REPORT

Robert Holland
Professor, University of London

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THE BRITISH, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE ANGLO-CYPRIOT RELATIONSHIP: WHAT WENT WRONG AND CAN IT BE PUT RIGHT?

'For Great Britain' the distinguished diplomatic historian E.H. Carr said in a lecture during 1937 'the Mediterranean problem is, in its final analysis, a problem of the way in, the way through, and the way out. If you consider the steps by which Great Britain became a Mediterranean power, you will find that her policy has always been dominated by this question of entrances and exits'.[i] Carr was writing in the after-blast of the crisis over Abyssinia, in its strategic aspect essentially a Mediterranean crisis. If you read the history of most Mediterranean countries during the 1930s, Abyssinia crops up prominently. Books on Cyprus largely ignore it. The introspectiveness of Cypriot affairs – both of the Cypriots themselves, and the British in Cyprus - is a theme I will come back to.

The ambivalence of Cyprus in British strategic assessments from 1878 onwards lies in the fact that Cyprus is not, in any very precise sense, on the way in, through or out of anywhere in the Mediterranean. It is not an *opening* such as Gibraltar, the Straits of Constantinople, Alexandria/Suez, or indeed Alexandretta, nor does it have the centrally commanding position of Malta. 'Cyprus I should not propose to consider' a senior Admiralty planner sniffily remarked in 1898 when considering where the British Mediterranean Fleet should be based at the outbreak of any war 'as it has no harbours and no strategic value'.[ii] Such dismissiveness on the part of British military planners could be endlessly quoted.

The problem here is that strategic value is such a nebulous concept. It is what anybody wants to make of it at a particular time, and under specific and often wildly changing circumstances. Gibraltar offers a classic instance. Its military significance has entered all kind of lexicons, including the musical. Mozart wrote an Ode to its defenders during the great siege by Spain in the 1780s, and 'safe as the Rock of Gibraltar' has a place in English usage - Ella Fitzgerald used it in a soulful lyric in the 1940s (probably because it had been General Eisenhower's first Headquarters as American and Allied Commander in Europe). Yet there is a

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considerable body of literature from the late eighteenth century stressing Gibraltar's military and naval *defects*, from its lack of water and vulnerability to disease, to the fact that from the moment really big guns were invented – the Armstrongs, Krupps and Creusots of the 1870s – Spain could have made the Rock untenable for the British at any time *if she dared to do so*, which until Franco in the 1950s and 1960s she never did.[iii] When a distinguished soldier was appointed Governor of Gibraltar in 1938 he remarked after his briefings in Whitehall that the place was '...only a garage. I dread to think what the Gibraltarians would say if they knew'.[iv] Many a Governor of Cyprus must have dreaded what Cypriots would think had Whitehall's assessments of its value been published in the Government Gazette in Nicosia. In short, hard and fast, blanket statements of strategic 'truths', complete with large-scale coloured maps, often turn out to be complete bunkum.

Why then *did* the British keep Cyprus between 1878 and 1960? Why did they not throw it up after occupying Alexandria in 1882 on the grounds that Disraeli had been sold a pup by the Sultan, and then palmed it off onto the British electorate? The Cypriot mountains provided a convenient sanitorium for recovering personnel. Still more useful were the Cypriot mules used in successive campaigns thereafter in Egypt, Greece (Salonica, etc.) and Palestine.[v] This may sound like taking coals to Newcastle – after all, Egypt had a few mules of its own – but without the great mule farms around Famagusta the advance of Allenby's army on Jerusalem in 1917 might have been delayed. Mules were indispensable in the logistics of unmotorized fighting. 'No mules, no manoeuvre' one Allied general remarked at Monte Cassino during the Italian campaign in 1944[vi], when thousands of lorries and tanks were snarled up in coastal traffic jams.

Beyond such prosaic matters as commercially-available livestock, however, the basic British motivation in possessing Cyprus was to stop other people having it and to be able to develop the island at some future point should it ever seem beneficial. There were two junctures at which Cyprus seemed to be on the verge of big things for the British – in 1937 and then in 1953/4 – in both cases not so much on its merits, as because of political uncertainties in Egypt – but, then, in the sphere of strategy, everything *is* purely relative and incidental. Both occasions, however, especially 1937, passed by all too quickly. Whether Cypriots *wanted* to be developed by British money, great dockyards and all, as the Maltese had been, is another matter. Henry Frendo says that the Cypriot press in the 1930s reflected a resentment at being left out of such a bonanza, though in saying so perhaps he is reflecting a specifically Maltese discourse.[vii] I will come back to Malta frequently in this paper. Here my point is that pure hypotheticals and negatives about the future do not make a brilliant basis for any relationship. In discussing 'what went wrong?' in Anglo-Cypriot terms this air of being in a vacuum, an absence of clear direction or real purpose, was very important.

The purpose of my presentation – already implied – is to offer an inevitably eclectic pan-Mediterranean perspective. This emerges from the book I am currently writing on the British in the Mediterranean since 1800 – that is, since the seizure of Malta in 1800, since if there is a single compelling image of British power and survival in the Mediterranean it was the British Fleet in Valletta's Grand Harbour. The fascination is to see how different places – including Cyprus –fit into a broad scheme. If there has been one basic question relating to the British in Mediterranean context it was surely this: were they staying, or were they going? Were they just sojourners – or 'merely visitors, like the Americans or the Danes' as the historian and The Times' eminent naval correspondent, W.L. Clowes, put it in the 1890s[viii] – or were they rather in some sense *inhabitants* themselves? Did local populations need to reckon on them as a permanent fact or 'player' in the region, or ultimately would they pack up and disappear? This theme of *packing up* we come

back to, but virtually all of Britain's Mediterranean relationships were tied up with such imponderables, including the Cypriots.

As part of this background, a *Financial Times* columnist – thwarted in a wish this summer to book a journey from Palma to Nice and then on to Beirut - wrote a piece on the disjointed character of Mediterranean travel.[ix] Such an observation is hardly original, but the very longevity of the trait is suggestive. Elizabeth Monroe in her classic 1937 book, *The Mediterranean in Politics*, says how she wanted to travel from Algeria to Egypt taking in Tunisia, and recalls how the local travel agent simply looked at her in amazement.[x] No such ticket could possibly be booked in his office.

This is an anecdotal way of commenting on the un-integrated character of the Mediterranean as a region. Fernand Braudel was careful to write of the Mediterranean *World* precisely because it lacked the coherence of a *region*. A Maltese historian, Dominic Fenech, comments how most countries in the Mediterranean define their interests and involvements in ways that are 'tangential to, or lead away from the Mediterranean, rather than across it'. He concludes:

> ...that the regionality of the Mediterranean is recognized more by external actors with alleged 'vital interests' than by the indigenous states. In itself this follows directly from the last (nineteenth)) century when Mediterranean regionality was largely brought about by the British- Russian-French contest for hegemony'.[xi]

In passing – because it is relevant to this conference's theme – one might say that the same process has operated in regard to the so-called 'Middle East' from the early twentieth century, and especially since *circa* 1945. As an entity, the 'Middle East' is even more of an artificial confection than the Mediterranean, a terminology of choice to make some apparent sense out of post-Ottoman confusion. It is the product of Western – and latterly overwhelmingly Anglo-American and American – strategic imagination, or rather pure invention. As a category, it cannot survive the decline of Western power east of Cyprus likely to occur over the next twenty years. It may well be that an older nomenclature – such as 'Near East' or 'Levant' – might come back into vogue, though they too carry outdated cultural baggage.

Against the background of the fragile regionality of the Mediterranean during an earlier period, insofar as there was a classic Mediterranean institution, *the British Mediterranean Fleet was it*. Nothing else made the region into some kind of operational whole. Admittedly, French shipping out of Marseilles and the Austria-Lloyd line out of Trieste made their contributions, but these were commercial rather than political and strategic. When Kings and Sultans fled, 'trouble-makers' were exiled, or fleeing refugees taken to safety, it was usually in Her Majesty's warships (though some refugees, including Greek-speaking ones, were occasionally left to other devices). The British Fleet to a significant degree created Mediterranean states by acts and omissions. It breathed life into Greece by smashing the Turks at Navarino, as we all know, and, less well known, significantly helped to create Italy by allowing Garibaldi to get to Sicily and then Naples, much to Napoleon III's irritation. The fact, therefore, that the British Mediterranean Fleet had only a subsidiary and erratic relationship with Cyprus means that the island after 1878 remained essentially peripheral, embedded in the exclusive Hellenism of the majority population. There was no counterpart of the linguistic battle between Englishness and *Italianitá* in Maltese society, itself a reflection of an expanding cultural marketplace in that island.

If only because of state origins, the power and strength of British maritime supremacy became axiomatic in Greek and Italian political discourse over a long period; it provided Venizelos with the excuse he needed to

sideline Greek-Cypriot *enosists* in 1919, and again in 1931 after the brief spurt of disorder in the island. Seemingly on the ropes in June 1940, British supremacy at sea was reasserted in September 1943 when the Italian Prime Minister signed the surrender on board a British warship before entering Malta's Grand Harbour. On that seminal Mediterranean occasion, Admiral Cunningham boosted Greek pride by making sure that one of the Royal Hellenic Navy's warships took its place in the receiving line. Yet already by circa 1950 the days of Britain dominating Mediterranean waters had passed, the baton taken up by the American Sixth Fleet –though the latter could never play the regional and political role of its British predecessor.

But if strategic concepts are often nebulous and fleeting in meaning, so are related assertions of *supremacy*, *mastery*, *strength* and so on. What to some appeared the immutability of British power at sea frequently seemed to the British themselves as highly vulnerable. In 1796 the British had abandoned the Mediterranean completely, and although Nelson fought his way back in, the spectre of *abandonment* never really went away. There were sustained periods when an *anti-Mediterranean* sentiment took a firm grip in military planning circles in Whitehall, as in the 1890s, the years immediately prior to 1914 and after 1935; whilst it was with some difficulty that Churchill fended off his military chiefs who wanted to clear out completely again in mid-1940. In these crises Mediterranean commitments were widely seen as a *millstone*, a liability, quite beyond the British capacity to shoulder, and which should be sheared off until such time as victory was secured in other directions.

The British in the Mediterranean, then, were not really the 'masters' that others often took them to be. To what degree, if at all, one might ask, were Cypriots of an earlier generation *aware* of these imponderables? It is sometimes contended that Cypriots before the Second World War had little cognition of the complexity and flux of international-cum-regional affairs, apart, that is, from the fate of Greece itself. Yet it does seem surprising that it should be so, After all, people's futures depended hugely on external events. Let us take the 1930s, when the British were busy deciding which bits of the Mediterranean might be more dispensable than others. The Maltese kept a close watch on the movements of the British Mediterranean Fleet, not only because many livelihoods depended on it, but increasingly because their very security hung in the balance. One Israeli historian notes how Palestinian Zionists deeply interested themselves in British strategic thinking.[xii] The Egyptians did a complete somersault from wanting British soldiers *out* to screeching that there were far too few of them – 'troops and more troops' a senior Egyptian figure demanded of the British Ambassador in Cairo in 1938.[xiii] These people knew that predators were on the prowl, and that however much one might wish to cut loose from the British in the longer term, meanwhile they were 'a hope, a strength and a very present help in trouble'.[xiv]

Nowhere in the Mediterranean was judged more dispensable by London than Cyprus. The Royal Navy had no intention whatsoever of going anywhere near it *in force* after 1938, if only because Italian airfields in the Dodecanese were too close, and it was left to a small garrison incapable of guarding anything seriously, ready to be picked up by whatever enemy could be bothered to make the effort. As it turned out, after June 1940 Hitler encouraged Mussolini to take Cyprus, and sometimes Mussolini encouraged Hitler to do so[xv], on a kind of 'After you, Caesar' basis, but neither did. By then nobody in Cyprus could be unaware of the risks – after all, Nicosia was bombed, though on a scale that to the Maltese would have been considered inconsequential. Yet Cypriot historiography takes little account of this persisting insecurity and fragility, and the limits that they set. Does this represent actual historical consciousness amongst most Cypriots at the time, or simply a gap in latter-day scholarship in recreating their world? It might be speculated that one reason why enosis remained so long purely *aspirational* was because educated, sophisticated contemporaries needed no reminding that in the real world any change in the status of Cyprus was likely

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to mean being passed from one overlord to another, rather than entering some Hellenic apotheosis. As John Darwin has recently emphasized in his widely-read *After Tamerlane: A Global History of Empire*, in the Eurasian world, including its Mediterranean borderlands, empires are the norm, not the exception, in history.

As already implied, comparisons between Malta and Cyprus are particularly telling, if only because they highlight the contrasting milieus of the central and eastern Mediterranean. Of course it is true that there was an *Anglo* element in Maltese life inconceivable in Cyprus. The British commanding presence in Malta went back longer in time (to 1800), and was deeper in nature, above all because of Admiralty docks. The Maltese Prime Minister – the island did have a Prime Minister – at the end of the 1920s was an English nobleman. But there were always plenty of tensions between British authority and civilian Maltese. The Cypriots had their constitution suspended once, in 1931; but the Maltese had their own suspended on multiple occasions (another way of saying that they kept getting it back and losing it again). But after June 1940, and devastatingly after January 1941, the British *and* the Maltese in Malta were bombed and near-starved together. There were more high explosives dropped on Malta than on London or Coventry at the height of their blitzes. This was a bonding experience for all concerned, symbolized by the award of the George Cross by King George VI. It did not mean that the Maltese loved the British or indeed vice versa. It did mean that the British admired the Maltese for their grit and determination under extreme duress, and the Maltese – as a recent evocation of the siege years reiterates – almost universally retained a 'soft spot' for the British despite their many defects.[xvi] Here is the psychological background, for example, to the proposal in the 1950s that Malta should actually become part of the United Kingdom – albeit a suggestion which those acquainted with the history of the Cyprus Tribute will not be surprised to hear was promptly shot down by the British Treasury. Still, the legacy remains. In Valletta one can take an evening meal in the Prince of Wales' Band Club, and have a beer afterwards in the Anglo-Maltese Union, both wholly Maltese institutions.

The point is that there can be no real parallel with Cyprus and the Anglo-Cypriot relationship between 1939 and 1945. In that case there was no mental and emotional convergence under acute external pressure of the Maltese type, whereby the very life of the island seemed to hinge on Spitfires and the heroism of convoys. For this anybody in Cyprus could be thoroughly relieved. The island fortunately fell between the cracks, as it were, of the Second World War, as it had of the First. It did not get fought over, and villages razed, as in Crete, where combined Anglo-Cretan resistance also left residues not wholly unlike the Anglo-Maltese. This is not to discount the wartime services of Greek-Cypriots at many levels, including Cypriot volunteers who got stranded alongside Palestinian Jewish counterparts waiting for the Royal Navy on the beaches of Kalamata in the dismal Greek spring of 1941, or those who served in the Cyprus Regiment. But in essence – as a book on wartime Cyprus soon to be published by Anastasia Yiangou shows – the missing of minds between the British and the Cypriots was partially checked after 1939, but was not reversed.[xvii] After 1945 things could pick up where they had left off, only *more* intensively, because the war had triangulated a new phase of struggle between Left, Right and the British following the emergence of AKEL. This triangular contest was taken a stage further during the Constitutional Convention of 1947-8, presided over by Sir Edward Jackson, another British official whose career, like that of Sir Harry Luke, combined both Maltese and Cypriot experience at crucial periods (Jackson was Lieutenant-Governor of Malta in the war, before becoming Chief Justice of Cyprus in 1943).

One thing that went wrong in the Anglo-Cypriot relationship with severe consequences concerned relations between colonial administration and the Church. Again, Cyprus and Malta provide instructive

counter-points, and although this is tangential to our main geo-political themes, the aspect is worth briefly dwelling on. Maltese Roman Catholicism was just as protective of its own rights and status as Cypriot Orthodoxy. It is scarcely credible that a Cypriot Archbishop could be Scottish-born, as was Caruana, Bishop of Malta for much of the first half of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, if you had asked officials in the Mediterranean Department of the Colonial Office *circa* 1938 which Church they worried about most, the Maltese or the Cypriot, they would probably have said the Maltese. But when it came to the crunch colonial officialdom and Catholic clergy in Malta knew that their interests hung together. Maltese Bishops and ordinary clergy were indispensable during the wartime emergency; in Cyprus, by contrast, the Church adopted a more enigmatic stance. After 1945 the secular (that is, British) and religious authorities in Malta were united in a *shared* suspicion of the Left; in Cyprus, in pitting themselves against the island's own Left, the Right and the Church *also* went on an offensive against the British. It is only by comparing the dynamics of different situations that the scale of the risks duly run can be fully appreciated.

The running of high risks and associated miscalculations was something of a phenomenon in the post-war world, and especially of the early 1950s. That world was changing so fast and so fundamentally that it seemed great opportunities were there to be grasped. This was particularly so in the case of those who saw the much-harassed British as their opponents, from, say, Nasser and Neguib in Egypt, to Mosadeqq in Iran. But there were at least two imponderable in such risk-taking: first, that if in earlier decades the British might be weaker than they appeared, in the 1950s they might be stronger than surface indications at first suggested; secondly, the consequences of trying to exploit their vulnerability might be booby-trapped with unanticipated effects.

Here the Mediterranean parallel with Cyprus coming to mind is not Malta, but Gibraltar. Cyprus and Gibraltar certainly had one thing in common; there was a genuine irredentist impulse drawn to a near-by Motherland (very near-by in the case of Gibraltar – Spain was a short stroll from Government House). Malta, by contrast, was never really *terra irredenta* – you could count the Maltese who wanted to become part of Italy *politically* almost on the fingers of two hands. Not since the 1780s had any Spanish government tried to activate its claim to Gibraltar. There was far more interest in acquiring bits of Morocco with British help, than in regaining the Rock and inviting British retribution. After 1954 Franco began to reverse this policy, eventually culminating in the border closure – a new 'siege' – in 1969. The result, however, was that the Gibraltarians simply gave up their residual Spanishness – most, after all, were first and foremost Spanish-speakers – and became fervently 'British'; indeed, more British than the British wanted them to be.[xviii] This remains the case today – indeed, yesterday, September 10, was National Day in Gibraltar, and Main Street there was awash with Union Jacks and Gibraltar flags. From 1704 to circa 1954 Gibraltar and its Spanish hinterland existed in symbiosis and Gibraltar *was* Spanish to a significant degree, so that Spanish-medium newspapers outsold *The Gibraltar Chronicle*. Franco's actions changed this irreversibly for the worse *from the Spanish point of view,* so that today *The Gibraltar Chronicle* – the oldest English newspaper in the world – has no Spanish competitor.

The echo of Cypriot events in this are probably not hard to detect. The architects of EOKA's campaign after 1952/3, like Franco at more or less the same moment, thought that the critical moment for their irredentist ambition was approaching. If Franco just had to gradually pressurize the frontier, all that 'real' (not just *aspirational)* protagonists of Enosis had to do in Cyprus was make a bit of 'noise' in the form of blowing up radio stations and, if that did not work, the odd police station. So the thing unfolded. Had the British been the main obstacle, Cyprus would have ended up in Greece, just as Gibraltar would almost certainly have ended up in Spain. However, this was not the case, and EOKA's actions helped to mobilize a

hitherto wavering Turkish-Cypriot consciousness, just as Franco gave birth to a real Gibraltarian identity. This is not to say that anybody was stupid, and as such to be reviled for the errors and consequences of their ways. It is merely to see that the world of the 1950s was full of pitfalls and traps that we can see easily enough looking back, but which contemporaries were apt to blunder into regardless.

The British, of course, made their own errors and misjudgements, and for much the same reasons – the confusions and flux of the times. Again, in the context of this conference, the difficulties of properly assessing post-1945 geo-strategic circumstances as through a glass darkly should be underlined. As Dominic Fenech notes, the defeat of Germany by 1944-45 at first seemed to restate the conditions of an essentially nineteenth century Anglo-Russian cross-Mediterranean contest, with the French in a supplementary role – conditions which included a patronage of Greece, a British guarantee of Turkey and international oversight of the Straits.[xix] Had such familiar outlines taken shape, then – with Alexandria, Haifa and other possibilities falling by the wayside – Cyprus might at last have become central to a revamped British Mediterranean commitment, and for entirely *non-NATO* reasons. There were large hints of this in the establishment of British Land Force Headquarters in Cyprus after 1953. But already a very different regional order was gestating, in which previous Mediterranean rivalries were overtaken and reformulated in the age of superpowers. Part of the tragic element in Cypriot events of the 1950s, and their legacy, including their impact on Anglo-Cypriot relations, was the bankruptcy and hollowness of the strategic argumentation attached to it in British planning, both diplomatic and strategic.

A shifting variable here was the premium attached respectively to Greece and Turkey in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This relativity mattered a good deal in Cypriot affairs, the decision by Cypriot supporters of Enosis to launch a militant campaign, after all, hinged on maximizing Greece's leverage over Britain, and largely ignoring any potential counter-leverage by Turkey. One can see how such an assumption emerged. True, the British had given a qualified guarantee to Greece in the spring of 1939 only as a necessary supplement to giving one to Turkey. The British at that point had no intention whatsoever of fighting in Greece as they had after 1916. But in the event, they did after Greece's 'Oxi' to Mussolini overlapped so powerfully with the aftermath of Britain's own spirit of the Blitz during 1940.[xx] By contrast, Turkey was very much in the wartime dog-house for its refusal to join the Allied side until very late in the day, and then for wholly self-protective reasons.

Furthermore, in the immediate post-war period Greece in Western perspective seemed considerably more deserving than Turkey, and also more urgently in need of 'saving', being duly accorded pride of place in the formation of the Truman Doctrine. Meanwhile Turkey had to work its passage back into favour, deeply anxious about the apparent Russian determination to secure their historic, essentially Tsarist, goal of preponderance at the Straits. No wonder the Turks played the tame pet when the Dodecanese were given to the Greeks in 1947/8. By extension, Turkey seemed wholly unengaged as to the future of Cyprus. Ankara had bigger things to worry about. As Evanthis Hatzivassilou has shown, Greece's entry into NATO during 1952 provided the cast iron guarantee it had always wanted, especially with regard to its crucial northern border.[xxi] Against this background, viewed from Athens or Nicosia, the old Venizelist principle that Greece could not afford to lift a finger over Cyprus easily appeared outdated and dispensable.

But in fact the international-cum-regional hierarchy in Greco-Turkish terms, so far as Western proclivities went, was *reverting* to pre-war norms after 1950/1. There were several reasons. Egypt was slipping from the British grip, and urgent means were required to keep Syria and Iraq on-side. The Turks offered to do the job.[xxii] The Americans wanted Turkey in NATO to use their army in Korea. The reality was that, in the

same vein as Britain's panicky Balkan diplomacy in 1939, Washington opened the NATO door to Greece in 1952 only because it was part of the logic of securing Turkey. Otherwise it would have remained shut. The British were reluctant about the whole exercise, but had to swallow the pill. After 1954/5 Western security frameworks in the 'Middle East' – the Northern Tier, CENTO and all that – were really dressed-up versions of Turkish defence schemes they had been pressing on London and Washington for some years.[xxiii] In short, the push by radical supporters of Cypriot Enosis, based on reaping the rewards of Greece's enlarged freedom of diplomatic manoeuvre, expressed not least in the United Nations, was riddled with extreme uncertainty. Recent history appeared to make the risks worth taking. Unfortunately, in making geo-political choices, as in buying shares, recent history is usually the worst possible guide to go by.

The essence of this presentation has been to suggest that looking at Cypriot circumstances in broader settings can help to expand our understanding. One barrier here is that, precisely because of the disjointedness inherent in Mediterranean regionality, attempts at comparisons between societies and polities are rare, and when made can grate on people. I recall attending a conference in Heraklion and making a contribution attempting to link enosis struggles in Crete and Cyprus. A formidable Cretan lady got up when I had finished and proceeded to give me a good going-over. She saw no reason why on earth Cretans should have to put up with being compared to those Cypriots, and least of all by an Englishman. One had to sympathize. But tracing parallels and analogies across the narrow, elongated but ever-fascinating stretch of water known as the Mediterranean remains full of intriguing possibilities, even if at the end of the day its western, central and eastern portions do belong to very different worlds.

Finally, my agenda was meant to include, regarding Anglo-Cypriot relations, 'how can it be put right?' Certainly that relationship was badly deformed by the process of decolonization in ways that it has not been the purpose of this paper to go over yet again. One anecdote helps to convey the psychological legacy on the Greek-Cypriot side. In the 1950s and 1960s, when it came to arranging Independence Day ceremonies, the British supplied a *chef de protocol* whose speciality was setting up such happy occasions. His services were usually accepted. The Greek-Cypriots in the immediate lead-up to August 16, 1960 would have nothing to do with him.[xxiv] Still, some degree of alienation in *Mediterranean* 'ends of empire' were in fact the norm rather than otherwise. The most mutually bitter in the British 'realm' was in Egypt. If the profound sourness in Anglo-Cypriot terms was political and diplomatic, in Malta it was social and economic, precisely because of the degree of material dependence involved. Indeed, no post-colonial Cypriot leader has been so *specifically* anti-British as the ex-Rhodes Scholar, Dom Mintoff, in Malta (though maybe Papadopoulos runs him close). Even the Anglo-Gibraltarian connection emits keen tensions, the British feeling that the Gibraltarians care little about damaging the United Kingdom's relations with Spain as an important EU partner, and the Gibraltarians that the British Foreign Office would leave them at Spanish mercy if ever given half a chance. Both suspicions have some justification. What would be best for Anglo-Cypriot relations today is what would be best for all these other complex interactions: transparency, trust, clarity, consistency and recognition of mutual interest. If those who govern us, however, were habitually impregnated with all these priorities and qualities, human history would not be the conflict-strewn phenomenon it is.

[i] E.H. Carr, *Great Britain as a Mediterranean Power* (1937), 1.

[ii] 'Strategic Position of the Mediterranean Fleet in time of War' Minute 5 April 1898 ADM 121/75, National Archives of the United Kingdom

[iii] Lawrence Pratt, *East of Malta, West of Suez; Britain's Mediterranean Crisis, 1936-39* (1975), 41.

[iv] Roderick Macleod (Ed.), *The Ironside Diariesm 1937-9* (1962), 17.

[v] For some early aspects of these uses see Maria Panayiotou, 'The Strategic Origins of Cyprus and its role during the Arabi Revolt and the resulting Egyptian campaign, 1876-01882', M. Phil Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2006.

[vi] Douglas Porch, *Hitler's Mediterranean Gamble: The North African Campaign in World War II* (2004), 443.

[vii] Henry Frendo, 'Britain's European Mediterranean: Language, Religion and Politics in Lord Strickland's Malta, 1927-1930', *History of European Ideas*, Vol., 21, 1, 1995, 48.

[viii] Arthur J. Marder, *British Naval Policy, 1880-1905. The Anatomy of British Seapower* (1941), 211.

[ix] Tyler Brulé, 'My Summertime Flight of Fancy', 20 June 2009, *Financial Times,*

[x] Elizabeth Monroe, *The Mediterranean in Politics* (1938), 161.

[xi] Dominic Fenech, 'Mediterranean Regionality' in Victor Mallia-Milanes (ed.), *Malta: a case-study in international cross-currents* (1991), 267-277.

[xii] Michael Cohen, 'British Strategy and the Palestine Question, 1936-9', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 7, 3, 1972, p. 170.

[xiii] Trefor Evans (ed.), *The Killearn Diaries, 1934-1946* (1972), 109.

[xiv] Monroe, *op.cit.,* 22.

[xv] Porch, *op.cit* 616.

[xvi] See Lawrence Mizzi, *The People's War. Malta, 1940-43 (2007).*

[xvii] Anastasia Yiangou, *Cyprus and the Second World War: The Rei=invention of Politics, 1939-35* (forthcoming, I.B. Tauris).

[xviii] For an excellent summary see Martin Blinkhorn, 'A Question of Identity: how the people of Gibraltar became Gibraltarians' in David Killingray and David Taylor, *The United Kingdom Overseas Territories* (2005).

[xix] Dominic Fenech, *The Mediterranean Region during the Cold War and after* in John Hattendorf (ed.,), *Naval Policy and Strategy in the Mediterranean. Past, Present and Future* (200), 223.

[xx] Robert Holland, 'Patterns of Anglo-Hellenism: a 'colonial' connection?' in Robert Holland and Sarah Stockwell (eds.), *Ambiguities of Empire* (2009), 77.

[xxi] Evanthis Hatzivassilou, *Greece and the Cold War. Frontline State, 1952-1967* (2006), 24-36.

[xxii] Mustafa Bilgin, *Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics and Influence in the early Cold War Era* (2008).

[xxiii] *Ibid.*

[xxiv] See David Cannadine, 'Independence Day Ceremonials in Historical Perspective' in Robert Holland, Susan Williams and Terry Barringer (eds.), *The Iconography of Independence: 'Freedoms at Midnight'* (2009).

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