is both irresponsible and provocative, taken by the Greek-Cypriots despite all warning." The statement said that the Cyprus EEZ overlaps areas claimed by Turkey as part of its continental shelf and that it also violates an agreement that the Turkish-Cypriot administration signed with the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO) giving TPAO the right to explore in Cypriot waters that are part of the EEZ.

Turkey "will give every support to the [Turkish-Cypriot administration] to prevent possible violations of Turkish-Cypriot concession blocks and thus to protect their rights and interests in

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maritime areas,” the Turkish Foreign Ministry statement said. It also warned foreign oil companies to avoid exploration in the areas that Turkey claims as its own in the Mediterranean.

The Republic of Cyprus is a member of the European Union and is a signatory of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The EU, UN, US, Russia and others have expressed their support for Cyprus’ right to explore for hydrocarbons in its EEZ.

The Cyprus Foreign Minister on February 17 replied to Ankara’s statements saying that Cyprus would proceed with the exploitation of its natural wealth, the Cyprus Mail reported. “The Republic of Cyprus is determined to proceed in exploiting its natural wealth, especially in relations with hydrocarbons, for the economic development and prosperity of its people, without discrimination.” It added: “Turkey once more proves that its aim is not the protection of the rights of Turkish-Cypriots, as it professes, since it is claiming for itself a significant part of Cyprus’ western, southern and northern EEZ.”

BRIEFING NOTE

Gary Lakes*

19 February 2012

New Azerbaijan-Turkey Agreement

An agreement between Azerbaijan's state-owned oil and gas company Socar and the government of Turkey regarding the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) is expected to be signed by April 2012.

Socar and Turkish pipeline company Botas announced in December 2011 a plan to construct a pipeline across Turkey that would carry gas produced in Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz gas field in the Caspian Sea to Europe. The project will likely be the end of the EU-backed Nabucco Gas Pipeline project, which since 2002 has been proposing to carry natural gas from Azerbaijan, Central Asia and the Middle East to Southeast and Central Europe.

With Azerbaijan and Turkey joining up to provide a system to carry Azeri gas as far as the Bulgarian border, TANAP is expected to receive the contracts from the Shah Deniz partners to transport the 16 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) that the Shah Deniz Stage 2 (SD2) is scheduled to produce in 2017. Of this, Turkey would receive 6 bcm/y and the remaining 10 bcm/y would be shipped into Europe. Turkey already receives 6 bcm/y of Shah Deniz gas from the first stage of the project.

TANAP is estimated to cost 5-7 billion dollars, considerably less than the current unofficial cost estimate of around 12 billion dollars for Nabucco. First reports on TANAP capacity were put at 10-16 bcm/y – sufficient to cover SD2 output, but new reports in the media are placing initial capacity for TANAP at 30 bcm/y with the possibility of expansion in the years ahead. Azerbaijan is expected to be producing enough gas by 2025 to export 50 bcm/y. That suggests that Socar will likely expand TANAP capacity for any future gas exports traveling to Europe, thus giving the pipeline the central role in the Southern Corridor and canceling out any opportunity for an alternative pipeline across Turkey, such as Nabucco, to become a feasible project, barring a major development between the EU, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on a Trans Caspian Gas Pipeline.

One of Nabucco's prime shortcomings has been its failure to secure sources of supply for its 31 bcm/y capacity. This, in turn, led to it not being able to secure financing. Besides looking for supplies from Azerbaijan, Nabucco had hoped to secure gas supplies from Turkmenistan and Iraq. While these options remain future possibilities, right now they look like long shots.

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Socar is to hold 80% of TANAP while Turkey, through Botas and its upstream petroleum company TPAO, will hold 20%. Mr. Abdullayev said the project would be open to other partners and it is likely that European shareholders in Shah Deniz and possibly some of those involved in Nabucco will look to join. Germany's RWE, a late-comer to Nabucco, has expressed an interest in TANAP.

While it appears that the likely project to carry SD2 gas across Turkey will be TANAP, there is still the question of which consortium will be selected to convey the gas into Europe. The Interconnector Greece-Italy (IGI) Poseidon project is designed to carry 10 bcm/y of gas across northern Greece and the Adriatic Sea to southern Italy. It also holds the possibility of shipping gas into Southeast Europe through the yet to be completed 5 bcm/y-capacity Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB) project.

The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) is also designed to carry 10 bcm/y (and later 20 bcm/y) to Italy and the southern Balkans. There is also the South East Europe Pipeline (SEEP) proposed last autumn by Shah Deniz operator BP only days before the deadline to contract submissions for SD2 gas. SEEP has yet to come up with a concise proposal, but could be given serious attention as an alternative. SEEP would run from the Turkish/Bulgarian border to Austria, roughly following the proposed Nabucco route.

In the midst of this, Nabucco is reported to be planning a scaled down model of itself in an attempt to stay alive. The consortium plans to cut its capacity by more than half and make the Bulgarian border its starting point.

The situation could result with Shah Deniz partners awarding the SD2 contracts in stages. The changing landscape of pipeline politics with regard to the Southern Corridor has caused a series of delays in awarding the SD2 contracts. But with TANAP seen at this point as the most likely winner of those contracts, the partners may decide to select TANAP and then give further consideration to which pipeline project will win the contracts for carrying SD2 gas into Europe.

BRIEFING NOTE

Gary Lakes*

29 February 2012

Nabucco Revisited

The Nabucco Gas Pipeline International consortium is reported to be reassessing its role as a major gas importer into Europe. That role may now be claimed by the gas pipeline announced by Turkey and Azerbaijan last December.

Nabucco is now considering a pipeline from the Bulgaria – Turkey border to the Central European Gas Hub in Baumgarten, Austria. The pipeline would follow Nabucco's proposed route through Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria, but with the stretch across Turkey eliminated.

Late last year, following the submission of bids on October 1 by the three consortia competing for Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz Stage 2 (SD2) gas shipments, Azerbaijan's state – owned oil and gas company Socar and Turkey's Petroleum Pipelines Corporation (Botas) announced that they had formed an 80:20 partnership to build a 10 billion cubic meter/year (bcm/y) across Turkey from the Georgian to the Bulgaria border. The Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) would have an initial capacity of 10 bcm/y – the amount of gas that SD2 will have available for export to Europe – and Turkish officials have said the pipeline could be expanded to 30 bcm/y. Azerbaijan is planning to expand its natural gas production to 50 – 55 bcm/y by 2025.

The announcement virtually struck a serious blow to the 31 bcm/y Nabucco project. Now estimated to cost 12 billion euros, Nabucco had been considered too much pipeline for the amount of gas available. Unable to secure gas from Azerbaijan, the project in years previously had turned to lining up gas projects in Iraqi Kurdistan, but no gas export deals were ever signed.

The Shah Deniz partners, led by BP and Statoil, are expected to award the gas shipment contract by the middle of this year. Other contenders for the 10 bcm/y from the Caspian is the Interconnector Turkey – Greece – Italy (ITGI) and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), both of which have initial capacities of around 10 bcm/y. Also, a few days before the October 1 bidding deadline for SD2 gas, BP announced that it was giving consideration to a pipeline project that it and other Shah Deniz partners would back, the South East Europe Pipeline (SEEP), which would also have a 10 bcm/y initial capacity and travel roughly the same route as the one proposed by Nabucco into Central Europe.

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The TANAP and SEEP pipelines together would remove Nabucco as a feasible project.

BRIEFING NOTE

Gary Lakes*
3 March 2012

Lebanon's Gas Exploration

On February 29, 2012, the leader of Lebanon's Shia Muslim Amal party and Speaker of the Lebanese parliament Mr. Nabih Berri arrived in Cyprus to discuss the maritime delimitation agreement between Cyprus and Lebanon.

Lebanon and Cyprus signed a delimitation agreement in 2007 but the Lebanese parliament has yet to ratify it primarily because of its difference with Israel over the delimitation line between those two countries. The Cyprus House of Representatives has ratified the agreement.

Claims by Lebanon and Israel for their respective exclusive economic zones (EEZs) overlap in an area that covers around 850 square kilometers. Both countries have filed claims with the UN, declaring the coordinates for their offshore territories.

Cyprus signed a maritime delimitation agreement with Israel in December 2010 and is negotiating a unitization agreement with Israel. Cyprus has therefore been drawn into the dispute between Lebanon and Israel. Lebanon claims that the point at where the three EEZs meet should be south of the same point provided by the Cyprus-Israel delimitation agreement.

While in Cyprus, Mr. Berri said that the problem was not between Lebanon and Cyprus, but between Lebanon and Israel, and added that if the difference between those two Levant states could be resolved, the Lebanese parliament would ratify the agreement with Cyprus "within 15 days."

Several significant gas discoveries have been made by Noble Energy in the Israeli offshore, notably the Tamar and Leviathan gas fields, with reserves of 9.1 trillion cubic feet and 17-20 trillion cubic feet respectively. In December, Noble announced the discovery of the 7 trillion cubic feet Aphrodite field in Cyprus' Block 12.

Noble and its Israeli partner Delek Group proposed last year the construction of a 15 million tons/year LNG facility in Cyprus that would process and export Israeli and Cypriot gas. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Nicosia in mid-February, two weeks before Mr. Berri's arrival, to discuss energy cooperation with the Cypriot President and other officials.

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Lebanese politicians have claimed that the Leviathan gas field extends into the Lebanese EEZ and accused Israel of attempted to usurp Lebanon's natural resources.

Meanwhile, Lebanon's Minister of Energy and Water Jibran Basil on March 1 urged the Lebanese cabinet to take urgent steps to form the Petroleum Administration, which is necessary if the country is to launch its first bidding round. Under Lebanon's hydrocarbon law, which was passed in 2010, the Petroleum Administration is to administrate the country's oil and gas resources. The administration was due to be formed by the end of last year, and in January the cabinet issued a decree sanctioning its formation. However, the country's bureaucracy is apparently making the formation of the group difficult.

Mr. Basil had during 2011 stated on several occasions that Lebanon would launch a licensing round in the first quarter of 2012. Now it appears that that endeavor will be delayed and perhaps launched during the first half of this year.

BRIEFING NOTE

Gary Lakes*
11 March 2012

Greek Hydrocarbon Exploration

In early March 2012 Greece started the process of commissioning geological surveys and seismic exploration in the country's western and southern seas. These geological surveys are to be carried out in the Ionian Sea and in the waters south of Crete covering an area of around 220,000 square kilometers. The region is estimated to hold several hundred million barrels of hydrocarbons according to data that was previously gathered.

The companies that have bid for the tenders include the world's major hydrocarbon survey firms: ION Geophysical of the US, TGS – NOPEC, Dolphin Geophysical and Petroleum Geo – Services (PGS) of Norway, CGG Veritas of France, Spec Partners, Spectrum Geo Ltd and Fugro Multiclient Services.

As many as three contracts are expected to be awarded in April and survey work is slated to begin shortly thereafter. Greece is then expected to delineate up to 15 blocks and introduce a licensing round before the end of the year. More tenders for onshore seismic surveys are expected by July 2012. Furthermore, tenders have been opened for exploration work in the areas of Patras, Katakolo and Ioannina. Greek company Energean is currently working in the Prinos oil fields in the Gulf of Kavala.

The development of its own energy resources could dent Greece's energy costs which currently amount to €10 – 12 billion, some 5% of its gross domestic product (GDP). Greece is in the midst of a financial crisis with accumulated debt of some €350 billion. The situation has moved it to privatize its natural gas company DEPA and the gas transport and service company DEFSa.

The energy minister also said that Greece would take steps to identify its offshore exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). "In no way is Greece willing to not exercise all its sovereign rights and these include EEZs. EEZs are a tool Greece intends to use, in line with its overall policy," Mr. Papaconstantinou said in late February.

Greece plans to negotiate a maritime delimitation agreement with Albania and Italy in the Ionian Sea and with Egypt and Libya regarding the Mediterranean south of Crete. Negotiations with

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Turkey on the issue of the Aegean Sea territories are expected to be difficult as Ankara is not a signatory to UNCLOS. Turkey has made claims on parts of the Aegean and has expressed its opposition on numerous occasions to the creation of an EEZ in Cypriot waters and exploration work carried out there by the US company Noble Energy. In December last year, Noble announced the discovery of 5 – 8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in Block 12, near to significant discoveries made by the company in Israeli waters.

Energy cooperation between Greece, Cyprus and Israel has grown over the last two years during the course of natural gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean. The three plan to sign a memorandum of understanding on energy cooperation by the end of March.

Cyprus and Israel have already taken strides towards energy cooperation in joint offshore development, with a joint LNG facility proposed for construction on the southern coast of the island. The Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) and DEH Quantum Energy, a Cypriot – Greek joint venture, in early March signed an MOU regarding a feasibility study to lay an electricity cable between the two countries. The project's cost is estimated at €500 billion. The plan calls for the cable to eventually be extended to Crete and from there connected with Greece's national electric grid.

REPORT

Dr. Yiannos Charalambides*
29 March 2012

Vulnerable States and Regional Predators

Introduction

Oil and gas constitute sources of energy and, by extension, power. However, the question is whether oil and gas constitute raw materials, utilized only for prosperity, development and stability or they may turn into a source of friction and thereby become fuel for conflict.

There is already reliable and concrete evidence, stemming from relevant research, showing that the Southeastern Mediterranean Sea lies on huge reserves of gas and probably oil. Israel and Cyprus undertook their own surveys within their respective Exclusive Economic Zones.¹ The first phase of these explorations was successfully accomplished. Both countries announced their intention to exploit their natural resources, especially in the neighboring “Block 12”, “Leviathan” and “Tamar”.² In this respect, a new geopolitical environment seems to have come into being. Currently, the relevant question is whether there is fertile ground for the shaping of a new geopolitical map through the establishment of a coalition between Israel and Cyprus, including, probably, other states.

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¹ ‘Cyprus to Offer 12 Blocks for Gas/Oil Research Round End-2011,’ *Reuters*, 10 January 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/10/cyprus-energy-exploration-idUSLDE7091ES20110110>; On December 17, 2010 the Republic of Cyprus and Israel signed an agreement and delineated their Exclusive Economic Zones.

² Noble Energy, 2011, Eastern Mediterranean, http://www.nobleenergyinc.com/fw/main/Eastern_Mediterranean-128.html; ‘Noble Energy Says Could Deliver Gas in Cyprus by 2014,’ *LNG World News*, 24 June 2011, <http://www.lngworldnews.com/noble-energy-says-could-deliver-gas-to-cyprus-by-2014/>; Amiram Barkat, ‘Noble CEO: Leviathan is Largest Gas Find in Our History,’ 29 December 2010, <http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=201439>; Ian Cooper, Israel's Huge Oil and Gas Discovery, *Seeking Alpha*, 2 September 2010, <http://seekingalpha.com/article/223487-israel-s-huge-oil-and-gas-discovery>; ‘Gas Discovery Already the Bright Spot in Israel’s Economy’, *Oil in Israel*, 18 February 2009, <http://www.oilinisrael.net/top-stories/gas-discovery-already-the-bright-spot-in-israels-economy>.

South Eastern Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East constitute sensitive geostrategic and geo-economic areas where conflicting and converging national interests are met. Israel is not the only regional power. Turkey has always intended to play a leading regional role. Therefore, a new geopolitical evolution should be seen through the lens of the Turkish foreign policy and national interests. Such a foreign policy is in line with the Turkish strategic goal, which predicts the consolidation of Ankara's dominant presence in a regional level.

This article will examine:

1. The regional geopolitical and geostrategic environment.
2. Whether concrete coalitions are likely to be established as a result of the hydrocarbon deposits, which lie in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus and Israel.
3. What is the Turkish reaction after Cyprus and Israel's decision to explore and exploit their gas recourses? A relevant question is whether Cyprus and Israel will establish a geo-economic and strategic coalition.
4. Whether it would be possible to establish a coalition between Cyprus and Israel, including other countries.
5. What is the preventive role that the EU as such, its leading states, the US and Russia, can play if tension and crises arise.
6. In what extent the Turkish accession to the EU might be affected if a military crisis erupts?

The geostrategic environment

Cyprus is located in a pivotal geopolitical and geostrategic region where the rules of balance of power and strategic methods and practices of the Cold War never ended. Cyprus lies between two powerful states, namely Turkey and Israel. Both, Turkey and Israel were allies under the supervision of the US and they still hold a key role in the regional system. However, when the moderate Islamic Party of the AKP came into office, Turkey attempted to formulate a twofold policy: The first direction focused on the EU³ and the second on the Islamic and Arab World. The central Turkish aim is to become an indisputable regional power. A relevant question is whether such a Turkish policy can coexist or not with the Israelis national and strategic goal.

There is no doubt that Israel constitutes a regional power which has been consolidated through victorious wars against Arab countries and military strength. In the current period, Israel maintains its strategic supremacy within the regional system, while realizing that the Turkish political and strategic ambitions put at risk its national interests and that the Turkish "zero problems policy"⁴ cannot lead to comprehensive solutions. Since Turkey acts as a regional power,

³ Council of the European Union 2004, 'Presidency Conclusions,' 16238/1/04 REV 1, Brussels, 16-17 December, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf.

Council of the European Union 2005, 2678th Council Meeting: General Affairs and External Relations, 12514/1/05 REV 1, Luxembourg, 3 October, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/86442.pdf.

⁴ Ahmet Davutoğlu, 'Mr. Zero Problems, interview by Blake Hounshell, Foreign Policy,' 28 November 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/29/mr_zero_problems?page=0.1.

Oleg Svet, 'Turkey's "Zero Problem" Foreign Policy: An Untenable Balancing Act,' NIMEP Insights Insights 2 (2006): 71-78,

http://www.tuftsgloballeadership.org/files/resources/nimep/v2/INSIGHTS06_Svet.pdf

the solutions it seeks, in order to solve the various problems it faces with its neighboring countries, would serve Turkish national interests and strategic goals. Israel detects that Turkish policy encompasses two main threats:

Firstly, Turkey has put forward a strategy with the aim of rising itself as a regional power with the prospect to replace the dominant role Israel plays in the regional system.⁵ Ankara questions the Israeli legal national interests and especially the deposits of gas and oil which lie in the seabed of the Israeli exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Secondly, Turkey plans to establish a chain of coalitions with Muslim and Arab countries. To this end, it promotes idealistic and religious criteria.⁶ In other words, it wants to formulate a wider coalition comprising of a common Muslim system of values and principles. From a realistic point of view, such a coalition cannot be relied only on the Muslim system of values and principles, but also on interests and political, economic and institutional power that Turkey may acquire in case of joining the EU. If Turkey accedes to the EU, we may observe history to repeat itself in view of establishing a second EU capital as happened with the separation of Roman Empire. The one will be in Brussels and the other in Istanbul, representing the Muslim populations within and outside of the European external legal borders.⁷ Pursuant to Yasser Yiakis, Istanbul is the epicenter of an important geostrategic circle, including many European, African and Asian countries.

As Yiakis maintains:

“Such a circle will cover the major part of areas where the history of the world is shaped. It will cover almost all of the European countries, North Africa, the Caucasus, and the entire Middle East. 70% of the gas oil reserves lie in this geography. 40% of the world oil and gas is consumed in this geography. Most of the conflicts that fill the agenda of world oil and gas is consumed in this geography. Most of the conflicts that fill the agenda of the international relations take place in the areas that are covered by this circle. It is not easy to draw a circle with similar effects, if you take its centre another major metropolis in the world.”⁸

This strategic and geopolitical position reminds us of a new version of the “Heartland Theory” as Halford John Mackinder⁹ and Nikola Spyckman¹⁰ set forth at the dawn of the 20th century. Moreover, Yiakis’ theory is in line with the geopolitical concept of the “Silk Road” and falls under

⁵ George Friedman, ‘Turkey as a Regional Power, Stratford Global Intelligence,’ 23 October 2010, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/turkey_regional_power; Ottens N, 2010, Turkey Awakes as Regional Power, Atlantic Sentinel, 11 June 2010, <http://atlanticsentinel.com/2010/06/turkey-awakes-as-a-regional-power/>; Josef Joffe, ‘Turkey is Making a Play for Regional Power,’ *Financial Times*, 6 June 2010, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/681fae96-7195-11df-8eec-0144feabdc0.html#axzz1VziHVBgf>

⁶ Voice of America, ‘Erdogan in Egypt on Manday; Also to Visit Libya, Tunisia,’ 12 September 2011, <http://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-news/2011/09/12/erdogan-in-egypt-monday-also-to-visit-libya-tunisia/>

⁷ Yannis Charalambides, *The Big Bet. Will the Turkish Accession to the EU Threaten the European Cohesion?* Peter Lang, Frankfurt, 2010, p.190-191.

⁸ ‘Turkey’s Geopolitical Position and Its Role as an Energy Corridor,’ Speech delivered by Mr. Yaşar Yakış, a Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey at the International Youth Conference ‘Turkey on the European Doorstep,’ European Parliament, Brussels, 22 June 2011.

⁹ Dikshit R D, *Political Geography, the Spatiality of Politics*, Third Edition, data McGraw-Hill, 2000, pp. 90-91.

¹⁰ Nicholas J. Spykman, ‘Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy,’ *American Political Science Review*, June 1939, Vol. 33, Issue 3, pp. 391-410.

the Turkish energy strategy, which aims for Turkish domination in the Eurasian region. Under these circumstances, Turkey will become a locus of interests and oil crossroad.¹¹ Ankara's administration plans to enhance its pivotal geopolitical location and thus presents itself as an indispensable international actor through which the US and the EU can safely and reliably advance their national interests.

The Muslim and Arab world has been engaged in a perpetual conflict with Israel for many years. The core issue of this conflict lies in the unresolved Palestinian question. Furthermore, this historical military and political dispute is an excellent opportunity for the Turkish foreign policy to advance a "paternalistic model" of action. The US always places at the top of its international agenda the solution of the Palestinian issue, whilst Turkey pursues to get actively involved in such diplomatic efforts, with the purpose of serving its national interests.¹² Not only the US, but the entire international community, realizes that with the Palestinian issue unsolved, no common ground can be found between Israel and Arabs and especially with the hardliner forces of Islam. If the extreme Islamic organizations of " Hamas" and "Hezbollah" have no intention to put guns away, then no peace can be achieved. Nor we can safely predict that Muslim uprisings will induce domestic and regional stability. The existing situation shows that the Arab Spring has turned into a cold and chaotic winter!

Muslim societies differ from the western ones as they still depend on their religious system of values. This system of values defines and yet restricts political options, thus eroding the soundness of government decision-making. At the same time, no one knows or can safely foresee what might be the role and political attitude of the extremist Islamic organizations within the new revolutionist political systems. In relevance, we cannot predict whether the resultant political situation would be better or worse in comparison with the past. The Iraqi model is a good example illustrating the reasons that caused the existing bad situation, despite the fact that the efforts of the international community are focused on the establishment of a democratic political system. Pertinent problems are evident in Libya where the first stage of the rebels' victory was stigmatized by anarchy and chaos. On the other hand, an anarchic and chaotic situation could never be an excuse for accepting any dictatorial regime to stay in power. Although the Arab and Muslim peoples revolted during the spring of 2011, democracy has not flourished yet. The rebels have no democratic institutional experience and since they really wish to build new democratic political systems, they should start from scratch. Thus, the international community should find the best possible policies and mechanisms to support Muslim and Arab countries for a smooth and rational normalization and democratization. Since this aspiration remains impossible to achieve, the regional system will continue to be volatile.

The current strategic vacuum in the Arab and Muslim world needs to be filled by traditional or raising leading countries. Turkey is one of the main actors of the regional system and it has already put in effect a "paternalistic model" of action and thus triggered the reaction of Israel. Turkish Foreign Policy does not rely only on the idealistic and religious criteria, but on the service

¹¹ 'Turkey's Geopolitical Position and Its Role as an Energy Corridor,' speech delivered by Mr. Yaşar Yakış, a Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey at the International Youth Conference 'Turkey on the European Doorstep,' European Parliament, Brussels, 22 June 2011; Turkish Foreign Ministry, 2009, Turkey's Energy Strategy, Deputy Directorate General for Energy, Water and Environment, January, viewed 17 August 2011, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/EnerjiPolitikasi/Turkey's%20Energy%20Strategy%20\(Ocak%202009\).pdf](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/EnerjiPolitikasi/Turkey's%20Energy%20Strategy%20(Ocak%202009).pdf)

¹² Barak Obama, Barak, 'Speech to Turkish Parliament,' 7 April 2009, *Associated Press*, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/obama_text.

of national interests as well. Therefore, we must see and analyze the Turkish policy under the spectrum of Realism. Why? Turkey is a significant actor with a strategic role in the international and regional system. Turkey, as most states, implements policies which provide idealistic and moral arguments and principles in order to advance its national interests, whether legitimate or not.¹³ In other words, states' political apparatus are devoted to advance national interest through the establishment of coalitions or in the context of good neighborhood policies. This is a rational political behavior which is adopted and performed by Turkey as a state aspiring to play a leading role in the regional and global system. In this regard, Turkey flirts with Muslim peoples, even with Iran,¹⁴ deemed by the US as a trouble maker of the international system and a permanent threat. This policy seems to be a strategic procedure, which can obviously threaten Israeli national interests and security.

Given the twofold Turkish policy (the one foot in Europe and the other in Muslim and Arab world), which aims at becoming regional power, a relevant question should be set: is Turkey the new rising regional power and Israel the declining one? In this respect, Thucydides is up to date, as he underlines that: "the growth of the power of Athens and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable."¹⁵ Otherwise, a crisis cannot be excluded as a possibility. We are in fact eyewitnesses of a rational game under the US guardianship. However, the Israeli-Turkish relations will continue to balance riskily as there is no sign that either one or the other side has a political intention to modify its national goal. If we accept that the existing Turkish policy results from the ideological and religious identity of the AKP, as well as from the advance of the Turkish national interests, and if the AKP - which won the elections on 12 June 2011 - rules the country for the next four years,¹⁶ we come to the following conclusion: the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan will persist to pursue a leading role in the Muslim world and he will never abandon his country's ambition to join the EU (Bağış).¹⁷ In any case, the problem between Turkey and Israel is evident and therefore a new question is raised: will the US let its allies get into a conflicting situation?

Explosive situation and axis

Looking carefully at the Middle East's map, one may realize that Israel is surrounded by a number of enemies or potential ones and that it has no way out other than shaping a geopolitical axis along with Cyprus and Greece toward Europe. The political landscape is always explosive and this estimate has been portrayed by the bloody incidents which occurred between the 18th and 20th of August 2011.¹⁸ The Israeli army retaliated to the terrorist actions against innocent tourists

¹³ Kathy Sammis, *Focus on U.S. History: The Era of Modernization Through the 1930s*, J. Weston Watch Publisher, 2000, p.30; Panayiotis Ifestos, *American Foreign Policy, From the "Idealistic Innocence" to the "Destiny of the Nation"*, Odysseas Publishing House, 1994, pp.323-324.

¹⁴ Suleyman Elik, *Turkey-Iran Relations, 1979-2011*, Routledge, 2012; Ely Karmon, 'Will the Arab Uprisings Result in the Emergence of a Sunni Bloc Dominated by Turkey?' *Turkey Analyst*, Vol. 4, Nr. 9, 2 May 2011, <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2011/110502B.html>; Mehmet Efe Biresselioglu, 'Changing Dynamic in the Turkey Iran Relationship,' *Balkananalysis.com*, 2010, <http://www.balkananalysis.com/turkey/2010/11/04/changing-dynamics-in-the-turkey-iran-relationship/>

¹⁵ Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian war*, New Work: Modern Library, 1951, p.15.

¹⁶ Konda (Arastima ve Danismanlik), 2011, 'Turkey After the Elections,' June 15, presented in the context of the JPC (Turkey – EU Joint Parliamentary Committee) in a teleconference (Brussels, Istanbul, Ankara).

¹⁷ E. Bağış, 'Meeting of the JPC (Joint Parliamentary Committee between Turkey and the EU).' On September 28, 2011, Minister Bağış delivered a speech on two issues: the Turkish citizen's visa in the EU and the Turkish – EU relations in general.

¹⁸ 'Israeli Airstrikes Target Gaza after Multiple Attacks,' CNN, 18 August 2011.

that took place close to the Sinai borders. Seven tourists were killed and Tel Aviv accused Egypt of not taking control over its borders. As a result of the Israeli military raids, mainly launched against Hamas' targets, five Egyptians lost their lives. Under these circumstances, Egypt recalled its ambassador in Tel Aviv and further escalation of the crisis was averted by intensive American diplomatic efforts as the US want to keep stability in the region.

Whilst Israel encounters severe troubles with its Arab neighboring countries, Cyprus is experiencing Turkish occupation and continuous military threat. The deposits of gas and oils as well as conflicting and converging national interests, shape a new geopolitical environment and fertile ground for the establishment of a Cypriot–Israeli coalition, based on the advance of common interests. Upon analyzing the existing geopolitical situation and the options that Israel has on exploring and exploiting its natural gas resources, we underscore the following:

- a) First option, to install a pipeline from Israel to Egypt where natural gas is to be liquefied and then be transferred to Europe and elsewhere via vessels.
- b) Second option, to install a pipeline from Israel to Ceyhan where natural gas is to be liquefied and then transferred to Europe and elsewhere with vessels; or to use a pipeline passing through Turkish territory.
- c) Third option, to install a pipeline from Israel to Cyprus, where liquefied natural gas is transferred via shipping in Europe and elsewhere.¹⁹

Israel cannot advance its national interests through the first and second option. Both Egypt and Turkey present themselves as regional powers and constitute the main Israel's rivalries. In this respect, if Israel goes for the first and second options, it will depend on Egypt and Turkey. Thus, one may argue that this is a strategically wrong decision as the Israelis have no intention and reason to enhance the Turkish and Egyptian geopolitical and geostrategic importance, especially during a period where their relations are on knife's edge. On September 2, 2011, Turkey expelled the Israeli ambassador from Ankara. Pursuant to Turkish President Abdullah Gul it was the first measure that his country took as Israel did not apologize to Ankara for the nine Turkish citizens who lost their lives in the bloody flotilla's incidents.²⁰ The Turkish government disputed the report on the bloody incidents, prepared by former New Zealand Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer and former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. The report, which had been unofficially circulated on May 10, 2011, was presented to the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. One may allege that it is a balanced report. On the one hand, it cites that the Israeli raid was "excessive and unreasonable". On the other hand, the spokesman of the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Mark Regev, underlines the following: "The UN commission clearly states that Israel acted legally in imposing the naval blockade to protect our people from the smuggling of rockets and weapons that are fired at our civilians."²¹

In parallel, the Turkish government evoked the legal order and officially expressed its political will to appeal to the International Court. As Davutoğlu said:

¹⁹ Yannis Charalambides, 'Aphrodite's Beauty,' *Simerini* <http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini>.

²⁰ ET World, 2011, (Greek TV), 2 September 2011.

²¹ Ghosh Palash, 'Turkey Plans to Challenge Gaza Blockade, As Relations with Israel Deteriorate Further,' *International Business Times*, 3 September 2011, <https://www.ibtimes.com/turkey-plans-challenge-gaza-blockade-relations-israel-deteriorate-further-308756>.

“What is binding is the International Court of Justice. This is what we are saying: let the International Court of Justice decide. We are starting the necessary legal procedures this coming week.” Davutoğlu took a step further supporting that: “If Israel persists with its current position, the Arab spring will give rise to a strong Israel opposition as well as the debate on the authoritarian regimes.”

Responding to the Turkish allegation, the Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon maintained on September 2, 2011 that his country has nothing to apologize for and stated:

“The problem here is on the Turkish side. (...) They were not ready for a compromise and kept raising the threshold. I think we need to say to the Turks: as far as we are concerned, this saga is behind us. Now we need to cooperate. Lack of cooperation harms not only us, but Turkey as well.”²²

Conflicting triangle

A few days later, a “conflicting triangle”, between Israel, Egypt and Turkey, was to be shaped. Whilst Turkey disputed with Israel, on September 10, 2001 the Israeli ambassador in Egypt was forced to leave the country over a night as Egyptian demonstrators invaded and destroyed the Israeli embassy in Cairo. The US intervened diplomatically and asked from the Egyptian authorities to send the vandals before the Court and punish them. Neither the Israeli government nor the Egyptian Military Forces, which rule the country in the transitional period, have the political intention to sever diplomatic relations. Israel announced that their ambassador would return to Egypt. However, the tension continued as the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan was planning to visit Cairo, expressing also his political intention to pass through Egypt toward the Palestinian Authority. The Egyptians opposed and never gave him the green light to pass through. Erdogan did not postpone his trip to Egypt. However, Davutoğlu stated that his prime minister would not visit the Palestinian Authority.

The theory of “Turkish Seas”

The conflicting political environment was not restricted within a “triangle”, composed by Israel, Egypt and Turkey. On the contrary, whilst the Egyptian Authorities cancelled Erdogan’s visit to the Palestinian Authorities, Egemen Bağış warned that if the Republic of Cyprus starts drilling “plot 12” called Aphrodite, then Turkey will be ready to take military measures. As Bağış stated, Turkey trains its army in order to mobilise it in a proper time. More precisely, the Turkish minister said:

“These kinds of things that have happened in the past [Turkish naval interference with exploration] whenever the Greek Cypriots have made such attempts may well happen again. That is how serious Turkey is. Doing this in waters where they have no jurisdiction is illegal. Turkey will rely on international law to pursue its rights to the fullest extent.” And he added: “This is what we have the navy for. We have trained our marines for this; we have equipped the navy for this. All options are on the table; anything can be done.”²³

²²David Batty, ‘Turkey to Challenge Gaza Blockade at International Court of Justice,’ The Guardian, 3 September 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/03/turkey-challenge-israel-gaza-blockade>.

²³ Yanatman S, 2011, Turkish minister warns Greek Cypriots about oil exploration in Mediterranean, Sunday’s Zaman, September 4, <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-255674-turkish-minister-warns-greek-cypriots-about->

This belligerent rhetoric was the prelude of a diplomatic and military tension that Ankara put in effect under the argument of defending its national interests and protecting the Turkish Cypriot interests. However, this way of action implies the revisionist Turkish policy which means a strategy including efforts to render Turkey as an undisputable regional power. In the same context, Ankara opposes to both Cyprus and Israel exploring and exploiting their gas and probably oil deposits as its geopolitical and geostrategic role would be at stake. Turkish policy and strategy considers that territorial waters from Marmaris to Iskenderun constitute a “closed Turkish lake”. A few days later, he added that the entire Mediterranean Sea is a “Turkish Sea”. Therefore, if Cyprus and Israel were to get into the gas production and market, the Turkish strategic plan would be threatened by the “new players” and Ankara could not present itself any more as the only supplier of gas and oil toward the EU, through the pipelines lying on its territory. The Turkish government expressed its political intention to send three frigates in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and the research ship “Piri Reis” in order to start surveys even in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus. “Noble Energy” accomplished successfully its survey within the Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone and Turkey continued to a great new fait accompli by signing agreements with the occupying Turkish Cypriots Authorities and thus its military vessels sailed in the Cyprus territorial waters.

In attempting to explain Turkish policy we maintain the following:

1. As Israel continues to impose embargo over the Palestinian territories, Turkey alleges that it feels the obligation to guarantee the free navigation in the international waters. In the meantime, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan organized a strategic tour in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, giving the impression that Turkey is the most important Muslim leading country, which can successfully defend their interests. In addition, the visits of the Turkish Prime Minister had multiple political and strategic dimensions:
 - a) to create fertile ground for the establishment of new coalitions;
 - b) to cover Turkey's back in case of a crisis with Israel and Cyprus.

However, a coin has always two sides. Egyptian analysts and the “Muslim Brotherhood” were very suspicious about Erdogan's visit in Egypt, deducing that the Turkish government aims at filling the leading political gap resulting from the volatile political situation in Egypt. In this respect, they did not give any support to the Turkish strategic task, which aims at replacing Egypt's leading role in the Muslim and Arab World. Thus, we have three stages of a “power game” where Turkey is engaged in. The first stage is that of the EU, the second is that of Israel, and the third is that of Egypt. It is obvious that the Turkish strategy to become a regional power seems to be like a “double sword” encompassing both visible and invisible risks.

2. Cyprus drilled “plot 12” and intends to drill other plots, lying in its EEZ, and furthermore to exploit its gas deposits. According to the Turkish arguments:
 - a) the Greek Cypriots have no legal right to drill in “plot 12” since the natural resources belong to the Turkish Cypriots who are not represented by the Greek Cypriots;

[oil-exploration-in-mediterranean.html](#); Loizou M, 2001, Upset to the Balance of Power, cited in Simerini, September 4.

- b) as far as the Cyprus issue remains unresolved, the Greek Cypriots cannot explore nor exploit the national resources of gas and oil.
- 3. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership do not recognize the Republic of Cyprus, which is in fact the only state in the island that both the UN and the EU recognize. In this regard, we must underline that, from the legal point of view, the gas and oil natural resources fall under the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus. In the spirit and practice of a diplomatic, strategic and legal “*equivalent fait accompli*”, the Turkish government signed on September 21, 2011 with the illegal Turkish Cypriot leadership an agreement with a twofold character. The one aspect focuses on delineating their “continental shelf” and the other on carrying out surveys for exploring gas and oil in the northern, even in the western territorial waters of Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus argues that the agreement, which has been signed between Turkey and the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, is illegal and invalid. The legal arguments provided by the Republic of Cyprus are the following:
 - a) the UN Security Council issued two relevant resolutions, 541 and 550, flatly stating that the so called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” is not valid;
 - b) the EU declaration, which was officially circulated on October 5, 2005, makes it clear that the only state the EU and its member states recognize on the island is the Republic of Cyprus.
- 4. Since Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus and did not sign the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, it does not recognize the delineation of the EEZ between Cyprus and Israel. In pursuance to the Turkish government, the EEZ between Turkey, Israel, and Cyprus will be delineated after the solution of the Cyprus issue. This solution will be based on the concept of the two “constituent states”. The one will be under the Greek Cypriots and the other under the Turkish Cypriot’s administrative control in the context of a political system, which is not clear whether there will be a federation or confederation.

Which is the moral argument provided by the Turkish policy? Turkish government attempts to ground its argument upon its ethical and legal obligation to defend the rights of the Turkish Cypriot Community, as they stem from the Zurich and London Agreement. In this respect, one may argue that this policy is morally correct. However, the Turkish troops have been continuously stationed in the northern part of the island, keeping the Turkish Cypriots in isolation and depriving from the Greek Cypriots the free exercise of their legal, constitutional and any other human rights deriving from the Zurich and London Agreement, the international law and the “*acquis communautaire*”. Under these conditions, one may also stress that the Turkish moral argument is based on an unethical and immoral policy, which breaches the international and European legal order.

Despite the Turkish objections, Cyprus has already delineated its EEZ. However, in the case of Greece, Turkey has silently set a “*casus belli*”. Ankara alleges that Greece has no right to delineate its own EEZ in the region of the island of Kastelorizo. The Turkish legal argument is grounded on the allegation that the Mediterranean Sea is a “closed sea” and therefore islands have no legal right of delineating their own EEZ. Beyond the Turkish legal argument, there is a strategic concept supporting that if Turkey stops “vetoing” the Greek sovereign rights and gives the green light, the Greek EEZ will adjoin the Cyprus one. In this case, Turkey could not expand its own

EEZ toward Egypt and could not realize its strategic plan of turning the territorial waters - extending from Marmaris to Iskenderun - into a Turkish lake. In light of these facts mentioned above, a number of significant strategic questions are raised: what would be the Turkish reaction if Greece delineates its EEZ and then signs a relevant agreement with Cyprus and establishes a coalition with Israel? Would Turkey trigger a military crisis? Would it launch an attack against Greece striking, at the same time, the Israelis, the EU and even the US interests, as Noble Energy, the company which took over to explore and exploit the gas and oil deposits within the Cyprus and Israel EEZ, belongs to American shareholders and interests? Would that mean or not the inglorious end of the Turkish accession negotiations to the EU? Would the US allow the region to blow up?

Preventive reasons

Whether the US will act or not as a preventive power in case of a crisis constitutes a fundamental issue which must be scrutinized. On September 17, 2011, Hilary Clinton intervened diplomatically to avert an imminent crisis by calling upon Turkey to show self-restraint and refrain from any threats that may create a dangerous situation with Israel. The preventive political practice of Hilary Clinton was followed by a meeting between President Obama and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan. The US never “twisted Turkey’s ear” as the American aim was not to offend Turkey but to prevent the crisis. The US still considers Turkey as one of its major allies, mainly due to its efforts against terrorism. Besides, American policy never stopped considering Turkey as a valuable actor for improving its relations with Muslim and Arab world. Thus, the US holds a leash to the Turkish policy in order to avoid the crisis, but it turned a blind eye regarding the patrol of the Turkish warships in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. In autumn 2011, the crisis was averted for the following reasons:

- a) American national interests, the regional security system, as well as economic interests imposed the prevention of the crisis. The US could not afford political and military power to avert a new military clash.
- b) Israel has a strong military strength and a reliable preventive ability and does not hesitate to respond at once against any strike.
- c) Although Turkey created tension, it does not take any military action against Cyprus since the cost of such a belligerent option would be higher than any possible benefit. Besides, a diplomatic shield - comprising of American, Russian and other EU energy and economic interests - has been raised around Cyprus. The support, given to the Republic of Cyprus, was grounded on the fundamental principles of the UN Charter, such as the respect for the exercise of the state’s sovereign rights. The conclusions issued by the European Council on December 9, 2010, call upon Turkey to refrain from any actions which may put the regional security at risk and to peacefully solve the problems that it raises against its neighboring countries.
- d) Cyprus has neither reliable military forces nor warships to hinder and keep away the Turkish military fleet from the Cyprus Republic territorial waters and the EEZ. Usually it takes two to tango. In the case of Cyprus we have only one. However, Cyprus is under constant Turkish threat and cannot fully defend its sovereign rights and its territorial integrity. Under these conditions, Turkey attempts to enforce a new “fait accompli” by putting in question the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, Turkey puts in effect

the “gunboat diplomacy” and plans to carry out surveys within the EEZ of Cyprus in the northern and western territorial waters of the island. Given the fact that the doctrine of the “Single Defensive Space” between Cyprus and Greece does not exist anymore and that Greece suffers from an unhealthy and grim economic crisis, the question is whether Cyprus needs or not to establish new preventive strategic coalitions.

Criteria of a strategic coalition

The surveys and the exploitation of the gas and oil deposits which lie in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus, the political situation resulting from the “Arab Spring”, and the “power game”, where regional and potential regional powers as Egypt, Israel and Turkey have engaged in, created a conflicting situation. In this conflicting political environment, states should find allies, proper policies and mechanisms in order to advance or protect their national interests and furthermore achieve their strategic goals. Preventive policy constitutes an indispensable pillar of a wider strategy with a certain goal. It is also a rational response to external threats, which may put at risk national interests, territorial integrity and state’s sovereignty. Given the fact that convergent national interests constitute a step stone upon which a coalition can be build, the question is whether Israel and Cyprus could sign and conclude a coalition and what the character of this coalition would be.

Taking into consideration the interconnected and conflicting relations between Israel-Cyprus on the one hand and Turkey on the other, one may argue that the pillars upon which a Cypriot-Israeli strategic coalition can be constructed are the following:

- a) Common interests. Both countries have explored hydrocarbons, (particularly natural gas) and therefore they could formulate a common policy for an effective and safe exploitation.
- b) Strategic situation. The enemy of my enemy is my friend. This is a cynical strategic tenet, which complies with the existing circumstances. In this context, a “conflicting triangle” is created. Turkey is Cyprus’ enemy and Israel is a Turkish enemy. Therefore, Israel could not only be a friend of Cyprus but also a strategic partner and vice versa. In this regard, if we consider that Cyprus is a strategic way out for Israel, at the same time, Israel can be seen by the Cypriots as a preventive shield against the Turkish threat.

We must cite another strategic parameter which is of utmost importance; the exploitation of natural gas resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus by Noble Energy, serves American interests since it is a US-based company. Therefore the US is obliged by economic, moral and political reasons to protect the company from potential threats. One may argue that, in this case, the common interests of all parties involved are in favor of establishing a coalition between Israel and Cyprus. It is evident that the US does not want any military clash between Cyprus and Turkey, and mostly between Israel and Turkey, since the interests of an American company would be at stake. For the US it is a matter of principle. Thus, one may allege that even if the US does not openly support an Israeli-Cypriot coalition, at least it will show tolerance. The US is not the only actor and parameter that should be taken on board. Cyprus has to consider all the political parameters and actors before establishing such a coalition and therefore any decision should be taken and scheduled on the basis of a strategic concept. Otherwise, it may be trapped within a coalition in which a powerful Israel will have the upper hand and absolute military and geopolitical power, as well as any other control over the island. Under these circumstances, Cyprus can do almost nothing to protect itself in case of disagreements or divergence of national

interests. As far as Cyprus continues to be under Turkish threat, it has no option other than establishing an alliance with Israel on the basis of common interests. Certainly, this alliance should be constructed on a strategic concept, which means the economic, commercial, military and any other cooperation so that both sides can safeguard their interests and prevent any threat which might be launched from Turkey. In terms of a “power game”,²⁴ Turkey deems that it has the strategic right to control oil and gas deposits, although they lie in the seabed of the EEZ of Cyprus. Turkey has called Lebanon not to ratify its agreement with Cyprus regarding the delineation of their EEZs and urged Egypt to suspend a package of similar agreements it has signed with the Republic of Cyprus.²⁵ In November 2011, both sides (Cyprus and Lebanon) concluded an agreement and this certain issue had a successful end. Although Turkish diplomatic efforts failed, since interest proved stronger than political pressures, Cyprus should be alert and ready to encounter various diplomatic and other problems created by Turkey, which is a state that never gives up.

Conclusion

The exploitation of gas and oil in the East Mediterranean region falls under the rules of strategic interests and “power games”. The legal aspect of the problem, reflected in the respect for International Law of the Sea, is used as a methodological tool to enshrine state’s sovereign rights and advance national interests. Should the parties involved wish to avoid a crisis, they must find rational ways of actions. These political formulas must be based on the international and European legal systems, the common interests, and mutual respect. To achieve a regional system of common interests, we must consider the rules of the “power game” as we don’t live in a perfect international and regional system. Thus, stability, mutual respect and common interests should be firstly based on the “balance of power”, which must be shaped through strategic coalitions. We must approach and analyze the political situation in the South-Eastern Mediterranean region and the Middle East through the prism of the peculiar rival mentality, which is reflected in a conflicting political and strategic environment. As gas and oil are raw strategic materials of development, prosperity, and power, we must maintain the following: a possible coalition between Cyprus and Israel is not the only decisive factor in exploiting gas and oil. There is another one which is also important. It is the advance of the Great Powers’ interests through the engagement of their multinational colossus into the energy game. The service of the American and European, even the Russian interests:

- a) Could become a political and economic shield against any aggressive policy or crisis and the basis upon which a wider block of common interests could be formulated.
- b) Could create a fertile ground toward the shaping of a new geopolitical status quo and alliance, including not only Cyprus, Israel and Greece, but also other countries. In this regard, Turkey could promote a flexible policy and thus produce more benefit than cost, by adopting and implementing a democratic policy in the context of a win-win situation in line with the international law and the *acquis communautaire*. This is a rational strategic game related to a democratic solution of the Cyprus issue, which may also help the Turkish accession to the EU.

²⁴ Henry Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Knopf, 1978.

²⁵ European Rim Policy and Investment Council, ‘Noble Energy’s Leviathan Discovery Creates New Energy Dynamics in East Mediterranean,’ Energy Program, East Mediterranean Energy Program, 1 August 2011, http://www.erpac.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=278;

In any case, the economic and political involvement of the EU, the US, and Russia should take place in view of respecting state sovereignty and thereby protecting Cyprus and other vulnerable states against regional predators.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Michael Harari**

19 June 2012

Challenges of the Israeli Foreign Policy

I'm very pleased to be here with you today. Clearly, the challenges the Israeli foreign policy is facing are enormous and I will try to cover at least part of them, and to focus on the more relevant to all of us. I will try as well to be as brief as possible in order to enable us to have a dialogue which I believe this is maybe the more interesting part for our meeting today.

We are living in interesting time and interesting region, I suppose. In a way too interesting. But I suppose, we diplomats do not need to complain about it because it gives us a lot of excuses to keep on talking. So I will do my best, of course, today to share with you some of these analyses.

First of all, if you allow me to give some brief basic data about Israel's economy and political system in order, let's say, to be able to understand a bit later on, I mean, the analysis. Israel's area: 22,000 square kilometers. Population: 7.8 million people. GDP in 2010 was about 220 billion dollars. GDP per capita in 2010 was around 30,000 dollars, precisely 29,531 dollars. GDP growth in 2010 was 4.6, and 4.5 in 2011. This year it is going to be of course lower but still quite positive. Unemployment in 2010 was 6.6%, and 5.6% in 2011.

Another element which I believe is very much important and interesting is very stable political system in the last more than three years. Now, I emphasize that because I am sure you know that Israeli governments, Israeli coalitions do not survive too long. Usually three years it's quite a long period of time. Surprisingly enough, and interestingly enough, this government, especially these days, it enjoys massive support in the parliament. This government actually enjoys the support of 94 out of 120 MP in the Knesset. It means - and this is the more important thing - that it has, how to say, a room to maneuver on political, economic, security challenges that we are facing. And this is quite important. And Israel, or the Israeli society, as you know, is a lively, vibrant society - sometimes we say too lively and too vibrant. But again, I think it is quite important to realize that this is heterogeneous society. Just to give you an example, I mean, the last fifteen-seventeen years we absorbed more than 1.5 million new immigrants from ex-Soviet Union republics. As you can imagine, it influenced the whole society dramatically. One anecdote - but

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

** *Ambassador of Israel to the Republic of Cyprus*

in a way it's very much interesting. About eighteen years ago a new theater was established in Israel, its name was Geshar – 'bridge' it means. Ninety five - if not more than that - of its productions were Russian-language. These days ninety five plus of its productions is in Hebrew. So in a way you could see that within this period of time the newcomers, or the old comers, were able, let's say, to digest themselves in a very healthy, vibrant, lively way. As I said, we are facing a lot of challenges. But I will focus on our near region, near arena. And I would like to emphasize with your permission, three main issues here.

The first one is Iran. No doubt this is the most important challenge that we in Israel are facing right now, and by that of course I mean preventing nuclear capability, military one of Iran. I'm sure that I don't need to elaborate very much on how much it is a crucial issue. We feel threatened. But in a way, more importantly I think - and what happens in the recent few months it only emphasized that - I believe that the whole international community has realized that this is of great importance to prevent Iran from nuclear capability. I believe this pressure, international pressure, as well as the sanctions are important. They do have an effect. Unfortunately not enough, since they haven't decided yet to stop their program, but they do have an effect. And so long we, all of us, the international community are able to remain united, demanding the Iranians to stop this program, I think that this is of great importance. It is not only the concern of Israel in this region. We are the more vocal about our worries, but believe me, many others in the region are of great concern of Iran becoming nuclear. Just imagine what might happen with the arms race, nuclear arms race, if Iran acquires this capability.

The second point is, of course, what we call the Arab Spring and the developments in the Arab states surrounding us. We follow closely and seriously, of course, these developments. At the same time we decided to adopt as silent approach as possible, I would say, mainly because of a) these are processes and developments which come within these societies – it's a domestic, important process which takes place important for democracy, of course; and b) whatever we say, the most objective or neutral thing, it might be interpreted in a wrong way. But we follow very closely, of course, these developments, and I do hope very much that at the end of the day – and clearly we are going to face a lot of question marks, doubts and unclear developments – they will produce stability in this region. And in this respect our peace agreement with Egypt and Jordan are of great importance to us. I believe that the Israeli-Egyptian peace accord was the cornerstone – to be honest – for stability in the region. We – from our point of view – we will do our best to keep this agreement. I believe it is of great importance: this is strategic interest for Israel, it is strategic interest of Egypt. And the same, of course, for our agreement with Jordan.

And the third point in this arena is of course the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is a pity that in the last three years we were not able to have – how do I say it – proper dialogue, proper negotiation. It is a pity because – I don't want to go in how much am I optimistic or less optimistic – but I believe that the fact that both sides do have good idea about the shape of future agreement – this is a great pity, in my opinion, that we are not able to overcome this present lack of confidence, and especially from the Palestinian side. I believe that the fact, as I mentioned before, that nowadays we have wide, stable government in Israel, very stable political system in arena right now – this is of great importance. In the past I was involved with the Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Arab negotiation quite a lot. And in the past we used to raise this question mark of how much

this side or the other one is able to deliver. And in a way, I believe that these days the most important thing is delivery question mark. Israel can deliver. The question mark is whether the Palestinians are willing to consider, or to take it into consideration in order to reach eventually solution. And just to emphasize one more point concerning this issue: only direct negotiation, direct dialogue. Whether we like each other or not, it doesn't matter, basically. It's better that we like each other. But I think that it is much more better that we understand both sides, that basically both interests are for having an agreement, and I believe it is possible. But only direct negotiation, not going through international institutions. We may be embarrassed here or there – this is not important. The most important thing is we are able to reach an agreement, and the only way is direct negotiation.

In this arena Israel and Cyprus were able in the last couple of years – even more than that – to develop very good, very impressive bilateral relations. And I'm very glad for that. Actually, it's by definition we should have good relations. We are neighbors, once again, whether we like it or not. But in this case I think that both of us like it, which makes things of course much easier. The problem sometimes – so-called “problem” – with neighbors is not always, since we are too close, we pay enough attention to each other. And I'm very glad that we were able to overcome this so-called problem in the recent few years. Actually, the scope of cooperation between Israel and Cyprus is very wide – and of course I will touch on the energy issue – but it's very, very wide. I mean, the recent visit of minister Sylikiotis – ok, his portfolio is quite wide, so he covered a lot of topics of course in this visit - is just one example. The economic and business cooperation, tourism - we've agreed to establish a working group in order to attract tourists from all over the world to Cyprus and Israel together. We are going to work much harder in order to enable much more fair flight tickets price, I mean fares. Health – it has been going very well in the last thirty years, I believe. But we will upgrade this cooperation very soon. Culture. Water – as you know, the desalination process here in Cyprus is by Israeli companies.

Actually, the total trade 2011 between Israel and Cyprus has reached 1.2 billion dollars. It is an increase of 37%, compared to 2010. Quite impressive, I believe, and I think that we should aim at much more than that.

On energy. You know that we in Israel – and there are here much better experts than myself, but I will do my best – we started this adventure – to call it this way – at the end of the 90s. I mean, Noa field was discovered 1999, Mari B was discovered the year 2000, later on 2006-2008 there were more licenses given by the Israeli government. Tamar was discovered 2009, and lately Leviathan 2010. We are nowadays in the process of – by “we” I mean the government – of discussing the proper policy on energy to be adopted. And for that - as we do quite often in Israel – we've established a committee, an expert committee: Tzemah. Tzemah is a permanent secretary at the Ministry of Energy and Water, and it submitted, just about two months ago, the interim recommendations of its report. The main two or three points of this report were: the first one is what we call the energy security for domestic needs. They emphasize very much the need to guarantee our needs - Israeli needs - from cheaper and cleaner energy like ours. Now, I emphasize that because in a way it explains why we are a bit slow – if this is the correct word to describe it – in this process of deciding what the best policy is for us as a government to adopt. We are driven by the need to guarantee our domestic needs. We are an island – not a geographical, but island

from a political point of view and from energy point of view – and the fact that we were fortunate enough to discover this potential of gas led us to focus very much on the fact that it is going to guarantee our needs for many years to come.

The second point is the question of export. Based on these very long discussions about guaranteeing our domestic needs, the committee recommended that it doesn't make sense not to allow export. Yes, we need to export, and they were saying that beyond guaranteeing our needs for the next twenty five years we should export the remaining gas. Again, I hope I don't repeat myself, but I think it is very much important to understand the psychological process that the Israeli public debate and the professional debate were going through. In a way – and this is very much interesting, I suppose, to witness and to compare, let's say, the process that takes place right now in Cyprus - we were not enthusiastic from day one to export gas. We were convinced later on that it doesn't make sense not to export from all relevant factors' point of view. And the third point, of course, is that how do we need to export. This committee recommended that any terminal should be under the Israeli control, whether onshore, or it mentioned as well the possibility of the Israeli EEZ. Now, in the coming few weeks, I believe - next two months maybe - this committee should submit its final report to the government and then the government should discuss this report, and should adopt - I believe quite soon, as a matter of fact it's a question of few months – the formal, or practical policy of the State of Israel concerning energy. It may add or drop some of this recommendations, but I think it's very much important to understand, or to be aware of these recommendations, because this is going to be the base for the ongoing discussion within the government, and of course, the government and all the relevant companies, players, experts, etc. And the political arena. As you can imagine, for example, one element that the government should take into consideration is the foreign policy, political – let's say – aspect: how much, or how, exporting gas to this country or cooperating with that country is going to hopefully improve the Israeli interests.

With Cyprus, as you know, we signed the economic exclusive zone agreement in December 2010. On the agenda right now we have the unitization agreement. As you know, there are cross-border fields, we are neighbors, as I mentioned. I believe that it's going to be signed very soon, I think that next month there is going to be the next round of talks. On the one hand it's quite a common agreement, I am told, by colleagues and experts. It happens, I mean, it is all over the world quite... On the other hand, it's quite a complicated agreement and, as I mentioned, both of us are newcomers to this issue, so I suppose that both of us during this process of negotiation will learn a lot. But it is going to be signed quite soon.

There is another project which is discussed between our two countries and it is the undersea electric cable. Basically, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the relevant electricity companies and feasibility studies are going to take place by the end of this year. And we will have much better idea of what can and what should be done. There is an ongoing discussion between Israel and Cyprus about the potential, or let say, how to cooperate to export this gas. Clearly, before the Israeli government will adopt its policy, I suppose we will be in this process of discussion for a while. I think that this process is very much important. As you know much better than me, this is a strategic issue, strategic asset. And this issue – maybe the most important element here, is how much there is political will on both sides to cooperate. And to

my best judgment, I think there is a very clear and positive political will between Israel and Cyprus to cooperate. But we need, I suppose, to go through a process. Sometimes it's different in Israel and Cyprus, but as well together, in order to exhaust the possibilities, and to discuss all other possibilities in order to reach to the very, the best – let's say – option. Prime Minister Netanyahu, when he was here in Cyprus just few months ago, he said publically that it does make a lot of sense to join forces when exporting the gas. When you have more to offer, I suppose you can have much better agreements. It does make a lot of sense. How do we do it? This is what we will do in the coming few months.

I may stop here in order not to be too long by emphasizing again that... I'm aware very much, of course, of the great interest with natural gas and energy. It is a huge potential, prospect for both of us, for Israel and Cyprus. It is a blessing. But I think that we should be very clever and very careful, I mean, to use, or to take advantage of this gift or blessing, whatever we call it. But it's clearly a great potential, positive potential, in order to use it in the best way. And sometimes it takes time. And this is something for years to come, for our both countries, and for the region. Because I believe that we should think as well of how it should and may contribute, let's say, to the regional stability.

Thank you very much for your time.

REPORT

George Chr. Pelagias*
September 2012

Eastern Mediterranean Gas Fields and a New Energy Corridor to Europe

Executive Summary

Several states in the Eastern Mediterranean, including Israel and Cyprus are currently developing their offshore hydrocarbon resources. In 2010, the US Geological Survey estimated that the *Levant Basin* (offshore Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Cyprus) holds reserves of 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil and approximately 122 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, while the *Nile Delta Basin Province* (offshore Egypt) holds reserves of 1.8 billion barrels of recoverable oil, 223 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas, and 6 billion barrels of natural gas liquids. The prospect of large recoverable energy resources promises important economic and other changes for the region.

Existing and proposed natural gas transit routes from Russia and the Caspian region form the main *East-West* energy corridors to Europe. As EU dependency on natural gas is expected to increase by 40% in the next twenty years, the establishment of an *Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor* linking current and future offshore natural gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean with the European continent would allow the EU to further diversify its energy supplies.

The *Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor* is a project that could enhance bilateral relations and EU involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel and the Republic of Cyprus have already moved closer, and are looking at different options of extending their cooperation in the energy field. Lebanon is also making preparations for a first offshore licensing round, and it too is likely to develop into a natural gas producer and potential exporter.

Cyprus, together with other southern EU member states should take the initiative for the construction of a new natural gas corridor to Europe and its incorporation into the broader energy security policy of the EU. Hand-in-hand, a regional liquefaction facility in Cyprus would facilitate the further exploration and production of the Eastern Mediterranean gas fields, and help provide other regional gas producers ready access to the European energy market.

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Introduction

Recent discoveries of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean are already altering the geopolitical map of the region. The idea of coordinating the export of energy resources of Israel and Cyprus is being widely discussed. Existing pipelines from Russia, North Africa, and Norway together with the proposed pipeline projects from the Caspian Sea Basin through Turkey form the main natural gas corridors to Europe. All of these transit routes are sourced from, and/or controlled by, non-EU member states, some of whom are not natural allies of the EU. A new East-West transit route linking current and future Eastern Mediterranean Gas Fields¹ to the European continent, would diversify Europe's energy supplies, and further improve European energy security. Without minimizing the difficulties of such a project, the concept of an *Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor* merits serious consideration.

Background

In March 2010, the U.S. Geological Survey ("USGS") published two studies entitled "*Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean*", and "*Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Nile Delta Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean*". The USGS estimated that the Levant Basin held potential reserves of 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil ("bbl"), and a mean of 122 trillion cubic feet, ("tcf"), (approximately 3.45 trillion cubic meters) of recoverable natural gas, while the Nile Delta Basin held 1.8 billion bbl of recoverable oil, 223 tcf of recoverable gas, and 6 billion bbl of natural gas liquids.²

During recent years, there have been important offshore hydrocarbon discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean that tend to confirm these estimates. Countries in the region are now at various stages of exploration and development. In Israel, the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources estimates (2012 assessment) that Israel's total offshore natural gas reserve potential, is about 49.4 tcf (1400 billion cubic meters "bcm").³ Israel natural gas consumption stood at 5.3 bcm in 2010 out of which 60% was supplied by domestic fields. The remainder was, until 2012⁴, supplied by Egypt. British Gas estimates the discovered reserves offshore Gaza to around 1 tcf (approx. 28.3 bcm).⁵ In 2011 proven reserves in Egypt stood at 77.3 tcf⁶ (2188.8 bcm), and in December 2011, the first well in Cyprus' Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ") indicated a possible reserve of

¹ The term 'Eastern Mediterranean Gas Fields' as used in this paper describes natural gas fields located in the Levant Basin (an area that covers offshore Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus and Israel), the Nile Delta Basin (offshore Egypt), as well as the area between islands of Cyprus and Crete.

² U.S Geological Survey, 'Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean', March 2010', <http://pubs.usgs.gov>; U.S Geological Survey, 'Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Nile Delta Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean, March 2010, <http://pubs.usgs.gov>.

³ Ministry of Energy and Water, Israel, 'Directorial Abstract of the Inter-Ministerial Committee to Examine the Government's Policy Regarding Natural Gas in Israel', 4 May 2012, <http://energy.gov.il>.

⁴ Egypt and Israel signed a memorandum of understanding for the import of natural gas from Egypt to Israel. At the same time, a natural gas purchase agreement was signed between the Israel Electric Corporation and the Israel Egypt joint venture company Eastern Mediterranean Oil & Gas (EMG). In April 2012, Egypt cancelled the 20-year contract on the basis that the Mubarak regime had concluded the agreement below market price.

⁵ BG Group Homepage, 'Where We Operate', <http://www.bg-group.com/>.

⁶ BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 'Natural Gas Section', June 2012, <http://www.bp.com/>.

approximately 5-8 tcf (141.5 -226.5 bcm).⁷




Plate 20: Leviathan and Nile Delta Basins




Plate 21: Offshore hydrocarbon deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean

In May 2012, Cyprus launched a second offshore licensing round which attracted several major international exploration companies. Meanwhile, Lebanon is preparing to launch its first offshore licensing round by the end of 2012. These important energy resources at the Eastern end of the

⁷ The results from the first well indicated an estimated gross resource range of 5 to 8 tcf, with a gross mean of 7 tcf. Noble Energy Inc. Homepage, 'Press Release', 28 December 2011, <http://investors.nobleenergyinc.com/>.

Mediterranean could form an additional natural gas supply for Europe. Of particular importance, in the security context is that a sizable proportion of the reserves are situated in the EEZ of an EU member state.

European Energy Security

According to the International Energy Agency, natural gas accounts for approximately 22% of the world energy mix.⁸ Compared with other fossil fuels, natural gas offers many advantages such as relatively low greenhouse signature, far fewer pollutants than coal, energy efficiency and ease of use. With the EU's own proven natural gas supplies limited,⁹ the need for greater diversity in the petroleum and natural gas sector is vital to the energy security of the 27-member economic and political union. Although over the next 10 years fracking technologies for shale gas are likely to considerably add to Europe's natural gas reserves, there are widespread concerns over the extraction process, which may delay the exploration of this valuable asset. In 2011, EU consumption of natural gas was approximately 447.9 bcm.¹⁰

In 2007, the EU Directorate-General for Research released a report, under the title of "*Energy Corridors: European Union and Neighboring Countries*"¹¹, that called for a European Energy Policy that considered both internal and external dimensions. The "internal" dimension referred to the emergence of new energy technologies while the "external" dimension focused on "*Energy Corridors*" linking the EU to its neighbors, both as suppliers and for transit. The report concluded that energy corridors are a key element of EU energy policy as they contribute to security of energy supply and ultimately to the competitiveness and sustainability of the Union.¹²

The report identified several gas corridors into Europe through the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean and Turkey. Within these corridors six pipeline projects emerge as priority projects: the *Langeled* (between Norway and the UK), the *Nord Stream* (between Russia and Germany), *Medgaz* (between Algeria and Spain), *Galsi* (between Algeria and Italy), *Nabucco* (starting at the Caspian Sea and through Turkey and connecting to Greece and/or the Eastern Balkans and Austria).¹³

All projects, except Nabucco, have been realized with Nord Stream being the largest. Operated by Nord Stream AG, it runs from Vyborg in Russia to Lubmin in Germany, stretching for 1,224 km making it the longest offshore pipeline in the world. The twin pipeline system will, by its completion in late 2012, be the most direct connection between gas reserves in Russia and the EU market with a capacity of 55 bcm/year.¹⁴ The project is, however, not without controversy as it has been criticized for its environmental impact on the Baltic Sea, and for increasing Europe's dependence on Russian gas. Natural gas imports from Russia stood at 140.6 bcm in 2011, which accounted for 38% of the EU's total gas imports that year. These imports are destined to increase with the final implementation of the Nord Stream pipeline system.

⁸ International Energy Agency, 'Natural Gas', <http://www.iea.org/>.

⁹ EU proven reserves of natural gas stood at 64.4 tcf in 2011, accounting for approximately 0.9% of the world's proven reserves. BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2012 – '*Natural Gas Section*' <http://www.bp.com/>.

¹⁰ BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2012 – '*Natural Gas Section*' <http://www.bp.com/>.

¹¹ EU Bookshop, 'Energy Corridors European Union and Neighboring Countries', 2007, <http://bookshop.europa.eu>.

¹² EU Bookshop, 'Energy Corridors European Union and Neighboring Countries', 2007, <http://bookshop.europa.eu>.

¹³ EU Bookshop, 'Energy Corridors European Union and Neighboring Countries', 2007, <http://bookshop.europa.eu/>.

¹⁴ North Stream AG Homepage, 'The Pipeline', <http://www.nord-stream.com/>.

In November 2010, the European Commission outlined its energy infrastructure priorities until 2030. In an effort to diversify from its dependence on Russia, Europe's new priorities included the "North-South Corridor" in Western Europe, aimed at removing internal bottlenecks and enabling better use of external supplies; the "Southern Corridor" carrying gas from the Caspian Sea through Georgia and Turkey; and the linkage of the Baltic region to Central and South Eastern European energy markets.¹⁵




Plate 22: Nord Stream




Plate 23: North-South Gas Corridor

¹⁵ Natural and Bio Gas Vehicle Association, 'North-South Natural Gas Corridor Approved,' <http://www.ngvaeurope.eu/>.




Plate 24: The Southern Corridor

By 2011, the total amount of natural gas imported by EU member states via pipeline and LNG reached 333.1 bcm and 65.4 bcm respectively.¹⁶ The primary sources of gas were from Russia, Norway, Algeria and Qatar.¹⁷

In 2011, the Commission published a report on the security of energy supply and international cooperation.¹⁸ The report stated that Europe is currently importing some 60% of its gas and 80% of its oil, and that it is estimated that these figures may increase by 40% by the year 2030. The report stressed the ‘importance of the Mediterranean in EU energy supplies’, and expressed the need for active engagement in promoting the ‘energy infrastructure of this region’.¹⁹ The EU called for consistent and well-coordinated energy policies by and among its members as vital to the further development of the internal market.²⁰ Alternative non-Russian gas supplies, especially from the Caspian region via Turkey, have become increasingly important for Europe. Turkey itself is also a significant regional energy consumer, and is increasing its involvement in international projects not only as a transit country but also as a large end-user. There are several inter-governmental gas pipelines in operation, such as the Blue Stream gas pipeline between

¹⁶ The figures only include EU member states. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, ‘Natural Gas Section’, June 2012, <http://www.bp.com/>.

¹⁷ BP Statistical Review of World Energy, ‘Natural Gas Section’, June 2012, <http://www.bp.com/>.

¹⁸ COM(2011) 539 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions On Security of Energy Supply and International Cooperation, ‘The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners Beyond Our Borders,’ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/>.

¹⁹ COM(2011) 539 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions On Security of Energy Supply and International Cooperation, ‘The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners Beyond Our Borders,’ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/>.

²⁰ COM(2011) 539 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions On Security of Energy Supply and International Cooperation, ‘The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners Beyond Our Borders,’ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/>.

Russia and Turkey, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (“BTE”, also known as the South Caucasus Pipeline), the Tabriz-Ankara gas pipeline, and the Turkey-Greece Interconnector (“TGI”).²¹

Responsibility for infrastructure security weighs heavily on Turkey, and other states that host critical energy infrastructure assets. Global terror organizations have declared pipelines as legitimate targets. An example of this is the 2011 bombings of the El Arish natural gas compressor station and the Egyptian sections of the pipelines supplying Israel and Jordan. In the case of Turkey, the Turkish section of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline and the Iran-Turkey gas pipeline has also been attacked on numerous occasions. On 5 August 2008, a terrorist strike on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (“BTC”) pipeline disrupted the flow of oil through the pipeline for two weeks.²² In May 2012, the BTE pipeline exploded in the Turkish section, suspending supplies until 11 June 2012. Speculations that the Kurdish Workers Party (“PKK”) was responsible have yet to be confirmed.²³ The explosion cut off 16% of Turkey’s daily gas use, and forced the country to rely on stored supplies and expensive imports from Russia. BOTAS, the operator of the Turkish section of the pipeline, was reluctant to admit sabotage fearing loss of investor confidence. Nevertheless, such incidents have broad implications for the security of the Southern Corridor. Regular attacks would increase security costs along the Turkish route, which would largely be shouldered by BOTAS. It would also be a source of frustration among BOTAS’s partners such as Azerbaijan’s SOCAR and the operating consortium of the Azerbaijani Shah Deniz field, headed by BP.²⁴ While the planned Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (“TANAP”) is estimated to have a capacity of 16 bcm/year (10 bcm/year will be earmarked for Europe), with an increase to 24 bcm/year at a later stage, any disruption of the flow of gas would have an impact on Europe.²⁵ With this degree of risk, Europe would be wise, therefore, to diversify and maintain a secure source of supply.

Turkey aspires to become a major transit hub for energy to Europe. Russia too, would clearly like to monopolize the European markets and transit routes, certainly for economic and maybe for political reasons as well. Russia is antipathetic to Turkey having an independent presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus region. Both nations have competing ambitions in Eurasia, a fact that complicates their otherwise positive economic relations.²⁶ After redirecting natural gas from its storage facilities in Europe during the winter of 2011, Gazprom now wants to build underground natural gas storage facilities in Turkey.²⁷ Russia would like to increase its influence over Turkey’s energy sector, and Ankara may find it difficult to withstand Russian pressure. Alternative natural gas supply options for Turkey, such as from Iran, or the expansion of the Shah Deniz II field in Azerbaijan or even the use of Liquefied Natural Gas (“LNG”) imports are years away.²⁸ Meanwhile, Russia is looking to establish itself in other parts of the Eastern

²¹ Hasan Alsancak, ‘The Role of Turkey in Global Energy: Bolstering Energy Infrastructure Security,’ *Journal of Energy Security*, May 2010 Issue, <http://www.ensec.org/>.

²² Journal of Energy Security ‘The Role of Turkey in Global Energy: Bolstering Energy Infrastructure Security,’ Hasan Alsancak, May 2010 Issue, <http://www.ensec.org/>.

²³ Natural Gas Europe, ‘The BTE Pipeline Blast: The Implications of Sabotage,’ 14 June 2012, <http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/>.

²⁴ Natural Gas Europe, ‘The BTE Pipeline Blast: The Implications of Sabotage,’ 14 June 2012, <http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/>.

²⁵ BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2012 – ‘Natural Gas Section’ <http://www.bp.com/>.

²⁶ S. McNamara, A. Cohen and J. Phillips, ‘Countering Turkey’s Strategic Drift,’ *The Heritage Foundation*, No. 2442, 2010.

²⁷ ‘Russia’s Energy Plans for Turkey,’ *Stratfor*, 20 March 2012, <http://www.stratfor.com/>.

²⁸ ‘Russia’s Energy Plans for Turkey,’ *Stratfor*, 20 March 2012, <http://www.stratfor.com/>.

Mediterranean. Russian International Oil Companies²⁹ (“IOCs”) are taking part in the second licensing round offshore Cyprus, and Gazprom, who exported 2.9 bcm of gas to Greece in 2011, has shown interest in acquiring a stake in Greece’s state-owned gas company (“DEPA”), scheduled for privatization due to the country’s financial difficulties.³⁰ Gazprom is also looking to become involved in the development of Israeli hydrocarbon projects.³¹ Given Europe’s existing heavy reliance on gas from Russia, one wonders if allowing Russia to assume a dominant position in the Eastern Mediterranean is in Europe’s wider economic and security interests.

The Concept of a New Energy Corridor to Europe

Existing pipelines from Russia into northern Europe, and proposed pipelines from the Caspian throughout Turkey, form the main East-West natural gas corridors to Europe. A new energy corridor that would carry gas from current and future Eastern Mediterranean Gas Fields to Europe could be a significant contribution to European energy security.

The idea for the joint export of Israeli and Cyprus hydrocarbon resources first surfaced in the beginning of 2011 in an initiative by the Delek Energy Group and Noble Energy Inc., licensees of Cyprus’ Block 12, in which the *Aphrodite* field is located. The two companies called for the construction of a liquefaction facility on Cyprus that, in its initial stages, would process and export natural gas received from the Israeli *Leviathan* field (estimated at 17 tcf) and the Cyprus *Aphrodite* field. The facility would be planned with the intention of accommodating additional discoveries including those by third parties.³²

Discussions of this and other ideas continued in the press and among stakeholders during 2011 and early 2012. Some of the competing suggestions included: transporting gas to Israel for the purposes of electricity production; the creation of LNG stations in Israel instead of Cyprus in order to supply world markets; the creation of floating facilities for the liquefaction of natural gas (“*FLNG Facilities*”) instead of a land based facility in Cyprus; the creation of a pipeline connecting Cyprus and Israeli fields to Greece and Italy; and the use of Israeli and Cyprus gas to produce electricity for export to Europe via high voltage undersea cables.³³ In this context, it is also important to note that with regard to Israel, security concerns and satisfaction of domestic demands will be major considerations in any export plans. For Cyprus too, similar considerations will apply, but since its domestic market is small (less than 1 bcm/year) most of its gas will be earmarked for export.

Any project that would carry gas from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe would have to take into account several important geopolitical facts. For the moment, only Israel and Cyprus have a prospect of commercializing their gas deposits. Regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean will be difficult due to maritime disputes between Israel and Lebanon, between Cyprus and Turkey, as well as the long running maritime dispute between Greece and Turkey.

²⁹ Russia’s Novatek Overseas Exploration and Production Gumby and Gazprom Bank Global Resources are participating in a consortium together with Total E&P Activities Petroliers who serves as the consortium operator.

³⁰ ‘Gazprom Group considers potential bidding for DEPA,’ 16 March 2012, <http://www.gazprom.com/>.

³¹ ‘Gazprom’s Play for Israel’s Offshore Gas Bounty’, *Interfax Energy*, Vol. 2, Issue 131, 13 July 2012, www.interfaxenergy.com.

³² ‘Israel’s Delek Proposes Building LNG Facility in Cyprus,’ *Middle East Economic Survey*, Vol. LV, No. 3, January 2011, <http://archives.mees.com/>.

³³ ‘Five Ways for the Third Corridor by Cyprus’, *Natural Gas Europe*, 29 April 2012, <http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/>.

Offshore exploration in Syria is unlikely to take place as long as the country's political turmoil persists. Exploration offshore Gaza is not progressing, and Lebanon has yet to announce its first licensing round. Egypt already possesses a well-developed natural gas export sector (with liquefaction facilities in Damietta and Idku), and could, therefore, link to any new energy corridor to Europe. The level of Egypt's participation would, however, depend on the country's domestic stability, its relations with Israel and its own growing energy demands.

The natural gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean have brought attention to a region that historically played a limited role in the European energy equation, but this could now change significantly. While the Southern Corridor through Turkey remains an energy priority for the EU, the development of an additional East-West energy corridor could establish a route by which the EU would be able to diversify its natural gas supply without being dependent on non-EU sources and transit routes. This could be of considerable strategic and economic importance to the EU as a whole.

At present, only Israel, and Egypt, has substantial quantities of natural gas. Despite estimated deposits in the Aphrodite field in Cyprus' Block 12, the proven reserves remain to be confirmed. While this is a positive development for the Republic of Cyprus, it is not yet enough to seek major financing to build an export industry. The second licensing round in Cyprus, which closed in May 2012, attracted several major IOCs³⁴ that are willing to invest in the exploration of new areas within Cyprus EEZ. More deposits are thus expected to be discovered over the next 3-5 years. Meanwhile, Lebanon's first offshore licensing round may be stalled as Lebanon suffers the political fallout from the escalating turmoil in Syria. Potentially, however, any Lebanese fields discovered could add significant additional reserves within the Eastern Mediterranean, thereby increasing the total amount of available gas at Europe's doorstep.

Economic Considerations and Policy Decisions

Whether produced offshore or onshore, natural gas must be transported to the end-user in one or more target markets. Transportation costs of natural gas, whether produced onshore or offshore, form an important element in its commercialization. For pipeline projects, the cost are usually directly proportional to the length of the pipeline for any given flow rate or pipeline diameter. Offshore pipelines are more expensive than onshore pipelines, as are very large diameter pipelines, and pipelines with additional compression facilities. An alternative is to liquefy the gas and transport it by sea. This option, however, only becomes economically feasible

³⁴ Petra Petroleum (Canada); ATP East Med No 2 BV (US); Naphtha Israel Petroleum Corporation Limited (Israel); DOR Chemicals Limited (Israel); Modiin Energy Limited Partnership (Israel); Total E&P Activities Petroliers (France); Novatek Overseas Exploration and Production GmbH (Russia); Gazprom Bank Global Resources (Russia); Premier Oil (UK); VITOL (UK); PETRONAS (Malaysia); Edison International S.p.A (Italy); Delek Drilling Ltd Partnership (Israel); Avner Oil Exploration Ltd Partnership (Israel); Enel Trade S.p.A (Italy); Woodside Energy Holdings PTY Ltd (Australia); ENI (Italy); KOGAS (Korea); C.O. Cyprus Opportunity Energy Public Company limited (Cyprus/Israel); AGR (Norway); OAK Delta NG Exploration Joint Venture (Israel/US/Cyprus); Capricorn Oil (UK); Marathon Oil (US); Orange NASSAU Energie (Holland); CC Energy SAL (Lebanon); WINEVIA Holdings Limited (Cyprus); RX Drill Cyprus Limited (Cyprus); PT Energy Mega Persada Tbk & Frastico Holdings Limited (Canada/Indonesia/Cyprus); Emannelle Geo Global Rosario (Israel) - Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism, Republic of Cyprus, www.mcit.gov.cy

in the case of long distances³⁵, or when the construction of a pipeline becomes complicated due to geographical or geo-political reasons.³⁶

Economics aside, national interest and security considerations are important elements in the realization of any major energy project, especially a multinational one. The Cyprus government announced in April 2012, its decision to construct an underwater pipeline linking Block 12 to a 5 million tons per annum (“*mtpa*”) (approximately 7 bcm/year) onshore natural gas liquefaction facility to be constructed on the southern coast of Cyprus.³⁷

Israel also has plans to construct its own liquefaction facility for export purposes. Israel’s inter-Ministerial Committee, headed by the Director-General of the Ministry of Energy and Water, Saul Zemach, was set-up with the purpose of evaluating export alternatives. In August 2012, the *Zemach Committee* released its report, which recommended that fields with more than 200 billion cubic meters (bcm) will need to reserve 50% for the domestic market. Fields with 100-200 bcm will need to reserve 40%, and fields with 25-100 bcm 25%. There is no export restriction recommended for fields containing less than 25 bcm. The export limit of any one field is recommended to be set at 75%.³⁸ While the Committee’s interim report, released in April 2012, ruled out the possibility of Israeli gas being exported via non-Israeli facilities, the final report still recommends that exports should be conducted from Israel, but that this is not necessary a requirement.³⁹

Prime Minister Netanyahu is facing strong opposition from Israeli environmentalists, and concerned citizens who object to an LNG facility in their community. There are also concerns regarding the funding of such projects.⁴⁰ In addition, the policies of the Israeli government do not always run parallel with the companies that are licensed to explore the gas. The seemingly changed position of the Zemach Committee’s position on this particular issue increases the possibility that Israel and Cyprus could agree on joint exports in the future.

Meanwhile, in early 2012, the National Gas Pipeline Company of Israel and the Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline Company submitted a proposal to the Israeli Minister of Finance for a LNG Facility in Eilat. The cost of such a project is estimated at about \$6 billion.⁴¹ Eilat would give Israel access to the Red Sea, and hence the Asian market without the political constraints likely from the Suez Canal. In addition, Israel has also been looking at the option of one or more FLNG facilities. The partnership of the Israeli Tamar field has already signed a memorandum of understanding to develop FLNG with a consortium of companies led by the South Korean company Daewoo.⁴²

³⁵ Expert’s opinions differ on the issue of the economic feasibility of long distance pipelines. As a rule of thumb, however, the cost effectiveness of pipelines vs. LNG shifts at distances that goes beyond 5,000 km onshore, and 2,000 km offshore.

³⁶ Peter Roberts, *Gas Sales and Gas Transportation Agreements: Principles and Practice*, Sweet and Maxwell, 2011, p.16.

³⁷ ‘Cyprus Opts for LNG Terminal for Offshore Gas,’ *Natural Gas Europe*, 11 June 2012, <http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/>.

³⁸ ‘Tzemach Report Welcomed by Israel’s Explorers,’ *Interfax Energy*, Vol. 2, Issue 165, 31 August 2012, www.interfaxenergy.com.

³⁹ ‘Tzemach Report Welcomed by Israel’s Explorers,’ *Interfax Energy*, Vol. 2 Issue 165, 31 August 2012, www.interfaxenergy.com.

⁴⁰ Delek Group Homepage, ‘Investor Relations,’ <http://ir.delek-group.com/>.

⁴¹ Globes News, ‘Gov’t Cos Want to Build \$6b Eilat LNG facility,’ 10 June 2012, <http://www.globes.co.il/>.

⁴² Delek Group Homepage, ‘Investor Relations,’ <http://ir.delek-group.com/>.

Floating liquefaction technology allows producers to bring liquefaction directly to the source of offshore natural gas. However, the cost of such projects is high and depends on relatively calm waters. From a financing perspective, lenders and buyers may also question the security of FLNG facilities in waters vulnerable to marine terrorism.⁴³ Moreover, FLNG technology is quite complex, and must be fitted into limited vessel space. FLNG facilities are expected to yield 75% of the capacity of a conventional land based LNG liquefaction facility, with just 5% of the surface area.⁴⁴

There are a number of major IOCs with advanced research projects on FLNG. There are also several projects under construction. Royal Dutch Shell's 'Prelude' FLNG project off Western Australia is to be the first of such projects to be completed. Shell took the final investment decision in May 2011 and Japan's INPEX Corporation joined the project in March 2012.⁴⁵ Upon completion, Prelude will be the largest manmade floating object, measuring 488m long and displacing 600,000 tons of water.⁴⁶ It will have a capacity of 3.6 mtpa (approximately 4.9 bcm).⁴⁷ It is estimated that the Prelude will cost \$3 billion to construct.⁴⁸ Other major companies that are exploring this technology are Australia's Woodside Petroleum, Malaysia's PETRONAS, and Brazil's PETROBRAS.⁴⁹

Regional Disputes

Existing regional tensions and political instability in the Eastern Mediterranean, and especially continuing maritime border disputes, add to the risk and complexity of hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in the region. While regional Islamist groups have gained new ground since the Arab Spring, it is Turkey that has gained the most regional influence. Turkey's new regional profile has also been felt by Turkey's non-Muslim neighbors. Following the Gaza flotilla incident in 2010, relations between Turkey and Israel have deteriorated considerably, as have Turkish and Greek relations despite US and NATO efforts to mediate.

Turkish violations of Greek and Cypriot airspace have become daily occurrences. Turkey has also escalated its claims in the Eastern Mediterranean in areas that form part of Cyprus EEZ or are claimed by Greece. In this highly confrontational atmosphere, Turkey objected to the second licensing round conducted by the Republic of Cyprus in Cyprus EEZ. Turkey, arrogating the perceived rights of the Turkish Cypriots, has granted licenses over large sections of Cyprus EEZ to TPAO, Turkey's national energy Exploration and Production Company. While Turkey has not

⁴³ Philip Weems, Matt Salo, 'The Top 10 Issues Facing the LNG Industry in 2012,' King & Spalding, 1 March 2012, <http://www.kslaw.com/>.

⁴⁴ 'Malaysia Lloyd's Register Launches FLNG Rules,' *LNG World News*, 6 June 2012, <http://www.lngworldnews.com/>.

⁴⁵ 'World LNG Report, *International Gas Union*, 2010, <http://www.igu.org/>.

⁴⁶ 'Malaysia Lloyd's Register Launches FLNG Rules,' *LNG World News*, 6 June 2012, <http://www.lngworldnews.com/>.

⁴⁷ 'World LNG Report, *International Gas Union (IGU)*, 2010, <http://www.igu.org/>.

⁴⁸ 'Prelude FLNG to Cost \$3bn,' *Upstream Online*, 1 June 11, <http://www.upstreamonline.com/>.

⁴⁹ 'Shell Floating LNG Technology Chosen by Joint Venture for Greater Sunrise Project,' Shell Homepage – News and Media Releases, 29 April 2010, <http://www.shell.com/>; 'Technip, Daewoo Win FEED Contract on PETRONAS' FLNG Vessel Offshore Malaysia,' *Penn Energy*, 1 February 2012, <http://www.pennenergy.com/>; 'Technip Awarded a Key Engineering Contract for a FLNG in Malaysia,' Technip Homepage – Press Releases, <http://www.technip.com/>; 'Prelude,' Shell Australia Homepage, <http://www.shell.com.au/>; 'Inpex Delays Indonesia LNG Output Start by 2 Years,' *Reuters*, 21 December 2010, <http://uk.reuters.com/>.

received any international support for its claims, Ankara has issued warnings of its intention to blacklist companies that engage in Cypriot exploration activities.⁵⁰




Plate 25: Turkish Claims in Cyprus EEZ




Plate 26: Exploration licenses Issued to the TPAO by Turkey

⁵⁰ Emre Peker, 'Erdoğan Threatens to Blacklist Companies Working With Cyprus on Oil, Gas,' *Bloomberg*, 22 September 2011, <http://www.bloomberg.com/>.

In a similar vein, in April 2012, Turkey awarded eight new licenses to TPAO in the Eastern Aegean in an area where sovereignty is disputed with Greece. Turkey, in support of its claims, has also deployed warships in Cyprus' territorial waters on several occasions.⁵¹

In 2007, Lebanon and Cyprus signed a delimitation agreement, and in 2010 Israel and Cyprus also agreed a maritime border. Lebanon then failed to ratify the 2007 agreement, arguing that it was the starting point for negotiations and claiming its maritime border extended further south than the agreed point. Lebanon and Israel have different ideas of where the maritime boundary between the two states lies. The difference is a pie-shaped area of 854 km² (330 mi²) in size where their declared EEZs overlap. In 2010, Lebanon submitted its proposed maritime boundary to the UN. Israel submitted its view to the UN in 2011. US and UN diplomats have been trying to resolve the issue, and in June 2012 reports indicated that diplomats were willing to acknowledge Lebanon's rights to control 530 km² (204mi²) of the disputed area.⁵² However, there is no official agreement between Israel and Lebanon settling the dispute.




Plate 27: Lebanon-Israel maritime dispute

For Lebanon to move ahead with the establishment of a hydrocarbon industry, a functioning energy authority (tentatively named the Petroleum Administration) must first be formed by the government. There are questions within Lebanon itself about whether such a body will be able to work without interference from the country's political groups. Lebanon has commissioned offshore seismic surveys to be carried out in its offshore territory, and aims to hold its first licensing round in October 2012.⁵³

⁵¹ 'Aphrodite's Gift: Can Cypriot Gas Power a New Dialogue?' *International Crisis Group*, 2 April 2012, p.5., <http://www.crisisgroup.org/>; 'Turkish Warships Head Towards Cyprus in Oil Exploration Dispute,' *Today's Zaman*, 21 September 2011 <http://www.todayszaman.com/>; 'Turkey to Deploy Warships Over Gas Dispute with Cyprus,' *Haaretz*, 25 September 2011, <http://www.haaretz.com/>.

⁵² 'Lebanon Recovers 530 Square Kilometers of its EEZ,' *Naharnet*, 6 June 2012, <http://www.naharnet.com/>.

⁵³ 'Beirut prepares first offshore licensing round,' *Interfax Energy*, Vol. 2, Issue 113, 19 June 2012, p. 6, www.interfaxenergy.com.

In this context, the developments in Syria could have severe effects on Lebanon. Syria maintained a strong military presence in Lebanon during the years 1976 - 2005. Syria has remained very influential in Lebanese affairs since its military withdrawal in 2005 through its local allies, notably the two main Shia movements, Hezbollah and Amal, and their network of Lebanese partners in different communities.⁵⁴ Lebanese political life is divided over the issue of Syrian influence with the Sunni-based “*March 14 Alliance*”, headed by Rafik Hariri's son Saad, opposing Syrian influence. Its rivals, the Shia-dominated “*March 8 Coalition*” headed by Hezbollah, are strong allies of Assad's regime in Damascus. If the Syrian regime (based on the Shia-offshoot Alawite minority) collapses and the Sunni majority takes over, Hezbollah's lifeline to its Iranian patrons may be severed, leaving the movement weakened both in Lebanon and vis-à-vis Israel.⁵⁵

A New East-West Energy Corridor to Europe

Given the political instability, the concept of an energy corridor that would link Israel and Cyprus to Southern Europe, will face several difficulties for the immediate future. While Israel may currently be looking towards Asian energy markets, a firm linkage to the European market backed by European financing could still be very attractive as China is known for sitting on considerable shale gas reserves.

Exporting LNG to the EU via Cyprus would give Israel direct access to the European internal market, and make it part of European energy security. As such, the relationship between Israel and Cyprus is key. However, a bilateral relationship between Israel and Cyprus must be based on a common vision, not only on the exploration of natural resources. It is important that the two countries establish a relationship based on partnership rather than dependency. Positive moves have been made in this respect as Israel and Cyprus are progressing in their energy talks.⁵⁶

Cyprus' options for transporting its energy to Europe include: the construction of an underwater pipeline linking Israel, Cyprus and Greece; an electricity cable linking the three countries and, by extension Europe; and the construction of an LNG facility in Cyprus to serve Cyprus', as well as Israeli natural gas exports to Europe.⁵⁷ Cyprus' decision to construct a liquefaction facility available to Israeli natural gas has important consequences. In view of the high cost and value of such major energy and infrastructure projects, national policy and security considerations figure prominently in what might otherwise be a private sector initiative. The energy resources on both sides of the Israeli-Cyprus maritime border are, and will be, under license to corporations with their own economic, even political agendas. Irrespective of who hold such licenses, and/or other major energy assets, however, Cyprus, as a host state will become responsible for the security of the energy exploration production and supply chain. Where energy and national security are concerned serious risk analyses will need to be part of the overall plan.⁵⁸ In order to develop into a reliable LNG producer and supplier, Cyprus must be able to ensure the security of the huge investments that will be required. Being a small country with a small armed forces, Cyprus can do this more cost effectively with Israeli cooperation and assistance.

⁵⁴ 'Syria: The view from Next Door', *BBC News*, 29 November 11, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/>.

⁵⁵ 'Syria: The View from Next Door', *BBC News*, 29 November 11, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/>.

⁵⁶ 'Details of Israel Energy Deal Are Being Fleshed Out,' *Cyprus Mail*, 13 June 2012, <http://www.cyprus-mail.com/>.

⁵⁷ 'Details of Israel Energy Deal Are Being Fleshed Out,' *Cyprus Mail*, 13 June 2012, <http://www.cyprus-mail.com/>.

⁵⁸ Kevin Rosner, 'Closing the Gap Between Energy and National Security,' *Energy Security Journal*, December 2011, <http://www.ensec.org/>.

Given the obvious advantages of having a secure source of energy, it would be in Europe's interest to be fully involved in the development of the natural gas resources of the Eastern Mediterranean. It is, therefore, strongly suggested that a new energy route from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe should become a European sponsored project. Of course, each option would have to be costed in detail, examined for risk and economic returns.

The idea of an underwater pipeline from Cyprus to Greece, the "*Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline*", has received much publicity in Greece as a way to salvage the non-Turkish section of the Italy-Turkey-Greece Interconnector ("*ITGI*").⁵⁹ In February 2012, the Shah Deniz consortium announced that it would favor the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline ("*TAP*") over the ITGI as the preferred leg of the route to Europe.⁶⁰ Greece maintains that the Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline is feasible both economically and technically despite requiring to be laid at depths over 2,000 meters. In addition, the project has to run through waters disputed by Turkey, and that without extensive infrastructure investments into the Greek transmission system, the gas would not be able to be transported to other markets. The last point is related to the fact that Greece's ability to access the rest of Europe will, to a large extent, depend on pipeline projects which essentially lie outside Greece's control.

Alternatively, it has also been suggested that gas from Cyprus could be exported to Turkey via a pipeline that would form part of the Southern Corridor.⁶¹ However, this option is a non-starter without the prior full normalization of Cyprus-Turkey relations.

LNG projects are not only more costly than pipeline projects, they also take longer to implement. It has been suggested that a 5 mtpa liquefaction plant would take approximately 10 years to construct once the final decision has been made.⁶² However, this option would give Cyprus more flexibility for exporting its own reserves, as well as provide an export option to its neighbors. There are several LNG regasification terminals in the Mediterranean that could serve as entry points into Europe. Although most of these terminals are currently contracted to work at close to capacity, by the time Eastern Mediterranean gas comes online, circumstances may be different, and sufficient receiving capacity may be available.

The relations between Cyprus and Greece are historically good, and Greece has one LNG regasification terminal located on the island of Revithoussa with a capacity of approximately 5.2 bcm/year.⁶³ In 2011, Greece imported close to 1 million tons ("*mt*") of LNG (approximately 1.38 bcm).⁶⁴ While these figures are unlikely to remain the same over the next 10 years, Greece will still have to invest in its national transmission system if the gas is going to be transported beyond its borders. In this context, any future expansion of Cyprus' liquefaction facility and export

⁵⁹ 'Cyprus Opts for LNG Terminal for Offshore Gas,' *Natural Gas Europe*, 11 June 2012, <http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/>.

⁶⁰ 'Analysis: TAP's Victory Attributed to Wider Geo-economic Considerations,' *Natural Gas Europe*, 21 February 2012, <http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/>.

⁶¹ 'Aphrodite's Gift: Can Cypriot Gas Power a New Dialogue?' *International Crisis Group*, 2 April 2012, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/>.

⁶² Peter Wallace, 'Constructing the Vassilikos LNG Plant: Questions of Feasibility, a Reality Check,' 11 September 2011, European Rim Policy and Investment Council, www.erpig.org; Peter Wallace, 'Cyprus Gas: A View on the Short and Long-Term Alternatives and Options', European Rim Policy and Investment Council, 11 January 2012, www.erpig.org.

⁶³ DESFA Hellenic Gas Transmission System Operator, Homepage, <http://www.desfa.gr>.

⁶⁴ 'World LNG Report, *International Gas Union*, 2010, <http://www.igu.org>.

capacity to 10, or even 15 mtpa, would also require Greece to either extend the Revithoussa terminal and/or construct a new terminal, like the one planned in the south of Primos (near Kavala).⁶⁵ In the current economic crisis, it is doubtful that Greece will be able to undertake the commitments, or attract the investors needed for the expansion of its national pipeline grid and the Revithoussa Terminal in the near future. To make matters worse DEPA may soon be forced to take loans in order to cover the cost of gas imports. DEPA, which is currently in the process of being privatized, reportedly owes approximately €120 million to various gas suppliers, including Gazprom, BOTAS and ENI.⁶⁶

In order to establish itself as a reliable energy supplier to Europe, Cyprus needs to adopt a broader EU oriented LNG export policy. Such a policy should include export to the existing LNG import terminals across Southern Europe as well as to Greece. Italy, one of the largest consumers of natural gas in the EU⁶⁷, has two LNG regasification terminals in operation, with several import terminals planned over the coming years.⁶⁸ There are also plans for expansions of existing terminals. The terminal closest to Cyprus is the Adriatic (Rovigo) LNG Terminal located in the northern part of the Adriatic Sea with a current capacity of 8 bcm/year⁶⁹, and the Panigaglia LNG Terminal, located on the North Western coast of Ligurian Sea with a current capacity of 3.5 bcm/year.⁷⁰ Italy imported 8.7 bcm of LNG in 2011, making it the fourth largest LNG importer in Europe.⁷¹ While it is unlikely that all the planned projects will materialize, Italy will undoubtedly remain a dominant force on the European natural gas import market.

The Fos-Tonkin and Fos Cavaou Terminals in southern France with receiving capacities of 5.5 bcm/year⁷² and 8.25 bcm/year⁷³ respectively are also options to consider. France imported a total of 14.6 bcm of LNG in 2011 making it the third largest LNG importer in Europe. With an LNG import of 24.2 bcm, Spain was the second largest LNG importer in 2011. Spain has three import terminals on its eastern coast, the Cartagena Terminal (11.8 bcm/year⁷⁴), Sagunto Terminal (8.7 bcm/year⁷⁵) and the Barcelona Terminal (17.1 bcm/year⁷⁶).

Cyprus' geographical position grants it access to the largest natural gas consumers and LNG importers in Europe. As such, The *Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor* should be able to reach all EU entry points in the Mediterranean in order to facilitate multiple end-users across Europe. In this context, it should be noted that several major EU energy companies have participated in Cyprus' second licensing round, therefore, creating the possibility that they will become

⁶⁵ 'Europe Breathes a Sigh of Relief after Greek Elections', *Interfax Energy*, Vol. 2 Issue 113, 19 June 2012, www.interfaxenergy.com.

⁶⁶ 'DEPA May Take Loan to Pay for Gas', *Natural Gas Europe*, 11 June 2012, <http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/>.

⁶⁷ Italy imported 69.5 bcm of natural gas in 2011 making it second to Germany with a total import of 84 bcm. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 'Natural Gas Section', June 2012 <http://www.bp.com/>.

⁶⁸ BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 'Natural Gas Section', June 2012, <http://www.bp.com/>.

⁶⁹ Adriatic LNG Homepage - 'The Adriatic LNG Terminal: Fact Sheet', <http://www.adriaticlng.com/>.

⁷⁰ Eni Homepage 'Gas Transmissions', <http://www.eni.com/>.

⁷¹ BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 'Natural Gas Section,' June 2012, <http://www.bp.com/>.

⁷² Gaz Suez Homepage 'LNG Terminals,' <http://www.gdfsuez.com/>.

⁷³ Gaz Suez Homepage 'LNG Terminals,' <http://www.gdfsuez.com/>.

⁷⁴ Enagás, S.A. Homepage 'Regasification Terminals,' <http://www.enagas.es/>.

⁷⁵ Saggas Homepage 'Technical file,' <http://www.saggas.com/>.

⁷⁶ Saggas Homepage 'Technical file,' <http://www.saggas.com/>.

stakeholders in Eastern Mediterranean gas.⁷⁷ In conclusion, their influence over EU policy makers could prove important.




Plate 28: The Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor

Eastern Mediterranean LNG could, of course, reach broader global markets as well. With regard to global LNG transportation, and regasification capacity, it is important to note that by the end of 2011 global LNG fleets stood at 360 vessels, which is an increase of 150% since 2006. Global regasification capacity has increased by 64% since 2006 and in 2011 it stood at 608 mtpa.⁷⁸ In the same year the global LNG trade grew by 8 % (17.7 mt) to a total of 241.5 mt. This was mainly due to an increased demand from Japan (8.2 mt). There was also an increase in demands from the UK (4.4mt), India (3.4 mt) and China (3.3 mt).⁷⁹

Conclusions

The success of an *Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor* to Europe would depend upon a strong bilateral relationship between the state of Israel and the Republic of Cyprus. Support from Greece, Italy, as well as other Southern European countries will be important in securing a commitment from the European community to help develop, and ultimately purchase Eastern Mediterranean natural gas. Initially, Italy, rather than Greece, would likely be the optimum target entry point into Europe, followed by France and Spain. Greece should, however, not be excluded from the equation, nor should other entry points into Europe.

As an initial step, Cyprus and Israel should explore the economic, political and security aspects

⁷⁷ For a list of these companies see footnote 35 above.

⁷⁸ International Gas Union, 'World LNG Report, 2010, <http://www.igu.org/>.

⁷⁹ International Gas Union, 'World LNG Report, 2010, <http://www.igu.org/>.

of jointly accessing the European energy market within the broader context of an Israel-Cyprus-Greece-Italy energy nexus. At the same time, Cyprus should seek EU Commission support for this project and submit a proposal before the European Council.

By helping develop the Eastern Mediterranean energy resources, and particularly the Cyprus fields, the EU would secure a substantial new supply of natural gas within its own borders. Israeli resources also, to the extent that they would be earmarked for Europe, would represent a secure and dependable source of energy for Europe.

An *Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor* would also decrease EU dependency upon non-member transit states. The *Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor* should, therefore, not be seen as a competitor of existing energy supply routes to Europe. On the contrary it should be viewed as complimentary to Europe's overall efforts to diversify and secure its energy supplies. This is very much in Europe's best interests, and will secure a considerable percentage of Europe's energy supplies for years to come.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

John Munro**
3 October 2012

Aftermath from the Arab Spring

The Middle East has always been an area of conflict but for the past fifty years that conflict has been more or less contained. This was largely due to an understanding between the Arabs and the West (mainly the United States), which involved a hypocritical trade-off between the main players. The West in effect agreed to overlook what the OECD calls the “democratic deficit” of the region’s autocratic regimes in return for them keeping the oil flowing and Israel secure.

A year and a half ago, this unholy alliance began to unravel. Economic hardship was largely to blame. The Arab masses also recognized that a privileged few with connections were unfairly benefitting from the system. They were also fed up with abuse from civil servants and the internal security forces, which were more likely to act in defiance of the law than implement it.

What became known as the Arab Spring began in Tunisia on January 14, 2011, when Mohammed Bouazizi, set himself on fire and died. He had been harassed by Tunisia’s internal security forces and he had had enough. Next the movement struck Egypt; later came Libya. Syria was hit with small scale protests shortly afterwards, which has now developed into a full scale civil war that shows no sign of ending. Even the relatively prosperous Gulf state of Bahrain was not immune. Public protests broke out there as well and have continued off and on ever since.

The various uprisings had several things in common.

First, they were in the main grass roots movements of protest. They were not coups d’état. They began almost haphazardly, taking the ruling regimes by surprise. The words “bekeffi,” “kefaya”—meaning “enough”—was on everyone’s lips. Kefaya even gave its name to a new, secular political party in Egypt.

Second, it was mainly young people who led the rebellions. Their main aim was not to seize power but simply to improve their lives.

Third, the unrest involved the middle class and included many young professionals.

** Text as submitted by the speaker.*

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Fourth, women – unusually – were well represented in the demonstrations, most notably in Yemen and Egypt.

Fifth, social networking played an important role and young, generally well educated rebels used Facebook, blogs and Twitter to mobilize and head off the states' more cumbersome security apparatus. A new, more sophisticated kind of political opposition had emerged.

In short, the Arab Spring had many progressive features which distinguished it from the angry, spontaneous and easily suppressed popular outbursts of the past, such as the so-called bread riots in Egypt in 1988. However, the Arab Spring was very different from, say, the fall of Communism, which was a region-wide uprising against a discredited ideology. In the Arab Spring local conditions largely shaped events and everywhere the outcome was different.

The two most important of these local conditions were religion and tribal affiliation.

With regard to religion, we must first distinguish between the two main strands of the Islamic faith: Sunni and Shia. After the death of the Prophet, some of the faithful wanted to elect a new caliph by consensus; these became known as Sunni Moslems. Another group believed that Mohammed's successor should derive from the family of the Prophet, specifically Ali; these became known as Shiites. Tension grew between the two groups and a fierce battle broke out between them at Karbala in 681. The Sunnis, led by Muwaiyyah, won and Hussein, of the Prophet's family, was martyred. This produced the main schism in Islam. Today, Sunnis constitute about 75% of all Middle Easterners; Shia 25%.

In many ways the two sects are similar. They both accept the so called five pillars of Islam:

1. To acknowledge the shihadah and recite it at least once every day: that there is only one God, Allah, and Mohammed is his messenger.
2. To make the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime.
3. To fast during the holy month of Ramadan.
4. To give alms to the poor (zakat).
5. To pray five times a day in the direction of Mecca.

Where the two sects differ most markedly is in their theological orientation. Sunnis believe that since the death of the Prophet there has been a falling away from the caliphate's original purity, therefore the more extreme Sunnis, loosely referred to as Salafists, believe true Moslems should strive to regain an ideal world that has been lost. Shiites are more inclined to look forward. They believe that a twelfth imam (a sort of Messiah) will be revealed at some future date, when the world will be purified of its sinfulness.

Shiites constitute the majority in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain and probably Lebanon. A significant number of Shiites also live in Pakistan and in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, which is linked to Bahrain by a causeway. Sunnis are everywhere else in the Middle East, including Turkey. However, Turkey's ten million or so minority Alevi Moslems lean towards Shiism and share an emotional (but not theological) kinship with the Alawites in neighboring Syria.

Finally, there is an ongoing debate (ishtihad) in both Sunni and Shiite Islam over what constitutes the true way. Thus, in both Sunni and, particularly, Shia Islam there are conflicting views about

the meaning of “jihad,” holy war, some seeing it as armed struggle, others as rhetorical persuasion. There is also debate about the status of women. Neither Sunni nor Shia Islam should be regarded as monolithic faiths. Sunnis in Saudi Arabia differ from Sunnis in Egypt. Lebanese Shia differ from those living in Iran.

As in similar situations (think of Christianity’s Great Schism of 1054), religious affiliation in Islam became politicized. Today it has morphed into rivalry between Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia for not just the soul of the Middle East but political influence as well.

For example, tension between Shiites and Sunnis is at the root of the recent troubles in Bahrain. In Bahrain, Shiites constitute approximately 65%-70% of the population but the ruling family is Sunni, headed by King Hamid bin Issa Al Khalifa. Although most Bahraini Shiites are hardly impoverished, they certainly suffer discrimination. Trouble, which broke out last year, has been ruthlessly put down by the regime with the assistance of Saudi Arabia.

The same sectarian rivalry colors the politics of Iraq, which is mainly made up of Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds. The latter are also Sunni but speak Kurdish rather than Arabic.

In Iraq, tribalism also plays an important role. Saddam Hussein, a Sunni Moslem, besides carrying out vendettas against Shiites, also tried to suppress the tribes in the interests of national unity. However, since the US-led invasion there has been a resurgence of tribalism in Iraq, largely due to the US military working with tribal leaders in security matters rather than with the only intermittently reliable, Shiite Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki. But to be fair, al-Maliki is not only constrained by the multi-sectarian framework of his coalition government but by tribal factions in his own bloc as well. Some he can count on; others he can’t.

As for the Kurds, they are scattered across the borders of Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Long victimized, by the rulers of these states, especially by successive Turkish regimes, they dream of one day having their own independent state, or at least the freedom to enjoy their cultural exceptionalism. In northern Iraq, the Kurds are largely split between two tribes once at odds with one another but now more or less united: Massoud Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The other major Kurdish grouping is the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). It too has a presence in Iraq but the movement is more widely based in Syria and has a strong following in Turkey, where their leader, Abdullah Ocalan, is currently in prison. The PKK is also factionalized along tribal lines.

In Libya, although there is a new centralized authority in Tripoli, real power resides with tribal militias, notably between those clustered around Benghazi in the east and Tripoli in the west; to the south the government has virtually no authority at all.

Lebanon is fractured not just along religious lines but tribal lines as well. The government is made up of representatives of different religions, their numerical strengths legitimized by a 1943 National Pact, which was based on the results of a census conducted during the French mandate in 1930. It prescribed a Maronite Christian president, a Sunni Prime Minister and a Shiite Speaker of the House. The Druse, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and other sects are also recognized with lesser portfolios. Since 1930, the relative strengths of the three main religions has undoubtedly changed and many believe Shiites now constitute the majority, therefore a new constitution should reflect that change. This was one of the main factors which fuelled Lebanon’s 25-year civil war that lasted between 1975 and 1990.

Within each of Lebanon's religious groupings there are also tribal factions. Therefore, we should distinguish between Shiites who come from the South and those who come from the Beqaa. Until recently, those from the South lived in something like medieval servitude under a handful of powerful landlords: they were primarily agricultural laborers engaged in the cultivation of tobacco. The Shiites in the Beqaa belonged to tribes, each of which followed its own traditions. Some educated their children (even enrolling them in Christian schools) and encouraged them to emigrate; others preferred their children to stay at home and engage in local economic activities, mostly farming but also smuggling and hashish cultivation.

Tribalism plays an important role in the present Lebanese government. While it is dominated by Shiite Hezbollah, it also relies for support from the tribal bloc of the Maronite Christian General Michel Aoun, (who, ironically, previously fought against the Syrian presence in Lebanon and now supports it). His group has been rewarded with several seats in the cabinet, including the energy portfolio, which is held by Aoun's son-in-law, Gibran Bassil.

In Syria, both religion and tribal allegiances exert a powerful influence. The population is predominantly Sunni (approximately 70%), with sizeable Christian and Druse communities, but the government is dominated by the minority Alawites, an obscure offshoot of Shiism.

The regime is led by President Bashar Al Assad, who succeeded his father, Hafez. Although it is said that the regime follows a secular, Baath socialist line, it is perhaps best understood as being a closely knit family mafia, supported by the shabiha, a band of mainly Alawite thugs, as well as government forces. Where the main power lies is the subject of some debate. Is Bashar a puppet manipulated by his family or is he a powerful force in his own right? What we do know is that Anisa Makhlouf, Bashar's mother and widow of the former president Hafez al Assad, exercises considerable authority. Rami, her nephew, is certainly the richest man in Syria. He has wide ranging business interests, including Syria's cell phone network, duty free shops, supermarkets and banks. Bashar's younger brother Maher heads the internal security forces and is well known for his ruthlessness. Bushra, Bashar's older sister, also has considerable influence and is said to have mediated successfully in serious family disputes. She is the widow of Atef Shawkat, who until his recent assassination was head of Syrian intelligence. Around this core are several key figures of varying degrees of loyalty. Some, such as Nawaz Fares, Syria's ambassador to Baghdad, a Sunni, have already defected. His departure to Iraq was facilitated by his role as leader of the Uqaydat tribe, which straddles the Syria-Iraq border: another reminder of how tribal affiliation complicates the politics of the region.

Although the Assad clique was never popular, it did have credibility, having brought stability to Syria, which allowed the country's Sunni bourgeois merchant class to prosper and its minority Christians and Druse to feel secure. Even so, the majority of Sunnis felt badly done to and had little liking for the Assad regime. In 1982 they rebelled in Homs, their main power base, where they were ruthlessly put down by Hafez Al Assad, who massacred an estimated 18,000-20,000 and destroyed a large part of the city. Now the Sunnis are rebelling again, this time with open support from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey and with more shadowy assistance - mainly logistical - from the West.

That the West has become involved in the Syrian conflict has more to do with regional politics than humanitarian concern, in spite of the West's protestations to the contrary. Almost alone among the Arab states, Syria has established good relations with nuclear-armed Iran, which has provoked opposition from both the West and Israel. Although the Alawite religion is an offshoot

of Shia Islam, the alliance with Iran has less to do with religious solidarity than political opportunism. It was said, when Hafez Al Assad was alive, that war with Israel would be impossible without Egypt (because of its strong military) and no peace without Syria (because of its covert mischief-making). In short, Syria has customarily played the role of regional spoiler and an alliance with Iran—which has declared its implacable commitment to the destruction of Israel— was well suited to Syria's foreign policy designs.

Syria also has good relations with Russia and (to a lesser degree) China, both of whom find their alliance with Syria (and by extension Iran) gives them leverage in Middle Eastern affairs. Hence their continuing support for the Assad regime.

How the civil war in Syria turns out is still difficult to predict. At the moment, Syria has overwhelming fire power but the rebels - now generally referred to as the Free Syrian Army (FSA) - now waging an effective guerrilla campaign. The FSA is made up of mainly Syrian Sunni Moslems but also includes a bewildering array of foreign fighters financed mainly by wealthy individuals and organizations in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE.

At present there are two outside political structures attempting to mediate:

1. The Friends of Syria, which meets occasionally in Istanbul, and is made up of mainly western powers but significantly not Syria's main backers, Russia and China. They have pledged financial support for a mediated solution but so far they have had little impact.
2. The Syrian National Council (SNC), which is made up of generally well meaning Syrian exiles of limited authority. Initially, the group met in Istanbul but has since met in Cairo and Qatar, whose governments would like to influence its deliberations. The SNC was originally headed by a Sorbonne professor, Burhan Ghalioun. He has since been moved aside in favor of Abdelbassit Sayda, a Kurdish exile living in Sweden, a curious choice as very few Syrians would back a Kurdish-led organization with any degree of enthusiasm. Supported primarily by France and Turkey, the SNC is dominated by Islamists but at their last meeting, France and Turkey promoted a breakaway group, backed by France and Russia headed by Manaf Tlass, the first major defector from Assad's circle. Its chances for success are regarded as slim.

Hopes of a negotiated settlement under UN auspices have now virtually collapsed. Originally, Kofi Annan headed a group of UN negotiators backed by the West, Russia, China and the Arab League but it was undermanned and ultimately ineffectual. Since then, the veteran Algerian negotiator, Lakhdar Brahimi, has taken over but he has been keen not to raise any hopes. Iran is now openly backing the Assad regime, though it denies that its help amounts to military intervention. China and Russia continue their support, though more circumspectly. Russia is a longtime ally and an important arms provider; it also has a major naval base at Tartus. Also, there are tens of thousands Russian nationals living in Syria. Perhaps most importantly, Russia is keen to curtail the growing power of the Islamists, who threaten the stability of Chechnya and the Caucasus as a whole. Ominously, the UN has reported numerous sightings of Chechens and other Central Asian nationals fighting on behalf of the rebels.

There are two basic problems with regard to resolving the war in Syria: a military campaign to topple the Assad regime would be hugely complicated as well as costly, especially as it is known that the government has stockpiled chemical weapons. On the other hand, if left to fester, Syria will likely fall into further chaos, creating a political vacuum to be filled, most probably, by an

Islamist regime, or worse, Islamist regimes. There are now numerous Al Qaeda sympathizers coming into Syria across its increasingly porous borders, some through Iraq but also from the Gulf via Turkey. Collectively, the FSA would probably favor some form of Islamist governance but it is hardly united, being torn over matters of inclusiveness and degrees of Islamic purity.

What happens in Syria will likely have an impact on Lebanon. Indeed, the traditional political view in Syria is that the two countries should never have been separated after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. Also, Lebanon's Shiite community has long maintained ties with Iran, initially religious but increasingly political. Therefore, Syria was able to facilitate Iran's foreign policy designs by channelling money and arms to Iran's closest political ally in Lebanon, Hezbollah, which were used to attack Israel.

Shiite Hezbollah is both a political party and a militia. Alone among Lebanon's other political parties it is allowed to maintain a well-armed militia (which is more powerful than the regular Lebanese army). This arrangement was agreed to under the terms of the 1989 Taif agreement, which brought Lebanon's civil war to an end and gave legitimacy to a Syrian peace-keeping presence in Lebanon. But in 2005, Syria and its proxy Hezbollah, were implicated in the murder of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, father of the current Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, who was actively seeking international support for Syria's withdrawal from his country. Hariri's assassination prompted UN Resolution 1559, shortly afterwards, which obliged all foreign forces to leave Lebanon, i.e. Syria, but also Israel, which was occupying an area in South Lebanon. At present, a UN tribunal continues to investigate Hariri's death but it is making very slow progress because of delaying tactics undertaken by Lebanon's Syria supporters.

So far, Lebanon has been able to stay out of the Syrian conflict. Memories of its own, long civil war still linger and no one wants to take the blame for restarting it. However, a wild card is the 450,000 or so Palestinian refugees living in camps in Lebanon. Essentially stateless, they have limited opportunities for work in Lebanon and are unable to emigrate. They spend their time praying, procreating and learning to fight. Mainly Sunnis, their sympathies are torn between Syria for its stance against Israel and their co-religionists in the SFA. So far, they have not been drawn into the conflict but they remain a regional time bomb.

If Syria were to break up, the tenuous peace that presently exists in Lebanon would come under pressure. The Taif agreement that ended the civil war was supposed to regulate if not resolve Lebanon's constitutional issues but it never really took hold. Factional rivalries remained and they burst out with renewed vigor after Prime Minister Rafik Hariri's assassination. This prompted both pro- and anti-Syria demonstrations, from which emerged two roughly equal blocs: the pro-Syrian March 8 alliance, which presently holds a slim majority in parliament over the anti-Syrian March 14 alliance.

At present, the Lebanese government is trying not to be drawn into Syria's civil war. The Hezbollah-dominated, pro-Syrian alliance continues to back the Assad regime; the anti-Syrian alliance does not. So far, both the March 8 and the March 14 alliances are united in refusing to compromise Lebanon's neutrality but it is becoming increasingly difficult for each side to rein in its more passionate supporters. Moreover, the events in Syria are having a negative impact on Lebanon's economy, which makes the situation even more inflammable. This summer, for example, Gulf Arabs and Saudis were advised not to stay in Lebanon, where they traditionally vacation in the Lebanese mountains to escape the Gulf heat.

Although Egypt is not directly implicated in the events in Syria, it could be drawn in. In Egypt, the Arab Spring resulted in the removal from power of Hosni Mubarak, his two sons Ala'a and Gamal, and their cronies. They were first replaced by an interim government made up of military men, led by former army chief-of-staff Field Marshall Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, who was well known and appreciated in Washington. This group, known as the Security Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), has said it is committed to democracy and the restoration of civilian rule but doubts remain over its intentions.

True, it did oversee parliamentary elections but when they produced an overwhelming Islamist majority, they pressured the judiciary to declare it unconstitutional. On the other hand, SCAF also supervised a reasonably fair presidential election, which was won by Mohammed El Morsi, an American educated engineer, backed by the Moslem Brothers (the Ikhwan Muslimin). He refused to accept SCAF's dissolution of parliament and there was a clash of wills between the Brotherhood and the military. Fortunately, both sides realized that much was at stake and the military quietly backed down.

It seems unlikely that the military will cheerfully step aside entirely. It has too much to lose. It plays a crucial role in Egypt's economy, being involved in a wide range of activities, including munitions and textile manufacturing, real estate, potato farming and supermarkets. The actual extent of the army's involvement has always been a state secret, so few know how big their stake actually is but it has variously been estimated by some to be as high as 35% of GDP.

What is encouraging, however, is that President Morsi is turning out to be a clever politician and is quietly asserting his authority over the military without alienating them. He has removed from office Field Marshall Mohammed El Tantawi and replaced him with a less slavish courtier to American interests, Abdel Fatah el-Sisi. Morsi has also quietly removed other senior military figures and appointed Brotherhood members to several key governorships, another move which boosts his authority. What we are witnessing in Egypt appears to be a quiet takeover by the Moslem Brothers, who so far have handled their newly won power with considerable finesse.

Finally, the so called Peace Process. Israelis see it as, primarily, a security issue. For the Arabs it is now more about cultural assertiveness and the restoration of Arab pride. What happens in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt - and by extension Turkey, Jordan and Iraq - could all have repercussions for Israel and the Palestinians.

Currently, a formal resolution to the Israel-Palestinian issue is predicated on the so called "road map," drawn up and supported by the "Quartet," which includes the US, UN, EU and Russia. It has four main points:

1. Two contiguous democratic states at peace within secure borders.
2. The Palestinian state should approximate its pre-1967 borders.
3. Jerusalem to be a shared capital.
4. The right of return or compensation for displaced Palestinians.

In 2002, this vision for the future was endorsed by all 21 states of the Arab League and in return the Arabs agreed not just to accept Israel's right to exist but for it to live in peace within secure borders.

Neither Israel nor the Palestinians respected this arrangement from the beginning: Israel did not stop building illegal settlements; the Palestinians did not give up their armed struggle. Hamas, an extremist Islamic faction, which had come to power in Gaza, continued its military activity, receiving covert support from Iran and elsewhere. At present the Palestinian administration is divided between Gaza's Hamas, led by Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, and the West Bank's less militant, more secular, Palestine National Authority, which is dominated by Fatah and led by Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas. Attacks against Israel from both Gaza and the West Bank have been reduced considerably but settlement building in the West Bank has accelerated. (A recent example is Migron, built on Palestinian private land. A group of Palestinians went to Israel's Supreme Court to stop it and won their case. The settlers were told to evacuate the land by August 1 yet they have made only a token withdrawal. Israel also has plans to build a full scale Israeli university in the occupied West Bank).

A so-called defensive wall snakes its way through the West Bank making free movement for Palestinians either difficult or impossible. Israel says it is for defense but it also appears to be a land grab. The West is caught in a bind. On the one hand, it supports the moderate government of Mahmoud Abbas both diplomatically and financially and is holding Hamas at arms' length. For progress to be made the two factions will have to coordinate more closely. However, since the Arab Spring the political dynamic may have changed, making a working partnership less likely. Mr. Abbas, who rules by edict, is far from popular and has little to show for his willingness to act as a partner for peace with Israel. If the Islamists are seen to be gaining the upper hand in Syria as well as in Egypt, Jordan and elsewhere, his authority will likely be further undermined.

It is difficult to measure whether the Arab Spring has had much impact on the peace process. So far, there is little tangible evidence of any concerted pressure on Israel. However, Egypt now appears to be pursuing a more independent line. In response to local pressure, the Egyptian military has relaxed its border control with Gaza at Rafaa. While Mubarak was in power he made sure that the many tunnels under the border which served as a conduit for smuggling merchandise and arms (mainly from Libya) were effectively monitored. Now Israel fears that under an Islamist regime this control may be relaxed. There have already been armed clashes at the Rafaa crossing, resulting in the deaths of five Egyptian policemen. This provoked mass anti-Israeli demonstrations in Cairo, which resulted in the evacuation of the Israeli embassy.

More recently, two Egyptian state oil companies - Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Co. and Egypt General Petroleum Co - which since 2008 have been pumping gas to Israel, suddenly turned the tap off. The Egyptian government has since reneged on its gas treaty with Israel and has shown no desire to negotiate its resumption.

Also, the Sinai is less closely monitored than it was under Mubarak and there are persistent reports that the Bedouin there, now more heavily armed thanks to the ineffectual security situation in Libya, are becoming radicalized by Al Qaeda. In July, there was yet another sabotage attack on the gas pipeline that supplies Israel and Jordan with Egypt's natural gas. In the past, Egypt would not have sent a large military force into the Sinai without coordinating closely with Israel. This time Egypt acted more or less independently, apparently consulting with Israel and the US only after the event.

While Israel may come under increased pressure as a result of political changes in the region, for the moment at least this is unlikely to be translated into military action. In fact, Mohammed Morsi has surprised many by keeping Gaza's Hamas at arm's length. Uppermost in most Arab

minds is simply to improve their economic condition. Hence, in Egypt, besides meetings with top US officials, mainly in a bid to secure debt relief and further loans, President Morsi's earliest diplomatic initiative was to visit China with a view to drumming up aid and trade. More controversial was his brief stopover in Tehran to address the conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). There he upset his hosts by refusing to support Mr Assad's beleaguered regime but simultaneously tried to reassure Iran that Egypt was nonetheless a true friend. In a move bound to create upset in the United States, Morsi has since pointed to the obvious by saying that any settlement to the crisis would have to take into account Iran's interests. He therefore proposed a new team of mediators made up of representatives from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Egypt. It is a proposal unlikely to take hold but is another indication of Egypt seeking a new independent role in the Middle East.

So far, Israel's policy with regard to these new threats remains outwardly unchanged. To make use of Ehud Barak's metaphor, they still see themselves inhabiting a villa in a jungle, so they must be vigilant and prepared to ward off unwelcome intruders. Nor, it seems, has Israel made up its mind how to tackle Iran's nuclear program, other than to speak noisily about "red lines". So far, Israel's instinctively aggressive posture towards Iran appears to have been reined in by the US, which continues to hope that economic sanctions and under-the-radar cyber-attacks will prove to be an adequate deterrent. Polls in Israel also suggest that there is little stomach for a full scale attack against Iran, a view endorsed by several well respected figures in Israel's intelligence community.

Whether Israel will continue to heed international pressure or attack Iran remains to be seen. In recent years, Israel has become increasingly belligerent and Prime Minister Netanyahu, who remains relatively popular at home, has swung his Likud party further to the right, partly from instinct but also in order to keep his right-wing parliamentary coalition together. Foremost among his supporters are his Defense Minister Ehud Barak and his Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, whom even ardent Zionists have labeled a racist. Also, Netanyahu's interior minister, Eli Yishai, has recently accentuated Israel's swing towards racial extremism, defending his country's policy of refusing refuge to South Sudanese fleeing their worn torn country on the grounds that Israel is for "white people" only. This conveniently overlooks the fact that there are sizable minorities of Ethiopians already living there.

The largest pro-Israeli lobby in the US, AIPAC, continues its wholehearted support for Netanyahu, but AIPAC's admittedly much tinier rival, the J Street Lobby is less enthusiastic. It believes that the greatest threat to Israel's existence is not from outside aggressors, nor from Arabs living in Israel and the Occupied Territories. It comes from a demographic imbalance, which Israeli historian Benny Morris identifies as Israel's primary, existential threat. This was also recognized by no less a fervent militarist than Ben Gurion, who counseled against annexing the West Bank after the 1967 war, because if it did, Israel would be unable to remain both Jewish and democratic.

Demographers differ over the date when Arabs will outnumber Jews in Israel and the Occupied Territories. But all agree it will be well within the lifetime of the majority of Israelis living today. Unfortunately, this "existential" threat has not led to an increased willingness on the part of Israel to negotiate with the Palestinians. On the contrary, the present trend seems to suggest that most Israelis are more comfortable living in an apartheid regime than reaching out to the peace-makers.

Finally, a look at the way the Arab Spring has raised the profile of two states: tiny Qatar and Turkey.

1. The present ruler of Qatar, Sheikh Hamid ibn Khalifa Al Thani and his family are open - albeit guardedly - to western ways. Witness their enthusiasm for western style educational institutions and their tolerance for the increasingly popular and independently minded Al Jazeera television channel. Qatar also sided with the West in regulating the situation in Libya, providing military and diplomatic support for the NATO-led invasion. Though tiny, Qatar has huge revenues from its natural gas reserves, which also enable it to exert considerable influence worldwide. Consider its economic importance only to the UK property market. Qatar has bought up several prime real estate properties in London, including Harrods and the Chelsea Barracks and financed the construction of the iconic Shard land mark.

While Qatar insists it wants to be friends with everyone, it also emphasizes its strong commitment to Islamic values. Hence, it offered safe haven for the Hamas leadership when they decamped from their headquarters in Damascus. Qatar is also said to have provided funds for at least one of the Islamist parties (Rafala al-Sahati) which contested Libya's recent elections and in Syria it is openly supporting the FSA. Whether Qatar will be able to maintain its delicate balancing act between East and West remains to be seen.

2. Most interesting is the enhanced international status of Turkey, which is seeking to supplement its growing economic clout with a more prominent diplomatic role. The man responsible for formulating Turkey's foreign policy is Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, whose 2001 book "Strategic Depth" built on Ataturk's dictum of "peace at home and peace abroad," recasting it as "zero problems with the neighbors." This meant, among other things, that Turkey should maintain a strong military and deploy it wisely. Hence, Turkey's cautious involvement in Libya. It joined the NATO initiative only when the conflict was well under way and then in a non-combat role. Over all, according to Mr. Davutoglu, as articulated in his recent address to the Turkish parliament, Turkey's main foreign policy aim is to be the "owner, pioneer and servant of the Middle East."

If Turkey is to realize this ambition, it must tread carefully. After World War I, in 1923, when it lost its empire and the secularizing Ataturk had come to power, Turkey's initial orientation was towards Europe. In 1952 it joined NATO, where its huge army on the border with the former Soviet Union made it the West's vital ally during the Cold War. Later, Turkey focused on joining the EU. But in the face of opposition from many EU members who believe that the EU should be a Christian club and that Turkey is anyway too big a mouthful to digest, Turkey began to re-orient its foreign policy - quite literally - eastwards, a policy which according to a recent Pew research poll, is supported by the majority of the Turkish population.

In recent years Turkey has sought to win friends throughout the Middle East, mediating between Saudi Arabia and Iran over Iraq and between the West and Iran over the imposition of economic sanctions designed to stop Iran's nuclear program. In 2011, Turkey also announced the establishment of a free trade zone between Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Jordan.

With regard to Turkey's courtship of its Arab neighbors, one should not under-estimate the hugely popular Turkish soap operas such as "Noor", "The Sultan's Harem" and the "Magnificent Century", dubbed in colloquial Arabic and shown at prime time throughout the Arab world.

Essentially, they portray an idealized picture of Ottoman rule with more flesh than you would find in their Arab equivalents, laced with family intrigue. Also, they tend to portray strong, capable women who have the courage to walk out on overbearing husbands without suffering the consequences. Overall, their effect is to remind the Arabs of their rich cultural heritage and simultaneously that Islam and modernity can co-exist.

The US has also encouraged Turkey to become more actively involved with its Arab neighbors, hoping that the mild Islamism of Turkey's ruling AK or Freedom and Justice Party (in power since 2003) might become a template for new governments in the region.

This is happening when Saudi Arabia, which used to be the region's main power-player, is beginning to lose some of its influence. The leaders of Saudi Arabia are now old and infirm. King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud can barely walk; the former conservative and highly influential Crown Prince and Interior Minister, Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz, has just died. He has been replaced by his brother, another conservative, colorless septuagenarian. Prince Saud al-Faisal is sick and the next generation may be less pliant to America's will. Already the most influential member of the royal family of the younger generation, Prince Faisal Al Turki, is warning that Saudi Arabia might pursue a more independent line. He announced in a recent op-ed article in the "New York Times" that the kingdom would have to rethink its relations with the US if it were to veto Palestinian statehood at the UN. Such cracks in the once solid US-Saudi axis can only boost Turkey's importance.

Qatar also seems to recognize Turkey's increasingly important role, judging by the increase of their bilateral visits. Since 2001 several important agreements have been signed between the two with regard to economic investment, double taxation and military co-operation. Particularly noteworthy are the close personal ties between Turkey and Tunisia, where the ideologically friendly An Nahda party constitutes the majority in the newly formed government.

The foreign policy orientation of both Qatar and Turkey sits well with US policy for the region. However, Turkey also values its independence and does not want to be seen as a western proxy. When the US Congress passed a non-binding resolution two years ago affirming that the World War I massacre of Armenians was "genocide," Turkey reacted angrily and called in the US ambassador for a dressing down. Turkey's newly independent line was demonstrated most forcefully when in 2011 it sided with the BRICS, refusing to toe the line with the US to impose sanctions on Iran. On that occasion, Turkey sided with Brazil, China and Russia and voted against sanctions.

Turkey's increasingly independent stance has also meant a cooling of its relations with Israel. Turkey and Israel once had close military ties and even staged joint military exercises. More recently, their relationship has turned sour. Erdogan openly walked out on the Israel delegation at Davos in 2009 over Israeli attacks on Gaza. Later, when Israel refused to apologize to Turkey for the attack on the flotilla of Turkish peace activists bound for Gaza, in early 2012, Turkey broke off diplomatic relations.

Turkey's more aggressive foreign policy is also reflected in its pursuit of the repatriation of artefacts important to its cultural heritage, such as the reputed sarcophagus of Alexander the Great, presently housed in the Pergamon Museum in Berlin.

Insiders in Turkey attribute this heightened assertiveness partly to Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's determination to recapture some of the lost glory of the Ottoman Empire. Like the late

Charles de Gaulle, he seems to identify personally both with his country's cultural heritage and its foreign policy. That is why Mr. Erdogan appeared to be more than diplomatically aggrieved when President Assad, with whom he thought he had a close personal understanding, refused to follow his advice and co-operate with Kofi Annan's UN peace initiative. After the shooting down of a Turkish fighter over Syria, which Turkey described as an act of war, the relationship between the two countries turned from cool to frigid and there has since been a break in diplomatic relations.

While Mr. Erdogan may be personally aggrieved with President Assad and eager to remain friends with Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the hardening of Turkey's stance vis-à-vis Syria is also influenced by Turkey's awkward relations with the Kurds. Initially, Turkey's ruling AK party was quite tolerant towards the 13 million or so Kurds on its soil and even admitted that the government had made mistakes when dealing with them. Since then, its position has hardened. It now worries that if Syria falls apart, the more militant Kurds, notably the PKK and its sympathizers, might find safe haven there and cause trouble. So far there is no united stand among the Kurds living in Syria: some groups still support President Assad; others the FSA.

Finally, it should be noted that Turkey's increasingly important role in the Middle East is matched by a decline in the regional influence of and support for the United States. The US lost considerable credibility during the Arab Spring, in Egypt, for example, because it refused to commit itself on behalf of the rebels until it was absolutely sure that the Mubarak clique was finished. Most Arabs are now acutely aware of the discrepancy between the democratic sentiments expressed by President Obama in his 2009 Cairo University address, entitled, ironically, "A New Beginning" - and American practice, especially with regard to the Palestinians.

There is also a growing conviction among Arabs that the West—particularly the US—is viscerally anti-Moslem. Events such as the recent airing of the defamatory YouTube clip about the Prophet, which led to widespread unrest in Benghazi, Cairo, Yemen and elsewhere, only serves to underline that view. The fact that the film (if it actually exists) was made by a disaffected, expatriate Egyptian Copt with extremist views is lost on the Arab masses. The majority seem to believe it is a true reflection of official US government attitudes.

Nor do Arabs believe - as they once did - that the US will pressure Israel to pursue a more balanced foreign policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians. They now recognize - somewhat belatedly - that the US and Israel are joined at the hip and America's support for Israel is closely intertwined with US domestic politics. Arabs noted with dismay that less than a year ago, Netanyahu was greeted with rapturous applause by the US Congress, which has since cut off its \$200 million aid to the Palestinians for daring to seek nationhood at the UN. It was also noted that the US left its \$3 billion aid package to Israel untouched, despite massive US cuts in the US defence budget elsewhere.

To sum up: while the Arab Spring may have changed the Middle East, much remains the same. It would be rash to predict what happens next as there is no history of democracy in the Middle East. The likelihood is that the Islamists will become a stronger force to reckon with but that does not necessarily mean increased support for Al Qaeda. Nor should we expect greater enthusiasm for secularism either. There is the danger of increased chaos if the Arab regimes fail to address the pressing economic needs of their people, which might fuel nostalgia for autocratic rule, though that seems unlikely. All we can safely say that now the genie of democracy has been let out of the bottle it will be hard to stuff it back in again. That is the fundamental change.

Addendum

Finally a brief word about the current gas and oil situation. Experts have said that there is enough oil and natural gas in the Mediterranean Basin to last as much as 200 years and there is a distribution network in place: the Arab Gas Pipeline which links, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan Israel, Gaza and Egypt; plans also exist to add links to Turkey and Iraq. Cyprus, however, is not a part of it. Until very recently, Israel had an agreement with Egypt for importing natural gas but this has just been cancelled unilaterally by Egypt. Previously, the line had been sabotaged on several occasions by Sinai Bedouins but in late April, Egyptian state-run GASCO shut down the line altogether. Shaul Mofaz said this marked a new low in relations between the two states but Netanyahu has sought to play down the dispute. But it does highlight the precariousness of Israel's energy supply. However, Israel does have an agreement with the US firm Noble to exploit its Tamar and Leviathan fields and new, lesser fields nearby.

It should also be noted that the Arab contracting firm, CCC, has a 13 year-old agreement with British Gas Co. and the Palestine Investment Fund to exploit offshore Gaza finds. Lebanon is also involved in a dispute over the extent of its territorial waters, which threatens to hamper Israeli drilling and Israeli drones regularly cruise over the area to monitor Hezbollah activity. Israel would have liked to negotiate directly with Lebanon over the issue but technically the two nations are at war, so Lebanon has submitted its case to the UN instead. The dispute is still unresolved.

Greece, it should also be noted, has ambitions to become a major oil and gas distribution hub and Russia has already entered into exploratory talks with the Greek government to this end. Greece is well placed to facilitate distribution of oil and gas from Azerbaijan, for example, and is already a partner in the ITGI pipeline, which also involves Turkey and Italy. But taking into account Greece's economic situation, coupled with the results of the recent elections, which produced no clear result, has cast a shadow over future development.

Finally, Turkey casts a shadow over the entire region. Its state-operated Turkish Petroleum Corporation has already begun drilling in the waters off the coast of the breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and has become increasingly alarmed with Cyprus' cozying up to Israel. In a bid to shore up Turkey's alliances with Russia and Iran, visits have been made to both places for talks with Medvedev.

In short, everywhere uncertainty reigns. With whom would Cyprus' best interests be served? Israel looks like the best bet - as long as one does not look too closely at the details. It has the full backing of the US and recently diplomatic ties have improved. But with Cyprus having problems with Turkey and Turkey's growing hostility to Israel, coupled with its improved relations with the Arabs, it might not be the best option.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Constantine Partasides**

26 January 2013

Cyprus: The Courage to Compromise

I spend my time representing clients in their legal disputes before international tribunals. That is my day job. So I do not stand before you here today doing something that I normally do. I'm not here to speak on behalf of a client, I'm not here to argue a legal case, and you ladies and gentlemen are not an international tribunal. Although I invite you to judge what I say, nevertheless.

Why am I here, you might legitimately ask. Well, I'm here because I disagree with my friend Klearchos Kyriakides. I'm here, let me state it simply, because I fear that a historic mistake is being advocated by some on this island. A mistake that will lead unintentionally, but no less inevitably, to the permanent division of this island. A mistake that it would be too late to rectify, for time is running out for a solution of a Cyprus problem. And if that self-evident statement requires demonstration, and some might think that it does not, let me do so, let me demonstrate it by recalling a recent tragedy that the world has already half forgotten.

It is the story of a young and proud republic, a republic that is small, but strategically located, a republic that finally obtained its independence after many years of domination by an overpowering neighbor, a republic whose powerful neighbor still coveted control over that small republic and used its small ethnic minority within the republic to claim and exert such control. It is a story that came to a tragic climax during the long days of a single summer when that powerful neighbor was finally given a pretext to invade and occupy an enclave, purportedly in defense of its minority. A pretext that was nothing more than a pretext and long after that pretext vanished, long after that summer passed, that powerful neighbor's forces continue to occupy those enclaves which it has since unilaterally recognized as independent. Now, these facts will, I'm sure, sound painfully familiar to Cypriots. But I am not describing Cyprus in the summer of 1974. I'm describing what happened to the Republic of Georgia in the summer of 2008. I'm describing an invasion that happened not forty years ago, but four years ago. I'm describing an invasion that the world has nevertheless already half forgotten.

So let us not hold an exaggerated sense of the world's attention span, or its innate sense of justice. Let us not simply as Cypriots repeat the mantras of invasion and occupation, as if they will

** Transcript of oral presentation.*

*** Solicitor-Advocate*

magically lead us to the perfect solution we want for this island. As we approach the 40th anniversary of the Turkish invasion, let us recognize that for most of the world Cyprus is no longer a crisis; it is a problem. And soon it will not even be a problem beyond Cyprus. I fear that it is naive to think otherwise and after what the Cypriot people have endured over the last half-century, history at this point moment I don't think will forgive naivety.

So against the background of a clock ticking ever louder I ask only one question in this address today, the right answer to which is critical in my view to there being even a chance of settling the Cyprus question in the time that still remains for doing so. That question is this: can we realistically expect anything other than a bi-zonal bi-communal federation as the basis for a permanent solution to a division on this island that has now lasted forty years? And let me tell you who I am in my own words to offer an answer to that question.

The perspective that I offer is the perspective of someone who is of Cyprus, but paradoxically because of the invasion has not remained Cyprus-centric. As Klearchos mentioned, my parents are Cypriot, I was born on this island and like many Cypriots in the summer of 1974 I was forced to flee my home because of the Turkish invasion. But for that invasion, I would have grown up a Cypriot. Despite that invasion I'm very proud of my Cypriot roots and like many who lived the invasion - my own experience as a child - I'm afflicted by the deep sense of injustice and its enduring aftertaste. I was four years old when an overwhelming number of Turkish soldiers marched through this island. The phrase 'ethnic cleansing' did not exist then, but that is what it was. It was not a bloodless invasion and I personally will never forget it.

Understandably, many Cypriots still feel the anger of dispossession and no one can blame us for that. But it is not that emotion, enduring as it is, that will lead us to the promised land of a solution. The mindset of war will not achieve a lasting peace. To settle the Cyprus problem, what is required in my view - and in this sense Cyprus is no different from any other ethnic conflict zone - is a final act of courage by those who have been its victims: the courage to compromise. And so in the face of an apparent growing intolerance to compromise amongst some on this island it is constitutional compromise that I personally continue to support and advocate.

Now, such compromise will not meet with universal acclaim. It will disappoint some and provoke others. And in this respect, I must observe from a distance, I see that the Cyprus debate as a national discourse has somewhat degenerated in recent years. Instead of a respectful recognition that fellow Cypriots can legitimately hold views that differ on this most important of questions, I've noticed that those who participate often most vociferously on the Cyprus issue respond to those who hold opposing views not simply by questioning their ideas, but by contesting their motives and their patriotism. Such personalized attacks undermine mature, democratic debate, they demean all participants in the dialogue, and they inhibit rather than encourage progress to a rational consensus. So as I begin my attempt to address the question that I posed, let me make a request, and that is that we question each other's ideas without questioning each other's loyalty. And so with that request let me turn to my single question and let me begin by addressing it by looking at the lessons of the past.

And the relevant past for these purposes must begin before the Turkish invasion of 1974 with the island's fourteen years of independence that preceded it. And there are two things, too obvious things, to say about that independence. The first is that it was but a short interlude in over five hundred years of Ottoman and British foreign subjugation. And the second observation is that those fourteen years were far from unitary. As many here know, indeed some of you may even

personally remember, during those fourteen short years Cyprus had more than one constitutional crisis that was created by and as a result supplemented communal strife and division.

In 1963, following constitutional amendments proposed by President Makarios which were aimed at diminishing constitutional recognition of ethnic identity and division - well-motivated - fighting broke out between the two communities that, as many of you know, led to the end of Turkish Cypriot participation in the Republic's government, the withdrawal of many Turkish Cypriots into geographic enclaves, and the establishment of an international peacekeeping force on the island of Cyprus. Not exactly features of a healthy unitary state.

In 1967, the outbreak of inter-communal fighting once again led to the threat of a Turkish invasion, the reinforcement of those Turkish enclaves, and the Turkish Cypriots' proclaiming their own provisional administration. So those fourteen years of independence, unitary independence, were brief, fragile and anything but unified. That is the historical context.

Since the invasion of 1974, against the backdrop of what became total geographic and political division numerous reunification plans have been proposed to the parties internationally. In all of these from the very first in 1977 - the four-point agreement signed by President Makarios and Ralf Denktas in February 1977 - the Republic of Cyprus has accepted that a future settlement would be based on a federation made up of two states - bi-zonal - and two communities - bi-communal. Now, as these plans came and went over the following thirty years, two trends became discernable. The first was that the Turkish Cypriot side under Denktas' leadership kept retreating from the principle of bi-zonal bi-communal federation, proposing eventually a form of confederation, which amounted to a poorly disguised legitimized permanent division by another name. The second trend was that in so doing Mr. Denktas invited widespread international condemnation for his blatant negotiating bad faith. That condemnation hardened into an international determination to ensure that Turkish Cypriot intransigence in settlement discussions would not prejudice the Republic's aspiration to become a member of the European Union - an aspiration that, as we all know, was realized on the 1st of May 2004 when Cyprus finally acceded to the EU. That was a day that as a member of the Cypriot diaspora then living and working in Paris I shall never forget. It was a day that taught us, or should have taught us, the value of maintaining a reasonable negotiating position in the face of diplomatic provocation. That was then.

Over the last ten years the widespread international support that the Republic achieved has been steadily but significantly eroded, I must tell you. And nothing has contributed to that damaging erosion more than the manner in which at the same time as European admission the Republic of Cyprus rejected the Annan Plan. Whatever the flaws of the Annan Plan, and there were many, whatever the inappropriate manner in which it was foisted upon the people of Cyprus at the eleventh hour, which can only be described as shabby, we must recognize that Greek Cypriots have paid a very heavy price internationally for the manner in which it was rejected. Under President Papadopoulos' leadership Greek Cypriots metamorphosized into the party that said 'no'. And as a consequence, whether the Greek Cypriots like it or not, rightly or wrongly, so far as international public opinion is concerned we have now forfeited much, not all, but much of the moral high ground in future settlement discussions. We, Greek Cypriots, may rightly regard ourselves as the victims of a long-standing Turkish aggression. And we were. But so far as the world is concerned, we now share some of the responsibility for the failure to find a solution.

Now, even at recognizing the shortcomings, the many shortcomings of the Annan Plan, the way in which the Greek Cypriot government maneuvered itself into the position of taking the blame for the debacle of the UN's last initiative was a huge political failure. As a consequence, President Erdogan now tours the world telling leaders that the Greek Cypriots moan about the number of Turkish soldiers on the island of Cyprus, but that if the Annan Plan had been accepted in 2004, there would today be fewer Turkish soldiers on the island than Greek Cypriot soldiers. That is what he's saying.

Now, against that recent historical backdrop, for Greek Cypriots today now to go further and reverse thirty five years of acceptance of the principle of bi-zonal bi-communal federation - something that we did not do even when rejecting the Annan Plan - would be political folly on a historic scale. Not only does it have zero chance of acceptance by Turkey and Turkish Cypriots of course, but it will benefit from no international support, even from the Republic of Cyprus' allies. In a world in which international support is required for political success, we cannot achieve a solution simply by persuading ourselves, ladies and gentlemen. Such revisionism is worse than futile.

So why should some Greek Cypriots encourage their government to shoot themselves in the foot in this monumental way? Well, for the best possible reason some say: in the pursuit of principle. And it is to that principle that I turn next.

That principle can be stated in the following stirring terms: let us leave behind the divisions of the past, let us not define and discriminate on the basis of ethnicity, let us establish a future in which all Cypriots are equal before the constitutional law, be there Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Maronites, or the growing number of immigrants who newly contribute to the Cypriot polity and economy. Is that, ladies and gentlemen, not after all - so the argument goes - what it means to be European in the 21st century? Well, this sounds like an ideal world, ladies and gentlemen, but it is not the real world, it is not the real world of Cyprus today. And regrettably it will not be the real world of Cyprus today until some history of reintegration of the two principal communities is established. We cannot simply brush aside fifty years of division as if they're just words on a page that can be turned. Whether we like it or not, Cypriots do presently define themselves by reference to the community that they belong to. Indeed, some go further and in truth define themselves by reference to not being of the other community. Now we must all hope that one day that division will become less meaningful. In fact, we must look for a settlement that accommodates such future ethnic rapprochement rather than a settlement that cements the present division. But today the communal division that has characterized this island for forty years could scarcely be more meaningful. And ignoring that reality, even if such a solution could be imposed without international support, which of course it cannot, would not be a secure foundation for a lasting settlement. Imagine what problems this might cause the day after settlement is achieved.

Ladies and gentlemen, you do not resolve division by suppressing it. For those schooled in the history of international conflict resolution that is a statement of the obvious. And there exist countless examples of successful peace settlements of ethnic conflicts such as Cyprus' that are of necessity based on a recognition of ethnic division.

Let me give you one example, an example that I am personally familiar with. It's the Irish example. In 1995, as the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British Conservative Party's Bow Group, a think tank within the Conservative Party, I led a delegation of young UK political

activists to Dublin Castle, the former seat of government in Ireland, to address the leaders of Ireland's political parties on a series of proposals that we had derived for bi-communal rapprochement in Northern Ireland. We presented to all of the leaders of all of island's leading political parties, including all those figures some of you will be familiar with. I found myself sitting right opposite Gerry Adams for the first and last time in my life, and I should tell you that we found ourselves as a group of young politicians - I was in my early to mid-twenties at that time - in Ireland at a time when the peace process through happenstance was entering a critical phase.

That critical phase began with the IRA ceasefire in the August of 1994, just a few months before we arrived, and it was given momentum by a joint paper by the British and Irish governments in February 1995 entitled "A new framework for agreement," in which both the British and the Irish governments set out what they referred to as a shared understanding to assist discussion and negotiations involving the Northern Ireland parties. Now, in this document both governments stated in broad but very significant terms the following principles (and because of their relevance to what I'm saying today I'm going to quote an extract from that document verbatim). The British and Irish governments agreed in this new framework document as follows:

"Given the absence of consensus and depth of divisions between the two main traditions in Northern Ireland, the two Governments agree that such an accommodation will involve an agreed new approach to the traditional constitutional doctrines on both sides. This would be aimed at enhancing and codifying the fullest attainable measure of consent across both traditions in Ireland (...)."

And on this basis they agreed - and here's the critical text - that:

"(...) institutions and arrangements in Northern Ireland and North/South institutions should afford both communities secure and satisfactory political, administrative and symbolic expression and protection. In particular, they commit themselves to entrenched provisions guaranteeing equitable and effective political participation for whichever community finds itself in a minority position (...)."

They were committing themselves to a constitutional recognition of ethnicity and the protection of the ethnic minority. Now, as anyone versed in the story of Northern Ireland will immediately be able to confirm to you, the framework agreement was a momentous compromise by both sides in the search for peace. And it was not the end of the road in finding a solution either. It was really the beginning of the end. The remaining road to peace was neither short nor without incident including the temporary ending of the IRA ceasefire in February 1996, a date all Londoners will remember because it was followed within a matter of days by the explosion by the IRA of a huge bomb in London's Docklands. I think, actually, it was one hour after the IRA's announcement at the end of the ceasefire.

But that road, bumpy as it was, eventually did lead to agreement in April 1998 with a so-called Good Friday Agreement signed by the political parties in Northern Ireland, and the British and Irish governments. For those of you who don't know, let me tell you something of that momentous Good Friday Agreement. Putting firmly to one side simple majority rule, the agreement contemplated an inclusive Northern Ireland government, troop reductions, and what was referred to as 'parity of esteem' for both divided communities in Northern Ireland by which I mean the unionist community, those mostly Protestant who wanted to continue union with the United Kingdom, and those of the Republican community, those mostly Catholic who strove for

Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic of Ireland.

That agreement was followed by a referendum in both Northern Ireland and Ireland, which it was easy for those on both sides of the ethnic divide to advocate rejection of, and many of them did on the basis of principle. On the unionist side the “no” campaign focused on the apparent one-sided nature of the process. We, after all, we Unionists are the majority in Northern Ireland, the apparent dilution of that majority rule was not popular. And on the Republican side the “no” campaign concentrated on the purity of the Republican ideal of complete independence from Britain - the colonial overlord - pointing to the overwhelming majority of Catholics when you took the island of Ireland as a whole. So some on both sides denounced the compromise as an attack on simple non-ethnic constitutional rule of law. But in the name of peace the people of Northern Ireland who'd suffered for a generation or two voted “yes” with majorities in both the Republic and in Northern Ireland. And although we don't have the detailed data breakdown that would help us confirm this, there is an understanding that both the Republican and the Unionist communities of Northern Ireland - in the Unionist case only a slim majority - voted in favor of the Good Friday Agreement.

The resulting constitutional arrangement is instructive, ladies and gentlemen, for all those around the world searching genuinely for a political settlement of ethnic conflict. For the agreement recognized in a variety of important ways the need for compulsory bi-communal involvement in all of the institutions of Northern Ireland's government. So the Assembly - a house of parliament - is elected by way of a system of proportional representation - it's called PR-STV - designed to ensure the representation of all communities, including the minority communities. And they do this by requiring for some issues parallel consent, so majorities of both communities, and on other issues what's referred to as weighted majority, which means a vote including at least 40% of each of the Nationalist, the Republican, and Unionist designates. In addition to the Assembly, so far as the executive is concerned, the executive is selected on a cross-community basis, so the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister reflect the two communities: one will be a Republican, the other will be from the Protestant community and the posts of ministers are allocated on the basis of what is known in international constitutional law as the D'Hondt system, a system that is used in over 30 legislatures around the world where ethnic divisions exist, as diverse as Belgium in the European Union and Brazil, as diverse as Paraguay and Poland, to ensure an allocation of ministerial portfolios to all major parties across community divides.

Importantly, recognition was included in the Good Friday Agreement of the responsibility of the British government to ensure compliance with European law which was also enshrined in the final paragraph of that agreement. But the peace settlement in Northern Ireland - notwithstanding that final sentence, that final paragraph - was nevertheless constructing a system of government unlike that in most parts of the European Union. But it did so, ladies and gentlemen, in the interest of peace, a peace that has endured. And today, many years later - many years of peace later - only the few remaining dissident extremists in Northern Ireland denounce such inclusive democracy as a compromise that was not worth achieving.

Now, there are of course many differences between the situation in Northern Ireland and that in Cyprus. I should tell you that after my presentation at Dublin Castle we had lunch with the delegates. And Gerry Adams in fact approached me, and was intrigued a little bit by my name, and said, what is a British Conservative doing with the name like Constantine Partasides? He asked me where I was from and I told him that I was born in Cyprus and that my parents were

Cypriots and I was of Cypriot origin. And he said, ah Cyprus, another divided island where the majority have been subjugated by the minority. He was pointing to what he referred to as a parallel between the Republican position and the Greek Cypriot position. It was a parallel, I have to tell you, I rejected on the spot, for a variety of reasons, including the methods, of course, that the Republicans had used to wage their war against what they refer to as minority subjugation for a generation.

There are significant differences between Northern Ireland and Cyprus. But there are also parallels and there are lessons to be learned from those parallels. The first lesson is that the solution to a historic ethnic divide is not found simply by pretending that the division does not exist. Let me repeat: you do not resolve division by suppressing it. The second lesson is that a stable solution involves both sides across the divide reaching out and forsaking their respective perfect solutions. The third lesson is that the resulting compromise can work and can endure even in a region like Northern Ireland where blood was being spilt right up until the day that the agreement was signed. Now, these are, I would suggest, important lessons, ladies and gentlemen, for us here in Cyprus. And Northern Ireland is not the only recent example of different communities in a conflict zone compromising for peace by accepting an ethnically denominated constitution. Bosnia provides us with another example. For Bosnia, the Dayton Peace Agreement forged the creation of a central state with a collective presidency of one Bosniak - that's a Bosnian Muslim - one Bosnian Serb and one Bosnian Croat. This was the price of peace. And most Bosnians today will confirm to you that it has been a price worth paying.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have to tell you that I think it takes a special kind of arrogance to brush aside these examples of careful compromise as good enough for other victims of conflicts but not good enough for Cyprus. In truth, those that propose pure majority rule democracy as a solution for Cyprus, treating Cyprus as if it was France or England with many hundreds, if not thousands of years of unified history, must know in their heart of hearts that in fact such proposals in reality mean no solution. And let us recognize that that is a legitimate position to hold after all these years. Perhaps the status quo is not the worst of all scenarios and all of us should recognize that even a successful solution will be hugely disruptive and at times traumatic for the people of Cyprus. But advocacy in favor of permanent division should be stated openly and it should be stated honestly. It should not be dressed up to masquerade as the alternate route to a perfect settlement that it is not. There is no perfect solution that can be delivered - that much is now clear. Those who pretend otherwise, who suggest that simply reciting the words 'invasion' and 'occupation' will lead us to our promised land, I fear are throwing sand in our eyes. So let me encourage us to sweep aside platitudes that are easy to say to each other, but get us nowhere with others. Let us have an honest debate. After all these years, in my view the choice now is between those who are willing to compromise to find a solution and those who are not and are consequently consigning the island to permanent division. And for those unwilling to consign the future of Cyprus to permanent and eventually legitimized division, bi-zonal bi-communal federation represents the only alternative.

The next question, in my view the real question, the much more relevant question, is: what kind of bi-zonal bi-communal settlement is achievable and fair enough to endure? That is the real question before us. And the position that I've sought to address, the question that I've sought to address in this address should not obscure it.

Although not the subject of my paper, I do want to end by saying a few words on what I would consider to be the requirements of a fair federal solution. The quid pro quo of the difficult

majority compromise that I have been advocating is that the compromise must be, and must be perceived to be fundamentally balanced and fair to the majority. And I cannot help but suspect that the recent rejections that are growing on this island of bi-zonal bi-communal federation arise only because the forms of federal solution offered by successive external peace brokers are not seen by the majority as sufficiently balanced and fair. The Greek Cypriot majority will undoubtedly make significant concessions, as we have already done in negotiations, on territorial, governance, EU and economic issues. But they cannot and should not be expected to do so without a sense of basic fairness in the resolution of property dispossessions and the security question that arise from foreign troop numbers that are to be left on the island following the settlement.

Let me take the example of property and recognize, as I do, that any solution that requires the vast majority of still living dispossessed citizens to say goodbye to properties that were their homes is too difficult a solution for any political leader to deliver. And I don't believe they need to. Once again, let us look at the examples that we're offered elsewhere, examples of successful implementation of property repossession in conflict zones. The return of over 1 million displaced persons and refugees to destroyed villages throughout the whole territory of Bosnia from all ethnic zones to all geographic zones surely challenges those who doubt its appropriateness in Cyprus to at least give good reasons why it's no longer appropriate in Cyprus. Restitution in Bosnia has worked. Property has been restored to those from whom it was stolen. Dividing lines between communities have been made permeable and as a result a future beyond segregation in Bosnia is once again real. Why should Cyprus, where less blood flowed less recently, expect less?

Now, the unfairness of officialized dispossession in my view is exacerbated by the insecurity of legitimized militarization and so I come to the question of the Turkish army on the island, the genuine fear created by a large standing Turkish army on the island of Cyprus, which is after all only forty miles from the Turkish coast, where proximate troops can be placed much less controversially, cannot easily be brushed aside. An overwhelming, large and ever-present military presence can be no basis for a lasting solution when you are asking the majority to compromise, particularly as it is so obviously serving no legitimate military purpose. So on these issues compromise must come from those that did the dispossessing on both sides and from the party with overwhelming military preponderance in the locality – Turkey.

Now, I remain convinced that the result of that mutual compromise can be a solution that endures, and endures long enough to see the constitutional compromises that I advocate become less necessary. As the need for an ethnically focused constitution becomes less necessary in the future, so the need for ethnic quotas and a standing army should, it is hoped, recede into irrelevance. And it is for that reason that the compromised solution that I am looking for on all issues should make express provision for periodic constitutional evolution in the future, when we must hope ethnic tension and suspicion has declined. In this way communities can more easily be invited to accept the proposed arrangement as an initial solution rather than a final solution and we can continue to work towards the ideal advocated by some for the future.

And so to my conclusion, ladies and gentlemen, in November 2010 Klearchos and I were discussing an article that had just appeared in The Times of London published by Jack Straw, the former British foreign secretary, who wrote – he'd just given up the position of foreign secretary – as follows: "It is time for the UK government to consider formally the partition of Cyprus if the talks fail." Now, it does not matter what we think of Mr. Straw and it does not matter that we vehemently denounced such remarks. What matters is that they are now being said openly

amongst the European establishment. And I can assure you that they will be said with ever greater regularity all around the world in years to come.

But more important than the words of transient politicians who come and go are the judgments of the world's international courts. And here too time may be beginning to work against us. For after a generation of cases before the European Court of Human Rights that are found against Turkey for depriving Greek Cypriots of their fundamental right to property, in 2010 in its decision in the case of *Demopoulos and others v. Turkey* we saw the European Court of Human Rights signal perhaps the emergence of a changing legal reality. Finding as it did then that the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" establishment of an Immovable Property Commission can as a matter of law potentially offer adequate redress for dispossession, the European Court of Human Rights made an observation that profoundly challenges those tempted to think that Greek Cypriots can wait and wait until they get the solution that they prefer. Let me read you a key extract. The court said this:

"At the present point, many decades after the loss of possession by the then owners, property has in many cases changed hands, by gift, succession or otherwise; those claiming title may have never seen, or ever used the property in question. The issue arises to what extent the notion of legal title, and the expectation of enjoying the full benefits of that title, is realistic in practice. The losses thus claimed become increasingly speculative and hypothetical. There has, it may be recalled, always been a strong legal and factual link between ownership and possession. And it must be recognized that with the passage of time the holding of a title may be emptied of any practical consequence."

As my former property law professor used to tell me, possession is nine-tenths of the law, and time waits for no man even if that man happens to be the victim, ladies and gentlemen. So as we debate these questions, let us recognize that the time for finding a solution is not unlimited. We cannot simply wait and wait and wait until we get what we want. No solution now at some point in the not too distant future means no solution at all. And no solution is, let us say it openly again, a viable option for Greek Cypriots. For we should be under no illusions a solution to the division will undoubtedly bring uncertainty and without doubt a period of greater insecurity. Ethnic tensions may not have been the original cause of the division - many of us know - but we must accept that it may now follow as a consequence of the forty years of division that we have lived. Extremists can be expected to stoke tensions on both sides the day after a settlement, and the prospect of Islamic extremism on this island is not far-fetched. The ethnic makeup of the island will also visibly change. Greek Cypriots must acknowledge that in pulling down the wall our Cyprus will change as well. And of course there will be an acute economic cost to reunification that initially at least will not be offset by the commercial opportunities that arise with reunification.

In short, the price of reunification should not be underestimated. But for all those like me who consider the Green Line to be an open wound across our ancestral home, the price I believe remains worth paying for Cyprus to become whole again. And if the problems of reunification are overcome, reunification will bring its own special prize for having served as a generation, as an international symbol of ethnic strife, a successfully reunified Cyprus can serve as a future beacon of hope for all those around the world who question the compatibility of Western and Islamic civilization in one land. That, ladies and gentlemen, I believe to be a vision worth showing courage for. That, I believe, is a future worth compromising for. Thank you for your attention.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Dr. Klearchos A. Kyriakides**

26 January 2013

The Prospect of Partition in the UK: Should Cyprus Say ‘OXI’ ('No') and Thereby Help to Guarantee the 'Ενωσις ('Union') between England and Scotland?

It's taken me a lifetime to try to work out what the Cyprus question entails. But for the last three or four years I've tried to enter into a separate quagmire: the Scottish question. And I just hope I'm not going to go mad. My objective today is quite straightforward: it is to explain why the Cyprus question has an echo in the Scottish question, and why the Republic of Cyprus and its diaspora ought to take an active interest in the Scottish question.

My initial views were set out in this article which was published in the Cyprus Weekly in May 2011 and since then I've repeated my views in a number of fora, including a lecture given for the University of Cyprus public lecture series in London in November 2012.

Before I move on, could I ask if there is anybody here representing the Government of the Republic of Cyprus? No. My article of November – when was it? – May 2011 was ignored by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. When I gave my lecture in London nobody came from the Cyprus High Commission. And I can see here today that there's nobody from the Cyprus government. And that rather tells us something perhaps as to how my views are considered by the Cyprus government. So I'm going to have another go and hopefully if you have any connections in the Cyprus government – and as I understand you have to have ‘μέσα’ to succeed in government here – please convey my message to them.

Could I ask: has the Scottish question being subject to any serious debate or discussion on PIK or on any of the other broadcasting stations here in Cyprus? No? I know they're interested in the elections, but last year... I'll take that as a 'no'. Well, let me demonstrate to you why the Cyprus question is connected to Scotland and why the Republic of Cyprus ought to take an active interest. I would even go as far as to suggest that the Republic of Cyprus should consider sending a special envoy to the United Kingdom to oversee the Scottish question. That idea I put last year; the Republic of Cyprus has clearly ignored me. Remember, the United Kingdom has spent the

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

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last 140 years also poking its nose into the affairs of the Island of Cyprus. And then in the run up to the Annan Plan Mr. Blair - the then British prime minister - told the voters here to vote 'yes'. He also sent Mr. Hannay - or rather Lord Hannay - to act as the Special Representative. There are United Nations peacekeeping forces on the buffer zone who are British. And I'm not saying that the Republic of Cyprus should send a contingent from the National Guard to Hadrian's Wall. But what I am saying is that the Republic of Cyprus ought to take the Scottish question seriously. Let me now explain to you why.

There are two reasons, among others, but there are two core reasons why Cyprus and Scotland are connected. One is to do with the process relating to the Scottish referendum procedure. And the other is to do with matters of substance, processing substance. And I will now explore those two themes in a little bit more detail.

At the very outset I must acknowledge that there are profound differences between Scotland and Cyprus. The Scots were once an independent state and at the beginning of the 18th century they chose to integrate themselves into England and form the United Kingdom. The Scottish population is a lawful population. It does not consist of unlawful settlers brought over from Turkey, nor does it consist of a contingent of foreign military forces. The history of Scotland is therefore markedly different to the history of Cyprus, and the legal status of Scotland is completely different to that of the occupied north. The occupied north is occupied by Turkey contrary to international law. Scotland is a constitutional part of the United Kingdom. So at the very outset, let's me make it absolutely clear that there are profound differences. Having said that, let's now move on to consider the parallels.

I want to first of all focus on the process and consider how the United Kingdom has come to the brink of being partitioned into two segments through what would be an act of secession by Scotland. Well, it could be other things as well - that's one of the things that's being considered at the moment. Well, the history of this begins in the early 18th century with the Acts of Union 1706 and 1707, when the then independent Scotland became part of the United Kingdom. And since then the executive and legislative branches of the United Kingdom in London have controlled and governed Scotland. Scotland retained its own judiciary and legal profession and its own football team, as we know. But Scotland was ruled by London. And over the last hundred years or so the Scottish nationalist movement has grown in significance. And a Scottish secessionist movement crystallized around the Scottish National Party. And the Scottish National Party has been calling for the self-determination of the Scottish people and the secession of Scotland from the United Kingdom.

The Blair government of the 1997 to 2007 period decided to appease the Scottish nationalist movement by introducing devolution. This is a form of constitutional government which stops short of federation but involves the transfer of power in certain designated fields from the central government - from London to Edinburgh. So we have the 1998 Scotland Act. It was part of the constitutional reforms introduced by Prime Minister Blair since he came to power, which dovetailed chronologically with a Northern Ireland peace process we've just heard about - the Northern Ireland act also dates back to 1998 as do other profound constitutional measures, including the Human Rights Act. Mr. Blair, before his mind was diverted by Iraq and President Bush, embarked upon arguably the most profound era of constitutional reform in British history, at least since the 17th century. We have the Freedom of Information Act as another product of that era as is the devolution arrangements set up in Wales.

Now, Alex Salmond is the leader of the Scottish National Party. He's one of the most astute, self-confident, cunning and successful politicians that the United Kingdom has ever produced. He managed to increase his popularity in Scotland in part by virtue of his dignified opposition to the conflict in Iraq. But he combines a mixture of socialism, populism, nationalism and patriotism to advance his party's cause. And the Scotland Act 1998 was a product - it was a compromise - but it was a product of his party's campaigning. But more specifically, in May 2011 Alex Salmond managed to secure victory for the Scottish National Party in the Scottish elections to the Scottish parliament, and that gave the Scottish National Party control not just of the Scottish parliament but of the Scottish government.

Now, if we can just rewind to what we were hearing about earlier: this is an example of what dangers arise when you transfer power from the central government to a local government. You can end up having the opposite of what you expect. When the Scotland Act was introduced in 1998, the hope was that this would suppress Scottish nationalism and maintain the union, and it produced the exact opposite effect of producing a Scottish nationalist government that was elected via the Scottish parliament on the basis of a pro-independence referendum. The United Kingdom government - that's the government in Westminster, in London, or Whitehall in London - the United Kingdom government respected the outcome of the Scottish elections in May 2011. My article was written at that time. From the very beginning - the Scottish sector in the London government has said - from the very beginning the British government recognized the political mandate that the Scottish National Party had secured for a referendum. And a process was put in place after the May 2011 elections by the Scottish nationalists, a part of the Scottish nationalists-dominated government. The objective of the process was to ensure that a referendum was held in Scotland, but not in the remaining of the United Kingdom, with a view to Scotland voting on breaking away from the union.

Now, that has implications - I'm going to just make a remark here - that has implications for whatever is being conducted in secret in Nicosia, if they are still conducting in secret in Nicosia here. Because if the federation is to be set up - and I'm against the setting up of federation - but if a federation is to be set up, it should clarify clearly the circumstances under which any referendum may be held in the future. I'll come to Cyprus later, but I just want to put that marker down for the moment.

So we're still on the question of process. The interesting point about the Scottish movement towards the referendum, which they hope will lead to a breakaway, is that it has been adopted in marked contrast to what occurred in the occupied area in 1983. In 1983 the Turkish Cypriot leadership exercised a unilateral declaration of independence which was branded as illegal by the United Nations Security Council and by the whole world with the exception of Turkey. As a consequence, the so-called 'TRNC' remains nothing more than a puppet regime of Ankara which remains the occupying power in the north.

Alex Salmond learnt the lessons of that. He chose not to go along the path of making a unilateral declaration of independence, he chose the path of consensus and cooperation. And as Angus Robertson MP, the Scottish Nationalist Party Member of Parliament in the Westminster Parliament in London has put it, Scotland's constitutional progress has been a model of democratic, peaceful and civic politics. And I suppose even though Constantine and I disagree profoundly on the Cyprus question, it is a mark of democracy, peacefulness and civility of the Republic that we can have a debate without throwing punches at one another, as might have occurred fifty years ago. But the Scots have decided to go along the path of democracy, peace and

civility as well, and that brings me to the second feature of this process, as Angus Robertson has put it. The United Kingdom government and the United Kingdom opposition party - Labor - have endorsed a legal, ordered and democratic path that can lead to Scotland becoming a sovereign state.

So there are two aspects to this process adopted by Alex Salmond. The first has been to adopt a transparent, democratic, peaceful and civilized process, and on the other hand the aim has been to ensure that the process is legal and constitutional, so that the referendum is covered in legality and that the outcome of that process can be covered in legality. And as part of this process, Alex Salmond managed to negotiate an agreement with Prime Minister Cameron. So Mr. Cameron is the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Alex Salmond is the First Minister of Scotland and they've entered into what an outsider may consider to be an international agreement. It's not an international agreement, it's an agreement between the prime minister of a sovereign state - United Kingdom - and the first minister of an integral part of the United Kingdom which wishes to break away. This was the Edinburgh Agreement of the 15th of October 2012. And I've given you a copy which you should have in front of you. So if you have that in front of you, appendix A tells us something about the nature of this process. The United Kingdom government and the Scottish government have agreed to work together to ensure that a referendum on Scottish independence can take place. The governments have agreed the referendum should have a clear legal base, be legislated for not by the Westminster government and Parliament, but by the Scottish parliament through the transfer of fresh powers from London to Edinburgh, be conducted so as to command the confidence of parliaments, governments and peoples, deliver a fair test and decisive expression of the views of people in Scotland, and as a result that everyone will respect.

I'll make one point here which is of profound relevance to Cyprus. Mr. Cameron's act of appeasement has resulted in Scotland having the right to vote unilaterally on whether they are going to break away from the rest of the United Kingdom. We in London, and in England, and in Wales, and in Northern Ireland are not being given the right to vote in a referendum. What's even more bizarre is that a French citizen living in Edinburgh will have the right to vote in the Scottish referendum, but a Scottish British citizen living in London will not have the right to vote. And that point was made absolutely clear in the House of Commons a few days ago. I'll just read to you the extract Mr. Freer - the MP for Finchley and Golders Green where I have voted in the past, asked the Scottish secretary:

“Does my right hon. Friend not agree that it is an anomaly that a Frenchman living in Edinburgh can vote on Scottish independence when a Scot living in London cannot do so?”

And the Scottish secretary of the British government responded:

“I think that that is a reasonably easily understood anomaly. The French person, the EU national, who has made a commitment to living in Scotland is entitled to vote in a referendum there, just as they would be in the Scottish parliamentary elections.”

What's the impact of that for Cyprus? In 2004, Cyprus was outside of the EU. Now Cyprus is in the EU. If there is a referendum in the future over the settlement of the Cyprus question, it's implicit in what's been happening in Scotland that European Union citizens living in the Republic of Cyprus would be eligible to vote. That of course brings me to another critique of what we've heard. How can we talk about two communities in Cyprus when there are in fact multiple

communities in Cyprus? And are these being considered in this ongoing deadlock in Nicosia? Because of the secrecy, we don't know.

And that brings me to the other point that's set out in the Edinburgh Agreement. If you have a look midway down in the paragraph where it begins "it will then be for the Scottish government to promote legislation," the second sentence says that the governments have agreed that the referendum should meet the highest standards of fairness, transparency and propriety informed by consultation and independent expert advice. I just draw another connection here with Cyprus: how much transparency and consultation has there been in Nicosia in these interminable negotiations, and how many independent experts have been brought in to advise on, say, matters of constitutional law, maritime law, European union law, public international law, military law, trade law - the list is endless?

Let's now turn to the substance, if we may - and I'm conscious of the time - and I want to throw this open to discussion. I'll just make one last point, if I may, on the process. And it's this, that - and it flows from what I've just been saying - both the Scottish Government in Edinburgh and the British government in London have instituted consultation exercises. They have both drawn upon and to some extent published the views of independent experts who've considered the various procedural and substantive questions that have been raised. And interestingly enough, the Advocate General for Scotland has published his views as to the legal position. The Advocate General for Scotland is the third law officer in the United Kingdom government. We have the Attorney General, the Solicitor General and the Advocate General. There's also the Northern Ireland Attorney General which I won't focus on today. So he's the equivalent of Mr. Clerides in Nicosia who's the Attorney General here. He is the legal adviser to the British government on constitutional legal matters related to Scotland and he has published his views up to a point in a series of articles and lectures. Has Mr. Clerides here in Nicosia published any views, or given any lectures, or identified the legal questions arising from the negotiations? Not Glafcos Clerides; Mr. Petros Clerides, the Attorney General. I would be interested to know. So there are lessons to be drawn, ladies and gentlemen, from the process.

So there are clearly lessons to be drawn, but there are also dangers to be drawn. And the danger to be drawn is: I wonder, if there is a settlement, whether in the future a Turkish-Cypriot nationalist party may stand for election in the north on a pro-separation, pro-secessionist basis, seize control of whatever parliament or government is established up there, and using their political mandate twist the arm of the government in Nicosia to follow the Scottish path towards a unilateral referendum. Can you understand why I was disappointed nobody from the Cyprus High Commission came to my lecture in the autumn, and why there should have been representatives here from the Cyprus government? I don't know whether they are aware of these parallels and I'd be interested to know afterwards whether they are actively considering this.

Let's now turn to the substance, the substantive consequences of what is happening in Scotland. And I have to here refer to my paper. The debate has unfolded in the United Kingdom and I will hopefully be contributing to that debate. The "no" camp is rallying around the "better together" slogan which has been coined by Alistair Darling, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer who is a lawyer by profession. And they're very much advancing the view that both the Conservative and Labour, and also I must add the Liberal Democrat parties in the United Kingdom are adopting, which is that the United Kingdom must stay together. Alex Salmond is pressing his campaign. The bookies - I always read what the bookies say to work out what's going on in politics - the bookies suggest that there will be a "no" vote in the Scottish referendum. But there are

maybe eighteen months or so until the election, who knows what will happen over the next eighteen months. But whatever the outcome of the referendum is, there are reasons why the Republic of Cyprus should take an active interest. And let me identify for substantive reasons.

The first reason is fairly straightforward if - I'm going to give you a series of 'ifs' here - if there is a referendum in the autumn of 2014, and if a majority of Scottish voters vote 'yes' to independence, and if Scotland thereby breaks away from the United Kingdom, that will establish an extremely dangerous precedent which the Turkish Cypriot nationalists would be able to seize upon. The dangers would be even greater if Scotland broke away from the Union and managed to stay within the European Union with all of the benefits and also all of the disadvantages that that brings with it. Czechoslovakia split into two before the two constituent parts of that federation entered the European Union. The Republic of Cyprus entered the European Union as a de facto partitioned state. Slovenia was part of the Yugoslav Federation before it broke away, but it joined the European Union as an independent sovereign stated in its own right. We have not yet - unless I'm mistaken - we have not yet seen a sovereign state within the European Union fragment into two sovereign states, but we could be seeing this chain of events taking place in the United Kingdom, and also, of course, in Spain with regard to Catalonia. So there is a substantive danger here for the Republic of Cyprus, if Alex Salmond has his way.

Secondly - this is the second substantive point - if Scotland manages to break away and thereby partition United Kingdom, there will not just be a territorial partition across the border; there will also be a maritime partition offshore and in airspace. Now, the relevance of the maritime dimension to the Republic of Cyprus is graphic if one considers the argument advanced by Alex Salmond. Alex Salmond claims - and I'm not saying he's right - Alex Salmond claims that if Scotland breaks away from the United Kingdom, there will be a partition of the territorial sea offshore, but more broadly there will be a partition of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. And Alex Salmond claims that - I think he is right on that point - Alex Salmond claims that if such a maritime partition took place, Scotland would be entitled to 90% of the offshore oil and gas installations and the offshore oil and gas reserves. You can see the relevance to Cyprus and why they should have been somebody here from the Cyprus government, and why there should have been somebody from the Cyprus High Commission in December, and why they should have picked up my article back in May 2011. This is - whether one agrees or disagrees with the bi-zonal bi-communal model - this is clearly of relevance to Cyprus because precedence will be set.

Thirdly - this is intriguing - it's been mooted in certain academic and legal circles that if Scotland breaks away, this may have an adverse effect upon the defense and national security infrastructure of the United Kingdom. Remember that the United Kingdom has bases dotted around the United Kingdom and these include the nuclear bases in Scotland. It has been mooted - that means suggested - that if Scotland broke away as part of the agreements reached for Scotland to break away, the United Kingdom should retain sovereign base areas in certain parts of Scotland, such as Faslane, where the Royal Navy's Trident nuclear submarines are based. Now, this isn't the time to open up the question of the Sovereign Base Areas, but I merely ask the Republic of Cyprus whether they want to see a second precedent set for the formation of British Sovereign Base Areas. The Sovereign Base Areas here are unique - there is no other place in the world which includes sovereign base areas, at least on this model. And as Bill Mallinson and others have pointed out, the Sovereign Base Areas here may have a paper title to them, but they are rather like the Parthenon marbles in the British Museum: they are Elginist. In other words,

there is a British title but the title is morally, if not legally, dubious. And the Republic of Cyprus can presumably reserve its position on that point. But a card up the sleeve, if anybody's wanting to play, the base card is that they are unique. But the uniqueness would be undermined if the United Kingdom retains sovereign base areas in Scotland post-independence. As some of you know, my views on the SBAs is that they should be folded into the security apparatus of the Republic of Cyprus and used to protect the offshore infrastructure and the onshore infrastructure that is now going to be established with the natural gas project. That's by the by. My point is that if Scotland achieves independence, there could be British sovereign base areas established in Scotland and that will establish a precedent which may adversely affect the Republic of Cyprus in relation to its legal and moral position.

And fourthly, if Scotland secedes from the United Kingdom, the armed forces of the United Kingdom will be adversely affected. By tradition the Scots have provided not just substantial numbers of armed forces but highly skilled and highly dynamic armed forces. Remember, the United Kingdom is a guarantor power of the Republic of Cyprus. It hasn't honored properly its moral and legal duties to the Republic of Cyprus, but who knows in the future what might occur. The Republic may be attacked by a regional Islamist regime and may have to call upon the United Kingdom to exercise its guarantee, and the United Kingdom may wish to exercise the guarantee because it would be in British national interest to exercise the guarantee, unlike in '74. Would the Republic of Cyprus wish to see a diminished, hollowed-out United Kingdom with much smaller armed forces? Would they wish to see other countries call for the United Kingdom to be dislodged as a permanent member of the Security Council? Because the argument might be, well, we wanted the United Kingdom of Scotland and England and Wales and Northern Ireland to be in the Security Council, you no longer are that United Kingdom, you're a small country now, why would you wish to stay on the Security Council? That may have good or bad consequences for the United Kingdom. My point is, these are matters that ought to be considered by the Republic of Cyprus in Nicosia.

And finally, if I may, there's one final point I want to make before I draw my conclusions. There is a very satisfactory and promising consequence of what has happened in Scotland for the Republic. And it takes us to our rule of law program. And one can agree or disagree with what we heard earlier, but what we must all agree is that whatever occurs here in the Republic of Cyprus must be lawful, it must be fair, and it must be decisive. And those are the three concepts that this referendum process in relation to Scotland have been built around. Everybody in Scotland and in London agrees that this process and the substance following on from that process must be lawful, fair and decisive. And whichever constitutional or international model is pursued in Cyprus must be built around those three concepts.

The British government through the Advocate General for Scotland Lord Wallace QC have made it absolutely clear that as far as the United Kingdom is concerned, it is a member of the European Union, the European Union is built on the rule of law, and the constitutional future and the possible territorial fragmentation of a European Union member state must be predicated on law. I'd like to read to you the comments of Lord Wallace QC as delivered in a lecture he gave at the University of Edinburgh last year. I have a transcript here. He gave the lecture on the 2nd of October 2012. As I read this, bear in mind he's clearly talking about Scotland, but he could equally be talking about Cyprus. Whether we agree or disagree with what we heard earlier, this is as applicable to Cyprus as it is to Scotland. And let me therefore read to you what he said: "The European project is a legal construct. The European Union constitutes a new legal order, and

when we consider Scotland's place within that order, we have to consider it as a matter of international and EU law." And by the same token one considers the future of the Turkish-occupied area, one must consider it through the lens of international law and EU law, and I might add the constitutional law of the Republic of Cyprus. Lord Wallace QC adds:

"It will simply not do to say that we can put the law aside in considering the future of the European Union. The institutions of the European Union arose from the ashes of a continent which had been shattered by the actions of governments who held the rule of law in contempt, who regarded rights and justice as affectations. So it is not surprising that law is at the core of the European project. Of course there is a political aspect to the question of Scotland and the United Kingdom's role in that project. But we must first ask ourselves with as much objectivity as we can manage whether in legal terms an independent Scotland would be a member of the European Union."

The point he's making there is that the constitutional future of a European Union member state must be built upon law within the framework of the European Union. Lord Wallace, I must add, is a liberal Democrat PM within the coalition government, but he's a lawyer at Queen's Counsel and his views accord with the views of the United Kingdom on this point. It makes no difference that he's a Liberal Democrat. He's also made one final point which I want to leave you with... Let's move on to the conclusion, I'll come back to that it perhaps in the question and answer session.

One other thing that the Republic of Cyprus needs to consider: should it say "ὄχι" and thereby help to guarantee the "ένωσις", the union between England and Scotland? And I would argue that the Republic of Cyprus must take an interest. It must take an interest for all of the reasons that I've outlined so far. And it must take an interest for one other reason: as a member of the European Union the Scottish Nationalist Party is arguing that if Scotland breaks away, Scotland will remain within the European Union. Lord Wallace, the Advocate General, and Mr. Barroso, the President of the Commission, have claimed that if Scotland breaks away from the European Union, it must reapply to join the European Union. Alex Salmond is now backtracking and saying, well, we will renegotiate our maintenance within the European Union before we withdraw from the United Kingdom. That brings to mind the Schleswig-Holstein question.

My point is that the Republic of Cyprus sooner or later may have to make a decision as to whether or not it endorses a Scottish application to join the European Union. There's an old English saying: prevention is better than cure. Rather than reach that point and see the formation of a precedent which will return to haunt the Republic possibly in the future, I would suggest that whoever is the next president of the Republic should make a grand proclamation and say that no, we're not going to put up with this, we are going to oppose the secession of Scotland from the United Kingdom, we are going to say "no", we believe in the territorial integrity of sovereign states within European Union, we do not want to see a dangerous precedent established within European Union, we want our guarantor power – if we're going to keep it as a guarantor power – to be strong and unified, and we do not want to see our fate tied to the hands of a country that has been partitioned, because we ourselves want to prevent partition from taking place.

So I would close this discussion by advocating even in these straitened financial times the appointment of a special envoy by the Republic of Cyprus to the United Kingdom. And he should go and open an office in London, and perhaps a branch in Edinburgh, to monitor what is going on to contribute to the discussions, to issue proclamations as and when necessary, to call upon

the prime minister in London and the first minister in Scotland, go and visit them, meet them, lend his good offices if necessary in the event of a dispute between Scotland and England, and try and ensure that the interests of the Republic of Cyprus are preserved, because the consequences of the partition of the United Kingdom would be too grave for anybody to want to consider.

So I will close, ladies and gentlemen, with an interesting thought, if I may. Winston Churchill spent a sizable proportion of his lengthy parliamentary career as the Member of Parliament for Dundee – he was a Member of Parliament there from 1908 until 1922, a historic year in the history of the Eastern Mediterranean. Churchill was therefore familiar with Scotland, and of course as we know familiar and particularly fond of fine Scotch whisky. However, Churchill was also a keen student of history and he is said to have remarked that “of all of the small nations of this earth perhaps only the ancient Greeks surpassed the Scots in their contribution to mankind.” Churchill was surely right. Think of David Hume who was often identified with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle as among the leading lights of philosophy, think of Adam Smith, Alexander Graham Bell and Sir Alexander Fleming, all of whom were Scottish. But I want to leave you with this thought from the Scottish philosopher David Hume: “Nothing is more surprising than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few.” I close on that note.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Andreas Jacovides**

17 July 2013

Regime of Islands¹

Once again, I am very pleased to have the occasion of addressing you, this time on the Regime of Islands. Even though it occupies only one of the 320 Articles of UNCLOS III, Article 121, the topic of islands is an important issue of the law of the sea, as evidenced by the extensive discussions in the early stages of the UN Conference (1973-82) and in the preparatory stage preceding it (1970-73) in the Seabed Committee, as outlined in the DOALOS publication “Regime of Islands – Legislative History”. It is very much a live issue today, especially in the Pacific Ocean, but also in several other parts of the world.

What I propose to do during the limited time available this morning, is to outline the historical introduction to the regime of islands; trace its evolution during the Conference itself following the earlier discussions in the Subcommittee II of the Seabed Committee; indicate the distinction between islands and rocks; briefly review how Article 121 was applied by international courts and tribunals; touch on, but not go into detail, the current international disputes involving islands and as applied in practice; and provide conclusions as to how such disputes, and those which no doubt will arise in future, should be solved peacefully, as required by the UN Charter on the basis of the applicable rules of the law of the sea.

In doing so I shall rely on my experience of the past four decades as the representative of my country, Cyprus, in the Seabed Committee, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and as an academic writer in various forums and publications in more recent years (most recently, in a chapter of a volume under preparation in honor of Satya Nandan). I was also honored to speak on behalf of Cyprus at the UN General Assembly on 10 December last year on the occasion of the Thirtieth Anniversary of UNCLOS III which I had signed in Montego Bay, Jamaica, in 1982.

International law rules on islands were initially developed through state practice and then

** Text as submitted by the speaker.*

*** Former Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus*

¹ Article 121 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS III.

This paper was originally presented by Ambassador Andreas Jacovides at a lecture at the Rhodes Academy of Maritime Law and Policy on July 5th, 2013.

through negotiations during successive codification conferences on the Law of the Sea. The status of islands was a question raised in a number of international forums. For example, discussions focused on the type of insular formations which should be accorded fishery zones in the North Sea at the Hague Conference for the Regulation of North Sea Fisheries, 1881. Attempts were made in finding a definition for an island at the Hague Codification Conference 1930.

It was not until 1956 that the UN International Law Commission (ILC) initially elaborated rules regarding islands, which were negotiated at the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. They were then enshrined in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, as well as in the Convention on the Continental Shelf in 1958. These documents constituted the groundwork for the work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), 1973-82, on the specific question on the Regime of Islands.

Article 10 of the ILC Report of 1956 stipulated that “Every island has its own territorial sea. An island is an area of land, surrounded by water which in normal circumstances is permanently above high-water mark”. The commentary to Article 10 specified that elevations which are above water at low tide only and technical installations built on the seabed are not considered islands and have no territorial sea. Articles 10 and 67 of the ILC Articles were consolidated in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. An island was defined as “A naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide”. In the 1958 Conference it was recognized that islands generate their own territorial sea and continental shelf. The principle that islands should be treated as any other land territory for the purpose of entitlement to territorial sea, contiguous zone and continental shelf was expressly recognized in Article 10 (1) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. It is noteworthy that Article 1(b) of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf expressly provided that the term “continental shelf” is used as referring also “to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands”, thus dispelling any doubts based on the etymology of the term “continental” as opposed to “insular” shelf (“insula” of course means “island”). Thus the 1958 Convention clearly established that islands are entitled to continental shelf as much as continents do.

In November 1973 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 3067 (XXVIII) convening the first session of UNCLOS III and dissolved the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. The topic of Islands, which had been dealt with in the Seabed Committee by Subcommittee II, was referred to the Second Committee of the Conference (under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Aguilar of Venezuela).

During the early stages of the Conference, the attempt systematically pursued by a number of continental states also in the Second Subcommittee of the Seabed Committee, was to differentiate between various kinds of islands and to apply criteria such as size, population, contiguity to the principal territory, geological and geomorphological factors as relevant to the entitlement of islands to the zones of maritime jurisdiction-which now included the EEZ in addition to the territorial sea, contiguous zone and continental shelf.

On the opposite side, small island states (among them Cyprus and Trinidad-Tobago) but also the United Kingdom and Greece firmly argued that

“no distinction whatsoever should be made between islands, irrespective of their size and

population, and continental land masses; and that the principles for determining the territorial sea, the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone should be exactly the same in the case of islands and continental land masses.”

These states

“were not prepared to accept any attempt at discrimination against islands in the form of artificial distinctions based on legally untenable considerations. Any deviation from the existing rules, as set out in the 1958 Conventions, should be in favour of islands since, generally speaking, their populations depended on the resources of the marine environment for their development, and even survival to a greater extent than continental territories.”²

The relevant proposals and arguments from both sides are detailed in the DOALOS Legislative History, Regime of Islands, to which you are referred if you are interested to pursue the subject.

This hotly contested issue, in the preparatory stage of the Seabed Committee and in the Conference itself, was settled through the adoption by the Conference of Article 121.

Article 121, Regime of Islands, reads as follows:

- “1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”

The definition of an island is identical to that in Article 10 (1) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone which – as already stated – was elaborated by the International Law Commission and had been framed in accordance with the traditionally held view.

This definition marks the rejection of the attempt, persistently pursued by a number of states (where Turkey played an active role) in the Seabed Committee and UNCLOS III, to establish different categories of islands with correspondingly different rights of entitlement to maritime jurisdiction.

The basic proposition of article 121 that the same criteria apply for determining the maritime zones of jurisdiction of islands as for other land territory follows the traditional line. In customary international law it had always been considered that islands generated a territorial sea. This was expressly recognized in Article 10(1) of the 1958 Convention of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. With regard to the newer notion of the continental shelf (Truman Declaration 1948), Article 1 of the 1958 Convention of the Continental Shelf expressly provided that it be applied to islands. This was recognized to be the customary rule of international law by the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 1969. Article 121(2) simply recognizes

² Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, ‘Regime of Islands. Legislative History’, United Nations, Caracas session, 1974, p. 27.

this rule. The exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which was the creation of UNCLOS III, was also covered by Article 121(2).

Thus, the position stated in Article 121(2) conclusively marks the acceptance of the views of a number of states participating in the Conference, including several island states, that no distinction whatsoever should be made between islands irrespective of their size, population or political status and the continental land masses; and that the criteria for determining maritime zones of jurisdiction apply to islands in the same way as they apply to continental land. Correspondingly, Article 121(2) marks the rejection of the proposition that the maritime spaces of islands should be determined by the special circumstances of each island, such as size, population, contiguity to the principal territory, the physical, geographical and the geomorphological area involved, the general configuration of the respective coasts and even whether they were “situated on the continental shelf of another state”.

A valid reply to the argument that inequity might result if the position in Article 121(2) was accepted, would be no more than other inequities created by nature. Why should maritime zones of islands of a small size or population be questioned while, for example, the same zones of continental countries consisting largely of deserts or otherwise unpopulated or underpopulated had not been open to dispute? It was argued that, if any discrimination was to be made on the islands on the one hand and continental land masses on the other, this should be in favor rather than at their expense, because ordinarily the populations of islands are dependent on the resources of the sea for their economic development or even survival, while the populations of continental territories could rely on the resources of the hinterland.

Article 121(3) gave rise to additional arguments. Unlike the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, a distinction was made between “islands” and “rocks”, the latter being defined as incapable of “sustaining human habitation or economic life of their own”. It is noteworthy that Japan and the United Kingdom made proposals to delete 121(3). Under Article 121(3), rocks generate territorial sea (12NM) and contiguous zone (24NM) but not EEZ or continental shelf. In practical terms, this distinction has given rise to difficulties over interpretation and borderline cases may occur where there is a difference of opinion (the case of Okinotori-shima comes readily to mind). In such cases the dispute settlement system of the Convention, Chapter XV can usefully come into play.

For those of you interested there is a considerable amount of literature devoted to the subject by such distinguished writers as J. Charney, B. Kwiatkowska, A. Soons, B. Oxman, H. Dipla. Borderline cases may occur as subsequent economic changes and economic developments may change the capacity of rocks to host human population or produce human activity.

Departure from the traditional position on the case of rocks is, in any case, more apparent than real. First, the exception from the general rule of full entitlement for islands, does not cover the territorial sea and the contiguous zone. Hence, islands which are no more than rocks continue to generate these zones of jurisdiction. Second, under the 1982 Convention, the breadth of the territorial sea over which sovereignty exists extends up to 12NM, unlike the situation in 1958. Third, under the 1958 Convention, “rocks” generated continental shelf, the applicable criteria then being depth and exploitability. The criteria of distance and natural prolongation under the 1982 Convention are considerably wider. Thus, in practical terms, the solitary exception of “rocks” to the principle in 121(2) should not be considered of major significance. Conversely, to insist on full rights of the EEZ and the equivalent continental shelf area on the basis of distance (200NM)

and natural prolongation (up to 350NM) for rocks might reasonably have been criticized as unduly excessive and therefore indefensible.

On the whole, therefore, the exception in Article 121(3), when properly interpreted and applied, does not materially affect the fundamental principle set out in Article 121(2).

Subsequently to the adoption of the 1982 UNCLOS III and its Article 121 on islands, international courts and tribunals have had the occasion to apply this article in various contexts, especially in the context of delimitation situations. They include the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration; Denmark/Norway (Jan Mayen); Libya/Malta; Barbados/Trinidad-Tobago; Qatar/Bahrain; Nicaragua/Honduras; Romania/Ukraine (where the ICJ concluded that it did not “need to consider whether Serpents’ Island falls under paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article 121 of UNCLOS nor its relevance to this case”); Bangladesh/Myanmar (ITLOS, on the effect of St. Martin’s Island); Nicaragua/Colombia (where the ICJ applied the customary law principle reflected in Article 121 of UNCLOS, Colombia not being a party to UNCLOS and also referred to Article 121(3) as producing no entitlement to continental shelf or EEZ). It will not be possible to examine this in any detail now.

Today there exist several situations in the world which involve islands in dispute. In some of these cases the issue is disputed sovereignty and in others the issue is the delimitation between states the coasts of which are opposite or adjacent to each other.

One of the most intractable disputes over islands is the case of Falklands/Malvinas between the United Kingdom and Argentina, which occasioned a two-month armed conflict in 1982 and which is still unresolved.

In the Mediterranean, the dispute between Greece and Turkey is primarily over the delimitation and the continental shelf (and indeed of the EEZ once declared) of the Greek islands in the Aegean as well as the issue of the breadth of the territorial sea, which is still currently 6NM, rather than 12NM as allowed by Article 3 of UNCLOS III.

Further east, around Cyprus, the issue is basically one of delimitation between Turkey and Cyprus. Cyprus has already reached agreements on the delimitation of its EEZ with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007- still unratified by Lebanon) and Israel (2010), on the basis of the median line and with a provision for arbitration as the way of solving any disputes arising. Those of you who are interested are referred to my lecture of last year on “Delimitation Practice in the Eastern Mediterranean”.³

The Pacific Ocean provides a number of situations involving disputes over islands, particularly issues of sovereignty and not only. Currently there is the situation in the Kuriles (Japan/Russia); Dokdo/Takeshima (Japan/Republic of Korea); Senkaku/Diaoyu (Japan/China); several situations in the South China Sea (where China’s claims are disputed by the Philippines in a case currently being brought to Annex VII Arbitration by the Philippines against China, on which you will hear authoritatively next week by Paul Reichler).

For situations involving China’s nine-dash line and island groups such as the Paracels, the

³ Andreas Jacovides, ‘Delimitation Practice in the Eastern Mediterranean’, European Rim Policy and Investment Council, 25 July 2012,

<https://erp.c.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/delimitation-practice-in-the-eastern-mediterranean.pdf>

Spratlys, the Pratas, Scarborough Shoal etc., I would recommend that you read the January 2013 issue of the American Journal of International Law, "Agora: The South China Sea", where opposing viewpoints are put forward and argued in three learned articles, and also to several other presentations on the subject.

As a general proposition and without referring in particular to these situations, where different parties involved may have their own viewpoints, it is self-evident that these and any other similar situations which may arise in the future, should be settled by the application of Articles 2(3) and 33 of the UN Charter on the peaceful settlement of disputes, in combination with Chapter XV of UNCLOS III. However, in an imperfect world, it may be unavoidable that political realities and other extralegal factors may prevent this approach from being followed. If matters get out of hand, it is for the UN Security Council to meet its responsibilities to maintain and restore international peace and security.

In conclusion, it can be safely asserted that the international law definition and the rule giving islands full entitlement to maritime zones of jurisdiction (territorial sea of 12NM, contiguous zone of 24NM, exclusive economic zone of 200NM and continental shelf of 200NM under the distance criterion and up to 350NM under the natural prolongation criterion), as stated in Article 121 of UNCLOS III, reflect customary international law. Criteria have also been introduced for establishing a distinction between islands and rocks. On the whole, the exception in Article 121(3), when properly interpreted and applied, does not materially affect the fundamental principle stated in Article 121(2). Artificial islands, reefs, low tide elevations are, of course, not covered by Article 121.

In terms of delimitation, islands as such are not "special circumstances". Consequently, the general rule, that is of starting from the median line in delimiting the coasts of opposite or adjacent states, applies as much to islands as to other territories. The party to a delimitation dispute alleging that a particular island should be considered "special circumstances" in order to depart from the application of the median line so as to reach "an equitable solution" under Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS III, has the burden to prove this before any international tribunal (onus of proof).

It is inevitable that disputes arise when the maritime zones of islands overlap with those of other countries thus creating issues of delimitation. Much depends on the particular circumstances of each case. International judges, in the ICJ, ITLOS and Annex VII Arbitral Tribunals, have contributed to the formulation of rules conducive to as much stability and predictability as possible in resolving such disputes, with the median line as the starting point and aiming at an equitable result taking into account the particular circumstances of each case. But the fundamental rule is that, under the 1982 UNCLOS III Article 121 and customary international law, islands are no less entitled to all the zones of maritime jurisdiction than continental territories.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Photis Photiou**

28 January 2014

The Contribution of the Republic of Cyprus to Eastern Mediterranean Security

To begin with, I consider that the discovery of substantial hydrocarbon reserves in the exclusive economic zone of Cyprus should benefit the entire people of Cyprus. This is what we want as a government. Moreover, I am confident that this development, the hydrocarbon reserves of the Eastern Mediterranean, could be a catalyst for peace and security in the region. Like the coal and steel paradigm in post-World War II, this discovery could be an example for a new era of strength and cooperation between the countries of the region.

Dear friends, I believe that time has come for the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean to acknowledge their common interest in exploiting their natural resources. We need to work collectively. We need to work together in order to consolidate those conditions conducive to regional stability and security and thus the growth, energy independence as well as sustainable development and prosperity. Cyprus' critical geopolitical and other strategic role in the region is mostly highlighted, unfortunately of course, due to the ongoing crisis in our volatile neighborhood. Our national infrastructure, both civilian and military, has been utilized by international partners, such as the United States of America, Russia, China, as well as European Union member states, or international organizations, such as the United Nations - as part of their responses to regional crises, like the crisis in Syria, like the United Nations mission for the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons.

Finally, let me reassure you that the President of the Republic and our government is working towards the enhancement of our energy and maritime security capabilities in a comprehensive manner. However, we are aware that our efforts cannot succeed in a vacuum, but with collective efforts and cooperation of our regional partners and other stakeholders. Of course, our ambition, my friends, is to continue to be a bridge of cooperation and mutual understanding between our neighboring countries and work as a security multiplayer, as a stabilizing factor for our region and of course for Western security concerns.

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

** *Minister of Defense of the Republic of Cyprus*

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Ali Akbar**

19 February 2014

Iran's Regional and International Developments

Good evening ladies and gentlemen. First of all, I would like to say that I am grateful for having this opportunity to present a view of Iran's foreign policy. I would especially like to thank Dr. Pelagias, the Director of European Rim Policy and Investment Council, for inviting me and for his personal interest in our region. I also thank his colleagues, dear ambassadors, especially on my right and left, without whom we couldn't have this meeting.

To understand Iran's foreign policy, I believe one should bear in mind couple of conceptual assumptions. First of all, I believe ideas and interests together move the world. Therefore, both are also imperative in any kind of foreign policy analysis. And there is no need to say that they are sometimes contradictory to each other. Second, in Iran the decision-making process, like many other places in the world, is rather circular than linear. Yet the Supreme Leader is in charge of making equilibrium between the ideas and the interest. Third, Iran's aim in the foreign policy moves between achieving an egalitarian status in one end, and establishing a strategic relation and friendship with the regional as well as international powers at the other end. In order to understand how our foreign policy is affected by egalitarianism, I should remind you of, for example, the notions of dialogue of civilization, respect to human dignity, and the struggle against violence and extremism, which are proposed respectively by the last three presidents of Iran.

At the same time, we have been always looking for opportunities to expand our relations with different countries, from Latin America and Africa to Asia, Europe and the Middle East.

Coming back to the present situation, I would like to put emphasis on the latest progress in the nuclear issue as well as the latest development in the Middle East. There have been ups and downs in the nuclear case, but after the last presidential election in Iran and the US, the nuclear development of Iran has received an impetus. Since then, three rounds of negotiations have passed and the final one is at the same time undertaking by Iran and six world powers to bring about some changes to our nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief as well as the international respect for the right of Iran to enrich uranium. As an achievement, the nuclear agreement is a chance for the two sides to overcome decades of suspicions. Although many

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

** *Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Republic of Cyprus*

changes have unfortunately been missed in dealing with this issue so far and the final agreement is yet to be made, the prospect of a positive outcome is well within the reach.

Bilaterally and regionally Iran and the West have much in common interest and the key is the nuclear deal which is potentially instrumental to some of the political settlements and conflict resolution in the region, and even wider world. Nuclear deal has also a crucial role in economic and energy cooperations. Europe, for example, needs oil and gas, and we need investment. We have the largest reserves of oil and gas, but we need, for example, at least 50 billion dollars in foreign investments.

Originally, we are following the developments in the Middle East very seriously and we are interested to see the changes in peaceful and democratic ways. After all, this is our experience that the dictators in our region do not feel comfortable to have friendly relations with us in the long term. Iran also cares very much about the security and stability in the region. We know very well that out of any chaotic situation the way is paved for radicalism to the detriment of everyone.

Thank you very much for your attention. I stop here as a short presentation and I'm ready to take questions.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Stanislav V. Osadchiy**

8 April 2014

Russia's Role in the Eastern Mediterranean and Beyond

It's a pleasure to speak here today in front of this audience. I'm convinced that this will help us to understand each other and to understand what are the positions of the Russian Federation in this region, in the region which is a very, very interesting - so to say - unstable, and a region where the interests of many countries are linked, and sometimes controversial.

I would like to say that Eastern Mediterranean was always a part of our policy - policy of the Russian Federation, of the Soviet Union. While working, I remember, in the Soviet Union's ministry of foreign affairs, I was in the group which was responsible for the Mediterranean issues. And as Khrushchev sometime said, the Soviet Union is Mediterranean country because it is a Black Sea country. So that is why we were very much integrated in all this process and follow all these events.

Actually, what is now happening here is especially interesting because it is of vital importance for many countries, of vital importance for Russia, for other countries, because the tension is growing and growing for many reasons. First of all, we are witnessing the Arab Spring in many countries. And lately I was listening to one lecture which explained why actually Arab Spring took place. And it was said, for example, that Arab Spring was because some dictatorships have fallen down and the people came out to the squares to defend their rights. There are such countries like Yemen, Tunisia, there are countries like Libya, Syria, where people were eager to construct their new future and to achieve something. Yes, maybe this is right, they were fighting against the dictatorship. But on the other hand there were some other countries, for example Saudi Arabia, Qatar, where people are quiet, where people don't go to the squares. And why? It was explained that because in these countries the ruling elite was sent by God, as it is considered to be, was sent by God and there is no question of changing it. And Islam helps it.

So I would propose another explanation for what actually happened. I think it is not a matter of dictatorship, because... I will explain why. I think it is a matter of poverty, poverty of people. Poverty of people who could not stand anymore this poverty and went to squares for better life, let us say. And they were eager to achieve it by weapons, by fighting, and that is why they went

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

** *Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Cyprus*

to the squares. Dictatorship in those countries - I don't know. But to my mind dictatorship in some of these countries were changed by another dictatorship after these revolutions, even maybe of the worse character, because it has such negative influence on the life in these countries. So it's, you know, some Islamistic tendencies in this country actually prevailed.

So what we got after the 'spring'? We got better life for these people? No. But people actually were fighting for the better life. And they didn't get it. So what is the future? The future is unstable, the future is chaos still in this region. And yes, on the other hand there are again rich countries, rich countries where people are satisfied with their standard of living and they're not going to squares, and they are not fighting. So a dividing line is not between democracy and dictatorship, to my mind, and I am eager to discuss it with you. But to my mind the dividing line is between poverty and richness. Richness of some families which were on the top in these countries and poverty of the most of the people in these countries. That's how I understand the situation, actually, which was created. And that was the stimulus for people to fight for the better life.

Yes, but what will happen after that? We can see the example of Egypt after dictatorship - so-called dictatorship - of Mubarak. Now, there is a military rule in Egypt. What will be next is unknown. So the situation, although all these 'springs', all these changes, the situation stays unstable. And this gives us very complex picture in the region. And we will see some other countries which are, I would not say, using this situation for their interest, but actually maybe some economic interests of the countries prevail in this situation, and some other interests. Take for example Turkey, which now has gained the power, gained the influence in this region. I know, I traveled there, I was in many countries. I was the chief, the director of the security department of the ministry. I visited all these countries: Libya, and Tunisia, and Yemen. So I saw how Turkey, for example, is getting in by its influence, economic first of all influence, and strengthening its positions. And it is also some element which should be considered seriously. So Arab Spring is a very complicated, very controversial development, which should be studied very thoroughly. It's a complex of military, political and economic ingredients in this regard.

And the main problems now, take for example Syria. What will be the result of fighting there? It's difficult to say because, ok, as somebody said, Assad is a dictator. But on the other hand he is supported - not like in Ukraine - Assad is supported by influential people, by rich people in this country. That is why he is able to oppose the fighters now. So it's interesting.

It's an interesting situation, especially interesting because of the hydrocarbons found in this region and creating new situation in this regard. And what is now interesting, because take for example Israel, (inaudible) and others resources, new resources. Cyprus - new natural resources. Where to direct them? To what direction? To Turkey? Or to some other countries? It is an interesting question. If we follow some advices, so the axis of Israel-Cyprus-Turkey will be strengthened. And this is an axis which is maybe not in favor of some Arab countries, which complicates the situation. The axis is... I don't know what will be the result of the axis. And what will be the - to tell the truth - the relations of the Cyprus republic and the other countries then with some Arab countries? So what Mediterranean needs it's a thoroughly weighted balance of interests in this region.

And speaking about Russia and its influence. Now, we are not in favor of supporting dictatorships, but we are not in favor of supporting oppositions either, which is kind of groups of people with different interests, different objectives they want to achieve. And that is why it is sometimes, it is more - as I return to my first point - it is more maybe reactionary than a dictatorship of these countries which prevailed previously. So the balance should be thoroughly kept, but we should not interfere in internal affairs so strongly, like some foreign actors doing this. And Russia is not doing this. Russia is in favor of preserving those regimes which were elected freely and which were elected by the peoples of these countries. Take for example Syria problem. Yes, it's a difficult problem, but the government of Assad was elected freely. Yes, if there is no Bashar Assad government, who will take place? I've been to Libya, you know, the situation is very difficult there. There're some groups fighting between each other after this 'spring'. And it is difficult to say who will win. The situation is very much unstable and unpredictable. So if we want a stability in this region, we should be very cautious, very cautious in supporting these or those forces. And to my mind, if we compare what happens there... Somebody says, look at the Soviet Union, look at Russia, what Putin does. In his office there is a portrait, photo of Peter the Great who was dictator, Peter the Great who took the population of Russia, brought it to the West by force, and this way Peter the Great did see that Russia developed in some Western patterns. Maybe it was so. But still Peter the Great was supported by the population. It was in accordance with the will of the population of those times and that is why it was achievable for him to do this, although there was a resistance of some part of the population. But in majority it was supported. And dictatorship - now some people compare Putin with Peter the Great and say that Putin is a kind of a person who is willing to use force on every occasion. It is not the truth. It is not the truth because it's the will of the Russian population to go this way. Actually, we support his efforts and it is not a matter of dictatorship.

Dictatorship, if you take for example Ukraine. It is how all this created the situation on Maidan, who paid for it, how it ended in Maidan, and who came to power shows that it is not in our interest. It was not in our interest at all. And propaganda, which plays a major role now in mass media in every country, just sometimes makes such terrible things that we are surprised in Russia. We don't have on the boundaries of Ukraine troops, but it is said that we have. We don't influence the Russian population in those parts in Donetsk, Kharkov and Lugansk, but somebody says we do. No, actually it is not our aim to inflame the situation. Our aim is to calm down the situation, to let Ukraine stay as it is - integrated country and not divided into many pieces, because it will be our headache then also. Because they are Russians, just Russians. They're not Russian-speaking people, they are just Russians, who were put in this framework, in this boundaries of Ukraine after 1917. And just many times the boundaries of Ukraine were restricted in the interest of the Communist Party of Russian Federation who sometimes needed support of the Communist Party of Ukraine in its fighting, in its internal fight with others.

So our aim is stability. Stability both in the Mediterranean, and just the example of Ukraine is to say, to convince you that our aim is stability in Ukraine also. Crimea is different.

I can foresee the question about Crimea. For us it is a different question. Crimea was always only Russian, it was never Ukrainian. It was a gift from Khrushchev in '54, so we took back what belongs to us as we think, actually. Because more than 80% of population are only Russians. If we take Donetsk, Kharkov, Lugansk who is fighting now for self-determination, let us say - they say it - so there is a mixture of population. There is about - in some regions - 30 to 70% Russians

and Ukrainians in some regions, vice-versa, but it's still a mixture of population, of Ukrainians and Russians. Not the example of Crimea, where only Russians lived always. Yes, it is different for us.

REPORT (in Greek)

Christos Minagias*
27 May 2014

Τουρκική Απειλή (Turkish Threat)

An in depth report on the Turkish military buildup over the last twenty years and especially naval and air power targeting the East Mediterranean and the Aegean, representing a serious threat to Cyprus, Greece, but also other regional states including Israel and Egypt.

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6. Επίλογος

1.Πρόλογος

Σαν πρόλογο επέλεξα την προβαλλόμενη άποψη ενός έγκριτου Τούρκου αρθρογράφου για το πόσο δύσκολο είναι ακόμη και για έναν Τούρκο να κατανοήσει τη σημερινή Τουρκία. Φανταστείτε λοιπόν πόσο δύσκολο είναι αυτό για έναν ξένο.

Αρθρογράφος

Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı

“Για να κατανοήσει κάποιος τη σημερινή Τουρκία θα πρέπει να διαβάσει πάρα πολύ, να αναλύσει και να σκεφθεί βαθιά. Όποιες απόψεις και να έχει κάποιος αρθρογράφος είναι πολύ δύσκολο να καταλάβει την Τουρκία.”

2. 1^η θεματική ενότητα

2.1 Ισλάμ και πολιτική στην Τουρκία

Η Τουρκία είναι ένα κράτος που ακόμη αναζητά το έθνος του και οι επίσημοι κρατικοί φορείς με τα χαλκευμένα στοιχεία που παρουσιάζουν ως αποδείξεις, επιδιώκουν συνεχώς να αποκρύψουν το μέγεθος του μωσαϊκού της εθνικής και θρησκευτικής δομής φοβούμενοι έναν ενδεχόμενο διαμελισμό της χώρας. Επισημαίνεται ότι, αυτό αποτελεί ένα «κλειστό κουτί» για τους ειδικούς του θέματος εντός και εκτός της χώρας, δεδομένου ότι οι τουρκικές αρχές, καχύποπτες όπως είναι από τη φύση τους, δεν επέτρεψαν ποτέ ή σχεδόν ποτέ να γίνουν ευρείες και εμπειριστατωμένες έρευνες και μετρήσεις για το θέμα αυτό. Όμως εκτός από τις μειονότητες, ένα άλλο παλαιό, παραδοσιακό και σύνθημα φαινόμενο στην ανατολική και νοτιανατολική Τουρκία είναι η δύναμη και η επιρροή των φυλών, οι οποίες αφενός θεωρούνται ως ένα κράτος εν κράτει στις περιοχές αυτές, αφετέρου αποτελούν μια ένδειξη ύπαρξης του φεουδαρχικού συστήματος και της ιδιάζουσας οργάνωσης του με κοινωνικές, πολιτικές, πολιτιστικές και οικονομικές διαστάσεις. Συνεπώς, η συνοχή του τουρκικού πληθυσμού παρουσιάζει σοβαρά ενδημικά προβλήματα και πολλά τρωτά σημεία, τα οποία εάν μια ξένη δύναμη τα εκμεταλλευθεί με κατάλληλους χειρισμούς από τον καιρό της ειρήνης, θα μπορούσε να επιφέρει σημαντικό πλήγμα στην τουρκική εσωτερική ασφάλεια, κατά τη διάρκεια μιας θερμής συγκρουσιακής κατάστασης ή ένοπλης σύρραξης με κάποιο γειτονικό της κράτος.

Οι δυσλειτουργικές πεποιθήσεις και συμπεριφορές του τουρκικού πολιτικού συστήματος είναι διαχρονικές, με αποτέλεσμα ο τουρκικός λαός να βρίσκεται αντιμέτωπος με ένα καθεστώς ιδεολογικής επίθεσης και μαύρης προπαγάνδας που έχουν ως κυρίαρχα χαρακτηριστικά το φόβο και την παράνοια. Μέχρι το 1980 υπήρχε η απειλή του κομμουνισμού και μετά αυτή αντικαταστάθηκε από την απειλή των Κούρδων. Στη συνέχεια, μετά το 1997 προστέθηκε η απειλή

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των ισλαμιστών και των θρησκευτικών αδελφοτήτων, ενώ μετά το 2008 η τουρκική κοινωνία έζησε την αποκαθήλωση του πραξικοπηματικού μηχανισμού των στρατιωτικών και το βαθύ κράτος των τουρκο-ισλαμιστών στρατηγών αντικαταστάθηκε από το βαθύ κράτος των τουρκο-ισλαμιστών πολιτικών. Μάλιστα, η κοινή συνισταμένη όλων αυτών, έχει να κάνει με τη μονοπωλιακή διαφύλαξη της τουρκικής ταυτότητας και της ακεραιότητας της χώρας από όλα εκείνα τα κέντρα ισχύος της Τουρκίας που θέλουν να ποδηγετούν τη χώρα, να είναι οι αποκλειστικοί διαχειριστές της εξουσίας και να μην αποδέχονται ως ισότιμους συνομιλητές κανένα άτομο ή φορέα θρησκευτικής ή εθνικής μειονότητας. Υπό τις συνθήκες δε αυτές, ενώ ο κουρδικός παράγοντας διεκδικεί δυναμικά έναν περιφερειακό και ρυθμιστικό ρόλο στην περιοχή, η τουρκική κυβέρνηση διακατέχεται από μια μικροπολιτική αντίληψη μη αντιλαμβανόμενη την ουσία του κουρδικού προβλήματος, το οποίο με την πάροδο του χρόνου αποκτά όλο και μεγαλύτερη σημασία. Δηλαδή, η Άγκυρα αντί να επιλύσει πρώτα το τουρκικό πρόβλημα, το οποίο αυτόματα θα συμπαράσχει σε επίλυση το κουρδικό και το πρόβλημα του PKK, επέλεξε να επιλύσει προσωρινά το πρόβλημα του PKK, χωρίς φυσικά να δημιουργούνται οι προϋποθέσεις επίλυσης του κουρδικού και στη συνέχεια του τουρκικού προβλήματος.

Οι όροι οθωμανισμός, ισλαμισμός και παντουρκισμός (*Türkçülük*) αποτέλεσαν τις κύριες αιτίες ώστε η τουρκική κοινωνία να ενστερνισθεί την ιδέα του συντηρητισμού που είχε σημαντική επίδραση στην κοινωνική, πολιτιστική και πολιτική ζωή της χώρας διαχρονικά και θεωρείται ως ένα νέο μόρφωμα ή μια νέα κίνηση με θρησκευτικά χαρακτηριστικά. Εκτός τούτου, ο συντηρητισμός για τους Τούρκους είναι μια ιδεολογία που αναφέρεται στη συνέχιση του δυτικού τρόπου ζωής διαφυλάττοντας παράλληλα τις εθνικές και ηθικές αξίες, καθώς επίσης τα έθιμα και τις παραδόσεις. Φυσικά, οι πολιτιστικοί κώδικες της ιδεολογίας αυτής τροφοδοτούν ταυτόχρονα τον εθνικισμό και τον ισλαμισμό, αφού ο τρόπος σκέψης του τουρκικού λαού εστιάζεται στη θρησκεία, την ιστορία και τον εθνικισμό. Μάλιστα, άλλοτε ο εθνικισμός είχε πρωταγωνιστικό ρόλο επικουρούμενος από τον ισλαμισμό, άλλοτε πρωταγωνιστούσε ο ισλαμισμός με τη στήριξη του εθνικισμού και σε μερικές περιόδους ενεργούσαν και οι δύο ισότιμα.

Ο εκσυγχρονισμός του Ισλάμ στην Τουρκία έχει δύο συνισταμένες: η μια είναι η προσωπική ζωή και η προσαρμογή των θρησκευτικών συναισθημάτων της κοινωνίας στις νέες συνήθειες και απαιτήσεις που επέβαλαν η αστικοποίηση, η οικονομική ανάπτυξη, η συμμετοχή των γυναικών σε πολιτικούς φορείς και οργανώσεις κ.λπ. Και η άλλη συνισταμένη αφορά στις θεολογικές επιστήμες, τα ιερατικά σχολεία, τους θρησκευτικούς λειτουργούς και τις πολιτικές δυναμικές που δημιουργούν τα μυστικιστικά τάγματα του Ισλάμ που υπάρχουν στη χώρα. Παράλληλα, η παρεμβατικότητα του κρατικού μηχανισμού στις θρησκευτικές υποθέσεις είναι περισσότερο από εμφανής διότι μέσω των ελεγκτικών του μηχανισμών επιδιώκει την απομόνωση της τουρκικής κοινωνίας, με θεμιτά και αθέμιτα μέσα, από κάθε εστία του φανατικού, εξτρεμιστικού και ριζοσπαστικού Ισλάμ.

Σε ό,τι αφορά στις θρησκευτικές αδελφότητες *cemaat* και *tarikats*, αυτές αποτελούν ένα φαινόμενο με θρησκευτικές, πνευματικές, κοινωνικές, πολιτιστικές, πολιτικές και οικονομικές διαστάσεις που έχει τις ρίζες του στην Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία και συνεχίζεται μέχρι τώρα. Επιπλέον, ο ρόλος και η θέση τους στην πολιτική ζωή έχουν λάβει μεγάλη διάσταση και επηρεάζουν σε μεγάλο βαθμό τη διαμόρφωση του εκάστοτε εκλογικού χάρτη της χώρας.

Μια άλλη πολύπλοκη διαδρομή της Τουρκικής Δημοκρατίας, αφορά στους αφανείς και παράλληλους μηχανισμούς, οι οποίοι παραπέμπουν στον όρο «βαθύ κράτος» και συγκεκριμένα στους οργανικούς δεσμούς των ενόπλων δυνάμεων, των υπηρεσιών πληροφοριών, των δυνάμεων ασφαλείας, της δικαιοσύνης, των πολιτικών κομμάτων, των θρησκευτικών αδελφοτήτων και

άλλων κρατικών φορέων με το οργανωμένο έγκλημα, τις παρακρατικές οργανώσεις και τις υπηρεσίες πληροφοριών ξένων κρατών. Επιπλέον, σε μερικές περιόδους, το βαθύ κράτος των κεμαλιστών δρούσε από κοινού με τους ισλαμιστές προκειμένου να αντιμετωπίσουν τις κοινές απειλές που ενεργοποιούσαν τα εθνικιστικά τους αντανakλαστικά, όπως οι μειονότητες που ζουν στην Τουρκία και συγκεκριμένα οι Κούρδοι, οι Αρμένιοι και οι Έλληνες.

Περαιτέρω θα πρέπει να ληφθεί υπόψη ότι, η φιλοσοφία του βαθύς κράτους μπορεί να θριαμβεύσει για δεκαετίες στην Τουρκία, ωστόσο μετά το 2008 αυτή δεν μπόρεσε να αποτρέψει τα πνευματικά, ηθικά και πολιτικά πλήγματα που υπέστη. Συγχρόνως όμως, είναι λάθος να ειπωθεί ότι το βαθύ κράτος στην Τουρκία έχει εξαλειφθεί ολοσχερώς, διότι αυτό είναι απαραίτητο σε όλους και θα υπάρχει για πάντα. Εν τω μεταξύ, τα σχέδια επιχειρήσεων και το *modus operandi* των πυρήνων του θα πρέπει να προβληματίσουν την ελληνική πλευρά για παρόμοια δράση στη Θράκη, στα νησιά του Αιγαίου και την Κύπρο. Τούτο προκύπτει από μια συνεξέταση των επιχειρησιακών δραστηριοτήτων των παρακρατικών μηχανισμών της Τουρκίας, οι οποίες εστιάζονται σε τρεις παράγοντες: στη χρονική περίοδο, στην επιλογή του στόχου και στο σκοπό της επιχείρησης. Ειδικότερα δε, σε ό,τι έχει να κάνει με το σκοπό της επιχείρησης, αυτός αφορούσε είτε στο να εξοργίσει την τουρκική κοινωνία, είτε να περάσει «βαθιά μηνύματα» σε συγκεκριμένους αποδέκτες, είτε να φέρει σε δυσχερή θέση την υπάρχουσα κυβέρνηση ή τη χώρα, εξυπηρετώντας τα συμφέροντα διαφόρων κύκλων της Τουρκίας ή ξένων κρατών.

Ένα άλλο κύριο στοιχείο είναι ότι, τα τελευταία χρόνια η έννοια της εξουσίας στην Τουρκία εξατομικεύθηκε στο πρόσωπο του Tayyip Erdogan, ο οποίος, ενώ προώθησε σημαντικές αλλαγές στη χώρα του, κατέδειξε ότι δεν ήταν ικανός να διαβάσει σωστά τα αποτελέσματα και τις συνέπειες που αυτές επέφεραν. Τούτο οφείλεται στο γεγονός ότι ο Τούρκος πρωθυπουργός: πρώτον, ακολούθησε μια πολιτική με ηγεμονικά, αλαζονικά και τυχοδιωκτικά χαρακτηριστικά, στηριζόμενη σε μια φαντασιόπληκτη ιδεολογία. Και δεύτερον, μετέτρεψε το κόμμα του σε μια μηχανή αυταρχικής εξουσίας, αποστασιοποιούμενος πλήρως από σημαντικούς βραχίονες της τουρκικής κοινωνίας που τον στήριξαν σε όλες τις εκλογικές διαδικασίες. Συγκεκριμένα πρόκειται για τους φιλελεύθερους που δεν έχουν μεγάλο κοινωνικό αντίβαρο, τους διανοούμενους, δημοσιογράφους, συγγραφείς και ακαδημαϊκούς που ήταν εύκολο να φιμωθούν και τις θρησκευτικές αδελφότητες που επιχειρήθηκε να απομονωθούν, να αποδυναμωθούν και να τεθούν εκτός συστήματος. Ας σημειωθεί ακόμη ότι, οι περισσότερες αδελφότητες, πλην του *Fethullah Gulen*, μπορεί να μην αντέδρασαν στην εν λόγω στρατηγική του Erdogan διότι αυτές χρηματοδοτούντο άμεσα ή έμμεσα από τον κρατικό προϋπολογισμό, ωστόσο αυτό αποτέλεσε την πρώτη βαθιά ρήξη και πόλωση που βίωσε στο εσωτερικό του μέτωπο το κυρίαρχο και μαζικό συνιτικό κίνημα της Τουρκίας, με αποτέλεσμα στην τουρκική κοινωνία να αρχίζει να κερδίζει έδαφος η ακόλουθη άποψη: Η σταθερότητα, η ηρεμία και η δημοκρατία θα έρθουν στη χώρα μόνο τότε, όταν η Τουρκία και το κόμμα AKP θα απαλλαχθούν από τον Erdogan. Φυσικά η άποψη αυτή παρουσιάζει τρία τρωτά σημεία: πρώτον, οι συνέπειες των πολυκομματικών κυβερνήσεων που προηγήθηκαν είναι ακόμη νωπές στη μνήμη της τουρκικής κοινωνίας. Το δεύτερο έχει να κάνει με τις πολιτικές της κυβέρνησης για την ισχυροποίηση της συνιτικής συντηρητικής ταυτότητας, όπως η αποκατάσταση του θεσμού των θρησκευτικών λυκείων *İmam-hatip*, η αποδοχή της μαντήλας από τα πανεπιστήμια και τους κρατικούς φορείς, η διαφύλαξη των ηθικών αξιών και παραδόσεων κ.λπ. Και το τρίτο τρωτό σημείο αφορά στην οικονομική ανάπτυξη που είχε σημαντική απήχηση στο οικογενειακό εισόδημα των Τούρκων πολιτών.

Εν κατακλείδι, εύκολα αντιλαμβάνεται κανείς ότι η Τουρκία είναι μια περίπλοκη χώρα, είναι μια χώρα που μεταμορφώνεται συνεχώς και η κοινωνία της μεταβάλλεται με ταχείς ρυθμούς.

Άλλωστε, τα τελευταία χρόνια αποκαλύπτονται τα στοιχεία μιας αρχόμενης εσωτερικής ρήξης στην τουρκική κοινωνία, η οποία αναζητά μια νέα ταυτότητα και ένα νέο ιδεολογικό προσανατολισμό που θα παραπέμπουν σε φιλελεύθερες αξίες και αρχές, χωρίς όμως να παρεκκλίνουν από τις αντιλήψεις περί τουρκισμού και εθνικισμού. Εντούτοις, η έννοια της δημοκρατίας στην Τουρκία θεωρείται αντικείμενο φόβου και ούτε οι ιδεολογίες, ούτε τα σύμβολα, ούτε οι ηγετικές παρουσίες έφεραν τη δημοκρατία στη χώρα και ούτε διαφαίνεται ότι θα τη φέρουν στο μέλλον.

2.2 Βασικοί άξονες της τουρκικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής

Μετά το 2002, η Τουρκία άρχισε να παρουσιάζει κλιμακωτά στη διεθνή κοινότητα τη γεωπολιτική της θέση ως ένα μέσο που θα μετατρέψει την υφιστάμενη περιφερειακή της στρατηγική σε παγκόσμια στρατηγική. Έτσι, αντί να χρησιμοποιεί την αξία της εντός των συνόρων, προσανατολίζει τις απαιτήσεις της σε όλη την ήπειρο και σε παγκόσμια κλίμακα, προκειμένου να βρεθεί σε ένα δυναμικό γεωπολιτικό περιβάλλον, διεθνών, οικονομικών και πολιτικών σχέσεων, καθώς επίσης και σχέσεων ασφαλείας. Η βασική αιτία υλοποίησης αυτού του στόχου είναι ότι, οι Τούρκοι πιστεύουν ότι μια εξωτερική πολιτική που δεν διακρίνεται για τους έντονους και δυναμικούς ρυθμούς της και η οποία στηρίζεται στη διατήρηση του υπάρχοντος status quo, όχι μόνο δεν θα μπορέσει να μεταμορφώσει τη γεωπολιτική θέση της χώρας σε παγκόσμια, αλλά ούτε καν θα μπορέσει να υπερασπιστεί τα υπάρχοντα σύνορά της. Ας σημειωθεί ακόμη ότι η Άγκυρα τροποποίησε και τη στρατηγική της εξωτερικής της πολιτικής, όσον αφορά τις σχέσεις της με τα κέντρα ισχύος, θεωρώντας ότι μακροπρόθεσμα θα εξασφαλίσει επιπλέον πολιτικά, οικονομικά και πολιτιστικά οφέλη.

Τα γεωπολιτικά πεδία δράσης της Άγκυρας εστιάζονται σε τρεις χώρους: στον εγγύς ηπειρωτικό χώρο, στον εγγύς χερσαίο χώρο και στον εγγύς θαλάσσιο χώρο.

2.2.1. Εγγύς ηπειρωτικός χώρος της Τουρκίας (Καύκασος, Κασπία Θάλασσα και Κεντρική Ασία)

Η πολιτική της Τουρκίας, που σχετίζεται με τον Καύκασο, την Κασπία και την Κεντρική Ασία, διέπεται από τρεις βασικές αρχές: πρώτον, στην ενδυνάμωση των σχέσεων με τις Δημοκρατίες του Βορείου Καυκάσου, που βρίσκονται εντός της Ρωσικής Ομοσπονδίας, προκειμένου να εξασφαλισθεί η διασύνδεση της Κασπίας με τη Μαύρη Θάλασσα μέσω αυτών των Δημοκρατιών. Δεύτερον, στην εξασφάλιση σχέσεων μιας δυναμικής και ορθολογιστικής οικονομικής συνεργασίας με το Ιράν, με το οποίο υπάρχουν ιδεολογικές εντάσεις, προκειμένου να εξισορροπηθεί η επίδραση της Ρωσίας στην Κεντρική Ασία και τον Καύκασο. Και τρίτον, στην ενθάρρυνση κάθε είδους συνεργασίας μεταξύ των χωρών της Κεντρικής Ασίας.

Φυσικά, οι Τούρκοι αναγνωρίζουν ότι είναι δύσκολο να παρέμβουν άμεσα στην Κασπία Θάλασσα. Προκειμένου όμως να εξασφαλίσουν τη δραστηριότητα τους στην περιοχή αυτή, έθεσαν σε εφαρμογή ένα σχέδιο δημιουργίας γραμμών συγκοινωνιών, οι οποίες θα συνδέουν την Κασπία Θάλασσα με τις υπόλοιπες θαλάσσιες περιοχές. Άλλωστε, το ίδιο ακριβώς επιδιώκουν και για τις χώρες της Κεντρικής Ασίας. Ωστόσο, ο εν λόγω σχεδιασμός λειτουργεί ανταγωνιστικά για την Τουρκία τόσο από ρωσικής όσο και από ιρανικής πλευράς. Πέραν των παραπάνω, η Τουρκία διαπίστωσε ότι η συνεργασία της με τη Ρωσία έχει μια ιδιαίτερη δυναμική όχι μόνο στον τομέα του φυσικού αερίου και του πετρελαίου, αλλά και στους τομείς της πυρηνικής ενέργειας, του εμπορίου και του τουρισμού. Η τουρκική κοινή γνώμη δεν βλέπει πλέον τη Ρωσία ως εχθρό και τη θεωρεί ως μια φιλική χώρα. Από την άλλη πλευρά η Μόσχα επιδιώκει τη συνεργασία με την Άγκυρα σε

πολλούς τομείς, διότι θεωρεί ότι η Τουρκία ενεργεί περισσότερο ανεξάρτητα και δεν είναι δέσμια των δυτικών κέντρων ισχύος.

2.2.2 Εγγύς χερσαίος χώρος της Τουρκίας

Ο εγγύς χερσαίος χώρος περιλαμβάνει τα Βαλκάνια, τη Μέση Ανατολή και τον Καύκασο και επηρεάζει άμεσα τη διαμόρφωση της τουρκικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής λόγω της γεωγραφικής αξίας που αυτός έχει και λόγω των ιστορικών καταβολών που υπάρχουν. Επομένως, η Άγκυρα θα συνεχίσει να έχει άμεση εξάρτηση τόσο από την αποτελεσματικότητα όσο και από την δράση που αναπτύσσει στο χώρο αυτό, δεδομένου ότι, οι παράμετροι αυτές προβάλλουν το πολιτικό, οικονομικό και πολιτιστικό της βάρος στην περιοχή. Επιπρόσθετα, επισημαίνεται ότι οι Τούρκοι θεωρούν ότι η εσωτερική συνοχή και η ακεραιότητα της χώρας τους σχετίζεται άμεσα με τους παράγοντες αυτού του χώρου, προβάλλοντας το επιχείρημα ότι μια Ανατολική χώρα η οποία δεν μπορεί να έχει επιρροή στις εξελίξεις των Βαλκανίων, του Καυκάσου και της Μέσης Ανατολής, δεν θα μπορέσει ούτε να προστατεύσει την ακεραιότητά της ούτε να ανοιχθεί σε διεθνές επίπεδο. Εξίσου σημαντικό είναι και το γεγονός ότι, οι μουσουλμανικές μειονότητες της Βουλγαρίας, της Ελλάδας, της Π.Γ.Δ.Μ. του Κοσσυφοπεδίου και της Ρουμανίας αποτελούν στοιχεία της τουρκικής πολιτικής για τα Βαλκάνια με ιδιάζουσα σημασία.

Τονίζεται ότι, η βραχυπρόθεσμη και μεσοπρόθεσμη εξωτερική πολιτική της Τουρκίας για τα Βαλκάνια έχει δύο κύριους στόχους. Ο πρώτος στόχος αφορά στην εδραίωση της σταθερότητας σύμφωνα με την τουρκική αντίληψη, ενώ ο δεύτερος στόχος αφορά στη δημιουργία ενός διεθνούς νομικού πλαισίου, στην ομπρέλα ασφαλείας του οποίου θα ενταχθούν οι εθνικές μειονότητες της περιοχής. Εντός αυτού του νομικού πλαισίου, η Τουρκία έχει ως διαρκή στόχο την απόκτηση του δικαιώματος επέμβασης στα προβλήματα που έχουν σχέση με τις μουσουλμανικές μειονότητες των Βαλκανίων. Είναι σημαντικό ότι ο Τούρκος υπουργός Εξωτερικών Ahmet Davutoglu χρησιμοποιεί ως παράδειγμα της σύγχρονης ιστορίας, την τουρκική εισβολή στην Κύπρο, η οποία, κατ' αυτόν, νομιμοποιήθηκε στα πλαίσια ενός τέτοιου νομικού πλαισίου. Επομένως, η Άγκυρα, αφενός για να μπορέσει στο μέλλον να αποκτήσει ένα παρόμοιο δικαίωμα στα Βαλκάνια, αφετέρου για να μην απολέσει την δραστηριότητά της στην περιοχή, να μη βρεθεί απέναντι σ' ένα «Βαλκανικό Μπλοκ» και να εξισορροπήσει το ρωσικό παράγοντα, εφαρμόζει μια ενεργητική βαλκανική πολιτική, η οποία:

- Προβάλλει συνεχώς τους πολιτιστικούς και ιστορικούς δεσμούς της Τουρκίας με τις μουσουλμανικές μειονότητες και δημιουργεί τις προϋποθέσεις, ώστε αυτή να μπορέσει στο μέλλον να αναλάβει νέες περιφερειακές αποστολές που πηγάζουν από τις ιστορικές παραμέτρους. Άλλωστε, δεν είναι τυχαίο ότι ο Davutoglu χρησιμοποιεί τον όρο «Οθωμανικό Κράτος», διότι το θεωρεί ως ένα μοντέλο διοίκησης που περιελάμβανε δραστηριότητες εποικισμού, ανοικοδόμησης και ανάπτυξης, σε αντίθεση με τον όρο «Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία», ο οποίος παραπέμπει στα μοντέλα της αποικιοκρατικής διακυβέρνησης των Άγγλων, των Γάλλων, των Ισπανών και των Πορτογάλων.
- Επικαλείται με δραστικό τρόπο τις εσωτερικές ισορροπίες και τους εξωτερικούς παράγοντες της κάθε περιοχής.
- Αυτοπαρουσιάζεται ως το τελικό άσυλο στο οποίο θα προσφύγει κάποιος σε περίπτωση προβλήματος και ως η δύναμη που εγγυάται είτε την εσωτερική ασφάλεια, είτε και την εδαφική ακεραιότητα μερικών χωρών που διαβιούν οι μειονότητες. Διαπιστώνεται δηλαδή, ότι η Τουρκία όχι μόνο ταυτίζει την ασφάλεια των Βαλκανίων με τις παραμέτρους

ασφαλείας των δυτικών συνόρων της, αλλά επιδιώκει να μετατοπίσει τη γραμμή ασφαλείας της ακόμη δυτικότερα, μέσω πολυμερών και διμερών συμφωνιών ασφαλείας σε βαλκανικό επίπεδο. Ενδεικτικά αναφέρονται οι στρατιωτικές συνεργασίες με την Αλβανία, το Κοσσυφοπέδιο και την Π.Γ.Δ.Μ., οι οποίες δημιουργούν μια επιπλέον απειλή με ασύμμετρες συνιστώσες στα βόρεια σύνορα της Ελλάδος. Τούτο οφείλεται στο γεγονός ότι μέσω των συνεργασιών σε τεχνολογικό και επιστημονικό επίπεδο, σε θέματα στρατιωτικής εκπαίδευσης και δωρεάν παροχής στρατιωτικού υλικού έχει γίνει αποδεκτή και νομιμοποιήθηκε η μόνιμη παρουσία τουρκικών στρατιωτικών τμημάτων στις εν λόγω περιοχές.

Εκτός τούτου, ένας παράγοντας που πρέπει να τύχει ιδιαίτερης προσοχής είναι ότι η Τουρκία έχει τρία διαφορετικά πρόσωπα: πρώτον, την Κωνσταντινούπολη, η οποία αποτελεί το κέντρο των οικονομικών και επιχειρηματικών δραστηριοτήτων της χώρας. Δεύτερον, την Άγκυρα, η οποία αποτελεί το διοικητικό κέντρο και το κέντρο λήψης των πολιτικών αποφάσεων. Και τέλος, την υπόλοιπη χώρα, η οποία στο μέγιστο τμήμα της δεν έχει καταστεί καν μέτοχος των αλλαγών του 20ου αιώνα, με αποτέλεσμα αυτό να αποτελεί μια από τις αιτίες ναυαγίου των ενταξιακών διαπραγματεύσεων με την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Αναλυτικότερα δε, η περιοχή του Μαρμαρά με τις αξιόλογες τεχνολογικές και οικονομικές υποδομές της και έχοντας ως επίκεντρο τις πόλεις Κωνσταντινούπολη και Kocaeli αποτελεί ένα σημαντικό εργαλείο για τις περιφερειακές επιδιώξεις των Τούρκων προς τα Βαλκάνια, τον Καύκασο και τα τουρκόφωνα κράτη της Κεντρικής Ασίας.

Αναφορικά με τα Βαλκάνια, σύμφωνα με την τουρκική στρατηγική, οι πολιτικές, πολιτιστικές, ιστορικές, οικονομικές και βιομηχανικές γραμμές του Kocaeli, της Κωνσταντινούπολης, της Ραιδεστού και της Αδριανούπολης επιδιώκεται να επεκταθούν μέχρι την Αθήνα, τη Σόφια, τα Τίρανα, τη Βοσνία-Ερζεγοβίνη, το Κοσσυφοπέδιο, τα Σκόπια, το Βελιγράδι και το Βουκουρέστι. Για την υλοποίηση της στρατηγικής αυτής χρησιμοποιείται ο τουρκικός όρος «*akilli inisiyatif* (έξυπνη πρωτοβουλία)» που έχει ως «εργαλεία» τα πανεπιστήμια, τον τουρισμό, τη βιομηχανία και τις πολιτιστικές δραστηριότητες. Εξάλλου στα πλαίσια αυτά, εντάσσεται και η λειτουργία ειδικής αντιπροσωπείας του τουρκικού υπουργείου Εξωτερικών με επικεφαλής πρέσβη στην Αδριανούπολη, τα εγκαίνια της οποίας πραγματοποιήθηκαν στις 23-11-2012 από τον υφυπουργό Εξωτερικών πρέσβη Naci Korgu. Μάλιστα ο Korgu, κατά την ομιλία που πραγματοποίησε, ανέφερε ότι η Αδριανούπολη είναι μια ξεχωριστή πόλη διότι για μεγάλο χρονικό διάστημα ήταν η πρωτεύουσα των Οθωμανών και τώρα υπάρχει η θέληση να γίνει η πρωτεύουσα των Βαλκανίων. Συνακόλουθα δε, σημαντικός είναι και ο ρόλος της στρατιωτικής παρουσίας στην περιοχή του Μαρμαρά, όπως η 1^η Στρατιά με το νατοϊκό στρατηγείο του 3^{ου} Σώματος Στρατού, το Αρχηγείο Στόλου με τη ναυτική βάση του Γκιολτσούκ και το σύνολο σχεδόν των ακαδημιών πολέμου, τα οποία με την αποτρεπτική δύναμη που διαθέτουν και τη στρατιωτική διπλωματία που ενασκούν, ενισχύουν έτι περαιτέρω την τουρκική εξωτερική πολιτική.

Φυσικά, όλα αυτά αποτελούν συνέχεια προηγούμενης απόφασης της τουρκικής κυβέρνησης να εντάξει στις 09-04-2011 τη Σμύρνη και την Αττάλεια στα κέντρα της τουρκικής διπλωματίας, πραγματοποιώντας εκεί διεθνείς συνόδους και συνεργασίες, με επιδίωξη την επέκταση των βιομηχανικών, πολιτιστικών, ενεργειακών και στρατιωτικών γραμμών της περιοχής των Δυτικών Παραλίων προς το Αιγαίο, την Ανατολική Μεσόγειο και τις χώρες της Βόρειου Αφρικής. Εξάλλου, τα τελευταία χρόνια, οι Τούρκοι δημιούργησαν περιοχές ελεύθερου εμπορίου στις πόλεις Μερσίνη, Αττάλεια, Σμύρνη, Άδανα και Ντενιζλί, ενώ διέθεσαν μεγάλες πιστώσεις για την ανάπτυξη των Δυτικών Παραλίων, ιδρύοντας μεγάλες βιομηχανικές μονάδες, υλοποιώντας οικιστικά προγράμματα σε όλες τις πόλεις, επεκτείνοντας και εκσυγχρονίζοντας τα οδικά-σιδηροδρομικά

δίκτυα και αναβαθμίζοντας τις λιμενικές εγκαταστάσεις. Παράλληλα, σε συνεργασία με το πανεπιστήμιο Σμύρνης και το πανεπιστήμιο Akdeniz στην Αττάλεια δημιουργήθηκαν ερευνητικά κέντρα τα οποία ασχολούνται με θέματα ασφάλειας τροφίμων, αγροτικής ανάπτυξης, βιολογίας, ενέργειας, περιβάλλοντος, νανοτεχνολογίας, γεωλογίας κ.λπ.

Επισημαίνεται ιδιαίτερα ότι έχει δοθεί ιδιαίτερη βαρύτητα στους φορείς παροχής ιατρικών υπηρεσιών κατά μήκος όλων των Δυτικών Παραλίων, με σκοπό την προβολή της υγειονομικής υποστήριξης που μπορούν να παρέχουν, αφενός σε επιχειρήσεις έρευνας και διάσωσης, αφετέρου σε επιχειρήσεις διακομιδής τραυματιών από περιοχές που υπάρχουν κρίσεις, συγκρούσεις και φυσικές καταστροφές. Σημειωτέον ότι, όλα αυτά αποτελούν μέρος μιας ευρύτερης στρατηγικής η οποία περιλαμβάνει την προμήθεια:

- Επτά πλωτών ασθενοφόρων τα οποία θα επιχειρούν στις νότιες ακτές της Τουρκίας.
- Ενός πλωτού νοσοκομείου το οποίο, σύμφωνα με δήλωση του υπουργού Υγείας Mehmet Müezzinoğlu (σ.σ. Ιανουάριος 2014), θα επιχειρεί σε περιοχές που εστιάζονται στις χώρες της Μέσης Ανατολής και των Βαλκανίων, ενώ η απόφαση για την προμήθεια του ελήφθη από τον πρωθυπουργό Erdogan μετά τον τελευταίο σεισμό στο Πακιστάν και τις συγκρούσεις στη Λιβύη. Υπόψη ότι το νοσοκομείο αυτό θα παρέχει ιατρικές υπηρεσίες σε 24ωρη βάση, θα έχει μήκος 200 μ., θα διαθέτει 206 κλίνες, 10 πολυκλινικές επειγόντων περιστατικών, 8 χειρουργεία, 16 μονάδες εντατικής θεραπείας, μικροβιολογικό εργαστήριο και 2 ελικοδρόμια. Επίσης, το κόστος του ανέρχεται στα 100 εκατομμύρια δολάρια και θα επανδρώνεται από 157 άτομα (122 ιατρικό και παραϊατρικό προσωπικό και 35 άτομα πλήρωμα).
- Ενός πλοίου αποβατικών επιχειρήσεων LPD, το οποίο πέραν της σοβαρότατης απειλής που δημιουργεί στην ελληνική κυριαρχία στο Αιγαίο και την Κύπρο, θα προβάλει τις δυνατότητες της Τουρκίας να επιχειρεί σε περιοχές επιχειρήσεων στη Μαύρη Θάλασσα, στο Αιγαίο, στη Μεσόγειο, καθώς επίσης στον Ινδικό και Ατλαντικό Ωκεανό. Η ναυπήγηση του LPD κόστους ενός δισ. δολαρίων ανατέθηκε σε τουρκική εταιρεία και το πλοίο αυτό θα έχει τις εξής δυνατότητες: μήκος 215 μέτρα περίπου, ταχύτητα 22 knot (40 χλμ/ώρα), πλήρωμα πλοίου 190 άτομα, προσωπικό πτήσεων 56 άτομα, υγειονομικό προσωπικό 50 άτομα, θα υπάρχει δυνατότητα καθέτου απογείωσης και προσγείωσης αεροσκαφών, θα υπάρχει νοσοκομείο με δυνατότητα χειρουργικών επεμβάσεων, καθώς επίσης θα μεταφέρει 1.200 πεζοναύτες, 13 άρματα, 27 τεθωρακισμένα αποβατικά οχήματα (AAV), 6 τεθωρακισμένα οχήματα μεταφοράς προσωπικού, 33 οχήματα διαφόρων τύπων, 15 ρυμουλκά, 8 ελικόπτερα και 3 μη επανδρωμένα αεροσκάφη.

Παράλληλα, τα τελευταία χρόνια η τουρκική κυβέρνηση έχει ενεργοποιήσει ένα δίκτυο Ινστιτούτων Στρατηγικών Μελετών τα οποία «στρατολόγησαν» ακαδημαϊκούς, πρώην διπλωμάτες, απόστρατους αξιωματικούς και επιστήμονες με σκοπό τη σύνταξη μελετών για την αντιμετώπιση των πολιτικών, οικονομικών, τεχνολογικών, κοινωνικο-πολιτιστικών και περιβαλλοντολογικών προβλημάτων της Τουρκίας. Οι μελέτες αυτές αποσκοπούν στην υποβοήθηση του τουρκικού κρατικού μηχανισμού για την αξιολόγηση των απειλών για τα επόμενα 5, 10 και 15 χρόνια και τη διαμόρφωση όλων εκείνων των στρατηγικών που έχουν σχέση με την ασφάλεια και τις γεωπολιτικές-γεωοικονομικές-γεωπολιτιστικές εξελίξεις, επισημαίνοντας ταυτόχρονα τους κινδύνους αλλά και τις ευκαιρίες που παρουσιάζονται μέσα στο συνεχώς μεταβαλλόμενο γεωπολιτικό περιβάλλον.

2.2.3 Εγγύς θαλάσσιος χώρος της Τουρκίας

Η Τουρκία επαναξιολόγησε τις στρατηγικές της επιδιώξεις, θέτοντας ως βασική προϋπόθεση ότι, οι θαλάσσιες λεκάνες και οι θαλάσσιοι διάδρομοι που την περιβάλλουν συνδέονται μεταξύ τους λόγω του ανταγωνισμού που υπάρχει μεταξύ των διαφόρων συνασπισμών. Αναλυτικότερα δε:

- Πρώτον, σε ό,τι αφορά στη Μαύρη Θάλασσα, η Άγκυρα θεωρεί ότι δεν πρέπει να περιοριστεί μόνο στο στρατιωτικό πεδίο, αλλά πρέπει να χρησιμοποιηθεί μια πιο δραστική μέθοδος για ένα οικονομικό άνοιγμα, λαμβάνοντας μέτρα που θα ενθαρρύνουν τις θαλάσσιες συγκοινωνίες πέραν των συνόρων της. Έτσι, η Τουρκία θα αποτελεί ένα σημαντικό παράγοντα, σε μια γραμμή συγκοινωνιών που θα συνδέει την περιοχή της Ανατολικής Μαύρης Θάλασσας, την Ανατολική Ευρώπη και τις Στέπες της Ασίας με την Μέση Ανατολή και τον Ινδικό Ωκεανό. Πάνω σε αυτή τη γραμμή θα μπορέσει να εξασφαλισθεί το πιο σύντομο και οικονομικό δίκτυο επικοινωνιών. Αυτό το δίκτυο θα περνάει από την Τουρκία και θα ενώνει την δυναμική οικονομική λεκάνη της Ανατολικής Ασίας με την Ανατολική και Κεντρική Ευρώπη.
- Δεύτερον, τα Στενά αποτελούν ένα από τα πιο σημαντικά γεωπολιτικά πλεονεκτήματα της Τουρκίας και τα προβάλλει μέσω μιας σταθερής στρατηγικής και μιας καλά προετοιμασμένης διπλωματίας, με σκοπό να προσδώσει σε αυτά τη μέγιστη και μακροπρόθεσμη στρατηγική σημασία τους.
- Τρίτον, το Αιγαίο και η Κύπρος αποτελούν δύο πολύ σημαντικούς παράγοντες που επηρεάζουν διαχρονικά τον εγγύς θαλάσσιο χώρο της Τουρκίας.
- Τέταρτον, αναφορικά με την Κύπρο, αυτή έχει ιδιαίτερη αξία για την Τουρκία ως ένα σημείο κλειδί μιας γενικής θαλάσσιας στρατηγικής, σχετιζόμενης με τον εγγύς θαλάσσιο χώρο, ο οποίος οριοθετείται από τη γραμμή Κασπία - Μαύρη Θάλασσα - Στενά - Αιγαίο - Ανατολική Μεσόγειος - Σουέζ - Περσικός Κόλπος.

Και πέμπτον, η διασύνδεση του Περσικού Κόλπου με την Ανατολική Μεσόγειο αποτελεί για την Τουρκία μια στρατηγική προτεραιότητα που δεν θα εγκαταλειφθεί, δεδομένου ότι η περιφερειακή ενεργή παρουσία της θα μεταμορφωθεί σε αντίστοιχη διηπειρωτική.

2.2.4 Τα αδιέξοδα της τουρκικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής

Στην τουρκική εξωτερική πολιτική εισήχθησαν ορισμένες έννοιες όπως, «στρατηγικό βάθος», «μηδενικά προβλήματα με τους γείτονες», «μέγιστο όφελος από τους γείτονες», «προληπτική διπλωματία», «μετριοπαθής ισχύς», «ρυθμική εξωτερική πολιτική», «εξασφάλιση των ισορροπιών μεταξύ ασφάλειας και ανεξαρτησίας», «στρατηγική συνεργασία με τις ομοεθνείς και συγγενικές τουρκικές χώρες προκειμένου να αποκατασταθεί η εικόνα του μεγάλου αδελφού που έχει η Τουρκία στα Βαλκάνια, στον Καύκασο, στην Κεντρική Ασία και στη Μέση Ανατολή» κ.λπ. Επιπλέον, για να υλοποιηθούν αυτές οι έννοιες στις εξωτερικές σχέσεις της Άγκυρας, ο πρωθυπουργός Erdogan και ο υπουργός Εξωτερικών Davutoğlu έδωσαν μια νέα κατεύθυνση που διαχωρίστηκε πλήρως από τις παλιές παραμέτρους. Ωστόσο, η εν λόγω αλλαγή πλεύσης αφενός προσέκρουσε στις πολιτικές της Δύσης, δεδομένου ότι έγινε εμφανής η αντίληψη της ανεξάρτητης τουρκικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής, αφετέρου προκλήθηκαν οι φόβοι στο εσωτερικό της χώρας ότι αυτό θα αποτελούσε αντικείμενο κερδοσκοπίας από κέντρα που επιβουλεύονται τα συμφέροντα της Τουρκίας. Εν τω μεταξύ, όλα αυτά είχαν ως συνέπεια τη διολίσθηση της εξωτερικής πολιτικής της Άγκυρας σε πάρα πολλά αδιέξοδα, με κυριότερα τα εξής:

- Οι κατ' επανάληψη δηλώσεις του Τούρκου πρωθυπουργού Erdogan προς τη Ρωσία, ότι σε περίπτωση συμμετοχής της χώρας του στον Οργανισμό Συνεργασίας της Σαγκάης ως πλήρες μέλος, η Άγκυρα θα έχανε κάθε ενδιαφέρον για την ένταξη της στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, καθώς επίσης η συμφωνία προμηθείας κινεζικών αντιαεροπορικών συστημάτων μεγάλου βεληνεκούς, ενόχλησαν τη Δύση και επιβεβαίωσαν για ακόμη μια φορά την αφερεγγυότητα της τουρκικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής.
- Η εμμονή της Τουρκίας να εμποδίσει την επίλυση του κυπριακού προβλήματος σύμφωνα με τις αρχές του Ο.Η.Ε. και της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης την απομακρύνει από την Ευρώπη.
- Η αρνητική στάση της Άγκυρας στην επίλυση των προβλημάτων της με την Αρμενία την απομακρύνει από τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες.
- Η ψυχρότητα που υπάρχει μεταξύ Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών και Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης αποτελεί μια αρνητική εξέλιξη για την Τουρκία, διότι έτσι μειώνεται η επιρροή των Αμερικανών προς την Ευρώπη σχετικά με την Τουρκία.
- Η διατάραξη των σχέσεων Τουρκίας-Ισραήλ ενοχλεί τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, διότι δυσχεραίνονται οι στρατηγικοί σχεδιασμοί των Αμερικανών για τη Μέση Ανατολή.
- Η Τουρκία κατηγορεί το Ισραήλ για απάνθρωπες επιθέσεις εναντίον των Παλαιστινίων, ενώ η ίδια αφενός έχει διαπράξει τις γενοκτονίες των Ποντίων, των Αρμενίων και του κουρδικού λαού, αφετέρου είναι η χώρα των ομαδικών τάφων και η χώρα που χρησιμοποίησε χημικά όπλα εναντίον των ανταρτών της κουρδικής εξέγερσης που διεκδικούν τα ατομικά τους δικαιώματα, των οποίων η καταπάτηση είναι γνωστή σε όλο το δυτικό κόσμο.
- Οι λάθος εκτιμήσεις για τις εξελίξεις στην Αίγυπτο και η εμμονή του Erdogan να υποστηρίζει του Αδελφούς Μουσουλμάνους οδήγησαν τις τουρκο-αιγυπτιακές σχέσεις σε πλήρες αδιέξοδο με αποτέλεσμα η Άγκυρα να χάσει ένα σημαντικό σύμμαχο στην περιοχή. Ενδεικτικό παράδειγμα των καλών σχέσεων που υπήρχαν μεταξύ των χωρών ήταν: α. Οι διαπραγματεύσεις της Τουρκίας, μέσω του διοικητού της Εθνικής Υπηρεσίας Πληροφοριών ΜΙΤ, με την τότε αιγυπτιακή κυβέρνηση προκειμένου να αποσταλούν Τούρκο σύμβουλοι στην Αίγυπτο για να συμβάλλουν στην αναδιοργάνωση του κρατικού μηχανισμού. β. Η διεξαγωγή της διακλαδικής άσκησης *Dostluk Denizi-2011*/Θάλασσα Φιλίας-2011 (σ.σ. πραγματοποιήθηκε από 17 έως 23-12-2011), η οποία έχει ως στόχο τη συνεργασία των τουρκικών και αιγυπτιακών ναυτικών δυνάμεων στην περιοχή της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου.
- Η μη επίλυση του κουρδικού προβλήματος ενοχλεί του Αμερικανούς, διότι αυτό έχει αντίκτυπο στις σχέσεις τους με τους Κούρδους του βορείου Ιράκ.
- Η Τουρκία στα πλαίσια της στρατηγικής «μηδενικά προβλήματα με τους γείτονες» υποστήριξε το Ιράν και αναβάθμισε τη συνεργασία της σε πολλούς τομείς όπως στον τομέα της ενέργειας και του πυρηνικού του προγράμματος, με αποτέλεσμα να προκαλέσει τη δυσανασχέτηση τόσο των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών, όσο και άλλων σημαντικών παραγόντων της διεθνούς κοινότητας.
- Οι χειρισμοί της Άγκυρας μετέτρεψαν την κρίση στη Συρία στο κυριότερο πρόβλημα της εξωτερικής πολιτικής της, με αποτέλεσμα αυτό να είναι η αιτία δημιουργίας ασύμμετρων απειλών στο εσωτερικό της χώρας.

- Το άνοιγμα των Τούρκων στα τουρκόφωνα κράτη του Καυκάσου και της Κεντρικής Ασίας δημιούργησε ανησυχία στη Ρωσία άσχετα με την προσέγγιση που υπάρχει το τελευταίο χρονικό διάστημα στις τουρκο-ρωσικές σχέσεις στους τομείς της ενέργειας, της πυρηνικής τεχνολογίας και του τουρισμού.
- Η διείσδυση της Άγκυρας στα Βαλκάνια μέσω των μουσουλμανικών μειονοτήτων, οι οποίες στο σύνολό τους βαφτίζονται από αυτήν ως τουρκικές, δημιουργούν αισθήματα ανασφάλειας κατά βάση στην Ελλάδα και τη Βουλγαρία.
- Τα εσωτερικά προβλήματα που αντιμετωπίζει η Τουρκία, λόγω της κοινωνικής και πολιτικής πόλωσης που έχει δημιουργηθεί, ώθησαν τον πρωθυπουργό Erdogan να προβεί σε δηλώσεις και κινήσεις στην εξωτερική πολιτική, οι οποίες έχουν αποδέκτη την κοινή γνώμη της χώρας του, αδιαφορώντας για τα προβλήματα που αυτές δημιουργούν στις σχέσεις της Άγκυρας με σημαντικά κέντρα αποφάσεων της διεθνούς κοινότητας.


2.3 Η στρατηγική εθνικής ασφαλείας της Τουρκίας

Η στρατηγική εθνικής ασφαλείας της Τουρκίας αφορά στη διαφύλαξη της ανεξαρτησίας, της εθνικής κυριαρχίας, της εδαφικής ακεραιότητας και των εθνικών συμφερόντων της χώρας, εστιαζόμενη στους τομείς της στρατιωτικής, πολιτικής, οικονομικής, κοινωνικής και περιβαλλοντολογικής ασφαλείας. Επιπλέον, σύμφωνα με την τουρκική αντίληψη, οι στρατηγικές ασφαλείας διακρίνονται σε τρεις κατηγορίες: στις ειρηνικές, στις συγκρουσιακές και στις στρατηγικές του πολέμου.

Με τις ειρηνικές στρατηγικές ασφαλείας εξασφαλίζεται η διαφύλαξη των συμφερόντων της Τουρκίας χωρίς να υπάρξει σύγκρουση μεταξύ των αντιπάλων, χρησιμοποιώντας ως μέσα, αφενός την απειλή χρήσης βίας και την αποτροπή, αφετέρου οικονομικές και διπλωματικές διαδικασίες παράλληλα με τη δημιουργία συνεργασιών σε παγκόσμιο και περιφερειακό επίπεδο. Ειδικότερα δε, οι οικονομικές διαδικασίες περιλαμβάνουν την αποστολή εξωτερικής βοήθειας και οικονομικής επιβράβευσης, ενώ οι αντίστοιχες διπλωματικές περιλαμβάνουν τη διαπραγματεύση, την υποβολή νέων προτάσεων, το συμβιβασμό, τη διαμεσολάβηση, την επίδειξη καλής θέλησης και τέλος τον «προσηλυτισμό» και την καθοδήγηση των ΜΜΕ και των προσωπικοτήτων της αντίπαλης πλευράς που λαμβάνουν τις αποφάσεις.

Σε ό,τι αφορά στις συγκρουσιακές στρατηγικές, αυτές διακρίνονται σε τέσσερις κατηγορίες: πρώτον, στις διπλωματικές στρατηγικές, με τη λήψη μονομερών αποφάσεων, τη δημιουργία τετελεσμένων και την επιβολή στην αντίπαλη πλευρά να συμμετάσχει σε διαπραγματεύσεις που δεν είχαν προκαθορισθεί. Δεύτερον, στις οικονομικές στρατηγικές, με υπονόμευση, αποκλεισμό, διείσδυση και πιέσεις. Τρίτον, στις θερμές συγκρουσιακές καταστάσεις χωρίς να εκδηλωθεί πόλεμος, με προκλήσεις, προβοκάτσιας, τρομοκρατικές ενέργειες, δολιοφθορές, θερμά επεισόδια και υποκίνηση για να πληγεί η εσωτερική ασφάλεια του αντιπάλου. Και τέλος, στις στρατιωτικές στρατηγικές που περιλαμβάνουν τη δημιουργία περιβάλλοντος ψυχρού πολέμου και τη διεξαγωγή μονομερών ή διμερών ασκήσεων.

Ο σχεδιασμός της τουρκικής εθνικής ασφαλείας αποτελεί μια πολύπλοκη διαδικασία εξέτασης διαφόρων παραγόντων, η οποία περιλαμβάνεται σε απόρρητο εγχειρίδιο της Ακαδημίας Εθνικής Ασφαλείας των τουρκικών ενόπλων δυνάμεων που εκδόθηκε το Φεβρουάριο του 2001 και περιλαμβάνει τα εξής:



Διαδικασία σχεδιασμού της εθνικής ασφάλειας της Τουρκίας

Plate 29: Turkish national security planning process

Αρχικά αναλύεται η γεωπολιτική, γεωστρατηγική και γεωοικονομική κατάσταση της χώρας. Στη συνέχεια, αξιολογείται η κατάσταση εθνικής ασφάλειας και συγκεκριμένα: η κατάσταση της εξωτερικής πολιτικής, η κατάσταση της εσωτερικής ασφάλειας, η πολιτικο-στρατιωτική κατάσταση, η κοινωνικο-πολιτιστική κατάσταση, η οικονομική κατάσταση, καθώς επίσης η επιστημονική και τεχνολογική κατάσταση. Κατόπιν, ακολουθεί ο καθορισμός των εθνικών συμφερόντων λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τόσο το εσωτερικό, όσο το διεθνές περιβάλλον αναλύοντας τους παράγοντες που ακολουθούν:

- *Εσωτερικό περιβάλλον:* Εθνικές αξίες, εθνικά φρονήματα, εσωτερική απειλή, στάση και συμπεριφορά της κοινωνίας, οικονομικές συνθήκες, εθνική δομή, ιδεολογική δομή, κοινωνικές ανάγκες, ΜΜΕ, καθώς επίσης επιστημονικές και τεχνολογικές συνθήκες.
- *Διεθνές περιβάλλον:* Γενική ασφάλεια διεθνώς, ισορροπία δυνάμεων, περιφερειακές εξωτερικές απειλές, συμμαχίες, διεθνείς οργανισμοί, διεθνές δίκαιο, οικονομικές συνθήκες διεθνώς, τεχνολογικές εξελίξεις και παγκοσμιοποίηση.

Επισημαίνεται ιδιαίτερα ότι τα τουρκικά εθνικά συμφέροντα αφορούν:

- Στην χωρίς όρους ηγεμονική παρουσία του έθνους.
- Στη διαφύλαξη του έθνους και της πατρίδας από εσωτερικές και εξωτερικές απειλές και κινδύνους.
- Στην εθνική και κρατική ακεραιότητα και συνοχή.
- Στην εξασφάλιση της ζωής και της περιουσίας των πολιτών.

- Στην υλοποίηση της ρήσης του Atatürk «ειρήνη στην πατρίδα ειρήνη διεθνώς».
- Στη δημιουργία προϋποθέσεων για εξασφάλιση και προστασία των ατομικών δικαιωμάτων και των βασικών ατομικών ελευθεριών.
- Στη δίκαιη διανομή του εθνικού εισοδήματος σύμφωνα με κοινωνικά κριτήρια.
- Στην παροχή των αναγκαίων υγειονομικών, εκπαιδευτικών και λοιπών υπηρεσιών σε εθνικό επίπεδο.

Ακολουθώντας, καθορίζονται οι εθνικοί στόχοι (πολιτικοί, κοινωνικοί, πολιτιστικοί, οικονομικοί και στρατιωτικοί) βάσει των στοιχείων εθνικής ισχύος της Τουρκίας και της αντίπαλης χώρας. Σημειωτέον ότι, τα στοιχεία εθνικής ισχύος περιλαμβάνουν τη γεωγραφική, τη δημογραφική, την πολιτική, την οικονομική, την επιστημονική και τεχνολογική, τη ψυχοκοινωνική και πολιτιστική, καθώς επίσης τη στρατιωτική ισχύ.

Μετά τον καθορισμό των εθνικών στόχων, συντάσσεται το *Milli Guvenlik Siyaset Belgesi*/Έγγραφο Πολιτικής Εθνικής Ασφαλείας(MGSB) που περιλαμβάνει την αξιολόγηση του παρελθόντος, της υπάρχουσας κατάστασης και των μελλοντικών εξελίξεων αναφορικά με την εσωτερική ασφάλεια της χώρας, την εξωτερική ασφάλεια αυτής και τις αρχές της αμυντικής πολιτικής. Το MGSB συντάχθηκε για πρώτη φορά το 1963, του είχε δοθεί ο τίτλος *Milli Güvenlik Politikasının Esasları*/Αρχές της Πολιτικής Εθνικής Ασφαλείας και επειδή το εξώφυλλο του είχε κόκκινο χρώμα, τα τουρκικά ΜΜΕ το αποκαλούσαν *Kırmızı Kitap*/Κόκκινη Βίβλος. Επιπλέον, αυτό θεωρείται ως ο «οδικός χάρτης» όλων των κυβερνήσεων, είναι απόρρητο, αναθεωρείται όταν απαιτηθεί (συνήθως αναθεωρείται κάθε πέντε έτη), συντάσσεται από το υπουργικό συμβούλιο και εγκρίνεται από το Συμβούλιο Εθνικής Ασφαλείας. Μετά την έγκρισή του, το MGSB διανέμεται σε όλα τα υπουργεία και τους αρμόδιους φορείς-οργανισμούς υπό μορφή πρωθυπουργικών κατευθυντήριων οδηγιών και ακολουθούν οι παρακάτω διαδικασίες: Καθορίζεται η στρατηγική των υπουργείων, των φορέων και οργανισμών και στη συνέχεια ακολουθούν οι επιμέρους στρατηγικές αυτών και τα σχέδια εφαρμογής τους. Παράλληλα, καθορίζεται και η στρατιωτική στρατηγική των τουρκικών ενόπλων δυνάμεων. Υπόψη ότι, ο ορισμός της στρατιωτικής στρατηγικής είναι κοινός σχεδόν σε όλα τα κράτη και αναφέρεται στην επιστήμη και την τέχνη χρησιμοποίησης των ενόπλων δυνάμεων ενός κράτους ή ενός συνασπισμού κρατών, η οποία αποβλέπει στην επίτευξη των σκοπών της εθνικής ή συμμαχικής πολιτικής με τη χρησιμοποίηση ή απειλή χρήσης βίας. Μετά τον καθορισμό αυτής, το τουρκικό Γενικό Επιτελείο Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων διατυπώνει την Εθνική Στρατιωτική Στρατηγική (*Milli Askeri Strateji*) βάσει της οποίας συντάσσονται:

- Το γενικό/διακλαδικό δόγμα επιχειρήσεων.
- Οι επιχειρήσεις των Κλάδων (στρατού ξηράς, ναυτικού και αεροπορίας) και τα λοιπά δόγματα.
- Η γνωστοποίηση των αναγκών των Κλάδων των ενόπλων δυνάμεων και οι προτάσεις τους για τη δομή, τον εκσυγχρονισμό, την πολεμική προετοιμασία, τις οικοδομικές επενδύσεις, τους στόχους και τις δυνατότητες σχεδιασμού τους.

- Το σχέδιο του στρατηγικού στόχου και το 10ετές πρόγραμμα προμηθειών.

Στο προβαλλόμενο διάγραμμα φαίνεται η σειρά των διαδικασιών που προαναφέρθηκαν.




Plate 30: Organization of State Security

Επιπρόσθετα, σύμφωνα με τον Τούρκο καθηγητή Nurullah Aydin του πανεπιστημίου Gazi της Κωνσταντινούπολης, η στρατηγική εθνικής ασφαλείας της Τουρκίας βασίζεται στις ακόλουθες αρχές:

- Ενδυνάμωση της εθνικής οικονομίας ώστε η χώρα να μην είναι ευάλωτη από το εξωτερικό.
- Δεν πρέπει να υπάρξει καμία συμφωνία και συνεργασία που δεν θα συνάδει με τα συμφέροντα της χώρας.
- Εφαρμογή αποφασιστικών πολιτικών που θα στηρίζονται στην αποτροπή.
- Ύπαρξη μιας αποτρεπτικής δύναμης για να διαφυλαχθούν τα εθνικά συμφέροντα και να υπάρξουν οι απαιτούμενες ισορροπίες έναντι των σύμμετρων απειλών στον περίγυρο της χώρας.
- Οι τουρκικές ένοπλες δυνάμεις δεν πρέπει να παραμείνουν μια κλασσική στρατιωτική δύναμη, αλλά πρέπει να μετατραπούν σε μια πυρηνική δύναμη που θα εξοπλιστεί με πυρηνικά όπλα και θα αποκτήσει υψηλή τεχνολογία. Επιπρόσθετα, αυτές θα πρέπει να έχουν τη δυνατότητα διεξαγωγής αμυντικών και επιθετικών πληροφοριακών επιχειρήσεων, καθώς επίσης και ετοιμότητα διεξαγωγής στρατιωτικών επιχειρήσεων για μεγάλο

χρονικό διάστημα.

- Αποτροπή των νέων διεθνών κινδύνων και ασύμμετρων απειλών που θα βλάψουν τα συμφέροντα της χώρας στο εσωτερικό και στο εξωτερικό.
- Λήψη όλων των απαραίτητων μέτρων για διαφύλαξη της ακεραιότητας και συνοχής της χώρας.
- Τήρηση αποφασιστικής στάσης έναντι των εξελίξεων στα Βαλκάνια, τη Μέση Ανατολή και τον Καύκασο που απειλούν την ασφάλεια της Τουρκίας.
- Διαφύλαξη των συμφερόντων της Τουρκίας στο Αιγαίο και την Κύπρο τα οποία αποτελούν το θεμέλιο λίθο της τουρκικής ασφάλειας στη Μεσόγειο.

Επιπλέον, στις ενημερώσεις τους κατά τη διάρκεια των ασκήσεων, οι Τούρκοι αναφέρουν ότι μετά το πέρας του Ψυχρού Πολέμου η έννοια της συμβατικής ολοκληρωτικής στρατιωτικής απειλής, σε μεγάλο βαθμό, τέθηκε στο περιθώριο και αντικαταστάθηκε από κινδύνους και ασύμμετρες απειλές όπως, η τρομοκρατία, οι εθνικές συγκρούσεις, η παράνομη εξάπλωση των όπλων μαζικής καταστροφής, ο κυβερνοπόλεμος, η λαθρομετανάστευση, οι μεταδοτικές ασθένειες και οι φυσικές καταστροφές με ιδιαίτερη έμφαση στους σεισμούς.

Κρίνεται σκόπιμο να τονισθεί ότι σχετικά με τους σεισμούς, που θεωρούνται ως εν δυνάμει απειλή, όλα τα τουρκικά ΜΜΕ, στις 31-1-2011, έκαναν εκτενή αναφορά στην πρόβλεψη του Αζέρου επιστήμονα Elcin Halilov για εκδήλωση σεισμού 6,5 ρίχτερ είτε στην Κωνσταντινούπολη είτε στη Σμύρνη, την περίοδο 2011-2015 και με μεγαλύτερη πιθανότητα τα έτη 2013 και 2014. Επίσης, ο εν λόγω επιστήμονας ενημέρωσε σχετικά την τουρκική πρωθυπουργία και συζητήθηκε η δημιουργία σταθμών συλλογής δεδομένων σε 5 διαφορετικές περιοχές της Τουρκίας. Ας σημειωθεί ακόμη, ότι ο Τούρκος καθηγητής Ahmet Mete Işıkara, σύμβουλος του προέδρου της Τουρκικής Ημισελήνου, το Φεβρουάριο του 2011 συνέταξε ένα χάρτη με τις περιοχές της Τουρκίας όπου υπάρχουν σοβαρές ενδείξεις για πρόκληση μεγάλου σεισμού. Επιπρόσθετα δε, η τουρκική εφημερίδα Milliyet/13-6-2012 σε δημοσίευμα της ανέφερε τα εξής:

“Ο καθηγητής Işıkara δήλωσε ότι δεν θα εκπλαγεί εάν μέχρι την 10-6-2013 εκδηλωθεί κάποιος σεισμός στην Τουρκία μεγέθους 6-6,9 ρίχτερ. Επίσης το ίδιο ισχύει εάν μέχρι το 2015-2016-2017 εκδηλωθεί κάποιος σεισμός μεγέθους 7 ρίχτερ. Σύμφωνα με τον καθηγητή Işıkara, ως περιοχές υψηλού κινδύνου θεωρούνται οι: Tokat-Erzincan-Bingol-Elazığ (7 ρίχτερ), Hatay (7 ρίχτερ), Σμύρνη (6 ρίχτερ), Marmara (6,5-7 ρίχτερ) και Gemlik (7 ρίχτερ).”

Ωστόσο, οι εξελίξεις στη Συρία και η αστάθεια που δημιουργήθηκε στη Μέση Ανατολή μετά τις εξεγέρσεις της Αραβικής Άνοιξης οδήγησαν την τουρκική κυβέρνηση στην επαναξιολόγηση της καταστάσεως ασφαλείας της χώρας, στον καθορισμό των νέων απειλών και στην εφαρμογή μιας νέας στρατηγικής για την αντιμετώπισή τους. Για το λόγο αυτό, οι τουρκικές ένοπλες δυνάμεις προχωρούν σε ριζικές αλλαγές προκειμένου να εναρμονισθούν με το νέο περιβάλλον ασφαλείας. Ο κύριος σκοπός των αλλαγών αυτών εστιάζεται στη δημιουργία μιας νέας δομής δυνάμεων με μείωση των κλιμακίων διοίκησης, ενώ ταυτόχρονα θα αυξηθεί η ισχύς πυρός μέσω εξοπλιστικών προγραμμάτων εκσυγχρονισμού και ανάπτυξης οπλικών συστημάτων. Όλα τα παραπάνω

αφορούν στην απόφαση της Άγκυρας να αναθεωρήσει το 2012 το Δόγμα της Εθνικής Στρατιωτικής Στρατηγικής της [Milli Askeri Stratejik Konsepti (MASK)] και συγκεκριμένα την επιστροφή στο δόγμα των 2,5 πολέμων από το δόγμα του 1,5 πολέμου. Για τους Τούρκους, τα θέατρα επιχειρήσεων των δύο πολέμων εστιάζονται, το πρώτο στη Συρία και το δεύτερο στην Ελλάδα, ενώ το αντίστοιχο δόγμα του μισού πολέμου αφορά στο κουρδικό απελευθερωτικό κίνημα PKK/KCK και στη τρομοκρατία. Υπόψη ότι το MASK συντάσσεται από το Γενικό Επιτελείο Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων, αναφέρεται στους εθνικούς στρατιωτικούς στόχους στα πλαίσια ενός οράματος 20-30 ετών και θεωρείται ως το «Σύνταγμα» των τουρκικών ενόπλων δυνάμεων. Μετά τη σύνταξη και το νομικό έλεγχο του, αυτό παρουσιάζεται στη συνεδρίαση του Ανωτάτου Στρατιωτικού Συμβουλίου προκειμένου να εγκριθεί από τον πρωθυπουργό και στη συνέχεια να τεθεί σε εφαρμογή. Επισημαίνεται ότι το Ανώτατο Στρατιωτικό Συμβούλιο (Α.Σ.Σ.) καθορίζει το στρατιωτικό δόγμα και τους κύριους στόχους των τουρκικών ενόπλων δυνάμεων. Παράλληλα, αυτό λαμβάνει αποφάσεις για θέματα που άπτονται της στρατιωτικής νομοθεσίας και των στρατιωτικών κανονισμών. Το Α.Σ.Σ. συνέρχεται δύο φορές ετησίως (Αύγουστο και Νοέμβριο) υπό την προεδρία του πρωθυπουργού και μέλη τον αρχηγό ενόπλων δυνάμεων, τον υπουργό Εθνικής Άμυνας, τους αρχηγούς των Διοικήσεων Χερσαίων, Ναυτικών, Αεροπορικών Δυνάμεων και στρατοχωροφυλακής, καθώς επίσης όλους τους ανώτατους αξιωματικούς που φέρουν το βαθμό του στρατηγού, ναυάρχου και πτεράρχου. Επίσης, ο αρχηγός των ενόπλων δυνάμεων αντικαθιστά τον πρωθυπουργό σε περίπτωση απουσίας του.

Στον πίνακα που ακολουθεί παρατίθενται τα κριτήρια που αξιολογούν οι Τούρκοι αναφορικά με την κατάσταση της εθνικής ισχύος της αντίπαλης χώρας.

ΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΗ ΕΘΝΙΚΗΣ ΙΣΧΥΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΤΙΠΑΛΗΣ ΧΩΡΑΣ		
ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΑ	ΑΠΕΙΛΗ	ΚΙΝΔΥΝΟΣ
Στρατιωτική ισχύς	Διαθέτει αποτρεπτική δύναμη	Διαθέτει οπλικά συστήματα μαζικής καταστροφής και μακρού πλήγματος σε περιορισμένες ποσότητες.
Πολιτική ισχύς	Έχει πρόθεση, σκοπό και αποφασιστικότητα για να υποστηρίξει την εξωτερική πολιτική	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ο σκοπός, οι προθέσεις, η αποφασιστικότητα και η υποστήριξη της εξωτερικής πολιτικής της είναι απρόβλεπτοι. - Παρέχει υποστήριξη στην τρομοκρατία - Έχει τη δυνατότητα υποστήριξης ασύμμετρων ενεργειών προκειμένου να ανατραπεί το καθεστώς κ.λπ. - Παρέχει υποστήριξη σε εθνικά μορφώματα και θρησκευτικές αδελφότητες που θα θέσουν σε κίνδυνο την ακεραιότητα και συνοχή της Τουρκίας

ΚΑΤΑΣΤΑΣΗ ΕΘΝΙΚΗΣ ΙΣΧΥΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΤΙΠΑΛΗΣ ΧΩΡΑΣ		
ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΑ	ΑΠΕΙΛΗ	ΚΙΝΔΥΝΟΣ
Οικονομική ισχύς Λοιπά στοιχεία εθνικής ισχύος - Δημογραφική ισχύς - Γεωγραφική ισχύς - Επιστημονική και τεχνολογική ισχύς - Ψυχοκοινωνική και πολιτιστική ισχύς	Κατάσταση υποστήριξης της στρατιωτικής ισχύος	- Θα υποστηρίξει τη στρατιωτική ισχύ σε καθορισμένο ή περιορισμένο βαθμό - Δεν είναι σε θέση να υποστηρίξει τη στρατιωτική ισχύ
Επιρροή της εθνικής ισχύος της αντίπαλης χώρας στα τουρκικά εθνικά συμφέροντα	Υφίστανται εμπόδια και δυσκολίες	Θα καθυστερήσει
Χρησιμοποίηση της στρατιωτικής ισχύος της αντίπαλης χώρας	- Θα χρησιμοποιήσει τη στρατιωτική της ισχύ με δική της πρωτοβουλία - Θα χρησιμοποιήσει τη στρατιωτική της ισχύ χωρίς τη δική της πρωτοβουλία	

3. 2^η Θεματική ενότητα

3.1 Τουρκικές ένοπλες δυνάμεις

Από την ίδρυση της Τουρκικής Δημοκρατίας, οι ένοπλες δυνάμεις της χώρας βρίσκονται στο επίκεντρο τόσο της εσωτερικής όσο και της εξωτερικής της πολιτικής. Πολύ περισσότερο από ό,τι συμβαίνει στα εσωτερικά ζητήματα, αυτές απολάμβαναν σημαντικά ευρύτερη θεσμική αυτονομία και θεωρούσαν ότι είναι οι καθ' ύλη αρμόδιες, όταν πρόκειται για κύρια και ευαίσθητα θέματα της εξωτερικής πολιτικής, όπως το κυπριακό, το Αιγαίο, το κουρδικό, οι εξελίξεις στο βόρειο Ιράκ και οι σχέσεις με το Ισραήλ. Επιπλέον, η αυτονομία αυτή εξακολουθεί να υφίσταται σε ορισμένα θέματα δημοκρατικού ελέγχου και συγκεκριμένα στο διαχωρισμό αρμοδιοτήτων που υπάρχει μεταξύ του Γενικού Επιτελείου Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων και του υπουργείου Άμυνας, καθώς επίσης στις διαδικασίες σύνταξης της αμυντικής πολιτικής, του προϋπολογισμού και των απαιτήσεων σε εξοπλισμούς.

Αυτό που έχει ξεχωριστό ενδιαφέρον είναι ότι η τουρκική κοινωνία αποδέχεται και νομιμοποιεί εν μέρει τον ρόλο αυτό των τουρκικών ενόπλων δυνάμεων, παρά τη στρατηγική αποκαθήλωση που υπέστησαν από την κυβέρνηση Erdogan μετά το 2008 λόγω των δικών της Ergenekon και της Βαριοπούλας. Η άποψη αυτή επιβεβαιώνεται από σχετική έρευνα που πραγματοποίησε το τουρκικό κέντρο στρατηγικών μελετών BİLGE SAM τον Ιανουάριο του 2013 αναφορικά με την

αντίληψη που έχει η τουρκική κοινωνία για τις ένοπλες δυνάμεις της χώρας. Τα ερωτήματα που εκλήθησαν να απαντήσουν τα 5.173 άτομα που συμμετείχαν στην έρευνα, αφορούσαν στην εμπιστοσύνη που εμπνέουν οι ένοπλες δυνάμεις, στη σχέση του στρατού με την οργάνωση Ergenekon, στα αρνητικά στοιχεία των ενόπλων δυνάμεων, καθώς επίσης στη σχέση τους με την κοινωνία και την κυβέρνηση. Από τα αποτελέσματα της έρευνας προκύπτει ότι:

- Οι Τούρκοι, ειδικά οι εθνικιστές και οι κεμαλιστές, εμπιστεύονται τις ένοπλες δυνάμεις περισσότερο από τους υπόλοιπους δημόσιους φορείς.
- Οι δίκες της Ergenekon και της Βαριοπούλας μπορεί να επηρέασαν αρνητικά την τουρκική κοινωνία, ωστόσο υπάρχει ο έντονος προβληματισμός σε ποσοστό 60,9% ότι οι ένοπλες δυνάμεις φθείρονται σκόπιμα. Μάλιστα, το γεγονός αυτό ήταν η αιτία να παραιτηθούν δεκάδες ανώτατοι και ανώτεροι αξιωματικοί με αποτέλεσμα να δημιουργηθούν σοβαρά προβλήματα στις διοικήσεις μονάδων και σχηματισμών. Επίσης, οι παραιτήσεις δημιούργησαν σοβαρό πρόβλημα στην τουρκική πολεμική αεροπορία, δεδομένου ότι, ενώ το χρονικό διάστημα 2002-2013 είχαν παραιτηθεί 291 χειριστές μαχητικών αεροσκαφών, το 2013 ο αριθμός αυτών έφθασε τους 110. Για το λόγο αυτό, το υπουργείο Άμυνας αποφάσισε την αύξηση του υποχρεωτικού χρόνου παραμονής των αξιωματικών στις ένοπλες δυνάμεις από 14 έτη σε 16 για τους πιλότους της πολεμικής αεροπορίας και από 12 σε 13 για τους πιλότους της αεροπορίας στρατού. Επιπλέον, οι πιλότοι που παραιτούνται απορροφώνται από τις τουρκικές εταιρείες πολιτικής αεροπορίας με τριπλάσιες ή τετραπλάσιες αποδοχές.
- Τα ατυχήματα και οι απώλειες του προσωπικού αποτελούν αρνητικό στοιχείο σε ποσοστό που υπερβαίνει το 65%. Υπόψη ότι, το χρονικό διάστημα 2002-2013 αυτοκτόνησαν 1.036 στρατιωτικοί (κατά βάσει στρατιώτες και υπαξιωματικοί) και 325 αστυνομικοί. Κατά έτος οι αυτοκτονίες των στρατιωτικών έχουν ως εξής: 2002: 157, 2003: 95, 2004: 87, 2005: 99, 2006: 85, 2007: 88, 2008: 83, 2009: 75, 2010: 80, 2011: 65, 2012: 69 και 2013: 53. Επίσης, σύμφωνα με την Ένωση Αποστράτων Υπαξιωματικών Τουρκίας τα αίτια των αυτοκτονιών στις ένοπλες δυνάμεις εστιάζονται στην οικονομική κατάσταση, στη ψυχολογική καταπίεση, στις αυθαίρετες πρακτικές, στην ανισότητα, στην απελπισία λόγω της έλλειψης εμπιστοσύνης για το μέλλον, στις ταπεινώσεις, στους ξυλοδαρμούς, στη στέρηση βασικών παροχών υγείας και στη σεξουαλική παρενόχληση. Περαιτέρω θα πρέπει να ληφθεί υπόψη ότι, μετά το 2004 το τουρκικό Γενικό Επιτελείο Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων τοποθέτησε ψυχολόγους σε κάθε ταξιαρχία με αποτέλεσμα να μειωθεί σταδιακά ο αριθμός των αυτοκτονιών.
- Η υπεροπτική συμπεριφορά της αλυσίδας διοικήσεως του στρατού, ενοχλεί την κοινωνία και εκλαμβάνεται από αυτήν ότι οι στρατιωτικοί θεωρούν τους εαυτούς τους ότι είναι υπεράνω όλων. Εν τω μεταξύ, το πρόβλημα αυτό εντοπίζεται και στο εσωτερικό των ενόπλων δυνάμεων και ειδικότερα σε ό,τι έχει να κάνει με τις σχέσεις αξιωματικών-μονίμων υπαξιωματικών και επαγγελματιών οπλιτών, αφού όπως ισχυρίζονται οι υπαξιωματικοί, αφενός υπάρχει μεγάλη ανισότητα και αδικία στα προνόμια και στις αποδοχές, αφετέρου στις στρατιωτικές μονάδες επικρατεί η «τρομοκρατία του διοικητού».
- Η αποστασιοποίηση, την τελευταία περίοδο, του στρατού από την πολιτική και η ομαλοποίηση των σχέσεων του γενικού επιτελείου με την κυβέρνηση αποτελεί θετικό στοιχείο.

- Το 52,9% υποστηρίζει ότι πρέπει να αλλάξει το καθεστώς υπαγωγής και ο αρχηγός του Γενικού Επιτελείου Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων από τον πρωθυπουργό να υπαχθεί στον υπουργό Άμυνας.

3.1.1 Οργάνωση των τουρκικών ενόπλων δυνάμεων

Οι τουρκικές ένοπλες δυνάμεις, των οποίων η οργάνωση απεικονίζεται στο προβαλλόμενο οργανόγραμμα, είναι ένοπλες κρατικές δυνάμεις οι οποίες διαθέτουν προσωπικό και σχηματισμούς που αποτελούνται από αξιωματικούς, υπαξιωματικούς, στρατιώτες και μαθητές στρατιωτικών σχολών, των χερσαίων δυνάμεων (συμπεριλαμβανομένης και της στρατοχωροφυλακής), των ναυτικών δυνάμεων και των αεροπορικών δυνάμεων.

3.1.2 Η Αριθμητική Δύναμη των Τουρκικών Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων

Το τουρκικό γενικό επιτελείο από το Φεβρουάριο του 2012 δημοσιοποιεί μηνιαίως την αναλυτική αριθμητική δύναμη των τουρκικών ενόπλων δυνάμεων. Στον πίνακα που ακολουθεί, πέραν της συνολικής δύναμης, περιλαμβάνεται η αριθμητική δύναμη των ανωτέρων και κατωτέρων αξιωματικών, των μονίμων υπαξιωματικών, των επαγγελματιών-συμβασιούχων οπλιτών και των κληρωτών.




Plate 31: Organization of Turkish Armed Forces

ΑΡΙΘΜΗΤΙΚΗ ΔΥΝΑΜΗ ΤΩΝ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΚΩΝ ΕΝΟΠΛΩΝ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΩΝ

ΙΔΙΟΤΗΤΑ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΙΚΟΥ	ΜΑΪΟΣ 2014			
	ΣΤΡΑΤΟΣ ΝΑΥΤΙΚΟ ΑΕΡΟΠΟΡΙΑ	ΣΤΡΑΤΟΧΩ- ΡΟΦΥΛΑΚΗ	ΔΙΟΙΚΗΣΗ ΑΣΦΑΛΕΙΑΣ ΑΚΤΩΝ	ΣΥΝΟΛΟ
Ανώτατοι Αξιωματικοί	311	31	1	343
Κατώτεροι και Ανώτεροι Αξιωματικοί	32.503	5.863	605	38.971
Μόνιμοι Υπαξιωματικοί	70.502	23.503	1.397	95.402
Εξειδικευμένοι Στρατοχωροφυλακής	0	23.479	0	23.479
Εξειδικευμένοι Οπλίτες	41.626	9.465	718	51.809
Συμβασιούχοι Οπλίτες	3.186	0	0	3.186
Σύνολο Επαγγελματικού Στρατιωτικού Προσωπικού	148.128	62.341	2.721	213.190
Έφεδροι Αξιωματικοί	6.059	775	24	6.858
Κληρωτοί Υπαξιωματικοί και Στρατιώτες	275.394	125.868	1.791	403.053
Σύνολο Προσωπικού Υποχρεωτικής Θητείας	281.453	126.643	1.815	409.911
Σύνολο Στρατιωτικού Προσωπικού	429.581	188.948	4.536	623.101
Πολιτικό και Εργατικό Προσωπικό	48.348	3.489	900	52.737
ΓΕΝΙΚΟ ΣΥΝΟΛΟ	477.929	192.473	5.436	675.838
Ποσοστό επί τοις % του Μόνιμου Στρατιωτικού Προσωπικού	34,48	32,99	59,99	34,21

Εφόσον τα στοιχεία αυτά γίνουν δεκτά ως ακριβή, εξάγονται τα ακόλουθα συμπεράσματα: πρώτον, στη δύναμη της στρατοχωροφυλακής θα πρέπει να προστεθούν οι 65.838 πολιτοφύλακες (*Geçici Korusu*)¹ από τους οποίους οι 46.495 συμπεριλαμβάνονται στην επίσημη κρατική

¹ Ο ιστορικός θεσμός των πολιτοφυλάκων, ο οποίος έχει τις ρίζες του στην τελευταία περίοδο της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας, αποτελεί μια εμπειροπόλεμη στρατιωτική δύναμη ιδιαίτερης σημασίας. Η σημαντική αυτή δύναμη χρησιμοποιείται από το τουρκικό κράτος αφενός στις επιχειρήσεις εναντίον του PKK, αφετέρου αποτελεί και έναν ένοπλο μηχανισμό πίεσης σε όσες φυλές και ομάδες της ανατολικής και νοτιοανατολικής Τουρκίας αποστασιοποιούνται από τη γραμμή που έχει χαράξει η Τουρκία για την αντιμετώπιση του κουρδικού προβλήματος. Το 1995 η δύναμη των πολιτοφυλάκων ανήρχετο σε 62.000 άνδρες, ενώ το 2000 αυτή αυξήθηκε στους 90.000 άνδρες. Το 2007 με τον Νόμο 5673 οι πολιτοφύλακες εντάχθηκαν στην κατηγορία των δημοσίων υπαλλήλων με μηνιαίες αποδοχές 330 Ευρώ. Η μισθοδοσία τους επιβαρύνει τον προϋπολογισμό του υπουργείου Εσωτερικών. Το 2008 το υπουργικό συμβούλιο αποφάσισε την πρόσληψη επιπλέον 10.000 πολιτοφυλάκων. Το Μάρτιο του 2009 το τουρκικό υπουργείο Εσωτερικών ανακοίνωσε ότι η συνολική δύναμη των πολιτοφυλάκων ανέρχεται σε 71.907 άνδρες. Από αυτούς οι 48.000 συμπεριλαμβάνονται στην επίσημη κρατική μισθοδοσία, ενώ οι υπόλοιποι 23.000

μισθοδοσία, ενώ οι υπόλοιποι 19.343 είναι εθελοντές. Μεταξύ αυτών, οι 498 είναι γυναίκες από τις οποίες οι 161 είναι εθελόντριες. Επομένως, η συνολική δύναμη του Μαΐου 2014 από 675.838 αυξάνεται στα 741.676 άτομα. Δεύτερον, σύμφωνα με νόμο που δημοσιεύθηκε στην εφημερίδα της κυβερνήσεως τον Οκτώβριο του 2013, αποφασίσθηκε από 01-01-2014 να μειωθεί η κανονική στρατιωτική θητεία των οπλιτών από τους 15 στους 12 μήνες. Για το λόγο αυτό, η δύναμη των ενόπλων δυνάμεων της Τουρκίας από 662.719 που ήταν στις 02 Ιανουαρίου 2014, μειώθηκε στις 589.330 το Φεβρουάριο του 2014. Ωστόσο, το Μάιο του 2014 αυτή αυξήθηκε πάλι στις 675.838. Αναλυτικά μηνιαία στοιχεία για την αριθμητική δύναμη των τουρκικών ενόπλων δυνάμεων από το Φεβρουάριο του 2012 φαίνονται στους πίνακες που ακολουθούν. Σημειώνεται ότι, τόσο η 6μηνη θητεία των κληρωτών οπλιτών μειωμένης θητείας, όσο η αντίστοιχη 12μηνη των εφέδρων αξιωματικών δεν υπέστησαν καμία διαφοροποίηση. Φυσικά, η εν λόγω απόφαση της τουρκικής κυβέρνησης δεν θα πρέπει να θεωρηθεί ότι, ταυτόχρονα μειώθηκαν και οι επιχειρησιακές δυνατότητες των μάχιμων σχηματισμών και κατά συνέπεια η τουρκική απειλή έναντι της ελληνικής πλευράς. Η απόφαση αυτή έχει σχέση με το πρόγραμμα αναδιοργάνωσης των ενόπλων δυνάμεων που άρχισε να υλοποιείται από το 2003 και προβλέπει τη δημιουργία σύγχρονων χερσαίων δυνάμεων, αφενός μειώνοντας τη δύναμη τους κατά 20-30%, αφετέρου αυξάνοντας τις επιχειρησιακές τους δυνατότητες και την ισχύ πυρός, τόσο με την πρόσληψη επαγγελματικού προσωπικού όσο και με την απόκτηση σύγχρονων οπλικών συστημάτων. Παράλληλα στο πλαίσιο αυτό, αποφασίσθηκε η αποδέσμευση του μεγαλύτερου μέρους των 65.000 οπλιτών που υπηρετούσαν σε θέσεις παροχής κοινωνικών υπηρεσιών των ενόπλων δυνάμεων, όπως λέσχες αξιωματικών, λέσχες μονίμων υπαξιωματικών, στρατιωτικά πρατήρια, παραθεριστικά κέντρα, συγκροτήματα στρατιωτικών κατοικιών αξιωματικών-υπαξιωματικών, οδηγοί αποστράτων αξιωματικών κ.λπ., ενώ η φύλαξη των εν λόγω εγκαταστάσεων θα ανατεθεί σε φορείς του ιδιωτικού τομέα.

Συνακόλουθα, θα πρέπει να ληφθούν υπόψη ακόμη τρεις παράγοντες. Ο πρώτος αφορά στην απόφαση της κυβέρνησης Erdogan να αναθέσει τη φύλαξη των συνόρων σε δυνάμεις επαγγελματιών συνοριοφυλάκων που θα συγκροτηθούν, εναρμονιζόμενοι παράλληλα και με τις απαιτήσεις της ευρωπαϊκής ένωσης. Επισημαίνεται ότι βρίσκεται σε εξέλιξη το πρόγραμμα συγκρότησης της Γενικής Διευθύνσεως Συνοριοφυλακής που θα υπάγεται στο υπουργείο Εσωτερικών και θα είναι υπεύθυνη για τα χερσαία και θαλάσσια σύνορα της χώρας, ενώ το μεγαλύτερο μέρος του προϋπολογισμού της θα καλύπτεται από την ευρωπαϊκή ένωση. Το προσωπικό της διεύθυνσης αυτής εκπαιδεύεται στην Ακαδημία Συνοριοφυλακής και κατόπιν θα επανδρώσει αντίστοιχες μονάδες, στα ελληνοτουρκικά και τουρκο-συριακά σύνορα, οπότε ο έλεγχος και η ασφάλεια των περιοχών αυτών θα περάσει στη Γενική Διεύθυνση Συνοριοφυλακής του υπουργείου Εσωτερικών. Ο δεύτερος παράγοντας έχει σχέση με την ανάθεση της ασφάλειας των αστικών κέντρων αποκλειστικά στην αστυνομία, ενώ μέχρι τώρα η ευθύνη ενός μεγάλου αριθμού από αυτά ανήκε στη στρατοχωροφυλακή. Τονίζεται ιδιαίτερα ότι η αστυνομική δύναμη

είναι εθελοντές. Στις 11-10-2009 δημοσίευμα της τουρκικής εφημερίδας Zaman ανέβασε τη δύναμη αυτή σε 90.000 άνδρες εκ των οποίων οι 60.000 συμπεριλαμβάνονται στην επίσημη κρατική μισθοδοσία, ενώ οι υπόλοιποι 30.000 είναι εθελοντές. Σε περίπτωση επιλύσεως του κουρδικού προβλήματος (PKK), η τουρκική κυβέρνηση σχεδιάζει να μετατρέψει την εν λόγω δύναμη σε θεσμό κοινωνικού χαρακτήρα, όπου οι πολιτοφύλακες θα χρησιμοποιηθούν σε υπηρεσίες κοινωφελών έργων. Ωστόσο, μετά το 1985 εκατοντάδες πολιτοφύλακες έχουν κατηγορηθεί για συνεργασία με το PKK, για λαθρεμπόριο και λοιπές κακοουργηματικές πράξεις. Επίσης, οι πολιτοφύλακες, με τον οπλισμό που διαθέτουν, θα μπορούσαν να χρησιμοποιηθούν στη διεξαγωγή επιχειρήσεων ασφάλειας μετόπισθεν σε περίπτωση μιας ελληνοτουρκικής ένοπλης σύγκρουσης.

Εφημερίδα Sabah, 06-09-2013, <http://www.aktifhaber.com/bakan-gulerden-korucular-aciklamasi-781908h.htm>

το 2008 ήταν 209.694 άτομα, το 2009 αυξήθηκε στα 220.954, το 2010 στα 229.965 και το 2013 στα 255.239 άτομα. Και τρίτον, στις επιχειρήσεις εναντίον του PKK έχει ανατεθεί σημαντικός ρόλος στη στρατοχωροφυλακή και την αστυνομία. Ήδη αποφασίσθηκε η αύξηση της δύναμης των μονάδων ειδικών επιχειρήσεων της αστυνομίας σε 11.000 άτομα μέχρι το 2015.

Συνεπώς όλα αυτά, σε συνδυασμό με την αναδιάταξη των δυνάμεων συνόρων και την ευρεία χρησιμοποίηση του μεγάλου αριθμού μη επανδρωμένων αεροσκαφών που διαθέτουν οι ένοπλες δυνάμεις και που συνεχίζουν να προμηθεύονται, θα μειώσουν έτι περαιτέρω τις ανάγκες σε προσωπικό του στρατού ξηράς και της στρατοχωροφυλακής. Υπόψη ότι η προαναφερθείσα αναδιάταξη, κατά βάσει, επικεντρώνεται στην τουρκο-ιρανική και τουρκο-ιρακινή μεθόριο και προβλέπει τη δημιουργία σύγχρονων βάσεων φύλαξης συνόρων. Στο πλαίσιο του εν λόγω σχεδιασμού περιλαμβάνεται η κατασκευή 402 φυλακίων με αναβαθμισμένες επιχειρησιακές δυνατότητες επιτήρησης και αντιμετώπισης απειλών, βάσει σχετικών πρωτοκόλλων συνεργασίας που η Διεύθυνση Διαχείρισης Συλλογικής Στέγασης ΤΟΚΙ υπέγραψε στις 11-11-2008 με το υπουργείο Άμυνας και στις 12-11-2008 με το υπουργείο Εσωτερικών και τη Γενική Διοίκηση Στρατοχωροφυλακής.

Σχετικά με την επιστρατευτική ικανότητα των τουρκικών ενόπλων δυνάμεων παρατίθενται τα ακόλουθα στοιχεία:

- Η δύναμη της μάχιμης εφεδρείας είναι 3.000.000 άτομα.
- Ο αριθμός ατόμων που φθάνουν σε ηλικία στράτευσης ετησίως είναι 700.079 άνδρες και 670.328 γυναίκες (στοιχεία του 2010).
- Κατά βάση, η ηλικία στράτευσης είναι το 20^ο έτος.
- Σύμφωνα με στοιχεία του 2010, τα άτομα διαθέσιμα για στράτευση ηλικίας 16-49 ετών ανέρχονται σε 21.079.077 άνδρες και 20.558.696 γυναίκες, ενώ τα άτομα κατάλληλα για στράτευση ηλικίας 16-49 ετών υπολογίζονται σε 17.664.510 άνδρες και 17.340.816 γυναίκες.

3.1.3 Διοίκηση Χερσαίων Δυνάμεων

Η Διοίκηση Χερσαίων Δυνάμεων της Τουρκίας έχει αποστολή να εξασφαλίζει την ασφάλεια των εθνικών συνόρων, να αμύνεται του εθνικού εδάφους όταν απαιτηθεί, να έχει ετοιμότητα συμμετοχής σε διεθνείς συμμαχίες και να χρησιμοποιήσει τη μαχητική ισχύ της στο εξωτερικό ύστερα από διαταγή του Γενικού Επιτελείου Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων, να συμμετέχει σε επιχειρήσεις υποστήριξης της ειρήνης και να παρέχει στρατιωτική βοήθεια σε φιλικές και συμμαχικές χώρες. Για την εκπλήρωση των αποστολών της, η Διοίκηση Χερσαίων Δυνάμεων έχει την ακόλουθη οργάνωση και διάταξη:

Οργανόγραμμα των τουρκικών χερσαίων δυνάμεων



Plate 32: Organization of Turkish Land Forces




Plate 32: Deployment of Turkish Land Forces

1^η Στρατιά: Υπάγεται στη Διοίκηση Χερσαίων Δυνάμεων, έχει έδρα την Κωνσταντινούπολη και ο τομέας ευθύνης της περιλαμβάνει την Ανατολική Θράκη, την Κωνσταντινούπολη και τα Στενά. Διαθέτει τρία σώματα στρατού και η διάταξη της είναι σαφώς επιθετικά προσανατολισμένη προς την Ελλάδα. Σημειωτέον ότι, μονάδες της 1^{ης} Στρατιάς μετασταθμεύουν συχνά στη νοτιοανατολική Τουρκία και στα τουρκο-συριακά σύνορα όπου συμμετέχουν σε στρατιωτικές επιχειρήσεις με σκοπό την απόκτηση πολεμικής εμπειρίας.

2^η Στρατιά: Υπάγεται στη Διοίκηση Χερσαίων Δυνάμεων και έχει έδρα τη Malatya. Διαθέτει ένα σώμα στρατού και μια μηχανοκίνητη μεραρχία, ενώ ο τομέας ευθύνης της περιλαμβάνει τη νοτιοανατολική Τουρκία. Η αποστολή της είναι η αντιμετώπιση εξωτερικών απειλών που προέρχονται από τη Συρία, το Ιράκ και το Ιράν, ενώ παράλληλα διεξάγει επιχειρήσεις εναντίον του ΡΚΚ τόσο εντός του τουρκικού εδάφους όσο και πέραν των συνόρων εντός του βορείου Ιράκ. Η 2^η Στρατιά αποτελεί κατά βάση την κυριότερη τουρκική χερσαία δύναμη που διεξάγει συνεχώς επιχειρήσεις και όλα τα κλιμάκια διοικήσεώς της διαθέτουν πολεμική εμπειρία.

3^η Στρατιά: Υπάγεται στη Διοίκηση Χερσαίων Δυνάμεων, διαθέτει δύο σώματα στρατού, έχει έδρα το Erzinçan και η αποστολή της αφορά στον έλεγχο των συνόρων της Τουρκίας με την Αρμενία και τη Γεωργία, ενώ παράλληλα διεξάγει και επιχειρήσεις εσωτερικής ασφαλείας εναντίον του ΡΚΚ.

Στρατιά Αιγαίου: Υπάγεται στη Διοίκηση Χερσαίων Δυνάμεων και έχει έδρα τη Σμύρνη. Διαθέτει τρεις μηχανοποιημένες ταξιαρχίες, μια ταξιαρχία πυροβολικού και σε περίοδο επιχειρήσεων την ταξιαρχία πεζοναυτών, η οποία υπάγεται στην Διοίκηση της Νότιας Θαλάσσιας Περιοχής των ναυτικών δυνάμεων με έδρα τη Σμύρνη. Επίσης, μονάδες της Στρατιάς Αιγαίου μετασταθμεύουν συχνά στη νοτιοανατολική Τουρκία και στα τουρκο-συριακά σύνορα όπου συμμετέχουν σε στρατιωτικές επιχειρήσεις με σκοπό την απόκτηση πολεμικής εμπειρίας.

4ο Σώμα Στρατού: Υπάγεται στη Διοίκηση Χερσαίων Δυνάμεων και έχει έδρα την Άγκυρα. Διαθέτει την 28^η Μηχανοκίνητη Ταξιαρχία (Ταξιαρχία Ειρηνευτικών Αποστολών) (Mamak της Άγκυρας), την 1^η Ταξιαρχία Καταδρομών (Kayseri), τη 2^η Ταξιαρχία Καταδρομών (Bolu) και την 58^η Ταξιαρχία Πυροβολικού (Polatli). Οι μονάδες των δύο ταξιαρχιών καταδρομών διαθέτουν πολεμική εμπειρία καθώς και συμμετέχουν στις επιχειρήσεις εναντίον του ΡΚΚ τόσο εντός του τουρκικού εδάφους στη νοτιοανατολική Τουρκία όσο και εκτός αυτού στο Βόρειο Ιράκ. Το 4ο Σώμα Στρατού αποτελεί εφεδρεία του τουρκικού Γενικού Επιτελείου Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων και είναι προφανές ότι σε μια «θερμή» ελληνοτουρκική κρίση θα πρέπει να συνυπολογισθεί στην τουρκική δύναμη που θα ενεργήσει κατά της Ελλάδος και της Κύπρου.

Διοίκηση Τουρκικών «Ειρηνευτικών» Δυνάμεων Κύπρου: Είναι επιπέδου σώματος στρατού, υπάγεται στη Διοίκηση Χερσαίων Δυνάμεων, έχει έδρα την Κερύνεια και αποτελείται από την 28^η και 39^η Μηχανοκίνητες Μεραρχίες, τη 14^η Τεθωρακισμένη Ταξιαρχία, ένα σύνταγμα ειδικών δυνάμεων, ένα σύνταγμα πυροβολικού, τμήμα του πολεμικού ναυτικού, ένα τάγμα διαβιβάσεων, ένα τάγμα στρατονομίας, τη Διοίκηση Διοικητικής Μέριμνας και την ΤΟΥΡΔΥΚ (Τουρκική Δύναμη Κύπρου). Πέραν των παραπάνω υφίσταται η *Güvenlik Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı* (Διοίκηση Δυνάμεων Ασφαλείας) που αποτελεί τη δύναμη ασφαλείας του ψευδοκράτους, είναι επιπέδου μεραρχίας και η δύναμη της ανέρχεται σε 5.000 άτομα. Αναλυτικότερα η εν λόγω Διοίκηση αποτελείται από το 1^ο, 2^ο, 3^ο και 4^ο Σύνταγμα Πεζικού, ένα κέντρο εκπαίδευσης επιπέδου τάγματος και τη Διοίκηση Ασφαλείας Ακτών.

Διοίκηση Εκπαίδευσης και Δόγματος (EDOK): Υπάγεται στη Διοίκηση Χερσαίων Δυνάμεων και έχει έδρα το Balgat της Άγκυρας. Αποστολή της είναι η προώθηση της εκπαίδευσης του προσωπικού (αξιωματικοί-οπλίτες) και παράλληλα επιμελείται όλων των στρατιωτικών εκδόσεων που έχουν σχέση με το στρατιωτικό δόγμα, τους εξοπλισμούς, τα οπλικά συστήματα και την εκπαίδευση. Διαθέτει τα στρατιωτικά λύκεια και τις Σχολές Εφαρμογής των όπλων μάχης, των όπλων υποστήριξης μάχης και των κλάδων λογιστικής υποστήριξης. Επίσης στην EDOK υπάγονται η Σχολή Αεροπορίας Στρατού και η Μεραρχία Εκπαίδευσης, η οποία αποτελείται από την 1^η Ταξιαρχία Εκπαίδευσης Πεζικού (Manisa), την 3^η Ταξιαρχία Εκπαίδευσης Πεζικού

(Antalya), την 5^η Ταξιαρχία Εκπαιδεύσεως Πεζικού (Sivas), τη 15^η Ταξιαρχία Εκπαιδεύσεως Πεζικού (Amasya) και την 59^η Ταξιαρχία Εκπαιδεύσεως Πυροβολικού (Erzincan).

Διοίκηση Αεροπορίας Στρατού (ΚΗΚ): Στις 15-08-2003, στα πλαίσια του προγράμματος *Kunvet-2014* (Δύναμη-2014) που αφορά στην αναδιοργάνωση των τουρκικών χερσαίων δυνάμεων, συγκροτήθηκε η τουρκική Διοίκηση Αεροπορίας Στρατού, στην οποία υπήχθησαν τα τέσσερα συντάγματα αεροπορίας στρατού, τα οποία μέχρι τότε υπάγονταν στις τέσσερις στρατιές. Η ΚΗΚ εδρεύει στην Άγκυρα και ο διοικητής της είναι υποστράτηγος. Συνεπώς, οι δυνάμεις που υπάγονται στη Διοίκηση Αεροπορίας Στρατού είναι: το 1^ο Σύνταγμα Αεροπορίας Στρατού με έδρα την Άγκυρα, το 2^ο Σύνταγμα Αεροπορίας Στρατού με έδρα τη Malatya στο οποίο υπάγεται η 7^η Διοίκηση Συγκροτήματος Αεροπορίας Στρατού, το 3^ο Σύνταγμα Αεροπορίας Στρατού με έδρα το Gaziantep, το 4^ο Σύνταγμα Αεροπορίας Στρατού με έδρα την Κωνσταντινούπολη και τη Διοίκηση Ομάδος Εναερίων Μεταφορών με έδρα την Άγκυρα. Σημειώνεται ότι η Διοίκηση της Ομάδος Εναερίων Μεταφορών έχει ως αποστολή τη μεταφορά προσώπων VIP, τη μεταφορά προσωπικού και υλικών, τη μεταφορά αλληλογραφίας, τη διακομιδή ασθενών και τραυματιών, τη μεταφορά ιατροφαρμακευτικού υλικού και την εκπαίδευση αλεξιπτωτιστών.

3.1.4 Διοίκηση Ναυτικών Δυνάμεων

Κύριο καθήκον της Διοίκησης Ναυτικών Δυνάμεων είναι αφενός να παρακολουθεί εκ του σύνεγγυς και να διαφυλάττει τα θαλάσσια συμφέροντα της Τουρκίας έναντι μελλοντικών απειλών, αφετέρου να εκτελεί τις αποστολές που θα της δοθούν. Συγκεκριμένα:

- Κατά την ειρηνική περίοδο και σε περίοδο κρίσης οι τουρκικές ναυτικές δυνάμεις:
 - ✓ Αναλαμβάνουν την αποστολή επίδειξης της τουρκικής ναυτικής παρουσίας και της τουρκικής σημαίας.
 - ✓ Συμμετέχουν σε επιχειρήσεις υποστήριξης της ειρήνης.
 - ✓ Λαμβάνουν μέρος σε επιχειρήσεις θαλάσσιας ασφάλειας όπως: επίγνωση της ναυτικής κατάστασης, ελεύθερη ναυσιπλοΐα, θαλάσσιος έλεγχος, αποτροπή εξάπλωσης των όπλων μαζικής καταστροφής, διαφύλαξη κρίσιμων υποδομών, αποτροπή της τρομοκρατίας και βελτίωση των δυνατοτήτων αναφορικά με τη θαλάσσια ασφάλεια.
 - ✓ Παρέχουν υποστήριξη σε επιχειρήσεις δυνάμεων άμεσης επέμβασης.
 - ✓ Πραγματοποιούν επιχειρήσεις εκκένωσης πληθυσμού (όχι μαχόμενων δυνάμεων).
 - ✓ Συμμετέχουν σε επιχειρήσεις ανθρωπιστικής βοήθειας ύστερα από φυσικές καταστροφές όπως, σεισμοί, πλημμύρες, τυφώνες, πυρκαγιές, ατυχήματα, επιδημίες, καθώς επίσης χημικά, ραδιολογικά, βιολογικά και πυρηνικά ατυχήματα.
 - ✓ Διεξάγουν επιχειρήσεις έρευνας και διάσωσης.
- Σε πολεμική περίοδο εκτελούν επιχειρήσεις μεταφοράς δυνάμεων, ελέγχου των θαλασσών, παρεμπόδισης της ελεύθερης χρήσης αυτών, καθώς επίσης διαφύλαξης και ελέγχου των θαλάσσιων διαδρόμων.

Το βασικό μέσο για τη διεξαγωγή ναυτικού πολέμου και θαλάσσιων επιχειρήσεων είναι το πλοίο. Γι' αυτό το λόγο οι τουρκικές ναυτικές δυνάμεις είναι οργανωμένες στα πλαίσια ενός «πλοιοκεντρικού» συστήματος, το οποίο εξασφαλίζει με τον πιο ορθό και ταχύ τρόπο τόσο τις

ανάγκες σε πλοία όσο και την υποστήριξή τους.² Το σύστημα αυτό περιλαμβάνει ναυτικές βάσεις, χερσαίες εγκαταστάσεις παροχής διευκολύνσεων, ναυτικές σχολές, κέντρα εκπαίδευσης, ναυπηγεία και εγκαταστάσεις διοικητικής μέριμνας, συντήρησης και επισκευών. Τα τέσσερα βασικά όργανα διοίκησης των τουρκικών ναυτικών δυνάμεων είναι τα εξής:

Οργανόγραμμα των τουρκικών ναυτικών δυνάμεων




Plate 34: Organization of Turkish Naval Forces

Το Αρχηγείο Στόλου που έχει ως αποστολή τη διατήρηση των ναυτικών του μονάδων σε ετοιμότητα πολέμου, καθώς επίσης τη χρησιμοποίηση αυτών, όταν απαιτηθεί, προκειμένου να διαφυλαχθούν τα θαλάσσια δικαιώματα και συμφέροντα της Τουρκίας. Στην οργάνωση του περιλαμβάνονται οι μοίρες των φρεγατών που εκπροσωπούν τη δύναμη πυρός, την ταχύτητα και τη διάρκεια των επιχειρήσεων, οι μοίρες των πυραυλακάτων με κύρια χαρακτηριστικά την ταχύτητα, τον αιφνιδιασμό και το ισχυρό πλήγμα, καθώς επίσης τα υποβρύχια που αποτελούν τη στρατηγική δύναμη του Στόλου.

Η Διοίκηση της Βόρειας Θαλάσσιας Περιοχής, με τομέα ευθύνης τον Ελλήσποντο (Μαύρη Θάλασσα), τη Θάλασσα του Μαρμαρά και τα Στενά των Δαρδανελίων, και έχει ως αποστολή την εξασφάλιση λογιστικής και παράκτιας υποστήριξης στα πολεμικά πλοία. Επισημαίνεται ότι στην οργάνωση της περιλαμβάνεται η Διοίκηση Διάσωσης και Βατραχανθρώπων που αποτελεί την πιο επίλεκτη δύναμη των τουρκικών ναυτικών δυνάμεων και συγκροτείται από τη Διοίκηση Ομάδων Διάσωσης, τη Διοίκηση Βατραχανθρώπων Επιθετικών Αποστολών (*Sualti Taarruz/SAT*) και τη Διοίκηση Βατραχανθρώπων Αμυντικών Αποστολών (*Sualti Savunma/SAS*). Η Διοίκηση Ομάδων Διάσωσης έχει ως αποστολή τη διάσωση πλοίων που έχουν ναυαγήσει ή έχουν

² Οι τουρκικές ναυτικές δυνάμεις διαθέτουν 16 φρεγάτες, 14 υποβρύχια, 8 κορβέτες, 25 πυραυλακάτους, 11 ναρκαλιευτικά, 8 ναρκοθηρευτικά, 6 πλοία περιπολίας, 37 αποβατικά και αρματαγωγά, 1 πλοίο εκκενώσεως πληθυσμού και μεταφοράς δυνάμεων, 2 πετρελαιοφόρα, 2 πλοία ανεφοδιασμού, 10 ρυμουλκά ανοικτών θαλασσών, 2 πλοία διάσωσης υποβρυχίων, 2 υδρογραφικά, 3 υδροφόρα, 8 εκπαιδευτικά, 2 πλοία ναυτικών σχολών, 7 εκπαιδευτικά αεροσκάφη, 6 αεροσκάφη ναυτικής περιπολίας και 35 ελικόπτερα (www.dzkk.tsk.tr)

προσαράξει, τη διάσωση πληρώματος υποβρυχίου που έχει βυθισθεί, τη ρυμούλκηση πλοίων από τις ανοικτές θάλασσες, την ανεύρεση αντικειμένων που έχουν βυθισθεί ή έχουν χαθεί, τον έλεγχο πλοίων και καθαρισμό των καρινών τους, καθώς επίσης και την τοποθέτηση σημαντήρων. Η Διοίκηση Βατραχανθρώπων Επιθετικών Αποστολών (*Sualti Taarruz/SAT*) υπάγεται επιχειρησιακά στη Διεύθυνση Επιχειρήσεων της Διοίκησης Ναυτικών Δυνάμεων, ο διοικητής της είναι πλοίαρχος και έχει ως αποστολή τη διεξαγωγή προκαταρκτικών επιχειρήσεων στις ακτές αποβάσεως πριν την κύρια αποβατική ενέργεια (αναγνώριση της περιοχής, εξάλειψη εμποδίων, προσβολή κύριων στόχων του εχθρού, συλλογή πληροφοριών βάθους για την εχθρική τοποθεσία, κατάληψη πλοίων κ.λπ.). Η Διοίκηση Βατραχανθρώπων Αμυντικών Αποστολών (*Sualti Savunma/SAS*) έχει ως αποστολή την εξουδετέρωση εκρηκτικών μηχανισμών, την τοποθέτηση και αλιεία ναρκών, τη λήψη αμυντικών μέτρων και την υποστήριξη των αποβατικών επιχειρήσεων.

Η Διοίκηση της Νότιας Θαλάσσιας Περιοχής, με τομέα ευθύνης το Αιγαίο και τη Μεσόγειο Θάλασσα. Η αποστολή της αφορά στην εξασφάλιση λογιστικής και παράκτιας υποστήριξης στα πολεμικά πλοία, στη θαλάσσια επιτήρηση-συνοδεία-περιπολία, στην αποτροπή του λαθρεμπορίου και της λαθρομετανάστευσης, καθώς επίσης είναι υπεύθυνη για τη μεταφορά τμημάτων και τη διεύθυνση των επιχειρήσεων έρευνας και διάσωσης σε περίπτωση ναυτικών ατυχημάτων, τα οποία θα πραγματοποιηθούν στην τουρκική περιοχή έρευνας και διάσωσης. Είναι σημαντικό ότι στην οργάνωση της περιλαμβάνεται ο αποβατικός στόλος και η ταξιαρχία πεζοναυτών, η οποία έχει ως αποστολή τη διεξαγωγή αποβατικών επιχειρήσεων, καθώς επίσης τη συμμετοχή σε επιχειρήσεις εσωτερικής ασφαλείας, ανθρωπιστικής βοήθειας και υποστήριξης της ειρήνης. Η ταξιαρχία πεζοναυτών διαθέτει τρία τάγματα πεζοναυτών, ένα ειδικό τάγμα πεζοναυτών και ένα τάγμα υποστηρίξεως.

Η Διοίκηση Ναυτικής Εκπαίδευσης, που έχει ως αποστολή την εκπαίδευση του προσωπικού σε θέματα ναυτικής εκπαίδευσης, εξασφαλίζοντας τις κατάλληλες εκπαιδευτικές και τεχνολογικές υποδομές τόσο για τα υπάρχοντα ναυτικά μέσα και οπλικά συστήματα, όσο και για αυτά που πρόκειται να ενταχθούν στο μέλλον. Επιπλέον, σε αυτήν υπάγονται οι ναυτικές σχολές αξιωματικών και μονίμων υπαξιωματικών, τα κέντρα εκπαίδευσως οπλιτών και το ναυτικό λύκειο

Επιπρόσθετα, ενδεικτικό της τουρκικής αντίληψης για την θαλάσσια πολιτική της Τουρκίας αποτελούν οι απόψεις του ναυάρχου Salim Dervisoglu πρώην αρχηγού των τουρκικών ναυτικών δυνάμεων, ο οποίος σε συνέντευξή του σε τουρκικό think tank (BİLGESAM) τον Απρίλιο του 2011 ανέφερε τα εξής:

«Όταν αναφερόμαστε στις ένοπλες δυνάμεις δεν πρέπει αμέσως να σκεπτόμαστε την ένοπλη σύρραξη, διότι η μεγαλύτερη χρησιμότητά τους είναι η αποτροπή. Οι ένοπλες δυνάμεις, συμμετέχοντας σε συμμαχικούς συνασπισμούς, συμβάλουν σημαντικά στις διεθνείς σχέσεις. Ως πρόσφατο παράδειγμα αναφέρω τη Λιβύη: στείλαμε τέσσερα πολεμικά πλοία, ένα πλοίο υποστηρίξεως και ένα υποβρύχιο, πραγματοποιώντας επιχειρήσεις ανθρωπιστικής βοήθειας, εκκένωσης πληθυσμού, έρευνας-διάσωσης κ.λπ. με σκοπό να αποκτήσει η χώρα μας μεγαλύτερη προβολή και γόητρο. Οι ναυτικές μας δυνάμεις σε σχέση με το στρατό και την πολεμική αεροπορία έχουν ένα ξεχωριστό χαρακτηριστικό: κατά την ειρηνική περίοδο είναι πολύ σημαντικές διότι με την επίδειξη της τουρκικής σημαίας στα λιμάνια διαφόρων χωρών που επισκέπτονται αλλά και στα δρομολόγια που ακολουθούν προβάλλουν την ισχύ της χώρας μας. Οι ναυτικές δυνάμεις αναπτύσσουν δραστηριότητες για μεγάλα χρονικά διαστήματα όπως, επιχειρούν συνεχώς στις ανοικτές θάλασσες και επιδεικνύουν, με τη παρουσία τους στις περιοχές των κρίσεων, τη στρατιωτική ισχύ της Τουρκίας. Ο στρατός ξηράς αποτελεί μια δύναμη που διαφυλάττει την άμυνα, τα

κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα και την εσωτερική ασφάλεια της χώρας μας. Η πολεμική αεροπορία, σε διεθνές επίπεδο, πραγματοποιεί επιχειρήσεις στο διεθνή εναέριο χώρο και στις ανοικτές θάλασσες, ωστόσο όμως για μικρό χρονικό διάστημα. Επομένως μόνο οι ναυτικές δυνάμεις δύνανται να επιχειρούν επί μακρόν και σε πολύ μεγάλες αποστάσεις. Τα τελευταία 50 χρόνια και ειδικά μετά την ένταξη μας στο ΝΑΤΟ, αποκτήσαμε μεγάλο αριθμό πολεμικών πλοίων, εκσυγχρονίσαμε το στόλο μας, επαγγελματοποιήσαμε το προσωπικό και αναβαθμίσαμε την εκπαίδευση του. Στην επίλυση των προβλημάτων του Αιγαίου οι ναυτικές μας δυνάμεις αποτέλεσαν το σημαντικότερο μέσο. Παρόλο που στο παρελθόν βιώσαμε περιόδους πολύ έντονης κρίσης, η ναυτική μας ισχύς ήταν ένας από τους παράγοντες που δεν δημιουργήθηκε μια σοβαρή σύγκρουση μεταξύ Τουρκίας και Ελλάδος. Ο στόλος των υποβρυχίων μας έχει μεγάλη ισχύ και το προσωπικό του είναι πολύ καλά εκπαιδευμένο και ικανό. Η Τουρκία διαθέτει ένα ισχυρό ναρκαλιευτικό στόλο στη ναυτική βάση του Erdek, που δημιουργήθηκε πρόσφατα (σ.σ. ευρίσκεται στη θάλασσα του Μαρμαρά), με πολύ σύγχρονα ναρκαλιευτικά και ναρκοθηρευτικά πλοία. Όταν αναφερόμαστε στη ναυτική ισχύ δεν πρέπει να σκεφτόμαστε μόνο τις ένοπλες δυνάμεις, αλλά το σύνολο της ναυτικής μας πολιτικής, της ναυπήγησης πλοίων, της αλιείας και ναυτιλίας του έθνους. Η αμφίβια δύναμη των τουρκικών ναυτικών δυνάμεων ίσως είναι η μεγαλύτερη της Μεσογείου. Διαθέτουμε μια ταξιαρχία πεζοναυτών και τα απαραίτητα αποβατικά και αρματαγωγά πλοία για να τη μεταφέρουν. Επίσης, υπάρχει σε εξέλιξη το πρόγραμμα ναυπήγησης του πλοίου αποβατικών επιχειρήσεων LPD, το οποίο θα μπορεί να μεταφέρει ένα τάγμα πεζοναυτών με τον εξοπλισμό του και 7-9 ελικόπτερα. Ως εκ τούτου, οι ναυτικές μας δυνάμεις διαθέτουν μια επιχειρησιακή δύναμη που μπορεί να συμμετάσχει σε εθνικές και συμμαχικές επιχειρήσεις σε μεγάλες αποστάσεις. Η Τουρκία δίδει ιδιαίτερη βαρύτητα στη δημιουργία ναυτικών βάσεων. Το πιο χαρακτηριστικό παράδειγμα αποτελεί η ναυτική βάση του Aksaz, απ' όπου μπορούμε να φθάσουμε στις ανοικτές θάλασσες σε σύντομο χρονικό διάστημα. Εν γένει, υπάρχει μια συνεχής δραστηριότητα στο θέμα των βάσεων. Κατόπιν των παραπάνω, διαπιστώνουμε ότι οι τουρκικές ναυτικές δυνάμεις έχουν την ικανότητα να καλύψουν τις ανάγκες της Τουρκίας, όπως π.χ. η διαφύλαξη της σταθερότητας στην περιοχή μας, η προάσπιση των εθνικών μας συμφερόντων στη Μεσόγειο ή ακόμη και εάν αποσκοπούμε σε μια ηγετική θέση στη Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση ως μέλος αυτής. Μια ναυτική δύναμη υποστηρίζεται με τη δημιουργία βάσεων και τον ανεφοδιασμό στη θάλασσα. Πέραν τούτου, δεν είναι δυνατόν τον 21^ο αιώνα να διεξαχθεί μια ναυτική επιχείρηση χωρίς την απαραίτητη αεροπορική υποστήριξη. Φυσικά, θα πρέπει τα μέσα της αεροπορικής υποστήριξης, συμπεριλαμβανομένων και των μαχητικών αεροσκαφών, να ανήκουν οργανικά στις ναυτικές δυνάμεις. Τούτο όμως έχει άμεση εξάρτηση από την οικονομική κατάσταση. Η Μεσόγειος είναι μια θάλασσα ιδιαίτερης σημασίας για την Τουρκία. Εκτός από την πολιτική και εμπορική της αξία, σημαντική είναι η ασφάλεια των θαλασσίων διαδρόμων και ο έλεγχος της θαλάσσιας κυκλοφορίας λόγω της μεταφοράς των προϊόντων ενέργειας.»

3.1.5 Διοίκηση Αεροπορικών Δυνάμεων

Οι τουρκικές αεροπορικές δυνάμεις προκειμένου να διαφυλάξουν τα κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα και τα εθνικά συμφέροντα της χώρας, όταν διαταχθούν είτε ανεξάρτητα, είτε διακλαδικά με τις χερσαίες και ναυτικές δυνάμεις, είτε με συμμαχικές δυνάμεις αναλαμβάνουν τις ακόλουθες

αποστολές:³

- Κατά την περίοδο της ειρήνης ή κρίσεως:
 - ✓ Ενεργούν ως αποτρεπτική δύναμη και παρεμποδίζουν τις εχθρικές παραβιάσεις του εθνικού εναερίου χώρου.
 - ✓ Όταν απαιτηθεί απαγορεύουν στον εχθρό να πραγματοποιήσει αεροπορικές επιθέσεις από κάθε ύψος και κάθε κατεύθυνση αναγνωρίζοντας και εξακριβώνοντας αυτόν σε σύντομο χρονικό διάστημα και από μεγάλη απόσταση.
 - ✓ Εξασφαλίζουν τον έλεγχο και τη διοίκηση του εθνικού εναερίου χώρου. Επίσης όταν απαιτηθεί, στα πλαίσια του διεθνούς δικαίου συμβάλουν στη διαφύλαξη της περιφερειακής και παγκόσμιας ειρήνης συμμετέχοντας σε επιχειρήσεις υποστήριξης της ειρήνης και σε επιχειρήσεις επιβολής της ειρήνης.
- Κατά την πολεμική περίοδο:
 - ✓ Εξασφαλίζουν την επιβίωση των φίλιων δυνάμεων που εγκαταλείπουν τις θέσεις μάχης, περιστέλλοντας, επιβραδύνοντας και αποτρέποντας με κάθε τρόπο την αεροπορική και πυραυλική απειλή των εχθρικών δυνάμεων.
 - ✓ Εξασφαλίζουν την ασφάλεια των στρατηγικών και οικονομικών εγκαταστάσεων από εχθρικές αεροπορικές και πυραυλικές επιθέσεις. Επίσης, σε συνεργασία με τους άλλους κλάδους (στρατό ξηράς, πολεμικό ναυτικό και ειδικές δυνάμεις) προσβάλλουν την αποφασιστικότητα του αντιπάλου και τη θέληση του για συνέχεια των επιχειρήσεων.



Plate 35: Administration of Turkish Air Force

³ Τουρκικό Υπουργείο Άμυνας, Ετήσια Έκθεση Δραστηριοτήτων για το έτος 2011

Τα τέσσερα βασικά όργανα διοίκησης των τουρκικών αεροπορικών δυνάμεων είναι:

- Η 1^η Τακτική Αεροπορική Δύναμη. Η έδρα της βρίσκεται στο Eskisehir και είναι υπεύθυνη για τον δυτικό εναέριο χώρο της Τουρκίας. Διαθέτει πέντε κύριες βάσεις πολεμικών αεροσκαφών και μια βάση πυραύλων.
- Η 2^η Τακτική Αεροπορική Δύναμη. Η έδρα της βρίσκεται στο Diyarbakir, είναι υπεύθυνη για τον ανατολικό εναέριο χώρο της Τουρκίας και διαθέτει τρεις κύριες βάσεις πολεμικών αεροσκαφών.
- Η Διοίκηση Αεροπορικής Εκπαίδευσης με έδρα στη Σμύρνη.
- Η Διοίκηση Διοικητικής Μερίμνης με έδρα στην Άγκυρα.

Επιπλέον, στο πλαίσιο αναδιοργάνωσης των τουρκικών ενόπλων δυνάμεων:

- Συνεχίζονται οι διαδικασίες προκειμένου μετά το 2014 να ολοκληρωθεί η συγκρότηση της *Uzay Grup Komutanlığı* (Διοίκηση Συγκροτήματος Διαστήματος) και η υπαγωγή της στη Διοίκηση Αεροπορικών Δυνάμεων. Σημειώνεται ότι η εν λόγω διοίκηση θα αποτελείται το Κέντρο Εκτόξευσης Δορυφόρων (σ.σ. συγκρότηση μέχρι το 2023) και τις διοικήσεις Αναγνώρισης-Επιτήρησης, Εγκαίρου Προειδοποίησης, Ηλεκτρονικής Υποστήριξης και Πλοήγησης Δορυφόρων.
- Προβλέπεται η συγκρότηση της *Muharip Hava Kuvveti* (Πολεμική Αεροπορική Δύναμη) που θα προέλθει από την ενοποίηση της 1^{ης} και 2^{ης} Τακτικής Αεροπορικής Δύναμης σε μια. Με τον τρόπο αυτό θα επαυξηθούν οι επιχειρησιακές δυνατότητες σε ό,τι έχει να κάνει με τον εναέριο έλεγχο, την έγκαιρη προειδοποίηση και τον εναέριο ανεφοδιασμό.
- Θα συγκροτηθεί η *Hava Füze Savunma Komutanlığı* (Διοίκηση Αντιαεροπορικής Άμυνας), στην οποία θα ενταχθούν τα τέσσερα νέα αντιαεροπορικά πυραυλικά συστήματα μεγάλου βεληνεκούς που θα προμηθευθεί η Τουρκία. Υπόψη ότι αυτά θα οργανωθούν σε τέσσερα τάγματα των τριών λόχων έκαστο και θα διαθέτουν συνολικά 288 πυραύλους.

Συνολικά οι τουρκικές αεροπορικές δυνάμεις διαθέτουν 19 πολεμικές μοίρες, 1 μοίρα αναγνωρίσεως, 1 μοίρα εναέριου ανεφοδιασμού, 6 μοίρες μεταφορών, 6 μοίρες εκπαιδεύσεως και 8 μοίρες αντιαεροπορικών πυραύλων. Πέραν των παραπάνω, αυτές διαθέτουν 3 μοίρες έρευνας-διάσωσης και έρευνας-διάσωσης μάχης (SAR-CSAR). Πρόκειται για Μονάδες των οποίων η εκπαίδευση είναι υψηλού επιπέδου και έχουν ως αποστολή να διασώζουν τους πιλότους, των οποίων τα αεροσκάφη κατέπεσαν στο εχθρικό έδαφος. Το προσωπικό τους έχει εκπαιδευτεί στις καταδύσεις και είναι αλεξιπτωτιστές ελευθέρως πτώσεως.

Αυτό που προκύπτει από μια συνεξέταση των στοιχείων που προαναφέρθηκαν, οι τουρκικές αεροπορικές δυνάμεις με τη διάταξη, το δυναμικό, την υποδομή και τα μέσα που διαθέτουν μπορούν να εκτελέσουν όλες τις αποστολές ενός σύγχρονου αεροπορικού πολέμου. Ο μεγάλος αριθμός μαχητικών αεροσκαφών της τουρκικής αεροπορίας, σε συνδυασμό με τα αεροσκάφη εναέριου ανεφοδιασμού που διαθέτει, της παρέχει το πλεονέκτημα να επιχειρεί από μεγάλο αριθμό αεροδρομίων στο βάθος της τουρκικής ενδοχώρας (εκτός ακτίνας δράσεως των ελληνικών μαχητικών) και τη δυνατότητα διεξαγωγής παρατεταμένων επιχειρήσεων.

3.1.6 Γενική Διοίκηση Στρατοχωροφυλακής

Η στρατοχωροφυλακή αποτελεί ταυτόχρονα μια ένοπλη στρατιωτική δύναμη ασφαλείας και μια αστυνομική δύναμη. Έχει αποστολή να εξασφαλίζει τη διαφύλαξη της εσωτερικής ασφάλειας και της δημόσιας τάξης σε περιοχές εκτός πόλεων, όπου η αστυνομία δεν έχει αρμοδιότητα, ενώ το εύρος των καθηκόντων της αφορά σε καθήκοντα ασφαλείας και δημόσιας τάξης, δικαστικά, στρατιωτικά και λοιπά καθήκοντα.

Εν γένει, οι περιοχές ευθύνης της στρατοχωροφυλακής ευρίσκονται εκτός των ορίων των μεγάλων αστικών κέντρων και των επαρχιακών πόλεων, των οποίων η ευθύνη ανήκει στην αστυνομία.

Η Τουρκία, λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τις οικονομικές, πολιτιστικές και τεχνολογικές δομές της χώρας, καθώς επίσης τις αναγκαίες παρεμβάσεις του κρατικού μηχανισμού στο νέο περιβάλλον ασφαλείας που έχει δημιουργηθεί, εστίασε τη δομή της στρατοχωροφυλακής σύμφωνα με το δόγμα που εφαρμόζουν άλλα κράτη όπως η Γαλλία, η Ιταλία και η Ισπανία. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, σύμφωνα με το προβαλλόμενο οργανόγραμμα η οργάνωση της περιλαμβάνει το επιτελείο, σχηματισμούς και μονάδες για τη διεξαγωγή κλασσικών αστυνομικών επιχειρήσεων και επιχειρήσεων εσωτερικής ασφάλειας, σχηματισμούς φύλαξης συνόρων, μονάδες αντιτρομοκρατικού αγώνα, σχολές και κέντρα εκπαίδευσης, μονάδες λογιστικής υποστήριξης, μονάδες αεροπορίας στρατοχωροφυλακής και λοιπές μονάδες.



Plate 36: Organization of Turkish Gendarmerie Administration

Για την αντιμετώπιση σημαντικών απειλών, όπως τρομοκρατικές ενέργειες αεροπειρατείες, απαγωγές, απελευθέρωση ομήρων, καθώς επίσης περιπτώσεις έρευνας και διάσωσης έχει

συγκροτηθεί η ειδική Διοίκηση Ασφαλείας και Καταδρομών JÖAK, η οποία υπάγεται απ' ευθείας στην κεντρική διοίκηση και αναλαμβάνει αποστολές σε όλη την τουρκική επικράτεια. Η JÖAK είναι επιπέδου ταξιαρχίας και το προσωπικό της είναι μόνιμοι αξιωματικοί και μόνιμοι υπαξιωματικοί. Επίσης, αυτή διαθέτει ένα τάγμα επιχειρήσεων (*Operasyon Taburu*) και ένα τάγμα ειδικών επιχειρήσεων (*Özel Harekât Taburu*) δυνάμει 124 ατόμων έκαστο, ένα τάγμα έρευνας και διάσωσης δυνάμει 235 ατόμων και ένα λόχο υποστήριξης της ειρήνης.

Οι σχηματισμοί εσωτερικής ασφάλειας αποτελούν το πιο περίπλοκο τμήμα διότι διαθέτουν ποικιλία τύπων σχηματισμών και περιοχών ευθύνης. Κατά βάση η φιλοσοφία συγκρότησης τους έχει να κάνει με την ύπαρξη σχηματισμών και μονάδων εσωτερικής ασφαλείας που ανήκουν στην αστική οργάνωση και αντιστοίχων που δεν ανήκουν στην αστική οργάνωση.

Οι σχηματισμοί που ανήκουν στην αστική οργάνωση είναι οι Διοικήσεις Περιοχής, επιπέδου μεραρχίας ή ταξιαρχίας και υπάγονται απευθείας στην κεντρική διοίκηση της στρατοχωροφυλακής. Σε όλη την τουρκική επικράτεια υπάρχουν 14 Διοικήσεις Περιοχής που η κάθε μια είναι υπεύθυνη για 3 έως 8 νομούς και η οργάνωση τους διαφοροποιείται ανάλογα με το επιχειρησιακό περιβάλλον. Επιπρόσθετα, ανάλογα με τις επιχειρησιακές ανάγκες, μερικές από αυτές διαθέτουν τάγματα καταδρομών, μονάδες ειδικών επιχειρήσεων και εγκληματολογικά εργαστήρια.

Οι Διοικήσεις Νομών είναι επιπέδου συντάγματος και η οργάνωση τους ποικίλει ανάλογα με τις επιχειρησιακές ιδιαιτερότητες του νομού. Οι διοικήσεις αυτές συγκροτούνται από τις διοικήσεις επαρχιών, τα αστυνομικά φυλάκια στρατοχωροφυλακής, τις μονάδες φύλαξης κρισίμων εγκαταστάσεων και φυλακών, τις μονάδες έρευνας-διάσωσης, τις έφιππες ομάδες και ανάλογα με τις επιχειρησιακές ανάγκες διαθέτουν τάγματα καταδρομών και μονάδες ειδικών επιχειρήσεων. Ο διοικητής της διοίκησης αυτής φέρει το βαθμό του συνταγματάρχη και πέραν των διοικητικών καθηκόντων του, εκτελεί καθήκοντα συμβούλου του νομάρχη επί θεμάτων ασφαλείας.

Οι Διοικήσεις Επαρχιών φέρουν την ονομασία των περιοχών που εδρεύουν, είναι επιπέδου τάγματος ή λόχου, ο συνολικός αριθμός τους ανέρχεται σε 920 και εκτελούν την αποστολή τους μέσω των αστυνομικών φυλακίων στρατοχωροφυλακής που διαθέτουν.

Οι σχηματισμοί που δεν ανήκουν στην αστική οργάνωση είναι οι εξής;

- Το Σώμα Στρατού Εσωτερικής Ασφάλειας, έχει έδρα στο Van, διαθέτει μια μεραρχία συνόρων, μια ταξιαρχία συνόρων, μια ταξιαρχία καταδρομών και πέντε τακτικά συντάγματα καταδρομών. Έχει ως τομέα ευθύνης την ανατολική και νοτιοανατολική Τουρκία και συμμετέχει ενεργά στις επιχειρήσεις εναντίον του PKK.
- Το Τακτικό Συγκρότημα Καταδρομών της Κωνσταντινούπολης το οποίο επιχειρησιακά υπάγεται στη Διοίκηση Περιοχής Κωνσταντινούπολης.
- Τα *Jandarma Özel Harekât Taburları/JÖHT* (Τάγματα Ειδικών Επιχειρήσεων Στρατοχωροφυλακής) που αποτελούνται από επιχειρησιακές ομάδες και το προσωπικό τους είναι μόνιμοι αξιωματικοί και μόνιμοι υπαξιωματικοί. Αυτά υπάγονται επιχειρησιακά είτε στις Διοικήσεις Περιοχών είτε στις Διοικήσεις Νομών Στρατοχωροφυλακής.
- Η Διοίκηση Αεροπορίας είναι επιπέδου συντάγματος και οι μονάδες της εδρεύουν στην Άγκυρα, στο Diyarbakır, στο Van και στο Çildir/Aydın. Το σύνταγμα αυτό, με τα 57 ελικόπτερα γενικής χρήσεως (AB-205, UH-60, UH-1 και Mi-17) που διαθέτει, δύναται να

μεταφέρει σε μια διαδρομή δύο τάγματα καταδρομών στρατοχωροφυλακής, για να διεξαγάγουν μια επιχείρηση εσωτερικής ασφαλείας. Όλα τα αεροπορικά μέσα έχουν την δυνατότητα να εκτελούν νυκτερινές επιχειρήσεις και το 2011 αυτά πραγματοποίησαν 12.316 ώρες πτήσεως οι οποίες φορούσαν σε επιχειρήσεις εσωτερικής ασφάλειας, ασκήσεις, αποστολές έρευνας και διάσωσης, διοίκησης και ελέγχου, καθώς επίσης μεταφορά VIP.⁴ Το προσωπικό με ειδικότητα πιλότου και τεχνικού τοποθετείται σε μονάδες της αεροπορίας στρατοχωροφυλακής μετά την περάτωση της βασικής εκπαίδευσης στο σχολείο της αεροπορίας. Κατά την διάρκεια της εκπαίδευσης οι πιλότοι και οι τεχνικοί πρέπει να αποφοιτήσουν επιτυχώς από όλα τα σχολεία των αεροσκαφών και ελικοπτέρων που διαθέτει η αεροπορία της στρατοχωροφυλακής.

- Η Διοίκηση Εκπαιδεύσεως ιδρύθηκε το 1975 και ήταν επιπέδου μεραρχίας. Στις 19-04-1996 αναδιοργανώθηκε σε σώμα στρατού αποτελούμενο από τη Διοίκηση Σχολών Στρατοχωροφυλακής, δύο ταξιαρχίες εκπαίδευσεως, τη Σχολή και Κέντρο Εκπαίδευσεως Καταδρομών Στρατοχωροφυλακής και το Κέντρο Εκπαίδευσεως Ιππασίας και Σκύλων. Επίσης, στην πόλη Vize στην ανατολική Θράκη εδρεύει το Κέντρο Ελέγχου Ασκήσεων Καταδρομών Στρατοχωροφυλακής επίπεδου τάγματος. Υπόψη ότι ετησίως πραγματοποιείται εκπαίδευση σε 80.000 νεοσυλλέκτους οπλίτες και 10.000 στελέχη όλων των κατηγοριών (αξιωματικοί, μόνιμοι υπαξιωματικοί και επαγγελματίες-συμβασιούχοι οπλίτες). Επιπλέον, επισημαίνεται ότι στην περιοχή των δυτικών παραλίων έναντι των ελληνικών νησιών αλλά και στην περιοχή της Ανατολικής Θράκης υπάρχουν πολύ σημαντικοί σχηματισμοί εκπαίδευσεως καταδρομών, οι οποίοι, σε περίοδο κρίσης ή πολέμου με την Ελλάδα, θα μπορούσαν εύκολα να μετασχηματισθούν σε σχηματισμούς μάχης αυξάνοντας τη μαχητική ισχύ των τουρκικών ενόπλων δυνάμεων.

Περιέργως, η δύναμη της Γενικής Διοίκησης Στρατοχωροφυλακής, παρά τον εμφανή στρατιωτικό της προσανατολισμό (189.000 άτομα), αγνοείται από τα διεθνή κέντρα μελετών τα οποία δεν την συνυπολογίζουν στη στρατιωτική δύναμη της Τουρκίας. Οι σχηματισμοί συνόρων, καταδρομών και εκπαίδευσεως της Στρατοχωροφυλακής έχουν καθαρά στρατιωτική δομή, ενώ το υλικό που διαθέτουν (εκατοντάδες τεθωρακισμένα οχήματα, 57 ελικόπτερα και βαρύς οπλισμός) σε συνδυασμό με την πολεμική εμπειρία του προσωπικού, συνιστούν ένα σημαντικό παράγοντα στρατιωτικής ισχύος. Οι αξιωματικοί προέρχονται από τη Στρατιωτική Σχολή Ευελπίδων, η εκπαίδευσή τους είναι η ίδια με τους υπόλοιπους αξιωματικούς του στρατού ξηράς και ο αρχηγός της στρατοχωροφυλακής είναι πάντα αξιωματικός του στρατού ξηράς.

Το προφανές συμπέρασμα που προκύπτει από τα παραπάνω είναι ότι η Γενική Διοίκηση Στρατοχωροφυλακής, η οποία σε μια ενδεχόμενη ελληνοτουρκική σύρραξη έχει τη δυνατότητα να αντιπαραθέσει έναντι της Ελλάδος μια δύναμη ισοδύναμη με σώμα στρατού, θα πρέπει να αποτελεί αντικείμενο προβληματισμού και ανησυχίας, διότι επηρεάζει άμεσα τις αναλογίες δυνάμεων μεταξύ Ελλάδος και Τουρκίας.

3.1.7 Διοίκηση Ασφαλείας Ακτών

Τα καθήκοντα της Διοίκησης Ασφαλείας Ακτών αφορούν στη διεξαγωγή αποστολών και δραστηριοτήτων, σύμφωνα με τους νόμους του εθνικού και διεθνούς δικαίου (σ.σ. όπως το αντιλαμβάνονται οι Τούρκοι). Αναλυτικότερα αυτά αφορούν στα εξής:

⁴ Ετήσια Έκθεση Δραστηριοτήτων της Γενικής Διεύθυνσης Στρατοχωροφυλακής για το Έτος 2012

- Στη διαφύλαξη και παροχή ασφάλειας στις ακτές, τα χωρικά ύδατα και την Αποκλειστική Οικονομική Ζώνη της Τουρκίας.
- Στην ασφάλεια της ζωής και της περιουσίας στις θαλάσσιες περιοχές, όπου η Τουρκία ασκεί κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα.
- Στην αποτροπή του λαθρεμπορίου και της λαθρομετανάστευσης μέσω της θαλάσσης.
- Στη διεξαγωγή επιχειρήσεων έρευνας και διάσωσης στην περιοχή έρευνας και διάσωσης της Τουρκίας με βάση τις διεθνείς συμφωνίες και τον τουρκικό Εθνικό Κανονισμό Έρευνας και Διάσωσης (SAR).
- Στην παροχή ασφάλειας στις στρατηγικές θαλάσσιες μεταφορές μέσω των Στενών.
- Στην προστασία των στρατηγικών εγκαταστάσεων από τη θάλασσα, όπως οι εγκαταστάσεις στο Ceyhan και στο Aliğa.
- Στη διαφύλαξη του θαλάσσιου πολιτιστικού και περιβαλλοντολογικού πλούτου.
- Στη διενέργεια ελέγχων για την αποτροπή της θαλάσσιας ρύπανσης.
- Στη λήψη μέτρων κατά της αρχαιοκαπηλίας και της παράνομης αλιείας.
- Στον έλεγχο των δραστηριοτήτων των τουριστικών σκαφών.

Οργανόγραμμα της Διοίκησης Ασφαλείας Ακτών




Plate 37: Organization of Turkish coastal security administration

Σύμφωνα με το παρακάτω οργανόγραμμα η Διοίκηση Ασφαλείας Ακτών διαθέτει επτά διοικήσεις: τη Διοίκηση Περιοχής Μαύρης Θάλασσας με έδρα την Σαμψούντα, τη Διοίκηση Περιοχής Μαρμαρά και Στενών με έδρα την Κωνσταντινούπολη, τη Διοίκηση Περιοχής Θάλασσας Αιγαίου με έδρα τη Σμύρνη, τη Διοίκηση Περιοχής Μεσογείου Θαλάσσης με έδρα τη Μερσίνη, τη Διοίκηση

Εκπαιδεύσεως με έδρα την Κωνσταντινούπολη, τη Διοίκηση Κέντρου Ανεφοδιασμού με έδρα την Κωνσταντινούπολη και τη Διοίκηση Αεροπορίας Ασφαλείας Ακτών με έδρα τη Σμύρνη. Συνακόλουθα, αυτή διαθέτει 65 βάσεις, λιμάνια και στρατιωτικές εγκαταστάσεις, όπου σταθμεύουν τα ελικόπτερα AB-412, τα αεροσκάφη επιτήρησης CN-235 και τα κινητά ραντάρ, τα οποία συμπληρώνουν τον κατάλογο των 160 θαλάσσιων μέσων (σκάφη-λέμβοι).

Περαιτέρω, θα πρέπει να ληφθεί υπόψη ο σύγχρονος και μεγάλος αριθμός ναυτικών και αεροπορικών μέσων της εν λόγω Διοίκησης, τα οποία αυξάνουν τις επιχειρησιακές της δυνατότητες. Συγκεκριμένα αυτή διαθέτει: 4 πλοία έρευνας-διάσωσης ανοικτών θαλασσών 1.750 τόνων, 14 σκάφη τύπου 80 Sinifi (156-195 τόνων), 17 σκάφη 90 τόνων, 8 σκάφη 70 τόνων, 4 σκάφη κλάσεως Kaan 33 (87-113 τόνων), 9 σκάφη κλάσεως Kaan 29 (83-97 τόνων), ένα σκάφος κλάσεως Kaan 19 (30 τόνων), 18 σκάφη κλάσεως Kaan 15 (4,4-18,7 τόνων), 4 σκάφη κλάσεως Sar 35 (185-210 τόνων), 10 σκάφη κλάσεως Sar 33 (150-180 τόνων), 14 σκάφη τουρκικού τύπου (156-195 τόνων), 13 σκάφη κλάσεως Sac Piket (26-29 τόνων), 48 ελαστικές λέμβους διαφόρων τύπων, 14 ελικόπτερα AB 412, καθώς επίσης 3 αεροσκάφη επιτήρησης CASA CN-235.

Από την παράθεση των παραπάνω στοιχείων προκύπτει ότι η τουρκική Διοίκηση Ασφαλείας Ακτών με την αύξηση του προσωπικού της αλλά και με τον αριθμητικό και ποιοτικό εκσυγχρονισμό της σε ναυτικά και αεροπορικά μέσα αποκτά συνεχώς πολύ σημαντικές δυνατότητες για διεξαγωγή επιχειρήσεων έρευνας-διάσωσης στο Αιγαίο και στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο, οι οποίες θα αναβαθμίσουν σε σημαντικό βαθμό την υπάρχουσα απειλή. Σημειώνεται ακόμη ότι σε μια ενδεχόμενη ελληνοτουρκική κρίση, αυτή θα αποτελέσει ένα σημαντικό «εργαλείο» των τουρκικών ενόπλων δυνάμεων, δεδομένου ότι ο τομέας των αρμοδιοτήτων της επικεντρώνεται σε δύο πολύ κρίσιμους τομείς: την έρευνα-διάσωση και τη λαθρομετανάστευση, όπου υπάρχει σοβαρός κίνδυνος για δημιουργία θερμού επεισοδίου και γενίκευσης της κρίσης.

3.1.8 Διοίκηση Ειδικών Δυνάμεων του τουρκικού Γενικού Επιτελείου Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων

Η Διοίκηση Ειδικών Δυνάμεων, *Özel Kuvvetler Komutanlığı/ÖKK*, γνωστή ως *Bordo Bereli* (Βυσσινί Μπερέ), αποτελεί ένα Σχηματισμό ο οποίος υπάγεται απευθείας στο τουρκικό Γενικό Επιτελείο Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων και ανταποκρίνεται στις ανάγκες ειδικών επιχειρήσεών του, τόσο στο εσωτερικό της Τουρκίας όσο και στο εξωτερικό. Η Διοίκηση αυτή ιδρύθηκε με απόφαση του Ανωτάτου Συμβουλίου Εθνικής Άμυνας στις 27-09-1952 με την ονομασία *Seferbelrik Tetkik Kurulu* (Επιτροπή Επιστρατευτικής Εποπτείας) η οποία αργότερα μετονομάστηκε σε *Özel Harp Dairesi* (Τμήμα Ειδικού Πολέμου), υπαγόμενη στον υπαρχηγό του τουρκικού Γενικού Επιτελείου Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων και στεγαζόμενη στο κτήριο της Ερυθράς Ημισελήνου στην Άγκυρα στη διεύθυνση *Adakale Sokak No 36*. Η αποστολή της αφορούσε στην αντιμετώπιση μιας ενδεχόμενης ρωσικής εισβολής στα πλαίσια του δόγματος του NATO. Είναι αξιοσημείωτο πάντως ότι η τουρκική Εθνοσυνέλευση αγνοούσε την ύπαρξή της, ενώ οι ιδρυτές της και μετέπειτα διοικητές της εκπαιδεύθηκαν στις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, οι οποίες προμήθευαν την εν λόγω Διοίκηση με όλα τα αναγκαία πολεμικά και τεχνολογικά υλικά. Η οργάνωση της αποτελείτο από τρεις κύριους κλάδους: του ανορθόδοξου πολέμου, των επιχειρήσεων σταθεροποίησης και του ψυχολογικού πολέμου. Επίσης, το προσωπικό της αποτελείτο από δύο κατηγορίες. Η πρώτη κατηγορία περιελάμβανε αποκλειστικά στρατιωτικούς, οι οποίοι διακρίνονταν για τις αντικομμουνιστικές τους

πεποιθήσεις και οι οποίοι κατά το Δεύτερο Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο είχαν διασυνδέσεις με ναζιστές. Η δεύτερη και πιο επικίνδυνη κατηγορία αποτελείτο αποκλειστικά από πολίτες, οργανωμένους σε ειδικά τμήματα, οι οποίοι είχαν ως αποστολή τη διεξαγωγή μυστικής αντίστασης-δολιοφθορών σε περίπτωση ρωσικής εισβολής. Τα άτομα αυτά, στα οποία είχαν δοθεί κωδικά ονόματα, εκπαιδεύονταν σε ειδικά κέντρα εκπαίδευσης. Μεταξύ αυτών συμπεριλαμβάνονται Τούρκοι, Κούρδοι, Τσερκέζοι και Λαζοί από διάφορους εργασιακούς χώρους, όπως εκπαιδευτικοί, αγρότες, αστυνομικοί, ακαδημαϊκοί, δημοσιογράφοι, ιατροί, νοσηλευτές, δικηγόροι κ.λπ. Μετά τη διάλυση της Σοβιετικής Ένωσης όλα τα κράτη μέλη του NATO διέλυσαν τις παρόμοιες διοικήσεις που διέθεταν. Αντιθέτως, η Τουρκία όχι μόνο δεν συμβάδισε με τις υπόλοιπες χώρες, αλλά το 1994 αναδιοργάνωσε το *Özel Harp Dairesi* (Τμήμα Ειδικού Πολέμου) σε μεραρχία με την ονομασία *Özel Kuvvetler Komutanlığı* (Διοίκηση Ειδικών Δυνάμεων). Παράλληλα ανακοινώθηκε επίσημα ότι διαλύθηκε και ο κλάδος των πολιτών. Ωστόσο όμως, ο κλάδος αυτός δεν έχει διαλυθεί, αντίθετα είναι οργανωμένος ως στρατιωτική δύναμη και εντεταγμένος στον πυρήνα των ειδικών δυνάμεων της Τουρκίας, με αποστολή την εκτέλεση ειδικών επιχειρήσεων. Άλλωστε, οι *Bordo Bereli* έχουν κατηγορηθεί στο παρελθόν για παράνομες ενέργειες, μεταξύ των οποίων και δεκάδες δολοφονίες τόσο Κούρδων όσο και λοιπών ατόμων που αποτελούσαν στόχο του εκάστοτε βαθέως κράτους.

Σύμφωνα με δημοσιεύματα έγκριτων Τούρκων αρθρογράφων η δύναμη των πολιτών αυτών ξεπερνά τις 100.000 άτομα. Ειδικότερα δε, η Nazlı Ilıcak σε άρθρο της στην εφημερίδα *Sabah*/26-02-2013 αποκάλυψε ότι: α. Στα προαναφερθέντα τμήματα των *Bordo Bereli* έχει δοθεί η κωδική ονομασία *Beyaz Kuvvetler* (Λευκές Δυνάμεις). β. Στο Σύνταγμα Έρευνας-Διάσωσης Μάχης [*Muhabere Arama Kurtarma (MAK)*] των *Bordo Bereli* είναι τοποθετημένοι 650 πολίτες κατανεμημένοι σε τέσσερις ομάδες. Στις *beyaz, siyah, turuncu* και *yeşil kuvvetleri*, δηλαδή στις λευκές, στις μαύρες, στις πορτοκαλί και στις πράσινες δυνάμεις. Η σπουδαιότητα των δυνάμεων αυτών για την Ελλάδα έγκειται στο γεγονός ότι το Σύνταγμα Έρευνας-Διάσωσης Μάχης (MAK) έχει την έδρα του στην Αεροπορική Βάση Çiğli της Σμύρνης και οι αποστολές που θα κληθεί ή «καλείται» να αναλάβει είναι προφανείς.

Το 2006, με απόφαση του Ανωτάτου Στρατιωτικού Συμβουλίου (YAS), η *Özel Kuvvetler Komutanlığı* αναδιοργανώθηκε σε σώμα στρατού με διοικητή αντιστράτηγο. Το 2007, αποφασίσθηκε η αύξηση της δυνάμεώς της από 5.000 σε 7.000 στελέχη και η ενίσχυση με μεταφορικά και επιθετικά ελικόπτερα. Όλα τα στελέχη είναι γλωσσομαθείς (ομιλούν την Αγγλική και μια γλώσσα γειτονικού κράτους-στόχου), είναι αλεξιπτωτιστές και βατραχάνθρωποι και η εκπαίδευσή τους διαρκεί περίπου 1,5 χρόνο.

Το βασικό επιχειρησιακό «κύτταρο» των *Bordo Bereli* ακολουθεί τις αμερικανικές δομές-οργάνωση και είναι η ομάδα ειδικών επιχειρήσεων, η οποία αποτελείται από δύο αξιωματικούς και δέκα μόνιμους υπαξιωματικούς. Οι ομάδες αυτές εντάσσονται σε τάγματα ειδικών δυνάμεων, τα οποία υπάγονται στο Σύνταγμα Έρευνας-Διάσωσης Μάχης (MAK) και στα δύο Συγκροτήματα Ειδικών Δυνάμεων. Πέραν των παραπάνω, η Διοίκηση Ειδικών Δυνάμεων του τουρκικού Γενικού Επιτελείου Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων διαθέτει την Διοίκηση του Ειδικού Αεροπορικού Συγκροτήματος, το Σύνταγμα Πολιτικο-στρατιωτικής Συνεργασίας, τη Διοίκηση Λογιστικής Υποστήριξης και τη Σχολή Ειδικών Δυνάμεων. Ακολούθως παρατίθεται το οργανόγραμμα της εν λόγω διοίκησης στα τουρκικά και υπόμνημα επεξηγήσεων αυτού.




Plate 38: Organization of Special Forces Command of Turkish Armed Forces' General Staff

ΥΠΟΜΝΗΜΑ ΕΠΕΞΗΓΗΣΕΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΡΓΑΝΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΔΙΟΙΚΗΣΗΣ ΕΙΔΙΚΩΝ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΩΝ		
A/A	ΟΝΟΜΑΣΙΑ	ΠΑΡΑΤΗΡΗΣΕΙΣ
1.	Διοίκηση Ειδικών Δυνάμεων	Επιπέδου Σώματος Στρατού
2.	Διεύθυνση Επιτροπής Επιστρατευτικού Ελέγχου	Επιπέδου Μεραρχίας
3.	Τρεις Ταξιαρχίες Ειδικών Δυνάμεων	
4.	Σύνταγμα Πολιτικο-στρατιωτικής Συνεργασίας	
5.	Σχολή Ειδικών Δυνάμεων	Επιπέδου Συντάγματος
6.	Σύνταγμα Έρευνας-Διάσωσης Μάχης	
7.	Διοίκηση Ειδικού Αεροπορικού Συγκροτήματος	Επιπέδου Συντάγματος
8.	Διοίκηση Λογιστικής Υποστήριξης	Επιπέδου Συντάγματος
9.	Στρατηγείο Ταξιαρχίας	
10.	1 ^ο Συγκρότημα Ειδικών Δυνάμεων	Επιπέδου Συντάγματος

11.	2 ^ο Συγκρότημα Ειδικών Δυνάμεων	Επιπέδου Συντάγματος
12.	Επιτελείο Συντάγματος	
13.	Τρία Τάγματα Ειδικών Δυνάμεων	
14.	Τρία Τάγματα Ειδικών Δυνάμεων	
15.	Τρία Τάγματα Ειδικών Δυνάμεων	

Οι αποστολές που ανατίθενται στους *Bordo Bereli* είναι οι εξής:

- Διεξαγωγή επιχειρήσεων έρευνας-διάσωσης προκειμένου να διασωθεί και να φυγαδευτεί στην Τουρκία σημαντικό φίλιο προσωπικό που έχει παραμείνει σε εχθρική περιοχή.
- Διεξαγωγή επιχειρήσεων εξουδετέρωσης (δολοφονίες) της ηγεσίας διασπαστικών οργανώσεων που βρίσκονται στο εξωτερικό καθώς επίσης και ατόμων που παρέχουν υποστήριξη σε αυτές και οι οποίες έχουν ως στόχο την Τουρκία.
- Διεξαγωγή ψυχολογικών επιχειρήσεων εντός της Τουρκίας και σε «χώρες στόχους».
- Εκπαίδευση προσωπικού, σχεδιασμός και διεξαγωγή επιχειρήσεων ανορθόδοξου πολέμου στο εσωτερικό και στο εξωτερικό.
- Σχεδιασμός και διεξαγωγή κάθε είδους επιχείρησης εσωτερικής ασφάλειας.
- Διεξαγωγή επιχειρήσεων εξουδετέρωσης τρομοκρατών και διάσωσης ομήρων, οι οποίοι ευρίσκονται σε κτήριο, σε αεροπλάνο, σε πλοίο, σε τρένο και σε λεωφορείο.
- Προστασία σημαντικών προσωπικοτήτων στην ειρήνη και στον πόλεμο.
- Εντοπισμός και εξουδετέρωση ύποπτων υλικών.
- Διεξαγωγή επιχειρήσεων έρευνας-διάσωσης λόγω φυσικών καταστροφών στο εσωτερικό και στο εξωτερικό.
- Διεξαγωγή επιχειρήσεων υποστήριξης της ειρήνης σε συνεργασία με φίλια και συμμαχικά κράτη.
- Εκπαίδευση ειδικών δυνάμεων φίλιων και συμμαχικών κρατών.
- Πραγματοποίηση επιδείξεων σε τουρκικές ή ξένες στρατιωτικές αποστολές και οργανισμούς.

Αυτό που κρίνεται σκόπιμο να τονισθεί ιδιαίτερα είναι ο μεγάλος αριθμός των *Bordo Bereli*, καθώς επίσης και το γεγονός ότι καμία άλλη χώρα, πλην των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών, δεν διαθέτει τόσο μεγάλη δύναμη ειδικών επιχειρήσεων. Τούτο σε συνδυασμό με την εκπαίδευση, την πολεμική

εμπειρία, το άριστο υλικό που διαθέτουν και με τις προαναφερόμενες αποστολές που τους έχουν ανατεθεί, αποτελεί μια σημαντικότερη απειλή για την Ελλάδα, η αντιμετώπιση της οποίας απαιτεί την ύπαρξη ειδικού σχεδιασμού.

4.3^η Θεματική ενότητα

4.1 Εξοπλισμοί των τουρκικών ενόπλων δυνάμεων

Οι τουρκοί εξοπλισμοί εντάσσονται σ' ένα πλήρως ολοκληρωμένο πρόγραμμα που καλύπτει κάθε πτυχή των επιχειρησιακών αναγκών των τουρκικών ενόπλων δυνάμεων. Τα εξοπλιστικά προγράμματα, τα οποία βρίσκονται σε εξέλιξη, κινούνται πάνω σε δύο κύριους άξονες. Ο πρώτος αφορά στην έμφαση που δίδεται στην απόκτηση αισθητήρων και ο δεύτερος στην απόκτηση όπλων μεγάλου βεληνεκούς και εν γένει όπλων μεγάλου πλήγματος. Ειδικότερα δε κατά Κλάδο, η κατάσταση παρουσιάζεται ως εξής: α. Ο πιο σημαντικός στόχος των τουρκικών χερσαίων δυνάμεων είναι η δημιουργία μιας ευέλικτης δομής, η οποία θα ανταποκρίνεται απόλυτα στην άμεση αντιμετώπιση κάθε εσωτερικής και εξωτερικής απειλής. Βασική προϋπόθεση για την υλοποίηση του στόχου αυτού αποτελεί η αναβάθμιση των επιχειρησιακών δυνατοτήτων, μέσω της εκπαίδευσης και της υλοποίησης εξοπλιστικών προγραμμάτων εκσυγχρονισμού, κατασκευής και προμήθειας οπλικών συστημάτων και κύριων μέσων-υλικών. β. Η μελλοντική δομή του τουρκικού πολεμικού ναυτικού σε συνδυασμό με την απαίτηση των ναυτικών δυνάμεων της Τουρκίας να επιχειρούν ταυτόχρονα σε τρεις θαλάσσιες περιοχές επιχειρήσεων, είτε στις ανοικτές θάλασσες είτε σε παράκτιες περιοχές, αποτελούν τις βασικές παραμέτρους προκειμένου η τουρκική θαλάσσια πολιτική να είναι αποτελεσματική και να έχει διάρκεια. Η σημασία που δίδει η τουρκική πολιτική και στρατιωτική ηγεσία για την υλοποίηση αυτού του στόχου είναι πρόδηλη και αποτυπώνεται εμφανώς στα εξοπλιστικά προγράμματα που βρίσκονται σε εξέλιξη. γ. Η Τουρκία επιδιώκει τη συμμετοχή των αεροπορικών της δυνάμεων σε πολυεθνικές επιχειρήσεις με σκοπό την προβολή των δυνατοτήτων τους, καθώς επίσης και τη χρησιμοποίηση αυτών ως ένα σοβαρό πολιτικό μέσο επιβεβαίωσης του περιφερειακού και εν μέρει του παγκόσμιου ρόλου της. Παράλληλα, η Τουρκία συνεχίζει με αυξανόμενους ρυθμούς την παραβίαση των κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων της Ελλάδας και της Κύπρου στο Αιγαίο και στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο.

Ειδικότερα δε, οι παράγοντες που έχουν ιδιαίτερη βαρύτητα και προσδίδουν σημαντική πολλαπλασιαστική ισχύ στους τουρκικούς σχεδιασμούς είναι οι εξής:

- Βρίσκονται σε εξέλιξη προγράμματα αναβάθμισης του αρματικού δυναμικού και του τροχαίου υλικού μάχης, με έμφαση στην κατασκευή-προμήθεια-εκσυγχρονισμό αρμάτων και στην κατασκευή τεθωρακισμένων τροχοφόρων οχημάτων.
- Οι τουρκικές ένοπλες δυνάμεις δίδουν μεγάλη βαρύτητα στον τομέα των ελικοπτέρων προκειμένου να μπορούν να μεταφέρουν μια ταξιαρχία με ελικόπτερα σε μια διαδρομή, ημέρα και νύκτα, σε οποιοδήποτε φυσικό περιβάλλον και με οποιοδήποτε καιρικές συνθήκες. Επιπρόσθετα δε, η στρατοχωροφυλακή με τα 57 ελικόπτερα που διαθέτει δύναται να μεταφέρει δύο τάγματα καταδρομών σε μια διαδρομή.
- Υπάρχει η δυνατότητα άμεσης οδικής μεταφοράς μιας μηχανοκίνητης ή τεθωρακισμένης ταξιαρχίας από το ένα άκρο της Τουρκίας στο άλλο προκειμένου να αντιμετωπισθούν οι

ανάγκες μεταφορών μηχανοκινήτων και τεθωρακισμένων Μονάδων σε στρατηγικό επίπεδο.

- Διατίθεται μια ισχύς πυρός με σύγχρονα οπλικά συστήματα τα οποία μπορούν να προσβάλλουν στόχους σε μεγάλες αποστάσεις. Συγκεκριμένα, οι Τούρκοι εκσυγχρονίζουν το πυροβολικό κατασκευάζοντας πυροβόλα, συστήματα αυτοματισμού πυρών υποστηρίξεως και πυραυλικά συστήματα μεγάλου βεληνεκούς. Περαιτέρω, θα πρέπει να ληφθεί υπόψη ότι η ανάπτυξη πυραύλων με μεγάλα βεληνεκή αποτελεί σοβαρότατη ένδειξη περί αναπτύξεως πυρηνικών όπλων, διότι πύραυλοι συμβατικής γομώσεως με αυτά τα βεληνεκή έχουν περιορισμένη στρατιωτική αξία σε σύγκριση με το κόστος ανάπτυξης και κατασκευής τους.
- Επαυξάνονται οι δυνατότητες διεξαγωγής επιχειρήσεων βιαίας διάβασης ποταμού, προκειμένου οι τουρκικές χερσαίες δυνάμεις να μπορούν να διέρχονται ποτάμια γραμμές γρήγορα, με ασφάλεια, σε οποιοδήποτε έδαφος και με οποιοδήποτε καιρικές συνθήκες.
- Αποκτούνται συστήματα επικοινωνιών και ηλεκτρονικού πολέμου τα οποία θα υποστηρίζουν τις επιχειρησιακές απαιτήσεις ενός σύγχρονου πεδίου επιχειρήσεων.
- Επαυξάνονται οι δυνατότητες αναγνώρισης, επιτήρησης και εντοπισμού στόχων με την εγχώρια κατασκευή μη επανδρωμένων αεροσκαφών.
- Αποκτούνται σημαντικές ναυτικές επιχειρησιακές δυνατότητες και ναυτική ισχύς πυρός με τη ναυπήγηση πλοίων ανθυποβρυχιακού πολέμου και αναγνωρίσεων (MILGEM), φρεγατών αντιαεροπορικού πολέμου TF 2000, πλοίων περιπολίας νέου τύπου, πυραυλακάτων, ναρκαλιευτικών και σκαφών επιχειρησιακής μεταφοράς ομάδων υποβρυχίων καταστροφών.
- Αναβαθμίζεται ο τουρκικός αποβατικός στόλος με σκοπό τη δημιουργία μιας ισχυρής αμφίβιας δύναμης που μεταξύ άλλων θα περιλαμβάνει και ένα πλοίο αποβατικών επιχειρήσεων LPD.
- Αναπτύσσονται τεχνολογίες υποβρύχιων οπλικών συστημάτων που περιλαμβάνουν κατασκευή υποβρυχίων, εθνικής τορπίλης και συστημάτων υποβρύχιας και επιφανειακής παρατήρησης και εντοπισμού στόχων.
- Ναυπηγούνται πλοία για τη Διοίκηση Ασφαλείας Ακτών που θα έχουν τη δυνατότητα να επιχειρούν με δυσμενείς καιρικές συνθήκες και θα εκτελούν αποστολές έρευνας και διάσωσης (ειδικά σε ανοικτές θάλασσες), αποστολές περιπολίας και αποτροπής παράνομων δραστηριοτήτων. Επισημαίνεται ότι τα πλοία αυτά θα έχουν κύρια αποστολή την υποστήριξη των τουρκικών διεκδικήσεων στην Αποκλειστική Οικονομική Ζώνη.
- Αναβαθμίζεται η τουρκική πολεμική αεροπορία με τον εκσυγχρονισμό, προμήθεια και κατασκευή αεροσκαφών.

- Πραγματοποιείται προμήθεια και εκσυγχρονισμός οπλικών συστημάτων αντιαεροπορικής άμυνας.
- Βρίσκεται σε εξέλιξη ένα δορυφορικό πρόγραμμα το οποίο σε συνδυασμό με τα αεροφωτογραφικά αεροσκάφη που εκσυγχρονίζονται και τα μη επανδρωμένα αεροσκάφη που αποκτούνται, θα δώσει μια σημαντική υπεροχή στις τουρκικές ένοπλες δυνάμεις στον τομέα των πληροφοριών, με ό,τι αυτό συνεπάγεται από απόψεως αποτελεσματικότητας.
- Αναπτύσσονται σημαντικές δυνατότητες κυβερνοπολέμου σε εθνικό επίπεδο.
- Το υφιστάμενο σχέδιο παραπλάνησης με τη δημιουργία παραπλανητικών/εικονικών σταθμών διοικήσεως από ομάδες παραπλάνησης διαβιβάσεων των μειζόνων σχηματισμών.

Περαιτέρω θα πρέπει να ληφθεί υπόψη ότι, από τους παρακάτω πίνακες με τα χρονοδιαγράμματα εξέλιξης των κυρίων εξοπλιστικών προγραμμάτων της Τουρκίας, διαπιστώνεται ότι, ενώ τα περισσότερα εξ' αυτών αποφασίσθηκαν από την κυβέρνηση Erdogan μετά το 2004, ο Τούρκος πρωθυπουργός παραπλανούσε την ελληνική πλευρά προτείνοντας μείωση των εξοπλισμών.

Α / Α	ΟΝΟΜΑΣΙΑ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΟΣ	ΧΡΟΝΟΔΙΑΓΡΑΜΜΑ ΕΞΕΛΙΞΗΣ ΚΥΡΙΩΝ ΕΞΟΠΛΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΩΝ ΧΕΡΣΑΙΩΝ ΜΕΣΩΝ																		
		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
1.	Εθνικό άρμα μάχης Altay																			
2.	Αναβάθμιση των αρμάτων Leopard 1 Α1/Α1Α3																			
3.	Εκσυγχρονισμός των αρμάτων M60 Α1																			
4.	Κινητές πλωτές γέφυρες εφόδου																			
5.	Τακτικά τροχοφόρα οχήματα προστασίας από νάρκες																			
6.	Τακτικά τροχοφόρα οχήματα 3/4 τόνων ελέγχου διοικήσεως και μεταφοράς προσωπικού-υλικών																			
7.	Τακτικά τροχοφόρα οχήματα 2 ½ τόνων μεταφοράς προσωπικού-υλικών																			

Α / Α	ΟΝΟΜΑΣΙΑ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΟΣ	ΧΡΟΝΟΔΙΑΓΡΑΜΜΑ ΕΞΕΛΙΞΗΣ ΚΥΡΙΩΝ ΕΞΟΠΛΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΩΝ ΧΕΡΣΑΙΩΝ ΜΕΣΩΝ												
		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
8.	Τακτικά τροχοφόρα οχήματα 5-10 τόνων μεταφοράς υλικών													
9.	Αμφίβια τεθωρακισμένα μηχανήματα μηχανικού μάχης													
10.	Αρματοφορείς και ρυμουλκά													
11.	Τακτικά τεθωρακισμένα τροχοφόρα οχήματα ειδικών αποστολών													
12.	Οχήματα φορείς οπλικών συστημάτων													
13.	Συστήματα εκκαθάρισης ναρκών													

Α / Α	ΟΝΟΜΑΣΙΑ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΟΣ	ΧΡΟΝΟΔΙΑΓΡΑΜΜΑ ΕΞΕΛΙΞΗΣ ΚΥΡΙΩΝ ΕΞΟΠΛΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΩΝ ΝΑΥΤΙΚΩΝ ΜΕΣΩΝ												
		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
1.	Σκάφη Διοίκησης Ασφαλείας Ακτών 90 τόνων													
2.	Σκάφη επιχειρησιακής μεταφοράς ομάδων υποβρυχίων καταστροφών													
3.	Σκάφη έρευνας και διάσωσης SAR-35													
4.	Σκάφη περιπολίας ταχείας επέμβασης													
5.	Σκάφη Διοίκησης Ασφαλείας Ακτών 25 τόνων													
6.	Πλοία ανθυποβρυχιακού πολέμου και αναγνωρίσεων-περιπολιών (MILGEM)													

Α / Α	ΟΝΟΜΑΣΙΑ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΟΣ	ΧΡΟΝΟΔΙΑΓΡΑΜΜΑ ΕΞΕΛΙΞΗΣ ΚΥΡΙΩΝ ΕΞΟΠΛΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΩΝ ΝΑΥΤΙΚΩΝ ΜΕΣΩΝ																		
		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
7.	Πλοία έρευνας και διάσωσης της Διοίκησης Ασφαλείας Ακτών																			
8.	Σκάφη περιπολίας νέου τύπου																			
9.	Υποβρύχια νέου τύπου																			
10.	Ταχεία αποβατικά πλοία (LCT)																			
11.	Πλοίο διάσωσης και ρυμούλκησης																			
12.	Κύριο πλοίο διάσωσης υποβρυχίων																			
13.	Αποβατικά πλοία (LST)																			
14.	Σκάφος άμεσης επέμβασης και εκπαίδευσης κατάδυσης																			
15.	Προμήθεια πλοίου σεισμολογικών ερευνών																			
16.	Ιστιοφόρα πλοία ναυτικών σχολών																			
17.	Φρεγάτες αντιαεροπορικού πολέμου TF 2000																			
18.	Πλοίο θαλάσσιου ανεφοδιασμού και υποστήριξης μάχης																			
19.	Πλοίο αποβατικών επιχειρήσεων (LPD)																			
20.	Σκάφη Διοίκησης Ασφαλείας Ακτών 600 τόνων																			

Α / Α	ΟΝΟΜΑΣΙΑ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΟΣ	ΧΡΟΝΟΔΙΑΓΡΑΜΜΑ ΕΞΕΛΙΞΗΣ ΚΥΡΙΩΝ ΕΞΟΠΛΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΩΝ ΑΕΡΟΠΟΡΙΚΩΝ ΜΕΣΩΝ																		
		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
1.	Μεταφορικό αεροσκάφος A400M																			

Α / Α	ΟΝΟΜΑΣΙΑ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΟΣ	ΧΡΟΝΟΔΙΑΓΡΑΜΜΑ ΕΞΕΛΙΞΗΣ ΚΥΡΙΩΝ ΕΞΟΠΛΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΩΝ ΑΕΡΟΠΟΡΙΚΩΝ ΜΕΣΩΝ																		
		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
2.	Αεροσκάφη εναερίου εγκαίρου προειδοποιήσεως και ένα σύστημα υποστήριξης εδάφους																			
3.	Εκσυγχρονισμός αεροσκαφών F5																			
4.	Αεροσκάφη θαλάσσιας περιπολίας με δυνατότητα θαλάσσιας επιτήρησης (MELTEM-3)																			
5.	Διακλαδικό Επιθετικό Αεροσκάφος (JSF)																			
6.	Βασικό αεροσκάφος εκπαίδευσης																			
7.	Ανάπτυξη προγράμματος αεροσκάφους αρχικής και βασικής εκπαίδευσης																			
8.	Συμπληρωματική προμήθεια 30 αεροσκαφών F-16, στο πλαίσιο του προγράμματος Peace ONYX IV																			
9.	Εκπαιδευτικά αεροσκάφη Διοίκησης Αεροπορίας Στρατού																			
10.	Εκσυγχρονισμός αεροσκαφών F-16																			
11.	Πρόγραμμα μεταφορικών αεροσκαφών μέσης κατηγορίας																			
12.	Πρόγραμμα αεριωθούμενου αεροσκάφους και μαχητικού αεροσκάφους																			
13.	Πρόγραμμα προμήθειας αεροσκάφους αρχικής εκπαίδευσης																			
14.	Προμήθεια ελικοπτέρων S-70B Sea Hawk																			
15.	Πρόγραμμα επιθετικών ελικοπτέρων																			
16.	Ελικόπτερα Διοίκησης Ασφαλείας Ακτών																			

Α / Α	ΟΝΟΜΑΣΙΑ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΟΣ	ΧΡΟΝΟΔΙΑΓΡΑΜΜΑ ΕΞΕΛΙΞΗΣ ΚΥΡΙΩΝ ΕΞΟΠΛΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΩΝ ΑΕΡΟΠΟΡΙΚΩΝ ΜΕΣΩΝ																		
		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
17 .	Μεταφορικά ελικόπτερα																			
18 .	Ελικόπτερα S-92																			
19 .	Ελικόπτερα γενικής χρήσεως																			
2 ο.	Μη επανδρωμένα αεροσκάφη																			

Ας σημειωθεί ακόμη, ότι η πολιτική και η στρατιωτική ηγεσία της Τουρκίας συνεχώς τονίζουν την ανάγκη απεξάρτησης των εξοπλιστικών αναγκών της χώρας από εξωτερικούς προμηθευτές, οι οποίοι χρησιμοποιούνται ως μοχλός άσκησης πιέσεων για πολιτικές παραχωρήσεις εκ μέρους της τουρκικής κυβέρνησης. Η τουρκική αμυντική βιομηχανία συμμετέχει ενεργά και με σταδιακά αυξανόμενους ρυθμούς για την υλοποίηση του παραπάνω στόχου, αυξάνοντας παράλληλα τις εξαγωγές αμυντικού υλικού. Άλλωστε, οι προθέσεις της Άγκυρας τόσο για τη στρατιωτική της ισχύ όσο και για την αμυντική της βιομηχανία είναι ιδιαίτερα αποκαλυπτικές, όπως προκύπτει από: α. Από τον πρόεδρο Δημοκρατίας Abdullah Gul, ο οποίος στις 13-05-2014 δήλωσε ότι, η Τουρκία, για να εξασφαλίσει την ειρήνη, είναι υποχρεωμένη να δείξει ότι είναι έτοιμη για πόλεμο εάν υπάρξουν οι προϋποθέσεις. β. Τους πίνακες που ακολουθούν και αφορούν στους προϋπολογισμούς των ενόπλων δυνάμεων και φορέων ασφαλείας της Τουρκίας από το 2008 έως το 2014, στο κόστος των εξοπλισμών από το 2002 έως το 2013, στα συνολικά ποσοστά της κατανομής των εξοπλιστικών προγραμμάτων και στις εξαγωγές της τουρκικής αμυντικής βιομηχανίας από το 2003 έως το 2013.

Αναφορικά δε, με τους προϋπολογισμούς των ενόπλων δυνάμεων και φορέων ασφαλείας, κρίνεται σκόπιμο να επισημανθεί ότι αυτοί είναι πολύ μεγαλύτεροι, κατά 40% περίπου, απ' ότι δημοσιοποιούν οι τουρκικές κυβερνήσεις και φαίνονται στους ακόλουθους πίνακες, των οποίων τα στοιχεία προέρχονται από τη Γενική Διεύθυνση Ελέγχου Προϋπολογισμού και Οικονομικών (BUMKO) του υπουργείου Οικονομικών της Τουρκίας. Τούτο οφείλεται στο γεγονός ότι, στους εν λόγω προϋπολογισμούς οι Τούρκοι δεν συνυπολογίζουν τους οικονομικούς δείκτες των ιδρυμάτων που ελέγχονται από τις ένοπλες δυνάμεις και συγκεκριμένα του SSDF (*Savunma Sanayii Destekleme Fonu*/Ταμείο Υποστήριξης της Αμυντικής Βιομηχανίας), του OYAK (*Ordu Yardılaşma Kurumu*/Φορέας Αρωγής του Στρατού) και του TSKGV (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerini Güçlendirme Vakfı*/Ίδρυμα Ενίσχυσης των Τουρκικών Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων. Τα ιδρύματα αυτά ελέγχουν πάνω από 40 τουρκικούς επιχειρηματικούς ομίλους αμυντικής βιομηχανίας και διαφόρων άλλων δραστηριοτήτων, όπως τσιμέντου, χημικών, χρηματοπιστωτικού συστήματος κ.λπ. Αναλυτικότερα: α. Μέσω του SSDF ενισχύεται η εγχώρια παραγωγή στρατιωτικού υλικού, η προώθηση των τουρκικών αμυντικών προϊόντων, η χρηματοδότηση της έρευνας και ανάπτυξης, η παροχή επιχορηγήσεων σε αντίστοιχες βιομηχανίες κ.λπ. Το Ταμείο Υποστήριξης της Αμυντικής Βιομηχανίας απαλλάσσεται από φόρους και ελέγχους, δεν εμπίπτει στην αρμοδιότητα του Ελεγκτικού Συνεδρίου, των κρατικών δημοπρασιών και του Γενικού Λογιστηρίου του Κράτους. Επίσης, απαλλάσσεται από τους φόρους ιδρυμάτων, κληρονομιάς, δωρεών και χαρτοσήμου, ενώ διαθέτει φοροαπαλλαγή στις τραπεζικές και ασφαλιστικές του συναλλαγές. Επιπλέον, η περιουσία

του Ταμείου τελεί υπό νομικό καθεστώς κρατικής περιουσίας. Τα έσοδα του *SSDF*, με βάση τα ποσοστά που προσδιορίζει το υπουργικό συμβούλιο, προέρχονται από το φόρο εισοδήματος και ιδρυμάτων, τις πωλήσεις οινοπνευματωδών και ειδών καπνού, τα τυχερά παιχνίδια, τις ιπποδρομίες, τα έσοδα από την εξαγορά της στρατιωτικής θητείας και τις πωλήσεις ελαφρών όπλων. Στον πίνακα που ακολουθεί φαίνονται τα έσοδα και τα έξοδα του εν λόγω ταμείου κατά το χρονικό διάστημα 2000-2013.

ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ ΕΣΟΔΩΝ-ΕΞΟΔΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΤΑΜΕΙΟΥ ΥΠΟΣΤΗΡΙΞΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΜΥΝΤΙΚΗΣ ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΑΣ SSDF ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟ ΧΡΟΝΙΚΟ ΔΙΑΣΤΗΜΑ 2000-2013 (δολάρια)		
ΕΤΟΣ	ΕΣΟΔΑ	ΕΞΟΔΑ
2000	1.306.000.000	1.092.000.000
2001	845.000.000	590.000.000
2002	1.464.000.000	1.083.000.000
2003	1.322.000.000	981.000.000
2004	1.199.000.000	983.000.000
2005	1.237.000.000	1.031.000.000
2006	1.134.000.000	1.044.000.000
2007	2.458.000.000	1.581.000.000
2008	2.896.000.000	2.015.000.000
2009	1.576.000.000	2.293.000.000
2010	1.133.000.000	2.506.000.000
2011	1.568.000.000	2.056.000.000
2012	1.442.000.000	2.161.000.000
2013	1.479.000.000	2.242.000.000

β. Το ΟΥΑΚ δραστηριοποιείται σε επενδύσεις τόνωσης και ανάπτυξης της εγχώριας βιομηχανίας και αποτελεί ταυτόχρονα, ίδρυμα υποχρεωτικών εισφορών, επικουρικό ίδρυμα κοινωνικής ασφάλισης και υπηρεσιών, καθώς επίσης έναν όμιλο εταιρειών που το 2011 απασχολούσε 28.917 εργαζομένους, ενώ το 2012 οι εργαζόμενοι μειώθηκαν στους 27.596. Επίσης, τα περιουσιακά του στοιχεία ήταν 9,641 δισ. Τουρκικές Λίρες το 2008, 10,846 δισ. το 2010, 12,204 δισ. το 2011, 13,816 δισ. το 2011 και 15,464 δισ. το 2012. γ. Το *TSKGV* συμβάλει στην αύξηση της πολεμικής ισχύος των ενόπλων δυνάμεων, συνεισφέροντας στην τουρκική αμυντική βιομηχανία και στην αγορά οπλικών συστημάτων, οχημάτων και εξοπλισμού. Ελέγχεται από μια εφορευτική επιτροπή, με πρόεδρο τον

υπουργό Εθνικής Άμυνας και μέλη τον υπαρχηγό του Γενικού Επιτελείου Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων, τον υφυπουργό Εθνικής Άμυνας και τον υφυπουργό Αμυντικής Βιομηχανίας. Η σπουδαιότητα του Ιδρύματος Ενίσχυσης των Τουρκικών Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων έγκειται στο γεγονός ότι αυτό ελέγχει τις αμυντικές βιομηχανίες ASELSAN, TAI, HAVELSAN, ROKETSAN, ASPILSAN και İSBİR.

5. 4^η Θεματική ενότητα

5.1 Τα σχέδια επιχειρήσεων της Τουρκίας εναντίον της Ελλάδος και της Κύπρου

Στρατηγικός αντικειμενικός σκοπός της Τουρκίας είναι η παραίτηση της ελληνικής πλευράς από τα κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα της στο Αιγαίο και την Ανατολική Μεσόγειο, ενώ για την επίτευξη των στόχων τους, οι Τούρκοι έχουν θέσει τέσσερις προϋποθέσεις. Πρώτον, να υπάρξει ευνοϊκή, για την Τουρκία, επίλυση του κουρδικού προβλήματος, αφενός εξασφαλίζοντας στην Άγκυρα το ρόλο του «μεγάλου αδελφού» για τους Κούρδους, αφετέρου αποπλέκοντας σημαντικό μέρος των τουρκικών ενόπλων δυνάμεων από τις νοτιοανατολικές περιοχές. Δεύτερον, επίλυση των εσωτερικών προβλημάτων και εμπέδωση της ασφαλείας στο εσωτερικό της χώρας. Τρίτον, έξοδος από την οικονομική κρίση. Στις 14-05-2013 η τουρκική κυβέρνηση αποπλήρωσε το εναπομείναν χρέος των 412 εκατ. δολαρίων στο ΔΝΤ. Και τέταρτον, βελτίωση του επιπέδου κατανόησης από τη διεθνή κοινότητα των ιδιαιτεροτήτων που παρουσιάζει η Τουρκία.

Με βάση τη διαφαινόμενη πρόθεση της Ελλάδος να διασφαλίσει τα θαλάσσια κυριαρχικά δικαιώματά της, η τουρκική στρατηγική εστιάζεται σε τέσσερις άξονες. Ο πρώτος άξονας έχει σχέση με την ανατροπή της ισορροπίας δυνάμεων στο Αιγαίο και την Ανατολική Μεσόγειο, καθώς επίσης τη δημιουργία φοβικών συνδρόμων στην ελληνική πλευρά. Ο δεύτερος άξονας αφορά στη μη επίλυση του κυπριακού προβλήματος πριν την εξεύρεση λύσης στο θέμα της οριοθέτησης των θαλασσιών ζωνών, προκειμένου η Άγκυρα να έχει την Κύπρο *rehin* (ενέχυρο). Ο τρίτος άξονας προβλέπει την εμμονή στο *casus belli*, για να χρησιμοποιηθεί αυτό ως επιχείρημα νομιμοποίησης μιας ενδεχόμενης τουρκικής επιθετικής ενέργειας. Και τέλος, ο τέταρτος άξονας επικεντρώνεται σε μια κλιμακούμενη ένταση στο Αιγαίο προκειμένου η Τουρκία να εξασφαλίσει είτε τη σύμφωνη γνώμη, είτε το συμβιβασμό της διεθνούς κοινότητας, στην οποία θα δοθεί η εντύπωση του νομίμου των διεκδικήσεων της στην περιοχή.

Αναφορικά με τη στάση της διεθνούς κοινότητας στο ενδεχόμενο μιας τουρκικής επιθετικής ενεργείας εναντίον της Ελλάδος, η Άγκυρα εκτιμά ότι οι χώρες της περιοχής και οι διεθνείς οργανισμοί, μετά το αρχικό «σοκ» που θα υποστούν, θα παρέμβουν για κατάπαυση του πυρός μετά από 3-4 ημέρες. Επομένως, ο επιδιωκόμενος σκοπός των Τούρκων θα πρέπει να ολοκληρωθεί εντός 3-4 ημερών το μέγιστο. Συνεπώς, αυτό θα πρέπει να ληφθεί πολύ σοβαρά υπόψη σε σχέση με τον απαιτούμενο χρόνο για κινητοποίηση των ελληνικών δυνάμεων.

Σε μια ενδεχόμενη στρατιωτική επιχείρηση, η κυρία προσπάθεια θα είναι στο Αιγαίο, ενώ μια ενέργεια στη Θράκη θα είναι υποστηρικτική για επίτευξη του στρατηγικού αντικειμενικού σκοπού. Τούτο επιβεβαιώνεται από σχετική Επιχειρησιακή Οδηγία που εκδόθηκε από τη Διοίκηση Χερσαίων Δυνάμεων, βάσει της οποίας σε μια ενδεχόμενη επιχείρηση που θα διεξαχθεί εναντίον της Ελλάδος το κέντρο βάρους θα είναι στο Αιγαίο και οι στρατηγικές εφεδρείες θα διατεθούν επ' ωφελεία της Διακλαδικής Αποβατικής Δύναμης Αιγαίου Ειδικής Αποστολής (ΕΜÖΓΚ).

5.1.1 Θέατρο Επιχειρήσεων Έβρου

Το Θέατρο Επιχειρήσεων του Έβρου καλύπτει τον ελληνικό χώρο από μια ενδεχόμενη επιθετική ενέργεια των Τούρκων εναντίον της Ελλάδος και η στρατιωτική αξία του είναι διαχρονική τόσο

για τη χρησιμοποίηση συμβατικών δυνάμεων όσο για τη δημιουργία ασύμμετρων απειλών.

Από τουρκικής πλευράς, στο Θέατρο Επιχειρήσεων του Έβρου θα ενεργήσει η 1^η Στρατιά με τομέα ευθύνης την Ανατολική Θράκη.

Μια στρατιωτική επιχείρηση στη Θράκη θα έχει το χαρακτήρα υποστήριξης της επιχείρησης στο Αιγαίο, η οποία είτε θα περιορισθεί αποκλειστικά στη στρατηγική άμυνα, είτε θα αποσκοπεί στη μέγιστη καταστροφή των ελληνικών δυνάμεων στην περιοχή, χωρίς να τεθεί σε κίνδυνο η μουσουλμανική μειονότητα. Τούτο θα εξαρτηθεί τόσο από τις υφιστάμενες γεωπολιτικές εξελίξεις στην περιοχή τη συγκεκριμένη χρονική περίοδο, όσο και από την κατάσταση της εθνικής ισχύος της Ελλάδος. Επισημαίνεται ότι σύμφωνα με τα τουρκικά στρατιωτικά εγχειρίδια, η στρατηγική άμυνα περιλαμβάνει επιχειρήσεις ειδικού σκοπού όπως, επίθεση με πυρά, επιθετική αναγνώριση, επίθεση καταστροφής, τακτική επιδρομή και διείσδυση.

Επίσης, κρίνεται σκόπιμο να επισημανθεί ένα βασικό τρωτό σημείο, το οποίο υποχρεώνει τη στρατιωτική ηγεσία της Τουρκίας να δεσμεύει σημαντικές στρατιωτικές δυνάμεις στις περιοχές των μετόπισθεν. Πρόκειται για τις ανατρεπτικές και διασπαστικές ομάδες που δραστηριοποιούνται στους νομούς Κωνσταντινούπολης, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Yalova, Bursa, Balıkesir και Bilecik και η στάση τους σε μια ενδεχόμενη στρατιωτική επιχείρηση της Τουρκίας εναντίον της Ελλάδος προβληματίζει σοβαρά τους Τούρκους επιτελείς, ειδικότερα δε, εάν στοιχεία αυτών ελέγχονται και υποστηρίζονται από ξένα κράτη. Σύμφωνα με τουρκικές πηγές, ο συνολικός αριθμός των ατόμων αυτών ξεπερνά τα 240.000-250.000 άτομα, μέρος των οποίων μπορεί να χρησιμοποιηθεί σε διαδηλώσεις, πορείες, λεηλασίες, καθώς επίσης να πραγματοποιήσουν ένοπλες επιθέσεις, όπως σαμποτάζ, βομβιστικές ενέργειες, δολοφονικές επιθέσεις κ.λπ. σε ευπαθή σημεία της ευρύτερης περιοχής.

5.1.2 Θέατρο Επιχειρήσεων Αιγαίου και Ανατολικής Μεσογείου-Κύπρος

Το Αιγαίο και η Ανατολική Μεσόγειος αποτελούν μια σημαντική επέκταση της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης νοτιοανατολικά και συμβάλλουν στη διασύνδεση της με το θέατρο επιχειρήσεων της Μέσης Ανατολής. Παράλληλα, οι εκατοντάδες νήσοι και νησίδες του Αιγαίου καταλήγουν με αύξουσα πυκνότητα προς νότο και διαμορφώνουν διαδοχικά νησιωτικά συμπλέγματα με μεγάλη επιχειρησιακή σπουδαιότητα σε ό,τι αφορά στην αεροναυτική άμυνα της Ελλάδος. Η απώλεια έστω και ελαχίστου μέρους του Αιγαίου, είτε χερσαίου, είτε υδάτινου, είτε εναέριου, αποτελεί την απαρχή για τη διάσπαση της εθνικής άμυνας της Ελλάδος. Άλλωστε, η καίρια θέση αυτού και η υψηλή οικονομική και πολιτιστική ανάπτυξη των νήσων του, από την αρχαιότητα ήταν η αιτία να αποτελεί πόλο έλξης, επιβουλής και εισβολής από εχθρικές δυνάμεις απ' όλες τις κατευθύνσεις και καθ' όλη τη διάρκεια της ιστορικής διαδρομής του ελληνικού έθνους. Εξάλλου, όποτε η Ελλάδα αποδυναμωνόταν και έχανε την κυριαρχία της στο Αιγαίο στερείτο και της ανεξαρτησίας της. Στη συνέχεια, η εισχώρηση του ελληνικού θαλάσσιου χώρου στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο δημιουργεί τις προϋποθέσεις για έναν αποτελεσματικό ναυτικό και αεροπορικό έλεγχο σε αυτήν την περιοχή, όπου η έντονη κινητικότητα και οι παγκόσμιες γεωπολιτικές παρεμβάσεις έχουν διαχρονικό χαρακτήρα.

Αν κρίνουμε από τις έως τώρα συμπεριφορές της Τουρκίας, καθίσταται σαφές ότι για το Θέατρο Επιχειρήσεων του Αιγαίου και της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου-Κύπρος, αφενός υπάρχει πλήρης και διαχρονική ταύτιση απόψεων σε πολιτικό και στρατιωτικό επίπεδο, αφετέρου η μια συμπληρώνει την άλλη. Η εκτίμηση αυτή επιβεβαιώνεται από τρία ενδεικτικά παραδείγματα: πρώτον, το 1937 κατά τη διάρκεια ασκήσεως που διεξαγόταν στη νότια Τουρκία, ο Kemal Atatürk απευθυνόμενος

στους Τούρκους επιτελείς αναφορικά με την Κύπρο είπε το εξής: «Ας υποθέσουμε ότι η Τουρκία εισβάλλει εκ νέου και οι τουρκικές ένοπλες δυνάμεις αντιστέκονται μόνο σε αυτήν την περιοχή. Ποίοι είναι οι διάδρομοι ανεφοδιασμού μας και ποιες είναι οι δυνατότητες μας;». Στη συνέχεια, ο Atatürk, αφού άκουσε τις απόψεις των επιτελών του, άπλωσε το χέρι του στο χάρτη δείχνοντας την Κύπρο και είπε: «Κύριοι. Για όσο χρονικό διάστημα η Κύπρος βρίσκεται σε εχθρικά χέρια, φράσσονται οι οδοί ανεφοδιασμού μας σε αυτήν την περιοχή. Προσέξτε την Κύπρο. Αυτό το νησί είναι πολύ σημαντικό για εμάς.».

Δεύτερον, σε πολιτικό επίπεδο, από τις γνωστές απόψεις του Τούρκου υπουργού Εξωτερικών Ahmet Davutoğlu στο βιβλίο του «Στρατηγικό βάθος: Η διεθνής θέση της Τουρκίας»:

«Η συγκέντρωση των νησιών του Αιγαίου στα χέρια της Ελλάδας δημιουργεί το πιο σημαντικό αρνητικό στοιχείο στην πολιτική της Τουρκίας για τον εγγύς θαλάσσιο χώρο. Η βασική πηγή του προβλήματος στο Αιγαίο είναι η αθεράπευτη αντίφαση μεταξύ του παρόντος καθεστώτος και της σημερινής γεωλογικής-γεωπολιτικής πραγματικότητας. Τα νησιά του Αιγαίου αποτελούν μια φυσική προέκταση της γεωλογικής δομής της Χερσονήσου της Ανατολίας. Σύμφωνα με διεθνείς συνθήκες, καθορίστηκε υπέρ της Ελλάδας η πολιτική κατανομή αυτών, η οποία είναι αντίθετη με τις γεωπολιτικές αναγκαιότητες που εμφανίζονται. Τα παραπάνω αποτελούν την κοιλίδα προβλημάτων σχετικών με την υφαλοκρηπίδα, τα χωρικά ύδατα, τον εναέριο χώρο, την γραμμή του FIR, τις περιοχές διοικήσεως και ελέγχου και τον εξοπλισμό των νησιών. Λόγω της εγγύτητάς τους με την Τουρκία, ένας σημαντικός αριθμός των ελληνικών νησιών μπορεί να χρησιμοποιηθεί ως εφалτήριο για στρατιωτικές επιχειρήσεις με κατεύθυνση την Ανατολία. Παράλληλα, επειδή τα νησιά αυτά περιβάλλουν τον θαλάσσιο διάδρομο που εξασφαλίζει την διέλευση της Τουρκίας από την Θάλασσα του Μαρμαρά στην Μεσόγειο, αξιολογούνται ως ένα πολύ σοβαρό πρόβλημα ασφάλειας. Τα παραπάνω, συμπεριλαμβανομένου και του πλεονεκτήματος που πηγάζει από την κυριαρχία της Ελλάδας στα νησιά, συνεχίζουν να αποτελούν μέρος μιας στρατηγικής προσπάθειας που αποσκοπεί να περιλάβει το σύνολο της θαλάσσιας λεκάνης του Αιγαίου. Επειδή τα νησιά του Αιγαίου περιβάλλουν τα περάσματα Σκαρπάντο, Σπάθη, της Κάσου, των Κυθήρων, της Καρπάθου και της Μαρμαρίδας, τα οποία ενώνουν το Αιγαίο με την Μεσόγειο, επηρεάζεται σε σημαντικό βαθμό η πρόσβαση της Τουρκίας από την Μαύρη Θάλασσα, στο Μαρμαρά και στη Μεσόγειο... Η Τουρκία πρέπει να προσέξει να μην κάνει λάθη που θα επηρεάσουν τις μακροπρόθεσμες πολιτικές της σε ευαίσθητα θέματα όπως το Αιγαίο... Η Τουρκία με τις διπλωματικές παραλείψεις του παρελθόντος έχει φθάσει στο τελικό στάδιο υποχωρήσεων στο Αιγαίο. Κάθε υποχώρηση που θα γίνεται από τούδε και στο εξής θα προκαλεί σοβαρές συνέπειες, έτσι ώστε η Τουρκία να απολέσει τον βióτοπο της Θάλασσας του Αιγαίου, η οποία αποτελεί τη σύνδεση Μεσογείου-Μαύρης Θάλασσας.

Δεν είναι δυνατόν μια χώρα που εγκαταλείπει την Κύπρο, να έχει ενεργό παρουσία στις παγκόσμιες και περιφερειακές πολιτικές. Δεν είναι δυνατόν να συμμετέχει στις παγκόσμιες πολιτικές, διότι αυτό το μικρό νησί βρίσκεται σε μια θέση που θα επηρεάσει άμεσα τις στρατηγικές διασυνδέσεις μεταξύ Ασίας-Αφρικής, Ευρώπης-Αφρικής και Ευρώπης-Ασίας. Και τούτο, διότι το νησί της Κύπρου στέκεται σαν ένα βέλος, του οποίου το ανατολικό άκρο κατευθύνεται προς τη Μέση Ανατολή και η δυτική του πλευρά επέχει θέση βασικού λίθου στρατηγικών ισορροπιών στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο, στα Βαλκάνια και στην Βόρεια Αφρική. Αυτή η γεωστρατηγική θέση, που είναι άλλωστε πολύ σημαντική, με τις νέες ισορροπίες που δημιουργήθηκαν μετά τον Ψυχρό Πόλεμο, απέκτησε νέα χαρακτηριστικά... Η διάλυση της Σοβιετικής Ένωσης έδωσε την ευκαιρία να έρθουν στο προσκήνιο η ενεργειακή και η εμπορική

διαδρομή, που οδηγούν από την Κεντρική Ασία στην Ευρώπη και η ανάγκη για εναλλακτικά δρομολόγια της Δυτικής Ασίας, Ανατολικής Μεσογείου και Νότιας Ασίας... Αυτές οι νέες διαδρομές είτε οδηγούν κατευθείαν στον Κόλπο της Αλεξανδρέτας (Iskenderun) και στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο, είτε έμμεσα από την Νότια Ασία μέσω του Σουέζ ή και μέσω της Μαύρης Θάλασσας και των Στενών κατεβαίνουν στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο. Πάνω σε αυτές τις διαδρομές βρίσκεται η Κύπρος σαν μια αμετάβλητη και σταθερή παράμετρος.»

Αναφορικά δε, με τη γεωγραφική θέση της Κύπρου, ο Davutoğlu αποδέχεται ότι αυτή έχει ζωτική στρατηγική σημασία άσχετα από τα ανθρώπινα στοιχεία της νήσου και τονίζει ότι ακόμη και αν δεν υπήρχε εκεί, έστω, και ένας Τούρκος μουσουλμάνος, η Τουρκία ήταν υποχρεωμένη να θέσει ένα κυπριακό ζήτημα. Υποστηρίζει μάλιστα με έμφαση ότι καμία χώρα δεν μπορεί να πάρει αψηφίστα ένα τέτοιο νησί που βρίσκεται στην καρδιά της ζωτικής της περιοχής και ότι η Τουρκία είναι υποχρεωμένη να ενδιαφέρεται στρατηγικά για την Κύπρο εξαιρουμένου του ανθρώπινου στοιχείου. Ως παραδείγματα χρησιμοποιεί τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες οι οποίες ενδιαφέρονται άμεσα για την Κούβα και τα νησιά της Καραϊβικής, παρόλο που δεν έχουν καμία σχέση με την ιθαγένεια των κατοίκων της, αλλά και την πολιτική της Τουρκίας η οποία συνεχίζει να συντηρεί και να περιφρουρεί την σημασία των Δωδεκανήσων, όπου δεν υφίσταται σοβαρός τουρκικός πληθυσμός.

Και τρίτον σε στρατιωτικό επίπεδο, από την *Ege Ordusu Harekat Bölgesi Etüdü* (τουρκική Μελέτη της Περιοχής Επιχειρήσεων της Στρατιάς Αιγαίου), όπου αναγράφονται τα εξής: α. Η Τουρκία πρέπει να εξασφαλίσει την απ' ευθείας επαφή με τα κράτη που έχει θαλάσσια διασύνδεση προκειμένου να προστατεύσει τα συμφέροντα της στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο. β. Η περιοχή επιχειρήσεων της Στρατιάς Αιγαίου συνιστά μια βάση για τη διεξαγωγή επιχειρήσεων σε άλλες περιοχές. γ. Απαιτείται η δημιουργία ενός ισχυρού στόλου για τη διεξαγωγή μιας επιχείρησης εναντίον των νησιών προκειμένου να τεθεί υπό έλεγχο η θάλασσα του Αιγαίου. δ. Δημιουργείται η ανάγκη μεγάλου αριθμού αποβατικών πλοίων επιφανείας λόγω της ύπαρξης πολλών νησιών. ε. Απαιτούνται μονάδες ελικοπτέρων για τη διεξαγωγή αεροκίνητων επιχειρήσεων και αντιμετώπιση εχθρικών τμημάτων που θα διεισδύσουν στις ορεινές περιοχές. στ. Στις (τουρκικές) ακτές πρέπει να εγκατασταθούν οπλικά συστήματα μεγάλου βεληνεκούς για να αποτραπεί η χρησιμοποίηση των νησιών (του Αιγαίου) ως στρατιωτικές βάσεις και ως περιοχές συγκέντρωσης δυνάμεων. ζ. Απαιτείται ειδική οργάνωση λόγω της ιδιαιτερότητας που παρουσιάζει η περιοχή επιχειρήσεων. η. Το δίκτυο συγκοινωνιών διευκολύνει επαρκώς την κινητοποίηση των (τουρκικών) δυνάμεων. θ. Το βάθος και το εύρος της περιοχής επιτρέπει τη διασπορά των εγκαταστάσεων λογιστικής υποστήριξης. ι. Σε περίπτωση διεξαγωγής μιας στρατιωτικής επιχείρησης (εναντίον των νησιών), η συσσώρευση του μεγαλύτερου μέρους του πληθυσμού στις παραθαλάσσιες περιοχές των δυτικών παραλίων θα δυσχεράνει την μετακίνηση του προς το εσωτερικό της χώρας.

Αυτό που εγείρει τους πιο έντονους προβληματισμούς στην ελληνική πλευρά είναι ότι οι Τούρκοι αποσκοπούν στην αποτροπή της Ελλάδος και της Κύπρου να δημιουργήσουν τετελεσμένα στο Αιγαίο και την Ανατολική Μεσόγειο, αφενός στρατιωτικοποιώντας τα θέματα που έχουν σχέση με τους ενεργειακούς πόρους, με τη δημιουργία γκρίζων ζωνών, αφετέρου δημιουργώντας μέσω της προπαγάνδας το αίσθημα ανασφάλειας σε ξένους επενδυτές και εταιρείες που δεν συντάσσονται με τις θέσεις τους. Ειδικότερα δε, οι τουρκικοί σχεδιασμοί συνοψίζονται στα εξής:


- Πραγματοποίηση ενεργειών που κλιμακώνουν την ένταση, λαμβάνοντας αντίστοιχα μέτρα βίας και αποτροπής στο Αιγαίο και την Ανατολική Μεσόγειο. Συγκεκριμένα, πρόκειται για τις «αβλαβείς» διελεύσεις πολεμικών πλοίων και παραβάσεις-παραβιάσεις του εθνικού εναερίου χώρου με ελικόπτερα και αεροσκάφη τα οποία πολλές φορές πραγματοποιούν και υπερπτήσεις πάνω από νησιά και νησίδες του Αιγαίου. Επίσης, κρίνεται σκόπιμο να

επισημανθούν οι παραβιάσεις των εθνικών χωρικών υδάτων και τα θαλάσσια συμβάντα από πλοία του πολεμικού ναυτικού και της Διοίκησης Ασφαλείας Ακτών ειδικά στην περιοχή των Ιμίων. Υπόψη ότι το τουρκικό Γενικό Επιτελείο Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων για να συντηρήσει την ένταση και να την προβάλλει τόσο στην τουρκική κοινή γνώμη όσο και διεθνώς, στην επίσημη ιστοσελίδα του γνωστοποιεί καθημερινά όλα τα αεροπορικά και θαλάσσια συμβάντα σύμφωνα με τη δική του εκδοχή.

- Με τη διάταξη των πολεμικών αεροσκαφών στα δυτικά αεροδρόμια της χώρας και τον αυξημένο αριθμό πολεμικών πλοίων που ελλιμενίζονται μαζί με το σύνολο του αποβατικού στόλου στο Αιγαίο, η Άγκυρα προβάλλει τις δυνατότητες της για αποκλεισμό περιοχών ενδιαφέροντος της σε σύντομο χρονικό διάστημα. Επισημαίνεται ότι, το τουρκικό πολεμικό ναυτικό για να αποκτήσει στρατηγικό πλεονέκτημα διαχώρισε τον επιχειρησιακό έλεγχο του θεάτρου επιχειρήσεων του Αιγαίου-Ανατολικής Μεσογείου και τις επιχειρησιακές του μονάδες σε δύο κύριες περιοχές: στη βόρεια και τη νότια. Ανάλογα δε, με την περιοχή που έχουν επιλέξει να διεξάγουν επιχείρηση, οι μονάδες του τομέα αυτού θα φθάσουν πρώτες στο γεωγραφικό χώρο του αντικειμενικού σκοπού και θα υποστηριχθούν από τις μονάδες του άλλου τομέα. Επιπλέον, στις ασκήσεις κατάληψης νήσου, συμμετέχει σχεδόν το σύνολο των πολεμικών πλοίων και μεγάλος αριθμός πολεμικών αεροσκαφών.
- Τα σενάρια όλων των ασκήσεων και εκπαιδύσεων σε θέματα τακτικής αναφέρονται στα νησιά, επιδεικνύοντας τη δυνατότητα της να επιχειρεί ταυτόχρονα στο Αιγαίο και την Ανατολική Μεσόγειο. Επίσης, προβλέπεται η αύξηση της έντασης, χωρίς να προκληθεί σύγκρουση με την Ελλάδα, κατά τη διάρκεια διεξαγωγής των ασκήσεων στο Αιγαίο.
- Βρίσκονται σε εξέλιξη οι διαδικασίες μεταστάθμευσης της Σχολής Αεροπορίας Στρατού από την Άγκυρα στην Ίσπarta, όπου το αεροδρόμιο Süleyman Demirel θα μετατραπεί σε μια νέα αεροπορική βάση, η οποία θα αναβαθμίσει την απειλή τόσο στο Αιγαίο όσο και την Κύπρο, διότι οι αποστάσεις για μεταστάθμευση ελικοπτέρων, στα πλαίσια μιας επιχείρησης, πλέον μειώνονται στο μισό. Τούτο, σε συνδυασμό με την αναβάθμιση που έγινε στη Σχολή Ορεινών Καταδρομών στο Eğirdir/Ίσπarta, προσδίδει στην περιοχή το χαρακτήρα μιας νέας ενιαίας Βάσης Εκπαίδευσης Ειδικών Δυνάμεων και Επιθετικών-Μεταφορικών Ελικοπτέρων, με αποτέλεσμα η τουρκική απειλή να προσλαμβάνει νέες διαστάσεις. Επισημαίνεται ότι σύμφωνα με το χρονοδιάγραμμα η ολοκλήρωση όλων αυτών αναμένεται να γίνει το 2015. Αυτό που πρέπει ακόμη να σημειωθεί είναι ότι οι τουρκικές ένοπλες δυνάμεις, με τον αριθμό ελικοπτέρων που διαθέτουν, μπορούν να μεταφέρουν σε πολύ σύντομο χρονικό διάστημα μια δύναμη 5-6 ταγμάτων, ημέρα και νύχτα, για πραγματοποίηση αεροκίνητης επιχείρησης.
- Δέσμευση περιοχών του Αιγαίου και της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου (άλλοτε παράνομα και άλλοτε όχι) για εκτέλεση πυρών και ασκήσεων μέσω σχετικών ανακοινώσεων της τουρκικής Υδρογραφικής Υπηρεσίας. Ας σημειωθεί ακόμη πως πέραν των ανακοινώσεων αυτών, η εν λόγω υπηρεσία δημοσιεύει και αντίστοιχους χάρτες των περιοχών που δεσμεύονται. Επιπλέον, από την παρακολούθηση των τουρκικών ασκήσεων διαπιστώνεται ότι πρόκειται για ποιοτικά και ποσοτικά αναβαθμισμένες αεροναυτικές επιχειρησιακές δραστηριότητες οι οποίες, μετά το 2007, από την περιοχή του Αιγαίου σταδιακά επεκτάθηκαν στην ευρύτερη περιοχή της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου. Φυσικά η αξιοσημείωτη αυτή αλλαγή έχει δύο στόχους: πρώτον, να περιθωριοποιήσει το Δόγμα του Ενιαίου Αμυντικού Χώρου Ελλάδος-Κύπρου και να καταδείξει ότι αυτό είναι ανενεργό και

ανεφάρμοστο. Και δεύτερον, να αμφισβητήσει τα κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα της ελληνικής πλευράς στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο.

- Διεξαγωγή διακλαδικών ασκήσεων έρευνας και διάσωσης μεσαίας κλίμακας στη θαλάσσια περιοχή μεταξύ Λέσβου και Χίου και στα διεθνή ύδατα της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου ανοικτά της Αμμοχώστου, αφενός για τη βελτίωση των επιχειρησιακών δυνατοτήτων στο συγκεκριμένο τομέα, αφετέρου στην προβολή αυτών στη διεθνή κοινή γνώμη και στους σχετικούς οργανισμούς.
- Χρησιμοποίηση ερευνητικών πλοίων σε περιοχές όπου η Τουρκία αμφισβητεί τα κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα της Ελλάδος και της Κύπρου. Οι Τούρκοι, με τα πλοία επιστημονικών ερευνών που διαθέτουν, προβαίνουν σε προκλήσεις, εκβιασμούς και αμφισβητήσεις των ελληνικών κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων στο Αιγαίο και την Ανατολική Μεσόγειο, εφαρμόζοντας μια ηπιότερη μεν αλλά πιο ύπουλη τακτική. Μάλιστα, είναι αξιοσημείωτο ότι ο τουρκικός στόλος διαθέτει πλέον δύο σύγχρονα ερευνητικά πλοία (το *TÜBİTAK Marmara* και το *Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa*) με τα οποία η Άγκυρα θα πραγματοποιεί θαλάσσιες έρευνες, νόμιμες ή μη, όπου και όποτε αυτή το θελήσει. Στην περίπτωση δε, που η Τουρκία θα θελήσει να αυξήσει την ένταση τότε θα συνοδεύσει τα πλοία αυτά με αντίστοιχα πολεμικά. Επίσης, το θέμα της δημοσιοποίησης των χαρτών, όπου απεικονίζονται οι θαλάσσιες περιοχές που έχουν προγραμματισθεί οι επιστημονικές έρευνες, αποκτά ιδιαίτερη σημασία δεδομένου ότι οι συμβολισμοί στην εξωτερική πολιτική έχουν μεγαλύτερη αξία ακόμα κι από την ίδια την ουσία. Άλλωστε, η Άγκυρα μέσω των χαρτών αυτών προβάλλει τις προθέσεις της τόσο για την οριοθέτηση του Αιγαίου όσο για την οριοθέτηση της Α.Ο.Ζ. νότια του Καστελόριζου. Σημειωτέον ότι, η στρατηγική αυτή άρχισε να εφαρμόζεται το Νοέμβριο του 1973, με τη δημοσίευση στην τουρκική εφημερίδα της κυβέρνησης των θαλάσσιων περιοχών που παραχωρήθηκαν στην τουρκική εταιρεία ερευνών πετρελαίου ΤΡΑΟ για έρευνες υδρογονανθράκων στο Αιγαίο. Στη συνέχεια, ακολούθησαν σταδιακές αμφισβητήσεις, οι οποίες είναι ιδιαίτερα αποκαλυπτικές των προθέσεων τους μετά το Νοέμβριο του 2007 μέχρι το Νοέμβριο του 2013, όπως φαίνεται στους χάρτες που ακολουθούν.



Χάρτης περιοχών ερευνών και εκμετάλλευσης
Πηγή: Τουρκικό Υπουργείο Ενέργειας και Φυσικών Πόρων
Ημερομηνία δημοσίευσης: 17-06-2011

Plate 39: Turkish exploration and exploitation blocks



Χάρτης περιοχών ερευνών και εκμετάλλευσης
 Πηγή: Τουρκικό Υπουργείο Ενέργειας και Φυσικών Πόρων
 Ημερομηνία δημοσίευσης: 29-11-2007

Plate 40: Turkish exploration and exploitation blocks




Χάρτης του Τούρκου καθηγητού
 Sertac Hami Başeren
 Πηγή: Περιοδικό Τουρκικών Ενόπλων
 Δυνάμεων

Plate 41: Map of Turkish Professor
 Sertac Hami Baseren



Χάρτης του Dr. πλοιάρχου Cihat Yaycı
 Πηγή: Τουρκικές Ακαδημίες Πολέμου και
 τουρκικό Κέντρο Στρατηγικών Μελετών
 BILGESAM

Plate 42: Map of Captain Cihat Yayci



Χάρτης περιοχών ερευνών και εκμετάλλευσης
 Πηγή: Τουρκικό Υπουργείο Ενέργειας και Φυσικών Πόρων
 Ημερομηνίες δημοσίευσης: 20-01-2012, 24-04-2012, 23-08-2012,
 29-01-2013, 10-04-2013 και 04-11-2013

Plate 43: Turkish exploration and exploitation blocks

Μάλιστα, η τελική αμφισβήτηση της Τουρκίας στη συγκεκριμένη θαλάσσια περιοχή πιθανόν θα αφορά στο τμήμα ανατολικά και νότια της Κρήτης, της Κάσου, της Καρπάθου και της Ρόδου όπως φαίνεται στους χάρτες του Τούρκου καθηγητού *Sertaç Hami Başeren* και του Τούρκου Δρ. πλοιάρχου *Cihat Yayı*. Η σημασία των χαρτών αυτών έγκειται στο γεγονός ότι οι απόψεις των εν λόγω Τούρκων τυγχάνουν πλήρους αποδοχής όχι μόνο από την κυβέρνηση *Erdogan* αλλά και από το στρατιωτικό κατεστημένο πριν ακόμη τη στρατηγική αποκαθήλωση του με τις φυλακίσεις εκατοντάδων αξιωματικών λόγω της υπόθεσης *Ergenekon*.

- Δημιουργία ειδικής ομάδας στην Εθνική Υπηρεσία Πληροφοριών ΜΙΤ για τη διεξαγωγή επιχειρήσεων πληροφοριών περί υδρογονανθράκων, όχι μόνο στην Ελλάδα και την Κύπρο αλλά και στα υπόλοιπα κράτη της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου, όπως στο Ισραήλ, το Λίβανο, τη Συρία, την Αίγυπτο κ.λπ. Η ομάδα αυτή υπάγεται στο τμήμα Στρατηγικών Πληροφοριών της Διεύθυνσης Πληροφοριών Εξωτερικού, ενώ κρίνεται σκόπιμο να τονισθεί η ιδιαίτερη βαρύτητα που δίδεται από την τελευταία αναδιοργάνωση της ΜΙΤ στις πληροφορίες εξωτερικού.
- Βελτιστοποίηση του έργου της συλλογής πληροφοριών και επιστάμενη παρακολούθηση όλων των ενεργειών της Ελλάδος και της Κύπρου στα νησιά, τις νησίδες και τις βραχονησίδες του Αιγαίου και στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο με τη διεξαγωγή επιχειρήσεων αναγνώρισης και επιτήρησης.

Μέσω των ελιγμών αυτών οι Τούρκοι θέλουν να διαπιστώσουν τις ανοχές της ελληνικής πλευράς έναντι της τουρκικής προκλητικότητας, ενώ δεν θα πρέπει να αποκλεισθεί το ενδεχόμενο, οι Τούρκοι να επιδιώξουν την αυθαίρετη επιβολή τετελεσμένων στις εν λόγω περιοχές, είτε με τη δημιουργία γκρίζων ζωνών, μετά από μια θερμή συγκρουσιακή κατάσταση, είτε με την ανακήρυξη της δικής τους Αποκλειστικής Οικονομικής Ζώνης. Για το λόγο αυτό παρακολουθούν επισταμένως όλες τις ενέργειες της Ελλάδος και της Κύπρου στα νησιά, τις νησίδες και τις βραχονησίδες του Αιγαίου και στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο και τηρούν σε συνεχή επιφυλακή αντίστοιχα ναυτικά, αεροπορικά και χερσαία μέσα προκειμένου να επεμβαίνουν όπου και όποτε χρειασθεί.

5.1.3 Ψυχολογικός πόλεμος και σχεδιασμός-οργάνωση επιχειρήσεων αποσταθεροποίησης από την Τουρκία στην Ελλάδα και την Κύπρο

Οι επιχειρήσεις ψυχολογικού πολέμου εμφανίστηκαν στην αρχαιότητα και συνιστούν σημαντικό πολλαπλασιαστή ισχύος. Αυτές απευθύνονται σε εχθρούς, φίλους, ουδέτερους και στοχεύουν τη λογική, τα συναισθήματα και τον επηρεασμό του πλήθους μέσα από εξειδικευμένες τεχνικές επίδρασης.

Στην Τουρκία, ο ψυχολογικός πόλεμος αποτελεί ένα τομέα που όλες οι πολιτικές και στρατιωτικές ηγεσίες έδωσαν πολύ μεγάλη βαρύτητα, συγκροτώντας πολυδιάστατους μηχανισμούς τόσο στο εσωτερικό όσο και στο εξωτερικό. Τούτο, σε συνδυασμό με τη σοβαρότητα και υπευθυνότητα που η τουρκική πλευρά αντιμετωπίζει τον ψυχολογικό πόλεμο, επέβαλε την αναγκαιότητα ώστε η παρούσα προσέγγιση του θέματος αυτού να στηριχθεί αποκλειστικά σε τουρκικές πηγές και ειδικότερα στο βιβλίο *Psikolojik Savaş* (Ψυχολογικός Πόλεμος) του Τούρκου καθηγητή ψυχιατρικής της στρατιωτικής ιατρικής *Nevzat Tarhan*, ώστε να εξαχθούν ασφαλή συμπεράσματα για τις προθέσεις και τους σχεδιασμούς της Άγκυρας.

Η έννοια του ψυχολογικού πολέμου, στην ειρήνη και στον πόλεμο, αφορά στη χρησιμοποίηση των πληροφοριών και της ενημέρωσης προκειμένου να επηρεασθούν τα αισθήματα, οι σκέψεις και οι συμπεριφορές των ανθρώπων. Η συλλογή πληροφοριών και η αξιολόγηση τους από εξειδικευμένο προσωπικό αποσκοπεί στην υποστήριξη για την επιτυχή έκβαση ενός πολέμου μέσω μιας ενεργητικής προπαγάνδας, σωστού σχεδιασμού και αποτελεσματικής διαχείρισης των καταστάσεων που θα προκύψουν.

Οι στρατηγικοί στόχοι του ψυχολογικού πολέμου αφορούν: α. Στην αποδυνάμωση του ηθικού και της πολιτικής, οικονομικής, κοινωνικής και στρατιωτικής ισχύος του αντιπάλου. β. Στη διευκόλυνση του ελέγχου και στην αναδιοργάνωση των περιοχών που θα καταληφθούν μετά από μια στρατιωτική επιχείρηση. γ. Στον επηρεασμό της σκέψης, του ηθικού, της συμπεριφοράς, της επιθυμίας για αντίσταση και της αποφασιστικότητας του αντιπάλου προκειμένου να υποκύψει.

Οι τακτικοί στόχοι του ψυχολογικού πολέμου διακρίνονται σε πέντε κατηγορίες και αναλύονται στον προβαλλόμενο πίνακα:

ΤΑΚΤΙΚΟΙ ΣΤΟΧΟΙ ΨΥΧΟΛΟΓΙΚΟΥ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥ	
ΤΑΚΤΙΚΟΣ ΣΤΟΧΟΣ	ΕΠΙΔΙΩΞΕΙΣ
Επαύξηση του αισθήματος της κοινωνίας για συμμόρφωση και πειθαρχία	Αποσκοπεί στην αποτροπή των αντιδράσεων που θα προκύψουν, αυξάνοντας το αίσθημα της πειθαρχίας στην κοινωνία και αφυπνίζοντας σε αυτήν το αίσθημα του φόβου για το έθνος.
Εξαπάτηση και παραπλάνηση της διεθνούς κοινής γνώμης	Επιδιώκει την οικονομική και πολιτική απομόνωση της χώρας στόχου.
Απομόνωση του λαού από την ηγεσία	Έχει σαν στόχο να δημιουργήσει το αίσθημα ανασφάλειας μεταξύ λαού και ηγεσίας και τη δημιουργία συγκρουσιακής κατάστασης.
Εξαπάτηση και παραπλάνηση των πολιτικών και στρατιωτικών ηγεσιών	Η λάθος και παραπλανητική πληροφόρηση στις πολιτικές και στρατιωτικές ηγεσίες θα έχει σαν αποτέλεσμα τη λήψη λανθασμένων αποφάσεων.
Κατοχύρωση των πολιτιστικών αλλαγών	Η εξαγωγή του πολιτισμού αποτελεί την πιο διαδεδομένη και προσφιλή μέθοδο ψυχολογικού πολέμου των τελευταίων δεκαετιών. Τη δεκαετία του 1980, επί κυβερνήσεως Özal, ο τότε υπουργός Πολιτισμού Gökhan Maraş κατέθεσε πρόταση νόμου για να περιορισθεί η προβολή των αμερικανικών ταινιών στην Τουρκία

ΤΑΚΤΙΚΟΙ ΣΤΟΧΟΙ ΨΥΧΟΛΟΓΙΚΟΥ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥ

ΤΑΚΤΙΚΟΣ ΣΤΟΧΟΣ	ΕΠΙΔΙΩΞΕΙΣ
	και να υπάρξει μεγαλύτερη ώθηση στις αντίστοιχες τουρκικές. Ωστόσο, η εν λόγω πρόταση αποσύρθηκε ύστερα από προσωπική παρέμβαση που έκανε ο Αμερικανός πρόεδρος George Bush στο Turgut Özal. Συνεπώς, εξάγεται το συμπέρασμα ότι η δημιουργία ενός μηχανισμού προβολής και εξαγωγής του πολιτισμού μέσω του κινηματογράφου και των τηλεοπτικών σήριαλ αποτελεί δραστηριότητα του ψυχολογικού πολέμου. Ειδικότερα δε για την Ελλάδα, γεννάται το εξής εύλογο ερώτημα αναφορικά με τα τουρκικά σήριαλ: Υπήρξε εκτός Ελλάδος παρέμβαση για την προβολή τους ή όχι;

Ο ψυχολογικός πόλεμος διακρίνεται σε τέσσερες κατηγορίες: στον ψυχολογικό πόλεμο στρατηγικού σκοπού, στον τακτικό ψυχολογικό πόλεμο, στον ενισχυτικό ψυχολογικό πόλεμο και στον ψυχολογικό πόλεμο τύπου προπαγάνδας. Ο ψυχολογικός πόλεμος στρατηγικού σκοπού προσανατολίζεται σε όλες τις κοινωνίες, εχθρικές και φίλιες, και εστιάζεται στις μετόπισθεν περιοχές των επιχειρήσεων. Μέσω αυτού εφαρμόζεται η λευκή προπαγάνδα και αυξάνεται η πειστικότητα του μέσω αληθινών πληροφοριών. Ο βασικός σκοπός του είναι η αντιμετώπιση των αμφιβολιών της κοινωνίας σε ό,τι αφορά στην ενημέρωση της από το ραδιόφωνο, την τηλεόραση, τις εφημερίδες και τα περιοδικά. Εν συνεχεία, με τον τακτικό ψυχολογικό πόλεμο υλοποιούνται τα συγκεκριμένα πεδία δράσης του στρατηγικού σχεδιασμού. Συγκεκριμένα, συντάσσονται τα σχέδια, καθορίζονται οι στόχοι, αναλύονται και σταθμίζονται τα οφέλη και οι ζημιές και συγκροτούνται οι αντίστοιχες ομάδες εργασίας. Αναφορικά δε με τον ενισχυτικό ψυχολογικό πόλεμο, αυτός εφαρμόζεται μετά την ολοκλήρωση των στρατιωτικών επιχειρήσεων για να εκτονωθεί η φορτισμένη ατμόσφαιρα και αποσκοπεί στην εξασφάλιση της πειθαρχίας ώστε να αποτραπεί μια ενδεχόμενη εξέγερση της κοινωνίας. Και τέλος, ο ψυχολογικός πόλεμος τύπου προπαγάνδας, ο οποίος διακρίνεται για τα επιθετικά του χαρακτηριστικά, δεν έχει σχεδιασθεί εξ αρχής και πραγματοποιείται μόλις υπάρξουν οι κατάλληλες προϋποθέσεις. Συγκεκριμένα, κατά τη διάρκεια κινητοποιήσεων, πολιτικών συγκεντρώσεων, συλλαλητηρίων, διαδηλώσεων και κηδείων επιχειρείται διείσδυση ταραχοποιών στοιχείων τα οποία φωνάζουν πειστικά συνθήματα για να αυξηθεί η ένταση και να προκληθούν επεισόδια. Υπόψη ότι τα εν λόγω εντεταλμένα άτομα επιδιώκουν να επηρεάσουν τη συμπεριφορά των κοινωνικών ομάδων που είναι αμόρφωτες, απογοητευμένες, αδικημένες, άπορες και άνεργες.

Οι Τούρκοι χρησιμοποιούν την προπαγάνδα, την εκπαίδευση και την προβοκάτσια ως αμυντικά και επιθετικά όπλα του ψυχολογικού πολέμου, επηρεαζόμενοι από τον Κινέζο στρατηγό Σουν Τζου και εστιάζοντας κυρίως την προσοχή τους στις ακόλουθες αρχές: α. Υποβαθμίστε την αξία των

θετικών στοιχείων των αντίπαλων χωρών. β. Υποβαθμίστε τις επιτυχίες των ηγετών των αντίπαλων χωρών, σκιάστε τη διασημότητα και τη φήμη τους και εξασφαλίστε ώστε ο λαός να τους απαξιώνει και να μην τους υπολογίζει. γ. Επωφεληθείτε από τη συνεργασία που θα έχετε με ευτελή και αξιοκαταφρόνητα άτομα της αντίπαλης χώρας. δ. Προκαλέστε διαπληκτισμούς, διενέξεις και συμπλοκές μεταξύ του λαού της αντίπαλης χώρας. ε. Γελοιοποιήστε και παρουσιάστε ως γραφικούς τα άτομα και τους συλλόγους της αντίπαλης χώρας που προβάλλουν τα έθιμα και τις παραδόσεις τους.

Όμως, οι Τούρκοι πως αντιλαμβάνονται την προπαγάνδα και αυτή σε πόσες κατηγορίες διακρίνεται; Ο όρος προπαγάνδα αφορά στις αντιλήψεις, τις ιδεολογίες, τα έγγραφα, τα αποδεικτικά στοιχεία και τις πληροφορίες που δημοσιοποιούνται προκειμένου να τεθούν υπό έλεγχο οι απόψεις, τα αισθήματα, η στάση, η συμπεριφορά και οι ενέργειες μιας κοινωνίας. Το κύριο οπλοστάσιο της είναι ο λόγος και οι λέξεις, πάνω στα οποία θα πρέπει να γίνουν μακροχρόνιες αναλύσεις και να ληφθούν υπόψη ο τόπος, ο τρόπος και ο χρόνος που θα χρησιμοποιηθούν. Ανάλογα με τον σκοπό της, η προπαγάνδα διακρίνεται σε πέντε κατηγορίες: στη λευκή, στη γκρι ή φαιά, στη μαύρη, στην ένοπλη και στη μικτή προπαγάνδα. Ειδικότερα δε: α. Στη λευκή προπαγάνδα οι πηγές είναι πραγματικές και οι ενέργειες που πραγματοποιούνται είναι διαφανείς και ανοικτές. Οι ειδήσεις και οι πληροφορίες αποτελούν το κύριο εφόδιο της λευκής προπαγάνδας και χρησιμοποιούνται για να αναδείξουν τα λάθη του αντιπάλου. Επίσης, δίδεται ιδιαίτερη βαρύτητα στην ειλικρίνεια και την ορθότητα προκειμένου να αντικρουστούν και να αποσαθρωθούν οι ιδέες και τα φρονήματα της αντίπαλης πλευράς. β. Η γκρι προπαγάνδα χρησιμοποιεί ως κύριο όπλο τη φήμη και αποτελεί ένα από τα σημαντικότερα στοιχεία του ψυχολογικού πολέμου λόγω της ζοφερότητας, της απαισιοδοξίας και της ανησυχίας που προκαλεί. Αυτό οφείλεται στο γεγονός ότι, ούτε η πηγή της είναι δυνατόν να προσδιορισθεί ούτε η ορθότητα της μπορεί να τεκμηριωθεί. Σημειωτέον ότι, ο τουρκικός μηχανισμός αναθέτει τη σχεδίαση και την υλοποίηση της γκρι προπαγάνδας σε άτομα που μπορούν να χρησιμοποιήσουν τις τοπικές διαλέκτους και γνωρίζουν πολύ καλά τις απολαύσεις και τις κοινωνικές-πολιτιστικές ιδιαιτερότητες του αντιπάλου. γ. Βασική προϋπόθεση της μαύρης προπαγάνδας είναι η μυστικότητα της πηγής, δεδομένου ότι αυτή εμφανίζεται διαφορετική απ' ότι είναι στην πραγματικότητα. Μέσω αυτής επιδιώκεται η παραποίηση της πραγματικότητας, ο κλυδωνισμός των φρονημάτων, η πτώση του ηθικού, η πρόκληση φόβου και η αναστάτωση της κοινωνίας. Άλλωστε, οι δολοπλοκίες, οι πλεκτάνες, τα ψέματα, οι λασπολογίες, η υποκίνηση και η υποουλίτητα αποτελούν τα δομικά χαρακτηριστικά της. Επισημαίνεται ότι η μαύρη προπαγάνδα δεν εστιάζεται μόνο στις ηγεσίες της αντίπαλης χώρας αλλά επεκτείνεται στους συγγενείς και στα μέλη των οικογενειών τους σε ό,τι έχει να κάνει με τις εξαρτήσεις και αδυναμίες τους όπως, αλκοολισμός, χρήση ναρκωτικών, μεγαλομανία, εγωκεντρισμός, πολιτικές πεποιθήσεις, απληστία και ιδιοτέλεια. δ. Η ένοπλη προπαγάνδα χρησιμοποιείται από τρομοκρατικές και παρακρατικές οργανώσεις και μέσω των ένοπλων δράσεων (βομβιστικές ενέργειες, πειρατείες κ.λπ.) επιδιώκεται η επίδειξη της εθνικής, ιδεολογικής, θρησκευτικής ή πολιτιστικής ταυτότητας τους. ε. Η μικτή προπαγάνδα αφορά στην παράλληλη χρησιμοποίηση μέρους ή όλων των προαναφερθέντων κατηγοριών για την επίτευξη του επιδιωκόμενου σκοπού.

Σε ό,τι αφορά στα είδη της προπαγάνδας ανάλογα με τη χρησιμοποίησή της, αυτή διακρίνεται στη στρατηγική, στην τακτική, στην προπαγάνδα εισβολής και στην αντιπροπαγάνδα. Συγκεκριμένα, η στρατηγική προπαγάνδα έχει μακροπρόθεσμο χαρακτήρα σε αντίθεση με την τακτική που είναι βραχυπρόθεσμη. Ωστόσο και οι δύο αποσκοπούν στη διατήρηση του ηθικού των φίλιων δυνάμεων σε υψηλό επίπεδο, στην εξασφάλιση της υποστήριξης από τις ουδέτερες χώρες, στην πτώση του ηθικού του αντιπάλου και στην επαύξηση του ηθικού των φίλιων δυνάμεων που διαμένουν στην

εχθρική περιοχή. Υπόψη ότι για τους Τούρκους, οι φίλιες δυνάμεις που διαμένουν στην εχθρική περιοχή είναι η μουσουλμανική μειονότητα στη Θράκη, στη Κω και στην Ρόδο. Συνακόλουθα δε, η προπαγάνδα εισβολής αφορά στους στόχους που έχουν τεθεί προκειμένου να εξασφαλιστεί η εσωτερική τάξη και ασφάλεια κατά τη διάρκεια στρατιωτικής εισβολής σε ένα κράτος, να αναδιοργανωθεί η εν λόγω περιοχή, να αντιμετωπισθούν οι ανάγκες της κοινωνίας και η ζωή να κυλά με κανονικούς ρυθμούς. Για την υλοποίηση όλων αυτών σημαντική είναι η συμβολή του ραδιοφώνου, της τηλεόρασης, των εφημερίδων, των προκηρύξεων, των αφισών και καλλιτεχνικών εκδηλώσεων όπως συναυλίες και θεατρικές παραστάσεις. Τέλος, η αντιπροπαγάνδα αποσκοπεί στην εξουδετέρωση της εχθρικής προπαγάνδας λαμβάνοντας προληπτικά και αμυντικά μέτρα.

Ας σημειωθεί ακόμη πως πέραν των παραπάνω, δύο άλλοι σημαντικοί και ιδιαίτερα επικίνδυνοι παράγοντες που αξιολογούν και σχεδιάζουν οι Τούρκοι είναι η πολιτική απειθαρχία και η δημιουργία της Πέμπτης Φάλαγγας⁵ προκειμένου να τροποποιηθούν και να αλλοιωθούν οι πολιτικές ισορροπίες και η πολιτιστική ταυτότητα μιας περιοχής. Άλλωστε οι προκλητικές ενέργειες της Άγκυρας στη Θράκη και στις νήσους Κω και Ρόδο επιβεβαιώνουν πλήρως την άποψη αυτή.

Οι τουρκικοί φορείς και υπηρεσίες για να συντάξουν ένα σχέδιο επιχειρήσεων ψυχολογικού πολέμου συλλέγουν πληροφορίες για τον στόχο τους από τις ακόλουθες πηγές: εφημερίδες, περιοδικά, εγχειρίδια κρατικών υπηρεσιών, μελέτες, αναλύσεις, αναφορές πληροφοριών, έγγραφα, χάρτες, σχέδια, έγγραφες διαταγές, βιογραφικά πολιτικών-στρατιωτικών, λαθρομετανάστες και αλλοδαπούς ή Τούρκους πολίτες. Στη συνέχεια αυτοί επεξεργάζονται και αναλύουν το εν λόγω πληροφοριακό υλικό και προβαίνουν στη σύνταξη του σχεδίου που τους έχει ανατεθεί. Για την πληρέστερη κατανόηση του εύρους των παραγόντων που οι Τούρκοι επιτελείς αξιολογούν κατά τη διαδικασία αυτή, παρατίθεται ακολούθως μεταφρασμένο στα ελληνικά η επιτελική δομή ενός αντίστοιχου σχεδίου ψυχολογικών επιχειρήσεων της Γενικής Διοίκησης Στρατοχωροφυλακής.

1. Γεωγραφική θέση και σημασία

- α. Έκταση, απόσταση από κύρια αστικά κέντρα και συνορεύοντες νομοί
- β. Κλιματολογικές συνθήκες

⁵ Πέμπτη φάλαγγα ονομάζεται η εντός πολιορκημένης πόλης, ή και εμπόλεμης χώρας γενικότερα, εκδηλωθείσα προπαγάνδα επ' ωφελεία του εχθρού. Αυτή η προπαγάνδα μπορεί να είναι εγχώριος (εσωτερική), ή να προέρχεται απευθείας εκ του εχθρού (εξωτερική). Επίσης, εκδηλώνεται ποικιλοτρόπως, με οτιδήποτε μέσο μπορεί να υπονομεύσει το φρόνημα ή και την ικανότητα των αμυνομένων, ήτοι από δολιοφθορά, μέχρι απλή διασπορά ψευδών ειδήσεων, π.χ. ραδιοφωνικές ανακοινώσεις ή έντυπες προτροπές (φέιγ-βολάν). Ο όρος τέθηκε σε χρήση για πρώτη φορά κατά τη διάρκεια του Ισπανικού Εμφυλίου Πολέμου (1936-1939), όταν στην πολιορκία της Μαδρίτης, κατά την διάρκεια συνέντευξης τύπου του επικεφαλής στρατηγού των εθνικιστών, ο ίδιος, είπε ότι έχει "4 φάλαγγες για να επιτεθούν στην Μαδρίτη". Τότε αμερικανός δημοσιογράφος τον ρώτησε με ποια από τις 4 θα ξεκινήσει την επίθεση, η απάντηση ήταν: "με την Πέμπτη" υπονοώντας τον άμαχο πληθυσμό της πόλης, ο οποίος ήταν καταφανώς στην πλειοψηφία του κατά των κομμουνιστών και υπέρ του Φράνκο και των εθνικιστών. Αυτό έδωσε την αφορμή στην κομμουνιστική διοίκηση να προβεί σε μαζικές εκτελέσεις αμάχων. Χαρακτηριστικό ήταν ότι στο σύνθημα των κομμουνιστών "ΔΕΝ ΘΑ ΠΕΡΑΣΟΥΝ " NO PASSARAN, ο λαός κατά την είσοδο των φασιστών και εθνικιστών μετά από τις μαζικές εκτελέσεις, φώναζε: HAT PASSATO δηλ. ΠΕΡΑΣΑΝ, επιδοκμάζοντας τον Στρατηγό Φράνκο. Έκτοτε και με αρχή αυτό το ιστορικό γεγονός, επεβλήθη ο όρος "ΠΕΜΠΤΗ ΦΑΛΑΓΓΑ", με την προαναφερόμενη σημασία. (el.wikipedia.org)

- γ. Εδαφικά χαρακτηριστικά (Γενική δομή του εδάφους, όρη, πεδιάδες, υδρογραφικά στοιχεία, φράγματα και οδικό-σιδηροδρομικό-αεροπορικό δίκτυο.
- δ. Γενική σπουδαιότητα του νομού

2. Ιστορικά στοιχεία

- α. Γενικά ιστορικά στοιχεία.
- β. Προέλευση του ονόματος του νομού.
- γ. Περίοδος πριν το Ισλάμ (Πολιτική ιστορία, θρησκεία, γλώσσα, δομή κρατικού μηχανισμού και πόλεμοι)
- δ. Περίοδος μετά την πτώση της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας
- ε. Σημαντικά γεγονότα που συνέβησαν κατά τη διάρκεια της ιστορικής εξέλιξης του νομού και ιδεολογικές δραστηριότητες (Δραστηριότητες της άκρα δεξιάς και δραστηριότητες της άκρα αριστεράς)
- στ. Φυσικές καταστροφές (Χρονολογία - είδος καταστροφής - περιοχή καταστροφής - απώλειες)

3. Οικονομία

- α. Γενικά
- β. Αριθμός επιχειρήσεων (Α.Ε., Π.Ε., Εταιρείες και Όμιλοι)
- γ. Εργατικό δυναμικό κατανεμημένο κατά κατηγορίες απασχόλησης
- δ. Απασχόληση και ανεργία
- ε. Τράπεζες
- στ. Βιομηχανία
- ζ. Πληροφοριακά στοιχεία για τα Εμπορικά και Τεχνικά Επιμελητήρια
- η. Πληροφοριακά στοιχεία για τις Εισαγωγές-Εξαγωγές
- θ. Γεωργία και κτηνοτροφία
- ι. Μεταλλουργία
- ια. Ενέργεια
- ιβ. Κατάταξη της οικονομικής κατάταξης του νομού στο σύνολο της τουρκικής επικράτειας

4. Δυνατότητες των ΜΜΕ

- α. Γενικά χαρακτηριστικά και προβλήματα
- β. Αριθμός συνδρομητών στην τηλεφωνία κατά αστικό κέντρο.
- γ. Ραδιοφωνικοί και τηλεοπτικοί σταθμοί (Συχνότητες, ιδιοκτήτες, διεύθυνση, τηλέφωνο)
- δ. Εφημερίδες και λοιπός ημερήσιος και περιοδικός έντυπος τύπος (Τίτλος, ιδιοκτήτες, διεύθυνση, τηλέφωνο, κάθε πότε εκδίδεται, οικονομική κατάσταση και πολιτικός προσανατολισμός)

5. Δομή κρατικού μηχανισμού

- α. (Ένοπλες Δυνάμεις, Αστυνομία, Τοπική Αυτοδιοίκηση, Δικαιοσύνη, Εκπαίδευση, Ταχυδρομείο, Ερυθρός Σταυρός, Δημόσιοι Οργανισμοί, Οργανώσεις κ.λπ.)
- β. Αστυνομικές Μονάδες (Οργάνωση, προσωπικό διαθέσιμο μέσα, εγκαταστάσεις, σχέσεις, κρατικές οικίες προσωπικού, συμβάντα, καταγραφή βαρέων οχημάτων όπως λεωφορεία, φορτηγά, βυτιοφόρα και μηχανήματα)

γ. Εκπαίδευση (Δημόσια πρωτοβάθμια, δευτεροβάθμια και τριτοβάθμια εκπαίδευση. Ιδιωτική εκπαίδευση. Κατανομή σχολικών εγκαταστάσεων και εκπαιδευτικού προσωπικού-σπουδαστών. Κατανομή μαθητικών εστιών, δυνατότητές τους και μαθητών που φιλοξενούν. Εκπαιδευτικές δραστηριότητες-σεμινάρια-συνέδρια κ.λπ.)

δ. Υγειονομική κατάσταση (Νοσοκομεία, Κέντρα Υγείας, Εργαστήρια, υγειονομικό προσωπικό κ.λπ.)

ε. Κοινωνικές Υπηρεσίες και παροχή υπηρεσιών κοινωνικής πρόνοιας.

6. Ήθη, έθιμα και παραδόσεις

α. Θρησκευτική κατανομή πληθυσμού και τρόπος ενδυμασίας ανδρών και γυναικών.

β. Διασκέδαση

γ. Κατάσταση των οικογενειών και σχέση γονέων με τα παιδιά τους.

δ. Ερωτική και σεξουαλική κατάσταση και τρόπος αποδοχής της από την κοινωνία. (Δεσμός, αρραβώνας, γάμος και λοιπές τελετές)

ε. Διατροφικές συνήθειες

7. Λοιπά

α. Φεστιβάλ, πολιτιστικά κέντρα, φολκλорικά συγκροτήματα κ.λπ.

β. Σημαντικές ημερομηνίες, εορτές και καλλιτεχνικές εκδηλώσεις.

8. Πολιτικός - ιδεολογικός προσανατολισμός των κατοίκων και δραστηριότητες θρησκευτικών και πολιτικών οργανώσεων (παράνομων και μη)

9. Κοινωνική και πολιτιστική δομή

Τα τουρκικά σχέδια ψυχολογικών επιχειρήσεων κατά βάση συντάσσονται από το Συμβούλιο Εθνικής Ασφαλείας και το Γενικό Επιτελείο Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων, καθορίζουν την οργάνωση των παρακρατικών μηχανισμών και τις ενδεχόμενες επιχειρήσεις που θα κληθούν να εκτελέσουν και έχουν ως στόχο: πρώτον, να προβάλλουν την επιδίωξη της Άγκυρας να προστατεύσει τις «τουρκικές» μειονότητες από διακρίσεις και αφομοιώσεις στα κράτη που διαβιούν. Και δεύτερον, να συμβάλλουν στην πολιτιστική ή και ουσιαστική ένωση αυτών με την Ana Vatan /Μητέρα Πατρίδα (σ.σ. εννοούν την Τουρκία).

Η βασική επιδίωξη των τουρκικών παρακρατικών μηχανισμών είναι να παρουσιάσουν μέσω προπαγανδιστικών ενεργειών, τόσο στην ελληνική όσο και στη διεθνή κοινή γνώμη, ότι οι μουσουλμάνοι της Θράκης και της Ρόδου-Κω αποτελούν στόχο της ελληνικής πολιτικής για αφομοίωση, μέσω της καταπάτησης των ατομικών, θρησκευτικών, πολιτικών και πολιτιστικών ελευθεριών τους. Για την υλοποίηση των σχεδιασμών τους, οι Τούρκοι πιθανόν έχουν συγκροτήσει μια οργάνωση εντός της ελληνικής επικράτειας η οποία αποτελείται από τρεις πυρήνες:

- 1^{ος} Πυρήνας (Συμβουλευτική Επιτροπή): Πρόκειται για μια Συμβουλευτική Επιτροπή (πρόεδρος-αντιπρόεδρος-μέλη) η οποία καθοδηγείται άμεσα από την Άγκυρα και είναι υπεύθυνη έναντι αυτής για την υλοποίηση των τουρκικών σχεδιασμών.
- 2^{ος} Πυρήνας (Πυρήνας Καθοδηγητών Κοινής Γνώμης): Υπάγεται στον 1^ο Πυρήνα και αποτελείται από μειονοτικούς πολιτικούς, μουφτήδες, ιμάμηδες, δημοσιογράφους, αρθρογράφους, επιστήμονες, προβεβλημένους επιχειρηματίες, καλλιτέχνες και λοιπά επικοινωνιακά άτομα «κλειδιά».

- 3^{ος} Πυρήνας (Διοίκηση Επιχειρήσεων): Υπάγεται στον 1^ο Πυρήνα και η συγκρότηση του περιλαμβάνει τον διοικητή, τον επικεφαλής του επιχειρησιακού σχεδιασμού και τις διοικήσεις περιοχών. Εκτιμάται ότι υφίστανται αντίστοιχες διοικήσεις περιοχών στους νομούς της Θράκης, στις νήσους Ρόδο-Κω, στην Αθήνα, στη Θεσ/νίκη και πιθανόν σε άλλες περιοχές της Ελλάδος στρατηγικής αξίας. Οι διοικήσεις περιοχών αποτελούνται από αριθμό ομάδων επιχειρήσεων, οι οποίες είναι ολιγομελείς (5-10 άτομα).

Στην συγκρότηση και επιχειρησιακή δράση της οργάνωσης αυτής, ο ρόλος των τουρκικών διπλωματικών αποστολών εκτιμάται ότι είναι ιδιαίτερα σημαντικός. Για τη στρατολόγηση και επάνδρωση των προαναφερθέντων πυρήνων, εκτιμάται ότι χρησιμοποιούνται κατά βάση οι ακόλουθες μέθοδοι: εκβιασμοί, απειλές, κοινωνικός αποκλεισμός, χρηματισμός, ικανοποίηση σεξουαλικών ιδιαιτεροτήτων και παροχή διευκολύνσεων όπως, διάθεση τραπεζικών δανείων μέσω της τουρκικής τράπεζας ZIRAAT, επαγγελματική αποκατάσταση, εξασφάλιση σπουδών και υποτροφιών, κοινωνικές και υγειονομικές παροχές κ.λπ.

Οι εν λόγω επιχειρήσεις αποσταθεροποίησης περιλαμβάνουν τέσσερις Φάσεις: τη Φάση Προετοιμασίας που περιλαμβάνει τον εντοπισμό στόχων και τη συλλογή σχετικών πληροφοριακών στοιχείων, τη Φάση Δημιουργίας Φόβου/Τρόμου, τη Φάση Επηρεασμού της Κοινής Γνώμης μέσω μαύρης προπαγάνδας και τη Φάση Κινητοποίησης και Επιχειρήσεων. Ειδικότερα δε, για τον τρόπο δράσης της προαναφερθείσας παρακρατικής οργάνωσης εντός του ελληνικού εδάφους, κρίνεται σκόπιμο να ληφθούν υπόψη τα τουρκικά σχέδια επιχειρήσεων *Kafes* (Κλωβός), *Çarşaf* (Σεντόνι) και *Sakal* (Γενειάδα) που συντάχθηκαν με σκοπό την αποσταθεροποίηση της Τουρκίας. Επίσης, οι Φάσεις Διεξαγωγής των σχεδίων αυτών μπορεί να αποτελέσουν *modus operandi* για διεξαγωγή ανάλογης τουρκικής επιχείρησης στην Ελλάδα και την Κύπρο, η οποία πιθανόν θα περιλαμβάνει τα ακόλουθα:

- Απειλητικά τηλεφωνήματα και αποστολές απειλητικών επιστολών σε στόχους, όπως άτομα και ΜΜΕ που πρωτοστατούν στην «υπεράσπιση/προάσπιση» των δικαιωμάτων των μειονοτήτων.
- Αναγραφή συνθημάτων με απειλητικό περιεχόμενο (είτε για μουσουλμάνους είτε για χριστιανούς) στους τοίχους περιοχών όπου υπάρχει πυκνή κυκλοφορία.
- Αναγραφή συνθημάτων σε κτηριακές εγκαταστάσεις συλλόγων που προβάλλουν την ελληνική στρατιωτική παρουσία στη Θράκη. Ενδεικτικό παράδειγμα αποτελεί η τοιχοκόλληση στα γραφεία του Συλλόγου Εφέδρων Καταδρομέων ΛΕΦΕΔ στη Θεσσαλονίκη σημαία της υποτιθέμενης Δημοκρατίας Δυτικής Θράκης» επί της οποίας είχε αναγραφεί: «*Trakya bizimdir* (Η Θράκη είναι δική μας)».
- Πραγματοποίηση βομβιστικών ενεργειών σε περιοχές που ζουν μουσουλμάνοι και σε τζαμιά και στη συνέχεια υποκίνηση διαδηλώσεων και επεισοδίων, με σκοπό την εξάπλωση τους σε πολλές περιοχές.
- Απαγωγή ή απόπειρα δολοφονίας ατόμου/ατόμων που πρωτοστατούν έντονα στην «υπεράσπιση/προάσπιση» των δικαιωμάτων των μειονοτήτων.
- Τοποθέτηση βομβών κρότου σε σημεία που θα καθορισθούν.

- Τοποθέτηση ύποπτων πακέτων σε διάφορες περιοχές και κατόπιν καταγγελία στις δυνάμεις ασφαλείας προκειμένου να τις απασχολήσουν και να τις δημιουργήσουν επιπλέον φόρτο εργασίας σε συγκεκριμένη χρονική περίοδο.
- Πυροβολισμοί, διαρρήξεις και πρόκληση ζημιών σε τζαμιά και σε κτήρια που στεγάζονται Σύλλογοι Μουσουλμάνων (ειδικά σε συλλόγους που δεν ασπάζονται τις θέσεις της Τουρκίας). Ενδεικτικά παραδείγματα θεωρούνται η διάρρηξη στις 04-03-2011 και οι πυροβολισμοί στις 06-03-2011 κατά του Συλλόγου Ελλήνων Μουσουλμάνων Κομοτηνής Πος Πος.
- Σύληση μουσουλμανικών και χριστιανικών νεκροταφείων. Ενδεικτικά παραδείγματα θεωρούνται τα εξής:
 - ✓ Η σύληση του μουσουλμανικού νεκροταφείου στην περιοχή Πος Πος της Κομοτηνής, στις 13-08-2010. Ήτοι, δύο ημέρες πριν την τέλεση, μετά από 88 χρόνια, της Θείας Λειτουργίας στην Παναγία Σουμελά του Πόντου.
 - ✓ Η σύληση νεκροταφείου στην Ίμβρο, στις 28-10-2010, που χρησιμοποιείται από κοινού από χριστιανούς και μουσουλμάνους.
 - ✓ Η σύληση του μουσουλμανικού νεκροταφείου της Νίκαιας Αττικής στις 25-03-2011. Επισημαίνεται ότι την ίδια ημέρα το τουρκικό υπουργείο Εξωτερικών εξέδωσε σχετική ανακοίνωση καλώντας την ελληνική κυβέρνηση να πράξει να δέοντα.
- Εντατικοποίηση των ενεργειών για αύξηση των ανθελληνικών ιστοσελίδων στο διαδίκτυο, καθώς επίσης θα γίνουν οι ανάλογες ενέργειες για ευρεία γνωστοποίηση των ιστοσελίδων αυτών.
- Υποστήριξη των ιστοσελίδων των οποίων το περιεχόμενο εναντιώνεται τις μειονότητες στην Ελλάδα και την Κύπρο, καθώς επίσης θα γίνουν οι ανάλογες ενέργειες για ευρεία γνωστοποίηση των ιστοσελίδων αυτών.
- Έντονη προβολή στην Τουρκία, στην Ελλάδα και στο εξωτερικό της επετείου της «Ημέρας Εθνικής Αντίστασης της Τουρκικής Μειονότητας Δυτικής Θράκης». Η επέτειος αυτή αφορά στα επεισόδια που πραγματοποιήθηκαν κατά τη διάρκεια διαδήλωσης στην Κομοτηνή, στις 29-01-1988, από μέρος των μουσουλμάνων της Θράκης οι οποίοι δήλωναν ότι είναι Τούρκοι και διεκδικούσαν τα πολιτικά και κοινωνικά τους δικαιώματα. Επισημαίνεται ότι στην εκδήλωση που πραγματοποιήθηκε στις 29-01-2011 σε αίθουσα εκδηλώσεων πλησίον της Ξάνθης, προβλήθηκε τμήμα της εκπομπής του TRT της Χούλια Εμίν «Εμείς είμαστε εδώ» με θέμα τα γεγονότα της 29ης Ιανουαρίου. Παρουσιάστηκε επίσης ένα τμήμα 4 λεπτών του ντοκιμαντέρ με τίτλο «29η Ιανουαρίου» που επιμελήθηκε ο φοιτητής του Τμήματος Επικοινωνιών Ουμίτ Χαλιλιμπράμ, ενώ τονίστηκε πως το ντοκιμαντέρ θα ολοκληρωνόταν τον Απρίλιο του 2011.
- Δημιουργία ιστοσελίδων που αφήνουν την εντύπωση ότι πρόσκεινται στην Ελληνική Κυβέρνηση. Στη συνέχεια:
 - ✓ Θα επιδιωχθεί η απαραίτητη προβολή τους μέσω δημοσιευμάτων ρατσιστικού περιεχομένου για τις μειονότητες στην Ελλάδα.

- ✓ Θα δημοσιευθούν μηνύματα που στοχοποιούν όργανα και πρόσωπα που υποστηρίζουν τους μειονοτικούς κύκλους.
- Διεξαγωγή μαύρης προπαγάνδας με σκοπό να ενοχοποιηθεί η Ελληνική Κυβέρνηση ότι δήθεν αδιαφορεί στις απειλές και τα επεισόδια εναντίον των μουσουλμάνων που ζουν στην Ελλάδα και μάλιστα υποστηρίζει αυτές τις ενέργειες.

6. Επίλογος

Το διεθνές δίκαιο και η πολιτική σοφία μπορεί να βρίσκονται ή να μη βρίσκονται από την ίδια πλευρά της διαμάχης και της αντιπαλότητας μεταξύ δύο κρατών. Αν δεν ευρίσκονται, η απλή εμμονή στο γράμμα του νόμου θα είναι απρόσφορη για τα εθνικά συμφέροντα και ίσως να καταστεί και ανήθικη. Χαρακτηριστική περίπτωση αποτελεί η επιλεκτική προάσπιση περιορισμένων συμφερόντων σε συγκεκριμένες περιόδους, η οποία όχι μόνο δεν υπηρετεί και βλάπτει το σύνολο των κυριαρχικών δικαιωμάτων, αλλά δημιουργεί δεδικασμένα με απρόβλεπτες συνέπειες.

Επομένως, μια τελική επισήμανση για τη διαμόρφωση της πολιτικής της Ελλάδος και της Κύπρου, καθώς επίσης και των στρατηγικών τους συμμάχων έναντι της Τουρκίας κρίνεται σκόπιμο να εστιασθεί στα ακόλουθα στοιχεία που αναλύουν οι Τούρκοι για την αντίπαλη χώρα, δεδομένου ότι τα συμπεράσματα που εξάγουν λαμβάνονται πολύ σοβαρά υπόψη από αυτούς στην εφαρμογή συγκεκριμένης, επιθετικής ή μη, στρατηγικής για θέματα άμυνας και εξωτερικής πολιτικής:

- Διαθέτει μια αποτρεπτική στρατιωτική ισχύ;
- Διαθέτει οπλικά συστήματα μαζικής καταστροφής και μακρού πλήγματος σε περιορισμένες ποσότητες;
- Θα χρησιμοποιήσει τη στρατιωτική της ισχύ με δική της πρωτοβουλία ή όχι; Δηλαδή έχει σχεδιάσει από τον καιρό της ειρήνης την περίπτωση να προβεί στο πρώτο πλήγμα; Αναλυτικότερα δε, το πρώτο πλήγμα, με τη στρατηγική σημασία του όρου, δεν είναι ο πρώτος τυχόν πυροβολισμός που πέφτει κατά το πρώτο «θερμό επεισόδιο» μιας πολεμικής αντιπαράθεσης. Είναι μια συντονισμένη και ακαριαία ενέργεια όλων των Κλάδων των Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων προς εκμηδένιση των ζωτικών σημείων του εχθρικού πολεμικού δυναμικού. Μπορεί να καταφερθεί στο πλαίσιο της κλιμάκωσης ενός τοπικού «θερμού επεισοδίου», αλλά και πολύ νωρίτερα ακόμη, όταν δηλαδή διαπιστωθεί ότι επίκειται έτσι και αλλιώς εχθρική επίθεση. Το επιτελικό σχέδιο του πρώτου πλήγματος πρέπει λοιπόν να βρίσκεται στο συρτάρι, ήδη από τον καιρό της ειρήνης, χωρίς αυτό να σημαίνει καθόλου ότι όποιος το έχει καταστρώσει και όποιος θα το εφαρμόσει είναι αναγκαία ο επιτιθέμενος με την ιστορική και πολιτική έννοια του όρου.⁶
- Η οικονομική, δημογραφική, επιστημονική, τεχνολογική, ψυχοκοινωνική και πολιτιστική ισχύς θα μπορέσει να υποστηρίξει τη στρατιωτική της ισχύ σε καθορισμένο ή περιορισμένο βαθμό ή όχι;
- Ο σκοπός, οι προθέσεις, η αποφασιστικότητα και η υποστήριξη της εξωτερικής πολιτικής της είναι απρόβλεπτοι;

⁶ Παναγιώτης Κονδύλης, *Θεωρία του Πολέμου*, Εκδόσεις Θεμέλιο, Αθήνα, 1998, Σελ. 397.

- Έχει τη δυνατότητα να υποστηρίξει ασύμμετρες ενέργειες στο εσωτερικό της Τουρκίας;
- Παρέχει υποστήριξη σε εθνικές μειονότητες και θρησκευτικές αδελφότητες που θα θέσουν σε κίνδυνο την ακεραιότητα και συνοχή της Τουρκίας.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Mostafa Zahrani**

23 June 20014

The Role of Iran in Search for Regional Stability

Thank you very much. I appreciate your remarks and your hospitality. I should thank Dr. Pelagias, and also Ambassador, and also the Minister. I should appreciate my Ambassador here, a very good friend of mine, for putting this meeting together, though I had a lot of things to do. But since it is the last days of him being here, so when he told me, I could not refuse it with all the things that I had.

I'm very happy to be here. I had long time work here in this country, of course, in a few years back, and I'm very happy that I'm beginning for the second time.

The most important issues which I want to raise is that, first of all, the most important base of and a source of foreign policy of a country is its domestic source. I'll try to talk about this to understand why Iran has such a behavior in its foreign policy, regional and international. A few points on that.

First of all, Iran is a nation whose people where the first to establish a nation-estate in history. It goes back seven thousand years. So this is a source, shaping the behavior of the Iranians. Iran is a country, to use the word from Richard Frye, it's just like the palm tree that when it comes under pressure and wind from the sides, it might bend to the left or right, but it never breaks.

1979 revolution, which was the most popular revolution of a century, is a source of behavior for us when it comes to foreign policy. Eight years of the war with Saddam Hussein have also has created so many things: culture, school of thought for us in a way of defending ourselves, and also behaving in our domestic and foreign policy.

Besides that, sanctions are very important. I put those sanctions also in a type of war against our people for last thirty years, especially last twenty years. Both sanctions and eight years of the war with Saddam Hussein has brought us a type of culture how to manage our society based on this culture of resistance. And I think that may give you an answer that while President Obama announces that America has been able to impose the most comprehensive sanctions in the history on Iranian people, but still Iran survives. We do know, based on that experience and that culture, how to manage our country. Myself and some other people who have studied about

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

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economic sanctions against Iran, we have come to a conclusion that if we could manage our economy in the eight years of the war with oil of six dollars a barrel, today also we can manage our country or economy with one million barrel of oil per day to be exported.

Iran is the only victim of WMD, myself one of them. And at the same time, Iran is being under the pressure of the only nuclear criminal of the world to be preached about how bad is WMD. Iranian people really do not like to be second-class citizen in the international community and they never tolerate to be in that category. These attitudes are very hurtful for us. And of course, Iranian people are very much proud of their civilization.

And from this I will take you to the recent election of Iran. Really, to understand the recent election is to understand these civilizations. Iranian people when they came to the ballot they thought that ex-president was not really representing this tradition, this peaceful civilization to the world. Dr. Ahmadinejad, even in my view, he was not even part of revolutionary establishment, and that was another problem. So the people wanted to bring back things to the revolutionary era which was rational, you know. Our revolution was a revolution of discourse and word and talk to the people and not a revolution of violence. This is really what we mean when we talk about the recent election of President Rouhani.

So, many people in the West try to say, okay, the people came to the ballot because of the economic pressure, they want change. That might be one of the reasons, but the real cause and motivation for the people to come to the ballot is that they really want someone to represent them as they are, as the civilization that they have. The people of Iran feel that they have been oppressed, they feel that they should be regarded as everybody else in the international community. These are the fundamental bases of our foreign policy, or understanding of war and peace, or understanding of international politics and international relations.

And this brings us to the new era under President Khatami. Two things which are important One is the nuclear negotiations. First of all, why Iran came to negotiate on this nuclear issue. Two things are important. A fundamental assumption is that Iran does not need the bomb. And there are so many reasons that Iran does not need the bomb. If we were victim of chemical weapon at eight years of the war and we did have the means to retaliate and we did not use it, this brings you to some of the principles, I mean moral principles of war and peace in the psyche, in the culture of Iran, in defending itself. And so many other reasons. Iran already is superior when it comes to conventional way of defending itself. So there is not really a rational, strategic logic that you undermine this superiority that you have, and to go to nuclear weapons with all the costs that this will bring with itself. Iran has not been in a war with those who are nuclear powers. We have no problem with Pakistan, no problem with India, not any of them. And really the strategic culture in Iran is that nobody really thought what does it mean to go to, let's say, for example, a first strike, or a second strike capability, because these are not part of our strategic negotiations, strategic talks. We do not need those kind of things when it comes to defending the country.

Assuming that is the case, those people like Rouhani and Dr. Zu who are part of negotiations and including the leader himself, had the thought, okay, why not negotiate. It was in I think 2005, the same people, I mean, Dr. Rouhani and I guess Zarif were part of the negotiations at that time. They made really a deal, it was not... It was Europeans who did not, who could not manage and come forward to what they had agreed to. So the mentality of the decision-makers is the same as it has been in the past. Assumption - no need for nuclear weapons, it does not help anything, and we have so far been able to stand on our own feet through other means of defending ourselves.

Our look toward what is happening in the region, what is happening in the international arena, also comes through these fundamentals of foreign policy, the domestic basis of what we think in our strategic understanding.

That brings us today to the issues and the thinking of what we have around us now in Iraq, in Syria, in Afghanistan, and everywhere. Two schools of thought always emerge. One is in the West they always try to bring Iran on the side to be a spoiler in the events in the region, while that's not really the case. I'll give you an example. Long time ago when we had in Afghanistan, the Taliban for the first time, we were telling the West that this will bring terrible things to the future of the region, the way they did treat the Taliban, because they look at things through this angle of Iran as an enemy, Iran as a threat, so anything which was a threat to this enemy they consider to be their friend. And now they have become trapped by what they have created themselves what and has become a problem for everybody. Very long ago we talked about 'talibanization' of Pakistan. And right now everybody is witnessing what is there. Very long ago we would say, we would tell them, okay, the way they treated the enemies of Iran will bring them a terrorist group that no one can control it. So this is what we see now. If in the beginning... Of course, when they got after 9/11 problem they wanted to overthrow Taliban in Afghanistan. They got the support of Iran but later on they put Iran in an 'axis of evil'. It was Iran who cooperated with them in Iraq, but every day they're blaming Iran, that Iran is doing this and that. And later on they came to a conclusion, no, that was not the case. Iran was part of solution and not part of the problem.

In Syria also from the beginning everybody was blaming Iran, that Iran was part of the problem. Now, after three years, they have not been able to do anything. And, of course, there has been disinformation about the events in Syria. First they thought it is a natural revolution there, which was not the case. They were in the part of optimistic view. They thought everything would be swift. Iran was telling them that on all aspect they made a mistake. And now after three years they have come to a conclusion that Iran was right when it said this. And now they think that ok, Iran is part of a solution and not the problem. We are happy for that although it's very late. But still Iran can be helpful. And of course, the same for what is happening in Iraq, almost on everything.

The most important aspect of our foreign policy is the soft power that we have and the language and discourse which this comes really from a very profound and old civilization that we have. For that reason, we can really be very, very helpful.

Just concluding my remarks, and then I prefer to go to Q and A. These nuclear negotiations are very difficult. Iran came to agreement in Geneva, but every day they are given a new reading to the content of that agreement and they bring in different things. First of all, it's been said that Iran needs enrichment for practical needs. And that "practical needs" is what you need for the fuel, for Bushehr reactor. And then the Americans have substituted the concept of "practical needs" with the concept of breakout time. And they put the breakout time that Iran would be able to get to that point within two months. Well, this is not our calculation.

Talking about Arak facilities, talking about Fordow and all those issues which have been agreed there, they are bringing a new meaning and new definition to that. These have created some constraints on the negotiations. This doesn't mean that negotiations will fail. We do know that there is a will on the side of the Obama administration to solve the issue. And, of course, when you talk about the Obama administration, you are not talking about a unified group. There are some people who were not that helpful for these negotiations. And of course P5+1 also, not every

one of them has the same motivation when it comes to these negotiations.

So, these are some of the difficulties. But cautiously we could say that things will go forward when it comes to the negotiations. Three things may happen. One is that we may come up with a good conclusion on July 20. And when I say good conclusion, everybody, every country, every party defines own goodness, the meaning of what is good.

The second possibility would be that the negotiations will be stopped and we go nowhere. And the third is the extension, six month-extension of negotiations. And I believe not many people go for the bad option. And I don't know how much one can talk about the best option. But it is also possible that we talk more about the extension of negotiations. And there are some back-channel talks also that possibility could lead to the type of deal acceptable to everybody.

The real point is that when Zarif and Rouhani negotiated ten years ago, or something like that, at that time we had at most a few hundred centrifuges. Iran really came to the table for a type of symbolic enrichment, and not a real enrichment. The other side did not accept. Now we have about twenty thousand centrifuges - ten thousand just running, and nine or something thousand ready to be operational.

The other side is making a very big mistake if they think that Iran is very desperate for a type of conclusion. Why a mistake? Because if they think that Iran is desperate and they can push as hard as they can, and they get no result, the conclusion would be very bad. And if things stop, next time you don't know. Maybe forty thousand, fifty thousand, ninety thousand centrifuges running. Iran is there. Sanctions have not been doing anything to us. Of course we, the people, suffer from the sanctions. First of all, it is not the elite which suffers the sanctions. Historically, theoretically, you just read sanctions. In no sanctions it has been the elite which has been suffering. It is the people. It is very interesting. We had Jack Straw in my institute three month ago and I told him, Mr. Minister, you want to know how successful your sanctions against our people have been? And he said, how? And as I take you tonight to one of these 24-hour pharmacies, the pharmacist which they give medicine for cancer and all those bad sicknesses, and you will see the father and mother crying, gosh, I don't have medicine, my son is dying! This is one aspect of it, you have been Mr. Minister very successful in your sanctions. And I take you in the morning to one of these dealers which sells Porsche cars. And if he tells you that he's been successful to sell six hundred Porsche in six months, then you will become confused. Okay, where does that money come from? And then Jack Straw went back home and gave an interview, and he said, we don't give Iranians medicine, but we sell them Porsches. So this is... The sanctions have brought two things: radicalism and corruption. No one really likes it. Still, we can run our society.

So, just to conclude my presentation. This is the source of foreign policy of Iranians. With this civilization that has suffered, being the victim of the world, being the victim of WMD, being the people with soft power, with language, being helpful for bringing peace and stability to the region, the Iranian people do not like ever to be the second-class citizens of the international community, and we are very much ready to solve the problems that we have with the so-called international community when it comes to nuclear weapons. Thank you very much.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Andreas Mavroyiannis**

1 July 2014

The Cyprus Problem: Moving Closer to a Solution?

Thank you very much Mr. Papadopoulos, Mr. Chairman, excellences, ministers, distinguished guests, dear friends. It's really a great honor and pleasure for me to be here with you today in order to try and give you an update on recent developments with regard to the Cyprus problem.

You have here among you some of the most eminent people that are working also with us in preparing our negotiating positions and trying to move the problem toward the settlement. Because we all understand and appreciate that this is really a collective effort and it's not the work of one person. And of course when you talk about Cyprus, unfortunately until now it was not the failure of one person; it was a failure of all of us to achieve concrete results.

So now we have embarked on a very, very serious and sustained effort to try at last to have a process that will yield the sought-after result, which is the solution of the Cyprus problem. Of course, one is always skeptical when one recalls the history of the Cyprus problem. And the first question that comes into the minds of people is what is different this time. Why should one believe that we can this time achieve a result, and concrete result which has been eluding us for so long? And of course there are no certainties in life, but at the same time we honestly believe that there are in place a number of conditions that create an unprecedented momentum and in gathering of circumstances that with the right alignment of the stars - as people were saying in Ireland at the time of Good Friday Agreement - can at last put an end to the division of our country.

And among those factors everybody is aware that there is a change in the new geopolitical circumstances in our area of the world and that there is an enhanced American interest, the second being partly the result of the first. There is the importance, the increasing importance of the energy question in the Eastern Mediterranean. There is the fact that Cyprus is in the European Union for ten years now and also a very, very strong commitment on the part of the leadership to move forward. Of course those elements are, you know, laying the ground for an effort that has good prospects, but at the same time we need to be fully conscious and aware that to talk about an environment which is prone, which is the right environment in order to move forward is not enough. It is not enough because the biggest difficulty we have when we talk about the Cyprus problem is how we funnel into the process those positive circumstances. How do we use

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

** *Ambassador, Greek Cypriot Negotiator for the Cyprus Problem*

this environment and this increasing momentum in order to bring about the necessary movement in order to get it right this time, in order to have, if you like, a reconciliation of the respective positions and to put the problem behind us.

I have to say from the outset that our experience so far is not a very, very positive in this respect because we have a lot of frustration exactly because it has not yet proven possible to see at the negotiating table the results of what is happening around. And we have the great honor and a pleasure to have with us today our former foreign minister Erato Kozakou-Marcullis who makes us the honor to preside over the working group on property and very often participates in the negotiations. And she exactly goes through this incredible phenomenon where everybody tells you, OK, it's good, let's work, let's do it, but then you face a wall, and you wonder why.

But before coming to this, I would like to say that since election of President Anastasiades it was very clear that the Greek Cypriot community was ready, and willing, and determined to embark on a new sustained effort in order to find the settlement.

Of course, you all recall that we spent the first months dealing with the economic crisis and it was almost impossible to focus on starting the negotiations. This is not to say at all that the Cyprus problem is not the number one priority of the government, at least in Greek Cypriot community. But it was important to tackle urgent economic, a very pressing economic issues first in the early months, and only in September it was possible to start this renewed effort which resulted later on in what we have now ongoing.

Initial effort, when it started in September was meant to be, as I was saying, from the beginning a bit different. Not only because of the external circumstances and the political momentum, but also we wanted to make sure that we maximize the chances of success of the effort through first having a very clear understanding on the basis of the sought-after solution and also, you know, the fundamentals of the settlement. This is when it comes to substance because our assessment was that the previous efforts have not succeeded in bringing about the settlement because of the lack of understanding and the lack of, how to say, clarity on many of the most fundamental issues that constitute the Cyprus problem.

On the other hand, it was also of utmost importance that we have an understanding on the methodology that we were going to follow in order to make sure that the process is result-oriented. This is why we have suggested from the beginning - and I have to say that the UN team was 100% forthcoming - that before we embark on full-fledged negotiations, we needed to have a kind of a joint statement that will lay the ground both on the substance and on the methodology. The initial idea was for this process to take a couple of months. Eventually it took more than five months to be completed and it resulted in February in the joint statement you all know. The joint statement is an important document because, as I was saying, it lays the ground for fully-fledged negotiations by, you know, defining very clearly the basis of the sought-after solution in line with the resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations, but also explaining the main attributes of the settlement which is bi-communal bi-zonal federation with political equality as defined by the resolutions of the Security Council with one international legal personality, with one sovereignty and one citizenship. And of course in order to have this clarity we had to make some clarifications concerning some other core issues. And so there are in the communique some other elements that are also very important, and that is that we are going to have two constituent states that will be created by the constitution. And this is very, very important because this is, if you like, the answer to the long-held position by the Turkish

Cypriot side that we need to have a new partnership of two pre-existing states. So the joint communique clarifies that we're going to have two constituent states that will be created by the constitution. And those constituent states that will be created by the constitution will exercise the residual powers but, again, as something that will be provided for by the constitution. And also that in addition to the united Cyprus citizenship we're going to have internal citizenship of the constituent states, but only as something which will be supplementary and not substituting in any way the united Cyprus citizenship.

On process. We had a lot of discussions and a lot of difficulty, but eventually we agreed that all outstanding core issues will be on the table and will be discussed interdependently and in a comprehensive manner. This was a session because, as I was saying, before our assessment was that until now there were a kind of sequential approaches, and as a result there are some issues that, though we were negotiating on and off for almost forty years, some issues were never discussed. And I'll give you a couple of examples.

One is territory. Though our side presented sometimes maps, and though in the Annan Plan there were maps in all versions of the plan, there has never been a discussion on territory. And there has never been a discussion on security and guarantees for almost forty years. There has never been a problem discussion on one of the main sticking points in the Cyprus problem which is the problem of the settlers. We use a euphemism that we talk about citizenship and we talk about anything else, but the real issue which is the question of the settlers. So we needed to have this new approach which was meant to allow us not only to put everything on the table, but through this interdependent discussion to create the conditions for an exercise, if you like, of give-and-take and trade-offs across the board. Because if one side is satisfied in an area where it attaches utmost importance, it can be more flexible in another area.

Then another important element was the European dimension. So far, I mean in the past, it was almost absent, sometimes it was ignored, sometimes in 2003-2004 there was a deliberate effort to have a settlement before Cyprus joining the European Union in order to ignore the European factor. And then later on the European dimension was one of the chapters of the negotiation. For us today things are completely different. Cyprus is a member state of the European Union and this dimension permeates everything we're doing on the Cyprus problem, whatever we are doing on this island, as a matter of fact. So we cannot just say, you know, this is yet another dimension, let's discuss it at the appropriate time. It has to be very clear that the European dimension is overarching, the European dimension is at the end of the day the key in order to offer solutions to many problems, and is the best possible guarantee for our present and our future which anyway is linked to membership and to the European Union.

I have to tell you that there were a lot of resistances on the other side concerning this new European approach. We're citing here a story I've mentioned already many times. In the beginning of September, when we had our first dinner with Alexander Downer, the two sides with Alexander Downer, from the very first moment I myself mentioned this need to adjust our approach and our perspective to the new reality which is the participation of Cyprus to the European Union. And there was a very fierce reaction from my Turkish Cypriot interlocutor who with an outburst of screaming said that, you know, it's not because you applied unilaterally to join the European Union and the European Union for the wrong reasons decided to accept you that you are going to impose on us the fact that we are in the European Union. We don't want to know, we're not members, and it is something we need to negotiate. So very calmly I put my hands on the table and I said, you know, under such conditions there is no need that we start

this dinner. We are losing our time, let's not even get started, let's go home and forget about this. Done and finished. So of course the UN made a very huge effort to keep us at the table and eventually - and it's a good thing that happened - this mini crisis created some dynamics on the Turkish Cypriot community and eventually a few weeks later we had a proposal that came from them containing the European dimension, and mentioning that it was not our proposal what is in the joint communique. It was a Turkish Cypriot proposal that the settlement should allow the respect of the fundamental values of the European Union and the implementation of the *acquis communautaire* throughout the island.

So it shows that the will of the Turkish Cypriot community very clearly is to be with us, with the European Union, though their leadership thinks differently. And they think differently because what they want at the end of the day is to have a settlement that will not take into account at all the fact that Cyprus is a member of the European Union, have all kind of arrangements that are in their very nature inconsistent with the *acquis communautaire* and inconsistent with international standards and obligations. Territory is one of the issues where we are along with Mrs. Marcoulli facing constantly this kind of approach. And then once we reach a settlement and they want this to become what they call primary law of the European Union in order to get legal certainty for something which they understand that it is abnormal, and later on they say, ok, in the future we will be able to accept the implementation of the *acquis communautaire* and of the four freedoms of the European Union, etc. But you understand that the result would be completely catastrophic for Cyprus, so for us when it comes to European Union there is no question that we can accept any permanent derogation from the *acquis communautaire*, there is no question that we accept any additional protocol and any primary law. We believe that we might need and we will need some transitional periods in order for the Turkish Cypriot community to adjust to the competitive environment existing in the European Union, but it has to be very clear that we cannot put in jeopardy our participation in the European Union.

At the same time, we honestly believe that it is possible to find a way to reconcile the main principles that are the acceptable principles for the solution of the Cyprus problem which is the bi-communal bi-zonal federation with political equality as defined by the resolutions of the Security Council, reconcile those principles with the full implementation of the *acquis communautaire*. It is not through exceptions that we are going to make this reconciliation. It's through the respect of all fundamental human rights and other rights provided for European citizens that we will manage to do this reconciliation with some special arrangements, if you like, fully consistent with *acquis communautaire* when it comes to the exercise of some of those political rights.

So after the adoption of the joint statement we embarked on the fully-fledged negotiations. We had a first phase of screening which went on for almost two months where we wanted to have a better understanding of each other's positions and we had some meetings of the leaders. At the same time, immediately after the adoption of the joint communique we managed for the first time ever to have visits of the negotiators to Ankara and Athens respectively. Let me tell you that for us it was very important to have access to Ankara because here in Cyprus we all say that the key of the solution is in Ankara. Ankara is the occupying power, they are the ones that ultimately make the decisions when it comes to the Cyprus problem. So it was for us very, very important to be able to talk to them, to make our case, if you like, and also to hear from the horse's mouth their thinking. The condition for this to happen, however, was that the Turkish Cypriot negotiator had to have access to Athens. Of course, we all know - and it is very clear - that Athens

and Ankara are not on an equal footing when it comes to the Cyprus problem. It's not Greece that occupies Cyprus. It's not Greece that has settlers, it's not Greece that interferes with what is happening in Cyprus. The only thing Greece does is to offer its support, its generous support to the government of Cyprus and towards a fair and balanced settlement. But since, if you like, the negotiators are projected completely out of the political system... For instance I myself do not represent the government of Cyprus, I was a diplomat, I took leave of absence and I was hired by the government of Cyprus in order to be the negotiator, and I was given as a loan to the Greek Cypriot community. So I don't work for the government of Cyprus. This is illegal situation. So since the negotiators do not represent the state, and when it comes to the Turkish Cypriot community the Turkish Cypriot negotiator only represents the leader of his community, there was no problem of status, if you like, and this facilitated this exchange of visits. So I should add that this first visit – I can talk only about my visit to Ankara – was really very, very successful and it made a lot of difference for us in order to have a better understanding of the way the Turkey's government is thinking. Of course, needless to say that the welcome and the hospitality were exceptionally warm, but the atmospherics are not always near the substance.

So since then, as I was saying, we had the first phase of screening which was very useful in order to get this better understanding of the respective positions because the feeling on our side was that in the previous effort there was between President Christofias and Mr. Talat a period during which they had some convergences of their positions, some common ground on many other issues. But eventually after the election of Dr. Eroğlu in 2010, most of those convergences were deconstructed by the new leader Dr. Eroğlu. So it was important for us to know where we stand on every issue, if you like, in particular in the light of the joint content of the joint communique. I should also remind you that negotiations between Mr. Christofias and Dr. Eroğlu were going on until the beginning of 2012, until such time when the Turkish Cypriots decided to interrupt the talks using as a pretext the fact that Cyprus was about to assume the presidency of the Council of the European Union. So I don't believe they are today legitimized to blame anybody else about any possible delay concerning, if you like, the pace of the negotiations. Because if we didn't have talks for the year and a half, it was entirely due to the fact that they interrupted the talks.

So when we completed the phase of the screening, we started in the beginning of May the second phase where we have the ambition, if you like, to put on the table very concrete proposals, and counter-proposals, and bridging proposals on all aspects of all issues and try at the same time through an in depth negotiation to reduce the gap between the respective positions. And this exercise goes on since then, with ups and downs, but certainly with a commitment on both sides to work very, very seriously. I'm not judging the substance of the positions presented, but the fact is that both sides work seriously and both sides submit proposals.

We believe, and it was announced during the last meeting of President Anastasiades with Dr. Eroğlu, that if things go well, by the end of July we should be able to have on the table all our positions on all issues. Unfortunately this last month we face a real problem which might end up at, you know, having at the end of July a train wreck. And the reason is that though there is this commitment, now we hear from the Turkish Cypriot side the old usual songs that they don't want to submit comprehensive proposal on territory, that they might be willing to discuss some criteria but they don't want to present a full proposal, and they say that at the same time that they don't want to discuss a security and guarantees except with the presence of the guarantor powers. This very clearly goes against the understanding we had, and against the joint communique, and against the very idea of having everything on the table in order to be able to

embark on having in front of us the whole picture into the next phase that would entail more tradeoffs and give-and-take. So we hope that in the coming weeks we will manage to overcome this major difficulty because otherwise we risk to find ourselves in a deadlock. And this certainly would be a pity because regardless of the divergences we have, as I was saying, there is a very, very serious effort and very serious work that is being done.

Now, this is where we stand at the negotiating table. At the same time, we felt from the beginning that it was of utmost importance that in parallel with the process at the negotiating table to have some confidence-building measures in place that would help the process and have some game changes that would boost and give a new dynamism to the effort for the settlement and render, if you like, very, very quickly the process irreversible. And you all know that there was a proposal by President Anastasiades on what we call the Famagusta package, which at the end of the day is not a new proposal. It was just putting together elements that were suggested by our side in the past.

And this proposal contained, as a matter-of-fact, four main elements. One is the transfer of the fenced area of Varosha to the United Nations in order to prepare for its return to its legitimate inhabitants. I have to remind everybody that this is something which goes without saying because, I mean, that was already an agreement between president Kyprianou and Mr. Denktaş in '79 about the priority that should be given to the return of the fenced territory of Varosha. Later on there was a very clear mention in Resolution 50. Later on there was a very clear mention in Resolution 789. So it's not a new story and it's not something for which the Turkish side should ask something in exchange. But because we are negotiating, it was for us important, if you like, to integrate this proposal into a broader package.

So the second element was, if you like, the implementation by Turkey of the Ankara Protocol of its customs union with the European Union. This means that Turkey has at last to comply with its European obligations which entail that it has to extend to all new member states the provisions of the customs union agreement it has with the Union. So Turkey has done so towards all member states except Cyprus. There, again, it's an obligation they have, and I mean it should go without saying again that they have to implement this obligation. Still we have included this second element in the package and were it to happen would be very, very important for both countries in terms of shipping, in terms of flights, and in terms of commercial exchanges. And certainly it would have created a win-win situation. More than that, were Turkey to implement the Ankara Protocol, immediately and certainly quasi automatically, the Council of the European Union would not have any reason to continue freezing eight chapters of the accession negotiations of Turkey which were frozen exactly because of Turkey's refusal to implement the Ankara Protocol.

For many years, when we were mentioning this to Turkey and there were behind-the-scenes efforts to have, you know, an understanding of these, Turkey was always telling us, OK, this is important, this is interesting, to have the implementation of the Ankara Protocol and the unfreezing of chapters. But it's very difficult to sell because we need also something very clear for the Turkish Cypriots and what they were alluding to was this regulation concerning direct trade between Turkish Cypriot community and the European Union. So there is a fourth element in the package which allows the use of the port of Famagusta for free movement of goods between the Turkish Cypriot community and the European Union. Of course this would require, if you like, to change the legal basis of the existing Commission proposal on this and have as a legal basis, as was the request by the Council, the Protocol 10 being the legal basis.

Now, this proposal, I mean, was discussed in the margins and as a parallel track. And in addition to these there were, you know, very sustained efforts by the government of Cyprus to create a better environment for moving forward with various issues. And you have all witnessed since last year a deliberate effort to streamline the external policy of Cyprus in order to be at the hardcore of the European Union. And we have shown also a very clear interest in participating in the Partnership for Peace. Not because it makes a lot of difference for Cyprus itself. But were this to happen, this would take out of the way the fundamental obstacle, if you like, in the relationship between NATO and the European Union. We all know that the real problem is the position of Turkey. But we were ready to help through our application to the Partnership for Peace in order to normalize, if you like, the institutional relationship between the European Union and NATO.

Unfortunately, those parallel tracks, and there are others that have to do also with a day-to-day life of the people, and there we have a series of technical committees working, and there are a lot of other efforts going on. And also a lot of work that is taking place from the part of the Commission. You know that every year the European Union spends approximately 30 million euros in order to promote reunification through the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community and for bi-communal projects. There are also other important international players that are trying to help: the United States, the European Union partners, Nordic countries – Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Other players are trying to assist in efforts to bring together, in particular the civil society, the business people, and NGOs in order to have in parallel a bottom-up approach in order to, if you like, have a real impact on what is happening at the negotiating table.

Unfortunately, as I was saying, the results until now are very, very poor. And the last example in this regard was the visit of the Vice President of the United States of America Joe Biden to Cyprus. This visit should be seen from two different angles. The one angle is bilateral angle – the relationship between Cyprus and the United States. And from this point of view it was a 100% successful visit. Joe Biden wanted to show that he has not forgotten his long-standing personal relationship with Cyprus since the early seventies and now that he is vice-president he wanted to show that he continues to be really very interested. The second element from this first angle is that Joe Biden very clearly and publicly made a mention of Cyprus as a strategic partner of the United States. The third element is that he went even beyond and he mentioned Cyprus as a leading strategic partner of the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean, which shows how much importance the United States attach to the changing environment in the Eastern Mediterranean, the new prospects that are opening with energy and gas, and the fluidity, the political fluidity in the countries of the region, developments in Iraq, in Syria, in Lebanon, in Egypt, in Libya, you know, the need to increase the energy security for the European Union, etc. So this was the first angle.

But then when it comes to the second angle which was a very strong effort on his part to try and do exactly what I was telling you in the beginning: to funnel into the negotiating process this dynamic. There was a complete failure. A complete failure because of the very clear refusal of the Turkish Cypriot leadership to engage, or to accept the slightest meaningful confidence-building measure, or to change anything from their previous positions, to the extent that we had to organize a kind of artificial choreography at the end of the dinner with the two leaders, where Joe Biden had to say alone what the American policy on Cyprus was, because Dr. Eroğlu wouldn't accept even to have Joe Biden stating the American position in his presence. This is why Joe Biden at the end spoke about the support of the United States to confidence-building measures, both

political, but also possibly financial. The support of the United States to every effort that will help the reunification, again through political support and through financial support, and that they want the Famagusta package to move forward, and many other things. But we cannot say that he managed to extract any agreement during this visit concerning the Cyprus problem. We're not going to give up, neither ourselves nor, I hope, the United States and other friends that are acting as friends of the Good Offices Mission. We shouldn't give any idea or belief that the way, you know, the United States or other players are behaving is to supplement or to replace the effort of the United Nations. The effort for the settlement of the Cyprus problem remains within the framework of the good offices mission of the Secretary General of the United Nations who works with the leaders of the two communities. But other important international players are acting as friends of the Good Offices Mission and they come to assist and help the process in moving forward.

This is what happened, if you recall, in the final phase of adopting the joint communique where we had a kind of shuttle diplomacy by the Undersecretary of State Victoria Nuland. And this is what Vice-President Biden tried to do during his visit in Cyprus, and this is what we expect in the near future the Secretary of State John Kerry to continue doing. And as far as we are concerned, we are really determined to do our utmost in order to move forward. But as I was saying, I shouldn't be honest if I were not to repeat the warning that the risk to face a wall if we don't manage in the coming weeks to overcome these difficulties concerning presenting position papers and, you know, showing flexibility on all aspects of all issues.

So with this I will stop here. I am of course at your disposal for any questions you might have.

PRESENTATION*

Klearchos A. Kyriakides**

23 July 2014

Guardians of Fundamental Rights or Servants of the New State of Affairs: The Proper Role of Judges in a Post-Settlement Cyprus

Good afternoon everybody. Thank you very much for the warm introduction and I'm very pleased to be once again here at ERPIC's headquarters in order to give a talk on a topic of enormous importance. And the title I've chosen goes to the very essence of what is going on here in Cyprus in the negotiations that have resumed.

The title I've given the talk is "Guardians of Fundamental Rights or Servants of the New State of Affairs? The Proper Role of Judges in a Post-Settlement Cyprus". I'd like to begin by referring to the remarks of the Chief Justice of New Zealand, of all places. In a lecture she gave at the University of Auckland in July 2010, Dame Sian Elias, the Chief Justice of New Zealand, chose as her principal theme the interconnectedness of the three branches of the legal profession, which she described as teachers, judges and practitioners of law. And in that context Chief Justice Elias assess the influence of the thinking coming out of the law schools and explained that academic lawyers have a greater freedom than others involved in the development of the law. Academic lawyers have the freedom to identify the questions that must be asked. A little later in her lecture Chief Justice Elias asserted that the academic lawyer has the ambitious task of looking to the whole of a particular issue. And no less importantly, the legal academic has the duty to act as one of the guardians of the rationality of the law, with the weighty consequential responsibility of providing a reality check whenever the need arises.

Now, as a legal academic I'm honored to assume the responsibilities identified by Chief Justice Elias over in New Zealand. However, as a non-practicing solicitor and member of the legal profession in England, I'm also mindful of the warning issued on the 18th of April of last year by Lord Judge, the then head of the judiciary of England and Wales at the Commonwealth law conference. According to Lord Judge, we must never take the rule of law for granted. Never, ever. We as lawyers have the trained eyes to see and the trained lips to voice the alarm signals. We have a particular responsibility to be vigilant.

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

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It's sometimes said that the Cyprus question involves a battle between 40,000 Turkish troops and 40,000 Greek Cypriot lawyers. That's a rather simplistic assertion, but it does draw attention to the fact that if you are engaged in a battle, and you have limited weapons at your disposal - weapons in the hard sense of the word - the law is often your best weapon of choice. Although the two, I would submit, should go hand in hand, at least in this part of the world, in the specific context of this part of the world. And I'm not an advocate of aggression, I'm an advocate of the use of military forces in the self-defense capacity as a main principle.

Now, with those preliminary remarks behind me, let me now turn to the substance of my talk which is to address three interconnected questions. The first is: has the judiciary of the Republic of Cyprus, or indeed any citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, been formally consulted or otherwise folded into the ongoing negotiations to compose the constitutional and legal instruments designed to settle the Cyprus question, and if not, why not? Secondly, what role should be accorded to the judiciary in a post-settlement Cyprus? And thirdly, which constitutional and justice-related questions should form the subject matter of what I would hope will become a proper and transparent consultation exercise? Now, I'm going to split this up into three parts and perhaps we can have a brief discussion at the end of each.

The first question: has the judiciary or the citizens of the Republic been formally consulted about or otherwise folded into the ongoing negotiations? Well, as far as I'm aware - and I'm only an outsider peering in - the answer to that question would appear to be in the negative. And that begs... And if my assumption is correct, than that, I would submit, is contrary to the requirements and expectations of the separation of powers as a constitutional principle. In the American and the British constitutional traditions that I'm more familiar with in view of my background, the separation of powers owes its philosophical origins to the works of writers such as Aristotle, Lock, Montesquieu, as well as the founding fathers of the United States. But here in Cyprus - notwithstanding the defects of its constitution of 1960 and its centuries of imperial rule where there was a concentration of powers rather than a separation of powers - here in Cyprus the separation of powers now forms an integral part of the constitutional arrangements of the Republic of Cyprus. Indeed, in a Supreme Court case dating back to 1981, the Supreme Court of Cyprus referred to the separation of powers - that is to say between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government - as a principle that pervades our system of law and finds expression in the constitution. Now, the point I'm making is that the separation of powers requires each branch of government to pay due respect to the other branches of government. And it's in that context that I would argue that the judiciary without becoming politicized should nonetheless be accorded a proper role in the settlement process, albeit in a consultative capacity. In other words, the judiciary - if it's not already being consulted - should be formally consulted. What is clear is that not only do many people such as me have profound concerns about the substance of what is being negotiated. We also have concerns about the procedure which has been adopted with a view to resulting in a comprehensive settlement. So these initial remarks I'm going to make now concern the procedural defect.

I've written about this before, I've published articles on this topic before. And I'm only now going to just summarize my main arguments. What seems clear is that the head of the executive branch of government here in the Republic of Cyprus President Anastasiades has assumed the mantle of the leader of the Greek Cypriot community. And he has entered into negotiations with Dr. Eroglu who is described as the leader of the Turkish Cypriots. The process is being conducted in secret, and it's been conducted behind closed doors, and it's been conducted without any public

participation. That is problematical philosophically, if one reads the works of, say, Aristotle. He makes a very important point: for the citizens to have confidence in the constitution they should have a say in its composition, and they should have an affinity with what is produced ostensibly to govern them and the institutions that will govern them. And that has been absent from Cyprus throughout the decades. But indeed, it's absent throughout the century. Every time there's been a turning point in the constitutional history of Cyprus, the decisions have been taken by members of the executive branch of government, of one state or another, and the people. And indeed, the judges on the island have been shut out of the decision-making process. Now that is problematical, it's problematical for a number of reasons. It brings to mind the remarks of - in a different context - but of Judge Damon J. Keith in the United States case where he said that democracies died behind closed doors. Republic of Cyprus, let's remember, is a democracy. It's a state, sovereign state, which is part of the European Union, part of the Commonwealth, part of the United Nations. It's a country whose constitution rests on the separation of powers and the rule of law, and yet its constitutional future is being decided, it seems, behind closed doors, subject, eventually, to public participation in the form of a double referendum.

That's deeply troubling. But it's key in keeping with the philosophy of the negotiations, the top-down philosophy of the negotiations. In fact, when the concerns such as the ones I just raised were put to the minister for Europe in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office back in 2009, the minister gave these concerns short shrift. This is what the minister said: "I know that some people get depressed and some of the media get a bit angry because they think that the talks are happening in private and in secret. But sometimes talks of this nature which are very sensitive grow a bit like mushrooms. They grow best in the dark." Well, events since 2009 when those remarks were issued have exposed the fallacy inherent in the British ministerial pronouncement. By the same token, people such as me are being spectacularly unsuccessful in attempting to change the philosophy of the negotiations from the top down to the bottom up. And as a consequence, we are where we are and the negotiations are taking place in strict secrecy with next to no, if no participation by the public whatsoever.

Now, this is not only in keeping with history, it's also in keeping with what's being described as - I always have difficulty pronouncing this word - consociational democracy. If I go back to that one of the seminal articles written by Arend Lijphart - the academic who's often associated with this concept - if we look at one of his articles in *World Politics* in January 1969, Lijphart describes consociational democracy as "government by elite cartel" designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy." I'm struck by his use of the phrase "government by elite cartel". It's instructive to what's happening here in Cyprus today. The leaders of "two communities" have come together in secret as if they are operating a cartel to fix their common futures in defiance of - I would add - the demographic realities all around them and in the absence of any meaningful participation by citizens or the leaders of other communities lawfully residing in the Republic of Cyprus. And that is something - I'm going to skip over a lot of what I've written down - that, I would submit, is contrary to the modern approach towards decision-making in Europe and in the wider liberal democratic world. In the modern liberal democratic world decisions are normally taken after a transparent and proper consultation process involving all citizens and all stakeholders in the society. And that would include in appropriate cases members of the judiciary. And indeed - I won't go into this in any detail now - there is even legislation, or there is even international treaty law which promotes the concept of public participation in decision-making. An example is the Aarhus Convention relating to environmental matters which actually makes it a legal requirement in appropriate

circumstances for proper consultation to take place prior to any decision being taken. And indeed, the Treaty on the European Union expressly says in article 1 that the Treaty - this is the Treaty on European Union, the founding treaty of the organization that Cyprus is now part of - "this Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen." Well, that principle which is embedded in article 1 of the Treaty does not seem to be operating properly here in Cyprus.

So to sum up, what am I asserting in this first part of this talk? I'm asserting that whatever is decided in the substantive negotiations should be preceded by a proper and transparent consultation exercise open to all, and as part of that consultation exercise the judiciary of the Republic of Cyprus should be properly consulted over its future and over the future make-up of the judiciary of the Republic.

And at that point I'm going to pause and ask if there are any questions. They may not be, but if there are, I'm willing to take them. Should I press on then? That takes me now to the second question which actually goes to the nub of the matter: what role should be accorded to the judiciary in a post-settlement Cyprus? It's a straightforward question but it does not elicit a correspondingly straightforward answer. My background is from the English legal tradition, and more broadly what might be described as the democratic tradition of open, liberal democracies which respect the rule of law and have a long tradition of respecting the rule of law - although that doesn't always function in all cases, as we know. So my approach is very much determined by my own professional and academic background. And with that in mind, a useful starting point would surely be to acknowledge that in any open liberal democracy which respects separation of powers and the rule of law, the judiciary constitutes one of the three branches of government. Now, in this part of the world, in the Eastern Mediterranean, it's normally being the executive branch of government that has been the dominant actor. And sometimes, as we've seen in the dictatorships in the Eastern Mediterranean, the executive branch of government is also simultaneously the legislative branch of government - or controls the legislative branch of government - and the judiciary is very much populated by puppets of the executive branch, or of the dictator, as the case may be. So there is not a long-standing tradition in the Eastern Mediterranean of judges exercising the independence and the authority that they have in other parts of the world. One might argue that Israel is an exception to that rule in the post-independence era. But even when the British were in control of this part of the world, they didn't properly respect the separation of powers. The governor, for example, not only exercised executive power, but he also exercised legislative power, and he had a strong influence over, at the very least, the appointment of judges in British colonial Cyprus. So there isn't a long-standing tradition of respect for the separation of powers or indeed for the concept of judicial independence, which is an essential manifestation of the separation of powers. But if there is to be a settlement of the Cyprus question, then a starting point must surely be that the separation of powers must exist and that the judiciary must be implanted within the separation of powers as one of the three branches of government, and it should be independent of the other two.

As to the primary duties of judges in open liberal democracies, these were neatly articulated in a lecture delivered in 1998 by the honorable Murray Gleeson, the then Chief Justice of Australia. Chief Justice Gleeson observed that judges maintain the rule of law, uphold the constitution and administer civil and criminal justice according to law. In turn, these duties hinge upon the independence, impartiality and integrity of the judiciary as part of the separation of powers. So

we come back to the separation of powers, and according to Chief Justice Gleeson, although judges are servants of the public, they are not public servants. The duty of a judge is to administer justice according to law without fear or favor, and without regard to the wishes or policy of the executive government. And that's a principle that is of crucial importance, but with regret it is not properly understood, let alone properly applied in large parts of the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East.

So if there is to be a settlement of the Cyprus question one would hope that those principles which are already by and large respected within the Republic of Cyprus today will find their way into the judiciary and into the governmental arrangements of a post-settlement Cyprus. The snag is - and there are a number of snags - but the fundamental snag is what do we mean by justice and what do we mean by law? And that is what the negotiations in Nicosia are in part turning around. And there is a difference of approach. I'm hesitant to use the phrase "clash of civilizations" and I'm not going to use that phrase, but I would submit that there is a "clash of values". And the "clash of values" is reflected in the different approaches to the role of the judiciary.

Now, I'm not privy to the documents that are being negotiated in Nicosia, but I do have access to the ill-fated Annan Plan of 2004 which was cobbled together, again, in secret and published by the United Nations in various stages culminating in the publication of the 31st of March 2004. And within the Annan Plan one finds an extraordinary provision which I understand is lying at the heart of the discussions in Nicosia which are taking place today. And this is a provision which flies in the face of the separation of powers doctrine. This was article 6.3 of the main articles of the ill-fated Annan Plan. And under this provision, "The Supreme Court shall, inter alia, resolve disputes between the constituent states or between one or both of them and the federal government, and resolve on an interim basis deadlocks within federal institutions if this is indispensable to the proper functioning of the federal government," that is to say the executive branch. Now, if that provision had come into force - and thankfully it was not - it would have exposed post-2004 Cyprus to a potentially divisive and devastating set of consequences. And it is frightening to think - and I hope that this is not taking place - it is frightening to think that a provision such as that is lying at the heart of the negotiations in Nicosia.

Now, why should the judiciary be kept out of politics? Why should the judiciary be kept out of assuming the role that should properly be fulfilled by either the legislature or by the executive? Well, again, one only needs to read the works of Aristotle, or Lock, or Montesquieu to understand. I'll just read to you what James Madison wrote in one of the *Federalist Papers*. Madison was one of the founding fathers of the United States and indeed its fourth president. Madison advised that the accumulation of all powers, be they legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. So the concentration of powers results in tyranny. The separation of powers prevents tyranny from arising - that's the constitutional and philosophical theory underpinning the separation of powers doctrine.

In the 20th century in a case that reached the Privy Council - that's a court in London that has jurisdiction over some parts of the Commonwealth, and some parts of what's left of the British Empire - in 1957 Lord Simmons stated in one of those Privy Council cases: "In a federal system," so this is relevant to Cyprus because there's a reference here to a federal system, "In a Federal system, the absolute independence of the Judiciary is the bulwark of the Constitution against encroachment whether by the Legislature or by the Executive." And this is the key point: "To vest in the same body executive and judicial power is to remove a vital constitutional safeguard."

I can go on. In the United States Supreme Court case of *Mistretta and the United States*, Associate Justice Blackmun declared that “The legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship. That reputation may not be borrowed by the political branches,” that is to say the executive and the legislative, “to cloak their work in the neutral colors of judicial action.” So the legitimacy of the judiciary would be undermined if they were accorded powers that related to the executive.

And there's a fourth reason - there are many, but I'll just finally draw your attention to the fourth reason - and that's simply that judges are not qualified to enter the sphere of policymaking, especially at executive level. In the words of dissenting judgment in this Canadian Supreme Court case, which has been subsequently cited with approval, for example in the English case of *A and others v. Home Secretary*, “Courts are specialists in the protection of liberty and the interpretation of legislation, so judges are therefore well placed a subjective careful scrutiny items of legislation such as criminal justice legislation. But on the other hand,” and this is the crucial point, “courts are not specialists in the realm of policymaking, nor should they be.”

So to sum, the Annan Plan was in part predicated on a provision which envisaged the judiciary in the Supreme Court assuming executive and other non-judicial functions. That provision flew in the face of thousands of years of constitutional and legal practice, which is predicated on the separation of powers. And if, if the current negotiations are built around the premise that the Supreme Court should be given what is described as tiebreaking executive or legislative functions, then that would be dangerous for a number of different reasons, including the four that I've highlighted in my analysis so far. So to sum up, Cyprus should not be the exception. Why should Cyprus be the exception? Cyprus should fall within the mainstream of open, liberal democratic constitutionalism, and the judiciary should exercise a judicial function and should not, under any circumstances, be given executive or legislative powers. To do so would fly in the face of history and it would fly in the face of legal and constitutional theory.

Another major function of the judiciary, therefore, is to perform judicial functions. But there are a couple of other major functions of the judiciary that I want to just dwell upon in the last few minutes of this talk. And this takes me to the question that I've put in the title of the talk: should the judges of a post-settlement Cyprus be the guardians of fundamental rights, or will they become the servants of the new state of affairs? Now, in a normal constitutional set up the judiciary will indeed perform both of those duties because it's the duty of the judiciary to protect fundamental rights and uphold the constitution. The problem in Cyprus is that there is an attempt to reach a settlement - as I understand it - there is an attempt to reach an Anan Plan's style settlement which will erode fundamental rights, or make those fundamental rights subject to derogations, but at the same time ensure that the judges are there to enforce this new state of affairs which is predicated on the undermining of rights.

I return to the mainstream, the mainstream approach in Western, or open liberal democracies. What is the position in open liberal democracies? The point was eloquently made by Mr. Justice Elias - as Lord Justice Elias was then known - in the English High Court case of, ironically enough, *Elias and Secretary of State for Defense*. According to Mr. Justice Elias, the courts are the guardians of fundamental rights. When the same case reached the court of appeal, the Court of Appeal proclaimed a very similar - in the words of Lady Justice Arden - in their capacity as guardians of the rule of law, judges have a responsibility to ensure that the government respects the rights of individuals conferred by the law. So the judiciary performs this vital function as the guardian of fundamental rights. And I deliberately use the phrase fundamental rights, because in

Cyprus the citizens are not solely endowed with human rights flowing from the European Convention. The citizens of Cyprus are also endowed with fundamental rights flowing from European Union law, flowing from the constitution of 1960, flowing from legislation, and flowing from the principles of the common law and equity, which now form part of the case law of the Republic of Cyprus. So that's why I use the phrase "fundamental rights". And I won't read from separate case law which I'm not an expert on, but as I understand it, the case law of the Republic of Cyprus confirms that the judges here in the republic regard themselves as being very much guardians of fundamental rights.

And now we come to the crux, the crux of the whole matter. Will the judges of a post-settlement Cyprus be the guardians of the existing fundamental rights of the citizens and other lawful residents of the Republic of Cyprus? Or will the judges be the guardians of a new state of affairs which curtails existing fundamental rights? I return to the theme I touched on earlier. This is an issue that reflects the clash of values that is regrettably being seen in Nicosia. There is a clash of values: on the one hand we have what I would hope is an approach that's rooted in the mainstream, open liberal democratic tradition that the European Union proclaims to be part of, and the Republic of Cyprus is a part of, and on the other hand we have an approach that reflects the statism inherent in the principles of Atatürk and in the constitution of Turkey, and the top-down governmental approach that regrettably prevails in large parts of the Eastern Mediterranean. Now we have some documentary evidence to support the assertion that fundamental rights are at risk. I only need to refer you to the Annan Plan of 2004 - the ill-fated Annan Plan - and documents such as the ill-fated proposal for an active adaptation of the terms of accession of the United Cyprus Republic to the European Union - a document dated 16th of April 2004 which thankfully didn't come to fruition because of the outcome of the so-called double referendum in Cyprus back in 2004. The Annan Plan sought to enshrine a system of apartheid in the Republic of Cyprus. And the negotiations going on in Nicosia today could very well be premised on the same objective. But of course we don't have access to the relevant documents, so we don't know for certain. And for that reason we have to resort to something that I find a little bit uncomfortable doing, and that is drawing upon the leaks from the American embassy which have been published by WikiLeaks. I'm only going to refer you to one document published by WikiLeaks in May 2009. And this concerns a conversation that was had by the American ambassador in the Republic of Cyprus with the ambassador of Turkey to the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". And this is what this cable supposedly says: "On bizonality, a key T/C demand, he thought there would be 'no residential mixing'," no residential mixing, "of Turkish and Greek Cypriots post-solution." He quickly clarified his comments, however, stating that there would be "ceilings" that limited G/C settlement in a future T/C constituent state." "Ceilings" are exactly what this draft act of adaptation from 2004 and the Annan plan both envisaged.

Beside this text in the WikiLeaks document, an American embassy official has added a note in brackets which reveals the following: "Our pro-solution T/C contacts, both in Talat's office" - the then Turkish Cypriot leader - "and the [so-called] 'TRNC MFA', claim that Turkey wants as ethnically pure a T/C constituent state as possible, even if this means giving up more territory in return." Now, I pause for a moment here to make two major observations. The first is that in Australia, which is a federation many times larger than Cyprus, the constitution - as I understand it - guarantees personal freedom of movement between the states without burden or restriction. The constitution also guarantees freedom of interstate trade and commerce. They have none of those Annan Plan-style restrictions. That the constitution of Australia - a federation - can provide

such guarantees, why should the constitution of a post-settlement Cyprus do anything less?

The second point I wish to make is to do with morality. Leave aside the law and the constitutional practice in other parts of the world. This is not a question of law, this is a question of morality. This is a question of ethics. This is a question of history. Does Cyprus want to discard one of the central lessons of history, which is that the law should exist to empower citizens, to constrain the government, and to promote justice, or does Cyprus wish to do the opposite? I am reminded of the eloquent remarks of United States Supreme Court Justice Brandeis who said that “if we desire respect for the law, we must first make the law respectable.” In my view, any constitutional settlement that restricts fundamental rights in the way that the Annan Plan tried to restrict fundamental rights, and any plan which is predicated on segregation, apartheid, or any other such practices, would be disrespectful, and it would be unjust. And on the 50th anniversary of the granting of the Nobel Peace Prize to Dr. Martin Luther King, and on the 50th anniversary of the United States Civil Rights Act, I wish to draw your attention to the memorable words of Dr. Martin Luther King in his letter from Birmingham jail of the 16th of April 1963. He attempted to address a question: how does one determine whether a law is just or unjust? He replied:

“A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas, an unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law.”

By contrast, any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that degrades human personality is unjust. And in that context, Martin Luther King referred to some legislation in the United States as falling within the definition what he described as a segregation statute. And regrettably, the Annan Plan - ill-fated though it is - was in my view a segregation statute. And Cyprus should not build its constitutional future on a segregation statute, or a segregation constitution. Dr. Martin Luther King put his finger on it:

“All segregation statutes are unjust because segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality. It gives the segregator a false sense of superiority and the segregated a false sense of inferiority.”

Segregation ends up relegating persons to the status of things, hence

“Segregation is not only politically economically and sociologically unsound, it is morally wrong and sinful too.”

I return to the point about rights. And I'm going to just read to you... I'm going to move slowly to the conclusion, but I'll read to you what Lord Sumption, a British Supreme Court judge said a short while ago: “Rights are necessarily claims against the claimant's own community,” he wasn't talking about Cyprus of course, but he made a very important point, “Rights are necessarily claims against the claimant's own community. [And] In a democracy, rights depend for their legitimacy on a measure of recognition by that community.” What Lord Sumption teaches us with those remarks is that rights in favor of citizens act as constraints upon the state, and in a true democracy recognition of rights by everybody, including those in power, conveys legitimacy upon those rights. We have a clash of values in Nicosia. Regrettably, the spirit, and the philosophy, and the ideology from Turkey is not predicated on the empowerment of the citizen and the constraining of the state, but it's the other way around: it's about the empowerment of the state and the disempowerment of the citizen. And you end up having a discussion of

constitutional quagmire in Nicosia, which is predicated on how to put together a segregation statute: an unjust law, a law which would degrade the human personality in the interests of a perceived political outcome.

All of this is - if I can just put this to you - contrary to the fundamental principles and values and ethics of open liberal democracies, as reflected in the preamble and opening articles of the Treaty on European Union, which Republic of Cyprus is part of. And I just put on this slide of - I'm going to show you a handful of slides today. There's a recognition that many of these fundamental principles of open liberal democracies owe their origins to ancient Athens, and they're reflected in the symbols of the West: the Greek letter Omega which is the symbol of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, and in the architectural design of the White House. These are the principles: the rule of law, ethics, justice, equity, fairness, dignity, equality, human rights and responsibilities, fundamental rights, liberty under the law, democracy, competition, the free market, social justice, consultation, transparency, accountability, separation of powers, checks and balances, and so on. These are the principles that any settlement - I would hope - is to be built upon. Not the unjust legal premise that is an unjust segregation statute.

And that takes me back to the judiciary. What then is to be the proper role of judges in a post-settlement Cyprus? It can only be as guardian of fundamental rights.

And let me just make a very important supplementary point here: I'm not just talking about grand constitutional theory, I'm also talking about harsh commercial realities. The rule of law does not just exist for the refugee, doesn't just exist for the defendant who is in court proceedings: it exists for everybody, including business. Since 1974, Cyprus has developed itself as a commercial hub, as a shipping center, as a banking institution - it has a very important financial role in the world. And fundamental rights exist as much for corporations and for other financial entities, as for the private individual or for the refugee. And that point is recognized by the judiciary around the world. And indeed, just a few days ago - if I can just find the words - just a few days ago the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales Lord Thomas made this very point on the 9th of July:

"I think,"

he's addressing judges here,

"I think we sometimes do not make it sufficiently clear that through developing the law and vindicating rights, whether they are private or public, our judicial system provides the sheer framework through which our society, its commerce, its industry can flourish, our freedoms can be protected, and the rule of law can be upheld."

So an additional fundamental role of judges in protecting fundamental rights is to ensure that business can conduct its affairs, is to ensure that contracts can be enforced. It's to ensure that a potential foreign investor who wants to come and spend money in Cyprus, or buy into a particular industry, or to support a particular enterprise, has confidence that they will be entitled to broadly the same rights as they will have in England, in Scotland, in Germany, in France, in Spain, in Portugal, in Slovakia, in Slovenia, in Lithuania and elsewhere in the European Union. It's a very important point. And it's something that the judges in England keep on telling us: that they are not just there to support the small man - although that is a crucial role that they perform. They are also there to support big business, and in the event of a dispute to ensure that the rule of law and the principles of justice are applied fairly and properly, without fear or favor.

So that brings me now to my conclusions. And I'm not going to read out to you what I've done in the third part of this talk, but I'll just summarize it. There needs to be a proper consultation exercise in Cyprus, so that the population of this island and everybody who has a stake in its future, can - including the judiciary - can contribute to it. In my paper - which I haven't yet published, but which will emerge from this talk - I've jotted down about forty or so questions which should form part of any consultation exercise relating to the constitutional and justice-related questions that emerged from this talk. And I would submit that a consultation exercise is not just important, it's not just important for the purposes of going through the motions of giving the citizens a role in the decision-making process. Consultation is also important to help the decision makers - the people engaged in the negotiations - to come up with better decisions that they would otherwise come up with, to fine-tune some of their ideas, and to give legitimacy - most importantly - to give legitimacy to the process.

Now, of these forty questions, let me just give you six as a sample. The most important question at the heart of any consultation exercise should go to the very essence of the Cyprus question: what should be the objective of the negotiations? Should it be to have a bi-zonal bi-communal federation consisting of two political equal communities? And as far as I'm aware, that question has not ever been put to consultation. It was the subjective of the referendum in 2004, but it hasn't been put to a referendum. A second fundamental initial question that should be addressed is: bearing in mind the checkered history of federations around the world, and bearing in mind the disintegration of so many federations, is it really wise for the Republic of Cyprus to reconstitute itself as a federation? Now, bear in mind there will be three judiciaries in a post-settlement Cyprus, three executive branches of government, three legislatures. There will be presumably three ombudsmen, there'll be three chiefs of police, there might be three chiefs of the Inland Revenue or whatever the tax raising authority is here. How many layers of bureaucracy are there going to be? How many instruments of bureaucracy are there going to be? And is it really sensible, bearing in mind the financial crash that they had here last year? Is it really sensible to build the constitutional future of Cyprus upon a bloated public sector? A third question which goes to the very essence of any constitution that is established: what is to be the primary purpose of the legal and constitutional text? What's to be the starting point? Is the starting point to be - as in the United States' constitution - to empower the people, and to empower the individual citizen? Or is the primary purpose and starting point to be the empowerment of the state? And if it's to be the empowerment of the state, what do we mean by the state? Do you mean the federal government? Should that be the primary objective of empowerment, or should it be the two constituent state governments? These questions are too fundamental - I would submit - to be decided upon behind closed doors in strict secrecy by politicians with their diplomatic and other advisers.

Now, I won't go through the other thirty seven or so questions I've posed, but let me just throw out three which I think are particularly important to the judiciary. What is to be the relationship between the various courts within a post-settlement Cyprus? What is to be the relationship between one another? Is the Republic of Cyprus or a post-settlement Cyprus going to retain the common law and the principles of equity? What is going to happen to the case law of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Cyprus before a settlement? Is that case law going to be binding upon the courts of a post-settlement Cyprus? What about the 'case law' of the 'courts' of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'? Is that case law going to have any weight in a post-settlement Cyprus? If so, what will happen if the Supreme Court of the Republic of Cyprus before the settlement says 'A', and the 'case law' of the 'TRNC' says something different? Which will prevail?

These are rather technical questions, but they ought to be the subject of a proper and transparent consultation exercise. They should be discussed and the public should be aware. These are the questions that should be discussed now, before a settlement, not after a settlement, because if you start having these discussions after a settlement, you're into the realms of deadlock or potential deadlock and crisis.

So that's just a flavor of some of the questions that need to be put to a consultation exercise. And I'll just ask one more actually, there is one that caught my eye. Should Cyprus be subject to (inaudible) or post-settlement Cyprus retain what I understand they currently now have in Nicosia, which are the twin principles of constitutional review and judicial review? If so, how is constitutional review going to arise? How is judicial review going to arise? Is there going to be a system of legal aid? Who is going to administer the legal aid system? Who is going to pay for the legal aid system? Who is going to be entitled to legal aid? These questions which lawyers deal with on a day-to-day basis have to be addressed as part of a consultation exercise.

So I conclude. I've tried to make three fundamental points in this talk. The first is that there must be a proper and transparent consultation exercise, involving the judiciary. The second point I've tried to make is that the judiciary should play a central role in a post settlement Cyprus, but as part of a proper separation of powers and as part of a constitutional architecture, which protects the existing fundamental rights of Cypriots and all other lawful residents here in Cyprus, and indeed of anybody else who has any involvement in Cyprus. But thirdly, the law is one thing. Ethics, and justice, and values are another thing. But in the context of Cyprus they go hand in hand. The law - I would suggest - must be just, must be seen to be just, and it must be seen to be legitimate. And the only way you can do that is if you have a proper consultation exercise and have the population properly and adequately involved in the decision-making process. Otherwise, you will end up with a top-down settlement, and you will end up with a set of constitutional texts, which even if implemented and approved in a double referendum, will lack the legitimacy that is necessary to ensure the viability of a sovereign state. Which is - I would hope - a member of the liberal democratic world. And on that note I will draw this talk to a close.

Thank you.

ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION*

Klearchos A. Kyriakides**

22 September 2014

Scotland and the Slippery Slope from Devolution to the Independence Referendum and Beyond: The Lessons to be Learnt and their Revelavce to Cyprus and Its Fellow Members

I believe it customary to make a declaration of interest at the beginning of any talk so I shall make a declaration of interest. I have participated actively in two referendum campaigns. The first was in 2004 here in Cyprus, a campaign in favor of a 'no' vote, but I didn't have a vote here in Cyprus as a British citizen. And the second occasion I became actively involved in a referendum campaign was this year - in fact over the last few weeks - in relation to Scotland, and I had no vote there either, even though I was a British citizen. So let me just lay my cards on the table straight away.

Scotland, ladies and gentlemen, which is the northern part of the United Kingdom, may be situated in northwest Europe and form part of an island, but in more ways than one Scotland has nonetheless left its imprint on the Eastern Mediterranean, and indeed vice versa. I can spend an hour talking about the connections between Scotland and Cyprus but, I'll limit myself to just forty five minutes or so and I'll just say this by way of introduction. Here in Cyprus just think of the connections between Cyprus and Scotland. We have a coastal district of Larnaca known as Mackenzie Beach, the Troodos Mountains are graced by the Caledonian Falls - Caledonia being the ancient Roman name for Scotland - and everywhere you go in Cyprus, especially the bars and restaurants, you can drink fine Scotch whisky. As for the Scottish expats, that's for those Scottish people who left Scotland to live elsewhere, Cyprus is populated by large numbers of Scots. And I understand there is even a Caledonian Society of Cyprus. There is even, as I understand, a shop in Paphos that sells kilts and other Scottish costumes. Now, I don't know if there's a shop in Edinburgh which sells the vraka - the Cypriot costume - but Cypriots have nonetheless left their mark on Scotland. My godfather is here and his son is an eminent surgeon and indeed a consultant surgeon at a hospital in Edinburgh. Other Cypriots have left their mark as well. Most famous is perhaps Sir Reo Stakis, the businessman who was heavily involved in property, in hotels in Scotland. So there is a commercial and professional connection between Scotland and Cyprus.

* *Transcript of oral presentation.*

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Let me now just zoom in on the precise subject matter of this presentation. I'm going to skate over the recent constitutional history of Cyprus and then dwell on what I would call the five core lessons - there are others - but five core lessons of history that we can draw from this British experience and Scotland and apply here in Cyprus, and indeed other parts of the European Union and beyond for that matter as well.

First of all, the history. On Thursday 18th of September, that is to say last Thursday, a referendum was held in Scotland but not in the rest of the United Kingdom. The referendum invited approximately 4.2 million registered voters to provide an answer to a seemingly straightforward question. The question was this: do you think that Scotland should be an independent country? In other words, if I can use Cypriot political terminology here, voters were given a stark choice between voting 'yes' with a view to procuring the partition of United Kingdom by means of Scottish independence, or voting 'no' with a view to prolonging the 307-year-old union, or "enosis", between Scotland and the United Kingdom. The referendum was planned to be determined in accordance with the principle of majoritarian democracy, that is to say by a simple majority of voters in Scotland voting one way or the other. The official result was announced by the Chief Counting Officer of Scotland - note the phrase "Chief Counting Officer of Scotland", not "Chief Counting Officer of the United Kingdom" - the official result was to be announced, or was announced by the Chief Counting Officer of Scotland on the morning of Friday the 19th of September last week. A total, and astonishing total of 84.6% of eligible voters cast their votes. Of these, 1.6 million, or 44.7% voted "yes" in favor of independence, and 2 million, or 55.3% voted "no", that is to say in favor of the maintenance of the United Kingdom. This was hailed by some as a reasonably decisive outcome in favor of the union, but of course Mr. Salmond, the leader of the Scottish National Party and outgoing First Minister of Scotland, stated that the Scottish nationalists have just fallen short of independence but he heavily hinted that another opportunity might arise in the not-too-distant future.

Now, I think it's important to understand how and why the Scottish referendum actually took place. Because we can learn lessons from the mistakes that were made by the British political establishment across the three main parties, particularly in the Labour Party in the 1990s and 2000s, and more laterally by the Conservative Party in coalition with the Liberal Democrats. So let me sketch out the history.

I'll say at the very outset in terms of the history that the referendum and the related rise of Scottish nationalism which preceded the referendum were the byproducts or what one might call the unintended consequences of a radical and multidimensional program of constitutional reform which was introduced on a case-by-case, step-by-step basis by Tony Blair when he served as prime minister from 1997 until 2007. This program included the establishment of what became known as devolved organs of government in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland pursuant to legislation dating from 1998. Now, what devolution means I'll explain in more detail later. It's not exactly the same as federation, but it's something similar to federation. It involves the transfer of power from the central organs of government in London to regional governments in Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland, but not England interestingly enough, not England. Now, when the idea of transferring or devolving power from London to Scotland was first fleshed out and presented to parliament in 1998, the then Labor government proclaimed that this act of devolution was also an active democratization. Now, we're all in favor of democracy I hope, but as we'll discover democracy can sometimes backfire on those who try and promote it.

Now, as the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has pointed out in a case known as *Martin and Her Majesty's Advocate*, the Scotland Act of 1998 which introduced devolution in Scotland is a monumental piece of constitutional legislation. Remember, in the United Kingdom we don't have a single book or booklet known as the British constitution. We have a scattering of documents that collectively form part of the constitution. Some of those documents are acts of parliament, others are court decisions, others are constitutional conventions, that is to say unwritten laws that are not enforceable at courts, but they are customs and traditions that have evolved over the years. So it is a monumental piece of legislation.

You may not be able to see this in all parts of the room, but I'll summarize what's on the screen there. That is taken from a parliamentary - forgive me - a British governmental publication. What devolution did was, it ensured that on the one hand there was a transfer of power from London to Edinburgh in relation to fields such as education, agriculture, fishing, crime, emergency services, some features of transport and so on. But on the other hand, certain reserved powers were left in the hands of the institutions of government in London. The reserved powers included those to do with defense, the armed forces and, crucially, taxation. That was the original idea in 1998 with the Scotland Act. We had a new Scotland Act in 2012 which headed even further in the direction of devolution, and astonishingly enough in the last few days of the referendum campaign when one or two opinion polls suggested that the Scottish nationalists might win, the three party leaders in London came together and issued what they called a vow - a promise - to transfer even more powers from London to Scotland. And if those promises are fulfilled, the United Kingdom is heading in the direction of federation, or quasi-federation, or what someone else has described as neo-federation. Whichever label you pin on it, the United Kingdom has changed dramatically since 1998. And if - and it's a big if - this vow is implemented, the United Kingdom will change even more as the years proceed.

I want to say a word or two about the judiciary because I am a lawyer by profession, although I'm no longer practicing. The post-1998 devolution arrangements did not generally disturb the Scottish legal system which predated the creation of the devolved organs of government in Scotland. Remember, Scotland had previously been an independent country prior to its union with the United Kingdom in 1704 after the Acts of Union of 1707, so there was a pre-existing judicial system in Scotland. Having said that, the judiciary, primarily through the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, has become the guardian of the devolution arrangements and Westminster, the Westminster Parliament in London has remained the sovereign legislature of the United Kingdom as a whole. So it's a mess, really. And this is what happens when you don't have a written constitution - number one, and number two - this is what happens when you engage in piecemeal step-by-step constitutional reform without any overarching program or system. It's very British. It's good in one sense because it allows the constitution to grow organically and that has its advantages. But on the other hand, you end up with what I will later describe as constitutional quagmire, because things have been allowed to grow in a haphazard way.

Let me now move on to more recent times. So that was what occurred in 1998. Initially Labor and the other pro-union parties, that is to say the Labor and Liberal Democrats, were able to check the Scottish National Party in the first few years of the Scottish parliament and what became the Scottish government north of what's called the "border" - the internal border between Scotland and England. The Scottish National Party led the government for a while in Scotland, but in 2011

the Scottish National Party led by an astonishing politician called Alex Salmond managed to secure an overall majority of seats in the Scottish parliament and thus the Scottish National Party was able to seize control of the Scottish government. That was in 2011. And using what he claimed to be a mandate from the electorate, Alex Salmond ran rings around Mr. Cameron - the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom - and he managed to negotiate the Edinburgh Agreement. That was an agreement between the Scottish government and the United Kingdom government. It was a government that paved the way to the independence referendum. And Mr. Cameron regrettably made a number of concessions which came very close to bringing the United Kingdom to an end. And I'll explain to you how and why that happened now before we draw some lessons which we can apply in Cyprus and elsewhere.

So one of the things that occurred was that, for example, the United Kingdom government effectively conceded control to the Scottish government over the referendum process. What did that mean in practice? It meant that the United Kingdom government recognized that there was a right to self-determination for the Scottish people, but on the other hand it meant that the Scottish government could determine what is meant by the "Scottish people" and who could vote in the referendum. And the way things unfolded meant that people called Kyriakides, and Dimitriades, and others who were not born in Scotland were given the right to vote because they happen to live and work in Scotland, and people called McDougall, or Cameron, or other Scottish names who had been born in Scotland but happened to live in England, were denied the vote. It was an astonishing state of affairs. And my university has a number of employees who are Scottish, and I spoke to a number of them in the run-up to the referendum, and they felt bitterly resentful that my relatives and friends could vote having been born in London, and they who have been born in Glasgow or Edinburgh but happened to be living in another part of the United Kingdom had been denied a vote.

The other thing that happened which was shocking, and I would argue improper, even though the relevant legislation was enacted, was that Alex Salmond - the leader of the Scottish National Party and First Minister of Scotland - managed to arrange the school children aged sixteen-seventeen to vote in the referendum. Now, in general elections in the United Kingdom you have to be eighteen and over to vote. But Alex Salmond arranged and Mr. Cameron allowed him to arrange for sixteen and seventeen-year-olds to vote. So Mr. Cameron looking back on it made concessions, and the concessions very nearly brought the United Kingdom to its end. Thankfully - and I speak as somebody who supported the "no" - thankfully 55% of Scottish voters chose to vote "no", and that is to say in favor of the union. Now, I'm not a psephologist, but I understand from the psephologists who have been commentating that it was the older voters who may have helped the United Kingdom stay in place. So the Scottish nationalists to say let's wait for those fifteen, sixteen-year-olds to become sixteen and seventeen and the older generation to pass out as it were, and then we can have a referendum in a few years' time, who knows. My point though is - this is what happens when you don't have a written constitution, you make concessions and you allow the voters in a country, or the voting system in the country to be manipulated for political ends.

Now, I'm going to draw some lessons. But I want to just preface my remarks as regards the lessons by emphasizing that there are profound differences between the north of the United Kingdom, that is to say Scotland, and the north of Cyprus, the occupied north Cyprus which is known as the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". There are crucial differences. First of all, Scotland

has previously been part of the United Kingdom. It had previously been an independent country before becoming part of the United Kingdom pursuant to a Scottish Act of Parliament. That doesn't apply in the occupied north of Cyprus. Secondly, Scotland does not have a population consisting of colonists. It may have a few illegal immigrants, but it doesn't have colonists who have been brought over in breach of the Geneva Conventions. Scotland has not been subject, at least in recent times, to any war crimes, hasn't been subject to genocide, hasn't been subject to ethnic cleansing. It has lawfully established devolved organs of government. The rule of law by and large functions and the judiciary upholds the rule of law. Alex Salmond, whatever his faults, was elected to the Scottish parliament and through the Scottish arrangements he was duly elected as the leader of the Scottish government as first minister. The government of the United Kingdom recognizes the Scottish government. That doesn't apply here with the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish-occupied north. So there are profound differences.

Nonetheless, the primary reason why I objected to both the Annan Plan and the proposed independence of Scotland was because I am against the principle of partition, whether it's partition in the form of the carving up of a single sovereign state into two, or the carving up of a sovereign state along so-called bi-zonal bi-communal federal lines, as the Annan Plan of 2004 attempted to do here in Cyprus. So there are differences between the two.

Let's now look at the lessons of history, or some of the lessons of history. And I'm going to just focus on five in the last remaining twenty minutes or so.

The first lesson of history reflects an immortal truth: if and when constitutional power is transferred away from the central government of a sovereign state to one or more regions pursuant to devolution or federalization, and if such a transfer of power is accompanied by the establishment or maintenance of an internal border of one description or another, then adverse consequences may follow. To begin with, the inhabitants on each side of that internal border may develop politically, economically and culturally in different ways, while their ties of common citizenship may become diluted and the authority of the organs of central government may be weakened. In a thoughtful article published in *The Spectator* magazine on the 13th of September - that's just a few days before the referendum - Sean Thomas articulated this truth in vivid terms which are highly relevant to Cyprus. This is what Mr. Thomas said:

“Once you put a frontier in place, then two peoples, however alike, will grow apart, even if they use the same language. A phony partition becomes a real partition overtime. Eventually the cultures diverge so far they can never be truly rejoined.”

Mr. Thomas was talking about Scotland there which is part of the United Kingdom, which shares a common language and by and large shares a common religion, although we are a multi-ethnic pluralist democracy in the United Kingdom with multiple faiths. But if the United Kingdom can grow apart from Scotland and come to the verge of partition, then I wonder what can happen here in Cyprus, if there is ever a so-called bi-zonal bi-communal federation with one side primarily speaking one language and sharing one faith, and the other side speaking another language and sharing another faith. Two sides can grow apart very, very quickly, as we've seen since 1998 in Scotland. In this context secessionist or separatist, dissolutionist movements are much more likely to come to power in countries which are divided by an internal border.

One of the interesting things about the Scottish referendum debate was the question of what would happen if there was a “yes”. It was unclear whether Scotland would secede, break away and secede, it was unclear whether Scotland and the United Kingdom would separate, and it was unclear whether or not United Kingdom would have to be dissolved with two new states emerging in their place. You had similar arguments here, I understand, in 2004 over the Annan Plan. It was unclear. The British government went more in the direction of secession in the event of a “yes” vote. But this is the mess that you can find yourself in once you start tampering with your constitution, and once you turn on a unitary state, into a federal or quasi-federal state. A good point was made in the Financial Times in the run-up to the referendum by Philip Stevens, the commentator of the Financial Times. He said that Alex Salmond, the leader of the Scottish National Party, has reawakened the allegiance of the tribe. So tribalism is another consequence of breaking up a country in the way that the United Kingdom is broken up.

And this is the sort of stuff that Alex Salmond has been promoting. First of all, when devolution was introduced, we used to refer to Scottish executive. The Scottish executive has now been renamed as the Scottish government with the Scottish flag – not the United Kingdom flag – the Scottish flag as the primary emblem of Scotland. And this was done to prepare the ground for independence. There wasn't just a referendum campaign in favor of independence. Alex Salmond and his colleagues were actively preparing the ground. And you can see there one of the steps that was taken – the consultation exercise was introduced on preparing an interim constitution for Scotland. The referendum closes on the 20th of October. I wonder whether it will go ahead or not. But I've got that out from the Scottish government website, this morning I think it was. So the Scots are still living in the hope of bringing about independence.

There is a positive lesson for Cyprus to draw, and that's consultation. In so far as I'm aware – please correct me if I'm wrong – no documents have been produced by the United Nations to facilitate a consultation exercise as regards the negotiation here in Nicosia. Has any consultation exercise been instigated to enable you, the citizens of Cyprus, to see what is being negotiated in your name? There has never been. The Scottish devolution experiment was preceded by what was called the constitutional convention which was to all intents and purposes a constitutional assembly, and the whole process was characterized by consultation – both the British government consulted, and the Scottish government consulted. There was transparency. The law offices, the legal advisors of the British government gave lectures and published transcripts and published papers setting up their interpretation of some of the legal issues that were presented. Has the Attorney General of the Republic done something similar as regards any draft papers that are floating around Nicosia? We can draw lessons from this because it's not all bad – I'm painting a negative picture. But there are some positive principles to draw from Scotland, and that is an example: the use of consultation exercises to facilitate transparency, to facilitate public participation, and to enable us citizens to hold the politicians to account, and to ensure that constitutions are, or any future constitution is made in as robust and good way possible.

Let me just move on now to the second lesson of history. It's well-known but rarely applied. And it's this: dangers flow from any policy of appeasement. I've skated over the history of the United Kingdom since 1998, and it's been characterized by one act of appeasement, one concession after another. And the concessions have been largely one way: from London to Edinburgh, not the other way round. It's easy to say this with the benefit of hindsight, but there was indeed a problem with the governance of Scotland before devolution. Scotland was governed by and large from

London and it was governed badly from London, which is one reason why there was a demand for Scottish government and the Scottish parliament. But it's one thing to govern badly and to govern well. In hindsight, it's easy to say what Scotland needed was better government from London, not devolved government from Edinburgh. And that's a lesson that we can draw from this whole episode. Related to that – and this is equally important if not more so – what the concessions and what the appeasement did was not satisfy the appetites of the Scottish nationalist, but it made it even more hungry. It wetted their appetite and encouraged them in the demand for partition and for independence. The Labor politicians who were promoting devolution were describing devolution as the destination. This is what we're going to produce: we're going to give you a Scottish parliament, a Scottish government within the United Kingdom and away you go, run your own affairs subject to the reserved powers in favor of London. That was the dream of Labor back in '98, but the reality was that the Scottish nationalists saw devolution as merely a stepping stone en route to partition.

The title – I haven't put it on the screen – but the title of this lecture “The Slippery Slope from Devolution to Independence”, I owe this title to a cartoon written and prepared by Nicholas Garland in the Daily Telegraph on 25th July 1997, where he effectively showed the Scottish flag with three labor politicians slipping down from devolution to independence. Sometimes the cartoonists back in 1997 were ahead of the curve, they could see where this was heading. Another person who could see where this was heading was Margaret Thatcher whose government from 1979 to 1990 generated an enormous amount of antipathy towards Scotland. But even she towards the end of her life could foresee that the devolution would head towards partition. So that's the second lesson of history: do not engage in appeasement. And I can't resist drawing attention to what Winston Churchill said about appeasement, he of course being the greatest enemy of appeasement during the thirties: “An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile hoping it will eat him last.”

This brings me to the third lesson of history – there are five in total, this is third: states which become constitutionally divided, or allow themselves to become constitutionally divided along religious, sectarian, ethnic or other lines are much more prone to become partitioned or otherwise divided, than integrated, pluralist and multiethnic democracies. In pluralist multiethnic democracies constitutional power is normally vested in the citizens as a whole, and each citizen is treated equally irrespective of religion, sect or ethnic origin. What we've done in the United Kingdom is move from being an integrated whole to being fragmented into four pieces. So there's a separate electorate in Scotland, a separate electorate in Wales, a separate electorate in Northern Ireland, a separate electorate in England. There are devolved organs of government in three of the four units of the United Kingdom. And what we've now done, we've re-awakened what was described a moment or two ago as tribalism. In Northern Ireland we see of course a different story played out between Catholics and Protestants, we've seen that same sectarian clash emerging in Glasgow over the past few days – we've seen it at Rangers and Celtic football matches. But this move towards devolution has created tensions. Not created tensions – exacerbated pre-existing tensions to see them come to the fore to a far greater extent. My fear here in Cyprus is once you instead of integrating Cyprus... I'm an idealist, but sometimes idealists are proven right, and hopefully I will be. If I'm not, you can hold me to it. But the future for Cyprus surely lies in having an integrated, pluralist, multiethnic democracy which respects every religion, every community, every faith. Bi-communalism is out of date. There are no two communities anymore in Cyprus. There is a Jewish community now, there are Armenians, there

are Catholics, there are Buddhists. Every religion is represented here in Cyprus. And for us to be talking about the two communities is to be talking in the language of the past. But if we establish a so-called bi-zonal bi-communal federation, we are just heading ourselves in the direction of the United Kingdom, where each “side” - another phrase that’s drawn from the lexicon of bi-communalism - each so-called “side” will head in different directions culturally, politically, economically and spiritually. And the lesson of the United Kingdom is that it is catastrophic and it will lead to partition sooner or later in a different way than one might first envisage.

I must cite here... And I’m conscious of the time, I’d like to finish in ten minutes. I was really taken by the remarks of Dominic Sandbrook in the Daily Mail. Now, because I’m in Cyprus I have to buy the Daily Mail, partly ‘because it’s cheaper, and secondly because it’s everywhere. And on Saturday - look at the headline: “Now home rule for England!” This is tribalism. The English are now saying, hang on, the Scots have had a referendum - we want a referendum. The Scots were given devolved organs of government - we want devolved organs of government. The Scots receive more pounds per Scot than the English from the British tax payer - we want more money. So tribalism - English tribalism - is coming to the fore. The Mail on Sunday says: “Prime minister warns Ed,” - Ed Miliband, the leader of the opposition - “Don’t sell out England”. So even the prime minister is engaged in tribalism here. (inaudible) election coming up as well, that’s maybe one of the reasons. Anyway, what Dominic Sandbrook said is a (inaudible). What he said in the Daily Mail on Saturday was the following:

“The campaign has been a terrible warning about the course of nationalism and the dreadful dangers of new politics based on crude populist appeals to the powerless and the alienated. The deeper lesson of the referendum campaign, especially when you consider the rise of separatist movements in Catalonia and Ukraine and elsewhere, is that the threat of nationalism is just as real today as in the era of the two world wars.”

I’ll make two points as a follow-up to that. The first is that there is a connection of some sort between the rise of Scottish nationalism, and the recession and the banking crash and economic troubles that we’ve had in the United Kingdom since the collapse of various banks, including the Royal Bank of Scotland and Halifax Bank of Scotland. Alex Salmond and the Scottish nationalists have tapped into a deep well of resentment that’s been generated by the financial catastrophe generated by the banks. And that’s a warning for other European Union member states that are gripped by recession or adversely affected by the Eurozone. We in the UK are outside the eurozone but we’ve had our own economic and financial miseries. So economic misery gives rise to nationalism.

The second point I’ll make is that the rise of Scottish nationalism has arisen in parallel and in different circumstances to the rise of Islamism over the last few years. It was interesting, listening to the BBC news in the run-up to the referendum, they were switching from the Scottish referendum campaign to the rise of Islamism in Iraq and Syria and Libya on the one hand, but in the United Kingdom itself as well. And I could sense the politicians didn’t want to connect the two, especially when the Scottish gentleman was executed by beheading on our doorstep. We’ve seen unfortunately the devastating consequences of the potent mixture of nationalism and Islamism in the case of the occupied north. Look at the name of the regime in the north: it’s the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, it’s not the “Republic of Northern Cyprus” - they chose that first word: the “*Turkish* Republic of Northern Cyprus”. And of course if you look

at the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus dated 1960, a Muslim is defined as a Turk. And we've seen now in recent years the emergence of this phrase "the Muslim Turkish Cypriot", the de-secularization of the Turkish Cypriots. Mr. Davutoğlu, the new prime minister of Turkey, uses that phrase the "Muslim Turkish Cypriots".

I can't resist making this point as well. The regime in the occupied north is the product of an illegal unilateral declaration of independence. That regime is religiously flavored, that regime is unrecognized on the world stage. I can't resist saying it: the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is unrecognized on the world stage. It's the product of a unilateral declaration. It is also the product of genocide in the same way as the regime in the occupied north is. And regime in the north is, of course, a product of appeasement – appeasement from here in Nicosia, and appeasement in Washington, London, Brussels and elsewhere. And that's what happens when you engage in appeasement. You might engage in short-term satisfaction, but in a long-term it can prove catastrophic, as the United Kingdom and the United States are now facing in this part of the world.

Fortunately, Scotland has not gone down the path of procuring or proclaiming a unilateral declaration of independence, and that's partly because Mrs. Thatcher and her administration in 1983 had the sense to support the United Nations declaration, United Nations resolution – sorry - which brand that the regime in the occupied north is illegal. And I have no doubt that Alex Salmond may well have toyed with the idea of declaring a unilateral, making a unilateral declaration of independence in Scotland. And if he did have some thoughts, his legal advisors would have told him there are precedents to the contrary he ought to be aware of, one of which is Cyprus. So you can see how you've got to be very careful in international relations when you engage in constitutional reform.

I'll go through my last two lessons of history. The fourth I've already drawn attention to: nationalists incline towards manipulating election laws, and thereby manipulating electoral rolls to their advantage. I've made the point earlier so I won't dwell on that. And you're all familiar with the manipulation of the voting here at the time of the Annan Plan in the occupied north.

The fifth and final lesson of history - and this is a more positive lesson - is that there are merits associated with the referendum which focuses on the acceptability or otherwise of a philosophical proposition. In Scotland there was no fully fledged plan presented to the population in the way that there was here in 2004. What was put to the population in Scotland was a philosophical question: do you think Scotland should be an independent country? In the event of a yes vote – and there wasn't of course - but in the event of a yes vote, then a plan would have been put together. And some commentators were saying, well, there should have been... In that situation there would have had to be a second referendum to approve any plan. Here in Cyprus they put the cart before the horse in 2004. They cobbled together this disagreement, this Annan Plan in secret from the top-down, it was rushed into print and then presented to the population. What should have happened – again, it's easier said than done - the philosophical question should have been put first: do you think that Cyprus should become a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation? In the event of a "yes" then you prepare the plan, in the event of a "no" you do something else. So there is a lesson to be drawn here and maybe that ought to be thought about here in Cyprus.

I now come to my conclusions. On this occasion, and that's partly thanks to the United Kingdom's campaigning, on this occasion the United Kingdom has been saved and Scotland has not had to face the economic and other costs flowing from any partition. Those are the statistics that were promoted by the British government in London as to the costs of any partition in the United Kingdom. The recent history of the United Kingdom has exposed the dangers associated with any decentralization of power away from the central organs of government. It doesn't matter whether such decentralization takes place pursuant to devolution or pursuant to federalization. The follies of federation will arise nonetheless.

And I suppose they can be summarized under what I would call the five "Fs". First "F" is "fragmentation". And we've seen in the United Kingdom, we've seen in the United Kingdom that United Kingdom has been fragmented by devolution. Here in Cyprus, if there is a bi-zonal bi-communal federation, Cyprus won't of course be fragmented into two; it will be fragmented into four, because you'll still have two sovereign base areas on the southern coast, even if they're truncated. So devolutionary federalisation results in fragmentation.

Number two, decentralization may give rise to increased "factionalism". And I've given you an example from the newspapers of the United Kingdom.

Number three, decentralization may give rise to allegations of "favoritism". Why does Scotland receive more money than England? I can envisage something similar happening here.

Number four, decentralization may generate "friction" between the various fragments of a sovereign state and within each fragment of a sovereign state. We're already seeing now the Labor Party and the Conservatives having a political punch up over how to provide for English votes, for English voters. So friction is a natural consequence. Not always, but it's often a natural consequence from federation.

And as a combined result of the above, decentralization makes sure that the sovereign state becomes inherently "fragile".

I end by drawing attention to an irony, and the irony relates to these two island states at opposite corners of the European Union. That image of the European Union I think omits Croatia, so my apologies to any Croatians in the audience here today. But here we have the European Union, at two opposing ends we have two island states: the United Kingdom and Cyprus. On the one hand the United Kingdom has been spared the ordeal of being partitioned de jure, thanks to the 55% of Scottish voters who voted 'no'. On the other hand the United Kingdom faces constitutional future which may be characterized by federalism or quasi-federalism. On the other hand the Republic of Cyprus is striving to overturn its de facto - in other words illegal - partition by embracing a form of federalism built upon bi-communalism, bi-zonalism, and a phrase that was coined by the Turkish government in 1958: 'intellectual partition'. That's a subject for another day.

My response to this irony is to point out that both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Cyprus have no tradition of federalism. And for this and multiple other reasons both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Cyprus are heading in the wrong direction. Unless they change direction, each state will end up in a constitutional quagmire of its own making, with even more layers of bureaucracy, but much less effective governance. Such a bureaucratic and multi-

governmental state of affairs is the last thing that citizens want. But no less importantly, it's the last thing that established businesses or potential investors want to see. Remember, investors want stability, not uncertainty. In short, if federalism or quasi-federalism is accomplished in either the United Kingdom or Cyprus, a Pandora's Box will be opened with potentially destructive consequences for all concerned.

All of which brings me neatly to the final lesson of history. It's the most simple of all, and it is this: prevention is better than cure. Thank you.

Concluding Remarks to Volume 2

The material included in this second volume of the East Mediterranean Chronicles, touches upon the various dimensions of the hydrocarbon industry, as well as the role that the region in general, and certain countries in particular, wish to play as an energy transport nexus to Europe. By the end of 2012, it is clear that the energy industry will be one of the more important new historical forces with a clear potential of re-shaping the future of the region. Turkey's escalating spat with Cyprus regarding ownership and development of Cyprus energy reserves highlights the regional strategic importance of Cyprus and adds to the complexity of the Cyprus problem. It also reveals the rising profile of a regional Turkish challenge as well as Turkey's gradual move away from reliance upon soft power. Turkey, which in this period is well into its ambitious twenty-year rearmament program initiated in 1996, is clearly anticipating reaping the benefits of its growing military might. Turkey's deteriorating relationship with Israel can be attributed to Erdogan's idiosyncrasy, but is also strongly affected by an Islamic conservative shift of the Turkish body-politic, coupled with a new sense of the country's growing regional power.

Turkey's new dream of regional destiny coincides with the start of a new era of social and political unrest in the region, and a new challenge to Westernism and its related concepts. This challenge is all the more serious given the rising role of Russia, and its new transactional approach to the region's many, and various, sources of conflict. Such anti-Western challenge is further strengthened by Iran's more traditional, ideological and ethno-religious role, but also by the fallout from the collapse of the Iraqi state, and the dissemination of its military know-how among growing Islamist actors. Efforts to combat such new Islamic actors and their evolving agendas will likely forge the future of the Eastern Mediterranean, but also of the West in general, and Europe in particular.

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East Mediterranean Chronicles: The last decade bore witness to several important changes that have and will continue to affect the historical development of the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East. These volumes are a record of such changes as they took place. The changing security landscape, the new hydrocarbon discoveries and the so-called “Arab Spring” and its aftermath have given birth to new dynamics and challenged the validity of old paradigms. These publications contain transcripts of conferences, round-table discussions, interviews, as well as reports and first-hand analyses, all by people that bore witness to the underlying events.



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