
TRANSCRIPT

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COERCION – A MODERN PARADIGM OF WAR

Okay, well ladies and gentlemen, thanks for coming back. I want to talk now about what is essentially, something that's sort of a heart of what I have been discussing earlier: coercion. Because essentially what has been talked about in the psychological sense is applying coercion to troops in the field. I said the dead have no vote. It's how you persuade those that are still alive to do what you want - that is the arts of generalship. So coercion is just a word that covers what you do to people in the army, in the field right up to what you do to Milosevic at the time of the Kosovo operation. You coerce them, you persuade them to do something.

But I suppose the question is then how do you do that? And this seems to me is you will take it that you are the emperor, the king, the prime minister whatever it is, so you have lots and lots of political and other challenges and objectives. The question is how do you persuade your enemies, your friends, your allies to achieve the right sort of political outcome? What sort of mechanism do you use to achieve that outcome?

It won't be any surprise to you to know that lots of strategies failed to produce a theory that works. Some of those who have actually tried it and succeeded, but most have been obsessed with their own theories and are blaming everybody else when the theories don't work. But I'm going to suggest to you that actually this is all about psychology. But it's a rather different sort of psychology in the sense that it's unlike military psychology because there are more instruments available to you. So what I'm going to talk about is how the state uses these instruments. It's not just about the size of the army, the nuclear threat and everything else. It's more about what are the instruments that you can use and how do you use them. Conventionally people tend to think of this as being something to do with nuclear theology. How do you use nuclear weapons to persuade people? How do you use your massive overwhelming power to persuade people?

Now, I'm going to surprise you now because actually the most classic, and one that's been around for at least 10,000 years, and probably even beyond the last ice age. This is power. This is Louise de Kérouaille. Louise de Kérouaille was born in Britain. She was born to an aristocratic family in the 1650s. She ended up at the court of Louis XIV and he thought she was quite pretty. This is a painting of her that currently hangs in Madingley at Cambridge. And I'll just point out because you probably can't see it. It says Portsmouth. And I'll come to that in a minute. So there she is, she's a painting and she has her left breast revealed with a pigeon. I don't know the full message

that is being conveyed by having a pigeon on a left breast revealed, but just take it for its own value. She arrived at the court of Louis XIV and he quite liked her. And he thought, I know somebody who might like her even more. And that was Charles II. So when Charles II's sister who was Henrietta, Duchess of [Orléans](#), went back to visit Charles II in 1670. Who should go with her as part of her retinue? Louise de Kérouaille. So Louise de Kérouaille arrives in the court in London as part of the retinue of Charles's sister. She was very clever, she was known to be strong-willed, she was obviously pretty, she had that sort of vulnerable type of demeanor sort of characteristics. But everybody thought that she was somebody who was very attractive and very charismatic. Nell Gwyn who you will recall was Charles II's mistress at the time called her Squintibella. Louise de Kérouaille, whatever the reason for her successes, by 1671, one year after she arrived in London, she became Charles's official mistress. He then showered her with gifts. Nell Gwyn was kicked out. And one year later she gave birth to a bastard son names Charles who then became Duke of Richmond. A year after that Charles created her Duchess of Portsmouth. So she's now Duchess of Portsmouth. And he wrote to Louis XIV saying, this great girl you've sent me should be created duchess in France. And so Louis XIV created her a Duchess of Aubigny. And she lived with Charles through the rest of his life but she was all the time in the pay of Louis XIV. She did what Louis wanted and she persuaded Charles to do what was required. Charles, as you probably recall, was an Anglican. He was persuaded on his deathbed to become a Catholic. He was persuaded to change the laws of Britain so that his brother James II who was a Catholic could inherit the kingdom. And all the laws that differentiated, discriminated against Catholics, most of them were repealed. Charles even borrowed money from Louis at suitable terms in order to finance his exports.

So this is a lady who had immense power. And she could with a little cry and little squint control the destiny of a nation. And she was doing it on behalf of a foreign power. Now, Charles would most certainly knew this, but he didn't care.

So, ladies and gentlemen, we talk about power. Let's not forget that this kind of power is probably one of the most important ones.

So when we talk about power, today let's just talk about this sort of power, but what sort of power is this? Well, we think we all know what sort of power this is. This represents power in a world which is different. You know we live in a different world from the conventional world. The British imperial world would send a gunboat to solve a problem. Those days are gone. Let me give you some thoughts.

We live in a global economy, we all know that. We have the G7, the G8, the G20. We now even have G77. Multinational companies. We have rampant ideologies. Communism was a rampant ideology until the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Some will say Islam is now a rampant ideology. We have supranational organizations. United Nations, OSCE and the rest.

But at the same time that we have all these global things happening, we have some interesting things happening at the micro level. The sanctity of human life in the West is now overwhelming. Oh my God, somebody got killed! Presidents will change direction because Mrs. Smith died: God, this is utterly unacceptable! So we have this huge sensitivity to casualties in the West. And yet in some places, particularly when you go to places like India where people die of famine, or indeed in Africa, there is very little sensitivity to casualties. So you have a huge imbalance.

There is a lot of inequality these days, lots of debt. And we also have a world that is much less deferential. So we're in a new world, new loyalties and new everything else. We're in a world where population growth is now huge. I mean, you mentioned nine billion this morning. My calculation is about seven right now, but you were pretty close to that. But I think we can stop at nine, so people say, UN says, if things happen, we will get to nine, we'll plateau. To which my retort is, well, how do you know? Why will it stop at nine? It didn't stop before at two point three. Why would it stop at nine? And indeed, people will say, and if you look at this graph here, it's almost symmetrical. And you could, there are as many people alive now as have ever lived. That's not actually true. But it wouldn't take much to see that if this thing is totally symmetrical, you would end up with that being true. That's a huge number of people. And when you look at that in terms of the global change, you can end up as you can see with major imbalances. So population is a problem.

I'm not going to go into oil just except that I show you that this is the calculation that was done by a group of researchers that was done for the Canadians. Talking about the fact that there may well be a point where there is maximum oil and there is now a runoff. And if you reduced demand down to the maximum you can reduce demand, there could well be a supply gap. Of course there probably won't actually be a gap. It's just that the other supplies, the costly supplies, will fill the gap and there's no reason why oil couldn't cost two hundred dollars a barrel, three hundred dollars a barrel, or even four hundred dollars a barrel, in order to bridge the gap between demand and supply.

So we have that. We have of course water as a pretty critical thing. But in addition to that, maybe the way in which conflict is taking place has changed as well? We're used to interstate warfare, or maybe civil war. But actually Rupert Smith has said, war amongst states. Substate actors in this state are fighting substate actors in another state. Or regimes over here are fighting regimes over there, but the mass of the population really aren't involved too much at all.

We have this phenomenon: globalization of comms. Why is that important? Well, it's now meant that we fight wars 24/7. Prime Minister Blair could sit, as we know, in Gulf War II and actually watch the predator field. So you can sit there in the office in Number 10 and even watch a predator fly around on his TV, and if he wants to give directions. In fact, in the Kosovo war in 1999 that's exactly what general Wesley Clark, the senior Allied Commander Europe, sitting in his office in Brussels, sat watching the predator field on the telephone giving instructions to somebody down in Kosovo: why are those tanks not being taken out? What, is that what a four-star general's supposed to do? That's what corporals are supposed to be doing, taking out of tanks. A general is supposed to be directing, thinking ahead. But the globalization of communications has given that capability. And so you now have people who micromanage down right at the lowest possible level.

We also have the phenomenon of asymmetry. Now people think that asymmetry is something new. But because if you think about asymmetry, it's always been there. I've shown you that with the chariots. When the chariots come into view for the first time, it's a huge asymmetry. So we think this is something new. But what it does mean is this, that whereas in the past we thought we understood conflict, now we've been in a situation where we try and deter everything we possibly can. We don't want, say, Rwanda to invade Chad – not that this is likely to happen – but we don't want that to happen, so we think about that and think how we can possibly make sure that it never happens. So we will buy the weapons, we will buy the goodwill, we will do whatever we need to do to make sure that can't happen. So when you're the enemy, if you live in Rwanda, and you know already that major activity is taking place to stop you invading Chad, well, how

are you going to do it? You're not going to do it the way people are anticipating it. Because if you do, you're a real fool, you've done exactly what they expected. You must do something they don't expect. Well, what's the effects of that? It's this. They're always going to surprise you because that's the only way to work. Because if you do the straightforward frontal assault, just like battles of the past, then you're going to get a very bloody nose. Unless you have overwhelming capability. But given the fact that there is a huge asymmetry, you don't have overwhelming capability.

So we are walking into this sort of game. And then when we come on to the fact that while the West may be playing one particular game, it may well be that other people are playing a completely different game. And it's very, very difficult then to try and work out what game they play. But here's the big problem as far as the West is concerned these days. We can congratulate ourselves on having huge amounts of power. God, we can blow the world apart twenty times over, destroy the world tomorrow. Can we use it? No.

So we have the power, conventional and nuclear. But there's a problem. There are the sort of things that stop us using our power. Things like legal restrictions, legitimacy, how will our publics react to them. What about straightforward political weakness? So given the fact that you owe fifty divisions, what actually comes out in terms of what the enemy gets to face. Of course, on the other hand the enemy, whoever he may be, he doesn't have much power in the first place. This is the difference. He doesn't have much of a constraints mesh. He can do whatever he likes anytime. So there's no mesh that stops him. Legitimacy? Who cares? He says, you know, might is right. I do what I could get away with because that will justify what I've done.

At the same time for the reasons I've mentioned yet there's this huge assumed vulnerability. Oh my God, Mrs. Smith died, this is the end of the world! So we end up in a position where although hugely powerful, we're almost impotent because of our own restraints and concerns. And yet at the same time the person who has virtually no power has got one gun with couple bullets. He could shoot somebody and we'll all jump to obey, jump to do whatever he wants. So we end up in a situation knowing that we have asymmetry in power, but also a lot of vulnerability in terms of the asymmetry of vulnerability.

So given the solar complicated complex world we have to ask ourselves what people are playing at? And it's not until you ask yourself these questions that you can fully understand quite what is going on.

What's this chap playing at? (*Picture of Kim Jong-il*). Those of us that have seen 'Team America' will recall Hans Brix. There was a sort of continuous competition between Kim Jong-il and Hans Brix. But what is he actually doing? Is he there to try and establish himself as a regional superpower? Is he actually trying to just cement his own family's grip on power? I don't know. Or are there much more subtle and less controversial results that one needs to take into account?

One has to ask as well what this particular gentleman is doing. (*Picture of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad*). No doubt the good doctor here well tell us what he's doing. I mean, does he really want to exterminate Israel? Or is actually his intention to cement his control of Iran and the way that we've seen it is the problems that he has in the election? Or is it going to be a new Persian empire? Let's take over Iraq. But whatever it is, we can't seem to be getting the message. I'll come back to that in a second. We don't understand what Iran's peaceful program is. We only can see the prospect of an Iranian nuclear bomb. Mohamed ElBaradei (*picture*) looking very awkward,

very worried. So what is going on? We need to ask ourselves these questions. What sort of power play is being used here?

And let's not forget that if I come back to our good friend Mr. Ahmadinejad - this particular gentleman here - and this gentleman (*picture*), you will know who they are because I had mentioned them before. This is Hassan. He is the leader of the Assassins, later became an Ismaili sect. And if I just described to you - this is how Marco Polo described the Ismaili sect or this particular sect. This man, Hassan, he was a regional warlord with a small number of castles in the northern part of Persia. And he wants to become a great regional power. So he had all these aspirations, but of course he didn't have enough troops to be able to do anything with it. And so he thought, well, what I will do in my castle of Alamut, I will create a garden of earthly delights. In the garden of earthly delights was everything a man could possibly want: wine, women and song, as much as you could possibly imagine. And his methodology, and this is Hassan's methodology, was to get a young man from the local village, fill him full of hashish, take him into the top of the castle of Alamut while he was out on hashish. While he was there, he would wake up, he would then have whatever fun and games that he wanted, and then a couple of days later Hassan will appear to see this young man and say, "My son, we are in paradise together." When the young man acknowledged that, he was filled in with hashish again, taken back down to the bottom of the hill, whereupon Hassan would come up to him again and say, "My son, yesterday we were together in paradise. If you wish to return to paradise, this is what you must do. Take this dagger and go to Baghdad and stab the caliph through the heart three times." The reaction of the young man, "My God, I've been to paradise, it's pretty good. I'm in for this." So off he goes to Baghdad and gets killed by the caliph guards. But if there are enough people who go through this process, eventually somebody arrives at the palace and kills the caliph. Whereupon Hassan then sends a letter and it reads: Dear new caliph, I was awfully sorry to hear what happened to your previous incumbent, you can rest assured of my absolute support. I wonder if you would like to help me with a few problems I have. And it doesn't take the new caliph long to get used to the idea that of course if he doesn't come up with the answers or do what Hassan wants, of course he is going to be the next one to have a knife stabbed through his heart.

Now, modern scholars have poured scorn on fact there was this garden of earthly delights. But it is clear that this group of people did use assassination as a method of war. It's also clear that they were high on drugs, hashish mostly, and the modern word 'assassin' comes directly from the word 'hashashin', which is what these people were deemed to have been part of. So they were hashashins. And indeed they were successful until 1256. And unfortunately for them, in 1256 the Mongols turned up, all the castles were captured, all people around the castles were murdered, and the problem just went away. But for a time that method of warfare, that terror of the highest level was extremely effective.

So that sort of sets the scene. Let's bring right up to date and ask ourselves then what all this was about? (*Picture of 9/11 attack*). Well, what was it about? Is it retribution for some imagined slight? Is it punishment to the West because you need to be punished, you haven't done what we've said? Or is it actually a persuasion to make us do what Osama bin Laden advised?

Well, you remember this chap (*Picture of Clausewitz*) and I gave you these two comments earlier: "War as an act of human intercourse." "It's an act of force to compel our enemies to do our will." And you'll remember that of course war is also "politics by other means." So a whole lot is wrapped up together.

Let's just talk a little bit about how you use this thing called force. Well, we've seen how power is used. Louise de Kérouaille used her power in one particular way, by crying at the appropriate moment, being flexible at other moments. She had power. And of course we've also seen how the assassins managed to use their power.

Let's try and break it down a little bit. Force really has these two components, and the components are denial and coercion. Now, let me just talk through those for a second. Let's look at the denial, this is all about the ability to use force in a physical sense. And you can use force to constrain or destroy. Let's say an enemy has an army of 10,000 people. I can go along and put a nuclear weapon on them and guess what, they're all dead, I have now destroyed them, the problem has gone away. I have destroyed them. Alternatively, I can find they still got 10,000 people I didn't drop a nuclear weapon on, but they got across a river. So what do I do then, essentially I knock down all the bridges so they can't get across. So I have denied the enemy the opportunity to use its army to come against me. I have denied him the opportunity. So I either destroyed him, or I constrained him, or I covered him with liquid, or whatever it is, and stopped him from moving by using non-lethal weapons. But I stopped him from doing whatever it was. That does not include any form of psychological warfare, it's purely physical.

But what about the coercive side, the psychological side? Let's just talk a little bit more about that for a second. What are the options that really come out? So if I got all this force, what's sort of things can I do?

Well, let's go back to Saddam Hussein and Kuwait. So the August of 1990 Saddam Hussein is in Kuwait, we could have said to him, Dear Saddam Hussein, if you don't get out of Kuwait by Christmas, you will need to a new Baghdad. That would be a threat. Now, whether they'd believe it or not, that's another matter. But that would be a threat. Or if you don't get out of Kuwait by Christmas, we're going to invade. But you're saying, unless you do something, I'm going to do something really nasty. So that's one.

The next one you can do is just hurt somebody. And that really is reflected by Demosthenes and Pericles' strategy: if you invade Athens or invade Attica, I will go around the corner and kick the hell out of Pylos, or I'll go to, I don't know, wherever it might be. And I will cause all sorts of hurt and damage in the middle of Sparta, but I'll make it not profitable for you to continue what you do. And I'll keep doing it every time you invade Attica.

And the final option that you have is to punish somebody. But of course, the trouble with punishment if it's not done with the idea of making them conform, I mean, all you're really doing is just motivating yourself, building your own population up to make them feel happier. You know, they invaded Kuwait so let's punish somebody else. Who is it who actually caused it in the first place we will punish them. And that makes us feel better about the whole thing. You've done something I don't like, this is our chance to get revenge. But at the same time maybe it's a deterrence for the future. So that's the sort of element that you have in terms of that.

But that of course is all psychological. So we can use force as you can see in a denial or physical sense, or in psychological sense. But the truth of the matter is that of course even as you go down the physical side, there's always a coercive pay off. And the closer you get to actually destroying something, the closer you get to persuading them, it's a good time to surrender.

But let's just think for a second. I've talked about force. One of the other instruments of power we could perhaps apply? Let's just think about sanctions. South Africa, when it had the apartheid

regime, we can go a denial type of thing, we can destroy the crops, or we can constrain them so they can't physically have baked beans, or weapons or whatever it is you don't want them to have. But what you're hoping for is that will then produce a coercive type of strategy that will make them then give in. But nevertheless, you do it in the physical sense in order to hopefully have some sort of a coercive pay off.

Diplomacy. You could do the same sort of thing diplomatically. I'll talk about it a little bit more. But you can try and prevent them from getting friends and keeping them isolated in order to have some sort of coercive pay back. So they can fall to what it is you want to do.

Then, of course, we come on to this one: cyber IT. We can take out their banking. We can take out their money supply and take their money away. We can go to Milosevic's account and take his money away, then to his uncle's account and take his money away. And ultimately of course he's been denied the ability to use his money in order to make him do what it is we want him to do.

And then, of course, we come on to the final one, which is not far from anybody's minds, and as many husbands will know there is of course a denial aspect of sex which produces a coercive outcome. Probably that's not politically correct to say things like that.

So we talked about the ways in which you can use power. Let's now talk about what we mean by the semantics of power. And you'll probably know Joseph Nye talked about soft power and hard power. Now, most people think of soft power being the carrots. But actually he wasn't talking about that. He was talking about soft power being the context. And I'll give you an example. Many parts of the world will drink Coca-Cola, eat hamburgers, and walk around wearing jeans, and that is the soft power. And they think it's really great to do these sorts of things. It doesn't necessarily mean they will do what you want in terms of foreign policy and the ways in which you wish them to behave. But when you come onto the hard power, the carrots and the stick is the combination of these two together that actually often produce a sort of outcome that you are after. So let's concentrate now on this area, because this is the background, and this is the methods by which you are going to try and persuade or coerce somebody into doing something.

So let's talk about coercion. Conventionally, coercion has been typified as having deterrent and repellent aspects. And I want to just talk about deterrents and repellents separately. I'm grateful to a chap and friend of mine John Harvey who wrote this particular thing on deterrence. But I think it's nevertheless a good starting position for what I'm going to talk about, which is the more coercive aspects.

We tend to think of deterrence as meaning this (*picture of nuclear explosion*). You recall, initially when the nuclear weapon was first produced, of course Hiroshima and Nagasaki and if Japan did not surrender, there would have been a third one. But of course there was a huge asymmetry. The nuclear weapons were designed to persuade the Soviet Union not to do this, this and this and take over the rest of Europe. So there was a nuclear theology that developed. Then they got a nuclear weapon, then we had a nuclear balance, mutually assured destruction, remember MAD - mutually assured destruction - was the watchword of the 60s, 70s and 80s. Because both sides could destroy the other with nuclear weapons. So you have a sort of balance. But that's great theological stuff. But that's not really what I want to talk about here.

This is a form of deterrence (*picture unclear*). You know World War One was the war to end all wars. There was never ever going to be another World War One. And for many it was believed.

This would never be allowed to happen again. It deterred a number of states from even contemplating war. The Germans on the other hand thought themselves aggrieved because they've been stabbed in the back. And they were determined to readjust the balance. But for the West, particularly the Allies, they ended up in a situation where they deterred themselves. and so you end up in a situation where the Germans were less deterred because they hadn't agree to this, and they were prepared if necessary to go back and do this again, whereas the West will say never again will we allow that to happen. So now you have a huge asymmetry in power, because the Germans are prepared to hazard everything and the West goes, no chance. And indeed I saw, there was a thing on TV last night, I don't know if anyone else saw it, talking about what happened when the Germans invaded Poland. It was news to me until a few years ago that the French actually marched forward as the Germans punched into Poland, the French said we will support our Polish allies and we will invade Germany. And they marched right up to the border line. That was a total distance of eight kilometers and it never went any further. Because they could not bear the thought of what might happen next. Had they punched on and continued punching on, there was at least some chance that Hitler would've had to bring divisions back from Poland and probably he would've stopped whatever he was doing. So self-deterrence played a huge role in forcing us into weakness.

But what do we mean by deterrence? Well, this is the classical sense: "... the state of mind brought about by a threat of retaliation (...)." Whatever you plan cannot succeed, the costs will exceed any gain, failure of costs and the consequences. That's a very logical statement. You can imagine somebody sitting down and drafting that out and saying, this is what deterrence is really all about. But the problem with that sort of methodology is that it almost completely ignores the psychology. It assumes that one is going to be entirely rational with a whole situation. You assume rationality: he's going to look at the expecting costs and the benefits or alternative courses of action and he'll make a logical choice. So Saddam Hussein thinking about whether to invade Kuwait: what's in it for me and what are the downsides? You know you produce a balance sheet. Okay, on the good side I get a huge oil field. What are the downsides? Nothing at all. She (the US ambassador) said it was okay. Off you go, easy. But because it doesn't quite work like that, it's not quite as simple as that. You can't just do it as a mathematical equation.

And the problem is that rational actors don't really work in this particular way. Go back to the Falkland Islands in 1982. Same sort of fault process would have gotten through. Oh my goodness, can we take the Falklands, what should we do about taking them? Is there a deterrent posture? And of course these things become far more built up in terms of what the junta thought in Buenos Aires, and why they needed to attack the Falklands rather than straight forward cost-benefit analysis.

But let's say that somebody does decide to set up a deterrent posture. And that deterrent posture then fails. Let's say, for example, taking the Falklands as an example, we've sent a company of Marines down to the Falklands and then the Argentineans hastily invaded. So our deterrent posture has not worked. What then do we need to do? Well, the answer is, we now need to think about coercion options. And of course once deterrence has failed, then we end up in a situation where things have changed. And it's really this way. When you set up a deterrent posture, the choice is with the person who is actually starting the campaign. So Saddam Hussein is being deterred from invading Kuwait. But once he invades Kuwait, now the choice passes to you, the assailant, and you must decide what to do with it. And you've got to decide what will be necessary to get back to where you were before. And it's pretty clear that if you put a company of Marines in the Falklands and that did not deter the Argentineans, putting another company of Marines is hardly going to kick them out. So whatever you do now is going to be much, much

bigger and stronger and harder than the first action that you took to deter them. So now everything comes to you. You now have the choice - Oh my God, what should I do? - and you now have to come up with a force level or the coercive methodology that will be strong enough to achieve what it is you want to work.

But of course now the problem is that there may be a cost asymmetry. So going back to Kuwait, or indeed the Falklands, once you've got possession of that particular new land what are you prepared to do now in order to retain it? And quite often that's where the asymmetry is: the person who's gained something will do an awful lot to keep it rather than the person they've only had a lukewarm feeling about it in the first place.

So let's see what you should do when you're going to go now for your coercive action. And conventionally - this is purely conventionally - the targets of your coercive force, whatever it might be, Louise de Kérouaille or you know your coercive option or nuclear weapon, whatever you're going to use, falls into one of these three categories. So you could either attack the leadership, or population, or the armed forces. Now, you come up with your own list. I mean there are maybe original chieftom that happens to sit down here somewhere who's separate from the armed forces and maybe this is the guy you need to attack. And indeed, as you probably know, on the opening night of Gulf War Two an attempt was made to kill Saddam Hussein at the outset. The intelligence was received that Saddam Hussein was at a certain location. Here was a B-1 bomber which was overhead Baghdad at the time. He was ready to put a bomb on the target, he did so within twenty minutes of the decision being taken. Unfortunately Saddam Hussein had just left. Now, that would have been coercively a great victory. Because those that were left, the remainder of the Republican - what was it - Council would probably have said we don't want to continue with this, let's give up, let's find a way out of this. So may well be that that would have been a very lucrative target on this particular list: top leadership, population or armed forces.

Now, let me just try and be a bit more specific about this. Let's think about Hiroshima at the end of World War Two. So what were Hiroshima targets? We're going to use that coercive force. Hiroshima - wrong. We're not targeting the population. The people in Hiroshima are dead. Sixty thousand people died at Hiroshima and unfortunately they had to do the dying so that the pressure could be applied there (*at the 'leadership'*). That's the target, not the people that had to do the dying.

If we then look at what happened in Kuwait, who was the target? Well, in that case it was the armed forces and it really was the armed forces because once they had given up, it didn't matter what Saddam Hussein was all about. They would get up and run away. We have regained Kuwait. So you have to try and be very selective in who you target. Because if you get the wrong one, take World War Two. We, as you recall in World War Two, did strategic bomber campaign supposedly against the population. Did it work? Well, in some senses it probably did because it's certainly demotivated the German population. But did it actually cause the end of the war? Well, no, the answer is it didn't, because the Gestapo were making sure no one gave up. So we need to think in terms of not only your coercive force and who you target, but also in terms of the counter coercive force. So the question you have to ask yourself is this one: who is the power broker? Who's the man that can influence what is going to happen? Who's the person you're going to go after? Don't forget he's not the person he is going to die. This is the decision maker. The people that die are the people that are going to influence him to make the right decision. And that is really the question that comes through next. What destruction or what sort of

pressure are you going to put on this man in order to get him to change his decision, change his mind, do whatever you like.

Let's look at Kosovo for an example. So let's take this one. The Kosovo campaign of '99, you'll recall, it lasted - the air campaign, there was no ground campaign - it lasted seventy eight days - quite a long time. Pretty similar in real terms to what happened in Gulf War One. 38,000 air sorties were flown of which 10,000 were attack sorties. That seems like quite a lot until you recall what did I say of a number of attack sorties flown on the first day on D-day. On D-day we flew 14,000 attack sorties and this is 10,000 attack sorties over 70 days. So you can see it's not anywhere near that.

So what are we actually thinking we're doing? Well, this is what SACEUR thought we were doing. SACEUR, Senior Allied Commander Europe, sits in NATO and he directs that we will attack the armed forces in the field, and by attacking the armed forces in the field Milosevic will give up and that will be the end of the problem. But that actually didn't work too well, because General Mike Short who was the air commander, who was sitting down the Aviano Air Base in northern Italy, his view was that actually you need to attack the leadership directly. And so his campaign was to go directly for the heart of the leadership in Serbia and take out all the devices that supported Milosevic: the factories that he owned, his cousins' factories, the banking that he owned, great long targets set. But nevertheless by attacking both of those the effect was that Milosevic was persuaded. As it turned out, the attack on the armed forces probably didn't produce much effect at all. And the real thing that caused Milosevic to give in was the bombing directed against Serbia, its infrastructure and everything else. So the question is then why was it that Milosevic capitulated? Well, what was it then? Was it NATO air power? Okay, maybe. Was it the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, because they told Milosevic he was up for charges? Was it the Russian factor? You'll probably remember, but Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin went to see Milosevic, I think it was twice during the course of the campaign. And then the last time they made it absolutely clear to him that the Russians were not like the 7th Cavalry going to come over the hill and get him off the hook. "You are Mr. Milosevic by yourself, you will be by yourself, and you've got yourself into this bloody muddle, and get yourself out of it. There is no other help." Was it that? Or was it the threat of the land operation that was sitting on the border? Well, the answer is actually very simple. It's all of the above. Because he is a person and these pressures are bearing down him. And you come through to what I've sort of described: the suicide theory of coercion. And that is - I don't know how many have actually considered suicide, but I'm sure somebody here has actually considered suicide. But the thing that actually drives you over the edge to actually fire the bullet or cut your wrist or whatever it is you're going to do, is not the most important thing. You know, the dog has died, the money is all gone, my wife has left me, the house has fallen apart. Oh my God, it's all terrible. You're going to a bit of a stew and then suddenly, I don't know, the light bulb fails. Ah that's it, I've had enough. And you commit suicide because the light bulb failed. You commit suicide because you know they are upon you, they cumulate. And there's just the final thing that makes you finally go. And almost certainly, because he's a person, you know, there's this huge air power, there is this and it's all coming together and he finds himself in a situation that he can't get himself out of.

So that's perhaps why Milosevic gave up. So what did he do to sort of counter, to try and offset this? Well, as you'll recall, I mean what he actually did was he tried to convince the West, that, you know, this was not a battle he should be prosecuted for. So what did he do? Ethnic cleansing, raping of women and children, genocide of women and children, mass deportations. So the West instead of going along to the leadership and saying, "Oh my goodness, let's stop doing this, it's terrible," actually had said, "Let's get this bloke because he's nasty." What he wanted to do was

to appear a victim: oh my God, this is poor Milosevic, they're bombing my own forces, they're attacking me directly, I've done nothing wrong. You know it's all your fault. Well, that was the message he tried to get across. But doing a bit of rape and genocide and deportations and ethnic cleansing did not help his case. So arguably, he shot himself in the foot. And that of course then recreates the situation.

Let's have a look in general terms at the current situation in Afghanistan. What are we trying to do in Afghanistan? And I think when you start to look at these sort of issues, the Afghan game plan begins to make a little bit more sense.

ISAF. Well, we could attack the leadership, and that's presumably the Taliban leadership, the population or the armed insurgents. What we actually do, of course, is trying to take out the armed insurgents in order to create the situation so the population feels secure. That is what ISAF is trying to do. So the population in turn will engage their leadership and say, we feel secure, there isn't a problem. So that is the coercive tactic to make the population feel secure. Which is why general Stanley McChrystal has realized that he can actually go to the population and tell them they're being secure, give them money and make them feel happy and contented. There's a two-pronged attack. And that way you will eventually get to a situation where the population will feel happy.

What are the Taliban doing on the other hand? Well, of course they're trying to do a different thing in time. They're going after the Western population - this is not their own population - they're trying to impose civilian casualties and military casualties through the Western media, because these people are the agents of the Taliban and that's essentially what is happening. The Taliban are very happy about that. There are free propaganda devices, it's called the Daily Mail or the Daily Sun, even the BBC. So they are using the media to get the message across to the Western population. Because if the Western population say that's unacceptable, they'll go to their leadership and say, "Let's get out of Afghanistan." Who does the dying? Well the Western public don't do the dying. It's the Afghans that will do the dying, but they're not the target. These are the target. That's the group they're trying to reach, make the Western population give up and their leadership will get out of Afghanistan. It is actually as simple as that. Unfortunately, until we appreciate this and start taking action, which McChrystal has started to do, we're never going to achieve a success.

But let me try and go through some examples to give you some idea of sort of success rates. And I can't go through all these campaigns even if we could or wanted to. Leadership campaigns: world war two verses the Japanese, Hiroshima and Nagasaki failures. Leadership campaign: US against the Vietnamese leadership. Didn't work. World War Two in Europe. That failed. And then we come on to population attacks. Vietnam versus the USA population - that was a success. The Vietnamese coerced the United States population and they essentially persuaded the leadership to give up on Vietnam and get the troops home. So that was a coercive success. Failures. You'd see that. But here we are. Taliban versus the Western public - you'll see I've put some sort of hovering between the two. But if you understand that is the population aspect, then we can have some sort of meaningful discussion about it. Armed forces. Well, generally there's been pretty successful coercive attacks against the armed forces, largely because there's quite a lot of denial in this and so these can be normally seen as less successful in a denial sense. Failures: US versus the Vietnamese arguably was a failure.

But if you then put them all together and try and work it out. Leadership. It can work pretty well. Population. Very difficult to say. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't. Armed forces. The reasons that I said quite often does work if you understand what you're doing.

But when you apply this carrots and sticks coercive force, what should you use then in order to generate the sort of outcomes that you're after? Well, if you're gonna bomb them, then that's great, because you impose pay and once you've bombed them, that's pretty good and indicates resolve. The sinking of the Belgrano in 1982 demonstrated the Argentineans, to the Americans and to the British people this was for real. We'll sink the Belgrano, there's no doubt anymore, this is now going to happen. It's like sort of nailing your colors to the mast.

Pain. The very thing about pain is actually if you bomb them, and then bomb them tomorrow, and then bomb them the next day, it all starts to add up. A bit like the suicide case. It accumulates as time goes by. And it often escalates as time passes as well. It's very difficult to perpetuate the pain. I remember when I was a schoolboy I used to get beaten. And I have to tell you that being beaten the second time was in some ways worse than being beaten the first time. And when you're beaten the third time you probably don't want it to happen too much again. So it tends to build up. But what it also does is it builds resentment. So you think as a result of the pain, I dislike you intensely. And so if you're going to use pain as the only method, force as the only method, there's a good chance that you're going to build up resentment. This is what happened to Germany in between the wars. The end of World War One, the Versailles settlement: they had used all these things on me. And Germany - let's not forget - Germany was not defeated in the field, the army was still intact. They never signed an instrument of surrender. Because this is whole part of the business - lots of pain, lots of coercion. They finally agreed to stop, declared an armistice but the resentment was there.

How about reward? Well, reward is often a one-off. I'll give you money, I'll give you a million pounds. Am I going to give you a million pounds today, than a million pounds tomorrow, or just as one off. And once you've got the million pounds, what do you then do? Put it in your pocket and do what you've been asked to do? Or you just go, thanks very much, that's very nice. So perhaps it's only a one off. And once you got it, it has little coercive effect. I remember one very senior officer telling me that he couldn't wait to be knighted. Whole of his life he wants to be knighted. And finally he was knighted but once of course he got it, it was of zero value, because he now was a knight. It's about like getting your doctorate. I can't wait till I get my doctorate. Now I'm a doctor! But once you are a doctor, you're a doctor. It becomes the new norm. And the trouble with getting a reward is that quite often it creates an expectation that you're going to get something more next time round. so if you give someone a lot of money, then in order to get you to continue to conform and to be compliant you're going to have to give them even more money the next time around.

Well of course if you're going to use force in classic ways of using coercion, you better consider some other things first before you go and bomb them. What do your populations think about this? Some people don't have to worry about that but others do. What about third-party reaction? What might the Russian reaction be? Might be they suddenly produce sixteen (inaudible) and come drive it straight into Kosovo. So you better understand that as well. But the first step if you're going to use this thing is to establish your credibility and demonstrate its impotence. Which is why air superiority over the area is such a fundamental thing. Because having established air superiority, having established your dominance, and then it's perfectly clear to the person you are persuading that you have all the cards in your hand and he has none of the cards in his hand.

So we've done all this. We've demonstrated that we've got the result, we've demonstrated his impotence – he can't argue about it – and we've demonstrated to him that we have all the cards. But then you're coming through to this idea of what does credibility mean? Well, it's something to do with your resolve and your capability. If I wanted to coerce the Argentinians to get out of the Falklands, I could say things like if you don't do such-and-such, I'm gonna bring my massive fleet and I'm going to do this, this and this. Now, do they believe me or don't they believe me? That's the question you have to judge. And you can measure capability of course, but the problem is you can't always measure a resolve.

This is an interesting thing. This is what happened during the Kosovo war, Wesley Clark declared, "We're going to attack, destruct, degrade, devastate (...) destroy." That looks very good. It was very, very good. If you were sitting in Belgrade and you heard these words, you might think, hm, this is not particularly what I want to hear. I mean, diplomatic niceties may be more appropriate, but I didn't want to hear this. But then of course they would think about it and think, well, okay, can he really achieve this? And then you come on to this: it's only the target's perception that counts. You may have lots of credibility, lots of resolve, lots of capability. But if they don't believe you, then you're going to get ignored.

So let's just bring us all the way through to the reactions that you get to coercion. That comes down basically to this thing: psychology and the stress versus time. Many of you have seen a graph like this. If I increase stress on an individual, then actually his performance will rise and then eventually after he's maxed out and he can't perform anymore. His performance will then start to drop off. I'm sure you would see that sort of graph in the past.

What you want to think about is what happens if the stress is put on too quickly? If I opened the door and brought a lion in here, I would get some very interesting reactions. Some of you would jump out of the door, others would fall in the corner and cry for mum, and some would say I'm really strong and try and take the lion on. But the stress factor would be very high and you would do all sorts of things which would be very unexpected, probably very irrational. So that tends to be the sort of reaction you get also to bombing. There's irrationality, the sudden reaction. But conversely if I were to apply the stress over a much longer time, you can tolerate much higher levels of stress, and the deterioration is much less rapid. Well, this is sort of like bombing, and this is quite often what happens in terrorism. So for a population reacting this way, that's the sort of way in which it quite often works.

So it becomes important when you're trying to look at this: what is the gradient of this application, and what is the intensity that's actually applied to a country. And if we then try and work out what might happen in the future, that is of course what people do, is they try and think, "well here I am now, what's likely to happen as time goes by?" If I then tell them that I'm going to do something and I start to apply a coercive effect, then you can start to see that as - this is a state that, let's say, has gone to war - as the build-up to war has happened, the war has then taken place and the war has then finished. What was the state's performance? Well, as the war started they built up, built up and then they won. So performance stays high for a long time, and there's a lot of euphoria, the stress comes off, everybody has a good time and you've now won the battle. What happens on the other hand if it's gone the other way and you're actually losing the battle? Well, the war is still going to come, the stress is still building up. But now guess what? We're starting to lose the battle. So what happens to the state's performance? Well, state's performance will rise initially. But now it all goes pear-shape and it drops off and eventually comes back to a very low level, and then finally flattens out as peace then comes. So you end up

in performance reaching the peak and then falling off. This is largely what happened to Germany in '44-'45. State performance was dropping, dropping, dropping all the time and although the final defeat actually came on the 8th of May, by this stage down here it was already pretty clear that it's going to be defeated.

So, as far as the victim is concerned, it's important that we do the things that I've got here. We must create an impression in the mind of the person you're controlling that he is incapable of controlling the outcome of events. So whatever you're going to do to him, you must make it pretty hard, but still there's more in your quiver. You haven't run out of options but yet you must know what he expected and then go well above his expectations.

So how will you do that? Let's just talk about concentration of pressures. There are all sorts of weapons in your arsenal if you are a state. And I've mentioned a few of them. Diplomatic: Isolating diplomatically, apply a diplomatic offensive with the coercive aspects that I've mentioned. Economic: Apply sanctions. These do not work all the time as South Africa proves, because rulers can exploit shortages and they could find means of overcoming them. And indeed Saddam Hussein, you recall, we denied him weapons, we also gave him lots and lots of medicines for his children. all he did was take all the medicines, put them into a lock up so nobody got access to them and then handed them out as if they were his own in order to make him seem that he was the man who was the great giver of good things. But economic sanctions can work on what offers leverage. And of course this is Russia trying to use oil imports against Ukraine.

Military: I won't say too much about this because I think we've gone through that so I shall leave that. Cyber: Physically you could take down his IT, you can destroy his bank account, you could take out his cash from his bank accounts, particularly those that were in Switzerland. But of course in doing the cyber physical activities, you're also going to have psychological activities as well. Put viruses into the system, make his computers run slow. Everything takes longer, so none of the cash dispensers work. Cause a crash or threaten to cause a crash and then finally take cash away from him so he can't actually do anything. I could go through these and I'm not going to go through them in too much detail.

Media offensive: This is another option that could be used. Obviously newspapers and the other option is to use something like this: this lady on Al-Jazeera, I'm not sure that she presents necessarily the right sort of message for what is trying to be a very serious assessment but what is going on. What sort of things could you use. Official announcements, broadcasts, propaganda, leaflets. Psychological: Use these sorts of things through the media. Can be very, very effective. Let's not forget Dr. Joseph Goebbels in World War Two who did virtually all of this with a considerable amount of success not only against the allies but also to re-motivate his own population.

Let me now come to intelligence. Why is intelligence important? Well, sometimes you want him to know about it because it demonstrates your power. I am all-powerful, I handle this side. So you can let him know your capabilities, your deployments. On the other hand you might want him to guess, you want to deceive him, you want to exaggerate things to make him in some sort of doubt.

There are several religious and ideological things you could do. Threaten to destroy his mosques, legislate against his interests. This was done, well, I mean, Louise de Kérouaille, the Catholics in Britain. They were discriminated against. That was of course done for a particular physical reasons. But of course you can use the ideological as a weapon. I mean, not forget, we used to

burn people at the stake. Catholics and Protestants, it was very common, people were burnt at the stakes during the Bloody Mary's rule. Public opinion: undermines his religious credibility. And all these things can be done.

I just show you these not because I'm suggest you to do it. I'm not suggesting you go ahead and do it ethnic cleansing. But you need to be aware that these things can be done against you. These are options. And unless you are aware that they can be done you're going to be wrong footed. Genghis Khan. Tell me Genghis Khan, how do you get on with your neighbors? Very well, I don't have any neighbors. The reason was he got rid of them. Psychological ethnic cleansing. Terrorism. Bosnia 93-95. Rape as a method of war. And if you think that that is something that is new, I'm sure I don't have to remind you that when Berlin fell, a 100,000 rapes were reported from the three days that the red army took possession of Berlin. Those were the ones that were reported, a hundred thousand. And indeed if you go back into history, many armies that have moved into an area, rape as an act of war, but for start you can increase the number of children of your army but also of course it means that the woman is unclean, probably will no longer procreate again.

So when we bring all this together, what I'm suggesting to you, this is the key. but as you start to use these various instruments, the sanctions, the sort of profile of how sanctions produce stress against time (inaudible), have a little offensive here, Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin turn up but that doesn't work, they come back later and shout a bit louder. And then we put in some bombing. That sort of thing starts a bit later and then bombing takes place. When you have put all this together, what you're actually after is what I best described as a synergy. Because as you add up all these things together you will end up with this sort of peak. And this sort of peak, the final yellow peak, just like a man who is committing, or deciding whether to commit a suicide, these things are all imploding on you at the same time. And it's not just the one, but it's all of them together that start to produce the effect. And finally, if you do it right, round about here somewhere he'll say, that's it, I'm out of here. I give in, I do what you want. So that is what it's all important about this whole business of coercion is using the instruments that you've got, and I've discussed several of them. And there are a whole lot more. And you can do them in a way that would actually produce the outcome that you particularly want.

But let me remind you of one thing and that was going back to the psychology that I mentioned before, that if you do these things at such a level of pressure that you create rage, then your enemy will appreciate that he's not going to be able to get away with it. He will then fight you and fight you to the end. So you must give him a way out. Because unless you give him a way out, all you will do is condense in their mind the idea they must fight and fight hard, because there's no other way.

So there, ladies and gentlemen a psychology of interstate relations coercion. I hope that if you remember nothing, you'll remember that graph, because it tells you everything there is to know about the way in which states behave. And they not just behave towards adversaries. I'm sure it will not have escaped your notice that these things are taking place even between allies. Now we didn't bomb allies, but everything else is being used continuously. So states are being bombarded by coercive pressures. Slowly, subtly but surely. And that way the West - and you remember Tony Blair was considered to be George Bush's poodle - was convinced that he must behave in a way that is compliant towards the United States. Coercive pressures, ladies and gentlemen.

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