
REPORT

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THE SECURITY PROBLEM OF CYPRUS

INTRODUCTION

1. As we all know, negotiations are currently underway for a new political settlement in Cyprus. Solving the security problem of Cyprus is a key element in these negotiations. Bearing in mind that solutions are often determined by the way a problem is defined, it is important to cast the *Cyprus Security Problem* in its proper dimensions.
2. The current threats to Cyprus security, both internal and external, can be traced back to the birth of the Republic of Cyprus and before. Historically, external threats came from Cyprus's volatile geopolitical environment and the competing interests of regional and global actors. Internal threats have emanated from the ethnic and religious differences among Cypriots and the way that such differences were exploited by external actors, mainly by Britain and Turkey.
3. What is important at this point is to assess the current and future relevance of such threats. This will help define the security problem of Cyprus more accurately and help provide solutions that will make sense both for Cyprus as well as for Western security in this troubled region of the world.

GEOPOLITICS

4. Cyprus, in the course of its long history, suffered greatly and indeed is still suffering as a result of its geostrategic importance. Strong regional and global powers have always sought control of the island as a means of advancing their own national interests. In its more recent history Cyprus has suffered what is perhaps the most serious attack on its geographical integrity and its national identity. The Turkish invasion of 1974 and the ensuing military occupation of a large part of Cyprus was followed by a deliberate attempt to alter the island's demographic character by illegally transferring thousands of Turkish settlers to the island.¹ Turkey's intention is to increase the

¹ Laakso Jaakko, *Colonisation by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus*, Report (Doc. 9799), 2 May, 2003. Council of Europe Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography.

<http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc03/EDOC9799.htm>.

Turkish Islamic ethnic element in Cyprus at the expense of the islands Greek Christian population (in violation of international law) and establish a regime subject to Turkish hegemony.

5. The location of Cyprus between the main oil producing, and oil consuming, regions of the world emphasises its geostrategic importance. Cyprus is located next to vital trade and oil routes that stretch from Central Asia through the Middle East and the Suez Canal to Europe. It is close to oil sources and their pipeline terminals on the Eastern Mediterranean coast (on the Turkish part Ceyhan and on the Israeli part Haifa). Ceyhan especially is emerging as an important energy link across from Cyprus on the Alexandretta Gulf of Turkey. The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline transfers oil from north Iraq to the West through Ceyhan, and the sea lanes along the northern coast of Cyprus. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline transfers oil from the Caspian Sea to the West through Turkey, and the sea corridor north of Cyprus. There are also plans to ship oil from Ceyhan to India, through the port city of Ashkelon in Israel and then by pipeline to the Red Sea port of Eilat where it can be shipped to East Asia.²
6. Cyprus also forms a communications and intelligence bridge between Asia, Africa and Europe. The bulk of air transportation from Europe to the Middle East crosses the Cyprus airspace. Important infrastructure supports air and naval military operations in the Middle East, surveillance over the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as intelligence gathering and communications monitoring of the Middle East, North Africa and beyond. Broadcasting stations for military purposes and propaganda, and state-of-the-art intelligence installations on the British military bases form part of the Echelon System.³
7. The fact that the British military bases in Cyprus are among the few overseas military facilities to have been retained by the UK into the twenty first century, underscores their geostrategic importance. They are necessary to the UK to secure its national interests in the area, especially those related to security and energy. The geopolitical importance of both Cyprus and the British military bases on the island has increased in recent years as a result of the increased instability in the Middle East with the escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Lebanon crisis, and the wars in Gaza, Iraq and Afghanistan.

TURKEY

8. Turkey plays a significant role in shaping the security environment of Cyprus. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse its intentions and aspirations for Cyprus. Turkey has made it clear that it aims to become a strong regional power in the Middle East, the Southern Balkans and the Caucasus region. Turkey's efforts to secure this objective include the assumption of a hegemonic attitude over its neighbours coupled with an intensive military build-up. Large military forces backed by large military industrial and procurement programmes, and a strong war industry help ensure Turkey's importance as a NATO Member. Its regional role is emphasized with large-scale participation in UN sponsored multinational forces and EU sanctioned activities.

² Garbis Koharian., "the Conquest of Eurasia: NATO's war for the world's Heartland" Article in the Armenian News Network/Groong, Thursday, 11 June 2009. <http://groong.usc.edu/news/msg272844.html>

³ O'Malley, B. & Craig, I., *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, (1999), London, pp. 81.

9. Turkey's regional role is further strengthened through its control of vital energy routes to the West, such as the Ceyhan terminal of the BTC, Kirkuk pipelines and water resources to the Middle East through the harnessing of the sources of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.
10. Exploitation of its geostrategic importance and its considerable leverage over its relations with the US, Russia, the EU, the Middle East, the Balkans and the countries of the Caucasus region has helped Turkey obtain additional political, military and economic benefits. At home, Turkey has discredited the Kurdish independence movement and has succeeded in branding the PKK as a 'terrorist' organisation, and therefore undeserving of any international support. On the contrary, Turkey has successfully induced the EU and successive US governments into providing it with billions of dollars and Euros in military and economic aid, and has even convinced Russia to accept a redefinition of Turkish role in the Black Sea region.⁴
11. Moreover, Turkey's declared opposition to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq aims to further frustrate secessionist efforts of its own Kurdish minority and help Turkey pursue additional privileges for western exploitation and transfer of northern Iraqi oil.
12. With the encouragement of the US, Turkey has increased its mediation role in the Middle East and even offered to mediate between Russia and Georgia. Similarly, Turkey's efforts to join the EU, with the help of the US, and the UK, aims to increase its geopolitical importance. So does its co-operation with the US in the war against terrorism, the cessation of the Iranian nuclear programme and the stabilisation in Iraq and the Caucasus area. Turkey strengthens its cooperation with Syria and the Palestinians while the Israeli-Turkish strategic cooperation is deteriorating.
13. In the Aegean Sea however, Turkey continues its aggressive policy. Through military power projection and systematic violations of Greek sovereign rights over sea and air space, Turkey aims to change the existing status quo between the two countries. In Western Thrace, Turkish policy has focused on using the Muslim minority as a tool for political pressure on Greece.⁵
14. As far as Cyprus is concerned, Turkey pursues the strategic objective established in the 1950s by Nihat Erim, a well-known Turkish jurist and later politician who was instrumental in defining Turkish policy toward Cyprus. In his 1956 Cyprus-related reports,⁶ Erim called for Turkish intervention rights and the presence of Turkish military forces in Cyprus to ensure the security of the south coast of Turkey and enhance the Turkish role in the Middle East, and Eastern Mediterranean. This objective was secured with the Treaties of Guarantee⁷ and Alliance⁸ which were made part of the 1960 Cyprus settlement. Erim further counselled in favour of partition of Cyprus and demographic change of the island by encouraging Turks to come to Cyprus from abroad. Nihat Erim was the Turkish Prime Minister Menderes adviser on the Cyprus issue and he

⁴ *US declare PKK 'a common enemy'*. BBC Friday, 2 November 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7074361.stm, *EU supports Turkey against PKK 'terrorists': Interview with EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn.*, Published EurActiv Tuesday 23 October 2007 <http://www.euractiv.com/en/foreign-affairs/interview-eu-supports-turkey-pkk-terrorists/article-167805>

⁵ Koumakis Leonidas, *the Miracle: A True Story*, Third Edition (1995) Athens p. 127

⁶ George Angeletopoulos presentation at the IV International Conference on Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus May 2008 on Nihat Erim's reports on Cyprus.

⁷ Appendix B of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus - Treaty of Guarantee, <http://www.cyprus.gov.cy>

⁸ Appendix C of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus - Treaty of Alliance, <http://www.cyprus.gov.cy>

supported that “Cyprus was never Greek”⁹. Today, with the northern part of Cyprus being under occupation of strong military forces, the Turks felt that they could easily extend their political control over the entire island and could therefore extend their geopolitical control further over the Eastern Mediterranean.

15. Erim’s objectives were fully implemented by the Turkish invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus in 1974. The expulsion of the Greek inhabitants in the north, and their replacement by mainland Turks in violation of international law, as well as the 1983 unilateral declaration of independence of the illegal Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (the “TRNC”) ¹⁰, can all be traced back to Erim’s grand design.
16. Over the past 35 years, Turkey’s objectives have received strong support from the USA and the UK. Such support was particularly manifested in connection with the 2004 plan for the settlement of the Cyprus problem, sponsored by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. The “Annan Plan”, as it came to be known, envisioned a demilitarised Cyprus with limited sea and air sovereign rights, with Turkey having effective control over the whole island (intervention rights for Turkish military forces that were to remain in Cyprus indefinitely).¹¹
17. To further ensure this outcome, Turkey refused to accept inclusion in the Annan Plan of any legislation of the Republic of Cyprus regarding the establishment of the continental shelf and sea zones. The Turkish side also refused to accept the agreement signed in 2003 between the Republic of Cyprus and Egypt on Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), and the exploitation of Cyprus’ considerable offshore oil and gas reserves. It also refused to incorporate the Montreux Convention of 1936.
18. Turkey also insisted on separate search and rescue responsibilities between the two Cyprus “constituent states”, with the establishment of separate search and rescue co-ordination centres. Turkey demanded, and was successful in incorporating into the Annan Plan, several bilateral agreements between Turkey and the “TRNC” to include the coastal security and search and rescue, which gave Turkey the right to have unlimited access to Cyprus sea and airspace, without having to seek the permission of the “United Republic of Cyprus”.¹²
19. Furthermore, there were limitations placed on the Republic of Cyprus concerning the disposal of its territory to facilitate military international operations. Any such activity would need the consent of both Turkey and Greece. Any participation of Cyprus in EU – ESDP activities could only occur if such activities did not violate any of the terms of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance of 1960.¹³

⁹ Erim Nihat, *Bildigrim ve Gordugum Olculer Incinde Kibris*. Ankara (1976) pp. 169 – 170. (Translation by Neoklis Sarris, E Alle Plevra., Vol. I Athens 1977)

¹⁰ Under Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) the so-called “TRNC” is not a recognised state.

¹¹ Article 8 of the Foundation Agreement and Annexes III and IV of the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem (“the Annan Plan”), UN, 31st March 2004, Fifth Edition. <http://www.unficyp.org/>

¹² Annex III, attachment 10 and 11, Foundation Agreements of the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem (“the Annan Plan”), UN, 31st March 2004, Fifth Edition. <http://www.unficyp.org/>

¹³ Article 8 of the Foundation Agreement of the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem (“the Annan Plan”), UN, 31st March 2004, Fifth Edition. <http://www.unficyp.org/>

20. Based on the provisions of the Annan Plan, the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey would not have the right to keep navy and air forces in Cyprus. This restriction, however, actually only adversely affected Cyprus and Greece, and not Turkey. Turkey maintains naval and air-force bases on its coast in the Eastern Mediterranean, immediately opposite Cyprus. Turkey would have the right to conduct any aeronautical activity in and around Cyprus without the permission of the Republic of Cyprus, since its bilateral agreements with the “TRNC” gave it that right. The ultimate objective of the Annan Plan was to neutralise the geopolitical role of Greece and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean sea, and to transform Cyprus into a Turkish dependency.
21. Turkish ability to project air and naval power over and around Cyprus is of great importance because it enables Turkey to control the routes of trade and petroleum from the Far and Middle East through the Suez Canal to the West, as well as the oil pipeline terminals to the Eastern Mediterranean coasts. It also makes Turkey, together with Britain and Israel, the exclusive guardians of Western interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.
22. During the current negotiations Turkey has taken every opportunity to emphasize that the area of the Eastern Mediterranean is of great interest to it, for use by its air and naval forces, and dispute the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus over the island’s maritime zone and the Nicosia Flight Information Region (FIR).
23. Turkey’s then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Babacan, stated on September 10 2008 that Turkey does not recognise that the two communities (Greek and Turkish) in Cyprus could even discuss the matter of security. This theme has been picked up by the new Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmed Davutoglu, who has made it clear that the system of guarantees established for Cyprus under the 1960 settlement cannot be altered as this is a matter that affects the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean and the role of Turkey. Similar statements were made by the Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces, General Basbouğ.¹⁴ Furthermore, Turkey has established a policy of harassing the research efforts, for hydrocarbon resources in Cyprus’s EEZ by the use of its naval forces which constitutes a violation of international law.
24. Despite the accession of Cyprus to the EU, Turkey’s occupation forces remain in Cyprus. At present it is estimated that about 43,000 Turkish soldiers, a ratio of 3:1 in comparison with the national guard of the Republic of Cyprus, is stationed in the northern part of the Island.¹⁵
25. The composition of the Turkish military forces include mechanised and armoured formations (296 tanks, 212 artillery guns, 677 armoured infantry battle vehicles), which are deployed in a forward offensive formation against the free areas.¹⁶ These forces are meant to exercise strong psychological pressure against the Greek Cypriots, in an effort to induce them to accept a solution to the Cyprus problem that would serve the strategic interests of Turkey.

¹⁴ Politis Newspaper 19th September, 2008. (ref.code: 817037)

¹⁵ Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus “*The Cyprus Question, A Brief Introduction*”, p.1.0., 372/2008
<http://www.moi.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/All/1A907466A6F4C923C22575940024550F?OpenDocument>

¹⁶ Letter dated 21st February 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General 28/02/2007. <http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/All/4FC90989378EAD00C225729000290986?OpenDocument>

26. As a result of its 1974 invasion, Turkey perpetuated serious war crimes against the Greek Cypriot people of Cyprus. Many such crimes regarding mistreatment and murder of civilians and prisoners of war have gone unpunished.¹⁷
27. Turkey is, also in violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention. Since 1974, Turkey has continued illegally and systematically to import Turkish settlers into Cyprus (115,000 by 2003¹⁸ and 160,000¹⁹ by 2008) with the clear intention of altering the island's demographic balance. As a result, the Turkish Cypriots (88,000)²⁰ have become a minority in the North. There are now *two* Turkish settlers for every *one* Turkish Cypriot.²¹ Turkey, with provocative statements and actions organises naval and air military exercises, and constantly harasses Cyprus government sponsored oil and gas searches within Cyprus's EEZ, continues to challenge the sovereign rights of Cyprus – Montego Bay 1982 International Treaty on the law of sea. Turkey also refuses to recognise that the islands have their own continental shelf and EEZ.
28. Turkey is systematically trying to force the Republic of Cyprus to stop its programme of oil and gas exploration in the EEZ agreed with Egypt in the sea area south of Cyprus. Turkey also disputes Cyprus's sovereign rights over its air space and continuously violates the Nicosia FIR with military aircrafts which in turn poses a serious threat to civil aviation in the area.
29. Turkey conducts aeronautical military exercises in this area, notably the exercise codenamed *Sea-wolf*. In November 2008, Turkish warships harassed the activities of a Norwegian oceanographic vessel acting on behalf of the Republic of Cyprus in its EEZ. The latter, having no way to respond and protect its rights, had no other choice but to refer the incident to the UN. To no avail, however, and with Turkey occupying a seat on the Security Council, no remedy is expected.
30. Ahmet Davutoglu the new Turkish Foreign Minister and architect of the “zero problem” theory of Turkish foreign policy clearly suggests in his theories of Turkey's “strategic depth” that Turkey's benign attitude toward its regional neighbours, by the exercise of a “maximum cooperation” policy in order to bring economic benefits from regional peace, does not include the Republic of Cyprus since it affects Turkish vital interest.²²

¹⁷ European Commission of Human Rights Report., CYPRUS AGAINST TURKEY., (Adopted on 10 July 1976) <http://www.cyprus-dispute.org/materials/echr/index.html>., *Greek Cypriot Bodies Identified*. BBC, Tuesday, 11 August 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8196106.stm>., CASE OF VARNAVA AND OTHERS v. TURKEY., <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4acc5ef12.pdf>

¹⁸ Laakso Jaakko, *Colonisation by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus*, Report (Doc. 9799), 2nd May, 2003. Council of Europe Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography. <http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc03/EDOC9799.htm>

¹⁹ Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus “*The Cyprus Question, A Brief Introduction*”, p.51 372/2008 <http://www.moi.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/All/1A907466A6F4C923C22575940024550F?OpenDocument>

²⁰ Statistical service of the Republic of Cyprus demographic report 2006., <http://www.pio.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/B34F2AC2C4546FDCC22573B1003325A9?OpenDocument>

²¹ Coufoudakis, Van., “*Human Rights Violations in Cyprus by Turkey*”, Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus p. 1.0 431/2008 <http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/25F252AA003F82A8C225759400246F88?OpenDocument>

²² According to the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, Cyprus, because of its strategic location, should be among Turkey's main policies even if not a single Turk lived on the island., Ahmet Davutoglu, *Stratejik Derinlik, Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, Istanbul, Kiire Yayinlan, 2001, pp. 179., Uslu Emrullah., *Ahmet Davutoglu: The Man behind Turkey's Assertive Foreign Policy*: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 57 March 25, 2009. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_tnews%5Btt_news%5D=34754 .

GREECE

31. The Greek Cypriots (82% of the total population of Cyprus) waged an anti-colonial liberation struggle between 1966 – 1959, against British rule, with the purpose and willingness to unite the island with Greece. They were unsuccessful in the unification and the result of their struggle was the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus as an independent state in 1960. In fact the nascent republic was imposed upon the people of Cyprus by granting a fettered independence and dysfunctional constitutional arrangements provided extraordinary veto powers to the Turkish Cypriots (18% of the population).
32. Greece, after the independence of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot rebellion 1963 inspired and organized by Turkey, transferred military forces to Cyprus to protect the Greek Cypriots from Turkish aggression. These forces were withdrawn in 1967. In 1974, Greece during the dictatorship period, staged a coup in Cyprus on July 15, 1974 and overthrew the legal government of Archbishop Makarios. The illegal intervention, lasted one week and just after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus on July 20 1974, the dictatorship in Greece collapsed.
33. After the Turkish invasion and the continuation of the occupation of the northern part of the island, the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, established defence cooperation in 1993 to discourage further expansionist intentions of Turkey.
34. Greece in contrast to Turkey, has never defined itself as a regional actor. Nor has it had any recent imperial history to look back upon with nostalgia. Huge numbers of Greeks were expelled mainly from Turkey as well as other parts of the region. Greece effort to absorb millions of such victims of ethnic cleansing plague Greek social and economic order to this day. Today, Greece has neither the political will nor the motivation and mission to project any form of expansionism beyond its borders. Its commitments to the Cyprus issue are focused to help the solution of the problem, rather than expand its role on Cyprus. In this respect, Greece supports the suspending of the obsolete treaties of Guarantee and Alliance of 1960, as well as the intervention rights of the guarantors, Greece, Turkey and Britain. It's an attitude stressing the dedication of Greece to disengage itself from Cyprus in contrast to Turkey whose strategic interest is to control the island.

BRITAIN

35. Britain also has an important role for the solution of the Cyprus problem, and the issue of local and regional security. The British intention is to secure and strengthen the regime governing the British bases, and to retain and even extend its control over Cyprus waters. In 2004, Britain insisted on an additional protocol to the Treaty of Establishment of 1960 that included the demarcation *by a single* British expert of sea zones that the Republic of Cyprus would not have been able to claim as part of its territorial waters.²³
36. The protocol also gave the UK the right to enjoy complete and unimpeded access for *any purpose* to the waters adjacent to the sovereign base areas. Any dispute about the interpretation of this

²³ Annex II Articles 6 and 7 of the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem ("the Annan Plan"), UN, 31st March 2004, Fifth Edition. <http://www.unficyp.org/>

additional protocol would have been resolved by consultation, and would not have been referred to any international tribunal or third party for settlement.

37. The British bases are a colonial remnant, and in some quarters of the British policy establishment, it is apparently felt that this may ultimately create problems. The Annan Plan, therefore, presented the opportunity to have secured the UK's legal rights over the territory by popular referendum. The UK even offered a large part of the British bases to Cyprus to urge implementation of the 2004 Annan Plan. Britain's 2004 offer should be seen in conjunction with efforts to secure the full demilitarisation of Cyprus and the elimination of the island's role in the context of ESDP. Such British willingness to swap part of the territory of the bases for strengthening their legal status and expanding their claims over the sea space adjacent to the remaining base areas is consistent with a broader British strategic perspective. Following the end of WWII, Britain together with the US helped craft for itself a particular strategic advantage in the Eastern Mediterranean. By giving Cyprus, then a British colony, control over a disproportionately large part of the air and sea space of the Eastern Mediterranean, it essentially ensured for itself the *de-jure* air and sea dominance over the area. Cyprus independence meant that this area now belonged to Cyprus. Cyprus's own military weakness and the presence of the British Bases meant therefore that effectively this area remained under British strategic control.
38. Effective strategic control over the air and sea territory around Cyprus is perhaps the one unifying thread that runs through modern Cyprus history, from its independence struggle in the 1950s to the Greek coup and the Turkish invasion that followed in 1974, through the various phases of the negotiations to reach a settlement before as well as after Cyprus's accession to the EU.
39. At a first glance this would suggest both Britain and Turkey share an interest in keeping Cyprus weak and internally divided without any significant military and political role in Europe or in the region; its internal stability and survival dependant on the preservation of a precarious balance between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Turkish strategic interests over Cyprus and the Aegean on the other hand, are best served by a level of instability and tension which will enable Turkey to continue to extending its firm control over Cyprus and the Greek islands of the Eastern Aegean. However, a demilitarised and politically weak Cyprus will not help the achieving stability of the region. Neither will it serve the interests of the EU and western security
40. It is important to note that in the context of its own accession, the UK excluded its bases in Cyprus from the jurisdiction of the EU. The bases are therefore not part of EU territory and can be used exclusively for the interests of Britain, avoiding any EU-related responsibilities or constraints. Britain can, therefore, freely use the bases to support any of its allies in the context of NATO, especially the US. British actions can be explained in the context of efforts to sustain its role in the area of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, under a broader US strategic umbrella. The British bases constitute one of the three corners of the triangle that dominates the Eastern Mediterranean under such US umbrella, the other two being Israel and Turkey. The UK shares many of the US's interests in this sensitive area. The recent international developments, including energy security, large-scale terrorist action, Middle East instability, the Iraq and Afghan wars, and the Iranian nuclear development programme, all argue for an increase in the importance of the bases. It is also clear that the UK is reluctant to share this role with other EU member states.

41. It is important to appreciate that unlike Turkey, Britain's interest in Cyprus and in the region involves the ability and potential to project power and do not include intentions of demographic alterations of the island.

SECURITY AND DEFENCE OF CYPRUS

42. Security is a fundamental factor in the existence and proper function of a state. It relates to the preservation of a state's independence and territorial integrity, the implementation of sovereign rights, the preservation of the freedom and security of its citizens, and the protection of its political, economic and cultural way of life.
43. To fulfil its security obligations, a state must possess adequate defence capabilities against military, economic, diplomatic and asymmetric threats. To secure such defence capabilities, a state must have reliable military forces and must participate in global security organisations and in political and military alliances. The possession of a credible defence capability provides deterrence and contributes to the promotion of peace and security.
44. Especially after the appearance of asymmetric threats, no country can defend itself alone against all types of threats, but especially the new types of threats that are more diverse, less visible and less predictable. An effective intelligence capability is an indispensable part of an adequate state defence.
45. The Republic of Cyprus faces serious security problems and threats that emanate from the aggressive and expansionist intentions of Turkey against Cyprus, as well as an increasingly volatile Middle East. Threats that include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organised crime are particularly difficult to deal with.
46. The Republic of Cyprus has limited defence capabilities, especially with regards to its airspace and territorial waters, which cover an extensive part of the Eastern Mediterranean. The military co-operation with Greece enhances the defence capabilities of the Republic of Cyprus, but not to the required level as far as military forces, strategic intelligence, and psychological and electronic warfare capabilities are concerned.
47. Because of the continuation of the occupation Cyprus's northern part, Cyprus established a defence co-operation with Greece in 1993. The *Doctrine of Unified Defence Area* was declared between Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and President Glafkos Clerides with the purpose to discourage any expansionist intentions of Turkey against Cyprus. There was also a purpose of enhancing the deterrent capabilities of the Cyprus National Guard, especially in the sea and air area. The defence co-operation between the two countries was active throughout the period 1993-2000. The main effort was given to the joint aeronautical military exercises in the area between the Greek island of Kastellorizon and Cyprus where the EEZ's of the two states adjoins. This co-operation has been gradually degraded especially when the discussion for a solution of the Cyprus problem started under UN secretary general Kofi Annan.

48. The EU umbrella provides the Republic of Cyprus with some degree of security on a strategic level, but the threats still exist because of the geographical position of Cyprus in the vicinity of the volatile area of the Middle East, and the Turkish expansionist policy against the island.
49. Today, Cyprus sovereignty is de facto split into four parts. The legitimate, internationally recognised government, Republic of Cyprus controls the free areas in the southern part of the island. Turkey controls the northern third of the island, which its military occupies while the UN controls over the buffer zone with the UK claiming exclusive de jure authority over its extensive military bases (almost 100 square miles of the island).
50. To be effective, the new Cypriot state, which would be the result of a new settlement, must have a single national security strategy based on common national and state interests. The national security strategy of the new state should focus on the following objectives: the maintenance of the autonomy and power of the state; the protection of national interests; the defence against threats to the security and sovereignty of the state; as well as the preservation of peace, stability and security both in Cyprus and in the region that surrounds it.
51. To formulate such national security strategy, it is necessary for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to define common national interests for the Cyprus Republic, and identify the probable threats against its security, both conventional and asymmetric. The new state must free itself of foreign guardianships and limitations to its sovereign rights. It must also avoid having any part of its sovereignty exercised by any other country.

THE 1960 CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: INVITATION FOR ABUSE

52. The 1960 regime of international guaranties, based on the treaties of Guarantee and Alliance involving Britain, Greece and Turkey, proved to be a disaster for the Republic of Cyprus due to the fact that they were imposed on the Cypriots under duress. These were not the expression of the public will, and they violated the right of the Republic of Cyprus to freely exercise its independence and sovereignty, and fully enjoy the benefits of international law. The 1960 system of guaranties not only failed to protect the Republic of Cyprus, but was also used as leverage to forward the interests of the guarantors at the expense of those of the Republic of Cyprus. As a result, independence, territorial integrity, security and constitutional order of Cyprus were primarily violated by the guarantors themselves.
53. The dysfunctional 1960 Constitution offered its guarantors perfect opportunities for intervention. When in 1963 the President of the Republic proposed some amendments to facilitate the functioning of the state, the Turkish community, guided by Turkey, responded with rebellion. In December 1963, the Turkish Cypriot ministers withdrew from the cabinet and Turkish public servants left their posts. After 1963, the declared aim of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, acting on instructions from the Turkish Government, was the partitioning of Cyprus. On the Greek side, the coup that was staged in Cyprus on 15th July 1974 by the Greek military junta, then in power in Greece, and its Greek Cypriot collaborators briefly overthrew the government of President Makarios. Turkey used this criminal act as a pretext to launch an invasion on July 20 against the Republic of Cyprus. The invasion was carried out in two stages (July 20-22, and August 14-16) in which Turkish troops eventually occupied 36.2% of the island's territory. The invasion caused

physical and economic devastation for the Greek Cypriots with about 5,000 Greek Cypriot casualties (killed and missing in action), 10,000 injured, and the entire northern third of the island ethnically cleansed with almost all Greek Cypriots presence wiped-out.

54. Ankara tried to justify the invasion as a “peace operation” aimed at restoring the constitutional order disturbed by the coup, but even after the restoration of constitutional order with the assumption of power by the House President, Glafcos Clerides, on July 23, and the return of President Makarios to the island in December 1974, the Turkish troops remained. Turkey’s plan to partition and colonise Cyprus came into full effect. About 200,000 Greek Cypriots, 70% of the population in the north, were forced to leave their homes in the occupied area and were turned into refugees. The few Greek Cypriots who remained in their homes after the completion of the invasion were gradually forced through intimidating methods to leave their homes and move to the south.²⁴ By 2008, fewer than 500 enclaved Greek Cypriots have remained in the occupied areas, mainly in the Karpass area. Turkey continues with the occupation of 36.2% of Cyprus’s territory, in utter disregard of repeated UN resolutions²⁵ calling for the respect of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as the withdrawal of all foreign troops from its territory, and the adoption of all practical measures to promote the effective implementation of the relevant resolutions.
55. This attitude of Turkey, as well as the continuing violation of the fundamental human rights of the people of Cyprus, has been condemned by international bodies, such as the UN General Assembly, the European Parliament, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth and the Council of Europe. The declassified report of the Council’s Commission of Human Rights reveals the extent of the atrocities committed by the Turkish forces of occupation.²⁶
56. Several rounds of inter-communal talks between the island’s two main communities (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots) have not led to any positive development. To a great extent, the blame should be attributed to Turkey’s intransigence and continuing efforts to partition the island by means of maintaining its occupation force and by the systematic colonisation of the occupied part of Cyprus in violation of international law, including the Geneva Convention 1949. The systematic destruction of the demographic balance of the island, as well as the alteration of the historic and cultural heritage of the northern part of Cyprus under Turkish occupation are well documented by international observers.²⁷ Turkey has tried to create a separate Turkish Cypriot economy, totally dependent on Turkey. Furthermore, in 1983, Turkey established the illegal regime of the “Turkish Republic of North Cyprus”,²⁸ where Greek Cypriot properties were illegally appropriated.

²⁴ Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus “The Cyprus Question, A Brief Introduction”, p.1.0., 372/2008 <http://www.moi.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/All/1A907466A6F4C923C22575940024550F?OpenDocument>

²⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 353, July 20 1974.

²⁶ Cyprus v Turkey Application No. 25781/94 European Court of Human Rights, 10th May 2001 <http://cmiskp.echr.coe>.

²⁷ Laakso Jaakko, *Colonisation by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus*, Report (Doc. 9799), 2nd May, 2003. Council of Europe Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography. <http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc03/EDOC9799.htm>

Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v Goldberg and Feldman Fine Arts Inc 917F.2d 278, US Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, Decision of 24th October 1990. <http://www.uniset.ca/microstates/917F2d278.htm>

Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus “The Cyprus Question, A Brief Introduction” p.1.0., 372/2008 <http://www.moi.gov.cy/MOI/pio/pio.nsf/All/1A907466A6F4C923C22575940024550F?OpenDocument>

²⁸ UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983), 550 (1984)

57. Over the past 35 years, Turkey has both exploited, and violated the treaties of Guarantee and Alliance of the 1960 settlement. The Treaty of Alliance provides for 650 Turkish soldiers to be stationed in Cyprus, the present number, as mentioned above is approximately 43,000. Despite the fact that the treaties clearly provide for Turkey and the other two guarantors to preserve the independence, territorial integrity, security of the Republic of Cyprus, by interpreting article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee as giving it right to take unilateral military action in Cyprus, Turkey invaded and occupied the northern part of the island. This interpretation is inconsistent with article 53 of the UN charter, according to which only the Security Council may authorize the use of military action, as well as with article 2(4) which prohibits the use or the threat or the use of force by states in their international relations.
58. As the 2004 Annan Plan revealed, Turkey's insistence on the presentation for the treaties of Guarantee and Alliance of 1960 (and its self-asserted right to unilateral action) clearly reveal Turkey's strategic objective of military and political control of Cyprus.
59. This view is further supported by the fact that during the Annan Plan negotiations, Turkey refused to accept any suggestion to make actions taken under the Treaty of Guarantee subject to approval by the Security Council of the UN. Today, Turkey supports the Annan plan provisions for the security of Cyprus.

CYPRUS ACCESSION TO THE EU

60. The application of such obsolete treaties of Guarantee and Alliance cannot be justified after the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU. Cyprus would continue to be under the guardianship of three other states, two of which are members of the EU (UK and Greece), and the third (Turkey) outside of the EU. Incidentally, another unacceptable term included in the Annan Plan put limitations in Cyprus's participation in ESDP activities, to the extent of not affecting provisions of the treaties of Guarantee and Alliance 1960.
61. In the case of the adoption of the Annan Plan, the intervention rights of the guarantor powers would have been enhanced to include not only the federal state, but also the component states.²⁹ The Republic of Cyprus would have been fully demilitarised, but Greece and Turkey would have maintained military contingents on Cyprus under their direct command without the federal government of Cyprus having any say. Despite the fact that defence policy was a competence of the federal government, there was an inability to exercise it because of the lack of military forces and any kind of co-ordinating staff as the Tripartite Headquarters and the Committee of Ministers provided by the Treaty of Alliance 1960 were to be abolished.
62. One thing that was made perfectly clear during the Annan Plan discussions was that the Turkish Cypriots, in all instances, supported the interests of the Turkish government over the interests of the united Cyprus state that was being created. One could assume that the reason was the pressure that the Turkish Cypriot community was being subjected to by the Turkish military stationed in Cyprus and the hundreds of thousands of Turkish settlers whose future hinged on the future role of

²⁹ Article 1, Annex III: Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Guarantee; the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem ("the Annan Plan"), UN, 31st March 2004, Fifth Edition. <http://www.unficyp.org/>

Turkey in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots supported ceding Cyprus's sovereign rights to Turkey regarding maritime zones, continental shelf, navigation, aviation and coastal security, as well as in the area of ESDP and the availability of Cyprus's territory to support international operations.³⁰

63. With the benefit of hindsight, the results of the 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan are not surprising. The concessions necessary to obtain Turkish acceptance (many of these worked into the plan by the UN arbitrator during the last phases of the process), were sure to doom the plan with the Greek Cypriots
64. The fact that EU accession went forward despite the failure of the Annan Plan, is in my opinion the most important positive development in the history of the Cyprus problem. There is now finally a chance for both Turkish and Greek Cypriots to construct their common homeland under the European political economic and ideological concepts that can guarantee security, democratic prosperity, peace and respect for human rights. One would also believe that Turkish accession would create a positive dynamic for the resolution of the Cyprus dispute. Yet one would be mistaken. Turkey's ability to circumvent rules and requirements in its own accession process, aided and abetted of course by particular members of the EU and the United States of America, has meant that this important chance of fairly and honourably resolving the Cyprus problem is also likely to be lost.

DEMILITARIZATION

65. In this context, it becomes necessary also to address *demilitarization*, an issue that features quite prominently in the current negotiations. Today, all EU countries, including the island of Malta, which is smaller than Cyprus, have their own military forces. Military forces are indispensable for the effective protection of a state from threats against its security. They are a country's main instrument exercising its sovereign rights on land, sea and air, and protect its national interests. In the case that we reach an agreement for the settlement of the Cyprus problem, it is necessary to proceed with the full withdrawal of all foreign military forces stationed on Cyprus's territory. It is essential, however, that the Cypriot state should retain the right to develop its own military forces.
66. The full demilitarisation of Cyprus, in the sense of a ban on Cyprus forces, cannot be justified. The self defence right is an inherent right of any state. It is secured by article 51 of the UN Charter with the purpose of contributing to peace and security. Cyprus's geographical position is of great geopolitical importance. In the case of a crisis, the demilitarisation will easily be violated by other countries. Cyprus is located close to the Middle East, at the most sensitive part of the EU's boundaries where threats could emerge against the security of the EU. Cyprus must be able to contribute to European security, including energy security. Without having military forces, Cyprus will not be able to exercise its sovereign rights and will be unable to fully participate in ESDP. A ban on Cyprus forces would, of course, benefit Turkey. Turkey, because of its location near Cyprus, could easily intervene on, and around Cyprus, without any resistance. Britain too would benefit. Its military bases are not part of the Cypriot state and, therefore, not subject to demilitarisation, would be able to take continued full advantage of the island's geographical position. In my opinion, a demilitarized Cyprus in the long-term will be against the strategic interests of Cyprus,

³⁰ The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem ("the Annan Plan"), UN, 31st March 2004, Fifth Edition.
<http://www.unficyp.org/>

but also the EU and the west, because it will be a source of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

67. Due to its geographical position, and its own resources, Cyprus could contribute to the new European Security Strategy (ESS)³¹ and help Europe face its global challenges such as migration, depletion of energy and natural resources, third-world poverty, disease, regional conflicts, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, state failures and organised crime.
68. Europe shares in the responsibility of ensuring global security. Cyprus can assist the EU in its strategic task to promote a ring of well governed countries to the east of the EU, and on the borders of the Mediterranean.³² Cyprus's geographical position and its infrastructure could support a broad scope of surveillance and other activities in the Middle East. It could provide the EU with a secure base to support operations and control sensitive energy supply routes and take precaution measures to face asymmetric threats such as terrorism, illegal immigration etc.

SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS

69. Based on the analysis of the Cyprus security environment and taking into account the experience of the discussions for the Annan Plan, my security recommendations move along *two axes*.
70. The *first axis* addresses the necessity to secure the independence, autonomy and territorial integrity of the new state. This could be accomplished by suspending the obsolete treaties of Guarantee and Alliance of 1960, and therefore suspending the intervention rights of foreign countries. The withdrawal of foreign military forces from Cyprus as well as the illegal settlers is also an important requirement. No sovereign rights of Cyprus should be ceded to any other country, especially over sea or airspace, as occurred with the Annan Plan. Also, there must be no limitations to the participation of Cyprus in the ESDP, or in the use of its territory for international military operations.
71. My *second axis* refers to the establishment of a new security system capable of protecting the national interests of Cyprus and efficiently facing the conventional or asymmetric threats against its security, and the security of EU. It is paramount that the new state maintains its own military forces, that it is fully integrated in ESDP and that it participates in alliances and organisations of collective security.
72. A small country like Cyprus, being in an area of great geostrategic importance in the vicinity of the Middle East, will be in danger of conventional and asymmetric threats and will not be able to exercise its sovereign rights without having its own military forces. Cyprus's military forces could be organized on a professional basis including Greek- and Turkish Cypriots. Cyprus needs a small but modern and capable army to accomplish the security demands of both the state and the EU. An indicative armed forces organisation of the Republic of Cyprus, upon the solution of the Cyprus issue is shown in Annex A.

³¹ European Security Strategy 8th December 2003, Council of Europe, Brussels., <http://register.consilium.europa.eu>

³² European Security Strategy 8th December 2003, Council of Europe, Brussels., <http://register.consilium.europa.eu>

73. At this point I deem necessary to make a clarification which, in my opinion, is of crucial importance. Namely, that the creation of a successful military organization presupposes that the Greek-and Turkish Cypriots share the same values and national interests. The spirit of *confidence* must be allowed to prevail among the members of the military organization, who should be free from the dependence and influence of foreign nations. However, as things stand at present, Cypriots have not shown an inclination to build such a positive environment in order to build a viable and effective military organization in the context of a common state. Nevertheless, if the two sides are unable to build, and operate, a joint security force protecting the common national interest of the people of Cyprus, it becomes questionable whether the two sides can build a common state.
74. Despite being a full EU Member State, Cyprus has not yet been fully incorporated into the Security System of the EU. This presupposes Cyprus becoming a member of NATO's partnership for peace programme (PfP) and concluding a bilateral security agreement with NATO. Today, Cyprus is the only EU member state that is not a member of NATO or the PfP. For this reason, Cyprus cannot fully participate in ESDP activities and is subject to important restrictions. According to the EU declaration of the council meeting in Copenhagen on December 12, 2002, and the security agreement of information between the EU and NATO (March 2003), Cyprus is not able to take part in EU military operations conducted using NATO assets – operations known as "Berlin Plus". Cyprus is also unable to participate in EU and NATO consultations on security matters. In addition, Cyprus may not receive classified NATO information. As such, Cyprus should seriously examine upon the solution of the Cyprus problem the proposition of applying for NATO membership. The EU regards NATO as the basic pillar for its member collective defence.
75. My recommendations on the security issue are therefore based on three basic arguments. *First*, such recommendations and indeed the right to self-defence are fully consistent with international law. *Second*, such recommendations do not only favour the Greek Cypriot side. On the contrary, the intention is to secure the autonomy and the sovereign rights of Cyprus for the benefit of both communities. *Third*, such recommendations take into account the geopolitical environment of Cyprus and the demand to fully participate in security systems of Western countries. These recommendations support Cyprus's national interests and strengthen the geopolitical importance of the island for the benefit of the interests of both Cyprus and the West. In addition, these recommendations contribute to the strengthening of the new EU Security Strategy that focuses on asymmetric threats and promotes a ring of well-governed countries to the east of the EU and along the Mediterranean rim. A solution to the Cyprus issue, based on a security system which provides for the independence and autonomy of Cyprus will contribute to its long term stability which will be for the benefit of the island, the EU and Western Security in particular.
76. The negotiations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots for the solution of the Cyprus problem are again under way. Based on the public statements, it is clear that the Turkish side insists on retaining the 1960 security system which keeps Cyprus under the guardianship of the guarantor powers. This is not acceptable by the Greek Cypriot side since it violates the independence and the sovereign rights of Cyprus. It is therefore necessary that the Turkish side revises its position with the purpose of reaching a viable solution to secure the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus. We need a security system to support the national interests of Cyprus and

the EU, as well as to contribute to the stability, peace and security of the Eastern Mediterranean region and worldwide.

THE ROLE OF CYPRUS IN REGIONAL SECURITY

77. Cyprus is a small country in an area of great strategic importance involving the international security and energy needs of the western countries. Despite the fact that it is now a member of the EU, Cyprus unfortunately is faced with serious security problems as Turkey continues to occupy the northern part of the island with a large military force. Over the last 35 years, Turkey has systematically imported more than 160,000 settlers in violation of international obligations, such as the Geneva Convention of 1949 and Security Council resolutions, specifically UNSC Resolution 353/1974.
78. The 1960 Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee are no longer compatible with a fair and viable solution to the Cyprus problem. The people of Cyprus do not have confidence in the guarantor powers because they have not fulfilled their obligations under the Treaties. Instead of protecting Cyprus, they have used the treaties as a pretext to secure their own national interests at the expense of the island, and they have proved to be dangerous for the Republic of Cyprus. The 1974 coup and the resulting invasion, occupation and colonisation of the northern part of the island are the result of actions taken by the guarantor powers.
79. Any new settlement of the Cyprus problem should therefore do away with any and all intervention rights of foreign countries, and should ensure the withdrawal of foreign military forces and illegal settlers. The security system, under any new settlement, must preserve the independence of Cyprus by protecting its national interests and securing its sovereignty. This system should provide for effective Cypriot military forces that will be able to participate in EU sponsored security activities. Cyprus should certainly participate in the PfP, and should seriously consider applying for full NATO membership upon the solution of the problem.
80. Cyprus geographical position and its infrastructure could support the implementation of the new European Union Security Strategy (ESS).³³ This support could be enhanced with the contribution of Cyprus's military forces. A fully demilitarized Cyprus will be incapable to perform such tasks. The EU, in the context of its new EES established three strategic objectives in 2003 to defend its security and to promote its values. Namely:
- (1). Active involvement of the EU in tackling new key threats, which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable. These threats include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime.
 - (2). Building security in the regions surrounding the EU by promoting a ring of well governed countries to the east of the EU and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom the EU can enjoy close and cooperate
 - (3). Strengthening of the international order based on effective multilateralism.
81. The adoption of a security system in Cyprus that supports the national interests of Cyprus and provides for Cyprus's inclusion in the EU security system, will contribute to the maintenance of

³³ European Security Strategy 8th December 2003, Council of Europe, Brussels., <http://register.consilium.europa.eu>

peace, stability and security in the area of the Eastern Mediterranean. The implementation of this proposal, however, challenges Turkey's strategic objectives (established in the 1950s) to have military and political control over the whole island. To accomplish its objectives, Turkey wants to secure the continuation of the treaties of Guarantee and Alliance of 1960 that grant intervention rights and permit Turkey to maintain military forces in Cyprus. Turkey wants to be able to continue its colonisation efforts by transferring more Turkish settlers to the island. Being able to effectively control the Turkish Cypriots and induce them to support the national interests of Turkey at the expense of Cyprus is an essential factor in Turkey's ability to achieve its standing objectives. The demilitarisation of Cyprus and the limitations on its sovereignty on the sea and in the air are also essential for Turkey. Greece is most likely to accept the suspension of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance of 1960 while Britain's position is unclear.

82. It is clear that it will be impossible for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to reach a settlement and find a viable solution that would secure the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus if Turkey insists on its strategic objectives. Even if the two communities were to reach an agreement at the negotiations for all other chapters with the exception of security, the whole agreement package would still collapse with negative consequences for the people of Cyprus, and for the stability and security of the region.

CONCLUSION

83. A viable solution must secure a common future for all Cypriots within the EU, without any third party having the right to intervene and affect its future. If we secure these requirements, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots could define common national interests, which constitute the basis for a common security strategy. These interests should include independence, territorial integrity and full sovereignty over land, sea and air. The new state must be able to protect itself and the lives and welfare of its citizens. It must be able to ensure the application of human rights and safeguard basic freedoms, including economic prosperity and stability for its entire people. If we fail to get rid of the third parties, Cyprus will not be able to solve its security problem, nor will it find a viable solution, and thus will remain a divided island and an area of foreign antagonism. This goes against the interests of Cyprus as well as all western countries.
84. The main obstacle to reaching a comprehensive agreement to the security problem of Cyprus is Turkey's strategic interest in controlling the island. To overcome this obstacle, it is necessary to have a more active intervention by both the UN and the EU to ensure that Turkey complies with the fundamental provisions of international law. As things stand at present, the difficulties in reaching an agreement on the security chapter rests on the inability of Cyprus to establish a common security strategy acceptable to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. A common security strategy presupposes the adoption of common national interests and a common perception of the conditions that threaten such interests. Demilitarization of Cyprus only benefits Turkey. It will increase Turkey's regional importance at the expense of Cyprus's strategic space. The demilitarization would neither be in the interest of the EU and western security because the security vacuum on the island would create instability in an already sensitive area of the Eastern Mediterranean. As long as Turkish Cypriots' support the national interests of Turkey at the expense of those of their own country, it is impossible to establish a common Greek and Turkish


Cypriot security for Cyprus, and therefore impossible to reach an agreement on the security chapter and find a viable solution to the Cyprus problem.

85. Turkey is not only a threat to Cyprus security. A neo-Ottoman Turkey with hegemonic and revisionist aspirations is not only a threat to the region but to Western security as well. There have been great efforts lately to present Turkey as a modern democratic state that is, and will continue to be, a force of stability. Turkey's new "zero problem" foreign policy and its carefully crafted image as a regional peace maker seriously misses the real potential of neo-Ottomanism, as it misreads the true nature and legacy of Turkish Ottoman history: -- A history of cultural, religious and ethnic oppression, economic exploitation and a total disregard of those humanitarian concepts and democratic freedoms that form the basis of Western liberal civilization. In fact a closer examination of the "zero problem" and Turkish policy suggests a benign attitude toward neighbouring states provided they bow to Turkish hegemony. Cyprus is a victim of this strategy. For those former Turkish subjects in the region with any remnant of historical memory, boasts of a benign golden age of Ottoman regional hegemony sounds completely absurd.
86. I conclude by stating: that security is a prerequisite to peace, freedom and democracy. The long term stability of the region depends on the application of this principle in equal measure to Cyprus as to all the states of the region.

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ANNEX A

INDICATIVE SECURITY FORCES ORGANIZATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS



* HQ Command Unit, Military Police, Psychological Ops Unit, Intelligence Unit, Military Hospital, Military Training Center.

** Personnel/Administration/Organization, Intelligence, Operations/Training, Plans and Policy, Logistics, Armament, Communication Information Systems CIS.