
ROUNDTABLE PRESENTATION
TRANSCRIPT

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THE LESSONS OF LANCASTER HOUSE FIFTY YEARS
ON: THE IMPORTANCE AND CONTEMPORARY
RELEVANCE OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE
CONFERENCE AND ZURICH-LONDON AGREEMENTS
OF FEBRUARY 1959

I'm going to split my talk into four parts. First of all I'm going to very briefly outline the history of the British connection with Cyprus from 1878 until 1959. Secondly, I'm going to skate over what happened exactly fifty years ago in February 1959 which gave rise to the Zurich-London agreements. I'm thirdly going to skip over the principal provisions of the Zurich-London agreements. But what I want to do in my final part of my talk, which will be the main part of the talk, is to draw the lessons from the Lancaster House and Zurich procedures and apply those lessons to what is going on here in Cyprus today. So my focus really is on the lessons of Lancaster House rather than on Lancaster House itself.

Let me just lay my cards on the table straight away. The other day I was listening to a wonderful Greek song, and according to the lyrics of the Greek song, "Ελληνας είμαι και μη με κρίνεις με τους κανόνες της λογικής". My argument is that the Zurich-London process was fundamentally illogical. By the same token the Annan Plan process was fundamentally illogical. And by the same token the current peace process is illogical. That's my overarching argument.

My second overarching argument is the Zurich-London process, the Annan Plan process and the current process involve what's called top-down diplomacy, top-down negotiations, negotiations conducted in a closed room, in secret between people who have decided upon themselves to embark upon the process with the citizens shut out.

So those are my... And let me just go one step further. My third overarching argument is that the top down process needs to be replaced by a bottom-up process involving the citizen, and not just a change of a procedure but a change of substance. Because the substance of the Cyprus question in my view is fundamentally defective. I speak as somebody who was born in

England. My parents are of Greek Cypriot origin. I have the privilege to have an excellent education in England, my whole mindset has been framed by my English education. So I speak from that standpoint. And it's because I was the beneficiary of an English education and an English legal education, that's why I'm saying that the process is illogical and substance is illogical.

Let me just skate over the history. In a few sentences, the United Kingdom - as you all know - acquired Cyprus under the Convention of Berlin in 1878. They effectively leased the island from the Ottoman Empire. They then annexed the island in 1914, the island became a British colony from that day to become a Crown colony - ceremonial title - in 1925. In the 50s the British came under colossal pressure from the Egyptians to move out of Egypt. They eventually decided to move out of Egypt in 1954, even though the departure wasn't confirmed till 1956. The British therefore relocated their forces here on the island of Cyprus in the mid-1950s. The same time the British were developing a nuclear deterrent. Cyprus and the infrastructure they were developing on Cyprus was pivotal to the construction and the development of the British nuclear deterrent. Side by side of those developments the role of Turkey in British foreign policy thinking was expanding, partly as a result of the Cold War, partly for other reasons. Against this strategic political backdrop, as we all know, the Greek Cypriot political leadership under Archbishop Makarios and Colonel Grivas embarked upon the anti-colonial campaign. Now, we're all familiar with the history, so I'm going to race forward.

The thrust of what I'm going to say is that for various reasons the Greek Cypriot political leadership effectively lost control of the process, especially after the archbishop was exiled to the Seychelles. The British brought Turkey and Greece into the picture, and the Americans were to some extent influencing things behind the scenes. And in 1956-57 the British came up with the idea of partitioning the island. This was put into the public domain in December 1956 by the foreign secretary. The British envisaged the partition of the island as a settlement to the Cyprus question. In 1957 the Americans took issue with the idea of partition. The British Chiefs of Staff took issue with the idea of the partition, and the Colonial Governor (inaudible) objected to the idea of partition. So the idea of partition was kicked into touch by virtue of an unholy alliance between the Chiefs of Staff in London, the Colonial Governor here in Cyprus and the American administration in Washington. This is all laid out in the study of Robert Holland, it's been laid up in my PhD thesis, it's laid out in the National Archives in Washington and in the UK.

The point I'm coming to is that partition was a non-runner by 1958. And the British who was still a colonial power had to come up with a new arrangement to settle the Cyprus question. They originally had in mind the idea of tridominium under the McMillan Plan which the Greek government resisted and the Turks didn't much like. And eventually by the end of 1958, by which time there was bloodshed here on the island between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and others, there was a possible war between Greece and Turkey. By late 1958 the idea emerged that the Cyprus question should be settled by means of what became known as guaranteed independence.

Archbishop Makarios gradually came around to this idea as well, and in Paris in December 1958 Greek and Turkish governments essentially agreed between themselves that the future of the British colony would be resolved by means of this concept of guaranteed independence. So in Zurich, in the first few days of February 1959 the Greek and Turkish governments convened and they came up with this notion: there will be a Republic of Cyprus which would be nominally independent, it would be subdivided into two parts with a Greek Cypriot political

leadership and Turkish Cypriot political leadership, it would be unitary officially, but in substance it would be subject to what the Turks referred to as “intellectual partition”. So there would have been a unitary state subject to intellectual partition. The phrase of course didn't prop up in the documents that were placed in the public domain back then. And as we all know, this arrangement was going to be underpinned by Treaty of Alliance, giving Greece and Turkey the right to station forces on the island, and the Treaty of Guarantee.

That agreement was concluded in Zurich on the 11th of February between the Greek and Turkish governments. They all jumped on a plane through to London. They met with the British foreign secretary on the evening of the 11th of February 1959. The British foreign secretary gave his blessing, subject to UK requirement to be met which over the next two or three days were indeed met.

Now, the conference needed to be convened. Notice the use of the word ‘conference’. It wasn't really a conference. It wasn't designed to be a conference on which matters were going to be negotiated. This was a piece of political theater. It was designed to create the impression that negotiations were going to be conducted, an agreement was going to be put together. But the agreement was already put together in secret talks between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The purpose of the conference was to convey a semblance of Cypriot participation into the process. So the conference was convened - and I'm glad to see that the photograph of the conference has been placed on your desks - the conference was convened on the 17th of February 1959. Archbishop Makarios was presented with the Zurich-London Agreements, otherwise known as the Lancaster House Agreement, a copy of which I presented to you. This document, or a variation of this document was presented to Archbishop Makarios and to Dr. Küçük, the Turkish Cypriot leader, and they were told ‘take it or leave it’. There was no opportunity for a single word to be amended. **The conference stretched from 17th to the 18th of February, and all sorts of alleged threats were forced on the archbishop's shoulders. He went to bed on the evening of the 18th of February, he prayed, he woke up the following morning and left his signature. And the London Agreement was born, and that London Agreement gave rise to the 1960 Constitution, the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Establishment.**

Now, the point I'm coming to is this. And it's a point that was made in antiquity by none other than Aristotle. And I'm going to read you what Aristotle said in antiquity in his great book ‘Politics’: “The task confronting all those who wish to set up a constitution within a democracy is not only, or even mainly to establish the constitution, but rather to ensure that it is preserved intact.” Aristotle adds: “Any constitution could be made to last for a day or two. It follows,” Aristotle declares, “that a constitution (inaudible) possible to command the support of all citizens.” The key phrase that I take from that analysis of Aristotle is that any constitution can be made to last for a day or two. The primary purpose - as I see it - the primary purpose of the trilateral approach taken by the Greek, Turkish and UK governments in February 1959 was to strike a deal, to cut a deal, to reach a fix which (inaudible) the name of the politicians to go back to their electorate and parliaments and proclaim success.

The downside of this process is that there was no thought given to the long-term future of the very people who would have to live with the consequences of what was agreed. That's the second document that's been given to you is. A cartoon from The Daily Express which is taken from the 12th February 1959 and that cartoon I think says it perfectly: the Greek, Turkish and British governments were primarily interested in just fixing this deal and then walking away, not in the case of Turkey or the UK. That was their primary (inaudible), just cut this deal and

close the Cyprus question, which was bedeviling them for so many years. They failed to hit the basic principle of Aristotle: "look to the future".

We just leap forward a bit - isn't this what was happening with the Annan Plan? Focus, as I see it, was to cut a deal and don't worry too much about the consequences, we'll muddle through the consequences. And I fear that what's going on today is rather similar. The overwhelming objective of Mr. Downer at the UN, the overwhelming objective possibly with parties (inaudible) - I'm not privy to what they're doing. But to me as an outsider it seems that all they seem to be focused on is reaching a deal rather than looking at what's going to happen on a day or two later. And that's my fear. It's all too easy to cut a deal, pick up the Nobel Peace Prize and then see the things disintegrating within a few months or years. And that's really the first major lesson to be drawn from the Lancaster House process. If you are involved in a negotiation and if you're involved in the process designed to set in the Cyprus question, look to the days, weeks and months beyond the conclusion of the implementation of the settlement.

Now, the 1959 Constitution is also very important for another reason. As we all know, as we should know, the 1959 London Agreement enshrined foreign interference in this island, and it prevented the executive government from wielding any effective political power by means of this arrangement whereby there was a Greek Cypriot president and Turkish Cypriot vice-president, a Turkish Cypriot veto and weighted powers in favor of the Turks. This is - as we've discussed before - this was really a product of its era. Let's just take each in turn.

What was the Annan Plan - and I lay my cards on the table here because I campaigned against the Annan Plan from its first incarnation, I didn't wait till the very last moment unlike some. The fundamental premise of the Annan Plan is to enshrine and indeed extend external interference. The Annan Plan, as we know, would have enabled the United Kingdom to maintain its military presence here on the island, in different form, but it would have been essentially preserved under the Annan Plan. The Treaty of Alliance would have remained in place subject to variations. This would have enabled Turkey, who would be the prime beneficiary of it, to maintain a firm military foothold on the island. And I flew over, by the way, I've come over from England; it took ten minutes to fly from Turkey to the island of Cyprus. So they would have been the prime beneficiaries of the Treaty of Alliance.

The Treaty of Guarantee would have remained in place under the Annan Plan in a different form. So what am I saying? I'm saying that the 1959 Zurich-London Agreements are of contemporary relevance today. I would like to see at least the Treaty of Alliance and Treaty of Guarantee swept away. And I would hope that the negotiations which are taking place at present would be based on the premise on the premise that they would be swept away. I don't see that happening because Turkey doesn't want the Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Alliance to be swept away. But that's the relevance of Zurich-London. Whenever I watch RIK - I watch RIK when I'm in England - I very rarely see the politicians, the talking heads on television, go back to this document or its later 1960 version and talk about this being swept aside. They talk about Turkish troops being swept aside. This is what they should be talking about, the legal basis upon which certain Turkish troops are permitted to station in the island. So the second lesson to be drawn from Lancaster House is that the Lancaster House (inaudible) should - in my view - be eradicated as part of any new settlement. It should not form the foundation of any settlement. And this is where I see great difficulty between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. And I don't like those phrases for reason we can discuss later. I don't like the premise of the current negotiations which are predicated on the

Turkish Cypriot premise that these agreements will remain in place. So that's the second lesson to be drawn that has to do with the external powers.

The third lesson to be drawn is from that phrase I used earlier: 'intellectual partition'. According to the Turkish government, the Zurich Agreement which became the London Agreement was predicated on the basis that the Republic of Cyprus would be subject to intellectual partition - not geographical partition, but the intellectual partition. Hence, the detailed provisions in the constitution. Similar provisions are found in the Annan Plan which gives even greater powers to the Turkish Cypriot side. And who knows? They were discussing this in secret.

The current negotiations are proceeding on a similar basis. I think that's fundamentally wrong. Interestingly enough, I had a look the other day at the Radcliffe Plan - the lovely thing about being an academic, we have the time to go back and read old documents. The Radcliffe Plan was quickly dismissed upon its publication because the British government or British colonial secretary decided on the day of its publication to envisage partition as a possible solution of Cyprus question. So this document, the Radcliffe Plan was kicked into touch in December 1956. It was overlooked and forgotten. There's a marvelous little paragraph here in the plan. Lord Radcliffe was a lawyer, one of the most eminent lawyers in the United Kingdom. And he was asked to provide for a constitutional framework whereby the governor would remain in place and power would be diffused down into the two communities. But he says this, and I don't think anything has changed: "I have given my best consideration to the claim put before me on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community. They should be accorded the political representation equal to that of the Greek Cypriot community." Back in '56 the Turks were pushing this idea of having equal representation under the constitution that Radcliffe was going to put together. "If I do not accept it", the 50-50 idea, "I do not think that it is out of any lack of respect for the misgivings that lie behind it. But this is a claim by 20% of the population to share political power equally with 80%, and, if it is to be given effect to, I think it must be made good on one of two possible grounds. Either it is consistent with the principles of a constitution based on liberal and democratic conceptions of political power which should be balanced in this way, or no other means in the creation of such political equilibrium will be effective to protect the essential interests of the community from oppression by the weight of the majority." Radcliffe concludes: "I do not feel that I can stand firmly on either of these propositions. The first embodies the idea of federation rather than a unitary state. It would be natural enough to accord to members of a federation equality of representation in the federal body, regardless of the numerical proportions of the populations in the territories they represent. But can Cyprus be organized as a federation in this way? I do not think so." He's speaking in 1956. "There is no pattern of territorial separation between the two communities (...)." There is now de facto territorial separation, but as we know from our European human rights law and now European Court of Justice Law, there is no legal territorial separation. There is a de facto separation. But he says: "There is no pattern of territorial separation (...) and, apart from other objections, federation of communities which does not involve also federation of territories seems to be a very difficult constitutional form."

And then we come to the crucial point. I've already spoken about the external interference. Now I'm going to (*inaudible*) subdivision of power. And this is what Lord Radcliff says: "I find myself baffled in the attempt to visualize how an effective executive government for Cyprus is to be thrown up by a system in which political power is to remain permanently divided in equal shares between two opposed communities." And I ask you, and perhaps you can help me. I'm an outsider looking in and I find myself baffled. How is it possible to have effective

executive government when you have a 50-50 split in the executive? The Annan Plan tried to resolve this conundrum by giving the deciding vote to the foreign judge sitting on the Supreme Court. Now, quite apart from the lawyers here who could understand this point, perhaps, quite apart from the separation of powers objections to that, is the function of the judiciary to settle political squabbles in the executive? Leading that to one side, is it right that the majority of the population should be subject to an effective veto in the hand of a minority with the balance of power wielded by a foreigner? That was the premise upon which disputes would be resolved under the Annan Plan. It was the grounds upon which disputes would have been resolved in (*inaudible*) and it was the premise upon which the whole system of the Annan Plan was predicated on. Lord Radcliffe, who is far more eminent lawyer than I am, was baffled by the suggestion, and I was baffled as he was. And I don't think anything has changed since he uttered those remarks in 1956. So that's another lesson to be drawn from Lancaster House.

Let's look at some of the others. And I really want to finish within the next ten minutes and have a discussion. Let me skate over this. Number one: a political leader needs to have a sound grasp of history and the principles of public international law, political science and related disciplines. Archbishop Makarios was a priest. He was surrounded by advisers who were well-meaning, but in my view without the benefit of hindsight, I must stress, in carrying the gravitas or the intellectual weight that was perhaps needed. Now, I wasn't privy to the Annan Plan process and I'm not privy to what's going on now. The question I pose is: does the current political leadership here in the Republic of Cyprus have the requisite intellectual weight and do they have the requisite intellectual advisers? Perhaps we can discuss that later.

Second lesson: a political leader must promote the national interest after defining what he means by the national interest. So what is the national interest of the proposed Federal Republic of Cyprus? Is there agreement to go back to Aristotle? Is there agreement between the two sides as to what is the common national interest? Unless there is agreement as to what is the common national interests, then how can you go ahead and construct the constitutional apparatus? Because that constitutional apparatus needs to promote the national interest.

Third lesson: the political leader must identify an achievable strategic objective and then pursue that objective by means of a coherent plan of action. (*inaudible*) appropriate strategy backed up by appropriate tactics. But what is the strategic objective of President Christofias and Mr. Talat? And what strategy are they jointly devising in order to achieve that strategic objective? In my view as an outsider looking in, they don't have that common strategic objective now when they're negotiating. Are they going to have it, to quote Aristotle, towards two or three days after the constitution comes into force? So what is the strategic objective that they are seeking to pursue? What is the role that Cyprus is going to perform in international community? That needs to be articulated and agreed.

Fourth fundamental lesson, and let's go back to procedure. What happens in advance of the conference or behind the scenes once the conference has begun is much more important than what goes on during the proceedings of the conference. Now, I've been reading JK Galbraith here, and I would urge you to read JK Galbraith analysis of the 1929 Wall Street crash, in which he analyzes the concept of meetings. Have they agreed heads of terms? You're closer to this than I am. Have the two sides agreed heads of terms before plunging into the negotiations? That's what we do as lawyers normally. When I act for one client and Christodoulos acts for another client, we don't embark upon detailed negotiations over the terms of the transaction before our respective clients have agreed the principal heads of terms. Have they agreed the principal heads of terms? I know they're talking about this concept of bi-zonal bi-communal

federation. But is the Republic of Cyprus going to be killed off and replaced by a new state? Is the new state of affairs going to be a metamorphosis of the Republic of Cyprus? What is going to be the relationship with NATO, for example? What's going to be the makeup of the Constitutional Court? The Supreme Court? What are going to be the powers of the constituent states? These are fundamental things in my view which ought to be agreed before you plunge into negotiations.

The reason JK Galbraith is so magnificent, among other things, is that he talks about the “no-business business meetings”. Back in 1929 the president, when the banks were crashing, when Wall Street was crashing, he would strut around Washington, he would go to business meetings and he would stand outside buildings and make ground statements to the press. And according to Galbraith most of these meetings were no-business business meetings. And he says that: “This is the type of the meeting which is called not to do business, but to do no-business. The meeting is called not because there is business to be done, but because it is necessary to create the impression that business is being done. Such meetings are regarded more as a substitute for action. Indeed, they are widely regarded as action.” So the purpose of the meeting is to have the meeting. And he goes on: “The no-business meetings of the great business executives,” now he’s talking about 1929, “depend for their illusion of importance on something quite different. Not the exchange of ideas or the spiritual rewards of comradeship, but the solemn sense of assemblage which power gives to the assemblage. Even though nothing of importance is said or done, men of importance cannot meet without the occasion seeming important. Even the commonplace observation of the head of a large corporation is still a statement of the head of a large corporation. What it lacks in content it gains in power from the assets behind it.”

As I see it as an outsider, if you engage in detailed negotiation before you’ve agreed the principal heads of terms, you’re engaging in a no-business business meeting. And again, I’m not privy to what’s going on, but as an outsider looking in, that’s the conclusion that I draw. In my view what they should do is agree the principal heads of terms before plunging into the detail, before setting up committees and subcommittees and working parties and working groups.

A lesson of Lancaster House is a procedural one. Do what you have to do behind closed doors if you have to do it behind closed doors, but make sure that it results in action. Lancaster House resulted in action. It was the wrong action in my point of view, but it actually produced something. So the lesson is: there’s a difference between a business meeting which produces something and a no-business meeting which produces nothing.

The next lesson: a political leader should not rush into making decisions or signing any document with far-reaching irreversible consequences unless they have absolutely no alternative. Archbishop Makarios was told: if you don’t sign, the island will be partitioned - the gist of the alleged threats that were foisted on him. We know from the archival materials behind the scenes, it wasn't in Western interests back then to partition Cyprus. Eisenhower - to be fair to President Eisenhower of the Americans - did not like the idea of partition. The British Chiefs of Staff or (*inaudible*) go around people's homes and ordering people out of their homes in order to produce a 1922-style exchange of population. They were not prepared to do it. So for those reasons, in my view, partitioning idea was off the table. Archbishop Makarios didn't know that. But because he succumbed to the pressure, he fell into the trap that was put before him. And so the lessons of that is: don't cave in to pressure.

Back in 2004, I remember when I was giving a few lectures criticizing the Annan Plan, there were certain people who quite understandably were supporting the Annan Plan because they feared the consequences of voting 'no'. And one of the arguments that was (*inaudible*) was that the so-called 'TRNC' – the Turkish-occupied north – would receive international recognition. That was one of the arguments battling about at the time of the Annan Plan. I remember saying back in 2003 and early 2004, it's not in the Western interest to provide a *de jure* recognition to the Turkish-occupied north. If there's a *de jure* recognition and there's *de jure* partition, it means the Treaty of Establishment will be unraveled. The UK will not have the right to overfly the occupied north. The UK will not have the right to use the port of Famagusta. The UK will not have the right to use facilities in the Turkish-occupied north, should they wish to do so under the Treaty of Establishment. And it is not in British interests for that to happen, it's not in the American interest for that to happen. The strategic calculations to one side, public international law cannot allow a precedent whereby separate sovereign state is carved out of the existing unitary state by means of the use of force. And I think my argument runs true.

And so the lesson for the future is: if we ever come to a new Annan Plan scenario and threats are bandied about, learn the lesson of Lancaster House, and learn the lesson of 2004, and don't cave in to pressures. And that argument is even more important now when the Republic of Cyprus is a member of the European Union. And I'm struck, of course, by what Sophocles said in antiquity: "Quick decisions are unsafe decisions."

Two or three more conclusions, and then I'll wrap up and have a discussion. Legal advice. It is absolutely imperative that a political leader who goes into a conference hall or goes into a set of negotiations with appropriate legal advice. Archbishop Makarios had Zenon Rossides, a fabled diplomat, skilful lawyer. The question, I'll put it in the form of question: did he have the requisite legal skills experience and knowledge to grapple with the huge legal questions raised by the Lancaster House agreement? Did Glafkos Klerides, did Spyros Kyprianou, did the other lawyers who formed part of the circle around Makarios, did they have the requisite skills? This document raises complicated questions of constitutional law and public international law, to name but two.

Today in 2009 the Cyprus question raises issues of public international law to do with state sovereignty, for example, and armed forces. It raises questions of maritime law, raises questions of international human rights law, raises questions of European Union law, constitutional law - I can go on, and on and on ad nauseam. Question: does President Christofias have the requisite team of lawyers, both here on the island and perhaps overseas, to tender the requisite legal advice in order to navigate way through the choppy legal waters? Law was complicated back then in 1959, today it seems even more complicated. It is absolutely vital that you have appropriate legal advice.

I'm just going to give you a little observation by one of our great judges in England Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. This is what he said in a case called Royal Bank of Scotland and Etridge. What do we mean by independent legal advice? This is what President Christofias needs, I hope he has this. But I'm just going to give this to you. This is, by the way, what Tony Blair allegedly didn't have in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq. "All that is necessary is that some independent person free from any taint of the relationship or the consideration of interest which would affect the act should put clearly before the person what are the nature and the consequences of the act." This is a domestic context but I think it's of broad importance. It simply means that the advice shall be removed entirely from the suspected

atmosphere and that from the clear language of an independent mind they should know precisely what they are doing. I don't think in hindsight Zenon Rossides was sufficiently removed from the suspected atmosphere. In the same, I don't think that Lord Goldsmith was removed entirely from the suspected atmosphere back in 2003 in relation to Iraq. The best form of legal advice is legal advice from an in-house government legal team, the attorney general, government legal advisors, side by side with external advisors. The Turkish Cypriots interestingly enough back in the 50s had professor Jennings from Cambridge as an external advisor. Professor of constitutional law. They had their in-house advice but they had at least one external advisor to give this independent legal advice. "Furthermore, a political leadership not normally allow this decision making to be shaped by theological or religious considerations." I think Archbishop Makarios was fairly clearly allowed some theological and religious considerations to enter his mind. I'll just quote you the Chief Rabbi of the United Kingdom Dr. Jonathan Sacks who I very much enjoy listening to, very lucid and articulate and intelligent gentleman. But according to the chief rabbi: "I can't imagine anything worse than ruled by religious leaders and I would have nothing to do with."

Let's just wrap up. The rule of law should prevail - this is my concluding thought. The rule of law should and must prevail. And what do we mean by the rule of law? It means that everybody involved in the process must comply with the law, everybody involved in the process is subject to the law, and nobody in the process is above the law. I began by quoting Aristotle, I'll end by quoting Aristotle: "The rule of the law is preferable to that of any individual." And if there is to be a settlement to the Cyprus question, it requires the rule of law to prevail. But what it also entails, as I've hopefully explained over the last forty minutes or so, is a correct procedure, and the correct procedure which results in an appropriate substance. I've written two articles recently, one of which I've circulated around the room, which supports this idea of a settlement from the bottom up. Settlement in which the citizens are in the driving seat, not the politicians up in the clouds and behind closed doors operating in secret. The citizens are in the driving seat. The citizens should have an opportunity to have an input into the process, the citizens should have an opportunity to scrutinize the documentation as it evolves. This is a democracy. If it's a democracy, then normal democratic principles should prevail. We should be seeing that the legislation that is being drafted goes through as in England: the first reading, second reading and so on, we should see the documentation as it evolves. We should have sight of the minutes of the meetings. Perhaps like in Northern Ireland where they have a mixture of secret meetings and open meetings. But the current process as I see is procedurally defective. And Lancaster House suggests that if you get the procedure wrong, you'll end up with defective substance as well.

I rest my case.

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